refugees did. However, the price of this early start to employment was an early stop to language training. The mean duration of the language training of privately sponsored refugees was 2.7 weeks less than for government-assisted refugees.

Language Training

Government-assisted refugees received living allowances while attending language classes, but privately sponsored refugees did not; they were generally supported by their sponsors. The trade-off between early employment and immediate language training was one of the most contentious issues within sponsorship groups and also among government settlement officers. The study found that, overall, government officials tended to give priority to language training, whereas sponsors tended to give priority to employment. Many sponsors interviewed mentioned that the refugees themselves gave priority to employment and economic independence.

Furthermore, although language training itself was paid for by the government for both government-assisted and privately sponsored refugees, the study encountered allegations that government-assisted refugees were given priority for seats in language classes, on top of the fact that there was as much as a three to four month wait for seats.

Other Differences

Privately sponsored refugees had the assistance of their sponsors in finding jobs. Government-assisted refugees had government support while they studied English or French. These conclusions point to a larger problem of inequitable treatment of refugees. Levels of material support given to privately sponsored refugees varied according to sources; those given to government-assisted refugees varied according to local CEC's interpretations of guidelines. Moreover, some CEC officers noted that privately sponsored refugees sometimes expressed resentment at receiving less than government-assisted refugees; for instance, they were often given hand-me-down clothes instead of money for new items. Some refugees were troubled by feeling indebted to a private benefactor, some CEC officers noted, and preferred receiving monies on the basis of government entitlement.

Refugees' material dependence on sponsors may pose problems for the emotional relationship between refugees and sponsors. One of the studies (based on in-depth interviews with sponsors) suggested that on the sponsors' part, it may reinforce a paternalistic and possessive attitude. On the refugees' part, it may induce dependency, suspicion, or even dishonesty. If all refugees were entitled to certain basic funds from the government, the study suggests, these emotional dangers might be less significant; and the problem of inequity would be ameliorated.

Cost

The average cost of setting a privately sponsored refugee was $753 less than for a government-assisted refugee, the study found. Private sponsors spent an average of $1,347 per refugee. The government spent an average of $2,100 on basic living allowances and language training allowances for each government-assisted refugee.

The study suggests that the apparent savings of $753 is somewhat misleading since the questionnaire on which the statistic is based asked sponsors not to include material contributions such as donations of clothing and furniture in their summaries of their expenditures. However, it is even more misleading for the report to discount these savings in this way. Donations of used items do not represent expenditures in the same way cash disbursements do, and the distinction is extremely important to finding ways to make refugee settlement cheaper.

Willingness to Sponsor Again

The majority of sponsors of Indochinese refugees would sponsor again if they felt there were a need and if they felt sure that there would be sufficient money and help to see the sponsorship through, the study found. Fifty-nine per cent of sponsors surveyed indicated that they would be prepared to sponsor again; 28% indicated they might be; and 13% indicated they would not.

Some of these sponsors cited specific conditions that would have to be met for them to be willing to sponsor again. Their most important concern involved need, with sponsors saying such things as, "I would sponsor again if a real 'need' can be demonstrated. I am not totally convinced that all the Indochinese were 'refugees' in the true sense"; and "I would sponsor again if I were satisfied that, given world conditions, it is those refugees who are most in need of our help who are being admitted to Canada."

Their second most important concerns involved means: sponsors wanted to be sure that there would be more government and agency support services available; that there would be an equitable sharing of workload; and that there would be adequate funds for the sponsorship.

In this connection it is interesting to note that a willingness to sponsor again was more likely to be expressed by sponsors associated with a church as a parent organization. Some churches and other organizations had signed umbrella agreements with the federal government to facilitate sponsorship by their constituent groups. These umbrella agreements simplified the bureaucratic procedures of sponsorship and assured sponsors of back-up assistance in case of an emergency. These assurances had often made the difference between choosing whether or not to sponsor the first time around.

Finally, government leadership was thought to be critical in motivating sponsors. Church leaders felt this was so, and sponsors and agencies attributed the present decline in sponsorship, not to a decline in public interest or willingness to sponsor, but to a lack of continuing government interest and leadership.

Miscounting Refugees

a Case Study of Lebanon

by Howard Adelman

"Refugee" is an equivocal term. It is used in many different senses. It describes people whose homes are destroyed by earthquakes; people who are driven from their homes during wars; people who flee persecution in their countries and become "Convention refugees". By failing to distinguish the various different senses of "refugee", gross differences in numbers of refugees can be reported.
First you must distinguish Lebanese Lebanese in turn have to be divided into five groups:

To answer the question in a useful and clarify terminology accordingly.

the refugees according to their planning relief, you have to categorize the refugees resulting from the recent attack on the Palestinians and Lebanese.

How many refugees were there in Lebanon following the invasion? 20,000 or 700,000?

To answer the question in a useful and accurate way that can contribute to planning relief, you have to categorize the refugees according to their situations and clarify terminology accordingly.

First you must distinguish Lebanese nationals, who would technically be described as internally displaced persons, from Palestinians in Lebanon. The Lebanese in turn have to be divided into five groups:

1. those in southern Lebanon whose homes were destroyed or so damaged as to be uninhabitable as a result of the Israeli invasion. In August 1982, there were approximately 250 homes destroyed in Tyre and four times that many in Sidon, resulting in about 6,250 Lebanese refugees or “roofless nationals” in southern Lebanon.

2. those who, as a result of the Israeli defeat of the Palestinians in southern Lebanon, returned to homes destroyed or so damaged as to be uninhabitable as a result of the civil war and, in particular, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) conflict with Lebanese in 1975-76 and after. Six hundred Lebanese Christians have returned to the town of Damour, which was occupied and totally destroyed by the PLO in the 1975-76 war. Of the 6,000 people who once lived there, some have found new homes, but many have been in temporary shelters and may wish to return.

These estimated 5,000 Lebanese refugees are also “roofless nationals”, but their situation predated the Israeli invasion; even though some are still “roofless”, they can be said to have benefited from the war because they have at least regained their land on which they can rebuild their homes.

3. those who were refugees as a result of the 1975-76 war but who recovered their homes and their lands following the invasion. 50,000 Lebanese refugees from Nabitieh returned to that city following the ouster of the PLO by the Israelis.

4. some have found new homes, but many have been in temporary shelters and may wish to return.

5. Others have found temporary shelters and may wish to return.

6. These estimated 5,000 Lebanese refugees are also “roofless nationals”, but their situation predated the Israeli invasion; even though some are still “roofless”, they can be said to have benefited from the war because they have at least regained their land on which they can rebuild their homes.

7. 50,000 Lebanese refugees from Nabitieh returned to that city following the ouster of the PLO by the Israelis.

Dear Mr. Axworthy,

In the Toronto Star of October 6, 1982, your advisor on immigration, Ian Rankin, suggests that Canada’s refugee intake will be reduced in response to financial constraints of the federal government. In the Globe and Mail of October 7, 1982, you suggest that a reduction is being considered in response to our unemployment problems. Neither rationalization is valid. Reducing Canada’s refugee intake because of these economic constraints is both inappropriate and unnecessary.

It may be one thing to reduce overall immigration levels in response to high unemployment in Canada. It is quite another to reduce the refugee intake. People who are persecuted; people who are stateless; people who are mired in the hopelessness of refugee camps, should not suffer further from our economic problems. Canadians’ problems are fairly minor by comparison. It should not be forgotten that unemployment levels were invoked to keep out Jewish refugees in the 1930’s.

As for the financial constraints of the government, reductions in unnecessary government expenditures should be made wherever possible, in good times and in bad. But reductions should not be made at the expense of refugees. Fortunately, we know that we can reduce the costs of resettling refugees without reducing the numbers of refugees we take in. How? The research reports of your ministry point the way. By combining the human support of private sponsors with government financial resources.

Privately sponsored Indochinese refugees were resettled at a direct cost of approximately one third less than government-assisted refugees. This was not because the private sector was more efficient. The employees of your department working in this field were dedicated, knowledgeable and extraordinarily hard-working. But civil servants cannot be expected to look for an old unused chest of drawers in their aunt’s basement or to rustle up jobs and housing through friends and acquaintances. By adopting a new model for sponsorship that involves private sponsors in the resettlement of every refugee in Canada, we could bring in the number of refugee we brought in last year for the reduced amount of money that is available this year.

The annual refugee plan could be established on the understanding that the private sector would participate fully in meeting the levels in the plan. If sufficient effort were forthcoming on the part of the private sector, then, since the costs for resettling each refugee would be higher, the intake would be reduced to fit in with the budget allocations for refugee resettlement.

Such a plan might include the following provisions:

1. All refugees brought into the country during the first half of th
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year would be privately sponsored, with the exception of any urgent cases for which sponsors were not forthcoming. Based on the number of sponsorship applications made, projections would be made for the second half of the year to indicate the amount of the refugee resettlement budget that would be needed for the sponsorships involving private groups. Any remaining funds would be spent on direct government sponsorship of refugees. In this way, the total intake would be a direct reflection of the efforts of the private sector.

2. All private sponsorship groups would receive a basic allowance of $500.00 from the government for each refugee sponsored within the levels tabled in Parliament.

3. The allowance would be increased by $500.00 if the refugee sponsored did not have a minimum proficiency in English or French.

4. The allowance would be increased by $500.00 if the sponsorship group did not share with the refugee some kinship such as family, ethnic or religious identification.

5. A further $500.00 per refugee would be available in a back-up fund to be disbursed to sponsors upon proof of necessary expenditures beyond the basic allowances.

6. Private sponsors would provide the government with audited statements of their expenditures, indicating that any funds left over from the allowances had been donated to an approved charity involved in assisting refugees (e.g., a church or a refugee aid organization).

This model undoubtedly has some shortcomings, and it is only one of many possibilities. But we do not have to solve the problem of a specific model at this time. Legislation requires only that the levels for refugee intake be tabled in Parliament. The same levels as last year could be tabled with the clear understanding that the resettlement efforts will have to be undertaken within greater financial constraints; and that therefore, in order to meet the levels, the involvement of the private sector will be needed. The private sector can then be invited to work out an effective plan for meeting the levels within the government’s financial constraints — a plan which at the same time can be fairer to sponsors and more effective for refugees.

Yours Sincerely,

Howard Adelman

If reports on the Lebanese refugees are confusing, those on the Palestinians are even more so. Some Palestinians are registered refugees: basically those who arrived in 1948 following the creation of the State of Israel, and their children. These refugees are entitled to rations and benefits from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Some are unregistered: basically those who arrived in 1970 following King Hussein’s slaughter of the PLO in Black September. Other Palestinian refugees have become Lebanese citizens but have never been struck from the official rolls of UNRWA.

Furthermore, the basic information on camp populations before the invasion is confusing. For example, the official population of the camp that was totally razed, Ein Hilweh, was 24,340 refugees. However, an UNRWA official said that since 1969 the PLO had not allowed them to check their figures. Deaths were often not reported and to compensate for this, UNRWA had adopted a policy of not registering more than five children in a family unless a death was also registered. Some registered Palestinians had moved into town or were working abroad in Bahrain or Kuwait or Abu Dhabi and had leased their camp homes to Egyptian or Syrian migrant workers. Also, PLO volunteers from Pakistan and Bangladesh lived in the camp. In addition, it is estimated that as many as 10,000 unregistered refugees lived in the camp, including many militants and their families. The destruction of Ein Hilweh alone can be estimated to have produced as many as 30,000 “roofless refugees”, most of whom would be stateless Palestinians.

According to UNRWA there are approximately 107,000 registered refugees living in southern Lebanon, of whom around 60,000 lived in camps and 47,000 in towns and cities. Some refugee camps were only slightly damaged in the fighting and Palestinians, both registered and unregistered, remained in those camps. On the other hand, Ein Hilweh in Sidon and Rashidiye in Tyre were completely destroyed in the battle between the Israelis and the PLO. El-Buss and Burj...
Shemalia were severely damaged. Overall, of these 60,000 registered refugees in camps in the south, and possibly another 25,000 unregistered refugees in camps there, the most reliable estimates indicate that as many as one-half or 42,000 may have lost their homes. In addition, it is estimated that there were approximately 80,000 Palestinian refugees living in the West Beirut and Mount Lebanon area of whom around 18,000 lived in camps. As of this writing, the extent of destruction of these camps is not known but it is probably very extreme. Even if we assume that all refugees living in camps in this area lost their homes in the bombardment, then the total number of homeless Palestinian refugees in all of Lebanon in August 1982 would have been a maximum of 60,000.

In its report on the situation in Lebanon following the Israeli invasion, the United Nations indicated that 300,000 Lebanese needed aid, a figure that included Lebanese in all of Lebanon who had suffered losses of schools, pock-marked homes, psychological trauma, etc. In its news release announcing aid to Lebanon, the Canadian National Development Agency notes that "UNRWA, which has responsibility for the more than 200,000 registered Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, estimates that the vast majority of them have been displaced, with refugee camps being razed." In addition there are an estimated 100,000 unregistered Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. Thus, if you do not distinguish among the various meanings of the word "refugee" — if you do not distinguish among "stateless" and "homeless" and "in need" — then you can say that there are 600,000 refugees in Lebanon following the Israeli invasion, (though not strictly as a result of the Israeli invasion).

But if you wish to specify what aid is required, and therefore wish, for example, to say how many Lebanese and Palestinians are homeless as a result of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, then an accurate figure will be 10,000 Lebanese and 50,000 – 60,000 Palestinians. Probably another 30,000 people in southern Lebanon have had to temporarily flee their homes in order to avoid the fighting. At the same time, 60,000 will have recovered their homes and another 6,000 will have recovered their land. Policy and rehabilitation efforts should be decided on the basis of as accurate a set of facts as possible.

"The introduction of an effective census mechanism to work independently of relief agencies in order to determine in an impartial and professional way the numbers of border-crossers requiring assistance in mass influx situations," is one of nine recommendations made by Sadruddin Aga Khan in his report Human Rights and Massive Exoduses, which will be summarized in the next issue of Refuge.

**Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon, 1980**

Howard Adelman visited Lebanon in August 1982 and published a report entitled Homeless Refugees and Displaced Persons in Southern Lebanon, Resulting from the Israeli Invasion of Lebanon, June 1982. The report may be obtained by sending $2.50 for the report alone, $5.00 for the report with selected appendices, or $20.00 for the report with full appendices to: Refugee Documentation Project, York University, 4700 Keele Street, Downsview, Ontario M3J 2R6.

**Canadian Financial Aid to Lebanon**

Canada has contributed $2.55 million for humanitarian relief in Lebanon since the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982. A grant of $950,000 has been allocated to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), which is responsible for registered Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. The funds are to be used to provide food, shelter and clothing. Another $450,000 has been granted to the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), for assistance to homeless mothers and children, mainly in southern Lebanon and the Beirut area. One million dollars has been granted to the International Committee of the Red Cross for relief to displaced Lebanese civilians. Finally, $150,000 has been granted to the World Council of Churches for humanitarian assistance to people in southern Lebanon, Beirut, and the Bekaa Valley.

Source: UNRWA