Relocating Refu

Martin Barber and

This is an edited version of the Barber-Br... the UNHCR Regarding the Protection of... Durable Solutions". Martin Barber is Dir... Brownstone is a professor of Political Scie... of the Canadian Council for International... Canada.

Introduction

There is continued widespread concern about plans to relocate the nearly 20,000 Salvadorean and Guatemalan refugees from their present camps to new sites in the interior of Honduras. In addition, there is concern regarding the access of new arrivals to reception centres in the border area and regarding the security situation within the camps.

It is important to note a number of significant factors.

1. The attitude of the Honduran Government to the different groups of refugees is quite distinct. The 13,500 Misquito refugees from Nicaragua are being allowed to settle on agricultural land in the Mosquitia area of Honduras. The 2,000 Ladino refugees from Nicaragua are living in two Honduran villages near Danli; although they have freedom of movement they are not at present allowed to take paid employment within the Honduran economy. The 18,000 Salvadoreans and 550 Guatemalans are restricted to camp sites under Honduran military control.

2. The total of 34,500 refugees from three countries now living in Honduras represents only a very small part of the vast number of people who have been uprooted as a result of the continuing conflict in Central America. We believe that the UNHCR, through the UN Secretary-General, should now make available his good offices to the governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua to assist them in alleviating the desperate plight of displaced persons within these countries. Estimates of the numbers of such people vary, but figures of over one million in Guatemala alone and of 450,000 persons in El Salvador have been reported to us by reliable sources.

3. The key to much of the debate over the situation of the refugees in Honduras is the clear definition of ap-

propriate durable solutions and of when and how such solutions can be promoted and implemented.

4. We do not try to offer ready-made solutions to a complex and difficult problem. We do believe, however, that our analysis of the issues involved can be of help to those who must make decisions.

Position of the Government of Honduras

1. At the most general level, the Government of Honduras will continue its humanitarian policy of accommodating refugees now in Honduras and of admitting additional refugees. A continued flow was anticipated. The Government of Honduras was not prepared to sign the Geneva Convention but the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was considering the question.

2. The Government of Honduras has taken a firm decision with respect to relocation on grounds of national security. One part of this decision is not to relocate either the refugees in Mesa Grande or the Nicaraguan refugees. The other part is to relocate the refugees in the El Tesoro, San Antonio and Colomoncagua camps. Reference was made to the proximity of Colomoncagua to the border and security problems related to guerrilla activity. The Commission for Refugees has informed the refugees of Colomoncagua of its firm intention to proceed with relocation. The timing of relocation remains uncertain. The government regards relocation as a "necessity" but not a matter of "urgency". Furthermore, there is no decision on the matter of relocation sites. These are now being sought through the joint work of the armed forces and the National Institute of Agriculture (a technical institute which has responsibility for administering the Honduran Agrarian Reform Law).

3. The Salvadorean and Guatemalan

refugee situation is seen as temporary. Given this and given the government's responsibility to the Honduran peasantry seeking land under the Agrarian Reform Law, the Minister stated that it would not be possible to consider allocating more extensive land resources for the Salvadorean and Guatemalan refugees in a relocation context. He was open, however, to extension of workshop activities as part of the refugees' economic base.

4. Colomoncagua would be retained as a reception centre in which refugees would be received initially and relocated to an interior camp following a brief stay.

5. General satisfaction was expressed regarding the work of UNHCR and the various service agencies. While the refugee program did not constitute a significant fiscal or programme burden on the government, reference was made to costs associated with immigration and military functions.

Position of the UNHCR

1. The UNHCR believes that all the Salvadorean and Guatemalan refugees in Honduras should be relocated to a new site(s) in the interior of the country, since UNHCR is unable to guarantee their security in the places where they are now living. This policy applies to the refugees in Mesa Grande, even though that camp is substantially further inland than the other camps and even though the refugees there have already been relocated from camps and villages at La Virtud and Guarita.

2. The UNCHR also intends to ensure that the refugees can achieve full food self-sufficiency, with increased freedom of movement and access to markets, and lead a more normal and dignified life than in the present camps. Efforts are currently being concentrated on ob-

Refugees In Honduras

Meyer Brownstone

Brownstone "Report and Recommendations to Refugees in Honduras and the Promotion of Work of the British Refugee Council. Meyer is at the University of Toronto, a member of the Canadian Council on International Cooperation, and Chairperson of Oxfam"

maintaining enough land in Yoro Province for 19,000 refugees.

3. On grounds of the UNHCR's fear of security problems, priority would be given to moving the refugees in Colomoncagua, San Antonio, and El Tesoro. Representatives of the refugees would be invited to view the sites selected, and the refugees would be moved in groups of 1,000 to 2,000. Relocating the first 9,000 refugees would therefore take several months from the start of the move, and it is not expected that anyone could be moved before the end of 1983. Movement of the refugees in Mesa Grande would follow a pragmatic evaluation of the relocation of the first three camps. The UNHCR would continue the presence of international Protection Officers in Honduras so long as the refugees remained in the country. In addition, the UNHCR would insist on maintaining the present reception centres at La Virtud and Guarita for new arrivals and at Colomoncagua and San Antonio once the present refugees had been relocated.

4. In spite of the opposition to the move expressed by the refugees, the UNHCR believes that a substantial majority of the refugees will move when presented with a specific proposal. Some refugees might opt to return to El Salvador or Guatemala. Those who agreed to be relocated would be clearly indicating that they were genuine refugees and not in any way involved in the continuing conflict within their own country.

5. The UNHCR representative does not believe that this proposal can be classified as a "durable solution". It is conceived of as somewhere between temporary camp life and permanent settlement. The land would be owned by a Honduran voluntary agency, and, once the Salvadorean and Guatemalan refugees had returned home, it would be made available to Honduran peasants.

The Position of the Refugees The Guatemalan Refugees

1. Conditions in Guatemala make it impossible for them to consider returning home at this time. In particular, persecution of their section of the Catholic Church in the area of Guatemala from which they come continues to be brutal.

2. All refugees in El Tesoro wish to be resettled to a third country. Eleven refugees have already gone to Bolivia, and it was understood that family members of those eleven may be resettled there soon.

3. The refugees do not wish to be relocated within Honduras, since they do not expect security to be better than it is now in El Tesoro, and they would not wish to take land which might otherwise be available to Honduran peasants.

The Salvadorean Refugees

1. The refugees in Mesa Grande complained forcefully about the false promises made by the UNHCR to persuade them to move from La Virtud and Guarita to Mesa Grande in 1981-82. They claim that the UNHCR promised fertile land to work, more freedom of movement, better security, sufficient water and that the refugees would not be moved from Mesa Grande until they were able to return home to El Salvador, unless the situation demanded that they be resettled in a third country. The premises were all false, since the site was "like a desert" when they arrived, and they have suffered continuous harassment there by the Honduran military forces. Now, the UNHCR informs them that they must be relocated further into Honduras, bringing up "the same false promises about land and better security".

2. The refugees in both camps expressed their strong opposition to relocation

for the following reasons:

- They do not believe their security can be guaranteed anywhere in Honduras. They think there will be worse security problems in the interior of the country. The refugees in Colomoncagua pointed out that there have been many fewer security problems in their camps than in Mesa Grande even though they are much closer to the border.

- They would prefer to return to die in their own country rather than be relocated. If forced to relocate, they would ask for voluntary repatriation "under an international flag".

- The refugees point out that Yoro (the relocation site) is close to the training base at Puerto Castillo on the Atlantic coast of Honduras, and they note that Salvadorean troops are to be trained there.

- They do not believe that anybody is in a position to fulfil the promises of greater freedom of movement, security, and access to markets which have been made by the UNHCR.

- They feel protection will be more difficult if they are dispersed into agricultural communities than if they remain in the present large camps. They are concerned as to whether the UNHCR would be able to assure their protection over many years, once their assistance needs lessen.

- They fear that relocation will bring them into conflict with Honduran peasants. They note that government statements already label the refugees as "subversives" and feel sure that they would be treated as such if settled in rural communities. They noted the traditional hostility of Hondurans towards Salvadoreans in Olancho Province and the past history of conflict between landowners and peasants in Yoro.

- They are unwilling to throw away the huge investment of work and money

Camp Benito Juárez, Chiapas, Mexico

which has gone into building up the present camps. They claim they would not be willing to work on creating the infrastructure in a new location.

3. In response to the UNHCR's suggestion that representatives of the refugees visit the proposed new sites, the refugee leaders said that even to do that would be to compromise their position.

4. Refugees in both Mesa Grande and Colomocagua expressed their satisfaction with the material conditions of life in the camps and their gratitude to the UNHCR and the agencies for their assistance.

5. In concluding their written petition, the refugees in Mesa Grande state, "For these reasons we say once and for all 'No!' to relocation, and if they want to relocate us by force, it would be better to let us return to die in our places of origin in El Salvador".

Position of the Agencies

We learned that agency workers have played a comprehensive support role in the camps. Although individuals involved have a primary technical responsibility with respect to functions such as health, education, infrastructure, workshops, and others, in reality their total role includes: (a) direct technical activity, (b) training of refugees in technical roles, (c) assistance in forming refugee organizations and camp structures, (d) supplementary protection, (e) maintaining a communications channel, (f) personal counselling and support. All of this results from the direct contact

which agency workers have with refugees and, in Mesa Grande and El Tesoro, the fact that they live in the camps and share many aspects of daily life there. As a result, the agency workers see themselves as basically "with the people", supporting them. listening to them and responding to them. This is, in their view, the relationship they want and must have as supportive individuals. That is, they must respect the refugees' decisions; they must voice the desires of the refugees and they must be channels of communication to the UNHCR and to their own agencies on behalf of the refugees.

Agency workers may not necessarily reflect the official positions of the agencies themselves.

1. They reject both the security argument and the possibility for any improvement in human rights or socioeconomic conditions of refugees relocated elsewhere in Honduras. Their explanation for the relocation policy tended to stress political-military purposes on a national and regional scale.

2. They oppose the specific position of the UNHCR on relocation and feel the way in which it has been presented by the UNHCR has worked against a constructive dialogue between the UNHCR and the refugees.

3. Attempts to relocate are expected to produce tragic results in terms of virtually forced repatriation at great personal danger, serious loss of morale, physical and psychological damage,

and loss of the impressive progress which has been made in building up infrastructure and services in the camps. (Since many agency workers were personally involved in the relocation from La Virtud and Guarita to Mesa Grande, they reflected the same difficult experiences that the refugees had.) They shared the refugees' justifiable satisfaction with what had been achieved in existing camps.

4. Agency workers as individuals and groups say they would stand with the refugees in opposition to relocation and would not abandon them.

Analysis

Our basic approach is predicated first and foremost on our responsibility to the refugees and our identification with their tragic situation, which means supporting them, listening to them and respecting their decisions. It is predicated also on the experience and understanding of the groups and individuals working supportively with the refugees. At the same time it is essential to understand the national and regional context in which they find themselves as defined by the Government of Honduras (and in observations made to us by Honduran citizens involved in human rights and other aspects of Honduran life), and by the relationship between the Government of Honduras and the UNHCR, and by the policies and programmes of the UNHCR in the region.

1. The refugee and agency workers do not find either the UNHCR or the Honduran Government relocation policies acceptable, with the important exception of the government's decision to retain the Mesa Grande camp.

- As refugee camps, and accepting the obvious constraints, the present locations and internal conditions are not a question at issue. Indeed, any objective analysis would find a remarkable adjustment in terms of material daily life and of a healthy community situation. The people and support workers have worked very hard under difficult conditions to produce impressive results which they identify as their achievements and which they resist abandoning. Furthermore, there has been little evidence of security problems in either Mesa Grande or Colomocagua for some time, although a serious incident did occur in El Tesoro recently. It is therefore difficult for us to anticipate a significant improvement in an already

reasonably secure situation.

- The refugees all define their stay in Honduras as temporary, and this brings into question the UNHCR arguments favouring relocation which are based on considerations of expanding the refugees' land base, access to markets, and freedom of movement. None of these are being demanded by the refugees who are quite prepared to stay in present camps under present conditions at Mesa Grande and Colomoncagua. Quite literally, refugees are not requesting "freedom" in Honduras.

- The Mesa Grande refugees and agency workers have vivid and painful memories of the relocation from La Virtud and Guarita and neighbouring villages, and they have received little assurance that another relocation will not be a repeat performance. The refugees at Colomoncagua are fully aware of the La Virtud relocation.

2. The refugees, when we raised the possibility of their being confronted with relocation, stated their preferred options; that is, resettlement to a third country or repatriation. Unfortunately, both options appear to us to be highly doubtful, in terms of the availability of a suitable third country on the one hand, and the enormous risks in repatriation on the other. In the latter case, under present circumstances the refugees would not have UNHCR protection available.

3. In relation to the institutions on which the refugees are primarily dependent, that is, the Government of Honduras and the UNHCR, two main comments emerged which affect their response to relocation:

- There is a profound lack of confidence in the UNHCR promises surrounding relocation.

- There is virtual certainty that, despite being received by Honduras, the Honduran Government and military regard them with a high degree of suspicion in terms of their political character, compounded by the historical tension between the two countries.

Under such circumstances the best option for the refugees would appear to be the status quo, and we feel that this is the best basis for continued discussions involving the refugees, the UNHCR and the Government of Honduras.

4. We have found it difficult to understand the logic of the UNHCR's position in some regards. If the UNHCR believes

that there are serious security risks for the refugees in their present camps, then we would expect them to be taking urgent measures to move them to safer sites. (We noted that no such sense of urgency was expressed either by the Honduran Government or by the refugees themselves.) However, the conditions which the UNHCR are imposing on the relocation plans (essentially enough land to allow self-sufficiency in food) would seem to militate against any likelihood of a speedy relocation. Our discussions with the Government of Honduras led us to believe that the government was unlikely to accede to these conditions.

Recommendations

1. The UNHCR should accept the policy of the Honduran Government to retain the present camp at Mesa Grande. If the site should become overcrowded, then new arrivals might be placed in a new camp.

2. The UNHCR should not pursue the

idea of relocating the refugees in Yoro or Olancho, or any other province in sites which would lead to self-sufficiency in food and access to Honduran markets, since we believe this to be an unrealistic objective in the circumstances which exist in Honduras.

3. If and when the Honduran Government nominates a site(s) for the relocation from Colomoncagua, San Antonio and El Tesoro, the UNHCR should examine the proposal in the light of the views of the refugees and should consult directly with the refugees and agency workers in the three camps.

4. The UNHCR should use its good offices to help in relieving the appalling plight of displaced persons in Central America, particularly in El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua. In addition, the UNHCR should seek to develop ways of monitoring the situation of refugees who have returned voluntarily to El Salvador and of obtaining all possible guarantees for their security.

Number and Nationality of Refugees Under UNHCR Assistance in Honduras

NATIONALITY	CAMP	TOTAL
Guatemalans	El Tesoro	567
Nicaraguan (Miskitos)	Rio Warunta	3,235
	Rio Mocoron	5,683
	Rio Patuca	3,770
	Cocobila	230
	Tapamlaya	247
	Prunmitara	186
		13,351
Nicaraguan (Ladinos)	Jacaleapa	1,008
	Teupasenti	990
		1,998
Salvadoreans	Mesa Grande	10,238
	Colomoncagua/San Antonio	8,154
		18,392
TOTAL ASSISTED		34,308

Source: UNHCR

Tegucigalpa, D.C.
August 25, 1983

Recommendations for Changes in Canada's Refugee Status Determination Procedures*

Introduction

In his address to the National Symposium on Refugee Determination, Toronto, February 20, 1982, the former Minister of Employment and Immigration, Lloyd Axworthy, underlined that the development of a humane, fair and workable system for determining refugee status is an evolutionary process, moving "from practices which met our former needs to those that will respond to our needs today and in the future." The Concerned Delegation has been an active participant in that evolutionary process. On March 13, 1979, a brief on "Recommended Changes in Canada's Refugee Status Determination Procedure" was presented to the Honourable Bud Cullen. In that brief, recommendations were made to support four key principles.

"The refugee claimant should:

- have the right to appear in person and present his case before the people who make the decision;
- know the reasons for the decision in his case;
- be assisted to obtain competent legal counsel;
- have the right to know and to respond to information which can be used against him."

On May 9, 1980, a second brief, "The Refugee Determination Process", was presented to the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy.

Several changes have been effected during this period which have the potential to improve our refugee determination procedure:

- The issuance of new guidelines with respect to the application of the refugee definition and assessment of credibility;
- the separation of the Refugee Status Advisory Committee from the Immigration Commission;
- the appointment of additional independent members to the Refugee Status Advisory Committee;
- the initiation of an oral hearing "pilot project."

A key issue is the need for an oral hearing — a need that was overwhelmingly supported in the Report of the Task

Force on Immigration Practices and Procedures on the Refugee Status Determination Process, November 1981, by participants at the National Symposium on Refugee Determination, February 20, 1982, by the Canadian Bar Association, and by the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence in its Eleventh Report on "Canada's Relations with Latin America and the Caribbean." It is time to act concretely to implement this widely supported principle.

Recommended Refugee Determination Procedure

It is felt that the recommended refugee determination procedure would ensure fairness to the claimants as well as protect the integrity of the process. Claimants with strong cases would be accepted quickly and without the necessity of convening a full oral hearing. Claimants who may be refugees would be ensured an oral hearing and would be entitled to work to support themselves while waiting for the hearing and final determination. Claimants abusing the system would be screened out without a hearing but would be guaranteed the right to fully contest the initial recommendation. As the work authorizations are dependent on a recommendation to accept or to refer to an oral hearing, non-bona-fide claimants would be discouraged from applying as the present material benefits associated with making the claim would be removed.

The proposed scheme would streamline the refugee determination process. The present cumbersome process of automatically preparing the transcript would be discontinued and transcripts would be necessary in only a small percentage of cases. The costs involved in providing an oral hearing to every claimant are high and the procedure may well be unnecessary. Initial interviews conducted by staff officers will be a less costly and more efficient mode of screening cases. Clearly well-founded cases need not go to a hearing. Manifestly unfounded cases — providing the qualifying guidelines be strictly controlled — need not be

granted a hearing and yet these claimants would be given a full opportunity to reply in writing to initial assessment of their claim. Thus, the Refugee Review Board can concentrate its efforts on those cases most requiring its expertise.

As well, the cumbersome procedure associated with the present redetermination application through the Immigration Appeal Board will be abolished and this will free the Immigration Appeal Board to deal more efficiently with appeals to it from other areas of jurisdiction.

Recommended Transitional Procedure

The most difficult impediment to an efficient transitional refugee determination process is the legislative requirement that transcripts be prepared for all refugee claimants. We feel, however, if legislative change will take some time and a transitional procedure is required, the following recommended scheme parallels the ideal process outlined above as closely as is possible within present legal confines.

It is recommended that the Refugee Status Advisory Committee be established as a full board with offices in the major centres. This can be done within the context of the present provisions of the Immigration Act. Staff officers of the Refugee Status Advisory Committee in various centres can be delegated by the Minister as Senior Immigration Officers for the purpose of conducting the examination-under-oath. These officers will play essentially the same role as contemplated for the staff officer of the Refugee Review Board under the ideal system. No more than 60 days should elapse before an examination-under-oath is held. While an examination-under-oath must be held, there is no prohibition to prevent the staff officer, acting as an SIO from examining the claimant in any way he/she wishes.

Therefore declarations or outlines of the claimant's case could still be presented, documentary evidence provided and the person examined by the senior staff officer. The Federal Court of Appeal has

made it clear that documents such as affidavits from witnesses would not form part of the transcript for the purposes of the application for redetermination to the Immigration Appeal Board. However, there is no bar to their use in the examination-under-oath *per se*.

The staff officer conducting the interview would then make a recommendation to the Refugee Status Advisory Committee within 30 days of the interview.

The staff officer would again make one of three recommendations to the Refugee Status Advisory Committee:

- that the claim be accepted outright without need for an oral hearing;
- that the case proceed to an oral hearing before the Refugee Status Advisory Committee;
- that the claim be rejected without an oral hearing on the grounds that it is manifestly unfounded.

Refugee Definition and Assessment of Credibility Guidelines

It is recommended that the guidelines be incorporated into the Immigration Regulations. The guidelines if left as such cannot offer the protection intended to a claimant.

If the guidelines are incorporated into the Regulations as recommended, this will ensure that the Refugee Status Advisory Committee can apply them without the danger that presently exists of reaching decisions which do not correspond with present judicial interpretation and without the danger of having their decisions overturned on review as being an incorrect application of the law.

Unless future court decisions reinterpret the law in a manner consistent with the guidelines, the guidelines will have no legal force and effect. Incorporating the guidelines into the Immigration Regulations would avoid this problem without the necessity of relying on courts to perhaps reinterpret the specific points in the future — a reliance at best uncertain and indefinite.

Review of the Recommendations of March 1979 and May 1980

In light of the above recommendations for change in the present procedure, not all of the previous recommendations made by the Concerned Delegation need be reviewed.

Transfer of Claimants' Files

Difficulties continue to be encountered

by claimants and counsel in transferring cases to the centre nearest to the person's intended destination. Under the proposed ideal and transitional system, Immigration Centres would have to be prepared to transfer claimants' files in order that applications for work authorizations and other immigration proceedings could be conducted within the same general area where the Refugee Status Advisory Committee office or the Refugee Review Board office is located.

Family Reunification

Mr. Cullen originally promised Minister's Permits to all spouses and children of refugee claimants. This commitment was later withdrawn by the Commission through subsequent ministers, both Mr. Atkey and Mr. Axworthy. Spouses and children are routinely required to make claims in inquiry and thereafter are generally permitted to include themselves in the major claimant's claim.

Family members should be entitled to claim under the spouse's application as a matter of course without the necessity of separate proceedings. Children in all cases should be entitled to apply for a student authorization once the claim is made, and the right to the student authorization should not be dependent on the parent receiving a work authorization.

The Commission did implement a program of reunification of refugee families once a claimant has been accepted and prior to the granting of permanent resident status to the claimant. Visa officers do not appear to be treating such cases as ones deserving of priority. Some officers have not shortened their procedures; they are following the regular procedure in applications for permanent residence, requiring that the IMM-8 be completed first, then the family member interviewed, and then medicals given and approved before a Minister's Permit is issued. Children and spouses can wait for up to a year or more to be reunited. Moreover, even where the program is applied it is not being applied to all family members as intended. In international law, "de facto" family members can claim under the person's application for refugee status. The reunification program is only being applied to family members who are sponsorable under the Regulations.

Right to Counsel

Persons arriving at the port of entry are still denied counsel even when counsel is waiting outside the Immigration office. The right to counsel is guaranteed to all inland claimants and should also be guaranteed to all port of entry claimants.

Although the Commission has prepared a pamphlet outlining the refugee procedure and made it clear that this pamphlet would be distributed to persons making refugee claims, the pamphlet is still not widely distributed. As well, to the Delegation's knowledge, claimants are not always advised of their right to counsel.

Examination-Under-Oath

There is still no consistent practice with respect to the conduct of examinations-under-oath. Some officers continue to conduct the examination while others permit counsel to conduct the initial examination.

Under the proposed transitional and ideal system, the senior staff officers would have no responsibilities other than to conduct examinations-under-oath and could be trained to conduct the interviews. As the initial interview is envisaged as being more informal than is presently the case, the individual should be permitted to have conduct of the basic presentation of the claim before being questioned by the interviewing officer.

"Fully competent translators should be provided for refugee examinations. Translators who have proved inadequate should be removed from service." In principle, every minister involved in the process has agreed with this recommendation. To the Delegation's knowledge, this review has never been conducted and the situation has improved little. Translators known to be inadequate still interpret in examinations-under-oath. The Commission cannot hope to offer competent service in this area if it is not prepared to pay rates similar to those offered in the private sector.

Claimant Review of Transcript

"The claimant and counsel should be provided with a copy of the transcript of the examination-under-oath and should be given the opportunity to correct it prior to it being forwarded to the Refugee Status Advisory Committee." The claimant does review a copy of the transcript and has the opportunity to

correct it. However, as such corrections are not then transferred to the original transcript it may be difficult for the Refugee Status Advisory Committee members making the decision to properly utilize the corrections.

Under the transitional and ideal programme, the transcript would still be prepared for consideration by the Refugee Status Advisory Committee and Refugee Review Board in oral hearing referrals and in cases where the interviewing officer recommends rejection as being manifestly unfounded. However, while the claimant is entitled to receive the transcript, the time period

given to correct it prior to its being sent to the Refugee Status Advisory Committee or Refugee Review Board could be eliminated. Persons referred for an oral hearing could present corrections at the outset of the hearing. Persons who have been determined to have frivolous claims could append corrections to the transcript as part of their declarations under oath to the Board.

Reasons Provided for Rejected Claims

In principle, "The claimant should be provided with the reasons for the Committee's decision at the time that he/she is notified of the decision." However,

the reasons are incomplete and often irrelevant. They are often stock reasons for rejection without any real analysis of the claim.

Under the recommended procedure, the Refugee Review Board would be required to give reasons for its decisions. Under the transitional procedure, the Refugee Status Advisory Committee would provide reasons when a claim is rejected after an oral hearing or because it is determined to be manifestly unfounded.

**This is an edited version of a report prepared in April 1983 by a Delegation of Concerned Legal, Church and Humanitarian Organizations.*

Books and Periodicals

The *World Refugee Survey 1983*, 25th anniversary issue, contains articles on international and U.S. definitions of refugees, repatriation as a solution to refugee situations, resettlement in the U.S. and Australia, emigration of Soviet Jews, and congressional perspectives on refugee policy. Country-by-country descriptions of refugee situations in Africa, East Asia, the Pacific, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia are provided. Extensive statistical information includes numbers of refugees in need and resettled and contributions by international refugee aid agencies in 1982.

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Escape to Freedom: The Story of the International Rescue Committee, by Aaron Levenstein, has been published to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the IRC. Originally founded to help those fleeing Hitler's Germany, the IRC has continued its work since then, tirelessly helping refugees from all over the world. In the course of attempting to sum up IRC's diverse experience, the book notes the many invaluable contributions refugees have made over the years. The late Reinhold Niebuhr, prominent theologian and one of IRC's chairmen, recognized the value of refugee work in a quote recorded near the end of the book: "Never before in the 20th century has any nation been presented a greater opportunity to contribute so directly to the preservation of invaluable creative sources and to the enrichment of its own civilization." 338 pages. Greenwood Press, 88 Port Road West, P.O. Box 5007, Westport, CT. 06881 U.S.A. (203) 226-3581. Hardcover \$29.95.

New Indochina Studies Program

The Committee on Southeast Asia — jointly sponsored by the Social Science Research Council and the American Council of Learned Societies — is pleased to announce a new Indochina Studies Program. The Program is intended to encourage and support research, writing, and the archiving of materials on Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, drawing on the knowledge and experience of the refugees who have left those three countries since 1975, and who are now residing in North America.

The Indochina Studies Program will sponsor an annual fellowship competition open to researchers, writers, journalists, artists, and other professionals and individuals. Fellows will be expected to produce a written product which will contribute to understanding the three countries, or the lives of specific people within them. Individual applicants must be residents of the United States or Canada. Joint projects involving one or more North American scholars and one or more refugees are encouraged. In these cases, at least one of the applicants must be a resident of North America. As needed, the Program will assist Fellows to obtain an academic affiliation for the period of the award.

Projects may be based on life histories, personal memoirs, focused interviews, studies of particular groups, the recording and analysis of

oral, ritual, performance, and other artistic traditions, or written literatures. Specifically excluded are projects concerned with the American experience in Indochina, and the experience of Indochinese refugees in North America. Program Fellows will be expected to place project materials in a selected archive to help assure their availability for others in the future.

Fellowships may be short-term, or for up to as much as 12 months. Projects should be designed to be completed within a single year. Skill in the relevant language(s) will be a major criterion in the selection process. Fellowships may include full-time or part-time maintenance, essential travel and research expenses, as well as summer language training or refresher courses in Hmong, Khmer, Lao, or Vietnamese. Supplemental funding for archival purposes will be considered. In exceptional cases, awards may be renewed for a second year, and support may be provided for a full year of language training in Khmer or Lao if in preparation for a subsequent research and writing project. The maximum award for any project will be \$25,000.

For application materials or other inquiries, please send the information requested above to the Indochina Studies Program, Social Science Research Council, 605 Third Avenue, New York, New York 10158.