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Contemporary Migration Processes in Russia

I. Orlova, Y. Streltsova and E. Skvortsova

Introduction

The enormous social, economic and political changes experienced in Russia in the 1990s have made migration a much more pressing issue than it was in previous decades. The rate and directions of migration have changed. New forms of migration have emerged: forced migration, repatriation of deported peoples and environmental migration. And the scale of migration has increased.

The growing socioeconomic crisis in many former republics of the USSR has resulted in palpable social tension. Limitations have been placed on the economic, social, cultural and political rights of national minorities and of people not native to given areas. Moreover, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the former socialist countries has brought home thousands of servicemen and their families. Migration flows caused by these factors have negatively influenced the country's economy. Settling these immigrants is a problem that demands billions of roubles and other resources. Even more serious is the question of how

adaptable the immigrants are to the new conditions of their existence.

International migration is a relatively new factor in Russia. In the last few years about 100,000 people have left Russia annually for countries outside the former USSR. Most emigrants are in the labour force. The country is thus losing many thousands of quali-

fied workers and professionals. This brain drain is undermining the intellectual and labour potential of the country.

This report provides an overview of contemporary migration processes in Russia, paying particular attention to each of the issues noted above.

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Contemporary Migration Processes in Russia

Abstract

This article, abridged from the Russian original, was published by the Institute of Socio-Political Studies of the Russian Academy of Science, Moscow, in 1993. Irena Orlova, Y. Streltsova and E. Skvortsova work in the Department of Sociology of Migration at the Institute. Dr. Orlova is the Head of the Department. The article was translated by A. Benifand and R. Kovaleva, York University, and edited by R. Brym, Professor of Sociology, University of Toronto.

The article examines the contribution of migration to Russian population dynamics, inter-regional migration flows, the growth of regional and ethnic separatism, human rights problems associated with migration, refugee issues, and the "brain drain" from Russia. It is based on official demographic statistics and a wide range of sociological surveys. It focuses mainly on the period 1990-93 and contains a brief postscript bringing the analysis up to date.

Processus contemporains de migration en Russie

Résumé

Cet article est une version abrégée d'un texte qui a été publié en russe par l'Institut d'études socio-politiques de l'Académie russe des sciences à Moscou en 1993. I. Orlova, Y. Streltsova et E. Skvortsova sont membres du Département de sociologie des migrations à l'Institut. Dr. Orlova est directrice du Département. L'article a été traduit par A. Benifand et R. Kovaleva de l'Université York. La traduction a été dirigée par le professeur R. Brym du Département de sociologie de l'Université de Toronto.

L'article examine l'effet des migrations sur la dynamique démographique en Russie, les flux migratoires interrégionaux, la croissance des mouvements séparatistes régionaux et ethniques, les problèmes des droits de la personne qui sont liés aux migrations, la situation des réfugiés et les problèmes résultant de l'émigration des intellectuels russes. L'analyse est fondée sur des statistiques démographiques officielles et plusieurs études sociologiques. Elle traite surtout de la période 1990-1993. Le postscriptum décrit les développements récents.

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The 1995 Social Summit (in Denmark) should endorse the emerging concept of human security as the basis upon which national development strategies, international cooperation and global governance should be organized. ...Human security is relevant to people everywhere, in rich nations and in poor.

Its reach is now global.

The UN Human Development Report 1994, in this issue (page 18)

Part 1: Sociodemographic Aspects of Migration

1. The Role of Migration in the Composition of the Russian Population

The global crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s has affected all of Russian society including its migration processes. The general instability, the erection of boundaries within a once-unified country, the introduction of visa regulations, and the existence of numerous "hot spots" has led to a decrease in the overall rate of migration. Thus several indicators of migration flows—the number of arrivals in the country, the number of departures from the country, and the number of internal migrants—fell between 1986 and 1992 (see Table 1). In 1992, the number of migrants per 1,000 Russians was 11 percent less than in 1991 and one-third less than in the period 1986-1990.

Table 1: The Declining Tendency of Russians to Migrate (in '000s)

Year	Arrivals	Departures	Internal Migrants
1986	6,400	6,100	5,500
1989	5,600	5,500	4,800
1990	5,200	5,000	4,200
1991	4,600	4,500	3,800
1992	4,200	4,000	3,200

Source: State Statistics Committee of the Russian Federation.

This decline is perhaps surprising given the country's cataclysmic state. But the plain fact is that Russia does not suffer from a migratory avalanche, notwithstanding occasional media

claims to the contrary. It is true, however, that contemporary migration in Russia has altered in character due to the country's high level of social, political and economic instability.

For a long time, migration between Russia, on the one hand, and the "near abroad"¹ and foreign countries, on the other hand, did not greatly influence the size of the Russian population. Natural increase (the surplus of births over deaths) was the main factor contributing to population growth. Thus the number of arrivals in the Russian Federation exceeded departures beginning in the mid-1970s. In the period 1979-88, the population grew at an average rate of 180,000 people per year. In any given year, no more than 19 percent of this growth was attributable to positive net migration (a surplus of arrivals over departures).

Over the past few years, however, the contribution of migration to population growth has increased dramatically. This is due to a declining birth rate and a rising death rate. By 1992, net migration was unable to compensate for losses caused by the natural decrease of the population. Thus in 1992, for the first time in the post-World War II period, the size of the Russian population actually fell (see Table 2).

Table 2 The Population of the Russian Federation (in '000s)

	Total	Urban	Rural
Population size, Jan. 1, '92	148,704.3	109,672.4	39,031.9
Change in '92 due to natural decrease	-207.0	-176.8	-30.2
Change in '92 due to net migration	176.1	-113.4	289.5
Total change	-30.9	-752.1	721.2
Population size, Jan. 1, '93	148,673.4	108,920.3	39,753.1
1993 population as % of '92 population	99.98	99.31	101.85

Source: State Statistics Committee of the Russian Federation

2. Inter-Regional Migration Streams and Changes in Their Direction

In the last few years, the direction of internal migration has changed substantially. Table 2 indicates that the historical rural-to-urban population flow has been reversed. Most regions in Russia experienced net urban-to-rural migration in 1992 for the first time in many years. Some 80,000 more people arrived in rural regions than departed from them.²

The reasons for this reversal are complex and diverse. They include: fewer urban job opportunities as a result of the general decline of production, the deterioration of many of the social advantages of urban living, and worsening ecological conditions in the cities.

Changes have also taken place in the direction of inter-regional migration. During the Soviet period migrants from all over the Soviet Union were drawn to the North, Siberia and the Far East. But the early 1990s have wit-

Table 3 Inter-Regional Migration in Russia (in '000s)

	Annual Average for 1979-88	1990	1991	1992
Economic districts:				
Northern	3.9	-13.2	-39.2	-45.6
East Siberian	4.3	-24.5	-28.6	-36.2
Far Eastern	33.4	-9.6	-66.1	-150.4
Total Siberia and Far East	119.1	-36.3	-126.7	-194.8

Source: State Statistics Committee of the Russian Federation.

nessed a massive flow of people from these regions (see Table 3).

In 1992, in the Nenetski and Yamalo-Nenetski regions of Russia, a survey was conducted by the Demographic Centre of the Russian Academy of Science. It demonstrated that 50 percent of the population not native to these places were going to leave.³ Three-quarters of these people expressed the intention to return to other regions of Russia and one-quarter planned to leave for the near abroad (Ukraine, Belarus, etc.). These people probably originally came from the regions to which they were then planning to return.

This return migration was due to two main factors. First, many people were eager to move to remote regions in order to earn high wages. Now, however, special compensation for isolation, difficult conditions, and severe climate is no longer available. Second, uncertainty has recently grown about whether their apartments in their places of origin will continue to be reserved for them and about whether they will receive privileges (such as higher old-age pensions) that a northern work record is supposed to give them. Suddenly everything is uncertain because each former Soviet republic has passed new laws governing such matters—but without coordinating them with the laws of the other former Soviet republics.

Population decreases in the areas of the Russian North became especially grave in 1992 (See Table 4).

Return migration has thus taken on massive proportions. It will undoubtedly have a damaging impact on the Russian economy and social life, and will jeopardize the further development of the Russian North, Siberia and the Far East. On the other hand, the European part of Russia and the Ural region, which are receiving these migrants, will suffer from a labour surplus and unemployment.

Table 4: Population Decrease in the Russia North in 1992

Region	Out-Migration	Increase since '91
Tumen	50,000	9,000
Magadan	38,000	20,000
Yakutia	34,000	6,000
Murmansk	29,000	13,000
Chukotka	22,000	13,000
Chitinsk	21,000	11,000
Khabarovsk	16,000	14,000
Amur	16,000	12,000

Source: State Statistics Committee of the Russian Federation.

Part II: Socioeconomic Consequences of the Reshaping of the Ethnic Map of the Former Soviet Union

3. Migration Exchange With the Countries of the "Near Abroad" and the Policy of de-Russification

Russia is now experiencing a positive migration balance with all the countries of the near abroad apart from Ukraine and Belarus (see Table 5). In addition to the arrival of people from the North, Siberia and the Far East, other migrants are coming from Central Asia, Transcaucasia and the Baltics. Among the migrants, the percentage of refugees is constantly growing. Estimates of the number of refugees on the territory of Russia as of January 1, 1993 vary from 363,000 (according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs) to 460,000 (according to the Federal Migration Service).

The ethnic composition of the migrant population in 1992 has been estimated by the State Statistics Committee of the Russian Federation to be 44 percent Russian, 18 percent Armenian, 8 percent Meskhetian Turkish, 7.9 percent Osetian and 2.5 percent Azeri.⁵

The main factors causing the various migration streams are all outgrowths of the collapse of the Soviet Union. They include: the socioeconomic crisis; the aggravation of ethnic relations; the activities of nationalist parties and groups; and the passage of discriminatory citizenship and language laws by the new states. According to a 1991 survey of 91,100 migrants to Russia, the aggravation of national relations was one of the most important factors on this list.⁶ Specifically, 70 percent of respondents from Azerbaijan, 64 percent from Tajikistan, 63 percent from Georgia, 50 percent from Armenia, 47 percent from Kyrgyzstan, 45 percent from Latvia and 36 percent from Moldova said that ethnic conflict was the most important reason they migrated.

Sixty-five percent of the respondents who cited the aggravation of ethnic relations as a reason for migrating

were Russians. Internal migrants in Russia who left their homes because of ethnic conflicts were mainly from Chechen-Ingushetia, Dagestan, Tuva and North Osetia; and fully 78 percent of them were of Russian background.

One can detect the indirect influence of ethnic strife on the decision to migrate even when respondents said they left mainly for other reasons. For example, among migrants from Latvia, a common reason for leaving was the need to change one's place of work. But 38 percent of the respondents from Latvia indicated that it was necessary to change work because of the new state-imposed demand for fluency in Latvian. Similar responses were given by 34 percent of respondents from Tajikistan, 25 percent from Kyrgyzstan, 23 percent from Uzbekistan, 33 percent from Lithuania, 31 percent from Estonia and 22 percent from Georgia. Forty-three percent of the respondents said they did not know the language of the titular national group⁷ in the former Soviet republic where they had resided and 17 percent said they had weak knowledge of the language. Among those who cited worsening ethnic relations as the main reason for migrating, the corresponding figures were 49 percent and 23 percent.

Given the worsening socioeconomic situation and the intensifying mobilization of national-political sentiment, we can expect a considerable rise in the migration of Russians from the former ex-Soviet republics and from the internal autonomous regions of Russia over the next four to five years. Experts estimate that due to linguistic discrimination and related causes, between 400,000 and 2,000,000 migrants will arrive in Russia annually over that period. This represents as much as a third of the migration potential of the Russian people residing in the territory of the former Soviet Union outside Russia.⁸ (A total of 25.3 million Russians now live in the near abroad.)

The high migration potential of Russians in the former republics of the USSR is evident from a 1992 survey carried out by the Institute of Problems of Employment of the Russian Academy of Science, in which 1,948 Russian families from Vilnius, Dushanbe, Dagestan, Kiev, Kazan, Western Ukraine and Tashkent were interviewed. In Dushanbe, fully 81 percent of the respondents said they wish to leave. In Dagestan the figure was 63 percent, in Tashkent 59 percent, and in Western Ukraine 35 percent. The situation is more stable in Kazan, where 22 percent of the respondents said they wish to leave. In Kiev the figure was 20 percent and in Vilnius 14 percent. Eighty percent of the potential migrants from Dushanbe, Tashkent, Dagestan and Kazan said they wanted to go to Russia and no other country. Among potential migrants from

Lithuania the corresponding figure was 60 percent and from the Ukraine about 33 percent.⁹

The emigration potential of the Russians will not be fully realized because alongside the forces that drive people from the former republics are some that make them remain where they are. Many Russians have lived outside of Russia for many years and have adapted and assimilated there. Moreover, due to the crisis in the Russian economy and the impoverishment of the Russian population there is no guarantee that migration will be easy. Finally, potential migrants have very little hope that they will be legally protected and that the rights of forced migrants will be observed. Their fate could become easier if each state in the region reaches an international agreement providing the migrants with transportation, property compensation

and pensions. The Russians in the near abroad are justifiably outraged because Russia has abandoned them and does not protect them. In many of the new states American embassies opened up much earlier than Russian embassies.

In Russia itself life is very difficult for the refugees. The Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation has passed a law regarding refugees and forced migrants but it has not been implemented. Refugees are completely unprotected by law when local bureaucrats confront them.

Migrants also suffer from not being free to choose where they can settle. They are restricted by job opportunities, lack of housing and lack of a residence permit (*propiska*). Russians in the ex-Soviet republics live mainly in the big cities, very often in the capitals of the new countries. They are mainly professionals, academics and highly qualified workers. But the Russian government is trying to settle them in backward rural areas.

Thus, the former republics of the Soviet Union are practising a policy of open or hidden de-Russification. This escalates social tension. Such conditions require action on the part of the government of the Russian Federation to protect the rights of its citizens and institute a well-defined program for admitting forced migrants and refugees.

4. Migration inside Russia and the growth of regional separatism¹⁰

The further complication of the sociopolitical situation in various regions of Russia—notably Chechen-Ingushetia, Dagestan, Tuva, North Osetia and Tatarstan—could easily intensify migration and stimulate a policy of ethnic cleansing. Thus the expulsion of non-native people (mainly Russians) is a direct consequence of the sociopolitical crisis and at the same time the reason for its further intensification.

Some 11.8 million Russians live in the various autonomous republics located within Russia itself. Most of them live in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. Smaller but significant numbers live in Yakutia-Sakha, Mordovia, and Karelia. Their social status is declining. They now have less opportunity to be admitted to administrative positions. Native people are far better represented even if their representation in the general population is quite small.

Interethnic relations in Russia today closely resemble the situation in the USSR on the eve of its fall. The ongoing crisis allows local elites to manipulate public opinion and create the image of independent "emirates" which are free to sell their raw materials. Nationalism and the instinct for self-preservation

Table 5: Net Migration Balance Between Russia and the other Republics of the Former USSR, 1989-92 (in thousands)

Republic	1989	1990	1991	1992
Ukraine	-30.0	-42.3	-99.1	-143.0
Belarus	-11.9	13.4	-12.9	-27.2
Moldava	5.2	3.7	5.3	9.9
Kazakhstan	35.3	42.0	17.5	89.5
Lithuania	-0.1	4.0	3.7	11.6
Latvia	1.2	3.6	6.4	23.2
Estonia	0.3	3.1	4.4	21.9
Baltic subtotal	1.4	10.7	14.5	56.7
Uzbekistan	49.3	69.1	38.3	86.3
Kyrgyzstan	3.4	20.5	15.9	49.8
Tajikistan	6.8	39.5	17.6	66.6
Turkmenistan	2.9	3.9	2.5	12.0
Central Asia subtotal	57.0	133.0	74.3	214.7
Azerbaijan	45.0	60.6	23.4	50.8
Armenia	12.2	4.0	-0.7	12.0
Georgia	15.9	18.0	28.7	46.3
Transcaucasus subtotal	73.1	82.6	51.4	109.1
Refugees not identified by state	0	24.2	88.7	31.6
Total	130.1	267.3	139.8	278.1

Source: State Statistics Committee of the Russian Federation

stimulate the ideology of ethnic superiority. Ethnic strangers are strongly rejected, and Russians are thus drawn into ethnic conflict. Between 1991 and 1992 the number of Russians who confronted national intolerance has grown dramatically, as indicated by the survey research summarized in Table 6.

It has become the general feeling of the people of Russia that their national interests are not taken into account. For example, in a recent survey, 45 percent of Cherkessk's inhabitants, 37 percent of Ufa's, 35 percent of Ulan-Ude's and 31 percent of Yakutsk's population agreed that their national interests are either fully or partially ignored. It is important to note in this connection that among representatives of the titular nationalities this opinion is one-and-a-half to two times more widespread than among ethnic minorities.

The desire to protect one's national interests creates the sociopsychological preconditions for a policy of national revanchism. During the last few years one can discern a marked upsurge of the priority of the nation's rights over the rights of the individual. This feeling is especially strong in the regions where national tension is escalating. For example, among the Cherkess and Karachayev people, 30 percent of those surveyed approved of the idea of the priority of the nation's rights over the rights of the individual. Relatedly, in 1992 members of the native ethnic groups of the internal Russian republics were appointed to leading positions twice as frequently as in 1991.

In general, ethnic background has started to play an extremely important role regarding the selection of candidates for leading administrative jobs, prestigious positions, and for the allocation of financial and material benefits. This encourages a highly negative attitude toward migrants. Actions of the Russian Federation to stabilize ethnic relations are held in very low regard. Forty-five percent of respondents stated that such actions are late, hasty, lacking in thought, and, indeed, are sometimes the source of conflict. As a logical extension of separatist tendencies that add pressure to migration, many inhabitants of Russia hold that independent autonomous regions are not really part of the country (see Table 7).

Due to the worsening economic crisis and the spread of ethnocentric ideology, a serious difference in understanding the essential features of national and state institutions is rising to the surface. This difference often turns into heated arguments when constitutional principles are discussed. In general, the spread of ethnocentrism and separatism ruins the society and demoralizes people who are attempting to consolidate it. The idea that the power of the titular ethnic group needs to be augmented leads to deep conflict among

various ethnic groups, jeopardizes ethnic relations, stimulates migration and increases xenophobia. It can eventually create the danger of eliminating Russia as a historical subject. The strategic concept of "one nation, one state" must be recognized as one without a future. Otherwise we will witness a chain reaction in which each ethnic group proclaims its territorial independence and the country is broken into ethnic segments. This concerns even Russians living inside Russia who do not enjoy self-government. It is absolutely necessary today that a new national-territorial approach be worked out—a sort of "Union of Peoples" or "Federation of Lands." This will provide equal rights to citizens and members of all ethnic communities and territories, and satisfy their national and cultural demands.

Table 6 Russians who Confront Ethnic Prejudice and Hostility in their Daily Lives (in percent)

	Stavropol		Orenburg		Moscow	
	1991	1992	1991	1992	1991	1992
National prejudice	19	38	18	42	17	35
Hostility [†]	36	54	17	29	35	40

[†]Hostility to people of other nationalities and to migrants.

Source: Surveys conducted by the Centre of Sociology of Interethnic Relations, Institute of Sociopolitical Research, Russian Academy of Science.

Table 7: What does Russia Represent Territorially? (in percent)

Region	Russia is the territory of...			
	A	B	C	D
Ulan-Ude				
Russians	24	48	9	22
others	12	44	28	16
Orenburg				
Russians	14	55	17	15
others	13	50	18	19
Ufa				
Russians	18	58	8	15
others	11	46	20	20
Petro-zavodsk				
Russians	11	68	7	13
others	10	63	10	7
Cherkessk				
Russians	39	51	4	16
others	19	48	14	19
Yakutsk				
Russians	18	61	8	12
others	16	41	34	10
Stavropol				
Russians	13	60	16	11
others	24	43	18	15

Notes: A ... the USSR; B ... the Russian Federation; C ... the Russian Federation minus the autonomous regions; D Hard to answer.

Source: Survey research of the Centre of Sociology of Interethnic Relations, Institute for Sociopolitical Research, Russian Academy of Science

Part III

Migration and Human Rights in the Former Soviet Union

For 75 million non-Russians living in the territory of the former Soviet Union but outside the Russian Federation, and for 28 million non-Russians with their own national territories in the Russian Federation, constitutional and legal questions regarding citizenship, the state language, and conditions for ethnic minority life are a top priority. That is fully understandable: such laws massively affect their economic, political, social and cultural conditions.

If we analyze the laws passed by the new states of the region regarding citizenship we can draw conclusions about the degree of tolerance of the new states toward minority nationalities. Citizenship law is, after all, fundamental since it defines basic political and social rights.

People not native to the republics, especially residents who speak Russian, are very uncertain about their future in the new countries and they often try to obtain dual citizenship with Russia. However, at present dual citizenship is acknowledged only by the Armenian Constitution (article 10) and by the law "On Turkmenistan Citizenship" (article 9); as an exception, dual citizenship is allowed by the "Law on Citizenship of Moldova" (article 6), of Kazakhstan (article 3), of Russia (article 3), of Uzbekistan (article 10), and of Lithuania (article 1).

It is urgent that dual citizenship be negotiated between the countries of the region and agreements signed. But the new states have in general not tried to conclude such agreements. For its part, Russia has prepared and submitted to the Supreme Soviet the draft of a law that will allow one to obtain Russian citizenship without cancelling one's other citizenship. This can be viewed as an attempt to ease the problems of the Russian-speaking population in the former republics of the USSR.

Many heated disputes over whether to recognize dual citizenship took

place when the constitutions of the new countries and autonomous republics (especially Tatarstan, Yakutia-Sakha and Bashkortostan) were being prepared. The law on citizenship of the Russian Federation specifies that citizens of Russia who live permanently in a republic within Russia are at the same time citizens of that republic. Republics within Russia are eligible to establish their own citizenship but are not entitled to limit the rights, freedoms and other interests obtained by virtue of Russian citizenship. However, the constitutions of Tatarstan and Yakutia-Sakha claim that these republics have the right to bestow or cancel citizenship of their republics. This contradicts the Russian constitution since Russia has reserved these rights for itself. This can have negative and discriminatory consequences for members of non-titular nationalities because, for example, they may consider themselves Russian while local law leaves them without legal protection from Russia.

Russian federal law attempts to guarantee protection of non-titular nationalities because it establishes the priority of the Russian Federation in citizenship regulations. Thus, according to federal statutes, it is illegal to establish conditions for citizenship apart from permanent residence in a republic.

Nonetheless, most of the laws on citizenship (and other regulations related to them) which have been approved by the former republics of the USSR contain, to varying degrees, conditions apart from residence for members of non-titular nationalities who wish to obtain citizenship. Only Lithuania, Ukraine and Russia accept the so-called "zero option" for citizenship. This means that all people residing in those states when their citizenship laws were passed and who have a legal source of subsistence need only to express the wish to become citizens. In all other new states, with the

exception of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, knowledge of the national language has become mandatory for citizenship eligibility.

From the formal-legal point of view it is very difficult to discern in the constitutions and laws of the republics biases against non-titular nationalities. They pay tribute to democratic principles and declare the equality of citizens before the law and the absence of discrimination on the basis of nationality, sex, origin, faith, political views, social background and possession of property. They stress that foreign citizens who are residents of the republic and the citizens of the republic share equal rights and freedoms.

However, the way these regulations are implemented, together with additional norms and acts, reveal the actual policy that is being carried out in the republics, especially when applied to non-titular nationalities. In Estonia and Latvia, regulations regarding citizenship for members of non-titular nationalities are especially severe (see Table 8).

Hundreds of thousands of Russian-speaking inhabitants of the Baltic States are residents without citizenship, or even potential foreigners if they obtain Russian citizenship. The circumstances for the Russian-speaking population are thus critical. In some districts inhabited mainly by Russians, such as Narva and Estonia, the situation is grim and violence is possible.

As a consequence of the fact that citizenship is not available to everyone, people are exposed to discrimination in the political, social, cultural and welfare spheres. In Estonia, for example, non-citizens do not have the right to vote or be elected. In the recently elected parliament of Estonia there is not a single candidate to represent the roughly 25 percent of the population that is Russian-speaking. Non-citizens of Latvia do not have the right to form parties and social movements. Self-administration of non-Latvian ethnic communities has been disallowed in places where non-Latvians compose a majority of the inhabitants.

Baltic politicians can hardly justify limiting the rights of other nationalities by claiming that they are disloyal. They must remember that in March 1990 one-third of the Russian democratic movement voted for Estonian independence. Despite this support, however, Russian speakers enjoy limited rights.¹¹

On the other hand, one cannot claim that the position of the Russian population in the former republics always meets the criteria of citizenship. Some Russians in the former Soviet republics still feel that they belong to a great power and that they are part of the Russian community and of Russian culture. Thus, 44 percent of the Russian population inhabiting both banks

of the Dniester river in Moldova believe that it is not necessary to know the language of the native ethnic group.¹²

Limitations on political rights may also be found in the constitutions of the other former republics of the USSR. For example, the constitutions of Moldova and Turkmenistan allow the opportunity to become President only to a member of a native ethnic group. Kazakhstan, Estonia and Latvia allow foreign business people—including those with Russian citizenship—to participate in privatization. But in Latvia 80 percent of privatization vouchers will go to the citizens of the republic and only 20 percent to non-citizens (including the half million

non-citizens resident in Latvia). Perhaps this approach has been taken because such a large proportion of business people in Latvia are Russians and Jews.

As far as social rights are concerned, there are some limits for non-citizens in employment, education and career advancement. In Estonia and Latvia a series of positions in state institutions are designated for citizens only. In order to take advantage of many of the sociocultural rights that are constitutionally guaranteed one must know the state language and pass certain tests. The constitutions of Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan are the most tolerant toward minority languages. Moldova and Ukraine guarantee the use of the Russian language for inter-ethnic communication and the parallel creation of conditions for learning the state language. It is not clear whether the Kirgiz Parliament will approve of Russian as a language for interethnic communication. At the moment the Russian language is used for administrative purposes in areas where Russian communities live.

In the republics of the Russian Federation the concept of two official languages is being discussed. In Bashkortostan there are three official languages due to its ethnic composition. In some Russian republics, where the majority of people belong to titular ethnic groups, various decisions have been made in favour of the language of the ethnic majority. Behind this are the leaders of the ethnic intelligentsia.

In Estonia, Latvia, Moldova and Ukraine regulations specify that certain jobs require knowledge of the state language. The Soviet of Ministers of Latvia passed an additional regulation (No. 189) that requires one to pass tests in the state language to qualify for work in state institutions. Employees are required to learn the state language in a very short period of time—only six months. A concession is made for owners of private enterprises, who are not required to know Latvian.¹³

Kazakhstan is composed of about 40 percent Russians and 40 percent Kazakhs. Therefore, the language

Table 8: Rights of the Russian-Speaking Population in the Baltic States

LITHUANIA	LATVIA	ESTONIA
	Citizenship:	
Zero option accepted by law; citizenship granted to everybody who lived in Latvia before June 1940, to their descendants, and to all residents who applied for citizenship before November 1989 (it is planned to extend this deadline to 1991).	Law on citizenship not yet passed; citizenship rights belong to residents who lived in Latvia before 1940 and their descendants; new law will be passed by the parliament elected in June 1993 without the participation of most of the Russian-speaking population (constituting 700,000 people, or about 30 percent of the total population).	In November 1991, the 1938 law on citizenship restored, citizenship granted exclusively to pre-1940 residents of Estonia and their descendants (thus excluding about 450,000 residents—about a third of the country's population).
	Property:	
Russian-speaking people have full rights to own property and participate in privatization.	Non-citizens lack right to participate in privatization but the Ministry of Economic Reforms can make exceptions regarding purchase of property.	Russian-speaking people lack rights to buy land and to participate in privatization.
	Voting:	
	Only citizens have right to vote; further determination of voting rights will take place in the current parliament.	Russian-speaking people have right to vote in municipal elections only.
Source: <i>The Criminal Situation and Social Tension in the Russian Federation in 1992</i> (Moscow: Minister of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, 1993) p. 78.		

problem is not pressing and is facilitated by regulation No. 8 of the constitution banishing discrimination on the grounds of language. However, some members in the parliament think that it is necessary to amend the Criminal and Administrative Laws because ignorance of the language is being used by ethnic Kazakh bureaucrats to create ethnically homogeneous administrative bodies. Thus from 1985 to 1992, when sovereignty was being established in Kazakhstan, the number of higher Kazakh state officials increased to 420 while the number of non-Kazakhs in similar positions remained constant at the 1988 level of 300. This is significant because it is this group of state officials that is so important in shoring up national stability.¹⁴ The situation is very similar in Tatarstan, where 70-75 percent of all administrative positions are held by Tatars; one can easily discern the creation of an ethnically-based state *nomenklatura*¹⁵ at the expense of the representatives of other minorities in all republics.

Discrimination on the grounds of language severely limits the rights of Russian speakers in employment and it renders people of pension age especially vulnerable. Nor is it easy to overcome language disabilities. There are few adult evening courses available in the state language and where such courses are available there is often only a very short period of time allowed to learn it. This violates international legal documents such as the General Declaration of Human Rights and the International Agreement on Political, Cultural and Social Rights.

In each of the former republics of the USSR the opportunity to receive higher and secondary education in non-state languages is substantially limited. For example, consider Article 10 of the Latvian Law on languages. It notes that the right to receive an education in one's native language is guaranteed for residents of Latvia. At the same time, it says that the state finances only those educational institutions where from the second year of study the state language, namely Latvian, is used.

In many other republics conditions which could facilitate the transition to the state language for the purposes of higher education are not yet in place. Methods and manuals for such instruction have not been worked out, especially for scientific-technical subjects. Very often teachers who belong to the native ethnic group do not know the state language well enough to teach it at a professional level even though in some republics a gradual transition to the state language is being planned. In Belarus, for example, the transition is planned for completion by the year 2000. But the majority of the population favours the idea of two languages for educational purposes.

It is evident that the complete rejection of the Russian language from the sphere of education when scientific, technical and foreign literature is not available in the state languages will inevitably lead to the destruction of information flows and the degradation of science. The situation is reminiscent of that in North Africa. In Algeria, for example, the problem has not been solved up to the present. They rejected the French language in the 1970s and 1980s, and immediately the problem of education became very complicated. Today the Algerians are taking a more pragmatic approach. In general, the experience of the developing countries is instructive: progress is quicker in those countries which are ready to compromise and use the language which had dominated earlier, parallel to the native state language.

Today the language problem is vital because it involves a large part of the non-native population in each republic. Only in Lithuania, Ukraine and Latvia is the percentage of Russian-speaking people with good ability in the native language high—33 percent, 25 percent and 20 percent, respectively. In Estonia and Moldova the corresponding figures are 10 percent and 12 percent, and in Kazakhstan and the other former republics of Central Asia 1-6 percent.

Thus in the "near abroad" the old approach to cultural and social problems has been revived and filled with

political content. In this sphere officials miss the point that the development of language use must be of an evolutionary character and involve an interaction of cultures.

Migration in Russia and the former republics of the USSR has encouraged the passage of many laws governing migration. However, these bills, decrees and regulations leave unsolved the problem of the responsibility of the governments of the states of the former USSR. Specifically, it is unclear when they must protect the rights of residents who do not speak the titular nationality's language, compensate the material and financial losses of refugees, and pay the housing expenses of refugees.

The situation is dangerously aggravated by local bureaucrats and regulations. The uncontrolled mass migration of refugees intensifies political, social, economic, demographic and criminal problems. It prompts local authorities in Stavropol and Krasnodar, for example, to resort to their own measures in limiting the admission of refugees and migrants.

The CIS Inter-Parliamentary Assembly is supposed to coordinate national laws and overcome sharp differences in citizenship questions between the former republics of the USSR. However, its functions today are mostly decorative because its regulations are not binding. They are basically recommendations.

Nor are human rights regulated by international law. Many countries in the region consider such matters a purely domestic concern. More practical from the point of view of the protection of human rights are bilateral and multilateral treaties. They can protect people against discrimination in employment, education and housing. They can provide social protection, allocate responsibilities for settling refugees, take care of the transportation of the property of the migrants and compensate their expenses.

At present, attempts to settle the migration problem at the state level are not succeeding in Russia. There are very few initiatives to conclude inter-

national treaties. A legal agreement does exist between the Russian Federation and Azerbaijan. It protects the citizens of each of these republics on the other's territory. There is also an agreement on interstate relations between the Russian Federation and Estonia and another on legal assistance in civil, family, and criminal cases. The latter regulates the protection of the rights of the citizens of both states in the event of property disputes. An agreement on regulating migration and protecting migrants' rights has been prepared by the parliaments of Russia and Tajikistan but has not yet been ratified. The problem of establishing and efficiently operating embassies and consular services in the republics is urgent because these institutions can give assistance and protection and offer naturalization services. Many voluntary organizations exist and are already rendering assistance. There are also national minority funds in the former republics but the help they provide is very limited. They need state support and financial assistance themselves.

We conclude that migration to Russia is largely uncontrolled and spontaneous. Russia and other states are unable to protect the rights of their citizens outside their boundaries. Given that financial and material means of assistance are so meagre, Russia can hardly deal with the stream of migrants, who must rely largely on their own devices.

Table 9: Attitudes of Muscovites Toward Various Ethnic Groups (in percent)

	Positive	Negative
Ukrainians	67	3
Jews	56	8
Tatars	53	11
Moldavians	47	7
Latvians	47	7
Armenians	37	34
Georgians	36	33
Gypsies	31	33
Chechens	27	40
Azeris	26	46

Part IV Crime and the Socio-Psychological Background of Migration

Migration has not jeopardized the social situation everywhere in Russia. We must look at its effects in each region separately. For example, in the central part of European Russia the situation is very favourable. There is a relatively high degree of ethnic tolerance.¹⁶ The Centre for the Study of Public Opinion at Moscow State University carried out a survey of public opinion in 1992 which demonstrates this. Some 1,009 Muscovites 18 years of age and over were interviewed. Two-thirds of them think that they do not have problems with members of other ethnic groups even though they live in a big multinational city. This indicates great tolerance on the part of Russians despite the growth of anti-Russian feelings and actions in many republics of the former USSR. Some respondents connect the existence of some problems with the multinational character of the Russian capital—17 percent say that the rise in crime, and 12 percent say that non-sanitary conditions, are connected to ethnic diversity. But it is recognized that these problems are of socioeconomic, not ethnic, origin. Such problems as mentioned above are characteristic of any big city. In Moscow they simply reflect the condition of the society and the insufficient work being done by the municipality. One can judge from Table 9 the attitudes of Muscovites toward non-Russian nationalities. They show that attitudes are worst toward Azeris and Chechens.

Other research shows that only a small proportion of people in the Tambov region regard ethnic principles very seriously when they choose neighbours. Moreover, only a tiny proportion of them dislike having neighbours from another ethnic group (see Table 10).¹⁷

Alongside the tolerance of the Central Russia population there are some areas in Russia where social and international conflicts caused by the streams of refugees and migrants are

dangerous to the point of explosion. This is the situation in the south of Russia (the Northern Caucasus region), where 75 percent of refugees are concentrated, mainly in Krasnodar, Rostov and Stavropol regions. It has become very typical of refugees to move to the southern areas and try to settle there, but not to the central regions of Russia as has been recommended by the authorities.

The Russian-speaking migrants possess high labour potential and are not afraid of difficulties. They have broken with their previous lives and are creating their own farms and businesses in deserted and neglected areas. Reviewing research sponsored by the Scientific Centre of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation in Krasnodar region in 1990-92,¹⁸ one can understand why more than half of the population of the region prefers Russian-speaking refugees. This must be regarded as a negative reaction to non-Russian migrants who flooded the southern areas of Russia. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, during 1991 the

Table 10: Respondents in Tambov Region Not Wishing to Have Members of Various Groups as Neighbours (in percent)

Drug addicts	87
Homosexuals	82
Drunkards	80
People with AIDS	68
People with a criminal record	63
Emotionally unbalanced people	52
Left-wing extremists	43
Right-wing extremists	42
Moslems	15
People with big families	12
Immigrants, foreign workers	11
People of another race	10
People of a nationality other than the respondents'	6

number of Meskhetian Turks in Rostov region increased from 6,500 to 9,500; in Kabardino-Balkaria, from 160 to 4,000; in Krasnodar, from 7,000 to 12,000. From June to October 1992 the number of Meskhetian Turks in Voronezh region dropped from 2,784 to 2,368 but the number increased in Krasnodar region from 13,130 to 13,350. During the same period the number of Armenians grew in Krasnodar region from 14,779 to 14,997; in Stavropol region from 14,225 to 15,097. The number of Azeris increased in Krasnodar region

from 1,269 to 1,337 and in Stavropol region from 1,096 to 1,195.

Refugees in Russia are not always able to choose where they will settle. In Krasnodar region in 1990, 20 percent of non-Russian speaking migrants did not any have choice of where to live. In 1992, that share grew to 66 percent. The refugees do their best to settle permanently. While in 1990, 65 percent of non-Russian refugees had such intentions, the percentage rose to 83 percent in 1992. Settling permanently was their highest priority (see Tables 11 and 12).

Notwithstanding their losses, 50 percent of non-Russian refugees in Krasnodar region were able to buy their own houses in the early 1990s. That is largely because relatives and friends of the refugees and migrants who live permanently in the area do their best to help. In 1992, 75 percent of refugees mentioned such assistance, up from 11 percent in 1990 (see Table 13).

The uncontrolled migration and settlement of refugees in the North Caucasus seriously aggravates ethnic relations. The situation regarding the Meskhetian Turks is explosive in the Crimea, Apsheron, Armavir and Koren districts of Krasnodar region. Nearly all refugees experience a feeling of unease and fear for themselves and their relatives regarding possible conflicts with the local people. One-third of refugees and 62 percent of the local population surveyed mentioned this anxiety in 1990.

Some of the refugees try to escape registration. According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in the cities of Stavropol, Georgievsk and Kavkas Mineralni Vodi, many illegal deals have been made with the aim of obtaining apartments against regulations. There are many marriages of convenience and fictitious divorces which allow people to obtain local registration and residence permits (*propiska*) and thus become eligible for state apartments. Some 1,600 refugees are living in Stavropol region without a *propiska*.

The adaptation of the migrants has deteriorated because of relations with

the local population. The latter view refugees as the cause of the worsening economic and social situation and as rivals in the labour and housing markets. Relations are full of conflict where professionals are involved because competition for administrative positions and material advantages is stiff. The flood of migrants is accompanied by universal rent and price hikes. Half of the respondents in Krasnodar region said that rent and the price of houses and agricultural products have jumped dramatically, and that it had become more difficult to find a good job and a place for children in kindergartens and schools (see Table 14).

According to the State Committee for Ethnic Relations, people of Armenian nationality in Krasnodar region find themselves in the most complicated situation. The Kuban Cossacks openly demonstrate their hostility against the Armenians. The Committee's research shows that the local people have a highly negative attitude toward the refugees because the latter have more money; they do not do manual work but act as traders and brokers. The survey of refugees in the Krasnodar region confirms that refugees obtain money not by earning it in state institutions according to their

Table 11: Orientation of Non-Russian Refugees in Krasnodar Region to their Current Residence, 1990 and 1992 (in percent)

	1990	1992
Wish to return to their former place of residence or leave for another republic	35	17
Do not wish go elsewhere	65	83

Table 12: The Most Urgent Problems that Concerned Non-Russian Refugees in Krasnodar Region, 1990 and 1992 (in percent)

Problem Type	1990	1992
Residence permit (<i>propiska</i>)	88	83
Employment	66	66
Lodging	55	41
Compensation for damages	44	42
Language difficulties	6	42
Lack of earnings	40	33
Children's enrolment in Daycare and school	42	25
Conflict with local residents	2	25
Further high school and College education	29	17
Climate	0	8
Religious ceremonies	27	0
Protection of national Customs and traditions	26	0

Table 13: Refugees' Sources of Income, 1990 and 1992 (in percent)

Means of Existence	1990	1992
Assistance from relatives or friends	11	75
Part-time work	26	50
Compensation for damage	39	42
Work in my speciality at a state enterprise	55	41
Work not in my speciality	10	8
Savings	60	25
Social assistance	40	0
Community funds	7	0
Private assistance	5	0
Work in cooperatives or small enterprises	29	0
Other	5	17

occupations but by getting it from relatives and friends in the form of the assistance, from temporary jobs and from "other" sources. Some 92 percent of respondents stressed that they did not have work. Of the refugees who did work, 17 percent were engaged in selling in the markets, 17 percent in commercial ventures, and 50 percent in odd jobs. More than half of the respondents said that TVs, tape recorders, VCRs, furniture, clothes, footwear and cars are available to them.

Ethnic cultural differences play a big role in generating interethnic tensions. Ignorance of, and lack of respect for, local manners and traditions cause local people to become irritated with the newcomers. Thus the image of a refugee that has been created in the minds of the local population does not coincide with the realities of life. Given this background, the places inhabited by refugees are known as criminally dangerous. Information from October 1, 1992 reveals rising annual crime rates in many areas: 41 percent in Krasnodar region, 28 percent in Russia as a whole. The local population readily connects these facts with the arrival of refugees, even though the number of crimes and offences committed by refugees is not large. For example, in

Stavropol region, twelve crimes were committed by refugees in 1991, and only three during a nine-month period in 1992-93 (compared to 142 in Russia as a whole).

Isolated cases of illegal acts by refugees produce a very sharp reaction on the part of the local population, including demands for deportation. Thus in 1991-92 in the cities of Stavropol and Mineralni vodi, in rural parts of Shapovsky, Novoaleksandrovsk and other areas, rallies were held and demands made to deport refugees because the latter were not working, were creating conflict and were said to be involved in illegal activities. Such an atmosphere is supported by local authorities and the local mass media in some cases. The city of Armavir (Krasnodar region, population: 180,000) can be regarded as the most volatile place in the area. Cossacks have confronted the 12,000-14,000 Armenians living there. Hostilities have assumed various forms: mutual re-criminations, assaults, participation of Cossacks in the deportation of Armenians who lacked residence permits, confrontations and attempted executions. In July 1992, two Armenians were killed.

Recently refugees have begun to be manipulated by destructive elements. For example, in June 1992, a national militant group from South Osetia seized military equipment and weapons under the cover of refugees, including women, elderly people and children. Such incidents cause heightened ethnic tension and further deterioration of the situation.

Research suggests that the local population will not remain a passive witness to the negative consequences of growth in the number of refugees. At the moment, violent

methods of dealing with the problem are in general rejected. Thus a 1990 survey found that 14 percent of respondents approved of the violence in Krasnodar region. In 1992 only 9 percent of respondents shared this opinion. Meanwhile the number of people who choose to confront the problem by participating in picketing government offices and institutions has increased from 3 to 13 percent. The percentage of respondents who wish to settle the problem by participating in meetings and demonstrations has also increased from 16 percent to 19 percent. Half of the respondents expressed the wish to join the national-patriotic forces of Russia.

The refugees, however, are more likely to use violent methods to solve their problems. In Krasnodar region in 1992, 17 percent of the refugees expressed this willingness while in 1990 not a single refugee did so. A quarter of the respondents said that they had already been involved in conflicts with local people, 58 percent said that they had witnessed such conflicts, 42 percent cited ethnic hatred as the grounds for ethnic conflict, and 64 percent said that ethnic conflict grows out of everyday, routine life (more than one option could be chosen).

Taking all the above into account, one arrives at the following conclusions: The aggravation of the social and criminal situation is caused mainly by the arrival of non-Russian speaking migrants, especially when they settle in the south of Russia. The national and clan traditions of the Caucasian peoples encourage illegal activities and are very dangerous for the refugees in these areas. Another threat involves using refugees in the interests of the clans. On the other hand, the psychological tension of the local population can result in mass confrontations and violence against non-Russian refugees. The danger of forced migration is not so much the number of crimes and offences committed by and against refugees as it is the potential threat of the refugee milieu, which can easily become the source of massive unrest and physical conflict.

Table 14: Local Population's Opinions about Changes in Krasnodar Region after the Arrival of Refugees, 1990 and 1992 (in percent)

	1990	1992
Conditions of life are the same	35	13
Conditions of life are better	0	2
Distribution of food and goods has become worse	65	43
Price of agricultural products and goods at markets has gone up	0	48
It is hard to find a good job	4	23
It is more difficult to arrange school and day care for children	6	12
The price of houses and apartments has gone up	0	54
Inter-ethnic conflicts between people are emerging	30	35
Violations of public order have become more frequent	30	37

Speaking about Russia in general terms, the intensification of social tension, the rising crime rate, and the growth of xenophobia are not the direct results of the present migration process. Besides, they are not identical in different districts and bear a strong regional stamp. The situation in the European part of Russia is very different from that in the south. In the south there are few legal control mechanisms governing the arrival and admission of migrants and refugees, and this has dangerous social consequences.

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Part V

Labour Emigration and the Brain Drain from Russia

In 1990 total emigration from Russia to the West and Israel reached 103,600 people. It fell to 88,300 in 1991 and rose again to 102,900 in 1992. In 1992 the ethnic composition of emigration to the West and Israel changed significantly, with the proportion of Germans and Russians rising and the proportion of Jews falling. The major receiving countries throughout the early 1990s were Israel, Germany and the USA. It may be expected that in the next few years emigration rates will continue at about 100,000 people per year.¹⁹

According to K. Frolov, Vice-President of the Russian Academy of Science, during the years of *perestroika* more than 150,000 members of the intelligentsia, mainly people with technical and scientific backgrounds, left Russia. The reduction in the number of scientific studies taking place in the various branches of science which are considered the most essential today is keenly felt. For example, in ecology Russia is very far behind the USA in the study of how engineering and technical problems influence nature and humankind.²⁰

More than 30,000 Russian scientists are now working in the USA and in Israel. There are more than 4,000 in Germany, 600 in France,²¹ and 95 in Korea. Some 150 scientists are soon

expected to leave for other countries in the former Soviet Union and another 50 for Chile.²² It is very likely that Russian specialists will be leaving for other Latin American countries too. The Venezuela Oil Company plans to spend five million dollars for a highly qualified work force from the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The European Community estimates that 50,000 people will be recruited in this way. The former Brazilian Minister of Education said that Brazil is ready to employ 10,000 scientists from the former Soviet Union in the universities and scientific centres of his country. Other possible destinations for Russian specialists include Malaysia, Singapore and the countries of the Persian Gulf, where the need for highly qualified specialists in banking and the computer business is urgent.

The Russian government passed a regulation on the conclusion of an agreement between Russia, Germany and Finland which allows the citizens of Russia to work legally in Germany and Finland on a contract basis. Every year 2,000 Russian specialists leave Russia to do such contract work. In the draft of the agreement it is mentioned that the number of people working in Germany on the basis of contracts will reach 8,000. The salary of Russian specialists must be in accordance with German rates.²³ Other such agreements are completed, while others are at the discussion stage, with more than 30 countries in Europe, America, Australia and Asia.

One survey suggests that the factors which motivate people to look for work abroad include the decline in the standard of living (77.7 percent), economic instability (69.9 percent), uncertainty about the future (54.4 percent), political instability (50.5 percent), poor furnishing of material-technical information in Russian science (4.9 percent), and low wages.²⁴ As of April 1, 1993 there were 7,390 unemployed scientists in Russia.²⁵

Russia and the West are especially concerned about the emigration of scientists employed in the nuclear indus-

try. Among physicists the potential rate of emigration is very high according to a survey carried out among leading scientists. Thirteen percent of physicists are ready to leave the country for abroad immediately and 40 percent of the respondents do not exclude such a possibility.²⁶

The specialists are leaving scientific institutes and construction offices in large numbers. In 1992, defence plants lost 600,000 people, scientific-research institutes and construction offices, 200,000 people.²⁷

According to the Director of the CIA, one million former Soviet citizens are engaged in the production of nuclear weapons. Out of this number, 1,000-2,000 are able to construct such weapons, 3,000-5,000 have experience in the production of plutonium, and tens of thousands have knowledge which could be very useful for countries which want to build and design missiles and produce chemical weapons.²⁸

According to western secret service sources, 60 of the 4,000 Soviet scientists who are connected with the nuclear bomb have been recruited by five foreign states. According to the same source, for each scientist, recruiters from Iran, Pakistan, India, Iraq and Brazil receive US \$1,000 and the Soviet scientists are promised an annual income of US \$36,000-75,000 and the right to settle in the host country.²⁹

Our sources quote another point of view. The Russian Atomic Ministry says that cases are known in which scientists connected with secret technology emigrate. But even if several hundred such scientists emigrate, they would not be able to build a nuclear bomb in a developing country because doing so requires a great deal of experience and access to very scarce technology and a unique industrial culture. The intelligence service of Russia stresses that access to detailed information in the sphere of nuclear weaponry is available only to several dozen scientists who have not left the country.³⁰

The real danger of losing such highly trained professionals exists

nonetheless. It is created by the sharp decline in the standard of living of scientists and engineers and by the collapse of the military-industrial complex and the uncontrolled conversion of industry from military to civilian use.

Today the envisaged growth in labour emigration is not considered very serious. Quotas on immigrants from Russia have been cut by Australia, Belgium, Finland, Spain, Germany, England and France due to high unemployment rates in those countries. Some economists maintain that immigration has a negative impact on GNP growth and on the personal income of the local people and that it deprives the local population of jobs.

Another factor which can affect emigration and labour migration negatively is the rise of nationalistic activities, the emergence of nationalistic parties and groups, and the support of these tendencies by the local population in Western Europe.

In general, the position of the West regarding labour migrants is becoming more pragmatic. There are two main approaches. The first imposes exact quotas on migrants. It would allow the West to keep immigration in close correspondence with national plans for economic, scientific and technical development. For example, the new Immigration Bill of the USA creates good opportunities for qualified specialists. The quota is 140,000 people per year. Requirements for this category are that the immigrant be a qualified and licensed worker, a scientist, or a person working in modern branches of industry connected with the use of science, such as protection of the environment. The US will accept only those people who are able to satisfy the economic needs of country.

The second option involves the improvement of the conditions of life for potential emigrants in their motherlands. This option is relevant particularly to specialists who are engaged in the production of weapons and who are highly valued abroad. Employment projects are approved when they can use the potential of weapons spe-

cialists in the interests of the West. Thus, for example, negotiations have been concluded between Russia, the European Community and Japan about establishing in Moscow (and later, possibly in Kiev) a Labour Exchange for specialists in nuclear weaponry. Similarly, the USA promised 50 million dollars to assist and support Russian scientists. With this project, the USA will save 4 billion dollars.³¹

The opinion exists that it is in the interest of the Western countries to promote technical and economic assistance and participate in investments to create new economic structures in Russia. European experts have emphasized the need to finance projects involving the conversion of industry from military to civilian use and to give technical assistance and train specialists. Similarly, the USA and other countries are creating an international scientific centre in Moscow which will attract scientists now engaged in the manufacture of nuclear bombs, ballistic missiles and other dangerous weapons for work in civilian projects. According to an agreement signed by the Department of Energy of the USA and the Kurchatov Institute of Nuclear Physics, 120 Russian scientists will be engaged in American research projects every year. The Department of Energy will pay the scientists US \$90,000. Expenses for similar research with American scientists would cost the American government US \$10 to \$15 million dollars, and America has invested US \$25 million in the creation of the American-German-Russian Scientific Centre for nuclear research. The funders of the Strategic Defence Initiative in the USA have instituted a program for obtaining technology and specialists from Russia. This project involves the purchase of Russian technology in 50 scientific branches, especially those where it is believed that the USA lags behind the USSR. The employment of 1,000 Soviet scientists and engineers will cost America only US \$550 per person each year. It could save the USA more than US \$4.5 billion.³² As far as we know, nobody in Russia

has tried to evaluate the full consequences for Russia of all these projects.

One cannot judge present Russian migration processes apart from their connection to world migration patterns. According to O. Stark's "balance theory,"³³ and the theory of the optimal world distribution of the factors of production under the influence of the price mechanism, general world profit is created as a result of labour force migration. We believe that such theories may well explain the rules governing world migration. However, the term "general world profit" seems to be a philosophical abstraction. Given the existence of national borders, losses or profits caused by the international movement of the labour force can be evaluated only in terms of given nation-states.

Conclusion

The total social transformation which the states of the former Soviet Union are going through today has generated a sharp intensification of migration processes, which have assumed new forms, contents and features in the 1990s. In the last few years we have witnessed ethnic migrations, repatriations of deported peoples, the homecoming of the Soviet army from Eastern Europe, various streams of refugees, and high levels of emigration, particularly of Jews and Germans.

The subject of migration used to interest only a narrow circle of specialists. Today, however, migration is an extremely important social, political and economic process. Not surprisingly, therefore, it has recently attracted the attention of many politicians in the former Soviet Union and abroad. Specifically:

- From an *economic* point of view, the high rate of immigration to Russia has negative consequences for the country. Refugees are being settled at the cost of billions of roubles—mainly Russia's. As long as the basic economic problems of Russians living in Russia remain unsolved, forced migration will aggravate a

very tense situation in the country regarding employment and housing, and will make it more difficult to implement political and economical reforms.

On the other hand, a very negative evaluation of forced migration and its consequences is not warranted. The growing number of able-bodied workers could help improve the demographics situation in Russia and help restore and develop neglected districts of the country. This could happen if the immigrants are welcomed, accepted, and employed—conditions which do not presently exist.

For the countries of the “near abroad,” the migration of the Russian-speaking population involves the loss of engineering, scientific, and technical specialists. Emigration will thus stimulate a decline in economic production.

In Central Asia, where Islamization is well under way, the emigration of Russians could heighten conflict between the remaining ethnic groups. In these areas the Russian people traditionally played a conciliatory role.

- From a *demographic* point of view, the role of migration has changed considerably in influencing the structure and size of the population of Russia. Due to the sharp fall of the birth rate and increase of the death rate, migration is becoming a key factor affecting the size of the population of Russia.

Concerning internal migration, one notes first that the pattern of rural-urban migration has altered. In 1992, for the first time in many years the number of people who moved into rural areas was greater than the number of people who moved out of them.

Movement between the countryside and the city can become routinized by socioeconomic reforms. The stream of rural people to urban areas is influenced by the privatization of land on the one hand and, on the other hand, the growth of unemployment, housing prob-

lems, difficulties in obtaining food and ecological conditions in the cities.

Inter-regionally, return migration from the North, Siberia and the Far East is gaining strength. This modification of internal migration patterns will diminish the size of the labour force in these remote regions and will jeopardize economic development there. On the other hand, the return of these people to their former places of residence will cause additional unemployment and labour unrest in the Russian heartland.

Inter-urban migration is characterized by population movement from small to large cities. With the development of market relations, big cities have started to attract business people, the unemployed and criminals. The removal of administrative restrictions on inter-urban migration will turn big cities into centres of social tension.

- From the *ethnic* point of view, we are witnessing a unique process involving population redistribution of a sixth of the world's land surface. The policy of ethnic cleansing, which is being practised by most ex-Soviet republics either overtly or covertly, urges non-native people to move to their titular republics—mainly Russian speakers to Russia. Forcing Russians out of social, political, economic and cultural life in the former republics has become a routine practice.

In the next four to five years Russia must be prepared to receive even more Russian speakers from the ex-Soviet republics and from ethnic administrative districts in the Russian Federation. According to various forecasts, between 400,000 and 3 million Russians may be expected in this period.

- From the *political* point of view, increased regional separatism poses a real danger to Russia's sovereignty as a distinct historical subject. It is spread by local ethnic elites in the national administrative dis-

tricts and autonomous republics in the Russian Federation.

Migration has become both a cause and a consequence of separatism. In some districts of Russia, such as Tatarstan, Chechen-Ingushetia, Dagestan, Tuva and Northern Osetia, priority is given to the rights of the titular nationality rather than to general human rights. The autonomous republics are increasingly seen as nascent states for their titular ethnic groups.

- Regardless of the fact that the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation passed a bill on refugees in 1993, and despite the Russian Federation signing the UN Convention of 1951 and its Protocols of 1967, the legal regulation of migration is not working. The Russian administration has not taken a definite position on protecting the rights of its citizens who are outside Russia and this obviously affects the conditions of life for Russian speakers in the “near abroad.” The conclusion of bilateral and multilateral international treaties between states has a beneficial effect. Aside from protecting human rights in employment and education, and ensuring social protection for people of non-titular nationalities, they regulate duties and rules for accepting migrants and mutual compensation between states.

The settlement of 75 percent of forced migrants and refugees in southern Russia has led to the aggravation of social tensions there. The most serious consequences of forced migration lie not in the number of crimes committed by or against refugees but in the potential danger of the refugee milieu as a source of widespread armed conflict.

- Just a few years ago Russia was a closed system with very limited emigration. But the situation changed dramatically in the 1990s. In the next three to five years the level of emigration will probably remain stable at about 100,000 people per year. It will be controlled by

the degree of economic, social and ethnic tension in Russia and, at its borders, by Western immigration quotas and regulations. In general terms the demand for nonqualified workers is very low in the West. This situation is very different from that which existed in the 1960s when the mass emigration of nonqualified workers was welcomed. Then the stream of immigrants to Western Europe and North America had a positive economic impact on the West. Russian reforms allowing freedom of emigration were 30 years too late to take advantage of those conditions.

- The high proportion of professionals and highly educated people among emigrants from Russia today testifies to the negative impact of emigration on the intellectual potential of Russia. Comparing the qualitative features of emigration and immigration, we see a looming danger of migration imbalance: the departure of highly qualified workers and the arrival of less qualified immigrants from the "near abroad."

There is little possibility that the emigration/immigration situation can be transformed without radical socioeconomic and political improvements in Russia. Some of the negative impact can be diminished by firmly establishing the state borders of Russia and by concluding bilateral and multinational international treaties on the legal regulation of migration. But even these changes will not affect the fundamental cause of contemporary migration in Russia: the aggravation of ethnic relations throughout the region due to the post-socialist transformation.

The countries of Western Europe are pluralist democracies in a post-nationalistic phase of their existence.³⁴ They have developed among themselves various forms of economic, social, cultural, and political cooperation. In contrast, the countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia are going through a

very painful process of forming their own democratic principles. This is accompanied by the growth of nationalism and national intolerance, when the rights of national groups have higher priority than general human rights, when xenophobia is spreading, when administrative forces are crumbling, when a war of laws is being prosecuted, and when territorial claims and national conflicts are leading to confrontations involving the use of force.

It is difficult to foresee how long this transitional period will continue. It is, however, very likely that the passage of Eastern Europe and Central Asia to higher levels of national tolerance will have to be analyzed by a future generation of social scientists.

Afterword to the English Edition

Analysis of the most recent data concerning the migration situation in Russia at the beginning of 1994 confirms the further development of all the tendencies mentioned above.

For example, the flow of migrants continues to increase and the rate of natural increase continues to decline. Thus the highest rate of in-migration since World War II (430,000 in 1993) could not compensate for the diminution of the Russian population due to natural causes by 737,000 in the same year.

The flow of (mainly Russian) migrants from Central Asia, Transcaucasia and Kazakhstan to Russia is also intensifying. In 1993, these regions accounted for two-thirds of the total number of immigrants to Russia. Russians make up 62 percent of all refugees.

Russia continues to maintain a negative net migration balance with Belarus and Ukraine, and with Western countries and Israel. In 1993, emigration of Russians to foreign countries outside the former USSR exceeded the level of the previous few

years. Some 115,900 people left for abroad in 1993, 11 percent more than in the previous year.

In a like fashion, other tendencies analyzed in the text are corroborated by up-to-date data. The past year has witnessed a worsening of the criminal situation in regions of mass concentration of migrants, a growing threat of migration imbalance, an intensification of economic and political problems connected with the absorption of new settlers, etc. The gravity of the economic, social, demographic and political consequences of migration—not only for Russia, but for the world as a whole—will thus require much scientific study in the years ahead. ■

Notes

1. The "near abroad" refers to the former Soviet republics outside Russia.
2. *Information Reference of the State Statistics Committee of the Russian Federation*. 1993. No. 17-1-16/11, January 14.
3. Institute for Sociopolitical Research. 1993. *The Social and Sociopolitical Situation in Russia: Conditions and Forecast, 1992*, p 62. Moscow: Russian Academy of Science.
4. *Information Reference...* op. cit.
5. *Information Reference...* op. cit.
6. State Statistics Committee of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. 1991. *Materials of the Selective Research on Reasons for Migration*. Moscow. (The survey was carried out at the end of 1991 over a period of 35 days. Respondents were 16 years of age and over. They were interviewed in 23 Russian locations where they had settled.)
7. The titular national group is the native ethnic group from which a territory derives its name, e.g., Ukrainians in Ukraine.
8. *Republic Long-term "Migration" Programme*. 1992. May 18:6.
9. *The Criminal Situation and Social Tension in the Russian Federation in 1992*. 1993. Moscow: Minister of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation: 78.
10. In this section we cite results of a sociological survey reported in *The Social and Sociopolitical Situation in Russia: Conditions and Forecast, 1992* (Moscow: Institute for Sociopolitical Research, Russian Academy of Science, 1992) pp. 48-54.
11. TASS Information. *Kompas*. 1992. No. 242, December 15.

12. *E.M.I.* 1993. No. 30, January 20.
13. *Rossiyskaya gazeta*. 1993. March 18.
14. *Rossiyskaya gazeta*. 1993. February 20.
15. *Nomenklatura* refers to the Soviet ruling class of party-appointed managers.
16. *The Criminal Situation and Social Tension in the Russian Federation in 1992* (Moscow: Research Centre of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, 1993) p. 73.
17. This research was headed by V. G. Andreenkov of the Department of Research Methodology of the Russian Academy of Science. See the Institute's report for 1992, pp. 46-8.
18. Schipanov, N. I. and Rozkov, S. S. 1992. *Possible Social and Criminal Consequences of the Forced Migration of the Population*. pp. 5-21. Moscow: Scientific Centre of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.
19. For a general assessment of emigration from Russia, see Irena Orlova "A Sketch of the Migration and Refugee Situation in Russia," *Refuge* (Vol. 13, No. 2: May 1993) pp. 19-22.
20. *Rossiyskaya gazeta*. 1993. April 24.
21. *EMI*. 1993. No. 5, February.
22. *Rossiyskaya gazeta*. 1993. April 24.
23. *Finansovye izvestiya*. 1992. February 11.
24. Results of a survey of the Institute of Problems of Employment of the Russian Academy of Science conducted among 774 physicists engaged in basic research in the biggest scientific centres of Russia, as reported in *Moskovskie novosti*, No. 14 (4 April 1993).
25. *Rossiyskaya gazeta*. 1993. April 24.
26. *Moskovskie novosti*. 1993. No. 14, April 4.
27. *Moskovskie novosti*. 1993. No. 11, 14 March 14.
28. TASS Information. 1992. *Kompas*. 1992. No. 46, March 9:5.
29. TASS Information. *Kompas*. 1992. No. 7, January 14.
30. In the sphere of nuclear research (in chemistry, biology, nuclear energy) in Russia, 1,500 to 2,000 people are employed. *EMI*, No 5 (February 1993).
31. TASS Information. *Kompas*. 1992. No. 135, July 16.
32. TASS Information. *Kompas*. 1992. No. 39, February 27:32.
33. Stark, O. *The Migration of Labour*. 1989. Cambridge UK: Basil Blackwell.
34. Dogan, M. 1993. "The Decline of Nationalism in Western Europe." *Sociological Research*. 3:86-98. □

Immigration and Refugee Board

Convention Refugee Determination Hearings

Claims Process Period: January 1, 1994 – March 31, 1994

Regional Summary

	Ottawa/Atlantic	Quebec	Ontario	Prairies	B.C.	National
Claims heard to completion (includes cases before 1994)	499	1,814	3,365	127	276	6,081
Decisions rendered	545	1,994	3,902	133	286	6,860
Claims rejected	67	555	1,478	37	151	2,288
Claims upheld	478	1,439	2,424	96	135	4,572
Withdrawn/abandoned	73	234	699	26	133	1,165
Decisions pending*	91	389	1,613	34	243	2,370
Claims pending**	1,220	5,183	8,487	266	2,019	17,175

* Decisions pending include all claims heard to completion for which no decision had been rendered by the end of the reporting period.

** Claims pending include all claims referred to the Convention Refugee Determination Division that have not been finalized (i.e. by a positive or negative decision or by withdrawal or abandonment) as of the end of the reporting period.

Statistical Summary by Major Source Countries

	Country of Alleged Persecution	Claims		Convention Refugee Status			
		Heard to Completion	Withdrawn Abandoned	Decided	Yes	No	Accept.%
1.	Sri Lanka	976	60	1,040	917	123	88.2
2.	Somalia	832	44	834	809	25	97.0
3.	Iran	338	32	341	286	55	83.9
4.	India	235	123	267	124	143	46.4
5.	Israel	216	36	336	92	244	27.4
6.	Bangladesh	182	31	184	132	52	71.7
7.	Yugoslavia	155	108	180	136	44	75.6
8.	Pakistan	148	44	210	122	88	58.1
9.	China	146	20	162	69	93	42.6
10.	Haiti	137	8	144	120	24	83.3
11.	Guatemala	134	28	125	67	58	53.6
12.	Russia	125	19	198	98	100	49.5
13.	Peru	117	10	111	84	27	75.7
14.	Afghanistan	115	5	118	110	8	93.2
15.	Romania	111	21	148	68	80	45.9
16.	Moldova	101	6	151	94	57	62.3
17.	Lebanon	95	31	142	63	79	44.4
18.	El Salvador	94	34	95	35	60	36.8
19.	Zaire	92	2	87	82	5	94.3
20.	Ukraine	88	23	110	52	58	47.3
21.	USSR	80	29	151	56	95	37.1
22.	Iraq	74	9	76	72	4	94.7
23.	Sudan	73	3	74	62	12	83.8
24.	Algeria	67	14	75	52	23	69.3
25.	Kuwait	67	1	67	65	2	97.0
Top-25 Countries		4,798	741	5,426	3,867	1,559	71.3
Total		6,081	1,165	6,860	4,572	2,288	66.6

Source: Immigration and Refugee Board, Ottawa; News Release, May 20, 1994.

/ A.S.A.