Refuge

SYMPOSIUM

*Beyond
the
Global Compacts*

Founded in 1981, *Refuge* is an interdisciplinary journal published by the Centre for Refugee Studies, York University. The journal aims to provide a forum for discussion and critical reflection on refugee and forced migration issues.

Refuge invites contributions from researchers, practitioners, and policy makers with national, international, or comparative perspectives. Special, thematic issues address the broad scope of the journal's mandate, featuring articles and reports, shorter commentaries, and book reviews. All submissions to *Refuge* are subject to double-blinded peer review. Articles are accepted in either English or French.

Refuge is a non-profit, independent periodical funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and supported by the membership of the Canadian Association for Refugee and Forced Migration Studies (CARFMS). The views expressed in *Refuge* do not necessarily reflect those of its funders or editors.

Refuge is indexed and abstracted in the *Index to Canadian Legal Literature*, *Pais International*, *Sociological Abstracts*, the *International Bibliography of the Social Sciences*, and *Canadian Business and Current Affairs*. In accordance with the journal's open access policy, the full text of articles published in *Refuge* is also available online through our website, www.yorku.ca/refuge.

Contents

"It Will Be a Weapon in My Hand": The Protective Potential of Education for Adolescent Syrian Refugee Girls in Lebanon

STEPHANIE CHOW GARBERN, SHAIMAA HELAL, SAJA MICHAEL, NIKKOLE J. TURGEON, AND SUSAN BARTELS

Abstract

This study uses over 140 first-person narratives from adolescent Syrian girls and Syrian parents displaced to Lebanon and literature from the Education in Emergencies (EiE) field to examine the concept of the protective potential of education. The findings illustrate the interplay between the risks taken to obtain education versus the protective potential of education for this vulnerable group. For this study population, protection risks frequently outweighed the protective potential of education and ultimately influenced decision-making at the individual level on continuation of education in Lebanon.

Résumé

Cette étude s'appuie sur plus de 140 récits à la première personne d'adolescentes et de parents syriens déplacés au Liban ainsi que sur la littérature existante dans le champ de l'éducation en situations d'urgence afin d'examiner le concept du potentiel protecteur de l'éducation. Les résultats illustrent l'interaction dynamique entre les risques pris pour obtenir une éducation et le potentiel protecteur de l'éducation pour ce groupe vulnérable. Pour la population étudiée, les risques en matière de protection l'emportaient fréquemment sur le potentiel protecteur de l'éducation et avaient ultimement une influence sur la prise de décision des individus concernant la poursuite d'une éducation au Liban.

Introduction

Education is a fundamental human right protected by international law, with all children, including refugees, having the right to accessible education.[1] Since the onset of the Syrian conflict in 2011, over 5.5 million people have fled Syria, largely to the surrounding countries of Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt, with approximately 1.9 million school-aged Syrian refugee children (three to eighteen years) now in the region.[2] Lebanon hosts the largest number of refugees per capita in the world; approximately one million Syrian refugees are officially registered with the United Nations High

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Lebanon, of whom nearly 600,000 are school-aged children, and over half are female.[3] No formal refugee camps have been established in Lebanon per official policy, with the result that Syrian refugees live dispersed within cities, towns, or in informal tented settlements (ITS) throughout the country.[4]

As of 2018, over 250,000 school-aged Syrian refugee children in Lebanon (over 40 of the total) remain out of both formal education (FE) and non-formal education (NFE), with many having been out of school for at least several years.[5] Adolescents make up a large proportion of those out of school, with fewer than 5 per cent of secondary school-aged Syrian refugee children enrolled in school.[6] While there are approximately equal numbers of Syrian girls and boys enrolled in school in Lebanon, reports have indicated that the reasons for not attending school are varied as well as gender- and age-specific.[7]

Education of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon

Prior to the Syrian conflict, Syria had made great advances in education, with over 93 per cent of girls and 94 per cent of boys enrolled in primary school as of 2009.[8] The conflict had a catastrophic impact on school enrolment within Syria as well as for Syrian children displaced to other countries.[9] In response to the crisis in education for Syrian refugee children, substantial coordinated efforts have been undertaken, including comprehensive national plans by host countries as well as regional strategies such as the No Lost Generation initiative—a collaboration between UN agencies, governments, donors, local and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Syria, as well as neighbouring host countries of Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt.[10]

In 2014, Lebanon's Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MEHE) developed an ambitious national response plan—Reaching All Children with Education (RACE)—to improve access to and quality of education, not only for refugees but also vulnerable Lebanese children.[11] Lebanon's public educational system, even prior to the start of the Syrian conflict, was weak, with only one-third of Lebanese children attending public schools, and the majority relying on Lebanon's extensive private school network.[12] RACE aimed to have all children enrolled in quality education through interventions such as allowing refugees to enrol in public schools without legal residency, waiving school fees, and introducing a second-shift system specifically for Syrian students.[13] While far from accomplishing the aim to enrol all children in school, there were commendable achievements in providing education, including increases in school enrolment rates from fewer than 20,000 Syrian students in 2011–12 to over 140,000 in 2015–16.[14] The first phase (RACE I) was implemented in 2014–16, with the second phase, RACE II (2017–21) further scaling up educational access and quality, as well as further integrating child-protection principles into its interventions.[15]

Despite these promising gains, as of 2018 Lebanon hosts the highest proportion of Syrian refugee children unable to access education in the region.[16] There are widespread structural barriers to education for the majority of Syrian children in Lebanon, including job scarcity for Syrian parents, extensive poverty, language and curriculum differences between Syrian and Lebanese educational systems, and lack of legal status. Lack of legal status has dire implications for education: Syrian children risk being arrested at checkpoints on their way to school, while Syrian parents are restricted in their ability to search for work, driving child labour and forcing children out of school.[17] An estimated 74 per cent of Syrians in Lebanon lack legal status as the result of residency regulations that require Syrians to be registered with the UNHCR or to have a Lebanese sponsor.[18] Lebanon, which is not signatory to the 1951 Convention on Refugees, has requested that the UNHCR suspend registration of Syrian refugees since 2015.[19]

The Protective Potential of Education

Education in emergencies (EiE) is a relatively new but burgeoning field, with a growing body of increasingly empirical research that has improved the humanitarian sector's understanding of the educational needs of children and adolescents affected by disaster and conflict, as well as the interventions to best improve educational outcomes.[20] Education has been promoted as a central means of protection in emergencies, offering "physical, psychosocial and cognitive protection that can sustain and save lives" as stated by the Inter-agency Network for Education in Emergencies, and education is now considered a core component of humanitarian response.[21] As described in Graça Machel's seminal 1996 report *The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children*, school can "be a haven of security that is vital to the well-being of war-affected children and their communities."[22]

This conceptual framework of the *protective potential of education* (PPE) from EiE is the key justification for humanitarian provision of education. EiE is upheld as a means to protect against threats of abduction, violence, discrimination, economic exploitation, and child labour, as well as for creating a sense of normality, supporting psychological healing from traumatic experiences, and enabling access to other life-saving services.[23] Despite intentions that education be protective, there is a lack of empirical evidence demonstrating the protective effect of EiE and how this can best be achieved. Furthermore, the research comes largely from grey literature reports, which suggest that education may have both positive and negative consequences, especially for girls.[24] The documented rise of targeted attacks on

education (against students, educators, and/or their institutions) during armed conflict, summarized in a series of four reports since 2007 by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack, has further convoluted the conceptualization of the PPE in emergencies. According to the 2018 *Education under Attack* report, more than 1,000 students or educators have been harmed or killed, in addition to a multitude of physical attacks on schools, military use of schools, and recruitment and sexual violence at or en route to schools between 2013 and 2017.[25]

The literature on PPE has focused largely on the evidence for psychosocial benefits of education, with schools acting to enrich social support, provide meaningful activity, and provide a sense of hope, as described in one of the earliest studies on the topic conducted among Chechen adolescents in the early 2000s.[26] The concept of "child-friendly" spaces/schools has also demonstrated positive protective effects of education for children and adolescents affected by conflict.[27] More recently, however, a study from three regions, including several affected by conflict, has also shown mixed evidence of the effect of school enrolment on risk of emotional, physical, and sexual violence in adolescents; in several of the countries studied, enrolment increased the risk of violence among both females and males, although it was protective for females in another country.[28] A randomized-controlled trial in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) also showed mixed results in a project designed to improve social and classroom interactions, with students reporting higher level of perceived support but no effect on reported level of well-being.[29]

Education for Adolescent Refugee Girls

Adolescent refugee girls worldwide have been identified as a marginalized group within education programs because they face unique barriers to accessing education. While all refugee children have far lower school enrolment rates, compared to non-refugee children (with primary school enrolment rates of 61 per cent versus 91 per cent, respectively), refugee girls are at greater disadvantage since tasks such as domestic duties and care of family members often fall on girls.[30] Refugee girls in low- and middle-income countries (LMIC) are less likely to be enrolled in school, with the gender gap widening as girls get older.[31] Discourse regarding the PPE for adolescents is commonly framed in gender-specific terms, with protection for adolescent girls focused on reducing threats of sex- and gender-based violence (SGBV) and early marriage, while for adolescent boys on reducing threats of recruitment by armed groups.[32]

Research suggests that girls and boys have different vulnerabilities and needs in emergencies and supports a gender-responsive approach to addressing protection concerns regarding education. For example, a study from 2013 in Afghanistan demonstrated that decreased distance to school, while having a positive impact on enrolment for all children, was especially significant for girls.[33] Another study from Afghanistan also showed that having higher proportions of female teachers in schools increased girls' enrolment.[34] There is also evidence that interventions on psychosocial protection affect girls and boys differently—a study of a psychosocial intervention for Palestinian children showed that post-traumatic stress symptoms were reduced for boys, but only for a subset of girls with low levels of baseline trauma.[35]

Study Objective

This study reviews the efforts to provide education for Syrian refugees in Lebanon and specifically highlights the struggles a uniquely vulnerable group—adolescent girls—to obtain education. The work analyzes first-person narratives from adolescent Syrian girls and Syrian parents residing in Lebanon. These perspectives are discussed within the conceptual framework of the PPE and emphasize this concept as the fundamental dynamic that frames decisions about continuation of education with implications for adolescent refugee girls in conflict-affected contexts.

Methods

This study utilized data collected from a cross-sectional, mixed-methods study conducted by the ABAAD Resource Center for Gender Equality and Queen's University from July to August 2016 to examine the concept of the PPE among adolescent Syrian girls and Syrian parents in Lebanon.[36] This study utilized Cognitive Edge's SenseMaker®—a smartphone/tablet-based data collection tool that aids researchers in extracting meaning from a collection of narratives shared on people's experiences. First, participants share a narrative, in the form of an audio or text recording in response to their choice of open-ended prompts. Participants then self-interpret the shared narrative by plotting their perspectives using sets of predefined variables on the tablet (see figure 1 for an example of a "triad" with three variables), which allows for more varied responses than typical categorical questions. Additionally, as participants self-interpret their narratives, this reduces researcher bias. The predefined variables used in this survey were selected on the basis of results from a pilot study conducted in May 2016. Full details of the study implementation, including further description of the SenseMaker instrument, have been previously published.[37]

Individuals had to be thirteen years of age or older to be eligible for participation. Participants were prompted to share an audio-recorded anonymous narrative about the

The shared story relates mostly to:

Education

Protection and security

Financial resources

Figure 1. SenseMaker "Triad" used for selection of narratives related to education

experiences of Syrian girls in Lebanon using one of three open-ended prompts written in colloquial Syrian Arabic in order to ensure comprehension for all target groups:

1. Suppose a family is coming to Lebanon from Syria, and the family has girls under the age of eighteen. Tell a story about a Syrian girl in Lebanon that the family can learn from.

2. Tell a story about a situation that you heard about or experienced that illustrates the *best or worst* thing about the life of a Syrian girl (under the age of eighteen) in Lebanon

3. Provide a story that illustrates the biggest difference between life for Syrian girls (under the age of eighteen) living in Lebanon in comparison to life for Syrian girls in Syria.

Demographic information including gender, marital status, length of time residing in Lebanon, etc., was collected. Multiple-choice questions were used to collect information such as whom the story was about (about me, someone in my family, someone else I know, someone I heard about). The survey was drafted in English, translated to Arabic by a Syrian translator, and then back-translated to English to check for accuracy with discrepancies resolved by consensus. A variety of participant subgroups were recruited to capture a wide range of perspectives—only the narratives of Syrian girls and Syrian parents were included in the present analysis.

The data collection team consisted of nine Syrian interviewers (six female, three male) who were selected on the basis of their place of residence, gender, nationality, and prior work experience. Interviews were conducted in three

locations: greater Beirut area, Tripoli, and Bekaa Valley. All interviewers participated in a four-day training session prior to data collection. A convenience sample of participants was recruited from public spaces, although all efforts were made by interviewers to recruit participants from a diverse range of backgrounds and geographic locations. If participants did not want to have their voice recorded, the interviewer listened to the participants' narrative and then recorded it in Arabic in the third person.[38]

Data Analysis

Only first-person narratives were included, to provide the richer detail necessary to understand the nuanced decisions that girls and their families made about education in Lebanon. Narratives were selected for further screening by using participants' responses to the triad question that asked, "This story mostly relates to: education, financial resources, protection & security." All first-person narratives by Syrian girls who indicated that their narrative mostly related to education (figure 1) were transcribed and translated from Arabic to English. In order to capture concerns of Syrian parents, thirty first-person narratives shared by parents and interpreted to be about education were also included in the analysis. All narratives were independently screened for inclusion by two researchers (SG and SH) blinded to each other's selections. Narratives describing experiences regarding education in Lebanon were retained for analysis. Researcher SH listened to narratives using the original Arabic recordings to ensure capture of tone, subtle cues, and nuances that may have been missed in the English translations. Where there were inclusion discrepancies between SG and SH, researcher SB reviewed the narratives, and a determination regarding inclusion was made by consensus of all researchers.[39]

An inductive approach using thematic analysis of participants' narratives was utilized, as described in the literature by Braun and Clarke.[40] This process consisted of familiarization with the data by researchers SG and SH, who read and/or listened to all narratives thoroughly multiple times, followed by independent manual coding by researchers SG and SH to generate a set of initial codes. Initial codes were independently sorted into potential themes representative of the data by researchers SG and SH. All themes were reviewed, and final themes determined by researcher SG, who defined the themes, which are presented below.

Limitations

The participants included in this study were selected using a convenience sample and therefore the findings may not be generalizable to the entire population of adolescent Syrian refugee girls. Particularly, marginalized persons and those

with disabilities, may not be adequately represented. Additionally, physical protection concerns—such as from armed violence, warfare, and abduction—are substantially lower in Lebanon compared to other crisis-affected contexts and limits evaluation of this protective element of education.

Research Findings and Discussion

There were 196 first-person narratives from Syrian girls (age thirteen to seventeen years) collected during the study period; of these, 123 (62.8 per cent) were indicated as mainly relating to education. One narrative was a duplicate and removed. Seven narratives were excluded, as they did not relate to education, leaving 115 narratives for further analysis. Of the 115 included girls' narratives, seventy participants (60.9 per cent) referenced having left school, 33 participants (28.7 per cent) reported currently being enrolled in school (either FE or NFE), and in 12 narratives (10.4 per cent) it was unclear if the participant was in school or not. Thirty-four participants (29.6 per cent) were married and 81 (70.4 per cent) were unmarried. Over 90 per cent of participants had been in Lebanon for more than one year, and over 60 per cent for more than three years. There were 58 first-person narratives from Syrian parents, and of these, 30 (51.7 per cent) were mainly related to education.

Four major themes emerged regarding the PPE for adolescent Syrian girls in Lebanon: (1) risks of SGBV in and around schools, (2) financial vulnerability inhibits schooling and increases child labour, (3) curriculum differences and discrimination affect psychosocial well-being, and (4) education versus early marriage as tools for protection. Interview excerpts were selected on the basis of their relevance and importance in illustrating emergent themes. Additionally, while far from being comprehensive, suggestions for interventions aimed at bolstering the protective potential of education for practitioners, NGOs, governments, and UN agencies that work with adolescent Syrian refugee girls in Lebanon and other host countries are discussed alongside the research findings.

Risks of Sexual- and Gender-Based Violence in and around Schools

While schools are often characterized as being protective from SGBV threats, none of the included narratives explicitly stated this but rather focused on the risks of SGBV faced going to/from and within schools. Frequent experiences of sexual harassment (especially in public spaces), as well as threats of sexual assault and kidnapping, were cited as protection concerns from both girls and parents, and often influenced parental decision-making in permitting girls to attend school. Participant 209, a Syrian girl in Bekaa, explained, "We can't go to school anymore, as girls are being

kidnapped on their way to school, and now I am staying at home with no education." Frustration, social isolation, and claustrophobia due to being forced to stay at home (often felt by parents to be the only means of protecting girls) were commonly described in girls' narratives. As participant 511, a Syrian girl in Bekaa, described, "We are currently living in suffocation. We cannot leave the camps because it is not safe for us outside [and] there aren't any nearby schools." The risks of SGBV during travel to/from school appeared to be particularly exacerbated by long transit times, as well as the need to travel after dark for second-shift classes. Several parents stated their concerns were decreased when there was a safe transportation option for girls in close proximity to the home or when schools were located within their ITS/camp.

Importantly, SGBV risks were not isolated to transportation to/from school, since sexual harassment was also described within schools—from students as well as school officials—and also led parents to pull girls out of school. Participant 201, a Syrian mother in Tripoli, described her girls' experience: "[My daughters] were harassed by boys [at school], so they stopped and stayed at home for one year. After that they entered the school again and faced the same situation. Now they are waiting for the opportunity to get married." In addition, multiple narratives also described the common presence of men waiting near schools and harassing girls as they entered or left school. Participant 699, a Syrian girl from Bekaa, described experiencing sexual harassment by a school principal, which eventually led to her leaving school: "My former school principal used to harass the students and teachers. After a while, he started to harass me. Therefore, I hated school and I accepted to get married to the first man who proposed to marry me. Even though I would have preferred to continue my education, I was compelled to marry in order to get rid of the harassment."

Much of the discussion regarding the PPE for adolescent girls has focused on the capacity for schools to reduce SGBV through physical protection from harassment and threats of assault, as well as more broadly, for teaching both boys and girls about gender equality, healthy relationships, and safe sex. However, this protective potential is greatly constrained if girls are not able to even reach schools safely and when school environments themselves place girls at risk for SGBV.

Any interventions to improve school attendance for adolescent girls must make it a priority to address sexual harassment in public spaces, especially during transportation to and from school for all girls. Dedicated school buses for girls, perhaps driven by female bus drivers, would be beneficial, as would more female teachers and improved oversight within schools. Collaborations between protection and education sectors could also create novel programs to combat SGBV, such as special training for teachers, school administrators,

and parents in sgbv awareness and referral mechanisms. Strengthening the capacity of mehe's Education Community Liaisons program, which facilitates communication between schools and families, to identify cases of harassment and sgbv is greatly needed.[41] Additionally, ensuring anonymous reporting mechanisms for harassment and threats of sgbv (such as mehe's plans to introduce a confidential hotline) and enforcing a no-tolerance policy for harassment within schools should also be implemented.[42]

Financial Vulnerability Inhibits Schooling and Increases Child Labour

Schools have also been asserted as a means of protection from exploitation and child labour. However, the narratives frequently described the difficult decisions that forced families to choose between using strained financial resources to meet basic needs for survival (housing, food, health care) instead of sending children to school, and financial constraints were parents' most-cited reason for which adolescent girls were not in school. Descriptions of parents' severe distress when forced to take girls out of school to ensure the families' survival were common. As described by a Syrian mother (participant 623) in Beirut, "We can't afford the schools' tuition fees. There's no mercy: we have up to four kids per family and they won't give us even the tiniest reductions on the fees. We also suffer from rent … we don't even eat and drink."

While child labour is often purported to disproportionately affect boys compared to girls (especially in regard to paid labour), many narratives described girls working in paid unskilled jobs (farming, selling vegetables and clothing, building houses, etc.) and unpaid work (household duties, care of family members, etc.) to support their families. As boys were not the focus of this study, further comment on the differential effects of child labour on boys versus girls cannot be made, although the subject warrants further study. While some participants cited parental pressure to work, many girls stated a personal desire to help provide for their families as the reason for deciding to leave school: "I [was] confused and torn between saving up for my education and helping my parents with the money. I had to work and I lost my chance. I forgot my education and felt the responsibility of helping my parents out," stated participant 1035, a Syrian girl in Beirut. Narratives also frequently described prioritization of schooling for younger children over adolescents. Beyond the opportunity costs of lost income, other education-related costs such as the high fees required for secondary school, as well as "hidden costs" of clothing, books, and transportation, increased financial vulnerability for Syrian families with descriptions of threats of eviction, food insecurity, and inability to pay for medical expenses.

While education can enable girls' long-term financial independence and security, the direct and opportunity costs of attending school often reduced families' ability to meet basic needs and drove the need for child labour. This relationship between financial vulnerability and ability to prioritize education have been long recognized by the humanitarian sector. In Lebanon, two studies on cash-transfer programs for Syrian refugees have been conducted, which both showed that cash assistance increased access to education; the Min Ila unconditional cash-transfer program (implemented in 2016–17) showed increased school attendance at the midpoint, but because schools were filled beyond capacity, the effect on endpoint enrolment could not be proven. However, the program did increase subjective well-being, health, and decreased household work, especially for girls.[43]

Financial vulnerability often places increased pressure on families to marry girls early in order to lessen financial and protection responsibilities. Reducing financial constraints, including providing scholarships for secondary schools and providing transportation assistance and school supplies, are greatly needed. Ensuring that refugees have access to basic necessities of life is the backbone needed to allow children to resume their education. Cash-transfer programs targeting families with adolescent girls may also reduce the overall financial vulnerability families face that drives adolescent girls out of school and towards child labour or early marriage.

Curriculum Differences and Discrimination Affect Psychosocial Well-being

Adolescents often face higher barriers in transitioning from the Syrian to Lebanese educational system compared to younger children and are often placed at least several grade levels below their age level, principally as a result of differences in language of instruction. Beginning in primary school, a significant portion of the Lebanese curriculum is taught in English or French, while the primary language of instruction in Syria is Arabic.[44] Many narratives described negative consequences on psychosocial well-being (feelings of embarrassment, demoralization, and futility) as a result of being placed in classes far below their age cohort. As participant 1148, a Syrian girl in Tripoli, explained, "I was fifteen [and] was developed as a woman, [so] I was ashamed of going to school." While the provision of emotional and psychosocial support has been asserted as a key protective effect of education for refugees, the negative consequences for adolescents such as demoralization and lack of peer social interaction are not sufficiently acknowledged. One Syrian mother in Bekaa (participant 161) explained, "They placed her in grade five, which affected her psychologically, because all the students with her in class are younger than her, so became ashamed of herself, because she was tall and

they were smaller than her, and she wore a veil while they didn't, and they could play but she couldn't…. Thus, the situation affected her and pushed her to prove that she is old and can be a woman [and] to get engaged."

Girls' narratives also described being victims of discrimination, bullying, and even physical abuse from Lebanese students, staff, and/or teachers and described difficulties making friends and feelings of isolation. Contrary to being protective, school was sometimes described as a hostile environment with fears of bullying and humiliation. While discrimination and bullying affect all Syrian children, this often took on a distinctly gendered tone in the narratives, especially with comments targeting girls' reputation. Participant 559, a Syrian girl in Beirut, described discrimination against Syrians by her teacher: "[The teacher] came to me in class and told me, 'Don't you feel any shame? You're Syrian and you should have some respect for your hijab.' She accused me of going out in a car with a guy in front of school. [I told her] I was not even in school that day. That day when she humiliated me in front of everyone and said shameful accusations about Syrians, I hated the school [so] I left."

Conversely, some girls' narratives did describe the positive protective effect school had on their psychosocial well-being, such as making friends, as well as giving them meaningful activity and hope. Girls also described valuing the opportunity to learn English and technical skills (such as hairstyling, sewing, nursing, and business) in order to later obtain a job. Importantly, a majority of the positive protective experiences were discussed in reference to NFE/training centres specifically for Syrian students. Narratives often described schools for Syrians, especially when taught by Syrian teachers, more positively in comparison to Lebanese public schools. As participant 345, a Syrian girl in Bekaa explained, "When I came to Lebanon, I enrolled in a public school for two years, but I failed both years because the curriculum was hard … the teachers made us feel that we are not part of the school, and they would isolate themselves from us. Currently, we are registered in training centres specific for Syrian refugees; they teach us English and nursing and so on. I advise every Syrian family to register their children in training centres specific to Syrians instead of public school."

Programs that help adolescents transition back to FE, such as foreign language, Basic Literacy and Numeracy (BLN), and Accelerated Learning Programs (ALP), should be prioritized in RACE II and strengthened with greater financial support. As students placed in classrooms with children much younger than themselves may feel demotivated, normalizing return to school after prolonged absence, as well as providing safe spaces or specialized classrooms for adolescent girls to re-enter FE or vocational schools while also providing them with a social network of peers can be psychologically healing and

protective. Continued improvements in the quality of public education, as well as development of curriculums responsive to youth desires for practical, vocational skills, are also needed to remove demand-side barriers to education.

As discriminatory comments and bullying may take on gender-specific dimensions, especially aimed at adolescent girls' "honour" or reputation, increased sensitivity to these issues and training on the influence of gender on classroom dynamics, especially in mixed-gender classrooms with students of highly varying ages, can be important for ensuring girls' psychosocial well-being in school. Increased support for reporting mechanisms and enforcement of a no-tolerance policy for discrimination and bullying are needed.

Education versus Early Marriage as Tools for Protection

Nearly all narratives from both girls and parents indicated a strong desire to continue girls' education, identifying the transformative and protective effect education could have on their lives, although they expressed significant frustration and disappointment regarding the path their futures would take without school. The benefits were nearly universally framed in terms of the long-term empowering benefits of education for providing financial security and obtaining higher status in the community. And multiple narratives described education as a "weapon" or "tool" for protecting girls. As stated by participant 535, a Syrian girl in Beirut, "I decided to leave my fiancé and continue my education…. It will be a weapon in my hand in the future." Many girls specifically cited hopes to become teachers, doctors, pharmacists, architects, and business women; however, these aspirations were commonly hindered by the short-term realities of the barriers preventing girls from continuing their education. As participant 290, a Syrian mother in Bekaa, reported, "Education is important for girls so they can secure themselves when they are older. I prefer that girls get educated, so they can deal better with their lives when they get married and have kids. I know a lot of people who got their daughters married and stopped their education, just so they can get rid of the burden of them going to school."

For many, a dichotomous relationship between education and early marriage formed a central part of the decision-making about continuation of schooling for adolescent girls. Adolescence often marked a turning point in whether girls were able to continue school, with narratives describing parents waiting until girls were a certain age (varying between twelve and eighteen years) before marriage was considered. In the majority of cases, marriage was viewed as far less desirable and school as more protective in the long term by both girls and parents; however, as a result of the myriad barriers to enrolling in school, marriage was compelled in

order to secure girls' futures. As participant 658, a Syrian girl in Bekaa, stated, "There are a lot of girls who are thirteen years old or so, and their parents get them married because they are unable to provide them with all their rights, and to protect them from guys' harassment, and the education problem, and a lot of other problems."

While some girls described being happy in their marriages, other girls' narratives described marriage as causing decreased protection because their marriages ended quickly in divorce/separation, their husband left to look for work in another country (often unsuccessfully), and they even experienced intimate partner violence (IPV) and abuse. These descriptions support findings from prior studies that show that early marriage increases girls' risks of IPV compared to those who marry at an older age.[45] Participant 432, a Syrian girl in Bekaa, described her experience of IPV after being married at age fifteen: "Here I was unable to continue my education. I was forced into getting married, and I couldn't get along with my husband. I was a teenager, and I was so young. I had a daughter and he still beat me. He divorced me, and he took my daughter. I endured our abusive relationship for two years."

Improving educational access for adolescent girls has a compounded benefit—both in securing girls' financial and personal independence, and in reducing the negative psychosocial impacts and health risks of early marriage and childbirth, which have been extensively described.[46] The frequent description of early marriage among the narratives corroborates reports that rates of early marriage among Syrian refugees are up to four times higher than among Syrians before the conflict, although the reasons are likely multifactorial. Recent studies have shown this may be due to differences in population composition between the pre-conflict Syrian population and Syrian refugees in host countries.[47]

Increased community engagement to improve awareness of the long-term protective value of education and negative consequences of early marriage for adolescent girls and their families should also be prioritized, such as the peer-led training by the UN Population Fund aimed at fathers as well as girls themselves to reduce cultural norms of early marriage and increase awareness about the health risks of early marriage and childbirth.[48]

Conclusion and Recommendations

This article uses a diverse sample of narratives from adolescent Syrian girls and Syrian parents residing in Lebanon to examine the PPE in emergencies and finds that protection concerns are fundamental to decision-making regarding continuation of education. While girls and their parents deeply value girls' education, the short-term risks often ultimately outweigh the largely long-term protective benefits of education for adolescent girls. The narratives included in this article also describe a stark discrepancy in perception between humanitarian practitioners/academics, who largely view education in emergencies as protective, versus adolescent girls and their parents, who often view education in terms of the risks posed. Over half the narratives described concerns regarding harassment/threats of SGBV as well as early marriage as factors that influenced decisions about school enrolment, emphasizing the need to prioritize gender- and age-specific interventions when developing educational programming for Syrian refugees, as these concerns overwhelmingly affect adolescent girls.

The findings of this research argue that the delicate balance between the potential of education to protect versus to increase risk is highly dynamic and influenced by age, gender, socioeconomic, and legal status, among other factors, and must be understood at minimum at the subgroup level (for instance, by age and gender). Further studies on protection concerns for education of other subgroups, such as adolescent boys (who may face even greater risks of child labour, for instance) or children with disabilities are also greatly needed. Overlooking or understating the risks that education may place on refugees is both negligent and potentially dangerous, and furthermore overlooks potential for collaboration between education and protection sectors that may have compounded benefits.

In many refugee communities, education is often viewed as the greatest symbol of hope for a better future. While all Syrian children face substantial barriers and risks to continuing their education in Lebanon, the immediate risks posed, especially to adolescent girls, make them particularly vulnerable to missing out on the benefits of education. If protection concerns regarding education persist, this generation of Syrian girls will ultimately largely be compelled into early marriages and reduced financial security, thereby perpetuating cycles of poverty and vulnerability for generations to come. For refugee girls, continued advocacy for education once they reach adolescence is imperative, as these individuals are far too often ignored or neglected as they transition abruptly and prematurely from childhood to becoming the caretakers of the next generation.

Notes

1 UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III); UN General Assembly, "Convention on the Rights of the Child," *United Nations, Treaty Series* 1577, no. 3 (1989).

2 UNHCR, "Syria Emergency," http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/syria-emergency.html; No Lost Generation Initiative, *We Made a Promise: Ensuring Learning Pathways and Protection*

for Syrian Children and Youth: Brussels Conference April 2018 (No Lost Generation Initiative, 2018), https://www.nolost-generation.org/article/nlg-education-report-we-made-promise.

3 No Lost Generation Initiative, W*e Made a Promise.*

4 UNHCR Lebanon, "Shelter," https://www.unhcr.org/lb/shelter.

5 No Lost Generation Initiative, *We Made a Promise.*

6 No Lost Generation Initiative, *We Made a Promise.*

7 Jocelyn DeJong, Farah Sbeity, Jennifer Schlecht, Manale Harfouche, Rouham Yamout, Fouad Fouad, Seema Manohar, and Courtland Robinson, "Young Lives Disrupted: Gender and Well-being among Adolescent Syrian Refugees in Lebanon," *Conflict and Health* 11, no. 1 (2017), https://doi.org/10.1186/s13031-017-0128-7; No Lost Generation Initiative, *We Made a Promise.*

8 UNESCO Institute for Statistics, "Syrian Arab Republic: Education and Literacy," http://uis.unesco.org/en/country/sy.

9 UNESCO Institute for Statistics, "Syrian Arab Republic."

10 Louisa Visconti and Diane Gal, "Regional Collaboration to Strengthen Education for Nationals & Syrian Refugees in Arabic-Speaking Host Countries," *International Journal of Educational Development* 61 (2018): 106–16.

11 Lebanon Ministry of Education and Higher Education, *Reaching All Children with Education: R.A.C.E.*, 2014, https://www.mehe.gov.lb/ar/Projects/التعليم20%العام/RACEfinalEnglish2.pdf; World Bank, *Lebanon: Support to Reaching All Children with Education (RACE 2) Program for Results Project (English),* 2016, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/980641475200856910/Lebanon-Support-to-Reaching-All-Children-with-Education-RACE-2-Program-for-Results-Project

12 Wannes Carlier, *Background Report: The Widening Educational Gap for Syrian Refugee Children* (Amsterdam: KidsRights, 2018); Human Rights Watch, *Lebanon: 250,000 Syrian Children Out of School*, 19 July 2016, https://www.refworld.org/docid/578e2d8a4.html.

13 Lebanon Ministry of Education and Higher Education, *Reaching All Children with Education: RACE II (2017–2021)*, 2016, https://planipolis.iiep.unesco.org/sites/planipolis/files/ressources/lebanon_race-ii_2017-2021.pdf.

14 World Bank, *Lebanon: Support to Reaching All Children with Education (RACE 2) Program.*

15 World Bank, Lebanon: Support to Reaching All Children with Education (RACE 2) Program.

16 Government of Lebanon and United Nations, *Lebanon Crisis Response Plan.*

17 Kevin Watkins, *No Lost Generation: Holding to the Promise of Education for All Syrian Refugees* (London: Theirworld and the Global Business Coalition for Education, 2016), https://theirworld.org/resources/detail/no-lost-generation-holding-to-the-promise-of-education-for-all-syrian-refugees; Human Rights Watch, "Education for Syrian Refugee Children: What Donors and Host Countries Should Do," September 16, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/09/16/education-syrian-refugee-children-what-donors-and-host-countries-should-do#.

18 Human Rights Watch, "Lebanon: Events of 2018," https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/lebanon.

19 Maja Janmyr, "Precarity in Exile: The Legal Status of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon," *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 35, no. 4 (2016): 58–78.

20 Dana Burde, Amy Kapit, Rachel L. Wahl, Ozen Guven, and Margot Igland Skarpeteig, "Education in Emergencies: A Review of Theory and Research," *Review of Educational Research* 87, no. 3 (2017): 619–58.

21 Interagency Network for Education in Emergencies, *Minimum Standards* (New York: INEE, 2010); Humanitarian Coalition, "Education and Emergencies," https://www.humanitariancoalition.ca/education-and-emergencies; UN General Assembly, T*he Right to Education in Emergency Situations: Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly*, 27 July 2010, A/RES/64/290, https://www.refworld.org/docid/4c6241bb2.html.

22 UN General Assembly, "Impact of Armed Conflict on Children: Report of the Expert of the Secretary-General, Ms. Graça Machel Submitted Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 48/157," A/51/306, 1996, https://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f2d30.html.

23 Mayesha Alam, Roslyn Warren, and Anna Applebaum, *Closing the Gap: Adolescent Girls' Access to Education in Conflict-Affected Settings* (Washington: Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security, 2016); Watkins, No Lost Generation; UNHCR, *Left Behind: Refugee Education in Crisis* (Geneva: UNHCR, 2017), http://www.unhcr.org/left-behind/; Margaret Sinclair, "Education in Emergencies," in Commonwealth Education Partnerships 2007, 1–84 (Cambridge: Nexus Strategic Partnerships, 2001); Susan Nicolai and Carl Triplehorn, "The Role of Education in Protecting Children in Conflict," *Network Paper: Humanitarian Practice Network (HPN)* 42 (2003): 1–36.

24 Global Education Cluster 2018, "The Protective Role of Education in Emergencies," Elevating Education in Emergencies, 2018; Andrea Diaz-Varela and Rita Lo, "The Protective Role of Education: Mapping Critical Intersections with Child Protection" (INEE, 2018); Jane Lowicki and Allison Pillsbury, "Untapped Potential: Adolescents Affected by Armed Conflict: A Review of Programs and Policies" (New York: Women's Refugee Commission, 2000).

25 Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack, *Education under Attack 2018*, 11 May 2018; Pilar Aguilar and Gonzalo Retamal, "Protective Environments and Quality Education in Humanitarian Contexts," *International Journal of Educational Development* 29, no. 1 (2009): 3–16.

26 Theresa Betancourt, "Stressors, Supports and the Social Ecology of Displacement: Psychosocial Dimensions of an Emergency Education Program for Chechen Adolescents Displaced in Ingushetia, Russia," *Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry* 29, no. 3 (2005): 309–40.

27   Aguilar and Retamal, "Protective Environments and Quality Education."

28   Tia Palermo, Audrey Pereira, Naomi Neijhoft, Ghaji Bello, Robert Buluma, Pierre Diem, Rocio Aznar Daban, Inah Fatoumata Kaloga, Aminul Islam, They Kheam, Birgithe Lund-Henriksen, Nankali Maksud, M. Catherine Maternowska, Alina Potts, Chivith Rottanak, Chea Samnang, Mary Shawa, Miho Yoshikawa, and Amber Peterman, "Risk Factors for Childhood Violence and Polyvictimization: A Cross-country Analysis from Three Regions," *Child Abuse & Neglect* 88 (2019): 348–61.

29   Catalina Torrente, Brian Johnston, Leighann Starkey, Edward Seidman, Anjuli Shivshanker, Nina Weisenhorn, Jeannie Annan, and John Lawrence Aber, "Improving the Quality of School Interactions and Student Well-being: Impacts of One Year of a School-Based Program in the Democratic Republic of Congo," *Journal on Education in Emergencies* 1, no. 1 (2015): 48–91.

30   UNHCR, "Her Turn: It's Time to Make Refugee Girls' Education a Priority," http://www.unhcr.org/herturn/.

31   UNHCR, "Her Turn."

32   Nicolai and Triplehorn, "Role of Education in Protecting Children in Conflict"; Global Education Cluster, "Protective Role of Education in Emergencies."

33   Dana Burde and Leigh L. Linden, "Bringing Education to Afghan girls: A Randomized Controlled Trial of Village-Based Schools," A*merican Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 5, no. 3 (2013): 27–40.

34   Stephane Guimbert, Keiko Miwa, and Duc Thanh Nguyen, "Back to School in Afghanistan: Determinants of School Enrollment," *International Journal of Educational Development* 28, no. 4 (2008): 419–34.

35   Raija-Leena Punamäki, Kirsi Peltonen, Marwan Diab, and Samir R. Qouta, "Psychosocial Interventions and Emotion Regulation among War-Affected Children: Randomized Control Trial Effects," T*raumatology* 20, no. 4 (2014): 241–52.

36   Nour Bakhache, Saja Michael, Sophie Roupetz, Stephanie Garbern, Harveen Bergquist, Colleen Davison, and Susan Bartels, "Implementation of a Sensemaker® Research Project among Syrian Refugees in Lebanon," *Global Health Action* 10, no. 1 (2017), 10.1080/16549716.2017.1362792; Maha Abushama, "Early Marriage and Harrassment of Syrian Refugee Women and Girls in Jordan," September 5 2013, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2013/09/early-marriage-and-harassment-of-syrian-refugee-women-and-girls-in-jordan/.

37   Bakhache et al., "Implementation of a Sensemaker."

38   Informed consent was obtained from all study participants. Interviews were conducted in a private location out of earshot of others using the SenseMaker® application on an iPad Mini 4. The Queen's University Health Sciences and Affiliated Teaching Hospitals Research Ethics Board approved this study.

39   Cohen's kappa coefficient was calculated to measure inter-rater agreement of narratives selected for inclusion and was 0.811, indicating strong agreement between raters.

40   Virginia Braun and Victoria Clarke, "Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology," *Qualitative Research in Psychology* 3, no. 2 (2006): 52–6.

41   Government of Lebanon and United Nations, *Lebanon Crisis Response Plan.*

42   Government of Lebanon and United Nations, *Lebanon Crisis Response Plan*; Karine M. Pezzani, *Lebanon—Second Phase of Reaching All Children with Education Support Project: Environmental Assessment; Environmental and Social Systems Assessment (English)* (Lebanon: World Bank, 2016), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/115771471848692329/Environmental-and-social-systems-assessment.

43   Christian Lehmann and Daniel Masterson, "Emergency Economies: The Impact of Cash Assistance in Lebanon," Beirut: International Rescue Committee (2014); Jacobus De Hoop, Mitchell Morey, Hannah Ring, Victoria Rothbard, and David Seidenfeld, *"Min Ila" Cash Transfer Programme for Displaced Syrian Children in Lebanon (UNICEF and WFP) Impact Evaluation Endline Report*, 2019.

44   Shelley Deane, "Syria's Lost Generation: Refugee Education Provision and Societal Security in an Ongoing Conflict Emergency," *IDS Bulletin* 47, no. 3 (2016): 35–52; Khawaja, *Growing up without an Education.*

45   WHO, "Child Marriages: 39 000 Every Day," news release, March 7, 2013, https://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2013/child_marriage_20130307/en/.

46   Andrea Nove, Zoë Matthews, Sarah Neal, and Alma Virginia Camacho, "Maternal Mortality in Adolescents Compared with Women of Other Ages: Evidence from 144 Countries," *Lancet Global Health* 2, no. 3 (2014): e155–64; Anita Raj, "When the Mother Is a Child: The Impact of Child Marriage on the Health and Human Rights of Girls," *Archives of Disease in Childhood* 95 (2010): 931–5.

47   Maia Sieverding, Caroline Krafft, Nasma Berri, and Caitlyn Keo, "Persistence and Change in Marriage Practices among Syrian Refugees in Jordan Working Paper No. 1281" (Cairo: Economic Research Forum, 2018).

48   UNFPA, "With High Child Marriage Rates among Syrian Refugees, One Girl Takes a Stand," UNFPA, 2016, https://www.unfpa.org/news/child-marriage-rates-soar-among-syrian-refugees-one-girl-takes-stand; Louise Donovan and Hannah O'Neill, "'My Daughter Demands More': The Men Fighting Child Marriage in Lebanon," January 18, 2018, https://www.newsdeeply.com/womenandgirls/articles/2018/01/18/my-daughter-demands-more-the-men-fighting-child-marriage-in-lebanon.

Stephanie Chow Garbern, MD, MPH, is an assistant professor of emergency medicine at Alpert Medical School of Brown

University and an affiliated fellow of the Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Studies at the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs. The author may be contacted at sgarbern@brown.edu.

Shaimaa Helal is a medical student at Queen's University. The author may be contacted at shelal@qmed.ca.

Saja Michael, MPH, is a Gender & Diversity technical adviser at ABAAD Resource Center for Gender Equality. The author may be contacted at saja.michael@abaadmena.org.

Nikkole J. Turgeon is a medical student at Robert Larner College of Medicine at University of Vermont. The author may be contacted at nikkole.turgeon@gmail.com.

Susan Bartels, MD, MPH, FRCPC, is an associate professor of emergency medicine at Queen's University. The author may be contacted at susanabartels@gmail.com.

A New Link in the Chain?
Arabic-Language Citizenship Education Courses and the Integration of Resettled Syrian Refugees in Canada

ROUBA AL-SALEM

Abstract

In 2015, following Canada's resettlement of large numbers of Syrian refugees, it was praised as a role model that should be implemented elsewhere. Or should it? With the resettlement of Syrian adult refugees as a case study, this article argues that Canada's federal and provincial efforts to promote the integration of these refugees have overlooked the contribution that citizenship and civic education activities, administered in the refugees' native language, can make towards their integration, as a way of empowering them to become active citizens in the political and civil life of the receiving country. In particular, the article critically evaluates current government-led efforts to rely on language courses as a medium for transmitting Canadian civic concepts. It also discusses why they are falling short of ensuring that these resettled refugees are saddled with the skills and know-how to navigate their rights and responsibilities as

future Canadian citizens and to contribute effectively to the political and civil life of their communities. Finally, the article suggests that the provision of a civic education course in Arabic could constitute the missing link in any chain of government-led efforts to tackle the disparity between the federal government's declared commitment to multiculturalism, inclusiveness, and the welcoming of immigrants/ refugees and the policies and realities of social exclusion. In addition, such a course could provide an avenue to encourage resettled refugees, as Canadian "citizens in waiting," to develop meaningful connections to and contributions in their new home country.

Résumé

En 2015, suite à la réinstallation d'un grand nombre de réfugiés syriens, le modèle canadien a été salué comme un exemple qui devrait être appliqué ailleurs. Le devrait-il

vraiment ? Prenant la réinstallation de réfugiés syriens adultes comme étude de cas, cet article soutient que jusqu'à présent, les efforts du gouvernement fédéral et des gouvernements provinciaux pour promouvoir l'intégration de ces réfugiés ont négligé la contribution que les activités de citoyenneté et d'éducation civique administrées dans leur langue maternelle peut apporter à leur intégration, notamment en les habilitant à devenir des citoyens actifs dans la vie politique et civique du pays d'accueil. Plus particulièrement, cet article évalue de manière critique les efforts actuellement menés par le gouvernement, qui se fient sur les cours de langue comme médium de transmission des concepts civiques canadiens. Il traite aussi des raisons pour lesquelles ils échouent à assurer que ces réfugiés réinstallés soient équipés des compétences et savoir-faires leur permettant de contribuer efficacement à la vie politique et civique de leurs communautés. Enfin, l'article suggère que l'offre d'un cours d'éducation civique en arabe constituerait le chaînon manquant dans la chaîne des efforts menés par les gouvernements pour s'attaquer à la disparité entre l'engagement du gouvernement fédéral actuel en faveur du multiculturalisme, de l'inclusivité et de l'accueil des immigrants/réfugiés et les réalités de l'exclusion sociale sur le terrain. Ce cours constitue une voie qui doit être explorée pour encourager les réfugiés réinstallés, en tant que citoyens canadiens « en attente », à développer des liens significatifs et à contribuer à leur nouveau pays.

Introduction

The resettlement of refugees to a third country is considered by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR) one way in which refugees can be offered recourse to a durable solution[1] under the 1951 United Nations (UN) Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,[2] to which Canada is a state party.[3] In fact, Canada has traditionally placed strong emphasis on the integration of immigrants and refugees, including those whom it chooses to resettle from abroad. Customarily, the county has made three main avenues available for refugee resettlement: government sponsorship, private sponsorship, and blended visa-office referred.[4] In 2015, and as a way of sharing the burden of refugee hosting countries, Canada embarked on a bold plan to resettle tens of thousands of Syrian refugees, many of whom came from the most vulnerable segments of the refugee population. As a direct consequence of these efforts, by 2016 refugees accounted for an estimated 24 per cent of all newcomers living in Canada, compared to 50.6 per cent of who were economic migrants.[5]

These steps came in response to the Syrian conflict beginning in 2011, which generated one of the worst refugee crises in the post–Second World War era. According to the UNHCR, by December 2018 more than 5.5 million Syrians have been registered as refugees,[6] 10 per cent of whom are in urgent need for resettlement.[7] Since 2011, some thirty countries have made resettlement pathways for admission available to more than 162,000 Syrian refugees,[8] including several European countries, the United States, and Canada.[9] In the case of Canada, by 2017, an estimated 40,000 Syrian refugees were resettled in 350 locations across the country.[10] Of those, approximately 21,876 (or 54.7 per cent) were government assisted refugees (GARs) while another 14,274 (35.7 per cent) were privately sponsored refugees (PSRs).[11] Within Canada, the French-speaking province of Quebec has also participated in the privately sponsored refugees program. Refugees were selected from the pool of Immigration Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) approved cases for resettlement, with the province administering its own private sponsorship program.[12]

The word *citizenship* has various potential meanings, "ranging from a person's legal status within a country to their civil, political, or social standing within a community to the set of behaviors that represent a particular ideal of civic virtue."[13] Traditionally, federal and provincial authorities have relied on government-funded French- and English-language courses to act as a medium for introducing newly arrived adult immigrants and refugees to Canadian citizenship and civic education concepts. As Levinson highlights, when educators speak of citizenship or civic education, they think of them as "the identities, rights and obligations of residents of a country in general rather than solely those of legal citizens."[14] The ways in which immigrants and refugees secure presence and gain access to employment, immigration settlement, or resettlement services and other public services are shaped not only by their legal status and social location, but also by their contact with different actors.[15] Hence, it can be argued that the decision by government authorities to rely on language courses to transmit civic education concepts is, on the face of it, both reasonable and pragmatic, for "it takes a lot of work to learn how, when, and why to exercise one's own rights and duties, as well as to respect those of others."[16] Moreover, familiarizing citizens in a democratic society with its civic concepts is necessary if they are to navigate life responsibly and constructively and if they are to internalize ideals such as equality, mutual toleration, and respect, and to forge a common national identity.[17]

Nevertheless, with resettled Syrian adult refugees as a case study, this article seeks to demonstrate why these arrangements fall short of ensuring that resettled refugees gain the

necessary skills of understanding Canadian civic concepts, and why there is a need for government authorities to adopt a more socio-cultural approach, if their resettlement- and integration-related policies are to succeed.[18] Many of the challenges that a large portion of resettled Syrian adult refugees (especially GARs) grapple with are compounded by pre-resettlement and post-resettlement factors that include the age and prior level of education of resettled individuals and/or their pre-immigration command of English and French.[19] In this regard, the article adopts the position that these lower levels of "linguistic adjustments affect not only the earnings of immigrants and/or refugees in the labour market, but also the type of social interaction and civic participation of immigrants and refugees."[20]

And although Canada's domestic policy and international obligation recognize that integration is a two-way process, one that requires adaptation not only by the newcomer, but also by its own society,[21] all too often the public discourse has emphasized what immigrants and refugees must do to integrate, or has analyzed how federal and provincial authorities have met the immediate needs of newly resettled refugees such as health, education, employment and housing, and attainment of English- and French-language proficiency. Moreover, the possible contributions of adult civic education classes as they relate to refugees remain under-researched by academics and not visibly present in discussions or assessments by policymakers of the qualitative impact of their resettlement policies and practices. This contrasts sharply with civil society initiatives, academic research, and governmental policies that have addressed the civic education and citizenship awareness needs of migrant youth and children (including refugees), and the resulting challenges facing Canadian educational policy.[22]

To make the case for the need for such courses, the article will first provide an overview of Canada's initiative to resettle Syrian refugees, many of whom are amongst the most vulnerable. This is followed by a review of a spectrum of citizenship education activities that have been supported and promoted by government authorities (primarily at the federal level) for newcomers (both migrants and refugees). It will then summarize some of the resettlement challenges experienced by resettled Syrian adult refugees, based on the evaluations conducted by the federal government of its Syria Initiative, which arguably make the development of these courses all the more necessary. While essentially offering a review of the literature on the resettlement and integration of Syrian refugees, this review is conducted to substantiate the argument that current efforts by federal authorities to improve the resettlement and integration experience of refugees would benefit from examining how Canadian citizenship education, if implemented in the resettled refugees'

mother tongue, can improve prospects for adult refugees to feel part of the economic, social, political, and cultural fabric of Canadian society.[23] In the case of resettled Syrian refugees, it is argued here that the need to develop these courses, in Arabic, is intrinsically linked to three elements. The first is that the majority of these resettled refugees possess relatively low levels of English and French upon arrival. The second element is that exposure to Canadian civic education concepts for adult immigrants and refugees once they arrive in Canada takes place through English- and French-language courses. The third one is that in addition to all the challenges faced by any newcomers to Canada, the majority of the resettled Syrian refugees have grappled with protracted displacement, violence, trauma, and complicated health and social difficulties, and lower levels of formal education.

Conceptual Framework

While citizenship is often considered a legal binary, in that either one has it or not, often it is a concept that describes more than just a formal status that is demonstrated by the possession of a passport and of legal rights. And while many Canadians frequently take the rights and entitlements that citizenship bestows on them for granted, for others, such as "non-citizen" and "not-yet citizen" immigrants and refugees, their rights, entitlements, access to quality services, and responsibilities are less certain and cannot always be determined in black-and-white.[24] This is because "legal rights do not miraculously apply equally to all people in all contexts": instead they are socially mobilized.[25] In addition, it is important to bear in mind that citizenship and its content are historically, socially, economically, and politically constructed, making an examination of these variables all the more necessary for understanding how exclusion and processes of exclusion are phenomena that appear at the intersection of these variables.[26]

Theorists of space have offered a useful approach to examine ways in which individuals and groups position themselves vis-à-vis prevailing socio-political processes and practices, or the manner in which these individuals and groups are positioned by others (such as government officials, service providers, schools, etc.) vis-à-vis those processes and practices, and how the space in which they operate is stabilized or contested as a result.[27] The experience of resettled refugees, including Syrians refugees, seeking to integrate in the societies of their host countries sheds light on these dynamics and processes of social exclusion/inclusion. In fact, with increased mobility and distress-inducted migration, "more and more people [are] inhabiting this slippery space between what rights they should and what rights they actually can access."[28]

And while there is not one single agreed-upon definition of what constitutes integration in the context of refugee

resettlement,[29] one useful definition is the one developed by the UNHCR, which underscores that it is "the end product of a multi-faceted and on-going process, of which self-reliance is but one part…. Integration requires preparedness on the part of the refugees to adapt to the host society, without having to forego their own cultural identity. From the host society, it requires communities that are welcoming and responsive to refugees, and public institutions that are able to meet the needs of a diverse population."[30]

In this regard, a plethora of literature has underscored the idea that integration is a multi-dimensional and two-way process.[31] Policy debates and academic conversations regarding integration challenges faced by newly arrived migrants have focused on different dimensions of citizenship, such as the rules of entry into the collective (i.e., legal status), the benefits associated with membership (rights), and the identity of the immigrant or newcomer in the collective of the receiving state.[32] They have also highlighted that the main challenges to the well-being of immigrants and refugees during settlement includes economic factors such as unemployment/underemployment, discrimination, and language barriers.[33]

Nevertheless, where studies have examined the extent to which policy measures could remove barriers to integration,[34] all too often their emphasis has been on traditional markers of that process and on the extent to which the government has offered support in those domains. In addition, the focus has frequently been placed on what non-nationals or non-citizens must do to earn Canadian citizenship and to integrate. Consequently, they have repeatedly placed the burden of integration on the shoulders of refugees and immigrants, with any failure to integrate becoming theirs and theirs alone.[35]

One challenge to any efforts to encourage and improve the well-being of immigrants and refugees in their host societies is that of creating a sense of belonging and social inclusion[36] and of promoting the resilience of newly arrived refugees as a direct objective of the resettlement efforts.[37] As Gutierrez notes, empowerment is crucial, because it involves "a process of increasing personal, interpersonal, or political power,"[38] as a way of enhancing the strengths in individuals or communities and establishing equity in the distribution of resources.[39] In this regard, education has been pointed out as one element that can promote the integration of newly arrived migrants and refugees, given that it is "a key site in which both the host and incoming populations learn with, and about, one another."[40] International studies have also underscored that command of the language of the host country is one of the most significant factors affecting settlement and integration in general and that the degree of proficiency in the host language affects inclusion by affecting the

refugees' or migrants' access to education, training, and the labour market, as well as their sense of "belonging."[41]

Along the same line of reasoning, Boggs argues that civic education empowers citizens by allowing them to find a meaningful basis for participation in public affairs, influencing public decisions and policies to develop civic virtues and an attitude of civility towards fellow citizens as well as an interest in and understanding of practical steps to better their own lives and those of their communities.[42] However, as the practice and theory of empowerment in social work highlights, moving individuals from apathy to action requires not only the need to develop effective interventions to empower them at the individual/micro-level by increasing their feeling of control, but also to implement strategies that develop their collective consciousness/awareness of how political structures and institutional order affect their individual and group experiences (macro-level).[43]

Arguably, developing Canadian civic education material in Arabic has the potential of contributing to that process of empowering resettled Syrian adult refugees and of fostering their social inclusion in a country that, at least formally speaking, espouses a multicultural policy. This, I argue, is the case because such material could potentially set into motion the key dimension of citizenship: participation. It also, I maintain, affords them the opportunity to engage effectively with Canadian civic concepts in their native language, while they are learning the host country's official languages. This, I argue, would help Syrian adult refugees overcome a key constraint that they face in their efforts to increase their individual agency and to exercise it:[44] the low levels of their command of English and French. Given that much of the research concerned with migrant adaptation and acculturation has assumed that increased participation in the host culture would require their detachment from their culture of origin, this option, of providing civic education material in the native language of resettled refugees, may never have been considered feasible by policy-makers. That point of departure may need re-evaluation.[45]

Canada's Resettlement of Syrian Refugees: Overview

In 2016, 11.6 per cent of all new immigrants admitted to Canada were refugees, a figure that represents the highest number the country has admitted[46] "since 1978, when the *Immigration Act* came into effect."[47] Canada is also a signatory of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951), which stresses amongst other things that "the Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation [integration] and naturalization of [domestic asylum] refugees."[48] In principle, resettlement programs allow "host countries" to provide refugees with protection against refoulement,[49] and

"with access to civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights similar to these enjoyed by nationals as well as the opportunity to become a citizen in accordance with national laws."[50]

In Canada, the majority of resettled refugees, including Syrian refugees who have been processed overseas, are granted permanent resident status upon arrival,[51] which other Western resettlement countries have not offered them.[52] In fact, Canada's immigrants and refugees resettled from abroad have traditionally been viewed as "citizens-in-waiting," as they are entitled to apply for citizenship status after three years of permanent residence.[53] Hence they enjoy most of the rights and social benefits that citizens have, as well as the protection afforded under Canadian law, including the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,[54] which declares that "every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination."[55]

Here, it is also worth underscoring that with the passage and implementation of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (2001) (IRPA), the government has, in its resettlement initiatives, shifted its focus to those most in need of protection.[56] In the context of group processing, the current legislation emphasizes the refugees' protection needs and their levels of vulnerability over their ability to establish themselves in Canada,[57] and removes, in considering the most vulnerable cases, restrictions on "admissibility" criteria based on medical, economic, educational, and language proficiency that are usually applied to economic immigrants.[58] These considerations have also been applied vis-à-vis the selection of Syrian refugees: chosen from a pool of referrals by the UNHCR because they are amongst the most vulnerable and hence in need of protection, GARs constituted more than half of all Canada resettled Syrian refugees by early 2017.[59]

Upon their arrival in Canada, resettled refugees, including the Syrians arriving in 2015, have enjoyed financial assistance for up to one year or until they are able to support themselves (whichever happens first).[60] Through programs such as the Resettlement Assistance Program (RAP), IRCC has provided recently arrived eligible refugees, primarily GARs, with both immediate and essential services and income support.[61] The federal government has also worked with many federal and provincial partners to help refugees adjust to their new society. This has also been the case in the federal government's Syrian refugees' resettlement initiative, during which the government expanded the current network of Canadian communities that can support the resettlement effort,[62] as a way of helping individuals and families adjust to their new society and foster integration. Implemented activities included port of entry services, assistance with temporary accommodations, orientation sessions, enrolment in English- or French-language courses, links to settlement programming as well as mandatory federal and provincial programs in health, education, employment, etc.[63]

Citizenship, Integration, and Civic Education for Immigrants and Resettled Refugees

In Canada, permanent residency affords migrants and refugees resettled from abroad a reasonably secure road to becoming citizens. Upon gaining citizenship, they "have rights and privileges accorded or protected by the state, as well as duties toward the state."[64] Ever since multiculturalism has become an official Canadian policy, efforts to inculcate an attachment to Canada amongst newly arrived immigrants and refugees, and to encourage them to become active citizens—ones who enjoy both the opportunity and capacity to participate in the political and social life of their new home country and their own immediate communities—were adopted.[65]

For many Canadians, good citizenship is a key reflection of "good integration." According to a survey conducted in 2011, 50 per cent of all Canadians interviewed identified active participation in the local community and sharing common values or volunteering as key attributes of good citizenship.[66] For youth and children, this takes place primarily through civic education at the school and university levels, while for adult immigrants and refugees it takes place by exposing them to civic education concepts that make their way into federal and provincial government-supported English- and French-language training programs. In this regard, GARs and PSRs, amongst others can enrol in the same language courses that all newly arrived permanent residents have access to.[67]

On the face of it, Canada's emphasis on the integration of newcomers, including refugees, is driven by several factors. The first is that it is a country that relies strongly on immigration: by 2017, more than one in every five Canadians (21.9 per cent) was foreign born.[68] The second is that its immigration model is about permanent settlement. Consequently, its legal system, public policy, and political structures all encourage integration.[69] Article 3(e) of the IRPA, for example, underscores as some of its key objectives the need "to promote the successful integration of permanent residents into Canada, while recognizing that integration involves mutual obligations for new immigrants and Canadian society."[70] Third, multiculturalism is an official policy and a tenet of Canadian constitutional law. Enshrined in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982,[71] the policy expanded in 1988 when the Multiculturalism Act became federal law.[72] As Meer and Moddod have underscored, in the political orientation of multicultural citizenship, this sought to rebalance "the politics of accommodation and inclusion

focused on ethno-religious groups, with a greater emphasis on hyphenated and plural forms of national citizenship, plural identities and individual rights."[73]

Some scholars have identified multiculturalism as a key factor driving successful citizenship integration.[74] Supporters of the proposition that multiculturalism is "doing well" in Canada point out that it is premised on the goals of fostering a society that recognizes and reflects a diversity of cultures; promotes active civic participation amongst its people; and ensures that people of all origins receive fair and equitable treatment.[75] To foster a sense of citizenship and strengthen the social integration of newly arrived immigrants and refugees, federal and provincial governments have supported or implemented activities that seek to promote refugees' active civic participation in the political and civil life of their new home country and "inculcating a sense of the rights and responsibilities of Canadian citizenship and the value of diversity."[76]

Given that citizenship education has considered literacy to constitute "an essential element of citizenship participation and voluntarism,"[77] it is hardly surprising that federal and provincial authorities have viewed language classes targeting newcomers as a crucial medium for transmitting citizenship education–related concepts. In 1992, new English- and French-language instructions for newcomers (LINC) were developed and were fully funded by the federal government and implemented across Canada (except for Quebec, Manitoba, and British Columbia, which have their own provincially run language programs)[78] as a way of contributing to the social, cultural, and economic integration of immigrants and refugees into Canada.[79] Language courses were also geared towards improving students' knowledge of Canada and of Canadian civics, and towards providing them with information on the Canadian workplace, job-search techniques, and tools amongst others.[80]

At the same time, it is worth emphasizing that the educational policy formulations, programming, and structures, including civic education curricula, essentially remain a provincial responsibility.[81] Thus, the federal government's influence is limited to equalization subsidies and facilitating bilingual and multicultural programs.[82] On the provincial level, civic education classes are provided in schools to youth and children.[83] There have also been initiatives by the non-profit sector and various immigrant-serving organizations to foster social, civic, and political engagement and immigrant integration. And while some receive funding from the IRCC, others have no regular sources of funding.[84]

In addition, federal government authorities have funded the development of resources to help instructors teach citizenship-related concepts as part of adult English as a Second Language (ESL) programs,[85] which are offered by school boards, community colleges, and universities, as well

as government and the private sector.[86] Another federal initiative has been the Welcoming Communities Initiative (WCI), which seeks to help newly arrived immigrants deal with racism and discrimination and raises awareness of the receiving communities about these issues.[87] Since 2010, the federal government has funded initiatives to undertake multiculturalism projects and events geared towards improving the responsiveness of institutions to the needs of diverse populations,[88] and promoting the civic engagement of minorities.[89]

Other activities and products geared specifically towards newcomers include study materials for the citizenship test, citizenship ceremonies, and outreach activities.[90] This is because citizenship applicants are required to pass a written multiple-choice citizenship test examining their understanding of Canada and rights and responsibilities of citizenship, as well as the level of their command of English or French.[91] Citizenship guides that have been developed in the past by the federal government have addressed topics such as volunteerism, multiculturalism, human rights, and individual responsibility with fellow citizens.[92] Through an assessment of immigrants' acquisition of language and the demonstration of their alignment with "Canadian values," the emphasis has been on the newcomer's capacity to participate in mainstream society.[93] Today, applicants are strongly encouraged to consult *Discover Canada: The Rights and Responsibilities of Citizenship*, on which the test-related questions are based.[94]

Critics of Canada's multiculturalism policy, on the other hand, underscore that its implementation has not been unproblematic. The fact that it is embedded within a bilingual framework has meant that multiculturalism became "a process of political bargaining among the two 'founding nations' of English and French and the more established immigrant communities of European origin … without the political participation of the overwhelmingly visible minority immigrant arrivals of the past two decades."[95] In addition, the policy has been deemed unsuccessful in transforming power relations, or dealing with the reality of systematic racism, social exclusion, and discrimination, all of which continue to pose serious challenges.[96] Furthermore, it has been argued that securitization stemming from the post–9/11 policy responses has disproportionately targeted minorities in Canada still remains central in the articulation of Canadian citizenship.[97] Moreover, scholars who have analyzed the current discourses of diversity in Canadian citizenship education have underscored that opportunities for advocating liberal social justice discourses risk being overtaken by neo-liberal and conservative narratives—ones that promote social cohesion while projecting a narrow vision of Canadian identity and asserting the role of the state.[98] Given that the objective is to integrate students of civic education

courses into the dominant society, "within this framework, inequities become constructed as individual issues, distracting attention from how power is embedded within social structures."[99] This, they argue, has de-emphasized the liberal justice discourse and progressive ideals that engage with differences, and reinforce the importance of the state committing to social action policies and nurturing the individual's right to his/her own identity.[100]

Language Courses for Resettled Syrian Adult Refugees: Challenges and Prospects

For resettled adult refugees, including Syrians, in Canada, the ability to participate effectively in society is hampered by limited knowledge of the functioning of the community and government, and inadequate skills and understanding of how to manoeuvre integration-related challenges.[101] This is not to suggest that refugees are not resourceful or resilient. Rather, it is to underscore that more needs to be done to increase the agency that the resettled refugee enjoys from the onset, rather than during subsequent stages of the resettlement experience further down the line.

A number of elements have made their resettlement and integration experience particularly challenging. By the time they have arrived in Canada, most have gone through precarious pre-resettlement experiences, including forced dislocation, exposure to violence, protracted social and economic difficulties, and psychological trauma.[102] A government-led evaluation of the Syria Initiative indicated that Syrian GARs, who by January 2017 constituted an estimated 54.5 per cent of all Syrian refugees who have been resettled across the country, carried higher education needs, health concerns, trauma, physical disabilities, challenging family compositions, lengthy refugee histories, and limited resilience and coping skills.[103] Coming from a war-torn country, many refugees grapple with fragile emotional conditions, which have made it difficult for them to integrate into their new surroundings. In addition, they often have escaped political regimes that have not only failed to protect their rights, but have frequently been involved in the systematic violation of these rights. Often, they have had limited exposure to what it means be an "active citizen" in their country of origin.[104]

As they become Canadian permanent residents, new uncertainties have coloured their lives.[105] They struggle with an unfamiliar community and political decision-making. Many find it difficult to participate in their new societies.[106] Past studies examining the engagement of diverse groups, including refugees, in the political life of Canadian society have produced mixed results. While some indicate that with time the level of formal and informal political participation of immigrants tends to be similar to that of Canadian-born individuals,[107] others have underscored that the political

incorporation and social and civic engagement of immigrants, particularly that of newly arrived immigrants, pose significant challenges. Language barriers, discrimination, lack of social relations and interactions, racism, and lack of knowledge of the Canadian political system represent elements that have hampered the ability of migrants to interact with the political system, including for those who have been living here for a decade or more.[108] Many newcomers, including refugees, do not know their rights—a fact that exacerbates their isolation, renders them vulnerable to exploitation, and results in overall low levels of civic engagement.[109]

Given these hurdles and contextual challenges, the extent to which the exposure by Syrian adult refugees to civic education concepts appears to have enhanced their integration remains unclear and merits further investigation. One reason is that in stark contrast to youth and child migrants and refugees, adult refugees are not obliged to enrol in an educational institution upon arrival in Canada. As a result, their knowledge of what it means to be Canadian, including their rights and responsibilities as citizens, trickles down through limited venues: language classes or their own individual efforts to participate in the political and civic life of their local communities.[110] In addition, most resettled Syrian refugees suffer from high levels of vulnerabilities and lower education levels and have attained lower levels of proficiency in the official languages (French or English) than previously resettled refugee cohorts arriving in Canada. According to government figures, 83 per cent of all GARs who were resettled between November 2015 and March 2016 and who had participated in the survey spoke neither English nor French.[111] And 81 per cent reported that they had attained a secondary-level education or less.[112]

Even where such activities have been offered, the inclusion of and reference to citizenship-related concepts, including civics, have lacked uniformity or have featured as indirect side-learning objectives of integration programs for newcomers more generally. A few examples illustrate this trend. In 2005, a study surveyed the extent to which teachers and program coordinators of eighty-five Language Instruction for Newcomers to Canada (LINC) programs based in Ontario, British Colombia, and Alberta offered for adult newcomers, had incorporated citizenship concepts into their classrooms. Most of those surveyed expressed the view that these courses were by no means a substitute for citizenship-preparation courses.[113] In addition, two main challenges were identified: the lack of a set curriculum and the low linguistic proficiency of students.[114]

In a similar vein, a federal government-led evaluation of the LINC program in 2010 concluded that although more than 90 and 80 per cent of LINC classes taught English for daily life and civics respectively,[115] the lack of a mandated

curriculum made it "almost impossible to create validated instruments to assess what has been learned in LINC classes beyond proficiency in English."[116] In other words, it proved challenging to assess "the extent to which LINC participants acquired knowledge of Canada and of Canadian civics and the degree to which the program has assisted with settling in Canada."[117] Another concern that was expressed about current adult immigration language policies more generally is their emphasis on employability, and their failure to integrate differences and diversity into language education.[118]

One other evaluation worth mentioning is the one conducted in 2012 by IRCC of its multiculturalism program. Although it highlighted that related projects were having a positive impact on increased civic memory and pride, respect for core democratic values, and intercultural/ interfaith understanding,[119] it also acknowledged that there was "limited evidence to demonstrate to what extent the Multiculturalism Program is achieving its expected outcomes."[120] Moreover, it was not clear to what extent civic-related concepts that were promoted through this program had contributed to the newcomers' civic/citizenship participation. One case in point is the Welcoming Communities Initiative: while its design had allowed communities across the country to tailor projects to the needs of newly arrived immigrants and has had a positive impact on newcomers, it has similarly been difficult to apply any standardized performance indicators to assess the more concrete impact of these projects.[121]

Similar results emerged in citizenship awareness activities. An IRCC-led evaluation conducted in 2013 to assess the relevance of these activities to promoting the value of Canadian citizenship found that the "emphasis is being shifted from promotional activities to processing [of citizenship applications] activities."[122] Moreover, it concluded that using the study guide *Discover Canada* as a key promotional tool required "a higher level of language proficiency, which may limit its accessibility to some vulnerable groups."[123] In other words, the guide may be less accessible to those with lower levels of education and official language abilities.[124] In contrast to countries like the United States and Australia, the Canadian citizenship guide is not provided in any non-official languages or in plain language. It has also been criticized for having "a rather minimalist conception of citizenship."[125] Furthermore, and following the adoption of the written citizenship test, many citizenship programs on the national level have been cut back or shortened.[126] Finally, the acquisition of formal citizenship in Canada comes at the end of the naturalization process. This signifies that the standardized citizenship test, and with it any exposure to citizenship education that it may grant to immigrants and refugees taking the exam, would at the earliest take place three years following their arrival in Canada.[127]

Formal Citizenship Education for Adult Syrian Refugees in Arabic: A New Link in the Chain?

On one hand, there is no specific legal obligation upon states to provide citizenship education courses for adult refugees. However, Canada can find support in domestic legislation and policies. The adoption of multiculturalism as an official state policy has, normatively speaking, signalled the passage from assimilation to normative pluralism,[128] as subsequently underscored by the Canadian Multiculturalism Act. Within this framework, enhanced civic participation[129] has been re-affirmed as a key objective.[130] Article 3(1)(c) of this act emphasizes that, amongst other things, it is Canada's policy to "promote the full and equitable participation of individuals and communities of all origins in the continuing evolution and shaping of all aspects of Canadian society and assist them in the elimination of any barrier to that participation."[131] With eight out of its nine principles dealing with equity, the change in the interpretation of multiculturalism, from one that recognizes diversity to one that emphasizes the full and equitable participation of all Canadians, is an important one.[132] It has also been reiterated by article 3(b) of IRPA, which proclaims that it seeks, amongst other objectives, "to enrich and strengthen the social and cultural fabric of Canadian society, while respecting the federal, bilingual and multicultural character of Canada,"[133] including by "support[ing] and assist[ing] the development of minority official languages communities in Canada."[134]

In terms of international human rights instruments, article 6(b) of the UN Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights emphasizes that the steps taken by state parties to recognize the right of everyone to enjoy an opportunity to gain his or her living by work, "shall include technical and vocational guidance and training programmes, policies and techniques to achieve steady economic, social and cultural development."[135] In addition, they must ensure that the right of everyone to education "shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and the sense of its dignity, and shall strengthen the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms … [and] shall enable all persons to participate effectively in a free society, promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations and all racial, ethnic or religious groups."[136]

It can also find support in international soft law such as UN General Assembly declarations and the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) recommendations on human rights education and training more generally, and "may be considered to impart on behalf of the organ adopting it, a strong expectation that Members of the international community will abide by it."[137] According to UNESCO, adult education strives formally and informally to ensure that "that all adults participate in their societies

… and [that they] develop and enrich their capabilities for living and working, both in their own interests and those of their communities, organisations and societies."[138] Adult learning and education also play a crucial role in contributing to various objectives, including active citizenship, by allowing people to engage with social issues (such as justice, equity, and exclusion) and to "lead a decent life … in all other ways that contribute to personal development and dignity."[139] Moreover, it equips people with the necessary capabilities to exercise and realize their rights, develops their capacity of thinking both critically and independently, fosters their resilience, and allows them to fully participate in development.[140] Finally, article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights underscores that all human beings are "equal in dignity and in rights,"[141] a principle that should affect the way in which specific human rights are interpreted and applied by member states of the UN.[142] Any state-led initiative that promotes this emphasis is a welcome development.

The proposal to develop and conduct civic education courses in Arabic, jointly with members of the resettled Syrian community, is driven by the concern that if government authorities were to wait until this cohort of resettled refugees attains proficiency in French or English before engaging with them on Canadian civic concepts, the delay will result in the loss of a valuable and time-sensitive window of opportunity to help them unpack these concepts. This risk is real, given that IRCC funded seats for lower-level language classes are not readily available and there are long waiting lists for language classes more generally.[143] Hence, waiting till they have attained improved English- and French-language skills risks putting them at a disadvantage in their resettlement and integration experience and is at odds with the declared policy of multiculturalism.

For many GARs, their low proficiency levels compared to those of other newcomers to Canada has meant that they have had to wait to attain a basic knowledge of one of the official languages before accessing the job market.[144] In fact, 54 per cent of the Syrian GARs participating in one federal government-led survey stated that they were not searching for employment, citing their enrolment in language classes as a primary reason.[145] At the time of the survey, only 27 per cent of the participating GARs had been referred to employment-related services and only 10 per cent had found employment.[146] Moreover, while federal and provincial service-providers have sought to tackle the immediate needs arising from resettlement (health, children's school enrolment, language, and housing),[147] the financial assistance has generally not extended beyond the one-year mark. In light of the above, the forecast is that there will be "a marked increase in the proportion of GARs who would be expected to have integration challenges due to lack of knowledge of an official language, limited education and age."[148] There has also been a real fear of the risk of their assimilation into poverty,[149] particularly strong for Syrian GARs, 74 per cent of whom were more likely to have accessed food banks, compared to 23 per cent of Syrian PSRs.[150]

The limited French and English proficiency skills at the time of resettlement have created obstacles for refugees at other levels as well. Not only are their abilities to engage in social interactions limited by the language barrier, the fact that most of them are GARs signifies that they do not necessarily have access to social or family ties, which renders them more socially isolated. Coupled with the precariousness of their refugee experience prior to arrival, their efforts to access the job market rapidly and efficiently are also affected, because proficiency in French and English remain a strong predictor of labour market success and educational attainment.[151] This overlaps with the conclusions by Adamuti-Trache that the economic and social integration outcomes, as well as immigrant perceptions of settlement, are still controlled largely by pre-migration language skills, rather than by skills reported four years after arrival.[152] Similarly, the ability to obtain recognition for their academic and professional credentials that they have earned in their home country or elsewhere continues to pose a significant challenge for refugees.[153]

Concluding Remarks

With the situation of recently resettled Syrian refugees as a case study, this article has sought to underscore how language courses by federal and provincial authorities have fallen short of providing resettled Syrian adult refugees with meaningful opportunities to engage with and understand Canadian civic concepts, as a way of empowering them to better integrate into Canadian society. One identified shortcoming is that these programs are geared towards addressing refugees' lack of linguistic "competence," rather than towards the need of dealing with structural constraints in the system, in a way that nurtures Syrian refugees' group consciousness and awareness of political and civic processes and structures. A civic education course in Arabic would ensure that this consciousness is harnessed, irrespective of individuals' command of the official languages of Canada.

Subsequently, the article sought to demonstrate why government programming would benefit from supporting the development and implementation of a Canadian citizenship education course for recently resettled adult refugees in their native language. Skeptics would argue that one major hurdle to overcome is the fact that Canada's multiculturalism policy remains strongly embedded in a bilingual framework (despite all the criticism that this has attracted). Hence, there is a fear that if the federal government were to support the

development and implementation of Canadian civic education courses in the native language of newly resettled refugees, this may subdue their enthusiasm for learning Canada's two official languages, as a way of fast-tracking their integration into the society of their new home country.

However, the fact that Canada has adopted a multiculturalism policy presents an imperative argument in favour of overcoming this hurdle, both on the level of policy formulation and mindset. This is because multiculturalism accords a high value to the promotion of equality of opportunity, recognition of "differences," and the interaction between ethno-religious groups and individual rights in a way that seeks to ensure that individuals and groups are treated as bearers of rights and that they enjoy horizontal and vertical relations to the state.[154] Given the government's commitment to multiculturalism, it is worth exploring whether the gap between policy and practice can be bridged through the development of Canadian civic education courses (in this case, in Arabic). However, more research is needed to establish the extent to which resettled Syrian refugees have been exposed to Canadian civic education concepts through government-funded language courses that they are enrolled in, or have enrolled in since their arrival, and whether or not they believe that their integration experience and their own empowerment can be further improved through provision of a compulsory Canadian citizenship course in their native language. It would also be important to ascertain whether or not there is support amongst the target group for enrolling in such a course, irrespective of the individuals' initial English- and French-language proficiency, given the lack of a systematic content of civic education in current English- or French-language courses.

If Canadian citizenship courses in Arabic were to be developed, there is also a pressing need for government-led civic education programs to better understand refugees' forced migration experience and the educational gaps and challenges that they face in the post-resettlement stage.[155] This is because Syrian refugees were admitted to Canada on humanitarian grounds and for protection needs, and not on economic grounds, as is the case of skilled worker immigrants.[156] Thus, with the exception of Syrians who were privately sponsored by extended family members or average concerned Canadian citizens, the majority of resettled Syrians have enjoyed very little agency in choosing Canada as the place of their resettlements.[157]

Canada's resettlement of these refugees has been hailed by the international community and by the UNHCR as a model that should be replicated elsewhere. In response to the 2017 fall reports of the auditor general of Canada, which had audited the Syrian Refugee Initiative, Canada's Minister of IRCC Ahmed Hussen reiterated "the importance of integration in building a strong society [and that] [t]his means that we need to support the full participation of newcomers in the economic, social, cultural, and civic life of Canada."[158] However it is clear that more can and must be done throughout all phases of the resettlement process. Furthermore, in light of Canada's commitment to multiculturalism, the emphasis of this policy on equitable participation must guide more thoroughly the actions of government authorities to ensure that they adopt a more justice-oriented approach to citizenship education. In short, what is needed is a policy shift in the way that language courses and their civic education content are developed and administered, so that refugees are no longer considered policy objects but active integral agents in their own resettlement.[159] This will enable them to "receive a fair return on their human capital assets and thereby contribute as early and fully as possible to their communities.[160] It would also allow Canada to translate its commitment to multiculturalism and "burden sharing" in a more effective manner, long after the initial resettlement phase of refugees has taken place.[161]

Notes

1 Debra Pressé and Jessie Thomson, "The Resettlement Challenge: The Integration of Refugees from Protracted Refugee Situations," *Refuge: Canada's Journal on Refugees* 25, no. 1 (2007): 94–9. Although the principle of burden-sharing is not incorporated in the operation section of a binding international refugee treaty, it has become a central objective of the UNHCR to push for the adoption of a global compact on refugees calling for "equitable sharing of the burden and responsibility for hosting and supporting the world's refugees" (UNHCR, "Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: Part III: Global Compact on Refugees," UN General Assembly A/73/12, Official Record, 73rd Session, Supplement 12, p. 1).

2 UN General Assembly (GA), "Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees," United Nations Treaty Series 189 (July 18, 1951), 137.

3 "States Parties to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol," UNHCR, https://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b73b0d63.pdf.

4 Immigration and Citizenship, "Sponsor a Refugee," August 9, 2017, https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/refugees/help-outside-canada/private-sponsorship-program.html.

5 Statistics Canada, "Distribution (in Percentage) of Immigrants Living in Canada, by Admission Category and Year of Immigration, 2016," 25 October 2017, https://www.statcan.gc.ca/eng/dai/btd/othervisuals/other007.

6 UNHCR, "Syria Refugee Response," last updated 31 December 2018, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria.

7   UNHCR, "High-Level Meeting on Global Responsibility Sharing through Pathways for Admission of Syrian Refugees," March 30, 2016, http://www.unhcr.org/56a628619.html.

8   UNHCR, "High-Level Meeting."

9   Sandra Elgersma, "Resettling Refugees: Canada's Humanitarian Commitment," Library of Parliament, April 1, 2015, https://lop.parl.ca/staticfiles/PublicWebsite/Home/ResearchPublications/InBriefs/PDF/2015-11-e.pdf. They are defined under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27). http://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/i-2.5/.

10   Immigration and Citizenship, "#Welcome Refugees: Key Figures," February 27, 2017, https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/refugees/welcome-syrian-refugees/key-figures.html.

11   The remaining 3,931 refugees were blended visa-office referred (BVOR). Immigration and Citizenship, "#Welcome Refugees." Under the BVOR program, Canada matches refugees identified for resettlement by agencies such as UNHCR with private sponsors in Canada. The federal government provides six months of federal income support for refugees, which is matched by six months of private sponsorship support. The sponsor is expected to provide social support for the full twelve months. Immigration and Citizenship, "Blended Visa-Office Referred Program-Sponsor a Refugee," July 26, 2017, http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/refugees/sponsor/vor.asp.

12   Emily Laxer, "Integration Discourses and the Generational Trajectories of Civic Engagement in Multi-Nation States: A Comparison of the Canadian Provinces of Quebec and Ontario," *Journal of Ethics and Migration Studies* 39, no. 10 (2013): 1577–99.

13   Meira Levinson, "Citizenship and Civic Education," in *Encyclopedia of Educational Theory and Philosophy*, ed. D. Phillips, 1:135 (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 2014).

14   Levinson, "Citizenship and Civic Education," 1:136.

15   Patricia Landolt and Luin Goldring, "Assembling Non-Citizenship through the Work of Conditionality," *Citizenship Studies* 19, no. 8 (2016): 853–69.

16   Levinson, "Citizenship and Civic Education," 1:139.

17   Levinson, "Citizenship and Civic Education," 1:139.

18   Bonny Norton, "Identity as a Sociocultural Construct in Second Language Education," in *TESOL in Context* (special issue), ed. K. Cadman and K. O'Regan (2006): S22–S33.

19   Maria Adamuti-Trache, "Language Acquisition among Adult Immigrants in Canada: The Effect of Premigration Language Capital," *Adult Education Quarterly* 63, no. 2 (2012): 103–26.

20   Barry R. Chiswick and Paul W. Miller, "The Endogeneity between Language and Earnings: International Analyses," *Journal of Labor Economics* 13, no. 2 (April 1995): 246–88; Adamuti-Trache, "Language Acquisition among Adult Immigrants," 109.

21   Soojin Yu, Estelle Ouellet, and Angelyn Warmington, "Refugee Integration in Canada: A Survey of Empirical Evidence and Existing Services," *Refuge: Canada's Journal on Refugees* 24, no. 2 (2007): 17–34.

22   Vanessa Braun, "Standpoint Theory in Professional Development: Former Refugee Education in Canada," *Education* 22, no. 2 (Autumn 2016): 72–86; Courtney A. Brewer, "An Outline for Including Refugees in Canadian Educational Policy," *Canadian Journal for New Scholars in Education* 7, no. 1 (2016): 133–41; Joanne MacNevin, "Learning the Way: Teaching and Learning with and for Youth from Refugee Backgrounds on Prince Edward Island," *Canadian Journal of Education* 35, no. 3 (2012): 48–63; Lana Stemac, Susan Elgie, Hester Dunlap, and Theresa Kelly, "Educational Experiences and Achievements of War-Zone Immigrant Students in Canada," *Vulnerable Children and Youth Studies* 5, no. 2 (2010): 97–107.

23   John Biles, Meyer Burstein, and James Fridores, "Conclusion: Canadian Society: Building Inclusive Communities," in *Immigration and Integration in Canada in the Twenty-First Century*, ed. John Biles, Meyer Burstein, and James Fridores, 269–78 (Kingston, ON: Queen's University, 2008).

24   Judith K. Bernhard, Luin Goldring, Julie Young, Carolina Bernstein, and Beth Wilson, "Living with Precarious Legal Status in Canada: Implications for the Well-being of Children and Families," *Refuge: Canada's Journal on Refugees* 24, no. 2 (2007): 101–14.

25   Margaret Walton-Roberts, "Conclusion: Slippery Citizenship and Retrenching Rights," in *The Human Right to Citizenship: A Slippery Concept*, ed. Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann and Margaret Walton-Roberts (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 253.

26   Stephen Castles, Hein de Haas, and Mark J. Miller, "New Ethnic Minorities and Society," in *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World*, 212–51 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998); Walton-Roberts, "Conclusion."

27   Walton-Roberts, "Conclusion."

28   Walton-Roberts, "Conclusion," 252.

29   Jan Niessen and Thomas Huddleston, *Handbook for Policymakers and Practitioners*, 3rd ed. (France: Directorate General for Justice Freedom and Security, European Commission, 2010), https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/docs/handbook_integration/docl_12892_168517401_en.pdf.

30   Rosa Da Costa, *Rights of Refugees in the Context of Integration: Legal Standards and Recommendations* (UNHCR: Division of International Protection Services, June 2006), http://www.unhcr.org/protection/globalconsult/44bb90882/12-rights-refugees-context-integration-legal-standards-recommendations.html.

31   Stephen Castles, M. Korac, E. Vasta, and S. Vertoviec, *Integration: Mapping the Field* (London: Oxford Centre for Migration Policy and Research and Refugee Studies Center, December 2002).

32 Irene Bloemraad, "Citizenship and Immigration: A Current Review," *Migration and Integration* 1, no. 1 (Winter 2000): 9–37.

33 Bernhard et al., "Living with Precarious Legal Status in Canada."

34 Aliaster Ager and Alison Strang, "Understanding Integration: A Conceptual Framework," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 21, no. 2 (2008): 166–90.

35 Eleni Andreouli and Janet E. Stockdale, "Earned Citizenship: Assumptions and Implications," *Tottel's Journal of Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law* 23, no. 2 (2009): 165–80.

36 Ignacio Correa-Velez, Sandra M. Gifford, and Adrian G. Barnett, "Longing to Belong: Social Inclusion and Wellbeing among Youth with Refugee Backgrounds in the First Three Years in Melbourne, Australia," *Social Science & Medicine* 71, no. 8 (2010): 1399–1408.

37 Nicole Dubus, "Integration or Building Resilience: What Should the Goal Be in Refugee Resettlement?," J*ournal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies* 16, no. 4 (2018): 413–29.

38 Lorraine Gutierrez, "Working with Women of Color: An Empowerment Perspective," *Social Work* 35 (March 1990): 149–53.

39 Gutierrez, "Working with Women of Color."

40 Janet Hannah, "The Role of Education and Training in the Empowerment and Inclusion of Migrants and Refugees," in *Comparative and Global Pedagogies: Equity Access and Democracy in Education*, ed. Joseph Zajda, Lynn Davies, and Suzanne Majhanovich, *Globalisation, Comparative Education and Policy Research* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008), 2:33.

41 Hannah, "Role of Education and Training."

42 D.L. Boggs, "Civic Education: An Adult Education Imperative," *Adult Education Quarterly* 42, no. 1 (Fall 1999): 46–55.

43 Lorraine Gutierrez, Kathryn DeLois, and Linnea Glen Maye, "Understanding Empowerment Practice: Building on Practitioner-Based Knowledge," *Families in Society,* 76, no. 9 (1995): 534–43.

44 Bloemraad, "Citizenship and Immigration."

45 Bernhard et al., "Living with Precarious Legal Status in Canada."

46 Statistics Canada, "Immigration and Ethnocultural Diversity: Key Results from the 2016 Census," 25 October 2017, http://www.statcan.gc.ca/daily-quotidien/171025/dq171025b-eng.htm.

47 Onja Puzic, "Record Number of Refugees Admitted to Canada in 2016, Highest since 1980," CTV News, April 24, 2017.

48 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, article 34.

49 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.

50 UNHCR, "High-Level Meeting on Global Responsibility Sharing."

51 UNHCR, *Resettlement Handbook and Country Chapters*, April 2018, http://www.unhcr.org/protection/resettlement/4a2ccf4c6/unhcr-resettlement-handbook-country-chapters.html.

52 Annette Korntheuer, "Germany's Refugee Protection System," in *Structural Context of Refugee Integration in Canada and Germany*, ed. Annette Korntheuer, Paul Pritchard, and Débora B. Maehler (Koln: Leibniz-Institut for Sozialwissenchaften Band, 2017), 37.

53 Naomi Alboim and Karen Cohl, *Canada's Rapidly Changing Immigration Policies* (Toronto: Maytree Foundation, October 2012), https://maytree.com/wp-content/uploads/shaping-the-future.pdf.

54 "Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms Part I of the Constitution Act 1982 Being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK)," Pub. L. No. c 11 (1982). These include the right to vote, run for office, or hold some jobs that need high security clearance.

55 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982), art 15(1).

56 Pressé and Thomson, "Resettlement Challenge."

57 Pressé and Thomson, "Resettlement Challenge."

58 Yogendra B. Shakya, Sepali Guruge, Michaela Hynie, Arzo Akebari, Mohamed Malik, Sheila Htoo, Azza Khogali, Stella Abiyo Mona, Rabea Murtaza, and Sarah Alley, "Aspirations for Higher Education among Newcomer Refugee Youth in Toronto: Expectations, Challenges, and Strategies," *Refuge: Canada's Journal on Refugees* 27, no. 2 (2010): 65–78.

59 Alboim and Cohl, *Canada's Rapidly Changing Immigration Policies.*

60 Immigration and Citizenship, "How Canada's Refugee System Works," April 3, 2017, https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/refugees/canada-role.html.

61 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, "Evaluation of Government Assisted Refugees (GAR) and Resettlement Assistance Program (RAP)," IRCC Evaluation Division, March 2011, https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/ircc/migration/ircc/english/pdf/pub/gar-rap.pdf.

62 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Guide for Submitting and Welcoming Com*munities: Community Partnership Settlement Plan*, June 9, 2016, http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/partner/communities.asp.

63 Depending on their needs, some refugees qualify for supplementary support programs such as the Immigration Loans Program and the Interim Federal Health Care Program. Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, "Immigration Loans Program (ILP)," March 31, 2016, https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/corporate/publications-manuals/operational-bulletins-manuals/service-delivery/immigration-loans-program.html; Immigration and Citizenship, "Interim Federal Health Program: Summary of Coverage," September 13, 2017, https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/refugees/help-within-canada/health-care/interim-federal-health-program/coverage-summary.html.

64 Meir Levinson, "Citizenship and Civic Education," in *Encyclopedia of Educational Theory and Philosophy*, ed. Denis C. Phillips (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 2014), 135.

65 Yasmeen Abu-Laban and Christina Gabriel, *Selling Diversity: Immigration, Multiculturalism, Employment Equity, and Globalization* (Peterborough, ON: Broadview, 2002).

66 At the bottom of the list was the element of being bilingual. Telephone interviews were conducted with 2,400 Canadians in ten provinces from November to December 2011. Environics Institute, "Canadians on Citizenship: The First National Survey on What It Means to Be a Citizen in Canada," February 2012, https://www.environicsinstitute .org/docs/default-source/project-documents/canadians-on-citizenship/final-report.pdf?sfvrsn=e590c902_2.

67 Yu, Ouellet, and Warmington, "Refugee Integration in Canada."

68 In 2011, 20.6 per cent of Canada's population was foreign born, the highest amongst the G8 countries. Statistics Canada, "Immigration and Ethnocultural Diversity in Canada: National Household Survey, 2011," September 15, 2016, catalogue no. 99-010-X2011001, https://www12.statcan.gc.ca/ nhs-enm/2011/as-sa/99-010-x/99-010-x2011001-eng.pdf.

69 Irene Bloemraad, *Understanding "Canadian Exceptionalism" in Immigration and Pluralism Policy* (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, July 2012), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/TCM-canadian-exceptionalism.

70 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (2001) SC 2001, c 27, art (3)(e), https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/i-2.5/ FullText.html.

71 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982).

72 Canadian Multiculturalism Act 1985 RSC, ch 24 (4th Supp), art 3(1)(a) and (b), http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/ acts/C-18.7/page-1.html. See also Irene Bloemraad, "Multiculturalism Has Been Canada's Solution Not Its Problem," *Globe and the Mail*, October 28, 2010.

73 Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood, "Diversity and Nationality: Contemporary Development in Five European Citizenship Regimes," in Immigration and Integration in Canada in the Twenty-First Century, ed. D. Kiwan, 67–94 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

74 Irene Bloemraad, *Becoming a Citizen: Incorporating Immigrants and Refugees in the United States and Canada* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006).

75 Abu-Laban and Gabriel, *Selling Diversity.*

76 Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, Report on Plans and Priorities 2013–2014, n.d., http://www.cic. gc.ca/english/resources/publications/rpp/2013-2014/index. asp#a2.3

77 Roberta J. Russell, "Bridging the Boundaries for a More Inclusive Citizenship Education," in *Citizenship in Transformation in Canada*, ed. Yvonne Hébert (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 140.

78 IRCC Evaluation Division, "Evaluation of the Language Instruction for Newcomers (LINC) Program," March 2010, https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/ircc/migration/ircc/ english/resources/evaluation/linc/2010/linc-eval.pdf

79 Once immigrants complete the Canadian Language Benchmark Level CLB level 4 or higher in speaking and listening, they can use the certificate as proof for meeting the citizenship language requirement. Immigration and Citizenship, "Language Classes Funded by the Government of Canada," last modified May 30, 2018, https://www.canada.ca/en/ immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/new-immigrants/new-life-canada/improve-english-french/classes .html.

80 IRCC Evaluation Division, "Evaluation of the Language Instruction for Newcomers (LINC) Program."

81 Catherine Broom, Anthony Di Mascio, and Douglas Fleming, "Citizenship Education in Canada: Past and Present," in Y*outh Civic Engagement in a Globalized World*, ed. Catherine Broom, Palgrave Studies in Global Citizenship Education and Democracy, 15–36 (New York: Springer Nature, 2017).

82 Canada does not have a ministry or department of education at the federal level, nor a national education policy. For common educational concerns, the provinces cooperate through the Council of Ministers of Education in Canada. Ratna Gosh, "Public Education and Multicultural Policy in Canada: The Specific Case of Quebec," *International Review of Education* 50, no. 5–6 (2004): 543–66.

83 Broom, Di Mascio, and Fleming, "Citizenship Education in Canada."

84 Ilene Hyman, Agnes Meinhard, and John Shields, "The Role of Multiculturalism Policy in Addressing Social Inclusion Processes in Canada" (Toronto: Center for Voluntary Sector Studies, June 1, 2011), https://www.researchgate.net/ profile/Ilene_Hyman/publication/265236030_The_Role_ of_Multiculturalism_Policy_in_Addressing_Social_ Inclusion_Processes_in_Canada_The_Role_of_ Multiculturalism_Policy_in_Addressing_Social_ Inclusion_Processes_in_Canada/links/ 564f3b6208ae4988a7a81a4b/The-Role-of-Multiculturalism-Policy-in-Addressing-Social-Inclusion-Processes-in-Canada-The-Role-of-Multiculturalism -Policy-in-Addressing-Social-Inclusion-Processes-in-Canada.pdf.

For examples, see City of Vancouver, "New Start 2016–2025: A Settlement and Integration Strategy for Immigrants and Refugees in Vancouver," May 2016, http://www. vancouverimmigrationpartnership.ca/media/1259/newstart-online-pdf-july-4.pdf; Canadian Council for Refugees, "Newcomer Youth Civic Engagement Leaders," n.d., http://ccrweb.ca/en/youth/nyce-youth-leaders; Centre for Newcomers, "Community Connections" n.d., https://www. centrefornewcomers.ca/communities.

85 IRCC Evaluation Division, "Evaluation of the Language Instruction for Newcomers (LINC) Program."

86 Yan Guo, "Language Policies and Programs for Adult Immigrants in Canada: Deconstructing Discourses of Integration," *New Directions for Adult and Continuing Education*, no. 146 (Summer 2015): 41–51.

87 Again, the provinces of Quebec, Manitoba, and British Columbia have their own programs. Citizenship and Immigration Canada, "Evaluation of the Welcoming

Communities Initiative," August 2010, http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pdf/research-stats/ER201103_05E_WCI.pdf.

88 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, "Evaluation of the Multiculturalism Program," March 2012, http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pdf/research-stats/multiculturalism.pdf.

89 Augie Fleras, *The Politics of Multiculturalism: Multicultural Governance in Comparative Perspective* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

90 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, "Evaluation of the Citizenship Awareness Program," October 2013, https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/ircc/migration/ircc/english/pdf/pub/cap.pdf.

91 Immigration and Citizenship, "Prepare for the Citizenship Test," November 10, 2017, http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/citizenship/cit-test.asp.

92 These elements featured in the analysis of five of six citizenship guides that were developed from 1963 to 2009. Nore Sobel, "Constructing Canadian Citizens: A Textual Analysis of Canadian Citizenship Guides in English 1947–2012" (University of Manitoba, 2013).

93 Mirieille Paquet, "Beyond Appearances: Citizenship Tests in Canada and the UK," *International Migration and Integration* 13 (2012): 243–60.

94 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, "Discover Canada," 2012, http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pdf/pub/discover.pdf.

95 Ratna Omidvar and Ted Richmond, "Immigrant Settlement and Social Inclusion in Canada" (Laidlaw Foundation, 2003) at 12, http://maytree.netfirms.com/maytree/wp-content/uploads/2008/05/summaryimmigrantsettlementandsocialinclusion2003.pdf.

96 Yasmeen Abu-Laban, "Building a New Citizenshp Regime? Immigration and Multiculturalism in Canada," in *Citizenship in Transnational Perspective: Australia, Canada and New Zealand*, ed. Jatinder Mann, 263–83 (Clam: Palgrave: Macmillan, 2017).

97 Yasmeen Abu-Laban, "Building a New Citizenshp Regime?"

98 Karen Pashby, Leigh-Anne Ingram, and Reva Joshee, "Discovering, Recovering and Covering-Up Canada: Tracing Historical Citizenship Discourses in K–12 and Adult Immigrant Citizenship Education," *Canadian Journal of Education* 37, no. 2 (2014): 1–26.

99 Pashby, Ingram, and Joshee, "Discovering, Recovering and Covering-Up Canada."

100 Pashby, Ingram, and Joshee, "Discovering, Recovering and Covering-Up Canada."

101 D.L. Bloggs, "Civic Education: An Adult Education Imperative," *Adult Education Quarterly* 42, no. 1 (Fall 1991): 46–55.

102 Shakya et al., "Aspirations for Higher Education"; Pressé and Thomson, "Resettlement Challenge."

103 The data collection took place between June and September 2016. Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, "Rapid Impact Evaluation of the Syrian Refugee Initiative," IRCC Evaluation Division, December 21, 2016, https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/

corporate/reports-statistics/evaluations/rapid-impact-evaluation-syrian-refugee-initiative.html.

104 UNHCR, *Refugee Resettlement: An International Handbook to Guide Reception and Integration*, UNHCR, October 1, 2002, http://www.unhcr.org/protection/resettlement/4a2cfe336/refugee-resettlement-international-handbook-guide-reception-integration.html.

105 Aleksandra Grzymala-Kazlowska and Jenny Phillimore, "Introduction: Rethinking Integration. New Perspectives on Adaptation and Settlement in the Era of Super-Diversity," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 44, no. 2 (2018): 1–18.

106 Victor Armony, Martha Barriga, and Daniel Schugurensky, "Citizenship Learning and Political Participation: The Experience of Latin American Immigrants in Canada," *Canadian Journal of Latin American and Carribean Studies* 29, no. 57–8 (2004): 17–38.

107 Formal political activity includes electoral participation and campaigning. Informal activities refer to contacting elected/non-elected officials and other less conventional forms of political participation such as signing petitions, demonstrating, etc. It also includes general civic engagement like activism in voluntary organizations and the broader community. Jerome Black, "Immigrant and Minority Political Incorporation in Canada: A Review with Some Reflections on Canadian-American Comparison Possibilities," *American Behavioral Scientist* 55, no. 9 (2011): 1160–88.

108 Jorge Ginieniewicz, "The Scope of Political Participation," I*nternational Migration and Integration* 8 (n.d.): 327–45; Ilene Hyman, Meinhard, and Shields, "Role of Multiculturalism Policy"; Yvonne Lai, "Community Engagement and Well-being of Immigrants: The Role of Knowledge," *Canadian Issues*, Summer 2010, 93–7.

109 Sarah V. Wayland, "Unsettled: Legal and Policy Barriers for Newcomers to Canada," Community Foundations of Canada & the Law Commissions of Canada, 2006, http://canada.metropolis.net/publications/pdfs/pf_9_ENG_Immigration.pdf.

110 Sobel, "Constructing Canadian Citizens."

111 By contrast, the Syrian PSRs had a significantly higher knowledge of English (80 per cent). Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, "Rapid Impact Evaluation of the Syrian Refugee Initiative."

112 Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, "Rapid Impact Evaluation of the Syrian Refugee Initiative."

113 Tracey M. Derwing and Ronald I. Thomson, "Citizenship Concepts in LINC Classrooms," *TESL Canada Journal* 23, no. 1 (2005): 9–37.

114 Derwing and Thomson, "Citizenship Concepts in LINC Classrooms."

115 IRCC Evaluation Division, "Evaluation of the Language Instruction for Newcomers (LINC) Program."

116 IRCC Evaluation Division, "Evaluation of the Language Instruction for Newcomers (LINC) Program," 10.

117 IRCC Evaluation Division, "Evaluation of the Language Instruction for Newcomers (LINC) Program," 36.

118 Guo, "Language Policies and Programs."

119 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, "Evaluation of the Multiculturalism Program."

120 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, "Evaluation of the Multiculturalism Program," vii.

121 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, "Evaluation of the Multiculturalism Program.

122 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, "Evaluation of the Citizenship Awareness Program," v.

123 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, "Evaluation of the Citizenship Awareness Program," v.

124 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, "Evaluation of the Citizenship Awareness Program."

125 Paquet, "Beyond Appearances."

126 Derwing and Thomson, "Citizenship Concepts in LINC Classrooms."

127 Paquet, "Beyond Appearances."

128 Elke Winter, "Descent, Territory and Common Values: Redefining Citizenship in Canada," in *Immigration and Integration in Canada in the Twenty-First Century*, ed. D. Kiwan, 95–122 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

129 Wolfram Schulz, John Ainley, Julian Fraillon, Bruno Losito, and Gabriella Angrusti, "IEA International Civic and Citizenship Education Study 2016: Assessment Framework" (Amsterdam: International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement, 2016).

130 Joshee Reva and Tracey M. Derwing, "The Unmasking of Citizenship Education for Adult Immigrants in Canada," *Journal of International Migration and Integration* 6, no. 1 (Winter 2005): 61–80.

131 Canadian Multiculturalism Act (1985), article 3(1)(c).

132 Gosh, "Public Education and Multicultural Policy in Canada."

133 Immigration and Refugee Proection Act (2001), article (3)(b).

134 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (2001), article 3(b.1).

135 Article 6(b) of UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICEscr), United Nations, Treaty Series, 993 (December 16, 1966): 3.

136 Article 13 of ICESCR (1966).

137 Report of the *18th Session* of the *Commission* on *Human Rights*, 19.3.-14.4.1962, *E/3616/Rev. 1*, E/CN. 4/832/Rev. 1, 46 S. (ESCOC 34th Sess. Suppl. 8), para. 105.

138 Article 1 of "'Recommendation on Adult Learning and Education 2015,' Annex to 'Final Report Containing a Draft Text of the Recommendation on Adult Learning and Education'" (UNESCO, October 10, 2015), http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0023/002325/232596e.pdf.

139 UNESCO, "'Recommendation on Adult Learning and Education 2015,'" article 3.

140 UNESCO, "'Recommendation on Adult Learning and Education (2015),'" articles 8, 9, and 16.

141 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, General Assembly Resolution. 21A (III), UN DOC A/810 (1948), 71.

142 Dinah Shelton, *Advanced Introduction to International Human Rights Law* (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014).

143 Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, "Rapid Impact Evaluation of the Syrian Refugee Initiative."

144 Refugees who wish to access employment services require a level of CLB 2 in English or French; however, most Syrians have lower language skills than that. Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, "Rapid Impact Evaluation of the Syrian Refugee Initiative."

145 Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, "Rapid Impact Evaluation of the Syrian Refugee Initiative."

146 This is compared to 63 per cent of PSRs who have been referred to employment services. Half of PSR had found employment. Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, "Rapid Impact Evaluation of the Syrian Refugee Initiative."

147 Sicty-three per cent of GARs and 74 per cent of PSRs have reported that their overall and essential needs were mostly or completely met upon their arrival in Canada. Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, "Rapid Impact Evaluation of the Syrian Refugee Initiative."

148 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, "Evaluation of Government Assisted Refugees," 22.

149 Shakya et al., "Aspirations for Higher Education."

150 Seventy per cent of GARs have pointed out that the income support that they receive does not meet their essential needs. This is compared to 23 per cent of PSRs. Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, "Rapid Impact Evaluation of the Syrian Refugee Initiative."

151 Lori Wilkinson and Joseph Garcea, *The Economic Integration of Refugees in Canada: A Mixed Record?* (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, April 2017).

152 Adamuti-Trache, "Language Acquisition among Adult Immigrants in Canada."

153 Wilkinson and Garcea, *Economic Integration of Refugees in Canada.*

154 Meer and Modood, "Diversity and Nationality."

155 Shakya et al., "Aspirations for Higher Education."

156 Yu, Ouellet, and Warmington, "Refugee Integration in Canada."

157 The resettlement regime empowers UNESCO and host states to select who will get resettled. Annelisa Lindsay, "Surge and Selection: Power in the Refugee Resettlement Regime," *Forced Migration Review* 54 (February 2017): 11–13.

158 Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, "2017 Fall Reports of the Auditor General of Canada: Statements from Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada," IRCC, 2017, https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/news/2017/11/2017_fall_reports-oftheauditorgeneralofcanada.htm.

159 Nicole Ives, "More than a 'Good Back': Looking for Integration in Refugee Resettlement," *Refuge: Canada's Journal on Refugees* 24, no. 2 (2007): 54–63.

160 Biles, Burstein, and Fridores, "Conclusion: Canadian Society," 273.

161 Research and fieldwork for this article was conducted by the author in her capacity as a postdoctoral Steinberg fellow in International Migration Law and Policy, Faculty of Law, McGill University, from 2017 to 2018. Since this article has been written, she has become aware that the Centre Culturel Quebeco-Syrien in Quebec has been holding sessions in Arabic to prepare immigrants for their Canadian citizenship exam. The author is not affiliated, professionally or personally, with the centre, did not have any engagement with it in the past, and cannot attest to the quality or content of these sessions. There may be similar initiatives in Quebec or elsewhere across Canada.

Rouba Al-Salem is an independent migration researcher. The views expressed in this article are her personal views and do not reflect those of her current or past professional or academic affiliations.

Making Canada Home: Snapshots of Syrian and Iraqi Newcomer Cultural Production in the Waterloo Region, 2016–2019

ANNE VERMEYDEN AND EID MOHAMED

Abstract

Since the beginning of the Syrian Crisis in 2011, millions of refugees from Syria and Iraq have been displaced. Over 25,000 Syrian newcomers settled in Canada between 2015 and 2016.[1] The Region of Waterloo, home to a population of approximately 535,000 by 2016,[2] was where about 2,000 of these newcomers settled.[3] This article argues that these newcomers have used arts and culture to navigate the difficulties of settlement and acculturation. Evidence from newspaper articles, interviews, and participant observation indicates that refugees from Syria and Iraq in this region have utilized dance and theatre to develop community that retains cultural connections and identity linked with Syria and the greater Levantine region. Professional and community arts initiatives spearheaded by refugees showcase how culture and identity are caught up in continuous circulations of culture that are geographically situated in the Canadian context. For Syrian and Iraqi refugees in the Waterloo Region, acculturation, nostalgia, and assimilation are complex and powerful sites of community.

Résumé

Depuis le début de la crise syrienne en 2011, des millions de réfugiés de Syrie et d'Irak ont été déplacés. Plus de 25 000 nouveaux arrivants syriens se sont installés au Canada entre 2015 et 2016. Environ 2 000 de ces réfugiés se sont installés dans la région de Waterloo, qui abritait une population approximative de 535 154 personnes en 2016. Cet article soutient que ces nouveaux arrivants ont utilisé les arts et la culture afin de faire face aux processus difficiles d'installation et d'acculturation. Des données tirées d'articles de journaux, d'entrevues et d'observations participantes indiquent que les réfugiés syriens et irakiens ont fait usage de la danse et du théâtre pour développer une communauté qui conserve des liens culturels et une identité en rapport avec la Syrie et la grande région du Levant. Des initiatives professionnelles aussi bien que communautaires menées par des réfugiés démontrent comment la culture et l'identité sont impliquées dans de constantes circulations culturelles situées géographiquement dans le contexte canadien. Pour les réfugiés syriens et irakiens dans la région de Waterloo,

les processus d'acculturation, la nostalgie et l'assimilation sont des sites complexes et puissants de communauté.

Introduction

Before the 2011 uprising, Syria had turned into a police state, and the security services had become the backbone of the system. This gave the regime extensive powers to interfere in the everyday details of citizens' lives. The country was in a perpetual state of emergency, which provided the legal basis for the absence of any rule of law. For decades, the practices of the security services constituted a direct violation of the dignity of Syrians, through the policies of arrest, torture, intimidation, repression, and the suppression of freedom of expression. After the success of both the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions in removing Presidents Hosni Mubarak and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali from power, Syrians were beginning to feel that a change in the structure of the totalitarian Baathist regime that had governed Syria since 1963 was possible. This is what motivated the revolutionary youth to embark upon a struggle that aimed to create a different political, social, and economic reality, one based on freedom, democracy, equal opportunity, and the rule of law, to replace the reality established by the regime, which was based on tyranny, repression, and the monopoly of wealth.

According to the Pew Research Center, as of 2017, nearly 13 million Syrians were displaced globally. By the end of that year, 54,000 Syrian refugees had settled in Canada, and during 2019, 55 per cent of refugees settled in Canada came from Syria or Iraq.[4] This movement has altered the ethnic and socio-cultural makeup of Arabic-speaking communities in many parts of Canada, and it has meant changes in Arabic cultural[5] production across the country. Not surprisingly, there has been an increase in cultural production by both professional and community arts groups within Canadian Arabic-speaking communities addressing themes of displacement. As a case study, this article focuses on refugee cultural production in the Kitchener-Waterloo Region of Ontario between late 2017 and early 2018. Newspaper articles, interviews with displaced Syrians, and participant observation all indicate that Arabic theatrical and dance cultural production in the Waterloo Region is being used to navigate settlement acculturation and to resist narratives of refugee helplessness. In addition, community theatrical and dance productions strengthened community in ways that reach across borders.

Methodology Note

This article is based on three sets of primary source evidence. The first is a set of interviews with twenty-eight Syrian and Iraqi refugees who settled in the Kitchener-Waterloo Region

after the Syrian crisis began. About ten of these participants were involved in the artistic productions listed below. Almost all the interviewees had received services or support in some way from local community non-profits that support refugees like Levant, Shamrose for Syrian Culture, and the K-W Multicultural Centre.[6] Furthermore, all participants indicated that they had taken part in Syrian or Arabic cultural events and/or activities upon arriving in Canada. The second source of data is documentary evidence from newspapers and ephemera detailing refugee professional and community theatre and dance productions in the region between 2016 and 2019. The key productions the authors attended, collected data at, and/or participated in included *Rajaeen Ya Hawa* (2019)*, Sahel el Ward* (2018)*, The Mug* (2017)*, Sultan Basha* (2017)*,* and *Adrenaline* (2017), along with over fifty different *dabke* (Levantine line dance) presentations of the Levant Dabke Troupe. Finally, as both authors are embedded in Arabic-speaking communities in the region, data were collected through participant observation.

In the case of this project, language, culture, and time filtered interviewees' creative acts of recollection.[7] Interviewers used Modern Standard Arabic, various Syrian dialects, and/or English to interview. In some instances, participants acted as translators for one another in the context of group-interviews/focus groups with families and close friends. There was significant language fluidity in many of these interviews (some started in English and ended in Arabic; others began in Arabic, switched to English, and ended in Kurdish). This reflected participants' complex linguistic identities and their linguistic readjustment upon arrival to Canada. The interviews were semi-structured and focused primarily on exploring the transition from the Middle East to Canada, and participation in cultural production after arrival in Canada. Interviews were done in a way that prized conversation and interaction, and thus did not follow a codified set of questions. The content of these interviews is thus a product not only of the newcomers' memories, but also of their cultural context, genders, ages, appearances, and backgrounds.

Documentary evidence in the form of newspaper articles, blog posts, and ephemera further grounded the study. To centre refugee voices and agency, the research team was cognizant of positionalities and the power imbalances inherent in academic research practices. The team recognized interviewees as equal partners in knowledge creation with the goal of mitigating power imbalance in the research relationship.[8] For example, interviewees who wished to have their intellectual input recognized by name are directly cited and credited in this article.[9] Participants who preferred anonymity have also had their wishes respected, and their contributions have

remained anonymous. This choice, to be named or to remain obscured, empowers the narrator in the interview.[10]

Participant observation was chosen so that the researchers could build relationships during the research period. Being connected to those participating in the research through relationships allowed for opportunities to support newcomer initiatives and arts objectives. It also allowed for a level of sensitivity and sharing that is not always present in more formalized interactions. Two contributors to this paper, Anne Vermeyden and Helen Ala Rashi, have been extensively involved with the cultural production of the Shamrose and Levant Refugee agencies. Both researchers have been dedicated to connecting with community and offering assistance to participants when possible. One hurdle to this research was the potential for accessing traumatic stories, while offering no support or recourse. Through developing relationships and continuing to volunteer with participants, the researchers aimed to mitigate this possibility. Anne Vermeyden also joined the Levant *dabke* group, allowing her to get an insider perspective on the group's dance activities, including *dabke* productions, fundraisers, and the plays *Rajaeen ya Hawa* and *Sahel el Ward*. Vermeyden also participated in dance activities through these groups, and furthermore is a community leader because of her activism for refugee causes. Throughout the study, both Ala Rashi and Vermeyden dedicated considerable resources to aid participants by helping advocate for participants' needs (i.e., in accessing health care or navigating government structures) and by offering translation services when needed. Although the power imbalance between researchers and participants cannot be removed entirely, it was hoped that it was diminished through these methodological considerations. This style of research may be criticized, as it limits supposed objectivity; however, any research relationship faces this challenge. This clear disclosure of research and relationship serves to ground understanding of the conclusions reached.

The Syrian Crisis

When demonstrations erupted against the regime of Bashar Al-Assad in 2011, the response of repressive violence and the resultant protracted armed conflict in Syria and Iraq displaced millions.[11] This extended conflict quickly involved numerous regional powers, including Iran and Russia, who offered support to Assad's regime (Russia even had military forces on the ground in Syria as of 2015).[12] Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom have, on the other hand, offered varying degrees of assistance to a variety of opposition Sunni groups.[13] Little progress has been made in resolving this conflict: there are reports of continued use of chemical weapons and barrel bombs.[14] Peace talks also continue to stall. Russia and China

consistently block any decisive UN action to abate the disaster.[15] As a result of this conflict, as of 2016 the UN estimates that approximately six million Syrians were internally displaced, while five million were forced to flee the country as refugees.[16] The conflict and the growth of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has had a significant negative effect on both Syria and neighbouring Iraq.

The emergency shattered the social structure and fabric of Syria and resulted in massive international shifts of the diverse Syrian and Iraqi populations. Syria itself was multi-ethnic and home to numerous faiths because it had itself long been a home for refugees; Syria and Iraq were home to a sizable Kurdish minority (and part of Kurdistan), as well as minorities of Tartars, Circassians, Armenians, Assyrians, Eritreans, Ethiopians, and Palestinians.[17] Before the emergency, Sunni Muslims comprised 65 per cent of Syria's population, while 35 per cent of the remaining population was made up of Christians of various denominations, along with Alawites, Druze, and Ismailis. Refugees of the crisis have come from all of these groups. Many have moved to other states within the Middle East and some to Europe, but thousands have also managed to escape to Canada.

Canadian Socio-political Context

As the world sees unprecedented displacement due to armed conflicts, controlling who enters the country has become a major issue in Canadian political discourse. Canadian and American conservatives have implied links between refugees and international terrorism, have used language to describe Syrians as a horde or wave, and have dehumanized and othered the group to please xenophobic populist movements.[18] Canada's Conservative government under Stephan Harper was purposefully restrictive in its policies towards Syrian refugees, and in fact limited refugee acceptance early on in the crisis, barely reaching 1,000 accepted to Canada by 2013. The refugees the Harper government did accept were unfairly prioritized on the basis of business backgrounds and religion.[19] Gaining refuge in Canada is not easy, as Canada, geographically far from Syria, has been able to strictly control refugee entry to the country.

The sharp increase in Canada's settlement of displaced Syrians during 2016 was not inevitable. It was the result of public objection to restrictive refugee acceptance policies during divisive national elections.[20] During the October 2015 federal election, the Liberal party reiterated its earlier April 2015 call for 25,000 refugees to be admitted to Canada. This election promise to bring 25,000 displaced Syrians to Canada resonated with many who had become concerned about the humanitarian crisis. This campaign promise contributed in part to Justin Trudeau's election, as it appealed to many Canadians who were increasingly sympathetic with

displaced Syrians.[21] The new government completed its promised resettlement of 25,000 refugees between November 2015 and February 29, 2016.[22] The American presidential election that followed in 2016 also helped shape Canada's 2016–19 refugee response. Protecting and supporting Syrian refugees became a marker of supposed Canadian superior morality. Canadians embraced narratives of Syrian support, in part as a way to distance their nation from Trump's America.[23]

Making Canada Home

It was in this context that refugees who were interviewed for this case study came to Waterloo Region between 2013 and 2017. While those interviewed agreed that settling in Canada was far from easy, many expressed that the region was very welcoming in comparison to many other nations they had passed through on the way to Canada. Many shared that they did not feel welcomed and even faced harassment and assault in countries such as Lebanon and Turkey. Interviewees reported experiences of violence or humiliation that they believed they had experienced because of their ethnicities. One man interviewed was stabbed in an altercation in Lebanon, and another was beaten at the Turkish border. The experience of finally being permitted to settle in Canada was a relief for many. One participant stated that Canadian society's way of welcoming them resembles a mother giving a hug to her child: "Their respect is enough, that they took us in. Exactly like a mum who takes in the kids. We felt like the nation takes us in like a mum who hugs her kids, and that was more than enough for us. Even the neighbours took us in."[24]

The majority of participants reported that on the whole they did not feel discriminated against because of their race, ethnicity, or religion in Canada. There is a chance that the growing diversity of the region allowed for such tolerance; as of 2018, 22.6 per cent of Waterloo's Region are immigrants, and one in five residents are members of visible minority groups.[25] Or perhaps there was a sense of welcome and respect because Waterloo Region is home to numerous community programs that help ease newcomer transitions and settlement.[26] Interviews consistently indicated that many Canadians were helpful and kind. Refugees interviewed reported that they received help from Canadians in their settlement and integration: "When we first moved here, everyone was welcoming. They would smile in our face. I've been living in Canada for almost one year and a half, and no one has ever given me an uncomfortable look. I don't know how to describe this to you. Wherever I go I find kindness."[27] Safety, freedom, and equality are some of the positive traits that participants attributed to Canada. Female refugees especially felt themselves freer and more equal to men in Canada.

They also viewed Canada as a place of safety: "Women are so much safer here. It's incredible. I mean I don't fear for my daughter to walk on the sidewalk, or for someone to come and harm my son. Even the little ones, if they're playing by the door outside, it's safe. I really appreciate these things."[28]

However, these positive reports should not be taken at face value. There are a variety of reasons people may have chosen not to reveal these less welcoming experiences. For instance, perhaps some participants chose to keep problematic experiences to themselves in order to save face for their Canadian interviewers. While most interviewees described life in Canada as generally positive, many also discussed experiences of micro-aggressions and societally pervasive racist and orientalist attitudes.[29] For instance, an interviewee explained how her son, in grade nine, had another student exclaim in front of the class, "You people are terrorists!"[30] Women who wear the hijab who were interviewed also related that they were often automatically assumed to be foreign to Canada by white Canadians.

For example, a participant expressed that her daughter faced discrimination because of her hijab: "My kid's in high school now, my daughter. She wears the hijab. She also faced a lot of difficulties, and until now she's facing them. It's been a year for us here. Maybe there's one girl in her school that talks to her [and became close friends], and she's originally Turkish, she's not Canadian, you see. Canadians, I don't know, they hang out together, and for her, since she wears a hijab, this hijab is causing her a big problem."[31]

Reem Hijali, a young Syrian woman, also related experiencing unwelcome comments at school on account of her hijab: "Sometimes I used to go to the washroom and trying to do my hair under the hijab. And they're like 'Is this the golden hair that you hide?' You know? Like 'Hey-y-y Rapunzel, is this the hair that you can't let anyone see or touch?'"[32]

Newcomers are navigating a Canadian context that is underpinned by stubborn cultural prejudices. Newcomers have had to navigate the attitudes of Canadian citizens and media outlets that participate in silencing and othering them. While the public discourse of "Canadian values" and the "moral imperative" to help refugees in Canada may be commendable, it centres supposed Canadian morality at the expense of Syrian voices.[33] A working paper out of the Ryerson Centre for Immigration and Settlement Program analyzed hundreds of print and video stories from Canada's major news outlets between 2015 and 2016, and it concluded that Canadian saviour-narratives dominated the news, while newcomers were homogenized as passively needy. Furthermore, if refugees were given voice at all in media reports, that voice was typically given to men.[34] Acts of racism were typically dismissed in papers and news reports as simply un-Canadian behaviour. The reality of racism and xenophobia

within Canada and abuses against refugees were ignored in favour of heart-warming stories. The study found that feel-good narratives about good-hearted Canadians helping newcomers dominated media coverage, and it concluded that generally Canadian media ignored the experiences and feelings of the refugees themselves.[35] Newcomer cultural production has been a counter-measure to this hostile environment and the limiting representations of media.

Cultural Production in the Canadian Context

Syrian and Iraqi Newcomer Voices in Theatre

Through theatre, refugee and newcomer Arab artists in the region have addressed problematic stereotypical media and academic narratives that focus on, or even exploit, refugee experiences. Amir Al-Azraki, an Iraqi newcomer, Renison College professor, and playwright, in his recent production *The Mug* (2017), powerfully criticized academic consumption and use of refugee trauma narratives.[36] Al-Azraki organized an event entitled "Arab Culture in Diaspora" on November 23, 2017, at the University of Waterloo. The show featured the work of Arab-Canadian artists, including that of refugees from Syria, Jordan, and Iraq. The goal of the evening was to present "Arab culture and identity in a Canadian context."[37] Al-Azraki argued that diaspora "is a shared human experience" and helped his audience engage with transnational Arab arts in the Waterloo Region by championing newcomer artists.[38] At this event *The Mug* was performed by an Iraqi-Canadian actor, also a refugee to Canada, Addil Abbas Hussain. Hussain performed the monologue piece and embodied the darker elements of refugee experience. He railed against those who took pleasure in pitying him, or who profited from his story of suffering. In the monologue he mocked "Canadian saviours." He had vitriol for academics who preyed upon his story to gain tenure or other professional advancement. Al-Azraki and Abbas Hussain made a theatrical piece that validated refugee frustration and anger at their unfair treatment. These newcomer artists offered up a space to challenge the "stereotypical grateful refugee success story." They used theatre to present and validate frustrating, even painful narratives that they had faced during acculturation.

Pressure to be grateful, even as Canadians continue to spotlight traumatizing refugee life-narratives, is something newcomers have found space to resist, in part through cultural production. One interviewee took time to describe his frustration with being constantly understood only as a refugee in Canada. This pigeonholing of his identity affected his art and his life. In Canada many people pressured him to feel grateful for his experience, saying, "You are in Canada. So you have to feel—" But he responded, "I don't have to feel anything."[39] In artistic spaces these complex feelings were shared within the newcomer community and with wider Canadian audiences.

For instance, the plays *Adrenaline* and *Sultan Basha* were part of a Syrian double bill at Kitchener-Waterloo's Registry Theatre on February 16, 2017.[40] Ahmad Mire'e, a displaced Syrian playwright and actor, wrote *Adrenaline* not long after arriving in Canada.[41] The piece, written and performed in his Aleppo dialect of Arabic (with English subtitles), explored the psychological effect of war and the loss of family on one man through the lens of his first New Year's Eve celebration in Canada.[42] The show was emotionally powerful and captured not only longing, loss, and trauma but also stubborn and hopeful resilience. He chose to present the play to Canadian audiences in Arabic with subtitles, so that there could be a Syrian voice in Canada speaking loudly and with dignity. Through organizations like the YMCA and Reception House, refugees were given free tickets to the performance and were encouraged to invite Canadian friends and acquaintances to the show.[43] After the play's premiere, Mire'e shared that as a playwright and actor, his writing, directing, and acting skills allowed him to voice emotions and experiences in a way that could draw both Canadian viewers into the Syrian refugee experience. After the performance, Mire'e mentioned that his use of Arabic as the medium for the play was a proclamation of Syrian resilience and a way to connect and circulate art back to Syria, even if it was presented in Canada.

The second part of this double bill, Nada Homsi's potent historical piece *Sultan Basha*, presented a female-centred perspective on the events that sparked Syria's 1925 revolution against the French. Homsi's work shared a story central to Syrian heritage and identity with the mixed Syrian-Canadian audience at the opening of the play. Homsi presented a very nationalist rendition of *Sultan Basha*. She critiqued colonialism in Syria's past in her monologue, but the work was also a critique of both domestic Canadian and current neo-imperial colonial activity in the Middle East. Homsi, as an immigrant who had come to Canada long before the 2011 crisis, was in a position to share a story centred on historical Syrian identity and Syrian resistance to colonial oppression. She could engage in a deep nostalgia as a playwright who had found her place in Canada—as an artistic associate at Multicultural Theatre Space (MT Space—a Kitchener theatre company), and a pioneering Arab artist.[44] Her play offered Syrian refugee viewers a foundation for their own nostalgia—for a Syria of the past, strong and united against colonizing forces. For a Syria where women's actions were central to political change for the better.

Community Dance and Theatre Groups

The Levant Dabke Troupe, made up in large part of recent newcomers from Syria, celebrates Levantine dance cultures,

and its performances help construct group identity while dismantling stereotypical perceptions of a Middle East defined by division and warfare. This community dance troupe is based in Ontario and has presented choreography and workshops at multicultural festivals and refugee fundraiser events across the province since its founding in 2014. Created in response to the growing refugee Syrian community in the region, the group's work is affected by decisions to stand up against stereotypical ideas about refugee identity. The troupe comprises Arab immigrants from a variety of backgrounds, a handful of Canadians from non-Arab backgrounds, and both Kurdish and Arab newcomer displaced Syrians.

The curation of the group's multicultural presentations has been a negotiation of self-representation. For instance, the group makes a point of including Arab and Kurdish performances together to stand against ethnically divided identity politics. The group has worked to centre a variety of cultural expressions from the Levant. Recent refugees from communities in Syria, both Arab and Kurdish, have contributed to choreography development since 2016. The group's most recent choreographic decisions present Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine as multi-ethnic and interconnected (as the group mainly comprises members from all these regions). Despite geopolitical tension, this group has decided to utilize national dance to educate Canadian audiences, and to encourage inter-Arab community development within Canada. It purposefully includes mixed-gender shows and allows flexibility in roles to stand against stereotypes about Middle Eastern conservatism and gendered dance norms. The troupe is also intimately connected with the Levant organization, whose primary mission is refugee assistance and settlement, with a specific focus on support for women and youth. Here arts and culture intertwine with community activism. Members and choreographers of this community dance group are cognizant of the oppressive structures they are operating within—and are not afraid to use dance to challenge them.

In this cultural community group, dance and theatre are used to create tradition and identity in Canada. For example, Levant sponsored the production of the community theatre pieces *Sahel El Ward* [Meadow of roses] in 2018 and *Rajaeen Ya Hawa* [Coming home] in 2019. These Arabic community theatre musicals were presented at the University of Waterloo and showcased Arab and Kurdish dancing, singing, and a traditional wedding ceremony from Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine. The theatrical group responsible for the production of these shows included recent Arab and Kurdish refugees; the playwright and choreographers were all immigrants or refugees from the Levant region. These shows blended contemporary and traditional wedding practices from across the Middle East and Levant.

Rajaeen Ya Hawa centred on a transnational Syrian narrative because it focused on a comedic long-distance love story where the protagonist returns home to Syria to find his love after spending ten years working in Argentina. *Rajaeen Ya Hawa* played with transnational elements of Argentinian, Syrian, and wider Middle Eastern culture in a Canadian context. This was especially evident in the dabke fusion performance done to the song "Talat Daqat" where the performers mixed Spanish costuming elements with Levantine garb to indicate cultural fusion and circulation. In the play, when the protagonist returns from his time in Argentina, he throws Spanish phrases into his Arabic and passes around yerba maté (a popular hot drink in Argentina) to his neighbours and friends.

In constructing cultural expression tied with Syrian identity in Canada, the individuals involved in this community play were forging intercultural linkages. Community plays and *dabke* performances take on significant meaning. When asked in an interview, "How do you feel when you do *dabke*?" an interviewee responded, "I feel I'm contacting to my culture. I'm, yes, I'm bringing something with me [to Canada] which is, my grounded. My great-, great-, great-grandparents were doing it and I'm continue … and so it's part of me. And I feel all the feelings … I'm bring my culture with me."[45]

The performance of *dabke* with the group was not just an ephemeral experience of movement. It was a physical manifestation of culture and connection to heritage; it was something of Syria he could bring with him to Canada without a suitcase. Even though this participant is not a professional dancer, he participated in sharing and establishing cultural roots here through his performance in the play.

Displaced Syrians have worked to develop a sense of community upon arrival to Canada, and they have used dance, theatre, and other community arts sites to this end—but still, isolation and dislocation remain challenges. Whether they came alone or with family, almost all newcomers interviewed in this project mentioned experiences of loneliness in their transitions to Canada. "I'm living my life, and then when I came here I was like, 'Shoot, I'm scared of being lonely.' And that's exactly what happened. I had no friends."[46] Loneliness, because of either being away from family or not having close friends in Canada, is one of the most reported difficulties they have encountered. Many interviewees complained about homesickness: "I feel so distant from my family. It's not like Europe [where] you can take five-hour flight and get to my family. But from Canada it's very far. Sometimes I'd get sick, and there's no one to help me. This has affected my psychological/mental health a lot. I got so tired, I went to the doctor. She said my mental health was bad. Even when I go to school, I'm disoriented, I can't focus very well. Even at work, I couldn't focus a lot. Where does my mind wander off?"[47]

Others spoke of not being able to make Canadian friends: "I had so many friends back home…. I used to go to parties every now and then, I'm living my life. And then when I came here, I was like I'm scared of being lonely. And that's exactly what happened."[48]

There was also psychological stress that specifically accompanied the reality of being across an ocean from Syria and the Middle East. The large time difference for refugees strained easy communication with those back home. While in Europe, refugees face only a three- or four-hour time difference with Syria, while in Canada, the eight-hour difference is challenging.[49] As a result of the trauma of trans-Atlantic resettlement, and loneliness in becoming culturally dislocated, newcomers participate in the labour of building new communities and engage in reimagined cultural practices in Canada. For instance, government-assisted refugees in Kitchener were housed together for several months in a Howard Johnson Hotel in 2016 upon their arrival. In this trying experience, newcomers forged lasting relationships with each other. In these social networks, newcomers can participate in social and cultural activities that connect them to both Canada and their homeland. Weddings, parties, and other celebrations attended by primarily Syrians, where Syrian food, music, dance, and cultural norms were practised, were a form of cultural production that mitigated loneliness and strengthened social cohesion here in Canada.

Newcomer cultural production has also affected social cohesion with inter-newcomer and Canadian social networks. Many newcomers took it upon themselves to seek out relationships and interactions with more established Canadians through local cultural programming like English partnership programs through Kitchener's Reception House, the YMCA, and the Working Centre's English Language Café.[50] English partnerships often served as the jumping-off point for friendships. Partners would invite each other to meals or holiday celebrations. The partnerships, however, are uneven because the native English-speaker maintains an aspect of power in the relationship. These bridging platforms have been used as access points for newcomers to share cultural production with Canadians. Within these relationships, Syrians challenge stereotypes. Newcomers who enter programs to learn language engage in uneven sharing, where Anglo-Canadian norms are prized and normalized, and Syrian cultural production, while respected, is still othered. They are participating in acculturation. Syrian cultural production is shared outside of newcomer communities, but the power dynamic is not balanced.

Cultural Production, Assimilation, and Acculturation

Many participants in this research project revealed that even though they try to embrace Canadian customs on the surface, they still feel their home cultures breathing inside of them. Of course, they did not choose to leave their home cultures. Displaced newcomers are forced to "make conscious and unconscious decisions about what to include and exclude" in their performance of cultural belonging.[51] Refugees navigate acculturation, nostalgia, and assimilation forces as they articulate identity and engage in cultural production within Canada.

Assimilation was considered a threat by many of the newcomers involved in the community arts projects, but it was also considered problematic by those who were not. The majority interviewed strongly believe that they have to maintain their Syrian identity while integrating into Canadian society. Arabic language competency was perceived as an important part of identity. One participant stated that she was worried about her children's retention of language, faith, and general culture. She described fears of a complete loss of Syrian identity:

> To preserve the faith of your kids in such an open and diverse society, it can be very difficult. There has to be something from our own environment to help us. This is very important, when we know what is needed, so that in one year or two, they will change into different people. As much as you try at home, you won't be able to help them, there isn't anything. Even teaching Arabic on Sundays, this is good, but this is very little. The kids forget what they learn in three hours. My daughter is five years old, she speaks English three-quarters of the time. At school, she speaks English, TV, neighbours, kids. She only has me and her father to speak in Arabic, and she doesn't spend much time with her father. By the time my husband returns from work, my kids are already sleeping.[52]

The struggle to retain Arabic in the home in a context that is so pervasively English is immense. Parents feared the growth of a cultural gulf between themselves and their children brought on by assimilation. Activities like Arabic school on Sundays were cultural initiatives to try to prevent complete assimilation. While this interviewee was seeking integration into Canadian society for her family, she also wanted to hold onto the language, arts, and culture of her homeland. She especially hoped to preserve them for her children.

Interviewees described holding onto their heritage while also embracing new traditions: "You have to meet new people and get involved and share with them their festivities. For example, I'm celebrating Halloween now. I put all the decorations outside, and the pumpkins. It's very nice. My kids really like this holiday and they haven't even seen it yet. I for one don't know anything about it [*laughter*]. They got bowls, and I'm very happy and pleased."[53]

Many stressed the theme of keeping their own cultural practices and values while integrating into Canadian society:

"You have to mingle with people. They have a lot of nice things [in Canadian culture], and one can learn all the great and good things about a culture and leave the bad things, or the things that don't fit, if we can of course. Even for us older people, we can still integrate. But it's important to have the strength to hold onto your [authentic culture/values]."[54]

A few respondents reported that they cannot feel themselves Canadians. One participant was asked whether she feels herself as a refugee: "Yes of course. I mean whatever happens, this is not our country. We are taking refuge in it. We are thankful for Canadians for having us. I'm missing something that would make me Canadian."[55]

Patterns of identity construction were varied, and the experience of newcomers is far from monolithic; however, it appears that all struggle to make sense of their interconnections between Syria, Canada, and the rest of the world, and this is reflected in cultural production in Ontario.

There was evidence for a transnational simultaneous embrace of—and resistance against—Canadian whiteness by many newcomers.[56] Refugees did not choose to leave home for Canada, and their cultural production in Canada is profoundly affected by this reality. In cultural production the displaced make their agency known. They find Canada a freeing but somewhat problematic environment. One interviewee highlights some of the benefits of cultural expression in Canada from her perspective. As a woman, being in Canada has given her space for unique cultural production that was not available to her while she lived as a displaced Syrian in Saudi Arabia: "There's a lot of respect in Canada…. I've never gotten this much respect, as a woman. Like I'm a feminist. Did I ever dare to even talk about feminism in Saudi Arabia?… But here people respect that I'm a feminist and people like support me. And you know what? We have a voice…. And I've never dreamed about being a model…. And [here] I got to be a model…. Those opportunities and the respect."[57]

This participant began professional activity as a *hijabi* model and fashion-content creator after she arrived in Canada. She took her move to Canada as a launching point for cultural production that centres on her own experiences of hybridity and transnational culture. Syrian ethnically and culturally, she was raised in Saudi Arabia, and now calls Canada home. This has resulted in a unique transnational and hybridized approach to life that is somehow embraced in Canada. She notes that in Canada, friends are always interested in different cultures, and people in general always seem interested in new things.[58] She has taught friends Syrian dance moves, and shared other elements of her cultural heritage with them: "So, the sharing of cultures, you're mixed up, I love that thing. When I was shooting [modelling], I don't know what I say, I say *bismillah*, before everything—and when something dropped off I was like, 'Jeez.' And they all looked at me and they were like, 'We love this! You said jeez and bismillah in the same sentence.' I'm like, 'Whatever you guys—we're in Canada!' [*laughs*] You know, it's a lot of sharing the cultures."[59]

Her comment, "Whatever you guys—we're in Canada!" sums up an attitude found amongst many newcomers—that their hybridization in cultural production is positive. Other interviewees also expressed excitement at participating with their families in Canadian holidays, like Halloween and Christmas.[60] The theme of entering Canadian culture and integrating while holding onto Syrian culture and tradition emerged in numerous narratives from recently displaced Syrians.[61] Through this hybridization, individuals present culturally non-homogenous artistic production and forge complex and multifaceted identities.[62]

But tensions remain, as many face racism and fear of losing touch with what they left behind. Amir Al-Azraki sums up these feelings completely in an interview he gave to *Imprint* at the University of Waterloo: "I live between two worlds…. I cannot completely integrate into this society, but at the same time I cannot go back and integrate completely in my own culture anymore. I'm like a floating island."[63]

Conclusion

The ongoing war in Syria has made it difficult for the millions who have been displaced to go back to their homelands. Newcomer populations have taken on the difficult task of making places they did not choose their new homes. In this process, displaced Arabic populations in the Kitchener-Waterloo Region have built community, shown resilience, and pushed back against stereotypes through their theatrical and dance presentations. Refugees have also spearheaded community dance and theatre initiatives to develop belonging and community. Both professional and community arts initiatives showcase how culture and identity are caught up in circulations of culture, and how acculturation, nostalgia, and assimilation are fraught with complexity and resistance. Professional artists and volunteers have reconfigured presentations of Levantine culture to facilitate community healing and uneven processes of acculturation that suit their adaptation needs. The decision of newcomers to navigate acculturation through cultural hybridization in theatre and dance allows them to resist traditional assimilation. Nostalgia and transnational connections in cultural production indicate the development of new internationally interconnected networks of Syrian cultural production and identity.

Acknowledgment

Notes

1 Statistics Canada, "Results from the 2016 Census: Syrian Refugees Who Resettled in Canada in 2015 and 2016," December 19, 2018, https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/75-006-x/2019001/article/00001-eng.htm.

2 Jeff Outhit, "Waterloo Region Growing but Not as Fast, Census Shows," *Record*, February 8, 2017, https://www.therecord.com/news-story/7110570-waterloo-region-growing-but-not-as-fast-census-shows/.

3 Statistics Canada, "Focus on Geography Series, 2016 Census," February 8, 2017, https://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2016/as-sa/fogs-spg/Facts-cma-eng.cfm?LANG=Eng&GK=CMA&GC=541&TOPIC=7.

4 Phillip Connor, "Most Displaced Syrians Are in the Middle East, and About a Million Are in Europe," Pew Research Center, January 29, 2018, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/01/29/where-displaced-syrians-have-resettled/; Jynnah Radford and Phillip Connor, "Canada Now Leads the World in Refugee Resettlement, Surpassing the U.S.," Pew Research Center (blog), June 19, 2019, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/19/canada-now-leads-the-world-in-refugee-resettlement-surpassing-the-u-s/.

5 For the purpose of this article, culture is defined as a shifting set of shared societal expectations that help individuals make meaning out actions, objects, and artistic expressions. This definition of culture is based on the work of Lila Abu-Lughod, which stresses the importance of non-objectivity, vibrancy, and life in defining culture. Lila Abu-Lughod, "Writing against Culture," in *Recapturing Anthropology: Working in the Present*, ed. Richard Fox, 137–9 (Santa Fe, NM: School of American Research Press, 1991).

6 Shamrose for Syrian Culture and Levant are two non-profit Syrian cultural organizations that were founded in the wake of the Syrian crisis to support refugee resettlement in Canada through sponsorship support, cultural programs, and community building. The K-W Multicultural Centre's mandate is to foster diversity and inclusion in the region by ensuring all who live in the region can participate fully in community.

7 Katherine Borland, "'That's Not What I Said': Interpretative Conflict in Oral Narrative Research," in *The Oral History Reader*, ed. Robert Perks and Alistair Thompson, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 1998), 310.

8 As the researcher decides on how information is collected, and what information is published, he or she always has power over the narrative constructed. Anna Sheftel and Stacey Zembrzycki, eds., *Oral History Off the Record: Toward an Ethnography of Practice* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013), 5.

9 Sarah Holcombe, "The Arrogance of Ethnography: Managing Anthropological Research Knowledge," *Australian Aboriginal Studies* 2, no. 2 (November 2010): 25.

10 Shulamit Reinharz, "Neglected Voices and Excessive Demands in Feminist Research," *Qualitative Sociology* 16, no. 1 (March 1993): 69–76.

11 Sarah Deardorff Miller, *Political and Humanitarian Responses to Syrian Displacement* (London: Routledge, 2016), vii.

12 Miller, *Political and Humanitarian Responses*, vii.

13 Miller, *Political and Humanitarian Responses*, vii.

14 *New Arab*, "Dozens Killed in Syrian Regime Barrel Bombing of Eastern Ghouta," March 5, 2018, https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2018/3/5/dozens-killed-in-syrian-regime-bombardment-of-eastern-ghouta.

15 Euan McKirdy, "8 Times Russia Blocked a UN Resolution on Syria," CNN, April 13, 2017, https://www.cnn.com/2017/04/13/middleeast/russia-unsc-syria-resolutions/index.html.

16 Miller, *Political and Humanitarian Responses*, viii.

17 Miller, *Political and Humanitarian Responses*, ii.

18 Petra Molnar, "The Boy on the Beach: The Fragility of Canada's Discourses on the Syrian Refugee 'Crisis,'" *Contention* 4, no. 1–2 (June 1, 2016): 72, https://www.berghahnjournals.com/view/journals/contention/4/1-2/cont040106.xml?pdfVersion=true.

19 Molnar, "Boy on the Beach," 70.

20 Anne-Marie McMurdo, "Causes and Consequences of Canada's Resettlement of Syrian Refugees," *Forced Migration Review* 52 (2016): 82.

21 Miller notes that Justin Trudeau's commitment to refugees was a key factor in his election win. Miller, *Political and Humanitarian Responses*, 117.

22 Miller, *Political and Humanitarian Responses*, 117.

23 Pro-Trump racist, xenophobic, anti-immigrant, and anti-refugee sentiment certainly still existed/exists in Canada.

24 KW 107, interview by Anne Vermeyden, trans. Helen Ala Rashi, November 30, 2017.

25 Immigration Partnership, *2017/2018 Progress Report* (Waterloo Region: Immigration Partnership, 2018), 4.

26 Immigration Partnership, *2017/2018 Progress Report*, 2.

27 KW 110, interview by Anne Vermeyden, trans. Helen Ala Rashi, December 4, 2017.

28 KW 102, interview by Anne Vermeyden, trans. Helen Ala Rashi, February 27, 2017.

29 The Orientalist perspectives found in Canada during the twentieth century of an imagined exotic, feminine, sensual East have been used not to facilitate colonial control over areas of the Middle East and North Africa, but instead to justify racial discrimination within Canada itself. Systematic and casual discrimination against peoples from North Africa and the Middle East has been perpetuated by unfair ethnic stereotyping in popular entertainment in

Canada. Constance Backhouse, *Colour-Coded: A Legal History of Racism in Canada, 1900–1950* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 4.

30 The student was suspended for three days, indicating the school recognized the unacceptability of this outburst. However, the fact that he said it in the first place indicates extant attitudes of racism and/or islamophobia in the community. KW 102.

31 KW 102.

32 Reem Hajali, interview by Anne Vermeyden, December 8, 2017.

33 Vappu Tyyskä, Jenna Blower, Samantha DeBoer, Shunya Kawai, and Walcott Ashley, "The Syrian Refugee Crisis in Canadian Media," ed. Shuguang Wang, Ryerson Centre for Immigration and Settlement Working Paper, no. 3 (2017): 15.

34 Tyyskä et al., "Syrian Refugee Crisis in Canadian Media," 6–7.

35 CBC Radio, "How Syrian Refugees Arriving in Canada Became 'Extras' in Their Own Stories," February 21, 2016.

36 Amir Al-Azraki, *The Mug*, University of Waterloo Art Gallery, November 23, 2017.

37 "Arab Culture in Diaspora," November 23, 2017.

38 Faith Rahman, "A Translation of Arabic Language and Diaspora," *Imprint*, November 30, 2017, http://uwimprint.ca/article/a-translation-of-arabic-language-and-diaspora/.

39 KM 107.

40 CBC News, "Syrian Actors Take Centre Stage This Weekend at Registry Theatre," February 16, 2017.

41 James Heaslip, "Kiss Is Wild and Watchable, but Falls Behind on the Syrian Conflict," *Globe and Mail*, April 2, 2017, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/arts/theatre-and-performance/theatre-reviews/kiss-is-wild-and-watchable-but-falls-behind-on-the-syrian-conflict/article34555551/.

42 CBC News, "Syrian Actors Take Centre Stage."

43 One interviewee related that she attended the show twice because she was so moved by it. She also encouraged her friends in Canada to attend. KW 112, interview by Anne Vermeyden, trans. Helen Ala Rashi, December 6, 2017.

44 Homsi is known throughout the Arab world for her leadership in experimental and avant-garde theatre. Not only was she Syria's first female professional mime, but she was also a leader in non-verbal theatrical experimentation across the Middle East. Homsi has also written and directed numerous plays and monodramas that have toured globally, and she has achieved theatrical awards at the international level. Martin DeGroot, "Arabic Comedy Celebrates Courage and Strength of Refugees," *Record*, June 21, 2013, https://www.therecord.com/whatson-story/3851265-arabic-comedy-celebrates-courage-and-strength-of-refugees/.

45 KM 107.

46 Hajali, interview.

47 WW100, interview by Anne Vermeyden , trans. Helen Ala Rashi, October 19, 2017.

48 RXX, interview by Anne Vermeyden, trans. Helen Ala Rashi, December 8, 2017.

49 WW100, interview.

50 WW100, interview.

51 Lucy Maddox, ed., *Locating American Studies: The Evolution of a Discipline* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 344.

52 KW 102, interview.

53 KW 102, interview.

54 KW 102, interview.

55 KW 110, interview.

56 Whiteness, socially, culturally, and even geographically constructed, is a dominant norm in Canada. Often newcomers feel intense pressure to fall in line with its social and cultural requirements. For more on this, see Andrew Baldwin, Laura Cameron, and Audrey Kobayashi, *Rethinking the Great White North: Race, Nature, and the Historical Geographies of Whiteness in Canada* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011), 4–5.

57 Hajali, interview.

58 Hajali, interview.

59 Hajali, interview.

60 KW 102, interview.

61 KW 102, interview; Hajali, interview.

62 This article's use of the term hybridity is derived from the work of Homi K. Bhabha. Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (New York: Routledge, 1994), 5, 10.

63 Rahman, "Translation of Arabic Language and Diaspora."

Anne Vermeyden is a writing consultant at Conestoga College. She can be reached at avermeyden@conestogac.on.ca.

Eid Mohamed is an assistant professor of Arab-US Cultural Politics at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies. He can be reached at eid.mohamed@dohainstitute.edu.qa.

Parenting and Education:
The Example of Refugee Parents in Greece

GEORGIA SARIKOUDI AND ANNA APOSTOLIDOU

Abstract

This article focuses on the interplay between parenthood and refugee status and documents the approaches that parents employ to become educational agents and enrich their children's language knowledge and cultural capital while residing in refugee camps in northern Greece. It discusses the prominent role that encampment times play in structuring the disempowering refugee condition, and describes the parents' strategies of managing time and teaching their mother tongue and homeland culture to their children but also through becoming students themselves. In doing so, it highlights the accentuated parental role as a mediator between "home" and future residence and touches upon the repercussions of parents' involvement in their children's education. Based on anthropological fieldwork, this article highlights instances where the active parental role presents itself as a tactical means to counterbalance the reported loss of agency that the refugee positionality entails.

Résumé

Cet article porte sur l'interaction entre la parentalité et le statut de réfugié et documente les diverses voies employées par les parents afin de devenir des agents éducatifs et d'enrichir
les connaissances linguistiques et le capital culturel de leurs enfants alors qu'ils vivent dans des camps de réfugiés dans le Nord de la Grèce. Il traite du rôle important que le temps passé dans les camps joue dans la structuration de la perte d'autonomie propre au statut de réfugié et décrit les stratégies de gestion du temps des parents, qui enseignent la langue maternelle et la culture du pays d'origine à leurs enfants, mais deviennent aussi eux-mêmes étudiants. Ce faisant, il souligne l'accentuation du rôle parental en tant que médiateur entre le pays d'origine et la future résidence et aborde les répercussions de l'implication des parents dans l'éducation de leurs enfants. S'appuyant sur une étude de terrain anthropologique, cet article présente cet article s'intéresse aux situations où le rôle parental actif apparaît comme un moyen tactique de contrebalancer la perte d'agentivité reportée qu'implique le positionnement de réfugié.

Introduction

Since the early 1990s, when the first migrants from Eastern European and Balkan countries arrived in Greece, the country has been transformed from a locale of emigration into a host country for persons of various ethnic and national backgrounds, which has had a significant effect on the political and cultural treatment of otherness

in the official discourse as well as everyday life. Intensified migration movements towards Europe and the "refugee crisis" during the last decade have been viewed as expressions of growing global interconnections. In the past few years, however, and increasingly after 2015, migratory flows dramatically changed. Until that point hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers had been crossing the geographical trail across Greek soil in order to continue their journey with the desire to be located in central and northern European countries. Following March 2015 and the closing of the "Balkan route," thousands of people from the Middle East, Asia, and Africa crossed the Aegean Sea to arrive on Greek islands in unsafe and undignified conditions,[1] only to find the way to other European countries closed. The closing of the borders created a new understanding of spatiality in the European crossing, and, as it is ethnographically evident, dramatically shifted refugees' prior projects for settlement, occupation, and, consequently, education. Under the new conditions, several thousand people have remained trapped in hosting structures for several months or years at a time, while waiting for their cases to be examined. These structures, also known as camps (*katavlismoi*), were created under extreme political and social pressure and constitute spaces of emergency and exception, where the residents experience prolonged immobility and waiting, faced with material and psychosocial constraints.

During a critical time in the host country, which had been undergoing major economic and social turmoil,[2] this pressing situation resulted in a reorientation of the priorities that state and private agents set for management of refugees in Greece, by intensifying and systematizing, among other things, the educational provisions available. This is partly due to the fact that a significant percentage of the newcomers were families with children: out of the approximately 46,000 refugees who currently reside in Greece,[3] more than 20,000 are children,[4] the educational care of whom became a firmly stated international priority.[5]

As the Greek state had no previous experience in integrating refugee children into Greek public schools, international NGOs and volunteer organizations were the first ones to provide lessons for children in camps, which "served more to keep the children occupied than to provide them with a real education."[6] It was not until March 2016 that the Greek government set up a scientific committee to organize the gradual integration of refugee children into the Greek public educational system. In 2017 the Ministry of Education created 145 reception classes across Greece. Children who lived in the camps were transferred daily into those afternoon reception classes under the supervision and financial support of the International Organization for Migration (IOM).[7] However, this program had challenges to overcome: inexperienced teachers, lack of appropriate textbooks, conflicting schedules between school life and inter-camp educational activities, problems with children's ages and the decrease in their attendance rate, and suspicion or hostility from Greek local communities. In the camps that we visited, only 20 per cent of the children attended in-camp educational activities or afternoon classes in Greek public schools, with a high percentage dropping out.

The present article approaches the experience of forced migration on parents, and individuals who become parents, during displacement or entrapment in liminal spaces (such as camps) that affect the performance of their parenting roles. In doing so, it focuses on refugees' educational needs and expectations and on parents' involvement in their children's education, drawing on fieldwork research that took place in northern Greece during 2017. The discussion that follows is premised on certain empirical assumptions: the largest part of the population apprehends their situation as transitory, i.e., they hope and seek ways to relocate, usually rendering their local plans as temporary, so the population is very mobile; the majority is in a state of encampment, in conditions that fulfil the minimum requirements of a routine, normal, daily life for children and adults; they have limited access to material and technical resources; finally, their personal and family "educational projects" are being constantly reshaped under the pressure of other—more urgent, in their view—contingencies regarding housing, employment, health, legal status, reunification, etc.[8] In light of these observations, we examine the performance of parental roles and the potential they present for self-identification, management of cultural capital, and control over the concept of time in conditions of encampment.

First, we seek to explore the ways and degrees to which parents (or parenthood actors) engage with the education of the children they care for in these socio-political conditions; second, we point out the attitudes towards their own educational plans in relation to the refugee experience and their parenting role as agents and carriers of cultural capital trying to create spaces of routine and normality for themselves and for their children in this prolonged liminal situation. The central research questions that informed our ethnographic study can be summed up as follows: (1) What are the main conceptualizations and education-related practices of parents of refugee children? (2) What are their expectations of the educational provisions? (3) What are their main strategies to counterbalance the reported loss of agency they experience? In addressing these key questions it is worth noting that, despite the state's concern with the provision of formal education and schooling, the term *education* here is intended to include a wide array of learning practices (non-formal activities, remedial education, and family education) and the

attitudes towards schooling as expressed in a non-formal context, thus contributing to wider approaches on the anthropology of education that adopts an elaborate definition of education that stretches beyond schooling or non-formal learning.[9] After detailing the methodological orientation of the study and providing a context for the educational provisions in "transit" countries, our principal focus lies on accounting for parents' strategies of language learning and transmitting elements of their cultural heritage to the children, while trying to control the intricacies of encampment time, so as to minimize the sense of "time wasted." We discuss their conceptualizations as educational guardians and we present examples of performing culture and making tactical choices in order to ensure a balance between home countries and future aspirations of integration in the European context.

Fieldwork Context and Methodology

The ethnographic material that supports our findings was collected from October 2016 until May 2017 and was predominantly based on qualitative research: mainly participant observation, along with open informal discussions and semi-structured interviews. The fieldwork research was carried out in two main camps of Thessaloniki—Diavata and Softex—in the industrial area in the west side of the city of Thessaloniki (within a twenty-five-kilometre radius) in northern Greece. Since 2015, Thessaloniki has been on the receiving end of many refugee and asylum-seekers waiting for relocation. The Diavata camp, which had been a military camp in the past, surrounded by walls and fences next to large areas of land and old factories, was the largest camp in the area of Thessaloniki at that time with 1,200 inhabitants, mostly Syrians and Afghans, and numerous local and international NGOs involved in the general management and the in-camp education provisions (language lessons, creative work, and sports activities). The Softex camp is in the facilities of an old paper factory, near the morgue and the city prison. Seven hundred people, mostly Syrians, were settled there at the time of our field research. Although this camp is the closest to the centre of Thessaloniki, there is no easy access to it. To reach this camp one requires a twenty-minute walk from the nearest bus stop through an isolated area, between abandoned factories and gas stations. In Softex only three NGOs were active and only one of them organized daily language lessons (Greek, Arabic, English) for children, or activities for adults (woodcarving, sports, language lessons). The fluidity that characterized life in camps was evident in the courses and the activities offered in both camps: most courses were attended erratically, educators were frequently changing, practising different methods and approaches, and NGOs were altering the courses and activities, based on interest, stability of attendance, and the learning profiles of attendees.

Following standard participant observation methods, and taking all standard ethical measures to ensure the confidentiality and safeguarding of our informants, we tried to have an almost daily presence in the selected camps and to create a network of informants. This proved to be a complex task, as the state agencies, NGOs, and refugee communities closely monitored and filtered our presence there. After having gained the consent of persons and organizations involved, we began attending some of their daily activities that led to frequent visits to refugees' tents or containers, which gradually led to in-depth conversations.

As team members of a larger multi-site research project on refugee education,[10] we employed a methodological strategy that encompasses the needs of youth and adults of the refugee population, in keeping track with the other research sub-teams (located in Lesvos and Attica): we employed life histories, participant observation, semi-structured interviews, informal talks, in combination with child-centred methods and methods suitable for research in non-formal and informal educational settings, such as classroom interactions, assigned projects, drawings, and role play. We attended the improvised (self-made) schools that were created in both camps under the initiative of certain NGOs and with the supervision and guidance of the ministry's education coordinators.

Our main demographic focus was families with one or two parents residing in the refugee camps along with their children, as this presented the most interesting ethnographic material in the camps. We conducted ten semi-structured interviews, mostly with adults whose children attended the educational activities consistently, but the range of the people we regularly met and talked to consisted of thirty-one people (aged five to fifty-three) who came mainly from Syria, with only a few families from Afghanistan and Iraq. Communication was held in English, French, or Arabic with the help of a translator, and we were particularly cautious about identifying and addressing the power relations and hierarchies in the families or the classroom settings as they were expressed in the interactions between children, adults, parents, educators, and camp agents. Our interlocutors presented a wide variety of educational levels: we talked with people who were illiterate, those who had completed elementary school, and some who had a university diploma (teachers, mathematicians, mechanics, and nurses). As far as their residency status is concerned, the majority of the women had applied for reunification with their husbands who lived in other European countries (usually Germany, where they have been granted asylum), while others had asked for relocation or asylum in European countries, or in Greece. Most interviews and informal talks took place in the informants' tents, containers, or apartments, but we also

accompanied them throughout their interactions with social services, in entertainment places, and in most of the educational activities they attended (language courses, excursions to museums and archaeological sites, etc.).

Refugee Education in Transit

Numerous studies highlight the importance of educational provision for refugees, especially in transit conditions,[11] where they encounter obstacles[12] that stretch from material barriers (lack of physical buildings) to administrative problems (inefficient curriculums, lack of teachers with appropriate training, and no accreditation for courses taught in camps) and other shortcomings. In transit countries such as Greece, studies about refugees focus on bureaucratic issues concerning the asylum process,[13] prospects of their social integration, access to the economy, the prospect of constructing a new home,[14] and the humanitarian responses towards the newcomers.[15] Studies on refugee children's education in Greece are notably scarce, with the exceptions of Papataxiarchis,[16] Daskalaki and Leivaditi,[17] and Nagy (2018).[18] Nagy presents a case study of a camp in the area of Perama, a neighbourhood in which the far-right party gained a high presence in the elections, on the interplay of crisis, hospitality, and solidarity. Papataxiachis, along with Daskalaki and Leivaditi, study the situation on the island of Lesvos; Papataxiarchis describes non-formal educational practices in hospitality structures, whereas Daskalaki and Leivaditi focus on the connections between education and in-shelter relationships with caretakers in an unaccompanied minors' shelter at the same location. Recently the work of Marmaridou[19] and Mogli, Kalbeni, and Stergiou[20] in the same location have focused on the role of the teacher in refugees' education in hosting structures. Marmaridou's research draws on two cities in northern Greece and describes the socio-emotional expressions of refugee children as experienced by their teachers and the practices that the latter employed to ensure a safe and welcoming environment for the children. On the other hand, the work of Mogli, Kalbeni, and Stergiou focuses on two big cities in central Greece and analyzes the problems caused in educational procedures by lack of training of teachers in reception facilities. As the authors demonstrate, lack of skills, lack of knowledge about refugee students' cultural beliefs and practices, difficulties in communication, and the state educational policy that focuses on the students' academic rather than social needs are the most crucial challenges facing teachers in their effort to approach and support refugee students educationally and emotionally.[21] In the aforementioned studies, parental involvement is mentioned seldom, if at all. In practice, however, many parents have been active in treating systemic and practical deficiencies, as they regard education to be essential for their children.

The relevant literature links refugee parenthood and education, in terms of goal-setting for their young and adolescent children,[22] or in terms of using their cultural background to gain access to (higher) education.[23] Although the literature largely indicates how important refugee parents' involvement in schooling is, it mostly views parents in auxiliary roles and not as active agents who transmit knowledge and cultural understanding to the younger members of the family. Drawing from our fieldwork, we wish to offer sufficient data to demonstrate that parents have a decisive role in their children's education and seek to challenge the disempowering position of the refugee condition.

Parenthood and the Refugee Condition

Forced migration transforms the family system. The experience of war or violent conflict in the country of origin and the difficulties encountered when fleeing affect family structures as well as individual educational experiences and future plans. Prolonged stay in temporary refugee camps with malnutrition, illnesses, separation of family during flight, injuries, lack of education, and loss of tranquillity and stability are some of the issues that a family can experience before entering the new country,[24] often resulting in radical reconfiguration of familial ties and drastically affecting the parental roles of people on the move.[25]

In many cases, when refugees enter a new social and culturally diverse environment they may be confronted with parenting styles and practices that are different from the ones they knew and upheld, causing them discomfort and awkwardness.[26] Most of them have experienced trauma with consequences to their state of mind and affective attachments.[27] Thus, refugees' adjustment to the new environment can evoke many challenges to parenting in the new society,[28] which consequently affect their views, practices, and plans for their children's education. Research has indicated that perceptions about education before, during, and after the migratory experience are factors that define adaptation to the new cultural environment and constitute a considerable coping mechanism.[29] Ethnographic approaches to parents or guardians/relatives as supporters of their children's goals and achievement indicate the personal and social significance that this role has for refugee parents of ethnic backgrounds (Bergnehr; Nagasa, both as cited in Merry et al., 2017).[30]

As far as integration and adjustment processes into the host country are concerned, parents are presented in the literature as notably slower than their children; they also face difficulties in assuming the figure of a role model for their children. They often find themselves turning to their children for help and guidance in the practical, cultural, and linguistic challenges in the new society. Furthermore, refugee parents are unfamiliar with the new school systems and need

to cope with several constraints—linguistic, psychological, and practical—that hinder them from helping their children adapt in school life. Amira[31] is a forty-three-year-old woman from Syria who lived for almost nine months in Softex with her two sons (five and eight years old) while her husband and her daughter have been granted asylum in Germany. Amira uses her elder son, Halil, as a translator when she goes to the open market or she speaks with the camp manager. Even though his level of Greek is not high (he is not capable of translating an official document), she feels more secure to have him with her. This role reversal, where children often take on the role of family spokesperson,[32] is rather commonly observed in refugee and migration studies in recent research; however, parents experience further disempowerment when they depend upon their children for everyday communication and/or mediation with local people and services. In the following section, we wish to demonstrate that, given the limited material and immaterial resources of the refugee state, the management of encampment time is one of the few means that helps counterbalance this disempowering condition.

Parenthood and Encampment "Time"

Time in the refugee context, especially in prolonged periods of the "transit" condition, is extremely important in shaping everyday routines, establishing normalcy in family structures, and preserving individual well-being. The concept of time wasted and time lost is a recurring theme in the field notes collected from sites in Athens, Lesvos, and Thessaloniki in the context of Project PRESS.[33] The time of encampment is perceived mainly as a time of waiting, a time controlled by others (camp routines, providers of goods, food, lessons, etc.), and often a time of rupture that includes the new cultural realities that define life in the new setting. The flourishing ethnographic literature on migration offers abundant proof of tensions between different forms of waiting, indicating that the experience of prolonged waiting may be seen as an imposed form of sanctioning used to slow movement towards Europe, for example, as a means to keep people out by making them linger and await decisions beyond their control. Such prolonged forms of waiting are reported to have a corrosive effect on many undocumented migrants, making their entire situation one of transience, with a grave effect on daily life.[34] This enforced experience often results in a feeling of loss of agency in individuals' key roles and identities, such as the parental one. In other cases, it constitutes an opportunity to intensify and enrich the parental role. According to our observations, many parents demand active engagement in their children's education.[35] Their request that their children's time not be wasted is also predominant in this example, echoing concern about the "lost generation" of pupils in the Syrian

refugee crisis[36] but also indicating the importance of time in the transient refugee state.

Furthermore, this biopolitical component that runs through everyday manifestations of children and adult refugees defines the ways education is perceived as a normative component of family life and, consequently, a key factor that affects the decision to participate in education and under which terms. Parents' main demand is that their children enjoy a constant and continuous process of learning. Many of these children have lost several school years because of wars and expatriation; thus, parents hope their children can regain the school rhythm, a daily routine,[37] and school rituals that structure children's lives and help them to become integrated. A daily school program without interruptions and gaps would reassure them that their children are learning. The identity of a student, and also the chance to socialize and learn, are the top priorities expressed by parents in the field.

Therefore, education plays a double role, since it underlines the time-related parameter of everyday life but is also a cornerstone for the future development of the family. As Daskalaki, Tsioli, and Androulakis observe,[38] strategies of families to ensure a better future often determine their choices (e.g., language learning, schooling, etc.), and the management of time by parental figures partially reinstates the fragmented time in the camp. Time entails both the reality and materiality of the present but also extends to the imagined future (usually placed in a different geographical place) and thus becomes even more precious in the encampment. As parents in the field publicly and individually expressed it, their role as managers and preservers of this precious currency is valorized as important, and it offers a means of individual agency, which may be coined in terms of responsibility, but also affection for children and family. Parents also worry that children have limited opportunities to communicate and mingle with non-refugee Greek children, which is a prerequisite for learning a language and becoming part of a society. "They don't feel like students. There is problem. They are alone. Why couldn't they play all together? Our children alone, Greek alone. They don't feel students, they feel alone. They do not play all together." Therefore, parents push for a daily schooling routine for their children, not only to acquire knowledge and reclaim time but also for continuous interaction among the children and between children and teachers. In their view, daily interaction is a major component that structures children's lives and helps them to become integrated.

Parents as Educational Guardians

This section discusses the attempts of numerous parents to follow their children's progress at school, even though few of

them are familiar with the Greek language. Although most of them believed or hoped that their stay in Greece would be temporary, they regard schooling in transit conditions as a necessity and send their children to informal and formal schools inside and outside the camps. However, the school schedule for refugee children and their parents' expectations seldom coincide. Parents from the Softex camp called for two meetings with their children's teachers and expressed their concerns about the loosening of the school program. Among parents' many complaints to the educational coordinator of the Ministry of Education, they were concerned that their children were not learning anything of value and were wasting their time: "If he does not write with his hand, he will never learn." "No exercises for home. They have many 'gap' [empty] hours, instead of doing lessons. They are playing all the time and they don't make lesson. Inside the camp are learning more than the Greek school."

It is common for parents to criticize the way in which Greek language is taught to their children. Abbas, a thirty-five-year-old Syrian man, who lived with his wife and their four children for almost a year in the Softex camp, offers: "In Syrian schools first we learn the letters and then slowly, slowly we learn to write. Here it is the opposite. If the children learn the letters, the basics, then they will learn to write correctly. You give them phrases for dictation, but they don't know what they write. If you teach them the alphabet and then you put them to write and write, they will learn more quick and they will get used to it."

Abbas and his family have asked for asylum in Greece, so they believe that learning the language is mandatory for their children. However, he and his wife don't attend Greek courses, using the excuse that they both work to make ends meet. They work for an international NGO in the camp for less money than they would earn somewhere else. They also hope that in working for an NGO they will meet the "right" people who can improve their stay in the camp, help their children with lessons, or make things easier for their asylum application. This is their way to establish and make use of a cultural capital that, according to their view, will promote their living situation in the camp.

Claiming a visible role in the camp and advocating for their children's education, many parents negotiate a new social position, a kind of "transit citizenship," which allows them to use their knowledge, assets, and attitudes to co-formulate the education of their children. Ethnographic and intersectional accounts on how parenting can be conceived as a citizenship practice[39] point to the importance of practising parental care in education.[40] Often mothers' new citizenship is fragile, as shown in the research findings on Kurdish refugee families,[41] and the role of fatherhood is especially challenging in the refugee condition, as among Sudanese refugees,[42] whose values and cultural background guide their behaviour and choices as fathers. Abbas and the rest of the group of parents demand full participation of their children in schooling and the mainstream curriculum. They express their discontent for the slow pace of the courses offered to children in formal education, the inadequate homework, and the non-disciplinary approaches of the Greek educational system. In all those cases, the active engagement of parents in the education of their children, directly or indirectly, grants many of them the power that has been diminished or lost in the conditions of forced migration.[43] This strategy is not uncommon for persons who find themselves in a disadvantaged position when they are perceived as inferior.

At the same time, however, certain parents who send their children to formal school feel that they gain institutional security while in the encampment. "Softex is a dangerous camp, but we are good people. We go to work and my children go to school. My daughter everyday takes on her bag and waits outside of the container the school bus. When she sees it she runs towards it yelling, 'I'm going to school!' This is our effort to adjust." Abbas, like many other parents, claims that getting a child to school, which is one of the most powerful and normative mechanisms of the state, is a procedure in which the child learns the new culture but also ensures better living conditions in Greece and on some level grants the whole family a more secure status, if only discursive, through participation in institutionalized knowledge formation. As he believes, this is also an investment for the future; their narrative indicates that if their children learn Greek and adjust well to the Greek educational system and way of life, it would be easier for them to get asylum there. This coincides with what Fiddian-Qasmiyeh[44] terms "the politics of survival" in proposing that refugees often recognize the extent to which being perceived to be "ideal" refugees facilitates their life, as it attracts the attention and support of Western academics, NGOs, and civil society and solidarity networks.

It is also worth noting that in spite of the extremely disadvantaged living conditions, the precariousness and the dangers that prevail in the camps, many families have decided to remain in them and not to move to a flat—which the UN and NGOs provide—because they believe that would terminate their children's school attendance. This is a remarkable strategy, since it contests the general public discourse about the importance of material needs vis-à-vis educational needs. The decision not to opt for a more comfortable everyday living in pursuit of systematic attendance at school and schooling activities indicates that the priorities for long-term empowerment and improvement of the family position override present difficulties.

Parents as Students: Learning Languages

For most of our field interlocutors, learning more languages than the mother tongue is an important asset. English and German are their top priorities and, even though Greek is not a common language, parents are glad that their children are learning it, because they see it as a tool that can considerably improve their residence in Greece. In this direction, some parents are eager to study Greek themselves in order to be able to help their children learn Greek. "English we can help our children, but Greek we cannot." Therefore, they try to find a way to somehow learn the language, so they can supervise their children and forge stronger bonds with the local culture.

Amira devotes most of her time and energy on the education of her children. To be able to help them, she finds time to attend language courses. Amira asked us if we could teach her the Greek language inside her container once a week, so that she will not spend more time away from the camp. She also occasionally attended English courses in the camp, and she goes to German lessons outside the camp. Although she presented herself as a "lazy student and an old mind who forgets things," she is quite diligent and she was almost impeccable when we checked her progress in the Greek language. As she told us a couple of times, "Learning is good. I don't want to let time pass by and only sit. I want to do things. It seems that her refugee experience is strongly influenced by language learning, since she learns three languages, and during most of her time she studies, goes to courses and activities, and takes care of her domestic duties.

However, language learning is also concurrent with each family's plans and aspirations. Mariam is a fifty-three-year-old English teacher from Syria who lived with her daughter and her husband for over a year in Thessaloniki. They have requested relocation to Germany, where her son lives with his family. With her children's encouragement, Mariam started learning German in order to make her time in Greece beneficial. Although she knows that NGOs organize language courses in the city centre, she chose online courses and in fact the very website her son recommended. He was the one who sent her a smartphone from Germany to motivate her. Although she is not particularly familiar with the use of the phone in general, and much less as a learning tool, under her son's instructions and with her daughter's assistance she uses it smoothly. Amira also teaches her two children English and German. "Whatever I learn in those courses, I want to pass it to my children. Every night for a couple of hours we do our own little homework. Alphabet in four languages (Arabic, Greek, English, and German) and some words and grammar. Little things. Even when we watch fairy tales on YouTube in Arabic, I ask them words in Greek and

in English. Everything is a learning and teaching opportunity." They learn Greek to improve their present condition, German because they applied for family reunification there, and English because "it is the language that we can use in any country we will end up." For Amira, education is a way out of an "empty" everyday routine, an investment in the direction of a better future, but also a means of performing parenting outside the limited arena of her expected gender roles.

Parents as Teachers: Performing Culture

Closely related to the issue of foreign languages is the attitudes towards learning the mother tongue. Although parents complained about children's fatigue from all-day schooling, no one wanted the Arabic language lessons in the camp to stop. As most of them stated, children should learn their mother language "no matter what." "If they learn the mother tongue, then they can learn all the other languages, but the most important is to learn the mother tongue," according to Abbas. When asked why he doesn't teach his children Arabic so that they would not have to attend school both in the morning and in the afternoon, he said, "Arab teacher teaches grammar, words, and mathematics. I 'speak' [teach] them culture; to be good people, to respect the others." As he told us, he spends most nights singing and teaching his children to play the lute. "No one will teach them this part of our history. I want my children to learn the music traditions and practices and the habits of Syrian people. So I have to be this teacher and guide." For Abbas, school is responsible for educating his children, but he is the one who will instruct and form their Arabic culture. He employs notes, lyrics, and stories to induct them into their ancestral history. As he admits, it is not an easy task; children get bored easily and show no interest in his stories. To make his effort more effective and motivate his children, he included his mobile phone in his narration. He attracted their attention by showing them photos, videos, or documentaries about Arabic history and culture. "They spent most of their time on screen playing games and watching videos. Why not using this for learning purposes? In this way they pay more attention when I narrate stories, they get more fascinated," Abbas is an example, yet not unique. As Roer-Strier and Strier[45] show in their study of immigrant families in Israel, parents for whom cultural traditions are important and who try to teach those traditions to their children find themselves in conflict with the educational system of the host country. Resolution of this tendency often comes by merging the two contrasting worlds through the children's education (even if systematic home-schooling is not the norm for most). As bearers of a place and culture mostly occupied by the performance of memory, many refugee women and men maintain their

parental agency as transmitters of the language, oral tradition, and sensory imprints of the home country, differentiating themselves from the role of the formal teacher, yet maintaining a strong pedagogical and shaping influence in the lives of their children.

Along similar lines, Mustafa, a forty-three-year-old taxi driver from Syria, admitted that he was very concerned about his daughters' ethical guidance. His wife and their three children lived in Diavata for over a year. He managed to reach Germany and lived there for seven months, when he was granted asylum and then he returned to Greece and secretly lived in the container with his family. As he said, he preferred to go back and forth rather than leave them unattended. Although his wife was a teacher in Syria and taught Arabic in the informal school in Diavata for some time, he was the one teaching them their tradition and religion through songs, customs, and history movies. "I am not only teaching them the language, but also our culture." Although he was very persistent in sending their daughters to school, he was very cautious about the fact that in the Greek school boys and girls are in the same classroom and interact with each other. He even considered going back to Syria so that his children would have the "proper" upbringing.

As our fieldwork data indicate, the high valorization of the teacher figure is intrinsic to most refugees' cultural understanding of education. Thus the performance of the parental role as a teacher in the cultivation and preservation of cultural elements (mother tongue, music, cooking, etc.) within the family combines two highly important cultural components: family and education. In employing Bourdieu's view,[46] we discern how transmitting the habitual and *embodied* state of one's cultural capital (through recreation, caretaking, and communication of values) is utilized to make up for the loss of the *objectified* and the *institutionalized* state of capital compromised by the encampment condition. In being unable(d) to occupy a recognizable citizenship role, to be systemically excluded from formal education and linguistically estranged from local daily activity, many refugee parents make up for this loss in agency by attaining a stronger "instructional" position in their children's lives and turn the preservation of their cultural capital into a central parental concern. This emphasis on cultural capital builds on the long anthropological discussion about shifting understandings of territorialization, and how (home)lands that can no longer be corporeally inhabited become strong imagined landmarks for moving populations.[47]

Closing Remarks

Refugee parents' thoughts and practices highlight their active engagement with their children's education, despite obstacles that the encampment condition poses in the performance of parental roles. Although they faced challenges, including the lack of Greek language, and cultural and material resources, parents developed strategies to overcome them, to organize the disordered daily life in the camps, and to become educational caretakers and agents for their children. Learning the language and transmitting the cultural heritage to their children are principal goals of many parents in the camps of northern Greece. Many parents learn the language of the host country in order to be able to assist their children, while following their children's progress and demand from teachers a less "loose" program in order to eliminate the sense of "time wasted." Others attain a teaching role in transmitting cultural knowledge and preventing their children's assimilation. In their effort to assure a better future for them in Greece or in a future destination country, parents adopt educational and mediating roles that grant them a greater sense of control over their families' present and future being. As we have ethnographically demonstrated, their efforts to appropriate time, cultural knowledge, and parental agency might give them back some of the power that they lost while traversing the processes of forced migration and encampment.

Notes

1 E. Papataxiarchis, "Being 'There': At the Front Line of the 'European Refugee Crisis'—Part One," *Anthropology Today* 32, no. 2 (2016): 5–9; Papataxiarchis, "Being 'There': At the Front Line of the 'European Refugee Crisis'—Part Two," *Anthropology Today* 32, no. 3 (2016): 3–7.

2 G. Agelopoulos, "To Whom Are the Greeks Bearing Gifts? Aspects of the Refugee Crisis in Greece," *Irish Journal of Anthropology* 18, no. 2 (2015): 9–12.

3 See https://data2.unhcr.org/es/documents/download/60528.

4 See UNHCR, "Refugee and Migrant Children in Europe: Accompanied, Unaccompanied and Separated," June 2017, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/58431.

5 According to UNHCR reports and estimations, more than half of all refugees are children of school age; thus international organizations, governments, and NGOs focus on the education and schooling of these children as fundamental for their integration in the new place, as important as shelter, nourishment, and sanity. See Y. Rah, S. Choi, and T.S.T. Nguyễn, "Building Bridges between Refugee Parents and Schools," *International Journal of Leadership in Education* 12, no. 4 (2009): 347–65. See also Scientific Committee for the Support of Refugee Children (Ministry of Education, Research and Religious Affairs), "The Project of the Education of Refugees," April 2017 (in Greek).

6 S. Nagy, "From Camps to Schools: The Participation of Refugee Children in Greek Public Education," *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 36, no. 2 (2018): 385.

7 G. Simopoulos and A. Alexandridis, "Refugee Education in Greece: Integration or Segregation?," *Forced Migration Review* 60 (2019): 27–9.

8 I. Daskalaki, S. Tsioli, and G. Androulakis, "Project PRESS: Ethnographic Approaches to Refugee Education in Greece," in *Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Open and Distance Learning "Education Design,"* November 23–6, 2017, ed. A. Lionakis, S. Ioakeimidou, M. Niari, G. Manousou, T. Hartofylaka, S. Papadimitriou, and A. Apostolidou, 23–6 (Athens: Hellenic Open University, 2017), (in Greek).

9 K.M. Anderson-Levitt, "Intro: Anthropologies and Ethnographies of Education Worldwide," in *Anthropologies of Education*, ed. K.M. Anderson-Levitt, 1–28 (New York: Berghahn, 2013).

10 The Provision of Refugee Education and Support Scheme (PRESS) was a research-based project, funded by the Hellenic Open University, that aimed to help refugees' educational support and long-term educational empowerment. By bringing together social anthropology and sociolinguistics, the project aimed to produce ethnographic insights into the educational, linguistic, and communication priorities and expectations of refugee children, youths, and adults in Greece in order to furnish educational activities and integration. The duration of the project, which consisted of twenty-four distinct actions, was nineteen months (June 2016 to December 2017). Academic director, Professor George Androulakis; project coordinators, Anna Apostolidou, Ivi Daskalaki, and Sofia Tsioli. For more information, see Project Press, "Press Toolkit," http://press-project.eap.gr/toolkit/.

11 S. Dryden-Peterson, *The Educational Experiences of Refugee Children in Countries of First Asylum* (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2015); Dryden-Peterson, "Refugee Education: Education for an Unknowable Future," *Curriculum Inquiry* 47, no. 1 (2017): 14–24; R. Hoss, "Education in Emergencies: Case of a Community School for Syrian Refugees," *European Journal of Educational Research* 5, no. 2 (2016): 53–60.

12 G. Lăzăroiu, "The Educational Status of Refugee Youth from Syria," *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 47, no. 13–14 (2015): 1383–4.

13 H. Cabot, *On the Doorstep of Europe: Asylum and Citizenship in Greece* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014).

14 E. Arvanitis and N. Yelland, "'Home Means Everything to Me': A Study of Young Syrian Refugees' Narratives Constructing Home in Greece," *Journal of Refugee Studies*, (2019), https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fez030; N. Kourachanis, "From Camps to Social Integration? Social Housing Interventions for Asylum Seekers in Greece," *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy* 39, no. 3–4 (2018): 221–34.

15 Papataxiarchis, "Being 'There,'" parts one and two; K. Rozakou, "Solidarians in the Land of Xenios Zeus: Migrant Deportability and the Radicalisation of Solidarity," in *Critical Times in Greece: Anthropological Engagements with the*

Crisis, ed. D. Dalakoglou and G. Agelopoulos, 188–201 (London: Routledge, 2018); S. Chtouris and M.S. DeMond, "Refugee Flows and Volunteers in the Current Humanitarian Crisis in Greece," *Journal of Applied Security Research* 12, no. 1 (2017): 61–77.

16 E. Papataxiarchis, "Cohabitation Exercises in the 'Humanitarian City': Informal Educational Practices and Refugee Governance post-2016," *Synchrona Themata* 137 (2017): 74–89 (in Greek).

17 I. Daskalaki and N. Leivaditi, "Education and 'Hospitality' in Liminal Locations for Unaccompanied Refugee Youths in Lesvos," *Migration and Society* 1 (2018): 51–65.

18 S. Nagy, "From Camps to Schools: The Participation of Refugee Children in Greek Public Education," *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 36, no. 2 (2018): 373–99.

19 M. Marmaridou, "Education of Refugee Children in Greece: Teacher's Experiences" (master's thesis, University of Jyväskylä, 2019), https://jyx.jyu.fi/bitstream/handle/123456789/66792/1/URN%3ANBN%3Afi%3Ajyu-201912135265.pdf.

20 M. Mogli, S. Kalbeni, and L. Stergiou, "'The Teacher Is Not a Magician': Teacher Training in Greece Reception Facilities for Refugee Education," *International e-Journal of Educational Studies* 4, no. 7 (2020): 42–55.

21 Mogli, Kalbeni, and Stergiou, "'The Teacher Is Not a Magician,'" 52–3.

22 J.M. Felter, as cited in L. Merry, S. Pelaez, and N. Edwards, "Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, and Undocumented Migrants and the Experience of Parenthood: A Synthesis of the Qualitative Literature," *Globalization and Health* 13, no. 75 (2017): 9.

23 A.D. Medina, as cited in Merry, Pelaez, and Edwards, "Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, and Undocumented Migrants," 10.

24 L.D. Adams and A. Kirova, "Introduction: Global Migration and Education: School, Children and Families," in *Global Migration and Education: School, Children and Families*, ed. L.D. Adams and A. Kirova, 1–12 (London: Routledge, 2006); E.H. Boyle and A. Ali, "Culture, Structure, and the Refugee Experience in Somali Immigrant Family Transformation," *International Migration* 48, no. 1 (2010), 47–79.

25 C. Suárez-Orozco and M. Suárez-Orozco, "Transnationalism of the Heart: Familyhood across Borders," in *What Is Parenthood? Contemporary Debates about the Family*, ed. L. McClain and D. Cere, 279–98. New York: New York University Press, 2013).

26 A.M. Renzaho and S. Vignjevic, as cited in Merry, Pelaez, and Edwards, "Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, and Undocumented Migrants," 6.

27 L. De Haene, as cited in Merry, Pelaez, and Edwards, "Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, and Undocumented Migrants," 7.

28 S.A. Deng and J. Marlowe, "Refugee Resettlement and Parenting in a Different Context," *Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies* 11, no. 4 (2013): 416–30.

29 R. Ramsden and A. Taket, as cited in Merry, Pelaez, and Edwards, "Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, and Undocumented Migrants," 5–6, 9.

30 D. Bergnehr and K.A. Nagasa, both as cited in Merry, Pelaez, and Edwards, "Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, and Undocumented Migrants," 15 and 16.

31 All the names used here are pseudonyms.

32 J.L. McBrien, "Educational Needs and Barriers for Refugee Students in the United States: A Review of the Literature," *Review of Educational Research* 75, no. 3 (2005): 329–64.

33 Daskalaki, Tsioli, and Androulakis, "Project press."

34 A. Bandak and M.K. Janeja, "Introduction: Worth the Wait," in *Ethnographies of Waiting: Doubt, Hope and Uncertainty*, ed. A. Bandak and M.K. Janeja, 1–39. London: Bloomsbury Academic.

35 Some of them pursue linguistic and cultural mediation during in-school and extracurricular activities, as is the case of mothers in the camp of Konitsa (in Epirus), who formed an informal coalition with educators and camp managers to assist the better integration of children in elementary school as well as schooling-like practices.

36 S. Deane, "Syria's Lost Generation: Refugee Education Provision and Societal Security in an Ongoing Conflict Emergency," *IDS Bulletin* 47, no. 3 (2016): 35–52.

37 L. De Wal Pastoor, "The Mediational Role of Schools in Supporting Psychosocial Transitions among Unaccompanied Young Refugees upon Resettlement in Norway," *International Journal of Educational Development* 41, no. 3 (2015): 245–54.

38 Daskalaki, Tsioli, and Androulakis, "Project press."

39 C. Longman, K. De Graeve, and T. Brouckaert, as cited in Merry, Pelaez, and Edwards, "Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, and Undocumented Migrants," 15.

40 For an overview of the parenting experience of refugees, asylum-seekers, and undocumented migrants see also Merry, Pelaez, and Edwards, "Refugees, Asylum-Seekers and Undocumented Migrants."

41 U. Erel, as cited in Merry, Pelaez, and Edwards, "Refugees, Asylum-Seekers and Undocumented Migrants," 5–6, 15.

42 D.C. Este and A.A. Tachble, "The Perceptions and Experiences of Russian Immigrant and Sudanese Refugee Men as Fathers in an Urban Center in Canada," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 624, no. 1 (2009): 139–155.

43 M.L. Van Korlaar, as cited in Merry, Pelaez, and Edwards, "Refugees, Asylum-Seekers and Undocumented Migrants," 9–10.

44 E. Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, *The Ideal Refugees: Gender, Islam, and the Sahrawi Politics of Survival* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2014).

45 D. Roer-Strier and R. Strier, "The Role of Home and School in the Socialization of Immigrant Children in Israel: Father's Views," in *Global Migration and Education: School, Children and Families*, ed. L.D. Adams and A. Kirova, 103–19 (London: Routledge, 2006).

46 P. Bourdieu, "The Forms of Capital," in *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education*, ed. J. Richardson, 241–58 (New York: Greenwood, 1986).

47 L. Malkki, "National Geographic: The Rooting of Peoples and the Territorialization of National Identity among Scholars and Refugees, *Cultural Anthropology* 7, no. 1 (1992): 24–44.

Georgia Sarikoudi is a post-doctoral fellow in Aristotle University of Thessaloniki. She can be reached at gsarikoudi@gmail.com.

Anna Apostolidou is a post-doctoral fellow and adjunct lecturer at Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences. She can be reached at anna.apostolidou@panteion.gr.

The Experiences of Mental Health Professionals Supporting Forced Migrants: A Qualitative Systematic Review

IONA MYFANWY TYNEWYDD, SOPHIE NORTH, AND IMOGEN RUSHWORTH

Abstract

Many forced migrants experience trauma in pre-migration, journeying, and post-migration phases of flight. Therefore appropriate mental health provision is required. Whilst previous reviews have explored the experiences of health-care staff in supporting forced migrants, no review was found that focused solely on the experiences of mental health professionals. This qualitative thematic synthesis integrates the findings from ten qualitative studies and identifies analytical constructs that encompass the challenges and facilitators for mental health professionals. Findings will inform how services can be developed to best support staff and enable the provision of high-quality mental health care for this potentially vulnerable population.

Résumé

Plusieurs migrants forcés vivent un trauma lors de la pré-migration, du voyage et de la post-migration. Une offre adéquate en santé mentale est donc nécessaire. Alors que des études précédentes ont exploré les expériences du personnel des services de santé dans le soutien aux migrants forcés, aucune études axée seulement sur les expériences des professionnels en santé mentale n'a été trouvée. Cette synthèse thématique qualitative intègre les résultats de dix études qualitatives et identifie les constructions analytiques englobant les obstacles et les facilitateurs pour les professionnels en santé mentale. Les résultats sont susceptibles d'orienter le développement de services visant à mieux soutenir le personnel et permettre la prestation de soins en santé mentale de qualité pour cette population potentiellement vulnérable.

Health consequences for forced migrants are vast, multifaceted, and greater than for "regular" migrants.[1] Traumatic events in pre-migration and "in-flight" phases, and post-migratory stress are linked to higher levels of distress.[2] These stressors influence forced migrants' abilities to engage in treatment and resettlement in post-migration phases. Distress may be further amplified by physical and social care needs, such as illness or housing issues.[3] Uncertain immigration status may also intensify fears of deportation and reduce feelings of safety.[4] Forced

migrants thus comprise a vulnerable population necessitating significant support for diverse and complex mental health needs.

There are a number of difficulties in identifying those requiring mental health support.[5] Professionals in mental health services may not have received training that enables them to identify and support the types of mental health difficulties experienced by forced migrants.[6] Language may also act as a barrier.[7] Furthermore, psychological approaches may be unfamiliar and uncomfortable within different cultural backgrounds or may evoke stigmatizing connotations.[8] Further challenges may be presented by specific stressors associated with forced migration, such as human rights violations and interpersonal violence.[9] These experiences may cause difficulties in trusting others, thus presenting challenges to care. There are a number of challenges, therefore, to providing appropriate and effective mental health support for forced migrants in the post-migratory phase.

Qualitative Reviews

The need to investigate properties of effective health services for forced migrants is widely acknowledged.[10] The number of studies is rapidly expanding, with a number of qualitative studies being undertaken across several countries and different health-care services. Qualitative research is of particular significance to evidence-based health care, because it seeks to explore the human experiences of health-care interactions and processes.[11] The synthesis of qualitative research, however, provides superior insight because its product allows supplementary understandings of the phenomena and their operations.[12]

Two recent qualitative systematic reviews of particular relevance have been identified. Robertshaw et al. reviewed challenges and facilitators for primary health-care professionals working with refugees and asylum seekers post-migration.[13] This review assessed experiences of doctors, nurses, and midwives providing health care in high-income countries. Twenty-six articles were analyzed thematically, producing three analytical constructs of health-care encounter, health-care system, and asylum and resettlement. Within these constructs, eleven themes relating to a range of challenges and facilitators were situated. In relation to the health-care encounter, a trusting relationship, communication, cultural understanding, health and social conditions, and time were identified as themes. Training and guidance, professional support, connecting with other services, organization, resources, and capacity were themes identified as relevant to the health-care system. Quality assessment revealed the included articles varied in quality. The review employed a transparent methodology, improving the validity of findings and conclusions. It highlighted a need to investigate mental

health professionals' experiences to further contribute to improved service provision for forced migrants.

The second review explored refugee and staff experiences of psychotherapeutic mental health services in countries of resettlement.[14] It aimed to address the lack of service-user perspective present in refugee service literature. The review was limited to articles containing the word *refugee* in the title, alongside terms relating to psychotherapeutic input and qualitative studies in the abstract. Therefore the review may not have identified studies that concerned asylum seekers or other forced migrants or had idiosyncratic titles. This limits the extent to which the findings can be generalized to clinical care, since the findings apply only to those granted refugee status and are not wholly representative of forcibly displaced persons presenting for care. The review included eleven studies: five involving service users and six involving staff. Whilst considering both the perspectives of service users and staff is important and valid, unique elements unsuited to being grouped in this way may have been compromised. Similarly, the included studies involved both individual and family client groups. Quality assessment revealed the majority of included studies had poor or very poor quality. Combined elements of thematic synthesis and meta-ethnographic approaches were utilized in the analysis. Mutual understanding, addressing complex needs, discussing trauma, and cultural competence were identified as key themes in achieving acceptable care.

The aim of the current review is to explore the experiences of mental health professionals providing support to forced migrants. Previous systematic reviews have identified a range of challenges and facilitators for health professionals providing care for forced migrants.[15] This review aims to explore the challenges and facilitators of mental health professionals—a novel area of focus. This review will also address limitations of the prior reviews in health-care provision. To enhance credibility, it will consider a single perspective, so that the results relate to this specific population. This will also allow improved generalizability to other mental health professional settings. The review will not be limited to professionals working with those with refugee status, but to professionals working with any forced migrant population, including those who have not yet been granted refugee status. Thus, it will encapsulate the experience of working with persons who are awaiting confirmation of their immigration status and who do not have the rights associated with refugee status (and the distress associated with these factors). It will encompass public, private, and/or charitable sector mental health services. Thus, this is the first comprehensive review of mental health service professionals' experiences. Improved understanding of these elements and their implications is vital for policy-making, staff support,

---

refugee* OR asylum seek* OR forced migrant*

AND qualitative OR qualitative research OR mixed method OR experienc* OR perception* OR attitude* OR perspective* OR challenge* OR facilitator* OR barrier*

AND mental health OR mental health service* OR mental health prov* OR healthcare OR health care OR service prov* OR care prov* OR profess* OR staff* OR counsel* OR psycholog* OR psychi* OR therapi* OR psychothe* OR mental health practitio* OR MHP OR mental health nurs* OR social work* OR occupational ther* OR support work*

Figure 1. Search strategy

and well-being, and provision of quality services for forced migrants.[16]

Review Question

What are the challenges and facilitators experienced by mental health professionals providing support to forced migrants?

Method

Search Strategy

The search strategy was pre-planned and registered with PROSPERO International prospective register of systematic reviews (ID: CRD42017084617). The strategy sought all available relevant articles. MEDLINE Complete (EBSCO), Web of Science (Web of Knowledge), PsycINFO (ProQuest), and CINAHL Complete (EBSCO) were searched on June 4, 2018. These sources were selected for their scope and coverage of literature pertaining to health, psychology, and clinical practice.

Search terms for forced migrants, mental health professionals, and qualitative research were combined to search article titles and abstracts. Both free text and MeSH terms were used. The search strategy was informed by the Sample, Phenomenon of interest, Design, Evaluation, Research type (SPIDER) tool. Compared to the established PICO (Population/problem, Intervention/exposure, Comparison, and Outcome) tool, SPIDER terminology is more suited to qualitative research and produces more manageable results.[17]

Google Scholar was utilized to identify further articles meeting the review criteria through hand-searching and footnote chasing to improve search comprehensibility.[18] Use of supplementary techniques is critical as the result of issues associated with locating relevant qualitative literature.[19] These include the low concentration of qualitative studies within databases, indexing variation between databases, and the use of quotations as article titles.

All search results were imported into Zotero. Duplicates were removed and the remaining titles and abstracts were screened by the first author. Articles clearly not meeting the inclusion criteria were excluded. Remaining articles were assessed according to the pre-specified study selection criteria by assessment of the full-text articles.

Inclusion Criteria

Qualitative and mixed method studies with a qualitative component exploring experiences of mental health professionals working with forced migrants were included in this review. Forced migrants were defined as asylum seekers, refugees, or other forcibly displaced migrants. All types of mental health professionals were included. Articles had to include at least some analysis in narrative form (e.g., first-person quotes) on mental health professionals' experiences and perspectives. Eligible data collection methods included verbal interviews, focus groups, or free-form questionnaire and survey data. Only studies where mental health professionals worked directly with forced migrants were included. Articles where recipient data were presented alongside other data were included. Published, peer-reviewed articles were included. No limits on year or geography were applied in response to the limited availability of source material. Non-English-language studies were considered if an English translation was available.

Exclusion Criteria

The following studies were excluded: quantitative studies; theses; dissertations; opinion articles; organization reports; reviews and case studies; studies exploring experiences of professionals providing physical health care; interpreters or informal carers; studies exploring only the experiences of service users (forced migrants); studies in which participants did not have direct, exclusive experience of working with forced migrants; studies concerning refugee camps, asylum seeker detention centres, or specialist services. Where no English language text was available, studies were excluded.

Data Extraction

Study characteristics including aims, setting, participants, methodology, results, and implications were extracted by the first author. As noted by Barroso et al., identification of findings was complicated by reporting variation and integrity.[20] Findings were taken to refer to more than direct quotation and data summation. Therefore all text under the headings "results," "discussion," and "conclusions" were extracted electronically and entered into QDA Miner Lite.

Assessment of Quality

Quality appraisal was conducted independently by the first author and reviewed by all authors. The Critical Appraisal Skills Programme (CASP) tool for appraisal of qualitative research was employed. The tool was developed in relation to medical literature and piloted with health-care practitioners and highlights procedural issues and reporting standards in qualitative research.[21] The comparative strengths of the studies were critically appraised and evaluated. No scoring system was used, as according to the purpose of the tool. Exclusions were not made based on quality appraisal, as the result of the following. First, there remains ongoing debate regarding the use of tools in this manner in qualitative research. Second, there is some suggestion of structured quality assessments bias in favour of research practice compliance over the value of contribution to the field; thus, inclusion enhanced the wealth and richness of the synthesis.[22] This is especially pertinent, given the lack of literature seeking to understand the experiences of mental health professionals working with forced migrants.

Data Synthesis

The recognized methodology for systematic review and thematic synthesis of qualitative research detailed by Thomas and Harden was utilized.[23] This methodology has particular value in informing health-related policy and practice.[24] Moreover, it provides a transparent account of the synthesis stages and derivation of conclusions.[25] The Enhancing Transparency of Reporting the Synthesis of Qualitative Research (ENTREQ) framework was utilized to guide the review reporting.[26]

Initial line-by-line coding was completed by hand by the first author in QDA Miner Lite. All primary quotations and interpretations related to the experiences of mental health professionals working with forced migrants were coded openly. An inductive process of theme derivation ensured the most complete representation of perspectives and experience. Inductive derivation reduces the risk of unanticipated emergent themes being obscured or overlooked by limiting the scope of the analysis to specific questions or theories. Subsequent studies were translated into the catalogue of pre-existing concepts where appropriate, and new concepts were created when deemed necessary. Initial codes were organized into descriptive themes of related constructs that closely related to original findings. In the final stage of synthesis, analytical themes were generated in order to produce understandings and notions that exceeded those of the primary studies.[27]

Results

Study Selection Results

Systematic database searching identified 7,922 studies. A further 12 studies were identified through hand searching and reference list searches. Thus, the total number of studies identified was 7,934. A total of 2,722 duplicates were removed, and a further 5,165 studies were excluded after screening titles and abstracts. Full-text articles of the remaining 47 studies were sought for eligibility assessment. Full-text articles could not be obtained for four studies; therefore, they were excluded. Ten articles met the full eligibility criteria and were included.

Study Characteristics

All included studies were qualitative. Four were from the United Kingdom, five from Australia, and one from the United States. All articles were published between 2007 and 2018. The number of participants ranged from seven to seventeen, yielding a combined total of seventy-nine participants. Participant samples in all except three studies were exclusively mental health clinicians. The combined sample included clinical psychologists, counselling psychologists, psychologists/general psychologists, counsellors, social workers, psychotherapists, psychiatrists, marriage and family therapists, "front-line clinicians," administrative and managerial staff, a trainee clinical psychologist/trainee psychoanalyst, a psychotherapist/social worker, an occupational therapist, and a community development worker. All studies employed semi-structured interviews. To analyze data, four utilized a thematic approach, three used discourse analysis, two used an interpretative phenomenological approach, and one a constant comparison framework.

Quality Assessment

The CASP critical appraisal tool was used to evaluate procedural issues and transparency of the included studies. The appraisal revealed variability in the quality of the ten articles, with none of the articles satisfying all quality criteria. All articles gave a statement of the research aims; however, there was variability in how explicitly they were stated and in detailing the importance and relevance of the research. The chosen

Figure 2. Article selection

Table 1. Analytic constructs

Analytical construct	Challenges	Facilitators
Professionals must be aware of and contend with power differentials	Working within complex and hostile frameworks Discomfort at one's relative privilege	Being in a position to "make a difference"
Professionals must develop specialist knowledge and skills	Working sensitivity with cultural differences Holding and balancing forced migrants' competing care needs Challenging negative social narratives about forced migration Supervisors lacking expertise in forced migration	Focusing on the importance of the work Networking with other professionals working with forced migrants Developing professionally in this specialization
Witnessing forced migrants' stories and trauma significantly affects professionals	Coping with vicarious responses to stories of horror	Witnessing the strength of forced migrants in their stories Support and care from professionals' organizations Prioritizing self-care. Growing and developing personally in response to the work

research method was appropriate across studies. A minority of studies explicitly stated the research design. Most detailed the sampling strategy, and the majority made some reference to eligibility criteria. There was wide variety in the reporting of participant demographic information, and possible reasons for non-participation were not discussed by any articles.

All articles stated the data collection method, and most provided some justification. Whilst two detailed their full interview schedule, the remainder gave only general descriptions of the interview schedule content. Less than half of the studies gave the location of data collection, and one identified the interviewer. Theoretical saturation was also largely not discussed. Six of the articles made either explicit reference to reflexivity or addressed issues relevant to it. The manner in which this was addressed was mixed, with some authors describing their motivations for undertaking the research and exploring potential consequences, and others stating methods employed in an effort to reduce bias.

There was wide variety in the reporting of ethical issues. Three articles made no reference. The remaining articles stated the study had ethical approval, and all except one gave details. Three articles evidenced participants being fully informed about the study. Five reported consent and/or withdrawal was discussed with participants, and one gave details regarding maintenance of confidentiality.

Nine articles gave full descriptions of the analysis employed, and all except two justified use of the approach utilized. All clearly presented their findings and gave support in the form of quotations, although the rationale for including presented data was discussed in only two. Contradictory data and the role of researchers were rarely discussed. All articles discussed study findings and their value in relation to wider literature, practice, and/or policy. Most addressed credibility, with five explicitly discussing the study strengths and limitations. Seven explored directions for future research.

Synthesis Output

To ensure the review question did not limit the themes produced by the analysis, an inductive bottom-up thematic analysis was initially conducted, as detailed by Thomas and Harden.[28] Line-by-line coding and translation of concepts gave rise to an initial catalogue of forty-four codes. Through evaluating similarities and differences between the initial codes, a hierarchical framework of descriptive themes was produced. Three higher-order themes encompassing twelve descriptive themes were embedded within this structure.

Figure 3. Hierarchy of descriptive themes

To address the review questions, and to generate understandings that exceeded those of the primary studies, analytical themes were derived through the iterative process described by Thomas and Harden.[29] This step of "going beyond" descriptive themes can be considered the defining feature of synthesis. Challenges and facilitators were inferred from the descriptive themes using the information and context within the journal articles. Related implications for clinical practice were also considered. From this process, analytical themes began to develop. The challenges and facilitators were then re-examined and refined within the context of these analytical themes. This iterative process continued until the analytical themes encapsulated the original descriptive themes, inferred challenges and facilitators and clinical implications. Through this process, three analytical themes emerged, encompassing relative challenges and facilitators of professionals' experiences.

Analytical Construct 1: Professionals Must Be Aware of and Contend with Power Differentials

All of the studies described issues of power present at multiple levels, both within and beyond the health-care interaction.

Challenges: Working within Complex and Hostile Frameworks, Discomfort with One's Relative Privilege

All studies except one highlighted the strain placed by outside systems and frameworks on professionals in supporting forced migrants' mental health. Professionals cited the time and energy this detracted from their ability to focus on their remit, the direct influence of wider systems on the emotional states of service users, and the impact of being perceived to be part of "the system" on the therapeutic relationship.

"You come up against a system which is meant to be there as backup for support in your role, but it's not functioning adequately. It can make you feel like the pressure is actually on you."[30]

"When they come here, they, by being detained and by being actually treated in this way basically … it reinforces the message that was previously given by the government from the country they belong to, that actually you are not a person with full rights, you know, having dignity and so on, so this unfortunately, the psychological effect on them, basically they are not believed, they are not validated."[31]

A number of professionals reflected on an awareness of their own privilege and powerful status having been highlighted to them. This was constructed as an uncomfortable realization, and professionals spoke of struggles in "coming to terms with" and accepting injustices in others' lives.

"Being a nice, white, middle-class male who is kind of sheltered from the awful things that happen on the whole around the world and lucky, and you can walk around in your own little bubble, or when you are working with asylum seekers and refugees you … you are forced to confront what's really going on. And by "what's really going on" I mean wars and torture in other countries, but then also the social reality of life in the UK for people."[32]

Facilitator: Being in a Position to "Make a Difference"

Holding a position of relative power was also viewed as a positive enabler in effecting change in almost every included study. Feeling able to elicit some influence over forced migrants' well-being, or assuming an active political stance gave professionals a sense of purpose and of "doing good." This was cited as a significant motivator.

"When I do trainings, when I speak in public, when I testify in court, I'm helping to publicize and speak out against and document the impact of these injustices. So to me that connects with my sense of resilience."[33]

Analytic Construct 2: Professionals Must Develop Specialist Knowledge and Skills

All the studies explored how the uniqueness of the forced migrant experience itself affected a variety of related issues. These issues again had influence within and beyond the immediate health-care interaction.

Challenges: Working Sensitively with Cultural Differences, Holding and Balancing Forced Migrants' Competing Care Needs, Challenging Negative Societal Narratives about Forced Migration, Supervisors Lacking Expertise in Forced Migration

Cultural differences contributed to challenges for professionals' experiences in the majority of included studies.

First, professionals spoke of this limiting forced migrants' knowledge and access to services, and giving rise to distress through acculturation and assimilation. Linguistic barriers and use of interpreters were commonly cited as having a negative impact on support overall.

"[It's] frustrating at times because of the lack of language, the ongoing struggle to understand other perspectives and other cultures."[34]

Second, as a result of the multiple and often competing care needs of forced migrants, professionals found mental health was seldom prioritized. Some professionals contended with this by becoming flexible in their role and supporting forced migrants in meeting other care needs, whilst others maintained firm boundaries in their role and remit.

"In terms of dealing with other stuff they come to see us about, they're not in a head space to even get into that deeper stuff. They're still trying to deal with the practical things they have to do to get through each day, and all of the different stresses around immigration, accommodation, finances."[35]

"I am social worker, I am a lawyer, I am everything that you can think of.… However, having said that, I don't do that with every patient. I refer sometimes to other agencies to do that, but I do that when I think doing it is right."[36]

Third, a further challenge in the uniqueness of the forced migrant experience was that of negative social attitudes and discourse, detailed by five studies. This is seen as attributing to difficulties with identity formation and assimilation for forced migrants, both of which influence emotional well-being.

"I've had friends and family talk about refugee people, people on the news, and all those sorts of people, and it's like, well hang on, and I'm able to articulate it in a way so it helps them understand the difference, you know, in what's happening."[37]

Fourth, two studies found professionals felt under-supported by their supervisors because they lacked supervisory experience. Participants raised concerns about a lack of supervisory provision and expertise, and increased risk as a result.

"I think the problem is that supervisors often have less experience than you do in working with refugees and asylum seekers. And that is really troubling you know, and so you get them kind … they are in a position of trying to guide you but they can't really direct you."[38]

Facilitators: Focusing on the Importance of the Work, Networking with Other Professionals Working with Forced Migrants, Developing Professionally in This Speciality

Seven of the ten studies explored how acknowledging the meaning and value of the work aided the mental health-care process. Focusing on positive changes that had occurred, however small, was also endorsed by several professionals.[39]

> "Even though it is going to take time, even though it is going to take years, even though the healing is not going to be complete, you can see in clients when you work a long time here, you can see how life changes in ways that you never thought could happen. If you can see it is like this, you have this motivation to continue to work and to continue encouraging them to do things, [to keep] helping them."[40]

Participants advocated peer support in four of the studies as facilitating their ability to provide care for forced migrants. Benefits included emotional support and being able to relate through shared experiences.

> "I've ended up linking up with colleagues and … and in a way doing much more peer supervision.… Colleagues who I know are particularly interested in the cross-cultural."[41]

The development of competency and expertise was also viewed as a facilitator and positive benefit. Five studies noted how professionals were able to develop specialist skills through working with people who were asylum seekers and refugees, and who had experienced trauma.

Five clinicians (41.7 per cent) experienced a sense of increased personal or professional development as a result of their work and described it as a reward of assisting people from refugee backgrounds. Some reported having a deeper understanding of trauma work and how to support clients, and some reported feeling more confident in their therapeutic skills and abilities. For instance, "I think I feel much, much more comfortable when working with people from different backgrounds."[42]

Analytic Construct 3: Witnessing Forced Migrants' Stories and Trauma Significantly Affects Professionals

The final construct encompasses the direct and indirect effects that supporting people who had experienced, and continued to experience, trauma relating to their displacement had for professionals.

Challenge: Coping with Vicarious Responses to Stories of Horror

Professionals in all studies described the challenges of coping with the trauma they were exposed to through their work. They detailed how difficult it was to hear about forced migrants' experiences, and how this resonated with them outside of their work. Emotional implications included feelings of being overwhelmed, powerless, unsafe, underprepared, or detached. In seven studies professionals experienced nightmares, flashbacks, and other responses to trauma that mirrored those of the people they were supporting.

> "I just feel that there is nothing safe and that's the rest [*sic*] of working in trauma because if, your whole world is unsafe outside because … because you just see the awful stories, you see, we see torture survivors, we see what the worst that a human being can do to another human being."[43]

> "I used to go to the supermarket and feel like I had bubble wrap, like Glad wrap, just around me, like this kind of coating. I would go there and I just felt like I was going from this horror world into normal land, and then I didn't feel connected to people in normal land. Like I was going, "You don't get it; you didn't hear what I heard!""[44]

Facilitators: Witnessing the Strength of Forced Migrants in Their Stories, Support and Care from Professionals' Organizations, Prioritizing Self-Care, Growing, and Developing Personally as a Result of the Work

Witnessing strength and growth were consistently regarded as positive, motivating aspects of supporting forced migrants. Professionals experienced this as rewarding through empowering, helping others to find meaning and improve their relationships and connections. Some described feeling awe and respect for those they supported, and feeling privileged and honoured to work alongside them.

> "It's the inner strength of the person. You know, you can feel that flame and you think I shall want to it keep alight, I don't want it to be crushed anymore, and they only seem to need a little bit of support for them to go ahead on their own." [45]

> "It feels like an absolute privilege to sit with [these] people and hear their stories, to be the person that they are willing to trust when they don't trust anybody else. You know, to be the person that they trust with that level of information, that depth of trauma and horror."[46]

Participants in six of the studies expressed the importance of organizational support in coping with their work,

although some called for greater support. Overall, provision of supervision, training, and opportunities for professional development was considered facilitative.

> "There's a lot of support here. They make it really clear that if you ever feel you need to talk to someone, it doesn't matter when it is, there is always someone you can just ask to speak to, whether it's a supervisor or it's another colleague, just grab someone and go and talk."[47]

In addition to organizational support, self-care strategies were advocated in four studies. Participants utilized individual self-care strategies, informal support from friends and family, and sought support through formal care (e.g., counselling). To look after themselves, participants reported engaging in practical strategies, including relaxation, sports, taking appropriate breaks, and ensuring that they maintained achievable personal schedules.

In nine of the ten studies, professionals experienced personal growth through their work, which helped them to continue. This occurred in increased acceptance of others, spiritual growth, and altered perceptions of themselves, their values, and the world.

> "It just helped bring it more to home on a personal level to want to do so much more, to bring equality to this earth."[48]

> "[The work] makes you strong. [I'm] a stronger person than I used to be."[49]

Discussion

Three analytical constructs encompassing challenges and facilitators for professionals providing mental health care to forced migrants emerged from the thematic synthesis. The first construct, "Professionals must be aware of and contend with power differentials," acts as a barrier when supporting someone within complex legal, financial, and housing systems. This is consistent with the review of professionals' experiences of treating physical health,[50] which also noted surrounding systems are not only complex, but often unfavourable to forced migrants. Becoming aware of one's privileges and the lack of privileges of those being supported also poses a challenge for professionals. Power differences between mental health professionals and service users have readily been identified as impeding recovery. In working with this particular population, imbalances of power are likely to be more pronounced and have a greater impact. Literature extensively documents how disempowerment and marginalization affect forced migrants. These include poverty, racism, and discrimination, amongst others.[51] Asylum processes and associated policies themselves often

further disempowerment.[52] These circumstances, along with uncertainty, frequently increase psychological distress and increase the task before mental health professionals.[53] Therefore professionals may need to conscientiously acknowledge and reduce power imbalances (where possible) to work effectively with and empower forced migrants. Having a safe space to reflect on and process these thoughts and feelings also helps to ensure the well-being of professionals.

Conversely, the findings show being in a position to "make a difference" promotes professionals' abilities to successfully support, advocate for, and empower forced migrants. Whilst little evidence has been found examining the impact of clinician self-efficacy on mental health outcomes, preliminary evidence indicates counsellor self-efficacy correlates with treatment outcomes.[54] Our review indicates that a sense of trust, choice, and power is highly important to mental health service-users' feeling safe and engaging with therapeutic processes.[55] Moreover, interventions that emphasize empowerment are consistently found to be more effective in child and adult mental health settings.[56]

The second construct, "Professionals must develop specialist knowledge and skills," highlights themes uniquely concurrent in the forced migrant experience. Clinicians must be aware of cultural differences, competing care needs, negative societal attitudes towards forced migrants, and scarce expert supervision. The first two of these themes were present in both health-care professionals' experiences of working with forced migrants in relation to physical health,[57] and service-provider and user experiences in psychotherapeutic services for refugees.[58] It would appear these challenges may be consistent across health-care settings. There may be an opportunity, therefore, for professionals from different backgrounds, including health care, mental health, and/or psychotherapeutic services to discuss and develop ways of working competently and sensitively with the cultural differences and competing care needs often synonymous with forced migration. Additionally, increasing "cultural competence" is strongly advocated for by an increasing body of literature to improve services for forced migrants.[59]

The impact of negative societal attitudes is widely documented as adversely affecting refugee and asylum seekers' mental health.[60] It follows that those compassionately supporting these individuals may also experience these effects. There is limited discussion of this in the literature, however. Paluck and Green's review found mixed evidence on reducing prejudice generally.[61] It is pertinent, therefore, that research seeks to understand how these effects might be mitigated for professionals. The specific issues raised in relation to supervision—in particular a lack of expertise—seem to be relatively novel findings. Effective clinical supervision demonstrably improves job satisfaction, stress levels,

burnout rates, and clinical outcomes.[62] The findings indicate access to quality supervision is of great importance, more so given the specialist and complex care needs of the forced migrant population.

Facilitative factors relating to 'Professionals must develop specialist knowledge and skills" were found to be "focusing on the importance of the work," networking, and professional development. Working with this population provides clinicians with the opportunity to contribute to humanitarian efforts, aligning with motivations to enter caring professions.[63] Furthermore, self-determination theory proposes that intrinsic values such as self-development, affiliation, and community contribution are associated with greater well-being in the workplace.[64] This illuminates how professionals will feel a sense of satisfaction from their work when their psychological needs are fulfilled. The development of mutual meaning and understanding has also been indicated to benefit the professional–service user relationship.

The final analytic construct, "Witnessing forced migrants' stories and trauma significantly affects professionals," addressed the intense effects of working with traumatized forced migrants and being exposed to their experiences. These effects are wide ranging and may be constructed as secondary traumatic stress, vicarious traumatization, burnout, or compassion fatigue. It is well documented that clinicians regularly working with trauma are at increased risk of experiencing secondary trauma symptoms.[65] Clinicians may experience nightmares, dissociation, or anxiety and hopelessness in relation to their work and world view. Studies indicate therapists experiencing secondary traumatic stress attempt to make sense of what they hear and integrate this with existing cognitive schemas, but that this can have multiple negative implications.[66]

Clinicians identified several facilitators to help combat this challenge. They cited witnessing growth and resilience as a powerful and motivational experience. Several frameworks describing vicarious trauma have been developed to include concepts of vicarious resilience and vicarious post-traumatic growth.[67] These seek to account for this experience, which appears to co-occur and counteract the fatigue that trauma clinicians often experienced. Concurrent with previous research, clinicians used a combination of organizational support and self-care to help manage their responses to traumas they were vicariously exposed to.[68] The literature included in this review indicates being able to talk to managers and/or colleagues and engage in self-care goes some way to mitigate these effects. However, some of the evidence is mixed.[69] Therefore, further research into how professionals manage these effects and what they find most helpful, or an exploration of support structures, such as group supervision, would be warranted. Organizations need to consider how

these protective elements can be integrated into structures and processes, and how they can support their staff in caring for themselves. They may consider what additional supports can be put in place, or how caseloads can be managed to allow for this—for example, is a smaller caseload required when working with this population to account for the complexity and help process the emotional implications?

Finally, personal growth was found to occur by supporting forced migrants' mental health. This is again consistent with the compassion fatigue resilience model, indicating that vicarious resilience and personal growth may be closely related. Qualitative study of vicarious resilience in therapists has also identified positive personal impacts and increased hopefulness resulting from trauma work.[70] Most literature that explores vicarious implications of working with trauma focuses on the experiences of therapists, and further research is needed to explore the experiences of other mental health professionals. However, the findings of this study are supported by the wider literature, which indicates working with trauma can be challenging but also rich and fulfilling. These fulfilling experiences are likely to improve staff well-being, satisfaction, and retention, and it is therefore worth exploring what specifically contributes to the experience and how professionals can "hold on" to this throughout their work.

Implications

The findings of this review may inform service providers needing to adapt their provision to improve care for disadvantaged groups, such as forced migrants. Reduction in health-care inequality is a public health concern for countries including the United Kingdom.[71] This may require amendments to policy and development of clinical guidelines for best-practice care, which must recognize the complex needs and enhanced resources required for this population. Wren highlights the dangers of reactively creating services for forced migrants, detailing how this leads to insufficient and disjointed provision.[72] Suitable planning and thoughtfulness is therefore required to develop effective and sustainable services.

The findings indicate that mental health professionals would benefit from appropriate training in the specialist area of forced migration. This could include training on relevant wider systems (e.g., legal, financial, and housing), cultural competency development, and working with survivors of trauma and torture. Improved understanding of the legal processes and requirements (for example, requirements to routinely present work permits at police stations), forced migrants must adhere to would help professionals to understand the processes forced migrants are going through and empathize with the associated effects. Specific gaps may include understanding the legal terminology and relevant

implications (for example, asylum seeker, refugee, leave to remain) associated with forced migration and resettlement. Education on housing processes, reunification, financial provision, and social and legal support for forced migrants may be beneficial, as well as the gaps in these services. Access to relevant literature and information on local and national services placed to aid forced migrants should also be facilitated. Given the often complex needs of this population, interservice collaboration may be both necessary and helpful. Moreover, additional time should be allowed for clinicians to build rapport, understand service users' perspectives and needs, and conduct appointments. The findings also show access to regular structured supervision with supervisors experienced in working with this population (or who are willing to undertake specific training) should be a priority wherever possible. Where this is not possible, creative alternatives such as telephone, teleconference, or group supervision could be considered to address this need. Peer support was also highlighted as a valuable resource, and it may also be prudent to explore the possibility of peer support groups.

Strengths and Limitations

This review provides the first systematic synthesis specifically exploring the experiences of mental health professionals supporting forced migrants. This allowed a thorough exploration of the challenges and facilitators of this provision from the professionals' perspectives. All ten papers included have been published since 2007, and nine since 2013. Thus, this is a review of contemporary literature, well timed to support the further development of this field. Given the limited research in this area, the focus on qualitative research is an additional strength of this review. The constructs and themes identified help us to understand experiences and processes that can be further explored qualitatively and quantitatively to form concepts, hypotheses, and theory.[73] The findings can also be used to develop study designs that are sensitive to these experiences.[74] The findings have been interpreted within the context of existing theory and literature, and generally provide additional support for them, and novel findings have been produced.

All of the included studies took place in the United Kingdom, Australia, or the United States, and this may constrain the relevance to countries with comparable economic status. The characteristics of each study have been provided to allow readers to assess their applicability to other settings. As noted, methodological and contextual information was limited in some of the studies, which restricted reporting in this review. It has been argued, however, that a lack of reported information may reflect word count restrictions as opposed to methodological rigour.[75] A particular area of paucity was the consideration of reflexivity and researcher bias. This was rarely discussed in the studies, and in-depth information was almost never provided. It is not possible to consider, therefore, to what extent researcher backgrounds may have influenced the interpretations of findings. To minimize this in the current review, first-person quotes were given priority over author quotes, and transparency has been promoted. This is particularly relevant, given the interpretive nature of the final stage of the analysis, highlighted by Thomas and Harden as being most controversial.[76]

The first author utilized a reflective journal and supervisory discussion to consider how her own background may have influenced her interpretations of findings in this review. This explored her life experiences, professional career as a trainee clinical psychologist, and interest in voluntary work abroad with vulnerable populations, although she has no experience of working with forced migrant populations. These discussions elicited themes of "wanting to get it [the analysis and interpretation] right" and sometimes of seeing forced migrants as vulnerable as opposed to resilient. The discussions allowed the primary author to become more aware of and "step away" from assumptions. All three authors have an interest in supporting forced migrant populations, and this could have had some impact on the emphasis of interpretations. To reduce potential bias introduced by these factors, the authors went back to the original papers and ensured the interpretations were grounded in them and the contexts provided.

Future Directions

The findings of this review provide vital implications for future research. This should strive to improve reporting transparency, and consideration of reflexivity in qualitative research. Research in different geographical settings will be especially useful in contributing to our understanding of mental health professionals' experiences and how they are influenced by context. Where strategies to support and improve professionals' experiences are implemented, evaluations should be undertaken to assess their effectiveness. Alternatively, evaluations may be employed to identify where care quality may be improved. These should include the perspective of both service users and providers and give voice to the perspectives of forced migrants. This review has also highlighted the issue of service access. Research investigating how we can improve access to services for forced migrants will be imperative in improving provision of mental health support for this population.

Conclusion

A novel review and thematic synthesis of mental health professionals' experiences of supporting forced migrants was conducted. The findings indicate constructs relating to

power, specialism and trauma are broadly influential in professionals' experiences. The associated challenges and facilitating factors have been presented and explored, which can inform service practice and policy. It is hoped this will support professionals and facilitate improved quality of care for forced migrant populations. Suggestions for future research include expansion to differing geographical settings, provision of interventions to support professionals in their work, evaluation of care quality, and investigating how access to services can be improved for forced migrant populations. Global conflicts and atrocities continue to occur, suggesting that the issues pertinent to this research will not subside. It is therefore essential that we continue to examine how we can support both those affected and those working with them.

Further supplementary information regarding the characteristics and quality assessment of the studies included in the systematic review is available on request to the lead author.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declare that there is no conflict of interest.

Funding

Notes

1 Brian D. Gushulak and Douglas W. MacPherson, "Population Mobility and Infectious Diseases: The Diminishing Impact of Classical Infectious Diseases and New Approaches for the 21st Century," *Clinical Infectious Diseases* 13, no. 3 (2000): 776–80.

2 Gareth Morgan, Steve Melluish, and Alice Welham, "Exploring the Relationship between Postmigratory Stressors and Mental Health for Asylum Seekers and Refused Asylum Seekers in the UK," *Transcultural Psychiatry* 54, no. 5–6 (2017): 653–74, https://doi.org/10.1177/1363461517737188; Shakeh Momartin, Zachary Steel, Marianio Coello, Jorge Aroche, Derrick M. Silove, and Robert Brooks, "A Comparison of the Mental Health of Refugees with Temporary versus Permanent Protection Visas," *Medical Journal of Australia* 185, no. 7 (2006): 357–61, https://doi.org/10.5694/J.1326-5377.2006.TB00610.X.

3 Luke Robertshaw, Surindar Dhesi, and Laura L. Jones, "Challenges and Facilitators for Health Professionals Providing Primary Healthcare for Refugees and Asylum Seekers in High-Income Countries: A Systematic Review and Thematic Synthesis of Qualitative Research," *BMJ Open* 7, no. 8 (2017): e015981, https://doi.org/10.1136/bmjopen-2017-015981.

4 David Palmer and Kim Ward, "'Lost': Listening to the Voices and Mental Health Needs of Forced Migrants in London," *Medicine, Conflict and Survival* 23, no. 3 (2007): 198–212, https://doi.org/10.1080/13623690701417345.

5 World Health Organisation (WHO), *Health of Migrants—The Way Forward: Report of a Global Consultation* (Madrid: WHO, 2010).

6 Laurence J. Kirmayer, Lavanya Narasiah, Marie Munoz, Meb Rashid, Andrew G. Ryder, Jaswant Guzder, Ghayda Hassan, Cecile Rousseau, and Kevin Pottie, "Common Mental Health Problems in Immigrants and Refugees: General Approach in Primary Care," *CMAJ* 183, no. 12 (2011): E959–E967, https://doi.org/10.1503/cmaj.090292.

7 Natasja K. Jensen, Marie Norredam, Stefan Priebe, and Allan Krasnik, "How Do General Practitioners Experience Providing Care to Refugees with Mental Health Problems? A Qualitative Study from Denmark," *BMC Family Practice* 14, no. 1 (2013), https://doi.org/10.1186/1471-2296-14-17.

8 Angela Burnett and Michael Peel, "Health Needs of Asylum Seekers and Refugees," *BMJ (Clinical Research Ed.)* 322, no. 7285 (2001): 544–7, https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.322.7285.544.

9 WHO, *Health of Migrants.*

10 Derrick Silove, Peter Ventevogel, and Susan Rees, "The Contemporary Refugee Crisis: An Overview of Mental Health Challenges," *World Psychiatry* 16, no. 2 (2017): 130–9, https://doi.org/10.1002/wps.20438; Mauro G. Carta, Mariola Bernal, Maria C. Hardoy, Josep M. Haro-Abad, and "The Report on the Mental Health in Eurpope" Working Group, "Migration and Mental Health in Europe (The State of the Mental Health in Europe Working Group: Appendix 1)," *Clinical Practice and Epidemiology in Mental Health* 1, no. 1 (2005), https://doi.org/10.1186/1745-0179-1-13.

11 Jane Noyes, "Never Mind the Qualitative Feel the Depth! The Evolving Role of Qualitative Research in Cochrane Intervention Reviews," *Journal of Research in Nursing* 15, no. 6 (2010): 525–34, https://doi.org/10.1177/1744987110381696.

12 Mary Dixon-Woods, Debbie Cavers, Shona Agarwal, Ellen Annandale, Antony Arthur, Janet Harvey, Ron Hsu, Savita Katbanna, Richard Olsen, Lucy Smith, Richard Riley, and Alex J. Sutton, "Conducting a Critical Interpretive Synthesis of the Literature on Access to Healthcare by Vulnerable Groups," *BMC Medical Research Methodology* 6, no. 1 (2006), https://doi.org/10.1186/1471-2288-6-35.

13 Robertshaw, Dhesi, and Jones, "Challenges and Facilitators for Health Professionals."

14 Aspasia Karageorge, Paul Rhodes, Rebecca Gray, and Renos Papadopoulos, "Refugee and Staff Experiences of Psychotherapeutic Services," *Intervention* 15, no. 1 (2017): 51–69, https://doi.org/10.1097/WTF.0000000000000137.

15 Robertshaw, Dhesi, and Jones, "Challenges and Facilitators for Health Professionals"; Karageorge et al., "Refugee and Staff Experiences of Psychotherapeutic Services."

16 Robertshaw, Dhesi, and Jones, "Challenges and Facilitators for Health Professionals"; Karageorge et al., "Refugee and Staff Experiences of Psychotherapeutic Services."

17 Alison Cooke, Debbie Smith, and Andrew Booth, "Beyond PICO: The SPIDER Tool for Qualitative Evidence Synthesis,"

Qualitative Health Research 22, no. 10 (2012): 1435–43, https://doi.org/10.1177/1049732312452938.

18 Marcia Bates, "The Design of Browsing and Berrypicking Techniques for the Online Search Interface," *Online Review* 13, no. 5 (1989): 407–24.

19 Yelena P. Wu, Brandon S. Aylward, Michael C. Roberts, and Spencer C. Evans, "Searching the Scientific Literature: Implications for Quantitative and Qualitative Reviews," *Clinical Psychology Review* 32, no. 6 (2012): 553–7, https://doi.org/10.1016/J.CPR.2012.06.007.

20 Julie Barroso, Claudia J. Gollop, Margarete Sandelowski, Janet Meynell, Patricia F. Pearce, and Linda J. Collins, "The Challenges of Searching for and Retrieving Qualitative Studies," *Western Journal of Nursing Research* 25, no. 2 (2003): 153–78, https://doi.org/10.1177/0193945902250034.

21 Dixon-Woods et al., "Conducting a Critical Interpretive Synthesis."

22 Dixon-Woods et al., "Conducting a Critical Interpretive Synthesis."

23 James Thomas and Angela Harden, "Methods for the Thematic Synthesis of Qualitative Research in Systematic Reviews," *BMC Medical Research Methodology* 8, no. 1 (2008), https://doi.org/10.1186/1471-2288-8-45.

24 Danielle M. Campbell, Sally Redman, Louisa Jorm, Margret Cooke, Anthony B. Zwi, and Lucie Rychetnik, "Increasing the Use of Evidence in Health Policy: Practice and Views of Policy Makers and Researchers," *Australia and New Zealand Health Policy* 6, no. 1 (2009), https://doi.org/10.1186/1743-8462-6-21.

25 Robertshaw, Dhesi, and Jones, "Challenges and Facilitators for Health Professionals."

26 Allison Tong, Kate Flemming, Elizabeth McInnes, Sandy Oliver, and Jonathon Craig, "Enhancing Transparency in Reporting the Synthesis of Qualitative Research: ENTREQ," *BMC Medical Research Methodology* 12, no. 1 (2012), https://doi.org/10.1186/1471-2288-12-181.

27 Thomas and Harden, "Methods for the Thematic Synthesis of Qualitative Research in Systematic Reviews."

28 Thomas and Harden, "Methods for the Thematic Synthesis of Qualitative Research in Systematic Reviews."

29 Thomas and Harden, "Methods for the Thematic Synthesis of Qualitative Research in Systematic Reviews."

30 Allysa J. Barrington and Jane Shakespeare-Finch, "Giving Voice to Service Providers Who Work with Survivors of Torture and Trauma," *Qualitative Health Research* 24, no. 12 (2014): 1686–99, https://doi.org/10.1177/1049732314549023.

31 Zoe Apostolidou, "Australian Asylum Discourses Permeating Therapeutic Work with Asylum Seekers: A Thematic Analysis of Specialist Practitioners' Experiences," *Psychotherapy and Politics International* 16, no. 1 (2018): e1434, https://doi.org/10.1002/ppi.1434.

32 Zoe Apostolidou, "Politicised Notions of Professional Identity and Psychosocial Practice Among Practitioners Working with Asylum Seekers and Refugees," *British Journal of Guidance and Counselling* 43, no. 4 (2015): 492–503, https://doi.org/10.1080/03069885.2014.987727.

33 Pilar Hernandez-Wolfe, Kyle Killian, David Engstrom, and David Gangsei, "Vicarious Resilience, Vicarious Trauma, and Awareness of Equity in Trauma Work," *Journal of Humanistic Psychology* 55, no. 2 (2015): 153–72, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022167814534322.

34 Robert Schweitzer, Sierra van Wyk, and Kate Murray, "Therapeutic Practice with Refugee Clients: A Qualitative Study of Therapist Experience," *Counselling and Psychotherapy Research* 15, no. 2 (2015): 109–18, https://doi.org/10.1002/capr.12018.

35 Nigar G. Khawaja and Georgia Stein, "Psychological Services for Asylum Seekers in the Community: Challenges and Solutions," *Australian Psychologist* 51, no. 6 (2016): 463–71, https://doi.org/10.1111/ap.12149.

36 Zoe Apostolidou, "Constructions of Emotional Impact, Risk and Meaning among Practitioners Working with Asylum Seekers and Refugees," *Counselling and Psychotherapy Research* 16, no. 4 (2016): 277–87, https://doi.org/10.1002/capr.12087.

37 Allysa J. Barrington and Jane Shakespeare-Finch, "Working with Refugee Survivors of Torture and Trauma: An Opportunity for Vicarious Post-Traumatic Growth," *Counselling Psychology Quarterly* 26, no. 1 (2013): 89–105, https://doi.org/10.1080/09515070.2012.727553.

38 Zoe Apostolidou, "The Notion of Professional Identity among Practitioners Working with Asylum Seekers: A Discursive Analysis of Practitioners' Experience of Clinical Supervision and Working Context in Work with Asylum Seekers," *European Journal of Psychotherapy and Counselling* 18, no. 1 (2016): 4–18, https://doi.org/10.1080/13642537.2015.1130073.

39 Richard Laugharne and Stefan Priebe, "Trust, Choice and Power in Mental Health," *Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology* 41, no. 11 (2006): 843–52, https://doi.org/10.1007/s00127-006-0123-6.

40 Barrington and Shakespeare-Finch, "Giving Voice to Service Providers."

41 Apostolidou, "Notion of Professional Identity."

42 Barrington and Shakespeare-Finch, "Giving Voice to Service Providers."

43 Apostolidou, "Constructions of Emotional Impact, Risk and Meaning."

44 Barrington and Shakespeare-Finch, "Working with Refugee Survivors of Torture and Trauma."

45 Gillian Century, Gerrard Leavey, and Helen Payne, "The Experience of Working with Refugees: Counsellors in Primary Care," *British Journal of Guidance & Counselling* 35, no. 1 (2007): 23–40, https://doi.org/10.1080/03069880601106765.

46 Barrington and Shakespeare-Finch, "Working with Refugee Survivors of Torture and Trauma."

47 Barrington and Shakespeare-Finch, "Giving Voice to Service Providers."

48 Barrington and Shakespeare-Finch, "Working with Refugee Survivors of Torture and Trauma."

49 Barrington and Shakespeare-Finch, "Giving Voice to Service Providers."

50 Robertshaw, Dhesi, and Jones, "Challenges and Facilitators for Health Professionals."

51 Jennifer Allsopp, Nando Sigona, and Jenny Phillimore, "Poverty among Refugees and Asylum Seekers in the UK: An Evidence and Policy Review," *IRiS Working Paper Series*, no. 1 (2014); Neil Quinn, "Participatory Action Research with Asylum Seekers and Refugees Experiencing Stigma and Discrimination: The Experience from Scotland," *Disability & Society* 29, no. 1 (2014): 58–70, https://doi.org/10.1080/09687599.2013.769863.

52 Allsopp, Sigona, and Phillimore, "Poverty among Refugees and Asylum Seekers in the UK"; Quinn, "Participatory Action Research with Asylum Seekers and Refugees"; Roger Zetter and Martyn Pearl, "The Minority within the Minority: Refugee Community-Based Organisations in the UK and the Impact of Restrictionism on Asylum-Seekers," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 26, no. 4 (2010): 675–97, https://doi.org/10.1080/713680501.

53 Louise Newman, Nicholas Proctor, and Michael Dudley, "Seeking Asylum in Australia: Immigration Detention, Human Rights and Mental Health Care," *Australasian Psychiatry* 21, no. 4 (2013): 315–20, https://doi.org/10.1177/1039856213491991.

54 Mark G. Hanson, "Counsellor Self-Efficacy: Supervision Contributions, Impact on Performance and Mediation of the Relationship between Supervision and Performance" (PhD diss., Southern Illinois University, 2006), ProQuest (3229884).

55 Laugharne and Priebe, "Trust, Choice and Power in Mental Health."

56 Suarla Fitzsimons and Ray Fuller, "Empowerment and Its Implications for Clinical Practice in Mental Health: A Review," *Journal of Mental Health* 11, no. 5 (2002): 481–99, https://doi.org/10.1080/09638230020023.

57 Robertshaw, Dhesi, and Jones, "Challenges and Facilitators for Health Professionals."

58 Karageorge et al., "Refugee and Staff Experiences of Psychotherapeutic Services."

59 Jeanine Suurmond, Conny Seeleman, Ines Rupp, Simone Goosen, and Karien Stronks, "Cultural Competence among Nurse Practitioners Working with Asylum Seekers," *Nurse Education Today* 30, no. 8 (2010): 821–26, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.nedt.2010.03.006.

60 Mina Fazel, Ruth V. Reed, Catherine Panter-Brick, and Alan Stein, "Mental Health of Displaced and Refugee Children Resettled in Low-Income and Middle-Income Countries: Risk and Protective Factors," *Lancet* 379, no. 9812 (2012): 250–65, https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(11)60050-0.

61 Elizabeth L. Paluck and Donald P. Green, "Prejudice Reduction: What Works? A Review and Assessment of Research and Practice," *Annual Review of Psychology* 60, no. 1 (2009): 339–67, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.60.110707.163607.

62 Deborah Edwards, Peter Burnard, Doug Coyle, Anne Fothergill, and Ben Hannigan, "Stress and Burnout in Community Mental Health Nursing: A Review of the Literature," *Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing* 7, no. 1 (2000): 7–14, https://doi.org/10.1046/j.1365-2850.2000.00258.x; Kristiina Hyrkäs, "Clinical Supervision, Burnout, and Job Satisfaction among Mental Health and Psychiatric Nurses in Finland," *Issues in Mental Health Nursing* 26, no. 5 (2005): 531–56, https://doi.org/10.1080/01612840590931975; Tim Bradshaw, Antony Butterworth, and Hilary Mairs, "Does Structured Clinical Supervision during Psychosocial Intervention Education Enhance Outcome for Mental Health Nurses and the Service Users They Work With?," *Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing* 14, no. 1 (2007): 4–12, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-2850.2007.01021.x.

63 Jennifer M. Newton, Cherene M. Kelly, Anne K. Kremser, Brian Jolly, and Stephen Billett, "The Motivations to Nurse: An Exploration of Factors amongst Undergraduate Students, Registered Nurses and Nurse Managers," *Journal of Nursing Management* 17, no. 3 (2009): 392–400, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-2834.2008.00945.x.

64 Richard M. Ryan and Edward L. Deci, "Self-Determination Theory and the Facilitation of Intrinsic Motivation, Social Development, and Well-being," *American Psychologist* 55, no. 1 (2000): 68–78.

65 Hernandez-Wolfe et al., "Vicarious Resilience, Vicarious Trauma, and Awareness of Equity in Trauma Work."

66 Century, Leavey, and Payne, "The Experience of Working with Refugees."

67 Marne Ludick and Charles R. Figley, "Toward a Mechanism for Secondary Trauma Induction and Reduction: Reimagining a Theory of Secondary Traumatic Stress," *Traumatology* 23, no. 1 (2017): 112–23, https://doi.org/10.1037/trm0000096.

68 Ludick and Figley, "Toward a Mechanism for Secondary Trauma Induction and Reduction"; Kyle D. Killian, "Helping till It Hurts? A Multimethod Study of Compassion Fatigue, Burnout, and Self-Care in Clinicians Working with Trauma Survivors," *Traumatology* 14, no. 2 (2008): 32–44, https://doi.org/10.1177/1534765608319083.

69 Lisa S. Elwood, Juliette Mott, Jeffrey M. Lohr, and Tara E. Galovski, "Secondary Trauma Symptoms in Clinicians: A Critical Review of the Construct, Specificity, and Implications for Trauma-Focused Treatment," *Clinical Psychology Review* 31, no. 1 (2011): 25–36, https://doi.org/10.1016/J.CPR.2010.09.004.

70 Hernandez-Wolfe et al., "Vicarious Resilience, Vicarious Trauma, and Awareness of Equity in Trauma Work."

71 Robertshaw, Dhesi, and Jones, "Challenges and Facilitators for Health Professionals."

72 Karen Wren, "Supporting Asylum Seekers and Refugees in Glasgow: The Role of Multi-Agency Networks," *Journal*

of Refugee Studies 20, no. 30 (2007): 391–413, https://doi
.org/10.1093/jrs/fem006.

73 Pamela O. Atieno, "An Analysis of the Strengths and Limitation of Qualitative and Quantitative Research Paradigms," *Problems of Education in the 21st Century* 13, no. 1 (2009): 13–18.

74 Karin Hammarberg, Maggie Kirkman, and Sheryl de Lacey, "Qualitative Research Methods: When to Use Them and How to Judge Them," *Human Reproduction* 31, no. 3 (2016): 498–501, https://doi.org/10.1093/humrep/dev334.

75 Salla Atkins, Simon Lewin, Helen Smith, Mark Engel, Atle Fretheim, and Jimmy Volmink, "Conducting a Meta-Ethnography of Qualitative Literature: Lessons Learnt," *bmc Medical Research Methodology* 8, no. 1 (2008), https://doi.org/10.1186/1471-2288-8-21; Angela Harden, Jo Garcia, Sandy Oliver, Rebecca Rees, Jonathon Shepherd, Ginny Brunton, and Ann Oakley, "Applying Systematic Review Methods to Studies of People's Views: An Example from Public Health Research," *Journal of Epidemiological Community Health* 58 (2004): 794–800, https://doi.org/10.1136/jech.2003.014829.

76 Thomas and Harden, "Methods for the Thematic Synthesis of Qualitative Research in Systematic Reviews."

Iona Tynewydd is a clinical psychologist at Betsi Cadwaladr University Health Board. She can be reached at Iona.Tynewydd@wales.nhs.uk.

Sophie North is a lecturer at the University of East Anglia. She can be reached at S.North1@uea.ac.uk

Imogen Rushworth is a clinical senior lecturer in clinical psychology at the University of East Anglia, Norwich. She can be reached at I.Rushworth@uea.ac.uk.

Symposium

Beyond the Global Compacts: Re-imagining Protection

JENNIFER HYNDMAN AND JOHANNA REYNOLDS

How can protection for refugees and migrants (hereafter "refugee-migrants") be imagined outside and beyond the status quo? The challenge of providing better protection for them is addressed through the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) and the Global Compact for Migration (GCM) is acute, and yet this distinction between migrants and refugees is deeply flawed. How do our civil societies and the "international community" of governments and intergovernmental organizations move beyond improving the status quo? Notions of "protection" are themselves fraught. Who is protecting whom? Who authorizes protection? And what power relations shape its terms? Highlighting where and how protection is self-authorized at scales that are not conventionally international or state-based is a critical first step. These questions—first discussed in a 2018 workshop in Toronto—are presented here as efforts that reframe protection strategies and meanings. In this introduction to the symposium that follows, we report on the broader workshop, identify key interventions that remain largely invisible at national and international scales, and call for more. We ask scholars of migration, asylum, and displacement to engage more critically with protection at different scales and in spaces not governed by international law, as highlighted further in the three articles that follow.

Since 2014, more than ten thousand migrants have died in the Mediterranean Sea.[1] Deaths along many other routes remain uncounted, on land and at sea. In 2015, 1.3 million people, a record number of asylum seekers, made refugee claims in Europe, with more than half coming from just three countries: Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq.[2] In European countries, the term *refugee crisis* became a hyperbolic characterization but also a rallying cry for something to be done, on humanitarian and security fronts, through a proliferation of public policy responses to fortify Europe's borders. The "crisis"[3] was constructed largely by states in the Global North about the uninvited asylum seekers arriving on their shores, often ignoring the violence and displacement and displacement in Syria, but also South Sudan and Eritrea. According to

this view, the "problem" was defined as the refugee-migrants arriving in Europe, and focused on restrictive policies to reduce the "flow" of people heading towards Europe.

In September 2016, world leaders met to determine what could be done to address record levels of displacement at the United Nations Summit and meetings in the United States. Remarkably, all 193 UN member states signed the New York Declaration on Refugees and Migrants in 2016, a pledge of support to those affected and the states that host them, and a catalyst for the GCR and the GCM, also known as the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration.

In 2018, the GCR was launched and signed by 164 states; the GCM was also released and signed by 152 countries. While legally non-binding, the compacts replicate in some ways the spirit of human rights principles encapsulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights after the Second World War, a legally non-binding document that has become customary law. In our view, the political hope was that the compacts could breathe new life and action into what had largely been considered a humanitarian failure of the international community; former UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon called it "a test of our collective conscience."[4] And yet this idea of a moral obligation to save lives and assist was questioned, and in some cases criminalized in the case of refugee-migrant rescue ships.[5] The not new, but palpable tension between providing protection to refugee-migrants and denying access to it in the name of national security remains the biggest "test" of our time.

While constructive and laudable in many respects, the global compacts are unlikely to shift the political and institutional frameworks that manage migration. Rather, we contend they will maintain the status quo whereby migration is encouraged to stay within Global South countries or people are turned away from state borders as they approach the Global North. Much scholarship has engaged with the compacts and their "plans of action."[6] This introduction and the articles that follow challenge the standard solutions and responses to displacement and migration. The GCR performs a kind of "legal orientalism"[7] that uses the 1951 Convention Relating to Refugees and 1967 Protocol to frame its Plan of Action and Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework. To the extent that the GCR focuses on states that are signatories to the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol, it suffers from "convention-centrism" and excludes major parts of the world (most notably, South and Southeast Asia, as well as Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey—in relation to Syrian asylum seekers). We contend that the GCR works to *improve the status quo* but does little to shift the containment paradigm of managing displacement in regions of the Global South. The GCM is a very different document that builds upon development and climate-related commitments, with indicators to measure its progress.

Research presented by leading migration scholars at a 2018 workshop in Toronto challenges the state-centrism of the GCR and the GCM and documents interventions that address protection challenges for people on the move. Freedom from forced return to violence at home, or *non-refoulement*, is the central pillar of refugee protection in law, but interdiction, return protocols, and readmission agreements (now often called "partnerships" in the European context) undermine obligations with spatial fixes that block refugee-migrants from accessing the territory of signatory states that would trigger such obligations, putting this basic principle of *non-refoulement* in question. A proliferation of such "partnerships" with transit countries continues to develop between Europe and its neighbouring countries, such as Libya, Mali, and Niger, effectively turning them into refugee-migrant holding cells.[8] Of course such containment strategies are not found in Europe alone: evidence of U.S. border externalization can also be found in the Americas,[9] just as Australia "offshores" asylum to islands in the South Pacific.[10]

The tension between simultaneous calls for protection and exclusion of people on the move, especially northward, cannot be ignored. The global nexus of refugee-migrant exclusion continues to be galvanized through a politics of securitization and related practices.[11] Beginning in the 1990s, the political valence of the "refugee" was transformed from "strategic and valuable" in a Cold War context to "costly and avoidable." This post–Cold War aversion to refugees was immensely consolidated by the global "war on terror," when wealthier countries in the Global North began finding myriad ways to outsource refugee care and maintenance to host countries in the Global South that were adjacent to displacement.[12] Alex Betts and James Milner note that European states are willing to pay for, but not host, refugees: for EU states "it doesn't matter where asylum is provided as long as it is provided."[13]

In this geopolitical context, workshop participants were asked to expand notions of protection beyond conventional meanings and "solutions" to foreground lesser-known, more local and regional interventions and practices that provide security to people whose lives and livelihoods have been displaced or destroyed.

How, then, can one reimagine "protection" outside and beyond current norms? The realm of possibility is truncated by the language we use,[14] the policy categories we adopt and deploy,[15] the longstanding research practices we employ, and the inequalities they reproduce.[16] Building on the work of many others, we contend that these inherited categories artificially delineate different migrant statuses that legitimize containment and constrain the agency of displaced persons. They naturalize state divisions and hide historical interstate relations of exploitation, including imperialism, colonialism, and slavery.

Refugees are often represented as bona fide and "deserving," while those fleeing structural violence, slow violence, or acute deprivation are seen as opportunistic. Betts and Collier assert this questionable distinction: "Migrants are lured by hope. Refugees are fleeing fear. Migrants hope for honeypots; refugees need havens."[17] Such false binaries and simplistic stereotypes do little more than obscure the multifaceted conditions and considerations that shape refugee-migrant journeys and the people who refuse the migrant/refugee distinction.

The very existence of two distinct global compacts reproduces the fiction that refugees and migrants are discrete, unrelated groups of people on the move. Examples in this symposium remind us of the fraught in-between categories and spaces where formal, legal protection statuses do not apply and more people-centred processes are needed to understand protection, security, and their meanings. We elaborate further on these themes in the Humane Mobility Manifesto, an outcome of the 2018 workshop, and the Kolkata Declaration, signed in November 2018, to which we return below.

Alternative Solutions to Refugee Protection: The Workshop

The workshop, "Alternative Solutions to Refugee Protection,"[18] held June 5 and 6, 2018, in Toronto, was organized around three questions:

1. What alternative forms of civil society engagement, solidarity, and legal intervention lie within global and regional frameworks that could be used to further the interests of international migrants and address racialized exclusions?
2. How can refugee-migrant agency and autonomy be taken seriously?
3. Building on the knowledge of refugee-migrants' decisions, actions, and self-authorized forms of protection, what alternative ways of imagining people's movement in search of security are possible? How are such alternatives enacted? What changes do they imply for the ways that states understand and "manage" international migration?

Scholars from Singapore, India, South Africa, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada addressed the workshop to unsettle the salient discourse of "solutions" to refugee protection. As Katy Long wrote, "The very fact of protracted displacement is evidence that existing approaches to 'solving' displacement have failed. Voluntary return, local integration and resettlement—the traditional 'durable solutions'—are not accessible for those trapped in protracted displacement.… *One question which must be asked … is whether the very language of 'solutions' is in fact creating—rather than confronting the apparent impasse in protracted displacement crisis*" (emphasis added).[19]

Research at the Toronto workshop included critiques of this salient language of "solutions," but also of the prevailing "self-reliance" trope found in the GCR and the neo-liberal loan schemes by the World Bank Group offered to states hosting most of the world's refugees, a strategy also promoted by scholars keen to keep displaced persons where they are: in Global South host countries.[20] In contrast, Morris (in this issue) analyzes this self-reliance strategy in Jordan, noting that it ignores *self-determination*. Workshop presenters highlighted concrete strategies that do create safe space for people and research showing how de facto protection in cities is possible without de jure official, permanent status. Informal humanitarianism in civil society creates fertile grounds for protection.

Key contributions at the workshop highlighted the "messiness" of categorization (Clark-Kazak, Crawley, Payne) and the need for more nuanced approaches that engage with the multifaceted reasons for migration. Recognition that the 1951 Refugee Convention does not enumerate all the rights that refugees have (Jones) and is not a reference point for refugee-migrants in many parts of the world was also underlined. Getting legal de jure status for most people on the move has been the exception rather than the rule. The "varieties" of displacement point to a wider range of responses to the challenge of protection, including informal and everyday humanitarianism (Abraham). Local literacy by refugee-migrants in urban sites creates de facto protection and highlights the limits of the identity politics of solidarity (Landau, Nah). Scholars challenged the very notions of responsibility (Samaddar) and self-reliance (Morris, Ilcan) and made the case for an expanded conceptualization of protection by showing that refugee-migrants will creatively make secure spaces for themselves, even in the absence of official protection policies or law (Payne, Mountz). Education was highlighted as a portable tool that benefited people on the move (Stevens) and even a pathway to resettlement for a select few.

Protracted Displacement in "Crisis"

As Aleinkoff and Zamore argue, the international refugee regime "constructs a bargain: hosting states will keep their borders open and house refugees in exchange for cash and camps and the international community will turn a blind eye to protection of rights and granting of membership."[21] Giles and Hyndman contend that the problem of protracted displacement is "crisis"-by-design and is not anomalous to global geopolitics. While international refugee law may provide basic protection against *non-refoulement* for refugees and asylum seekers, a geopolitical consensus among the world's wealthiest countries to support and finance management of

human displacement in Global South regions prevails.[22] The tacit message is clear: refugee-migrants should remain in their *regions of origin*. The GCR aims to improve conditions for refugees and host states with a model that does little to reimagine protection and security for displaced people.

States will use the guise of "national security" to authorize extraordinary expenditures, extra-legal border enforcement or detention strategies, and legally questionable interdiction practices. The security of their own citizens is paramount. That of refugee-migrant non-citizens is not. Strategizing to gain public consent to use whatever means necessary to protect polity, economy, and society is a political priority of governments. This short introduction cannot analyze national security and securitization discourses employed by states, but the workshop did echo a call to rescale security to that of the person affected by displacement, against the salience of national security discourse.

Scholarship that highlights the more embodied notion of *ontological security*, a notion of "feeling safe," as a refugee-migrant is foregrounded here.[23] To reclaim security discourse back from Global North governments that aim, without exception, to externalize refugee-migrants at high cost is no small undertaking. To place an emphasis, instead, on ontological security that reframes the scales and ways security is *practised* renders visible finer local and urban sites at which protection is being forged in new ways. Foregrounding *self-authorized* modes of protection is critical in contexts where one's legal sttatus does not confer a clear suite of rights and entitlements. Such modes also mitigate the paternalistic expressions of protection of refugee-migrants who are represented as unable to protect themselves.

While the workshop had several objectives, first among them reimagining refugee protection, we briefly touch upon two of the most salient aims that are steps to achieving this overarching objective: (1) to foreground agency, authority, and categorical distinctions between "refugee" and "migrant"; and (2) to highlight urban and regional protection strategies—beyond the state.

Agency, Authority, and Categorical Distinctions between "Refugee" and "Migrant"

The drafting of the Global Compact *on* Refugees, led by the UNHCR, was separate from that of the Global Compact *for* Safe Orderly and Regular Migration (aka GCM), convened by the IOM. The prepositions in each are telling: a Global Compact *on* Refugees signals a more top-down approach[24] compared to the GCM *for* migration, and its social media presence #ForMigration. The difference in them may be stylistic, but the categorical distinction between refugee and migrant has political and epistemological implications. Each is embedded in a separate compact.

To address this chasm, we employ the term *refugee-migrants* as an imperfect working concept that blurs any discrete boundary between the categories *refugee* and *migrant*. Categories are the outcome of social and political negotiations, debates, and histories that are not neutral.[25] A "fleer of necessity"[26] may claim both migrant and refugee statuses during a single journey to safety. The lively discussion of *refugee* versus *migrant* and other terminology has been ongoing for many years.[27] Many people on the move are displaced for reasons not of their own making. They may not have access to "refugee" status merely because the state in which they seek asylum has not signed on to international refugee law, the gold standard of protection available to a select few.

By focusing on refugee populations narrowly defined by the 1951 Convention and those states that are signatories to it, the GCR leaves out entire histories and groups of displaced persons, including Palestinians. The immense and violent displacement caused by Partition between India and Pakistan is omitted, though admittedly it occurred before the convention was signed (neither country is a signatory to it). The plight of the Rohingya from Burma (aka Myanmar) arguably receives less attention than other "case studies"; neither state is a signatory to the convention.[28] Is a universal solution even possible under such a variety of conditions of displacement, across vastly different political landscapes where displaced people reside (e.g., temporary camps, semi-permanent camps, detention centres, etc.)?

Workshop participants were invited to present existing and plausible practices, tactics, strategies, or policies at local, urban, and regional scales, employed both by civil society and state actors. Clark-Kazak reminds us that re-centring refugee agency and authority is vital to protection, as refugee-migrant narratives of their journeys reveal nuanced decision-making shaped by multifaceted constellations of power relations. She shows how the GCR, in contrast, tends to frame refugees as objects of policy, objects of concern, or objects of aid. With a few exceptions, there has been no input from displaced people themselves.[29]

Urban and Regional Protection Strategies—beyond the State

One way to question the quietly countenanced refugee-migrant containment paradigm is to challenge the *scale* at which protection and safety from violence is provided. To their credit the authors of and state signatories to the GCR recognize "complementary pathways" for refugee protection. These current protection practices have received some attention since the 2016 New York Declaration was signed in the United States with the impressive consensus of 193 UN member states. In the section that follows, we highlight some such practices as well as others that have remained "off the grid" of

the GCR discourse. The ideas that cities become the de facto sites of residence and livelihood for most displaced people and that informal humanitarianism and refugee-migrant autonomy characterize urban centres are highlighted here.

As Fawaz et al. show, on the basis of their urban research in Lebanon, refugees are "citymakers," protagonists who forge livelihoods and homes in dense urban spaces.[30] Cities are de facto spaces where people on the move seek multiple sources of security. Social and political solidarity among host and refugee-migrant groups may be scarce and not possible or desirable as the result of xenophobia or other anti-migrant sentiment.[31] In four large Southern African cities, housing, work, and education are available to newcomers who have experience in urban contexts.[32] If a national government authorizes the entry of asylum seekers to a territory, even if it cannot provide economic, health, education, and housing security to those it lets in, research shows that city bureaucracies can facilitate inclusion on these fronts.[33] In South Africa, concrete backdoor relations of bureaucratic cooperation help create de facto pathways to people's "integration."[34] This constitutes what Kihato and Landau call "stealth humanitarianism," whereby lived security is a nexus of quotidian relationships forged among neighbours, parents, teachers, and co-workers.[35]

What kind of community and institutional networks can be tapped in urban spaces where no one is from? Landau argues that solidarity is less important than opportunity for improving protection at an everyday urban scale. Relative long-term security and possibility come from informality, where legal status remains unclear; social relations are destabilized and remade; and outsider status is largely invisible. Protection is forged through opportunities for urban inclusion. Similarly, Darling shows how informal practices in the city highlight the "ever-shifting urban relationship between the legal and the illegal, legitimate and illegitimate, authorized and unauthorized."[36] Magnusson contends that "urbanism as a way of life is a form of human freedom: for many people the ultimate form of human freedom," and goes on to name practices of self-regulation, mutual tolerance, and collective action for the greater public good as inherently urban.[37] Refugee-migrant protection and precarious legal status can co-exist where there is opportunity to live, work, and study in urban centres. As Katy Long notes, de facto integration is much more likely for refugee-migrants than de jure status in the current geopolitical framing of human displacement across borders.

The Kolkata Declaration is a subaltern regional response to the GCR, signed in that city in November 2018. The declaration demands that the displaced be included in wide-ranging dialogues about their futures: "Nothing about us without us" is a common refrain that has emerged from refugee advocate groups during the writing of the global compacts. The

declaration recognizes the multiple scales at which protection and security are enacted and captures the *irrelevance* of the GCR for South Asian states who have not signed onto international refugee law. It highlights instead the salient issues noted earlier, that states that are not signatories to the 1951 Refugee Convention are rendered much less visible by legal orientalism[38]—statelessness and migrant worker rights especially, all in the absence of the narrow, if still important, Occidental "refugee" definition that focuses on civil and political rights, coined more than seven decades ago.

The Kolkata Declaration shows how the geopolitical privilege of the Global North/First World or "West" translates into epistemological dominance when knowledge is produced.

The declaration is more radical than the compacts. While both the GCR and GCM are forward-thinking on relations of gender and age, the Kolkata Declaration goes much further: "Discrimination and exclusion based on race, religion, caste, ability, sexuality, gender and resources cannot be tolerated. This situation refuses to privilege majoritarian, male, and monolithic cultural values, which may dispossess refugees, migrants or stateless women undermining their individuality, subjectivity, citizenship and the ability to make political and social choices."

The declaration goes on to make eight statements of purpose:

1. The right to move is a universal human right and any restriction on that right cannot be subject to policies and measures that violate the dignity of human beings;

2. The refugees, migrants, stateless and other displaced persons are central figures in any protection system, legal regime, government and societal institutions;

3. The idea of a global compact must acknowledge the practices of protection at various regional, country, local, customary, city, and other scales. Any global compact aiming at sustainable resolutions must be based on wide-ranging dialogues involving refugees, migrants, stateless persons and groups defending them;

4. Any protection framework—global and local—must combat discrimination based on race, religion, caste, ability, sexuality, gender and class that affect rights and dignity of all human beings;

5. In any redesigning of the global framework of protection, perpetrators of violence and displacement must be held accountable for their actions;

6. Refugees, migrants and stateless persons working as informal labourers are entitled to social and economic rights;

7. Stateless persons should be prioritised for protection. Restoration of their citizenship rights is a global responsibility;

8. In the context of widespread forced migration and statelessness in Asia, a regime of protection along the lines of the African Charter of Human and People's Rights and its regional systems and institutions is imperative. Such a Charter must involve specific provisions of human rights, including labour rights, of migrants, refugees, asylum-seekers, and stateless persons to ensure the dignity and rights of all.

The Kolkata Declaration is a not-so-subtle critique of the global compacts, yet it raises as many new questions to address as answers. This symposium and this discussion based on the 2018 workshop are reminders of the fraught, highly imperfect categories employed in international law and the global refugee regime. The compacts and the Kolkata Declaration's responses to them highlight their shortcomings: formal, legal protection falls short.

In the three articles that follow this introduction, the subaltern mode of knowledge production of the Kolkata Declaration is elaborated in more detail, as Ranabir Samaddar addresses the limited relevance of the GCR in South Asia and adjoining regions. Samaddar highlights the spatial slippage and political exclusions of the GCR. The protection provided to refugee-migrants, from Thailand to India and Bangladesh, is largely unrecognized by the GCR, leaving the GCM as the relevant reference point on migration. Julia Morris examines a different kind of regional compact, the Jordan Compact, already considered a failure. Funded by EU donors and financed in part by the World Bank Group, economic investment in production facilities that employ Syrian refugees is consistent with the puzzling neo-liberal logic of the GCR. This loan-driven recipe for greater self-reliance promised to make refugees into self-sufficient development actors: precisely what the GCR promotes. This "fix," whereby displaced persons are made to be less of an economic burden on the host countries in which they reside, may improve their material conditions but provides deeply problematic conditions for protection and does little to change the prospects for remaking home among the displaced or to transform the intransigent norm of protracted displacement. Finally, Alison Mountz's article demonstrates how people seeking refuge will "make space" in the absence of protection policies that fit their circumstances. Based on a study of U.S. war resisters coming to Canada over two generations—people fleeing the draft during the U.S. war in Vietnam, as well as professional soldiers in the 2000s avoiding tours of duty in the legally questionable war in Iraq—Mountz underscores the *making* of refuge where there are no official state categories or easy fit with refugee definitions. Applying a subaltern lens to this article, the "Vietnam War" may more accurately be called the American War on Vietnam once stripped of its imperialist tinges and the legacy of U.S. defeat.[39] Each generation

of U.S. soldiers fleeing is also racialized in distinct ways that speak to inequality, class, and terms of military service, though this article focuses on the possibilities for protection at local scales that are forged within civil society.

An outcome of the 2018 workshop, the manifesto on humane mobility, is a collective statement and question, as well as a political act of refusal. Is the current epoch a moment of potential transformation or one of imposing an amended status quo? In a spirit of optimism that keeps us engaged in this field of research, we conclude without solutions,[40] but with a call for change.

A Call for More: A Manifesto for Change

"Humane Mobility: A Manifesto for Change" urges the global community to engage beyond the global compacts. The document was first drafted by University of Ottawa Professor Christina Clark-Kazak with input from workshop participants. It has been translated from English into eight other languages—Swahili, Arabic, Dari, Pashtu, Sgaw, Spanish, Portuguese, and French—and has been endorsed by academics and leaders in the field.[41]

Humane Mobility: A Manifesto for Change

A deep reimagining of migration is urgently needed. We are profoundly concerned about responses to human mobility, including the GCR and the artificial separation from wider migration issues. It emerges from exclusionary drafting and decision-making processes that ignore the lived realities of the people and spaces most affected by displacement. It privileges state sovereignty over human beings. It reinforces unequal power relations and waters down commitments to human rights and dignity.

In an act of refusal rather than reform,[42] we propose this manifesto as one mechanism to re-centre[43] people and spaces of displacement. We hope to contribute to a generative, inclusive movement that finds creative and humane ways to work in solidarity with people on the move, and the individuals, communities, and organizations who live and work within these spaces of displacement.

Our Manifesto

Human beings have migrated since the beginning of time. National borders and passports are recent creations and often reinforce colonial practices. The current "crisis" reflects not the fact that people are moving, but rather the deep inequalities and violence at the root of mobility, as well as the militarized, racist, xenophobic, and exclusionary responses to this displacement. The people and places most affected by human mobility—i.e., people who are on the move and the people and communities with whom they interact—should be central to all decision-making processes.

This requires a fundamental reordering of current global, regional, and national migration governance norms, structures, and practices.

Human dignity, self-determination, self-representation and justice should be central to these norms, structures and practices.

People are more than their migration status. They are individuals with intersecting identities interacting with others in dynamic relationships. All responses to human displacement should attend to these relationships, especially power relations embedded in them.

Immigration detention, containment, and the separation of families are inhumane and should be discontinued. We recognize the real threats posed by terrorism, smuggling, and armed incursions. However, indiscriminate detention and border militarization will not make us safer, but will drive precisely these kinds of illicit activities and violence.

People leave their homes in response to a complex interplay of dynamic economic, social, political, and environmental factors. Reductionist categories based on modes or rationale for migration limit understandings of complex migration journeys.

We need to take the time to listen to individual narratives and collective her/his/their-stories. Any assistance should support people's own livelihood strategies, expand opportunities for all who are excluded, and re-centre local ways of knowing and doing.

Notes

1 IOM Missing Migrants Project, "Missing Migrants: Tracking Deaths along Migratory Routes," https://missingmigrants.iom.int/region/mediterranean.

2 Pew Research Center, "Number of Refugees to Europe Surges to Record 1.3 Million in 2015," August 2, 2016, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2016/08/02/number-of-refugees-to-europe-surges-to-record-1-3-million-in-2015/.

3 For an important intersectional feminist critique of the "refugee crisis," see Anna Carastathis, Natalie Kouri-Towe, Gada Mahrouse, and Leila Whitley, "Introduction," *Refuge: Canada's Journal on Refugees* 34, no. 1 (2018): 3–15, https://doi.org/10.7202/1050850ar.

4 Ban-Ki Moon, "The Refugee Crisis Is a Test of Our Collective Conscience," *New York Times*, September 16, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/16/opinion/politics/ban-ki-moon-refugee-crisis.html.

5 Paul Hockenos, "Europe Has Criminalized Humanitarianism," *Foreign Policy*, August 1, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/01/europe-has-criminalized-humanitarianism/.

6 See, for example, Elizabeth E. Ferris and Susan F. Martin, "The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration and the Global Compact on Refugees," special issue, *International Migration* 57, no. 6 (December 2019): 5–18, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/toc/14682435/2019/57/6; Jane McAdam, "The Global Compacts on Refugees and Migration: A New Era for International Protection?," special Issue, *International Journal of Refugee Law* 30, no. 4 (December 2018), 571–4, https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/eez004; Christina Oelgemoller, "Mobility and the Containment of Solutions: Reflections on the Global Compacts, Mixed Migration and the Transformation of Protection" (forthcoming), special issue on mixed migration, the global compacts, and protection, in *Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies*.

7 Teemu Ruskola, *Legal Orientalism: China, the United States, and Modern Law* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013). This point was raised at the workshop in Martin Jones, "Developing a Law of Asylum in the Middle East and Asia: Engaging the Law at the Frontiers of the International Refugee Regime," Alternative Solutions to Refugee Protection Workshop, June 5–6, 2018, Toronto.

8 See European Commission, "Partnership Framework on Migration: Commission Reports on Results and Lessons Learnt One Year On," news release, June 13, 2017, Strasbourg, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_17_1595; see also "European Neighbourhood Policy," which builds upon policies between the EU and its neighbouring countries to create an expanded political and economic governance apparatus, notably migration management priorities, effectively externalizing Europe's borders: European Commission, "European Neighbourhood Policy," (n.d.), https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-affairs/european-neighbourhood-policy_en.

9 See, for example, Nancy Hiemstra, "Pushing the US-Mexico Border South: United States' Immigration Policing throughout the Americas," *International Journal of Migration and Border Studies* 5, no. 1/2 (2019): 4–63, doi: 10.1504/IJMBS.2019.099681

10 Jennifer Hyndman and Alison Mountz, "Another Brick in the Wall? Neo-refoulement & the Externalisation of Asylum in Europe & Australia," *Government & Opposition* 43, no. 2 (2008): 249–69.

11 Matthew B. Sparke, "A Neoliberal Nexus: Economy, Security and the Biopolitics of Citizenship on the Border," *Political Geography* 25, no. 2 (2006): 151–80; Jef Huysmans, *The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU* (London: Routledge, 2006); Reece Jones, *Violent Borders: Refugees and the Right to Move* (London: Verso, 2016); Vicki Squire, ed., *The Contested Politics of Mobility: Borderzones and Irregularity* (London: Routledge, 2011); Nick Gill, "The Suppression of Welcome," *Fennia* 196, no. 1 (2018): 88–98.

12 Jennifer Hyndman, "Border Crossings," Antipode 29, no. 2 (1997): 149–76; Stephen Castles, "The Politics of Exclusion: Asylum and the Global Order," *Metropolis World Bulletin* 8 (2008): 3–6; John Urry, Offshoring (Cambridge/Oxford: Polity, 2017); Louise Amoore, "Biometric

Borders: Governing Mobilities in the War on Terror," *Political Geography* 25 (2006): 336–51; Heaven Crawley, Franck Düvell, Katharine Jones, Simon McMahon, and Nando Sigona, *Unravelling Europe's "Migration Crisis": Journeys over Land and Sea* (Bristol, UK: Policy, 2018).

13 Alexander Betts and James Milner, "The Externalisation of EU Asylum Policy: The Position of African States," Oxford: COMPAS Working Paper no. 36 (2006), 4.

14 Katy Long, "Permanent Crises? Unlocking the Protracted Displacement of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons: Policy Overview" (Refugee Studies Centre, Oxford, 2011), https://www.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/inline-files/201110-Permanent-crises-Unlocking-the-protracted-displacement-of-refugees-and-internally-displaced-persons-thematic-en.pdf.

15 Roger Zetter, "More Labels, Fewer Refugees: Remaking the Refugee Label in an Era of Globalization," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 20, no. 2 (2007): 172–92, doi: 10.1093/jrs/fem011; Heaven Crawley and Dimitris Skleparis, "Refugees, Migrants, Neither, Both: Categorical Fetishism and the Politics of Bounding Europe's 'Migration Crisis,'" *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 44, no. 1 (2018): 48–64, doi: 10.1080/1369183X.2017.1348224.

16 B.S. Chimni, "The 'Birth' of a Discipline: From Refugee to Forced Migration Studies," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 22, no. 1 (2008): 11–29.

17 Alexander Betts and Paul Collier, *Refuge: Rethinking Refugee Policy in a Changing World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 30.

18 Workshop participants included Itty Abraham, Christina Clark-Kazak, Heaven Crawley, Wenona Giles, Jennifer Hyndman, Michaela Hynie, Suzan Ilcan, Martin Jones, Christopher Kyriakides, Loren Landau, Susan McGrath, Julia Morris, Alison Mountz, Alice Nah, William Payne, Jay Ramasubramanyam, Johanna Reynolds, Ranabir Samaddar, and Matthew Stevens. Much gratitude to Rachel Silvey and the Asian Institute at the University of Toronto for hosting us. Thank you to Felisa Ponce, who was rapporteur at the workshop, and ThinkLink Graphics for visually representing the discussion. Thank you also to Christine Streeter from the Office of VPRI who helped with logistics. The workshop was sponsored by the Office of the Vice-President, Research and Innovation; the Faculty of Liberal Arts and Professional Studies; the Centre for Refugee Studies; the Department of Social Science; and the Sociology Research Committee. It also received support from the Canadian Association for Refugee and Forced Migration Studies and from *Refuge: Canada's Journal on Refugees.*

19 Long, *Permanent Crises?*, 8.

20 Betts Alexander and Paul Collier, *Refuge: Rethinking Refugee Policy in a Changing World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017).

21 T. Alexander Aleinkoff and Leah Zamore, *The Arc of Protection: Reforming the International Refugee Regime* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2019).

22 Jennifer Hyndman and Wenona Giles, *Refugees in Extended Exile: Living on the Edge* (New York: Routledge, 2017).

23 Hyndman and Giles, *Refugees in Extended Exile.*

24 Christina Clark-Kazak, "'A Refugee Is Someone Who Refuses to Be Oppressed': Re-centering Refugees' Agency and Intersectionality in Protection Responses," Alternative Solutions to Refugee Protection Workshop, June 5–6, 2018, Toronto.

25 Crawley and Skleparis, "Refugees, Migrants, Neither, Both."

26 Aleinkoff and Zamore, *Arc of Protection.*

27 Zetter, "More Labels, Fewer Refugees"; Al Jazeera, "Migrants or Refugees?," August 21, 2015, https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2015/08/migrants-refugees-150821200514311.html; Christopher Kyriakides, "Words Don't Come Easy: Al Jazeera's Migrant-Refugee Distinction and the European Culture of (Mis)trust," *Current Sociology* 65, no. 7 (2017): 933–52; Crawley and Skleparis, "Refugees, Migrants, Neither, Both."

28 Itty Abraham, "'Informal Humanitarianism as the Rule, Not Exception," Alternative Solutions to Refugee Protection Workshop, June 5–6, 2018, Toronto.

29 Mustafa Alio was Canada's first state delegate with refugee experience to attend the Global Forum and contribute to policy decision-making. See Nicholas Keung, "Canadian Refugee Makes History as State Delegate at UNHCR Forum," *Star*, January 20, 2020, https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2020/01/12/canadian-refugee-makes-history-as-state-delegate-at-unhcr-forum.html?fbclid=IwAR1aXH3McIVaYoWfGT16oz_e7ziKxqz5t-PgZGPajy_LO125XaXfYz-uP0s.

30 Mona Fawaz, Ahmad Gharbieh, Mona Harb, and Dounia Salame, eds., *Refugees as City-Makers* (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 2018), https://www.aub.edu.lb/ifi/Documents/publications/research_reports/2018-2019/20180910_refugees_as_city_makers.pdf.

31 Loren B. Landau, "Shunning Solidarity: Durable Solutions in a Fluid Era," in *Shaping the Struggles of Their Times: Refugees, Peacebuilding and Resolving Displacement*, ed. M. Bradley, J. Milner, and B. Peruniak, 153–67 (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2019).

32 Loren Landau and Marguerite Duponchel, "Laws, Policies or Social Position? Capabilities and the Determinants of Effective Protection in Four African Cities," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 24, no. 1 (2011): 1–22.

33 Caroline Wanjiku Kihato and Loren B. Landau, "Stealth Humanitarianism: Negotiating Politics, Precarity and Performance Management in Protecting the Urban Displaced," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 30, no. 3 (2017): 407–25, https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/few031.

34 Long, "Permanent Crises?"

35 Kihato and Landau, "Stealth Humanitarianism."

36 Jonathan Darling, "Forced Migration and the City: Irregularity, Informality, and the Politics of Presence," *Progress in Human Geography* 41, no. 2 (2017): 178–98; Ananya Roy, "Slumdog Cities: Rethinking Subaltern Urbanism," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 35 (2011):

223–8; Romola Sanyal, "A No-Camp Policy: Interrogating Informal Settlements in Lebanon," *Geoforum* 84 (2017): 117–25; Warren Magnusson, *Politics of Urbanism: Seeing Like a City* (New York, Routledge, 2011).

37   Magnusson, *Politics of Urbanism*, 23.

38   Ruskola, *Legal Orientalism.*

39   Viet Thanh Nguyen, *Nothing Ever Dies* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016).

40   Hyndman and Giles, *Refugees in Extended Exile*

41   The manifesto marked its official launch on July 25, 2018, at the International Association for the Study of Forced Migration Conference in Greece. To view "Humane Mobility: A Manifesto for Change" and to sign on to the recommendations made in document, visit Humane Mobility, humanemobility.net.

42   Refusal is a "generative stance" that serves "to counter narratives and images arising (becoming-claims) in social science research that diminish personhood or sovereignty, or rehumilitate when circulated." See Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang, "Unbecoming Claims: Pedagogies of Refusal in Qualitative Research," *Qualitative Inquiry* 20, no. 6 (2014): 811–18. As McGranahan further elaborates, "Refusal is social and affiliative… Refusal is hopeful, refusal is willful." See Carole McGranahan, "Theorizing Refusal: An Introduction," *Cultural Anthropology* 31, no. 3 (2016): 319–25.

43   We draw here on bell hooks, *Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center* (London: Pluto, 2000).

Jennifer Hyndman is professor and resident scholar at the Centre for Refugee Studies, York University. She may be reached at jhyndman@yorku.ca.

Johanna Reynolds is a research project coordinator at the Centre for Refugee Studies, York University. She may be reached at jreynol@yorku.ca.

The Global Gaze of Protection, Care, and Power[1]

RANABIR SAMADDAR

Abstract

The Global Compacts on Refugees and Migrants have been widely considered as opportunities for the world to reconsider old approaches to refugee and migrant protection. The New York Declaration is global, not only because it emanates from a global institution, but also because of the following aspects, to be detailed in course of this article: First, a single declaration covering subjects of migration and forced migration is an acknowledgment of the reality that the two have deep relations, and that population flows are increasingly mixed and massive, defying neat categorization. Second, the declaration also highlights the limits and/or unwillingness of states to carry primary responsibility of refugees and migrants, and hence opens up the possibility to include the "whole of society," which is to say the "whole of globe" covering stakeholders including business and commercial segments. Third, the new approach is global because refugees and migrants are conceptualized as subjects of global development. Fourth, migration and refugee "crises" are considered inevitable, hence the need for durable solutions, such as the need for a globally relevant comprehensive response framework. And finally, the article touches on the changing nature of the rights question under such a technological mode of management. These aspects are not discussed separately in order, but in an interrelated way. The article is a post-colonial critique of an emerging global apparatus of care and power.*

Résumé

Les Pactes Mondiaux pour les Réfugiés et les Migrants ont généralement été considérés comme des opportunités de repenser les vieilles approches concernant la protection des réfugiés et migrants. La Déclaration de New York est globale non seulement car elle émane d'une institution globale, mais aussi en raison des aspects suivants, qui seront détaillés dans cet article: Premièrement, une déclaration unique couvrant les sujets de la migration et de la migration forcée est une reconnaissance du fait que les deux ont une relation profonde et que les flux de population sont de plus en plus mixtes et massifs, défiant les catégorisations pures. Deuxièmement, la Déclaration souligne aussi les limites et/ou la réticence des États à porter la responsabilité principale des réfugiés et migrants, et, de ce fait, ouvre la possibilité d'inclure toute la société, ce qui en revient à dire « le monde

entier » recouvrant diverses parties prenantes, dont les secteurs des affaires et du commerce. Troisièmement, la nouvelle approche est globale car les réfugiés et les migrants sont conceptualisés comme des sujets du développement global. Quatrièmement, les « crises » migratoires et des réfugiés sont considérées comme inévitables, et requérant par conséquent des solutions durables, telles qu'un cadre d'intervention global et pertinent au niveau mondial. Finalement, cet article traite de la nature changeante de la question des droits sous un mode de gestion aussi technocratique. Ces aspects ne sont pas traités séparément, mais de manière interreliée. Cet article est une critique postcoloniale d'un appareil global d'aide et de pouvoir en émergence.

The Birth of a Global Gaze

The Global Compact on Refugees and the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration, mandated by the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, 2016, have been widely considered as opportunities for the world to reconsider old approaches to refugee and migrant protection. The declaration was unambiguous in linking the question of protecting the migrants and refugees with a global development agenda.[2] It was also a promise of a new orientation to a global issue.

Annex 1 of the Compact on Refugees spoke of a comprehensive refugee response framework (which would include improved norms of reception and admission, support for immediate and ongoing needs, support for host countries and communities, and steps towards durable solutions) and the resolution invited the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to engage with states and consult all relevant stakeholders over the coming two years, with a view to evaluating the detailed practical application of the comprehensive refugee response framework (CRRF) and assessing the scope for refinement and further development. It also specified that the objective was to ease pressures on the host countries involved, to enhance refugee self-reliance, to expand access to third country solutions, and to support conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity. The UNHCR was asked to propose a global compact on refugees in the annual report of the High Commissioner to the General Assembly in 2018, for consideration by the Assembly at its seventy-third session.

Annex II likewise proposed intergovernmental negotiations leading to the adoption of a global compact for safe, orderly, and regular migration. It said that the proposed global compact would set out a range of principles, commitments, and understandings among member states regarding international migration in all its dimensions, and thus make an important contribution to global governance and enhance coordination on international migration by dealing with all aspects of international migration, including the humanitarian, developmental, human rights-related, and other aspects of migration. As set out in its draft "Vision and Guiding Principles," the Migration Compact decided to focus on some of the following objectives, to be fulfilled through actionable commitments: collection and utilization of accurate, disaggregated data as a basis for evidence-based policies;[3] minimization of the drivers and structural factors that compel people to leave their country of origin; provision of adequate and timely information at all stages of migration, and all migrants with proof of legal identity, proper identification and documentation; enhanced availability and flexibility of pathways for regular migration; fair and ethical recruitment and safeguard conditions that ensure decent work; address and reduce vulnerabilities in migration; manage borders in an integrated, secure, and coordinated manner; strengthen certainty and predictability in migration procedures; use migration detention only as a measure of last resort and work towards alternatives; enhance consular protection, assistance, and cooperation throughout the migration cycle; provide access to basic services for migrants; eliminate all forms of discrimination and promote fact-based public discourse to shape perceptions of migration and invest in skills development and facilitate recognition of skills, qualifications, and competences; create conditions for migrants and diasporas to fully contribute to sustainable development in all countries; promote faster, safer, and cheaper transfer of remittances and foster financial inclusion of migrants; and establish mechanisms for the portability of social security entitlements and earned benefits.[4]

These two compacts together promised a new global approach to global migration, including forced migration. The slogan was to be "Making migration work for all."

The declaration was global, not only because it emanated from a global institution, but also because of the following aspects to be detailed in the course of this article.

First, a single declaration covering migration and forced migration was an acknowledgment of the reality that the two had deep relations, and that population flows were increasingly mixed and massive, defying neat categorization.

Second, the declaration also highlighted the limits and/or unwillingness of states to carry primary responsibility for refugees and migrants, and hence opened up the possibility to include the "whole of society," which is to say the "whole of globe" covering stakeholders including business and commercial segments.

Third, the declaration suggested uneven geographies of protection and labour market, and conceived of the globe in terms of sanctuaries, third countries, hotspots, border zones, safe corridors, legally run labour regimes, remittance-centric

segments of global economy, as well places characterized by multi-stakeholder operations. These geographies were created in part by spatial planning for refugees and migrants, in part by financial and security operations.

Fourth, the new approach was global because refugees and migrants were conceptualized as subjects of global development.

Fifth, migration and refugee "crises" were going to be inevitable unless the world struggled for durable solutions—hence the need for a globally relevant comprehensive response framework, such as the CRRF, and what the IOM popularized as a "framework for effective practices with regard to management capacity building."[5]

Finally, solutions could become durable only by becoming global, first as indicated above by practising a new geography of labour market and care, and second, by pursuing a technological mode of management that would circumvent borders and boundaries to cope with the complex reality of global migration.

In this background, this article focuses on the initiative for a global compact on refugees. The article aims to show how a global gaze as an apparatus of power is born, how it becomes a material reality, how a particular ideology, in this case humanitarianism, works as the vehicle of such a global machine, how the global must become technological in its strategy, and finally what happens to the agenda of rights, which had provided the backbone of much of the welfare and protection ethos in the preceding century.

The Roadmap of a Global Plan

The UNDP spent nearly half a million dollars (USD) in 2017 in supporting the migration compact process. This was overseen by the Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office of the UNDP. Austria, Australia, Cyprus, Ireland, Norway, Slovakia, and Switzerland provided the money, with Norway putting up most of the support—USD257,748. This was only one of several indications of monetary and other investments to prepare consent for the global compact agenda and secure it. In this way, scores of funding agencies, countries, foundations, think tanks, and multilateral institutions got involved in the process.[6] Global conversations were initiated and held. Meetings were organized in the metropolises, mostly in the Global North and some in the Global South. The agenda of preparing the world for a new regime of protection as part of global governance was shaped through these steps. If this was only a picture of one organization (UNDP), one can only imagine the amount money, number of meetings, presence of specialists, recycling of views of known specialists, and involvement of a thin layer of experts of the South that were required to manufacture consent for the idea of a global mandate. Indeed these were marks of the process. By and

large, human rights activists, peace activists, political parties, governments, regional associations, and critical jurists of the post-colonial world were left out.[7] The global compact/s was/were to become a reality in a short time. A detailed work plan was chalked out for "global compact for safe, orderly and regular migration," with preparatory meetings to be held in three phases in New York, Geneva, and Vienna—three of the global capitals. Thematic sessions, UN regional economic commissions, regional consultations (discussions to be held in regional capital cities), multi-stakeholder meetings, global fora on migration and development, IOM-conducted international dialogue on migration, and other preparatory stocktaking meetings, distribution of documents, and negotiations were steps towards building consensus on the compact.[8]

The UNHCR's roadmap to a global compact on refugees proposed two complementary parts: a comprehensive refugee response framework, as agreed to by states, and a program of action setting out measures to be taken by states and other relevant stakeholders, to underpin the CRRF, support its application, and ultimately ensure more equitable sharing of the responsibility for responding to large movements of refugees. The process would take special note of (1) the application of the CRRF in specific countries and situations; (2) a series of five thematic discussions, held in the second half of 2017; and (3) a stocktaking of progress made and lessons learned—which would identify good practices in refugee responses, actions that were required to bring about the type of response envisaged in the New York Declaration, and areas for future development.[9] It was also specifically mentioned that the path of the compact would be marked by a multi-stakeholder, "whole-of-society" approach endorsed by the General Assembly in the New York Declaration that would involve "national and local authorities, international organizations, international financial institutions, regional organizations, regional coordination and partnership mechanisms, civil society partners, including faith-based organizations and academia, the private sector, media and the refugees themselves."[10]

The UNHCR was thus ambitious. Usually nations have compacts on war, peace, cessation of hostilities, development projects, regional trade, etc. Now the UNHCR was embarking on achieving a compact on human beings—a group of human beings.[11] It was upheld as a political declaration (paragraph 1); member states were to reaffirm their commitments to migrants and refugees, and the UNHCR declared the need for "a framework for a comprehensive and people-centric refugee response to each situation involving large number of refugees" (paragraph 4).

What were to be the main aspects of this framework? It was to have four objectives: to (1) ease pressures on host

countries; (2) enhance refugee self-reliance; (3) expand access to third-country solutions; and (4) support conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity. We can only note here that "easing pressure on host countries" indirectly alluded to countries of the North and not South (say Pakistan or Bangladesh); enhancing refugee self-reliance has implied increasing dependence on the market; expanding access to third-country solutions has meant shifting more burdens to countries of the South; and returning refugees has often been "forced return," as in the ongoing case of the Rohingyas. These were time-worn policies, whose advocates never tired of repeating them, whose results had never been objectively analyzed, and that now came back under the call for a comprehensive refugee response framework, whose key pillars were equally time-worn: reception and admission (thus they may be interned in camps and detention centres), support for immediate and ongoing needs (thus barely minimal), support for host countries and communities; and that old pillar of protection called "durable solutions."[12]

Added to that was the advocacy of a multi-stakeholder, "whole-of-society" approach that included national and local authorities, international organizations, international financial institutions, regional organizations, regional coordination and partnership mechanisms, civil society partners, including faith-based organizations and academia, the private sector, media, and the refugees themselves. The whole-of-society approach thus bypassed considering the existing variety of protection modes in the vast post-colonial world, and took a "modernistic" and global governance approach, which would focus on identifying or detecting an "emergency." Thus the "whole-of-society" approach advocated "more sustainable refugee responses by linking humanitarian and development efforts early on in a crisis, and by strengthening sustainable approaches that invest in the resilience of both refugees and local communities, including through investment in national and local systems wherever possible."[13] It also meant understanding migration risk and resilience in disasters.[14]

The global nature of the refugee response was acknowledged in this way. It meant two things.

First, it meant a comprehensive response built around "emergencies," an indirect acknowledgment that migrations were becoming mixed and massive, and displacements were increasingly protracted,[15] with refugees and migrants in limbo. Yet the "emergency" was never defined. What defined an emergency—the capacity of a host country, or number of escapees, or the complex of factors contributing to an intolerable situation of not only escape but also arrival (say in Calais or Idomeni) or even the nature of passage (say through a sea), or the refusal of a state like Australia to allow the asylum-seeking escapees to arrive—even sinking rickety boats on the sea and confining them to islands away from human eyes—indeed what constituted an emergency? What would justify global attention?

Second, it called for widening the protection capacity through a whole-of-society approach, which again was an admission that states were not marshalling their protection capacity adequately—some were, while many were not. Therefore societies were to be mobilized widely and deeply. This could mean putting more stress on countries already reeling under the burden of protecting and caring, while others would not share the burden at all, or share less. In other words, the whole of society was again a global gaze that would not take into account variegated approaches and experiences of care and protection, such as cities of refuge, bilateral treaties and other arrangements, regional initiatives, local innovations, and steps to keep the borders relatively open so that refugees could come in, work, and go back in an irregular manner—approaches that made stay more flexible. From the beginning, the whole-of-society approach was a captive of the myth of durable solutions, which had given birth to the UNHCR in the first place.

It was necessary to mobilize the whole of society because other desperate attempts at durable solutions had failed, and in the context of the Mediterranean crisis and the European migration crisis something had to done. Economy buttressed by demography has been always the other scene of refugee and migration management in the modern capitalist age. Yet this could hardly be acknowledged. Humanitarianism was the ground on which the new migration and refugee management mode was to be legitimized. The whole-of-society mode of management would enable refugees and migrants to learn quickly new skills, adapt themselves relatively quickly—in a year or two—to new requirements of language, labour protocols, and self-run business rules, and learn to straddle the two different but interacting worlds of the formal economy and the informal economy. The eventual absorption of current immigrant flows of skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled labour in labour markets of Europe and countries of other regions (Brazil, South Africa, Hong Kong, the Gulf states, etc.), albeit in differential manner, would not be substantially different from what had happened in Europe, the United States, Canada, and Australia in the pre–Second World War years.[16] In a dense labour market scenario, "whole of society" (involvement of all "stakeholders") meant pleas for labour market equality. But formal (political, legal) equality made sense only if they were relevant for entry in labour markets. Otherwise as a labouring subject, the migrant's lack of political equality was the other side of her economic ability to enter the labour market. For a long time, it was a case of political opportunity but economic closure; now it was a case of economic opening (entry in the informal labour market) but political closure. In

a way this return of economy to the centre stage of discussions on refugees and migrants was strange but perhaps should not have been considered so, if we recall that at the heart of the "durable solutions" debate in refugee studies circles, the issue of economic rehabilitation was always paramount. The formation of the UNHCR itself, nudged by the UN Economic and Social Council, was an effort to find a durable solution to the refugee crisis.

In short, the roadmap avoided the political question of economy, and thus the issue of financial responsibility—responsibility of global powers for unleashing wars and causing population displacements, responsibility of countries for embarking on citizenship drives, making many people stateless and turning them into wandering hordes of protectionless subjects—as well as the responsibility of the institutions of global governance to ensure an equitable sharing of burden. While there were ample references to the principle of responsibility, it avoided the issue of reparations—which was at the heart of the issue of burden and the shift from the idea of burden to that of responsibility—for wars and destruction of economies leading to massive migrations. This is the post-colonial wedge running through the world of global humanitarianism.

But perhaps the biggest paradox of this new global plan was that it treated a massive block of the world population as a subject of a compact as if it was a piece of land, a sea, a mineral-rich territory, etc., and avoided the question of rights. But again is this not how minorities were traded as subjects of international diplomacy since the "bad" Ottoman days? Migrants and refugees had few rights, or none at all; there was to be no charter of rights of refugees and migrants. They were to be subjects of care, and hence international subjects. Thus, to be humanitarian one had to be global.

The Arendtian impasse was resolved in this way. Hanna Arendt had raised the reality of refugees as subjects of a basic "rightlessness." Neoliberalism resolved the problematic of a neologism. One cannot be a subject of "rightlessness"—in such a condition one would not be a *subject* at all. Neoliberalism has rescued the refugee as a subject—subject of economy, subject of care of the whole of society, a subject for whom politics is redundant. Rights no longer make a subject; care does, economy does, global attention does.

The Humanitarian Machine

Yet at this point we must note that in this roadmap, in which consultation was given due bureaucratic place, human rights or civil rights bodies within countries were shunned. In place were given a set of dates for six consultations between February and July 2018, to be co-chaired by a member of the UNHCR's Executive Committee Bureau, together with the UNHCR's assistant high commissioner for protection, and

to be held in private at the Palais des Nations in Geneva. A zero draft of the compact was shared with states and other relevant stakeholders by the end of January 2018. Following the formal consultation, the UNHCR shared a revised draft of the global compact, and the expected outcome at the end of the formal consultations would be a non-binding document, reflecting a consensus among all UN member states. All member and non-member observer states of the United Nations, and non-governmental organizations having consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council or were members of the International Council of Voluntary Agencies, were invited to participate in the formal consultations.[17] Meanwhile do-gooder intellectuals were to be encouraged to send written contributions to the process. Evidently, the figure of the rights-bearing migrant or the refugee was to be only a skeleton in this policy feast at Geneva. The humanitarian machine was given a new life in this way.

One telling instance of the machine being reset to work was the step to set up another bureaucratic body—an Asylum Capacity Support Group—by the UNHCR under the heading "Identifying International Protection Needs," as if inadequate asylum-determining capacity was the reason behind states' (read states of the North) reluctance to take in the asylum-seeking population. The Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework, mentioned earlier, was the keystone of the global-humanitarian machine. As with all other machines, it needed to be fed and lubricated, and in this case bodies were needed for the job. Marx spoke of human bodies and the machine in a factory. Here the bodies for the humanitarian machine were the poor states of the South, and not the reluctant countries of the North. The UNHCR declared that the CRRF was being applied in thirteen countries and situations: Belize, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and Panama (who had come together under a regional approach, the Comprehensive Regional Protection and Solutions Framework) and in Africa, seven countries—Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, Somalia, and Zambia. The UNHCR further declared that the "range of situations" included "regional diversity and a variety of phases (new emergency, established situation, protracted situation)." The UNHCR also expressed satisfaction that important work on many of the elements of CRRF was already underway in many other contexts, such as prevention and response to sexual and gender-based violence, or innovation in the delivery of assistance, such as cash-based interventions. It felt that the "process of assessment and refinement [was] key to the development of the global compact on refugees."[18]

The machinic nature of the CRRF also devoured the spirit of the cities. The movement, "cities of refuge," was turned into a

bureaucratic appendage of a gigantic machine. Pioneered by the Rockefeller Foundation, 100 "resilient cities" were lined up.[19] Urban resilience was defined as the capacity of individuals, communities, institutions, businesses, and systems within a city to survive, adapt, and grow, no matter what kinds of "chronic stresses and acute shocks" they experience. "Chronic stresses" weakened the fabric of a city on a daily or cyclical basis, and such stresses included high unemployment, inefficient public transportation systems, endemic violence, and chronic food and water shortages. "Acute shocks" such as earthquakes, floods, disease outbreaks, and terrorist attacks were sudden and sharp events that threatened a city. And of course cities were doing what they could, not because their national governments had directed them to do so, but often *against* national governments or independent of these governments, cities provided hospitality, and these stories of hospitality were marked invariably with conflicts and contentions. The ghosts of cities like Kolkata, Karachi, Bangkok, Nairobi, Istanbul, Johannesburg, and Mumbai had effected the mythical transformation of the urban landscape into one of kindness.[20] There was an accompanying transformation—that of a movement inspired by thinkers like Derrida, Edward Said, Bourdieu, and others into another potential cog in the humanitarian machine.[21] Rights and justice were alien cries in this world of humanitarian machines. The radical edge of the idea of "cities of refuge" had rested on acknowledgment that urban spaces were marked with the materiality of control and contests, and that space for migrants and refugees had not been given benevolently by city fathers and mothers, but that it was an outcome of the sheer persistent presence of the migrant in the city. The governmentalization of the movement attempted to take away that radical edge.

How did this governmentalization of a noble idea come about? To understand that, we must first take a look at the enormous range of inputs from institutions to the framing of the "zero draft" (at the heart of which sat the policy of a comprehensive framework). Just as a big factory works like an assembly of machinic inputs, here too an assembly process could be found at work—from the Council of Europe, the European Union, and the European Asylum Support Office, to institutions like the Arab Regional Consultative Process on Migration and Refugee Affairs, the Vaccine Alliance, Global Youth Advisory Council, ICRC, Human Rights Council, International Labour Organisation, the UN Broadband Commission for Sustainable Development, Food and Agriculture Organization, International Fund for Agricultural Development and the World Food Programme, International Organisation for Migration, Inter Parliamentary Union), UN Women, World Bank, UNICEF, United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, World Food Programme, UNDP, Office of the United Nations High

Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Habitat, Metropolis, WHO, Asylum Access, and several other international non-governmental organizations, and the International Refugee Congress. In addition, consider the hundreds of statements and inputs from the governments. The IRC spoke of itself as "We, 156 participants, representing 98 diverse institutions from 29 countries, including refugee led and host community civil society organisations and initiatives, academia, think tanks, municipalities and the private sector came together in Istanbul for the International Refugee Congress on May 10–11, 2018. The gathering in Istanbul drew on the contributions of close to 600 organizations from 47 countries, which participated in consultations that were held over the past six months leading to the Congress."[22] "This preparation process and the meeting itself provided an important platform to demonstrate our shared quest for equal participation in decision making processes at all levels, as well as our common commitment to work together to put the voices and aspirations of refugees and host communities at the forefront of policy and program development, including the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR)."[23] To be fair, the GCR spoke of rights, but as expected was minimal in its approach.

There was a pattern to global consultations preceding the drafting of the compact. Most input providers, as evident from the random list of names given above, were "international," the forums were "international," and UN institutions had been ploughed in—as if in an orchestrated chorus of voices in support for the need a new global compact. If they chose, the UNHCR and other UN institutions could have used their country offices throughout the world to act as catalysts for intra-country and intra-regional discussions on what should go into a compact or what else should have been striven for towards a new global initiative, or if a new global compact was needed at all. In South Asia, the UNHCR took no such initiative; in India, none. In India, there was no discussion with rights groups, political movements, refugee advocacy platforms, scholars and their bodies, not even any discussion with humanitarian institutions providing aid and relief to the shelter-seekers. And particularly the process avoided drawing any lesson from the vast corpus of experiences from the management of fallouts from internal displacements.

Thus, it was a case of the "global plan" choosing to be global. The global was only self-reproducing, though from some communiqués, statements, manifestos, declarations, and representations it seemed as if the muffled voice of rights of the victims of forced migration was trying to break out. However, it was a weak voice that could not question the formulation of the principle of responsibility on which the realization of rights rested. The "responsibility to protect" principle had empowered and legitimized interventions while

remaining silent about any responsibility for wars, denial of asylums, structural adjustment programs, policies of meta-borders, and regime change campaigns that had provoked the current phase of refugee and forced migration flows. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) had reserved all powers for the major countries of the world and the institutions of global governance, and had tasked the hapless UN agencies with "humanitarian" responsibility.[24] Now when the R2P had backfired, the global consultation process remained silent on the complicity of the global governance regime busy with humanitarian tasks. It was clearly an act of bad faith. One may ask why the question of R2P suddenly vanished from the global protection agenda. Or was it now to be invoked only selectively so that it could no longer be formulated as a major component of the principle of responsibility?

The figure of the refugee and the migrant was thus up against two realities—the reality of sovereignty and the reality of a global economy, which could think of the refugee only as cheap labour employed in informal economies and supply chains. In this bleak backdrop of dissociation of power and responsibility, as if in a last burst of humanitarian emotion the UNICEF cried out, "This is the moment for States to ensure that the provisions of the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants and the Convention on the Rights of the Child are fully realised for all children, especially those most at risk through no fault of their own."[25]

The Global Gaze is a Technocratic Gaze

Till now this article has shown how, in producing a global gaze, the roadmap was as important as the task of redefining and reproducing humanitarianism. However, there was another factor, which related to the need to develop a technocratic gaze that could make care global. Continuous improvements in successive drafts on detailing technocratic means and modes to refugee protection were signs of the evolution of such a technocratic gaze. Also, this technologic gaze was natural, given that political voices had been silenced from the beginning, the diversity of experiences had been ignored, human rights had been replaced by humanitarianism, the place of claims and justice had been given over to pity, kindness, and compassion, and the principle of plural dialogues, decentralization, and international legal pluralism for the task of protection had been replaced by technocratic modalities and the central mode of salvation. If in the nineteenth century humanitarianism had been about saving the damned souls, and in the twentieth century about saving damned bodies, in the neoliberal twenty-first century it was going to be about finding and refining technocratic, market-based, digitally enabled modes of saving the damned world from humanitarian disasters. It was an apt signature of the age of the Anthropocene. The problem now was not about

rescuing the soul or the body, but about the right mode and the right instrument to be resilient in face of disasters. In this technocratic turn, which was clearly away from the earlier dominantly legal turn in humanitarianism in the post-1951 time, getting the right platform and the right protocol for saving the world got the place of honour now.

One consequence of the technocratic turn was that politics was even more effaced from the refugee and migrant question. Let us take the example of race. There was only one reference to the word *race* in the final draft of the Global Compact (that too, a customary reference).[26] The deployment of the word was in the same context as in the first draft (paragraph 12), second draft (paragraph 10), and third draft (paragraph 9).[27] This singular reference in each of the three drafts, and same in nature, was in the context of non-discrimination only. The makers of the drafts never realized in their technocratic obsession that race was a pillar of the structure of forced migration. It was the same with another keyword, *religion.* Again the word is to be found in the same paragraph and context in the final draft and the three previous drafts. It was a stunning near-omission in the background of the global discourse on terror, which had used race and religion (often mixing them) to unleash wars on countries and peoples, and used counter-terrorism logic to deny refugees and other victims of forced migration protection, and immigrant labour their rights. On the other hand, the draft was almost legitimizing the discourse on terror that denies the rights of refugees and other victims by saying, as in the second draft, "Security considerations and international protection are complementary. The primary responsibility for safety and security lies with States which can benefit from the promotion of national integrated approaches that protect refugees and their human rights, while safeguarding national security, including from a counter-terrorism perspective. The legitimate security concerns of host States are fully recognized, as well as the need to uphold the civilian and humanitarian character of asylum."[28] The final draft stepped back from the political blunder and reformulated the point under the heading "Safety and Security":

> Security considerations and international protection are complementary. The primary responsibility for safety and security lies with States, which can benefit from the promotion of national integrated approaches that protect refugees and their human rights, while safeguarding national security. The legitimate security concerns of host States are fully recognized, as well as the importance of upholding the civilian and humanitarian character of international protection and applicable international law, both in emergency and protracted situations. At the request of concerned States, and in full respect of national laws and policies, UNHCR and relevant stakeholders will contribute resources and expertise to support protection-sensitive

arrangements for timely security screening and health assessments of new arrivals. (paras 56–7)

Yet precisely on these grounds of security, health screening, "identification and separation of fighters and combatants at border entry points or as early as possible after arrival," and "legitimate security concerns of host States," the rights of refugees have been denied. Not incidentally, these are the marks of the fundamental phenomenological principle of race. The refugee is the carrier of race, and this is one of the ways in which migration today appears as "crisis." If blood in the not so ancient time determined race, religion today often acts as a determinant of race. The entire refugee protection regime from its inception has been guilty of maintaining silence over race as a fundamental fault line in the structure of population flows, and hence has never noticed how racism has transformed to create newer and newer forms of boundaries that migrants and refugees would have to perpetually cross to reach the never finally reachable destinations of "safety and security"—the two words of concern of the Global Compact. The colour of the skin has been supplemented by the colour of religion today, and this became more than evident in the first full-scale race war of the neoliberal age—the Balkan wars. Technocratic solutions—such as setting up a global refugee forum, support platforms, a multistakeholder and partnership approach, early warning system, preparedness and contingency planning, improvement of immediate reception arrangements for refugees, safety and security measures, improved procedures of registration and documentation, procedures for voluntary repatriation, resettlement, and complementary pathways for admission to third countries, modes of local integration along with other local solutions, intensive data collection and management, and finally better social care such as education, health, accommodation, energy needs, resource management, nutrition, etc.[29]—cannot change the facts where refugees live, say in Idomeni, Chittagong, Calais, or Darfur, or the way refugees and migrants are received and detained or turned back at the borders of the metropolitan world. These technocratic solutions attempt to resituate in concrete terms the historical discourses of humanitarianism from which the administrative modes of governance have emerged.[30] They introduce into our contemporary neoliberal time the infamous figure of an alien, someone belonging to an alien race and embodying the historical facts of invasion, appropriation of lands, and the enslavement of men, women, and children. Technocratic solutions based on global humanitarianism filter the most vigorous and absolute fact of claims and will allow no aspect of the barbarian into history.

The task therefore is to locate concretely the secret relation between the ideology of humanitarianism, universalism,

and the power of technological mode of care. The question will be, How could humanitarianism that naturally essays into universalism become dependent on global technological power?

In this age when the range of humanitarianism extends from humanitarian bombings to humanitarian protection, responsibility and burden sharing in order to be effective has to acquire technical solutions, such as mode and determination of the quantum of monetary support to host countries and communities, providing political, material, and technical resources, help to prepare countries and agencies for large movements of refugees and to provide refugee protection; expanding access to third-country solutions, including resettlement and complementary pathways,[31] such as regional mobility schemes, support to emerging resettlement countries, and identifying and involving relevant stakeholders according to their respective capacity—all these so that "burden" sharing becomes "responsibility" sharing.

In this way, the new humanitarian tools can ensure that refugees will be no longer considered a burden but a responsibility of the society.[32] This has been at the heart of the crucial strategy of the CRRF, which we have discussed earlier, and which means a globally coordinated policy that involves mobilizing greater resources through innovative approaches, ensuring humanitarian assistance through local systems, education to build on sustainable development goals, concrete support for national health systems, energy and environment protection, and strengthening economic opportunities for refugees and members of local communities through structural analysis of and support to local labour markets and access by refugees to financial products and services. The CRRF echoes the sustainable development goals of development.[33] This is maximum humanitarianism—when humanitarianism removes the opprobrium of "refugees as burden" and reorients the task of protection as "refugees as subjects of development." This is the way in which the global presence of the postcolonial in the forced migration scenario is addressed. With arrival of the global principle of responsibility, refugees and migrants are encouraged to learn to live on till development arrives. They must not clamour for rights. They must not disturb any system put in place for "safe and orderly migration."

Yet if we have to conceptualize rights as the scene of politics whose displaced image we find only in the humanitarian mechanisms, we must, while ending this article, look carefully, albeit briefly, into the fate of the rights agenda in the neoliberal age.

Rights under a Global Regime of Care and Power
Even though it can be claimed that the 1951 Convention is a rights-based document, the convention does not contain

a charter of refugee rights or suggestion about the formulation of any such charter. The convention also cannot be considered as a manifesto of rights of migrants and refugees. It primarily enjoins certain obligations on states to refugees and asylum seekers from which international law and municipal laws the world over have tried to deduce refugee rights. Rights of the refugees in such situations become, as has happened, a matter of jurisprudence, a continuous tussle between legal and human rights activists and the states, and protection has become a matter of following legal norms and certain protocols. In situations like the European migration "crisis," refugee rights became an anachronism. Such a situation shows on one hand the ever increasing demand on humanitarian alertness and response and on the other hand the ineffectiveness of the half-hearted approach of a global body such as the UNHCR to the issue of rights. Yet as the overwhelming presence of the humanitarian approach reaches a point of emptying it of all humanitarian content, the rights question creeps back to the political question of migration in contemporary global history.

In this situation, the notion of rights becomes subordinate to the power to protect, and care becomes a part of protection. Refugees are then less rights-bearing subjects, and more dispossessed victims to be protected and thus cared for. Care and protection in the form of a migration management mode form the dominant reality. Hence, improvement of management modes gets pride of place in the strategy laid out by the compact. In the wake of the so-called migration crisis, to the extent there is a return of rights to the discourse of a global compact, it is thus due not to law, but to the persistence of massive and mixed migratory flows, whose unruly nature nullifies the well laid out plans for safe and orderly migration. These flows continuously pound on the walls of the protected states and regions. They are evidence of what some thinkers call the "autonomy of migration." Flows of people are unrestricted by laws, procedures, and controls; and they defy the refugee regime, not because the victims of forced migration are unruly subjects of international law, but because these flows are mixed. They do not belong to one pure type and they are massive.[34] Also the displacements are increasingly protracted. The inherently subversive and oppositional nature of migration expressed in acts of freedom has been the greatest worry for the refugee regime, and the reactive nature of the migratory flows as resistance to control practices is also matched by the fact that the refugee and migrant resistance anticipates many of the control measures. Thus, as some have suggested, "the relation between control and escape is one of temporal difference: escape comes first."[35] Or one can say that the migrant autonomy is already "entangled in and regulated by control."[36] Well-considered policies and measures meet migration practices

as an adversary; each anticipates the other, and the result is an the enormous difficulty of making migration orderly and regulated.[37] Claims to justice have emerged in this situation. In a milieu marked by the autonomy of population movements, these claims now confront the humanitarian order. They create a new politics of rights, different from the ones recognized reluctantly in the Convention of 1951 or the balancing acts of the UNHCR and the IOM. In the post–Second World War era, rights were connected with welfare and a regime of Keynesianism. Now they are linked to a global neoliberal regime of protection, which subsumes the former and with it the notion of care.

It is thus a contradictory situation.[38] The dissociation of law and claims forms the context in which the rights politics reorients itself; and the GCR occupies an awkward position in this confrontation between a regulatory mode of humanitarianism and the autonomous claim to move and secure justice. Building on humanitarian principles and a global ambition to do well for the world, the GCR cannot venture into the *other scene*—the scene of unregulated flows, claims to autonomy and rights as the form of justice or claim to citizenship in conditions of statelessness, customary and local modes of protection, legal pluralism, scores of bilateral treaties to save refugees, older histories of protection in the great decades of decolonization, and the variegated histories of care and reconciliation. Hence the humanitarian promises appear to be limited. That is the paradox. The paradox cannot be solved with globalization of protection strategy, inclusion of business houses to broaden the capacity base for protection, privatization of care, and fine tuning strategies and policies.

Indeed, one may ask, if these were the answers, what was the question? Why did we need the compacts in the first place?

Notes

1 The arguments are discussed in greater detail in the author's *The Postcolonial Age of Migration* (Routledge, forthcoming).

2 UN General Assembly, "New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants," September 19, 2016, para. 4, pp. 1–2, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/71/1.

3 It never occurred to the IOM that data collection can be counter-productive for a large section of migrants. See, for instance, Frank Laczko of the IOM Global Migration Data Analysis Centre, "Improving Data on International Migration: Towards Agenda 2030 and the Global Compact on Migration," IOM discussion paper, December 2016, https://gmdac.iom.int/sites/default/files/presentations/Laczko.pdf; also Migration Data Portal, "GCM Development

Process," last modified August 20, 2019, https://migration-dataportal.org/themes/global-compact-migration.

4 USNW Sydney, "The Global Compacts on Refugees and Migration," January 23, 2019, http://www.kaldorcentre.unsw.edu.au/publication/2018-global-compacts-refugees-and-migration.

5 IOM, "Berne Initiative," 2020, https://www.iom.int/berne-initiative.

6 UNDP, "Migration Compact Support MPTF: Financial Reporting on Sources and Uses of Funds for the Period Ending 31 December 2017," 2018.

7 Although we cannot give an exact figure on how many such persons were invited to such discussions hosted by the UNHCR or the IOM, India can be taken as an instance. See p. 11.

8 September 20, 2017, https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/sites/default/files/work_plan_gcm.pdf, 2.

9 For further information, see UNHCR, "New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants," www.unhcr.org/newyorkdeclaration. The roadmap and other background information is available at UNHCR, "The Global Compact on Refugees," www.unhcr.org/refugeecompact.

10 UNHCR, "New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants." However, it is to be noted that the invocation of "society" to protect migrants and refugees meant that human rights and humanitarian activists, who are part of the "whole of society," could be "at war" with another side of the same society: officials and policy-makers. Humanitarianism was thus not just legitimized, it also became a site of contestation.

11 UNHCR, "Towards a Global Compact on Refugees: A Roadmap," May 17, 2017, http://www.unhcr.org/events/conferences/58e625aa7/towards-global-compact-refugees-roadmap.html.

12 UNHCR, "Towards a Global Compact on Refugees: Key elements of the Roadmap," May 17, 2017, http://www.unhcr.org/58d135517.pdf.

13 UNHCR, "Towards a Global Compact on Refugees: A Roadmap"; the concept of resilience played a big part in the framework of the compact on migration, and resilience needed technical means to build up. Thus, the IOM study paper "Migration, Risk, and Resilience in the Context of Sudden and Slow-Onset Disaster" rolled out the technical road to build migrants' resilience. https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/our_work/ODG/GCM/IOM-Thematic-Paper-Migration-Risk-and-Resilience-in-the-Context.pdf.

14 UNHCR, "Migration, Risk, and Resilience in the Context of Sudden and Slow-Onset Disaster," 3.

15 Jessica Brandt and Lucy Earle commented in "The Global Compact for Refugees: Bringing Mayors to the Table," Brookings Policy Brief, January 2018, "Displacement is increasingly protracted. Today, those who take flight are more likely than ever before to remain in exile for extended periods. At the end of last year, more than two-thirds of all refugees, some 11 million of them, were in a protracted refugee situation—one in which 25,000 or more refugees

of the same nationality have been in exile for at least five consecutive years, with no immediate prospect of finding a durable solution." Figures based on UNHCR, *Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2016* (Geneva: UNHCR, 2017), http://www.refworld.org/docid/594aa38e0.html.

16 Stephen Castles discussed the role of immigrant labour in Nazi Germany and postwar France, where immigrant workers accounted for at least 15 per cent of the workforce. See David Theo Goldberg and John Solomos, eds., *A Companion to Racial and Ethnic Studies* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 571–2.

17 UNHCR, "Towards a Global Compact on Refugees: Roadmap on the Formal Consultations Process," April 16, 2018, http://www.unhcr.org/5a60b9409.pdf.

18 All citations in this paragraph are from UNHCR, "Bringing the New York Declaration to Life: Applying the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF)," June 2017, http://www.unhcr.org/dach/wp-content/uploads/sites/27/2017/07/BringingTheNewYorkDeclarationToLife.pdf.

19 100 Resilient Cities, "Global Migration: Resilient Cities at the Forefront," 2017, http://www.100resilientcities.org/turning-migration-challenges-into-opportunities-to-build-resilience/.

20 On the histories of three well-known of post-colonial cities (Kolkata, Mumbai, Delhi) marked with massive migrant presence, see R. Samaddar (ed.), *Migrant and the Neoliberal City* (Hyderabad: Orient Blackswan, 2018).

21 Costas Douzinas, "Cities of Refuge," openDemocracy, https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/costas-douzinas/cities-of-refuge; Jonathan Mark Darling, "Cities of Refuge: Asylum and the Politics of Hospitality" (PhD diss., Durham University, 2008) http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/2228/1/2228_238.pdf; J. Derrida, *On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness*, trans. M. Dooley and M Hughes. (London: Routledge, 2001); also on cities becoming places of refuge, Jessica Brandt and Lucy Earle, "The Global Compact for Refugees: Bringing Mayors to the Table," Brookings Policy Brief, January 2018.

22 In preparation for a compact on safe, orderly, and regular migration, several institutions were likewise involved. However, in both cases, primarily global institutions were thinking globally, and where countries were involved, mostly ambassadors were involved in the discussions. Besides, there were regional meetings where prominent NGOs were involved. All were steps towards an intergovernmental conference to adopt the global compact—UN General Assembly Resolution at the 72nd session, September 24, 2017. Indeed the resolution (72/244) went on to extreme procedural details to make the conference for the adoption of the compact possible: UN General Assembly, "Modalities for the Intergovernmental Conference to Adopt the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration," December 24, 2017, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/72/244.

23 International Refugee Congress, "Shared Responsibility, Shared Humanity," communiqué, June 10–11, 2018, http://jhrmk.org/index.php/2018/05/18/international-refugee-congress-2018-shared-responsibility-shared-humanity/?lang=en.

24 There is a voluminous literature on the "Responsibility to Protect." On some of the reports, ICISS, *Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty*, December 2001, http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf; e-International Relations, "The Responsibility to Protect," November 2011, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/181082/R2P.pdf.

25 UNICEF, "The Time for Action Children Uprooted Is Now," June 8, 2018, http://www.unhcr.org/5a4374d47.pdf.

26 UNHCR, "The Global Compact on Refugees: Final Draft," June 26, 2018, para. 9, http://www.unhcr.org/5b3295167.pdf.

27 UNHCR, "The Global Compact on Refugees: Draft 1," March 9, 2018, http://www.unhcr.org/5aa2b3287.pdf; UNHCR, "The Global Compact on Refugees: Draft 2," April 30, 2018, http://www.unhcr.org/events/conferences/5ae758d07/official-version-draft-2-global-compact-refugees-30-april-2018.html; and UNHCR, "The Global Compact on Refugees: Draft 3," June 4, 2018, http://www.unhcr.org/events/conferences/5b1579427/official-version-draft-3-global-compact-refugees-4-june-2018.html.

28 Second draft, para. 59, p. 12.

29 Changes in the successive drafts are instructive. For fine changes with regard to solutions, see UNHCR, "Global Compact on Refugees: From Draft 2 (30 April) to Draft 3 (4 June): Explanatory Memorandum on Main Changes," http://www.unhcr.org/5b1579b17.pdf.

30 The IOM vision statement explicitly accords importance to a proper governance framework to realize safe and orderly migration. See IOM, "IOM Vision on the Global Compact on Migration," April 13, 2017, paras. 6–10, https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/our_work/ODG/GCM/IOM-vision-on-the-global-compact-on-migration-13April2017.pdf.

31 The technical nature of the idea of "complementary pathways" will be clear from the way the concept paper for thematic discussion IV (measures to be taken in pursuit of solutions) and thematic discussion V (issues that cut across all four substantive sections of the comprehensive refugee responses, and overarching issues) in the discussion on "Towards a Global Compact on Refugees," Palais des Nations (room XIX), Geneva, November 14–15, 2017, formulated the following: "As a complement to resettlement opportunities, safe and regulated pathways for the admission of refugees to third countries can facilitate access to protection and solutions, and are an important expression of burden- and responsibility-sharing. In line with the commitments contained in the New York Declaration,15 this panel will consider ways that the programme of action can support the establishment or expansion of complementary pathways as part of a comprehensive refugee response, including by: (i) expanding family reunification; (ii) leveraging private and community sponsorship; (iii) increasing access to educational opportunities in third countries; (iv) facilitating labour mobility schemes; and (v) data collection on and overall monitoring of complementary pathways for admission." http://www.unhcr.org/5a0019467.pdf.

32 To make sense of the technical evolution, one should study the UN Refugee High Commissioner's Annual Dialogues. For instance, these points of emphasis were laid out in UNHCR, "High Commissioner's Dialogue on Protection Challenges, 2017," http://www.unhcr.org/high-commissioners-dialogue-on-protection-challenges-2017.html.

33 See UN General Assembly, "Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development," para. 29, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/1&Lang=E, where the manifesto speaks of the positive contribution of refugees and migrants to "inclusive growth and sustainable development."

34 The UNHCR realized the mixed nature of migratory flows in 2007 as it drew up "Refugee Protection and Mixed Migration: A 10-Point Plan of Action," http://www.unhcr.org/uk/protection/migration/4742a30b4/refugee-protection-mixed-migration-10-point-plan-action.html, though the plan of action showed the bind of humanitarian thought. On this debate see, among others, Christoph Tometten, "Juridical Response to Mixed and Massive Population Flows," *Refugee Watch* 39–40 (2012): 125–40, http://www.mcrg.ac.in/rw%20files/RW39_40/11.pdf; Khadija Elmadmad, "Mixed Flows and the Protection of Migrants with Special Reference to Sub-Saharan Migrants," Istituto Per GLI Studi Di Politica Internazionale (ISPI), Working Paper 26, 2008, https://www.ispionline.it/it/documents/wp_26_2008.pdf.

35 Dimitris Papadopoulos, Niamh Stephenson, and Vassilis Tsianos, *Escape Routes: Control and Subversion in the Twenty-First Century* (London: Pluto, 2006), 56.

36 Papadopoulos, Stephenson, and Tsianos, Escape Routes, 43.

37 For a comprehensive discussion on the concept of autonomy of migration, see Stephan Scheel, "Autonomy of Migration Despite Its Securitisation? Facing the Terms and Conditions of Biometric Re-bordering," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 41, no. 3 (2013): 575–600; Scheel speaks of the interface of the principle of autonomy and government as embodied encounters, such as between migrants' autonomous practices of movement and myriad regulations, including biometric surveillance. See his "Studying Embodied Encounters: Autonomy of Migration beyond Its Romanticisation," *Postcolonial Studies* 16, no. 3 (2013): 279–88.

38 The IOM vision also carries evidence of such contradiction. It states, "The Global Compact presents an historical opportunity for achieving a world in which migrants move as a matter of choice rather than necessity, through safe, orderly and regular channels, and in which migration is well governed and able to act as a positive force for individuals, societies and States. IOM envisions a global compact that will place the rights, needs, capacities and

contributions of migrants at its core, with a view to ensuring their safety, dignity and human rights. Central to this vision are four core elements: (1) protecting the rights of migrants; (2) facilitating safe, orderly and regular migration; (3) reducing the incidence and impacts of forced and irregular migration; and (4) addressing mobility consequences of natural and human-induced disasters." IOM, "IOM Vision on the Global Compact on Migration," April 13, 2017, para. 2; also para. 10, https://www.iom.int/sites/ default/files/our_work/ODG/GCM/IOM-vision-on-the-global-compact-on-migration-13April2017.pdf.

Ranabir Samaddar is the Distinguished Chair in Migration and Forced Migration Studies, Calcutta Research Group, Kolkata, India. The author may be contacted at ranabir@mcrg .ac.in.

Extractive Landscapes:
The Case of the Jordan Refugee Compact

JULIA MORRIS

Abstract

In a climate of immigration securitization, recent years have seen a global move away from humanitarian resettlement responses in sites of displacement. Instead, wealthy governments in the Global North often finance poorer third countries and rural regions of territories to abet border enforcement. The Jordan Compact, in particular, has been upheld as an economic development model that provides an "innovative alternative" to refugee camps, as well as to protracted refugee situations. Yet, as much research shows, the direct economic gains from this trade concessions scheme have been limited. This raises the question, What value does the Jordan Compact hold with such ample evidence of failure? Importantly, how is this failure experienced by refugees in practice? Drawing on fieldwork conducted in Amman and northern Jordan, this article advances a framework centred on extractivism to better detail how value is extracted from migrants and displaced persons at the expense of their well-being. The article illuminates the disjuncture between the lack of profit achieved directly from the Jordan Compact's trade concessions and the forms of value extracted from refugees' immobility. Overall, I argue that these economic development policies formalize precariousness, allowing the international community to abdicate global responsibility and reap the benefits of a purported altruism.

Résumé

Dans un climat de sécurisation de l'immigration, on a assisté ces dernières années à un recul des réponses de réinstallation humanitaires axées sur les sites de déplacement. Souvent, les gouvernements riches du Nord global financent plutôt des tiers pays plus pauvres ainsi que des régions et territoires ruraux pour soutenir des projets de renforcement des frontières. Le Pacte pour la Jordanie, en particulier, a été salué comme un modèle de développement économique qui fournit des « alternatives innovantesm » aux camps de réfugiés ainsi qu'aux situations de refuge prolongées. Cependant, comme le démontre beaucoup de recherches, les gains économiques immédiats de ce régime de concessions commerciales ont été limités. Ceci soulève la question suivante: quelle est la valeur accordée au Pacte pour la Jordanie malgré les preuves de son échec? Comment cet échec est-il vécu en pratique par les réfugiés ? S'appuyant sur du travail de terrain effectué à Amman et au nord de la Jordanie, cet article met de l'avant un cadre théorique centré sur l'extractivisme pour mieux saisir comment la valeur est extraite

des migrants et des personnes déplacées aux dépens de leur bien-être. L'article met en lumière l'écart entre le manque de bénéfices directement obtenus des concessions commerciales du Pacte pour la Jordanie et les formes de valeur extraites de l'immobilité des réfugiés. Globalement, je soutiens que ces politiques de développement économique formalisent les conditions de la précarité, permettant à la communauté internationale d'abdiquer sa responsabilité globale et de tirer profit d'un prétendu altruisme.

Since the Syrian conflict, over six million refugees have been displaced.[1] As the crisis has continued into protracted stages, wealthy governments in the Global North have moved away from humanitarian resettlement responses towards funding development projects in regions that neighbour the conflict. By financing less-developed countries, European governments in particular are looking to reduce transit migration from those countries and prevent the arrival of migrants across their borders through foreign investment and trade. Meanwhile, major refugee host states in the Global South have leveraged their proximity to sites of mass displacement in order to negotiate self-serving policies.[2]

Jordan holds the third-largest population of registered Syrian refugees in the region at 671,428 people, but second in demographic ratio of Syrians in the country.[3] Within the wider refugee-development policy trend, the government of Jordan, the European Union (EU), and the World Bank signed the US$1.7 billion Jordan Compact in February 2016, a landmark political declaration. The compact was designed to transform the challenges of hosting such a significant number of Syrian refugees into a development opportunity for Jordan, while also improving the livelihoods of both Jordanians and the country's Syrian refugee population. The deal combines humanitarian and development funding with pledges of US$700 million in grants to Jordan annually for three years and concessional loans of $1.9 billion. Payment of grants and loans are linked to specific targets. One of these targets is to expand access to the formal labour market for Syrian refugees by issuing 200,000 work permits in specified sectors and support Syrian education through the Accelerating Access to Quality Formal Education plan. The compact also stipulates that Jordan will institute reforms to improve the business and investment environment and formalize Syrian businesses. In exchange, Jordan would be offered considerable financial support and the opening up of tariff-free trade in the European market to Jordanian goods. Unemployment in Jordan stands at 18.2 per cent (around double that for youth) and 14.4 per cent in poverty.[4] Tying economic incentives directly to work opportunities for refugees attempts to open the job market to Syrians and Jordanians. It

is also a means for the Jordanian government to create new economic opportunities by encouraging more international aid to be channelled into the country.

This article considers employment programs focused on Syrian refugees in Jordan, on the basis of my empirical findings in the field. Although refugee employment is significantly promoted by organizations like the World Bank and the EU, behind the headlines, the Jordan Compact has been widely considered a failure.[5] In non-governmental and state reporting, and in migration studies scholarship, a critical body of literature has been produced on the Jordan Compact in recent years.[6] In these studies, the work permit process is found to be complex and time-consuming, with many employers continuing to employ refugees without permits.[7] My findings expand upon this research into the impact of economic policies on migrants' and refugees' subjectivities[8] and Syrian refugee policies focused on employment in particular.[9] This scholarship offers a critical picture of the merging of humanitarian and economic agendas, looking at the effects of a major policy trend that intersects neoliberal values and refugee policies.

Katharina Lenner and Lewis Turner's research is arguably the pre-eminent academic study of the Jordan Compact.[10] They show that meaningful social changes have been abandoned for refugees in Jordan in the quest for meeting formal targets of donors and implementing agencies. Their work details how international refugee responses have moved from portraying Syrian refugees as objects of humanitarian care to development opportunities. Yet underneath the mantra of self-reliance, jobs available for refugees tend to be in sectors like garment manufacture, which are unregulated and rife with overtime physical abuse.[11] The labour rights of migrants can be compromised, resulting in extremely low wages, forced overtime, and forms of exploitation.

Much of this research draws attention to the encroachment of economic agendas into humanitarian contexts. In recent years, market metrics have been brought to the fore by humanitarian workers striving to maintain relevance.[12] In fact, "transforming the refugee crisis into a development opportunity" is the operational mantra surrounding the Jordan Compact, with Jordan showcased as the poster child of this "win-win" solution.[13] Yet, as others show, the direct economic gains from the trade concessions scheme have been very limited, and from this standpoint, it should be considered as a disaster.[14] This questions the value of the Jordan Compact with such an ample evidence of failure. And importantly, how is this failure experienced by refugees in practice?

Building on the work of Kelberer[15] and Lenner and Turner,[16] I argue that refugee employment efforts are better understood through a framework centred on extractivism: an analytic I have advanced elsewhere to document

and critically theorize the expansion of mining sectors into domains of human resources, such as migrants and refugees.[17] Extractivism is a mode of accumulation, with deep roots in colonial and imperial endeavours, whereby natural resources are removed at a high intensity for export markets.[18] As a method of colonial appropriation, extractivism has been essential in the industrial development and prosperity of the Global North at the expense of poorer countries, particularly in the Global South.[19] The exploitation of raw minerals has also enabled wealthy networks of transnational elites, and the domination of corporations and non-governmental organizations to move into ever-growing resource frontiers globally.[20] Here, capitalist values have encroached into new forms of extractive intrusion that amount to extracting value(s) from humans, whereby countries in the Global South strategically capitalize on the value of refugee hosting and/or containment.

Arguably, one of the major reasons why scholarship has difficulty in capturing the political economic logics of refugee employment programs in Jordan is that it is often reduced to economic interests alone. Capital, of course, takes a variety of forms, including human, financial, symbolic, and moral capital, all of which generate surplus value, and all of which enter into the refugee equation. Migrants and displaced persons have become utilized as forms of capital through containment,[21] here, under the line of "refugee crisis as development opportunity." The extractivism framework makes clear how value is extracted from refugees, as one lucrative industry sector. Although only 7 per cent of the world's population are refugees, governments around the world, particularly in the Global North, have also gained purchase through the symbolic capital attached to refugees and migrants.[22] This includes the representation of a spectacle of strict asylum policies, as much as one of humanitarian benevolence. In a climate of immigration control and securitization, poorer third countries such as Jordan, and rural regions of territories, have been financed to abet the project of border outsourcing and externalization.[23] Such forms of support entail not only direct cash payments, but also economic contributions to fund national security or development interests in exchange for refugee-hosting efforts. Incentives also include the renegotiation of trade agreements, which open Western markets to states in the Global South, and the relaxing of travel restrictions, as has been the case with Morocco and Turkey.[24] Meanwhile, corporations, non-governmental organizations, interest groups, and academics, among others, also profit as contracts are outsourced for refugee-hosting provisions or opportunities arise for conducting research projects.[25] These developments have led scholars to refer to an "immigration industrial complex"[26] and an expansive "migration business."[27]

Proponents of rentier state theories, on the other hand, argue that economic liberalization discourse is mainly window-dressing, and underneath lie political rationalities of appeasing different constituencies.[28] Victoria Kelberer has coined the term *refugee rentierism* to detail how states leverage their position as host states of displaced communities.[29] Using refugee rights as a strategic instrument of foreign policy, Jordan, as one major host state engaging in refugee rent-seeking behaviour, extracts revenue from other states for maintaining those refugee groups within their borders. This article takes these logics into account, illuminating the disjuncture between the lack of profit achieved directly from the Jordan Compact's trade concessions and the political economic logics of Jordan's rent-seeking strategies. Instead oft focusing on the profoundly political problems that underpin the drivers of forced migration, I argue that the Jordan Compact regulates people's movement while extracting value-laden prerogatives.

These debates are important to consider. International advisors have presented the socioeconomic integration of Syrians in Jordan as a way to support Syrians financially and boost the Jordanian economy overall, while reducing the number of Syrians attempting to reach Europe. Similar models in other host states such as Ethiopia, Lebanon, and Turkey also tie refugees in with financial incentives and the underlying goal of stemming the flow of migrants and refugees to Europe. The high commissioner for refugees, Filippo Grandi, recently announced that the Jordan Compact offers a "new blueprint for supporting refugees."[30] However, as this article will show, the economic development model of the Jordan Compact has not only failed to reinvigorate the Jordanian economy, but it has also not offered Syrians the prospect of a dignified, self-sufficient life. Given that the Jordan Compact was widely endorsed by development and humanitarian actors, it is essential to question some of the assumptions and beliefs that underpin its practice.

This article draws on fieldwork in Jordan and New York during 2018, a period that saw protests in Jordan and the ousting of Prime Minister Hani Al-Mulki. Prior to the protests, I led a week-long field intensive with university students from the New School in March 2018 to examine the implementation of the Jordan Compact. Students interviewed leading humanitarian and development organizations operating in Amman whose work intersects with refugee employment. These interviews were planned and led by students who devised interview questions connected to the project's overall objectives. During the field visit, other opportunities also arose for learning about the context in more depth, including simply speaking with refugees, locals, and aid workers in more informal settings. I returned to Jordan in June 2018 and then February–March 2019 to conduct

follow-up research as well as facilitating fieldwork trips for the New School students at the International Rescue Committee's office in Amman.

This article starts by presenting the particularities of the Jordanian context, placing the country's newest "trade deal" within past national economic development projects and experiences of hosting refugees. I then turn to examine the characteristics of and challenges faced by employment programs in Jordan, detailing how extractive logics have overtaken refugees' well-being. I close by placing the Jordan Compact within a system of globalized production, in which forms of value circulate outside of Jordan at the expense of refugees' immobility. Overall, I find that these policies formalize precariousness, allowing the international community to abdicate global responsibility and reap the benefits of a purported altruism.

Oil Turned Refugee Economies

The Jordan Compact is best understood locally within the Hashemite Kingdom's extractive history and economic dependencies. Jordan has long depended on the support of outside powers such as Great Britain, the United States, and oil-rich Arab states for its economic and political well-being.[31] Even after independence in 1946, from its establishment as a British protectorate, Jordan's finances remained guided by the British government. But in the 1950s and 1970s, Jordan shot up economically as a result of remittances received from migration to neighbouring oil-rich countries. Jordanian workers flocked to Gulf states to work the oil fields as skilled laborers and in professional positions such as engineers, bankers, and teachers.[32] The kingdom relied increasingly on these Gulf connections as a source of Jordanian employment, labour remittances, and considerable Arab foreign aid to Jordan. Jordan was viewed as a frontline state in the conflict with Israel, with some 500,000 Palestinians taking refuge in the country following the Arab-Israeli war of 1948, and then subsequent annexation of the West Bank in 1949, which almost trebled the population.[33]

In turn, the discovery of phosphate in Jordan in 1908 and later establishment of mining from 1935 through the Trans-Jordan Phosphate Company grew a successful resource extractive industry for the country.[34] The Arab Potash Company was later developed in 1956 to harvest minerals in the Dead Sea, with potassium phosphate and potassic fertilizers remaining the top exports of Jordan to this day.[35] As many Jordanians left to work in the Gulf, increasing numbers of migrant workers moved to Jordan, predominantly from Egypt and Southeast Asia, to fill demand for low-wage workers in domestic work, agriculture, construction, and service industries. Thus, low-skilled immigration simultaneously heightened Jordanians' status via a job-ladder effect, and

foreign labour became part of the clientelist redistribution of assets to citizens.[36] But by the 1980s Jordan's economy began to struggle with low productivity and high unemployment rates. The Iranian Revolution in 1979, the Iran-Iraq War (1980–8), and later Gulf War (1990–1) upset regional oil production rates, resulting in declining labour remittances and Arab bilateral aid to Jordan. This coincided with the establishment of higher government spending by the kingdom's economic planners. Increasing shortfalls in the national budget spurred Jordan onto a greater level of borrowing. With the decline in remittances and aid, Jordan's national debt steadily rose, until by 1988 the country's debt was twice its gross domestic product (GDP).

From this point, Jordan's relationship with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) played a key part in guiding the country's trajectories, with an economic liberalization program in place since 1989.[37] Then Prime Minister Zayd al-Rifaai turned to the IMF and World Bank for assistance with Jordan's debt payments in a five-year plan for economic adjustment and stabilization, including dramatically cutting government expenditures. However, in Jordan the imposition of neoliberal economic policies since the 1980s has been accompanied by political instability and unrest. Economic adjustment programs removed a key source of welfare for the public, while simultaneously reducing government spending in major sectors.[38] When the government attempted to comply with IMF guidelines, austerity plans produced violent results, with riots spreading across the country in April 1989, August 1996, and June 2018. At times, the Hashemite regime backed down to comply with protestors, at others, they proceeded apace with few concessions.

Within this context of former colonial power relations and economic instability, refugees have played a major part in Jordan's development as forms of human, financial, and symbolic capital. The country has a history as a refugee host state far before it was formalized a state independent from British control in 1946.[39] Since that time, Jordan has hosted displaced people from Iraq, Yemen, Sudan, Syria, and Palestine, as some of the more significant waves of refugees. According to the UNHCR, Jordan ranked as the second-highest host to the largest number of refugees relative to national population in 2017, where one in fourteen people was a refugee under the UNHCR's responsibility.[40] When including Palestine refugees under UNRWA's mandate, the figures rise to one in three for Jordan.

The Jordanian government has been astute about its negotiation of international aid through refugee policy. While Syrian refugees currently account for the largest group of refugees registered with the UNHCR, Jordan also hosts over two million Palestinian refugees registered with UNRWA. The arrival of Palestinian refugees from 1948, followed by those

who fled the Six-Day War in 1967, brought major challenges for the country.[41] Many of the official camps established for Palestinian refugees became enclaves for Palestinian militia and remain severely economically deprived. Yet Palestinian refugees contributed to the country's economic development in significant ways. First, they allowed Jordan to receive large amounts of development assistance from the international community to help resettle and integrate the refugees. Second, the remittances of those Palestinians who went to look for work in Persian Gulf states also helped develop Jordan's public and private sectors. These remittances, together with foreign aid, have contributed to developing sectors of the Jordanian economy by providing start-up money for Jordanian businesses and for large state-sponsored projects.

With the Iraqi crisis, Jordan strategically increased its use of refugee hosting as an instrument of foreign policy. During the 1990s and 2000s, Jordan's sources of foreign aid decreased and its appeals for humanitarian aid centred on the "burden" of hosting thousands of Iraqi refugees. The Jordanian government was later criticized for inflating the size of the crisis and the level of need to elicit higher funding rates. For example, the government cited numbers as high as 750,000–1,000,000, while other groups concluded that no more than 100,000–200,000 Iraqis were in the country as refugees.[42] Thus, by expanding or retracting refugee rights, Jordan was able to frame its ongoing ability to adequately protect and assist Iraqi refugees as dependent on contributions from the international community.

New opportunities have now emerged for Jordan as a country proximate to the Syrian conflict.[43] The Jordan Compact came about partially through the work of a Jordanian think tank, the West Asia-North Africa Institute (WANA), which submitted a White Paper to the Jordanian government on the potential contribution of Syrian refugees to the Jordanian economy. This was met by the work of Oxford economics and forced migration professors Paul Collier and Alexander Betts, who widely endorsed pathways for Syrians into the Jordanian labour market.[44] At the time, the Jordanian government was already arguing that hosting Syrian refugees has harmed the country's development outcomes. In fact, the World Bank estimated in 2016 that the Jordan government had spent over $2.5 billion a year in direct costs for hosting Syrian refugees since the onset of the crisis: 6 per cent of GDP and 25 per cent of the government's annual revenues.[45] An increasingly right-wing political climate was also sweeping across Europe, with the EU seeking ways to manage, and halt, the numbers of refugees arriving at European borders. For European states, the Jordan Compact was a way to deter Syrian refugees from migrating to Europe by improving their livelihoods in Jordan. Meanwhile, Jordan was already heavily in debt. For the Jordanian government, the compact presented an opportunity for favourable trade arrangements with the EU (predicted to result in increased investment), in addition to an aid package and concessional loans.

This is what Victoria Kelberer describes as "refugee rentierism" or "the phenomenon of using host status and refugee policy as primary mechanisms of international rent-seeking."[46] Through the bargaining power of refugees, Jordan was able to extract increased contributions from the international community, in much the same way as the €6bn ($6.8 billion) EU-Turkey deal, in which Turkey agreed to contain refugees within its borders: allegedly as many as three million refugees.[47] However, whereas Turkey agreed to receive deported migrants in exchange for money and visa-free travel to the Schengen zone, the Jordanian government pledged to promote Syrian economic and social integration. Thus, in different ways, the Syrian "refugee boom" yielded new opportunities for Jordan to have access to labour markets and sources of foreign aid.

The next section turns to examine the grounded effects of the compact in more detail, arguing that extractive logics have overtaken the social concerns of refugees' and migrants' well-being. The contemporary Jordanian strategy for acquiring international aid by hosting Syrian refugees comes at the very expense of the refugees that the project is nominally supposed to support.

Jordan Compact in Practice

> We have gone to the garment factories [in Khaldiyeh] linking Jordanians and Syrians with employers. Both Jordanian and Syrian women have successfully started working but then they have dropped out. Why? Because it takes at least thirty minutes to get there, one hour both ways. They need to work ten hours, minimum eight hours with two hours extra.… Mothers only want to work eight hours, but this doesn't work for the industry.
>
> —NGO representative, Amman[48]

We meet with Nadine in her handicraft store several floors up in a tall, nondescript office building, above a bank in a busy street in central Amman. In contrast to the grey exterior, inside the walls are brightly coloured, shelves heaved with handmade soaps, vials of rosewater, knitted children's toys, shawls, and crocheted table decorations, delicately wrapped in exquisite packaging. Several women wearing headscarves milled around from the end of a shift, all once from far-flung cities and villages across Syria. Nadine is one of the lucky ones as the co-owner of her own business, but not without struggles and perseverance. For Syrians, owning your own business is not an easy prospect. "Work permits, work permits" is a phrase we hear incessantly as Syrians frequently tell us about the complex bureaucratic process of acquiring one. For small business-owners like Nadine, obtaining a work

permit is often Kafka-esque, and unsuccessful. There are two routes: either pay 50,000 Jordanian dinars (US$70,462) and partner with a local, or pay 200,000JOD (US$281,850) to be classified as an investor.[49]

Nadine's story appears to be relatively characteristic of others we have heard. She initially partnered with a local businessman to set up her handicraft store in Amman, but he took advantage of her precarious status as a foreign citizen and made off with the majority of her investment and stock—something she found was of little interest to local police, who chalked off the incident as little more than unfortunate. Luckily, before the Syrian conflict, Nadine had a successful business in Damascus. Savings, family connections in Europe, NGO grants, and the partnership of a Syrian cousin enabled her to reignite the small business. Now committed to helping those affected by the war, Nadine has over one hundred Syrian women on flexible contracts (some working from home) to help produce the beautifully packaged goods so intricately placed around her store: a far cry from when she first started in 2013 with five women in a dingy office space. Some of the women are widows, others successful young professionals unable to instrumentalize their skills in Jordan, a number have husbands still fighting in the war or curtailed from working by Jordan's strict immigration rules. "We work on our own terms here," she tells us, describing how the cooperative works to combat the demands of most available employment for Syrian refugees—concerns voiced by the NGO representative in the opening quote to this section. Instead, Nadine now sells products online and on social media, and even advertises through AirBnB Experiences to help guarantee a steady stream of revenue, bulking up her retail with soap-making workshops for tourists, wealthy Ammanites, and NGO workers.

Nadine's experience speaks to just some of the myriad difficulties encountered by Syrian refugees in Jordan. Although wrapped in discourses of innovation, the Jordan Compact has been marred by failures and uneven outcomes. The compact had two major elements—the development of special economic zones or SEZs (industrial parks for manufacturing goods) and the issuing of work permits to Syrian refugees in specified sectors both in and out of the industrial export zones.[50] Besides development funding, Jordan was promised access to tariff-free trade with the EU, providing it issued at least 200,000 work permits to Syrians. While work permits were made widely available to Syrians from April 2016, by February 2017 only 38,516 permits had been issued, the majority in agriculture and construction.[51] The government sought to meet its quotas by formalizing work in agriculture, construction, and manufacturing. But, according to local NGOs, many of the work permits in the agricultural sector were based on Syrian workers in the country prior to the conflict.

In reality, the compact has created few if any new jobs, and instead redistributes some positions held by migrant Bangladeshis and Egyptians to Syrian refugees as preferential migrant workers, which helps meet formal targets of donors and implementing agencies. Meanwhile, although Syrian refugees are allowed to apply for work permits outside of the SEZs, they are barred from applying for some professions, such as engineering, medicine, law, teaching, driving, and hairdressing, for which they have previously been trained, but which are viewed as potentially taking opportunities from Jordanian workers. Instead, jobs are in backbreaking sectors like garment manufacture, agriculture, and construction that are of little interest to the majority of the population, many just having been through the brutality of conflict and displacement. These jobs are unregulated and are at times rife with overtime physical abuse. The hours are punishingly long (a minimum of ten-hour shifts), wages low, and safety of little concern.

Several NGOs in Jordan have taken an interest in employer-matching programs to ensure more accountability of otherwise occluded business practices. However, these NGOs also hold their own work quotas—one organization I spoke with cited a "20,0000 refugees in employment scheme"—in addition to being understaffed and under-resourced.[52] The drive to reach these sorts of employment targets by contracted NGOs calls into question their ability to act as employer watchdog enforcers. While the Jordanian government has made some changes to ease the work permit process for Syrian refugees, including waiving the work permit fee and prioritizing Syrian refugees over other foreign workers, Syrians continue to face extreme restrictions to employment. Not only do Syrians in Jordan face significant barriers in accessing decent, paid work, but a future Syria is as risk of what was so often described to me by refugees and advocates as "a lost generation," unused to core professions such as medicine, engineering, and education.[53]

For many Syrians, there is little advantage to formalized employment. Instead, the rigid and bureaucratic labour market has resulted in widespread informal work. For some refugees I spoke with there is fear of losing access to the UNHCR cash assistance or the chance of resettlement to a third country. "If we do lose our job we could end up without any income at all," Mohammad, a father of three pointed out, voicing the widespread concern that holding a work permit may make one ineligible for cash assistance, and thus unable to cover what a family needs to survive.[54] As a result, refugees must choose between working informally at the risk of arrest and deportation or seeking unskilled work on a one-year working permit. Other refugees suggested that work permits might actually decrease their working conditions because their work permit sponsor exerts extreme controls over their mobility.[55] Being reliant on precarious worker visas places

workers in a position where they end up not voicing concerns, perhaps more exploitable and paid lesser wages—or are unaware of the labour standards that should be in place.

Some refugees prefer to remain under the radar rather than risk registering with a government they mistrust. "Sometimes authorities will make it hard for you even if you have papers," Mohammad continued. "They'll make trouble for you just because they feel like it. Nothing—paper or no paper—is really protection." Deportations of Syrians have indeed skyrocketed since 2016, with reports of more than 4,100 Syrians returned to Syria on the grounds that they pose potential security problems, including working without a permit, which is the most prominent reason for deportation in a context where workplace raids have become commonplace.[56] It is not uncommon for Syrian refugees to register for work permits as protection from deportation. However, this is clearly counter to the aims of the compact, which was presented as beneficial for Syrians. Given that refugees in camps have minimal freedom of movement outside, the "opportunity" to work in factories when they have little other option is certainly coercive, and counter to the "helping refugees help themselves" motto that Betts and Collier advanced.[57]

Particular challenges are felt by women in the Jordan Compact experiment, some of which were voiced by Nadine and members of her team, as they sought to ameliorate the corporate and back-breaking work structure of labour production.[58] Less than 4 per cent of formal work permits have been issued to women, while at the time of my fieldwork only 150 Syrian women were part of a cash-for-work program from Zaatari to the industrial parks. I found that the principle factor for these low take-up rates related to the location and requirements of the industry. Syrian women face gender roles and responsibilities as mothers or at times in female-headed households, which are on the rise from 25 per cent a few years ago to nearly 40 per cent in 2016.[59] With employment at minimum wage (220JOD or US$310 a month) and working conditions of little concern, it is unsurprising that efforts in targeting Syrian women to work have encountered difficulties. In another interview, a UNHCR representative said that even when they launched the "perfect" program, which provided Syrian women with child care, transportation to factories, and decent working hours and conditions, they still failed to retain workers.[60] Rather, Syrian women generally prefer to work at home, or close to home for cultural and practical reasons. Many Syrian women run their own income-generating projects from home, including knitting, beauty salons, or clothes altering.

Yet, instead of supporting home-based businesses, limitations are placed on creating home-businesses that have affected Syrian women's economic autonomy. These restrictions have led to a culture of occlusion where home businesses are hidden under the radar, in fear of deportation. For example, one Syrian woman I spoke with described running a hairdressing salon (a closed-off sector) out of her home, quickly swapping bottles of shampoo for nail polish (an open sector), during a spate of police visitations.[61] This case characterizes the perennial fear and at times farcical practices that Syrian refugees are forced to engage in constantly. In a country where female labour force participation is very low, 14 per cent in 2016 (compared to 22 per cent in the MENA region), and where the unemployment rate for young women (aged fifteen to twenty-four) is at 56 per cent, nearly double the rate of that of young men (29 per cent), the Jordan Compact only strengthens the gender gap across locals and refugees alike.[62]

What is clear from these findings is how the concerns of affected populations have been subsumed under the guise of "development." As James C. Scott famously showed, large-scale authoritarian plans misfire when they fail to integrate local, practical knowledge.[63] In quickstep with this classic critique of development and humanitarian work, the majority of refugees in Jordan were not actively consulted in the compact programs that affect their lives, nor were experts on the region, NGOs, and research centres in Jordan. Rather, the compact reveals a high level of donor interest in presenting Jordan as a model of reform and globalization in the MENA region in order to allow for the continued management of refugees outside of Europe.[64] At its core the compact aims to reduce the international migration of Syrians, but it should be recognized that migration is an essential part of people's future well-being that is actually an agent of development.[65] Meanwhile, an overwhelming aid industry has grown in Jordan around Syrian refugees as major funding targets of development aid. For many service providers, there is little incentive in directly critiquing the compact when it runs in opposition to the extraction of revenue.[66] The compact itself provides little incentive for Jordan to implement the much-needed reforms for overhauling the business development landscape. Instead, the Jordanian government relies largely on the quick cash from the arrangement to kickstart their economy, often at the expense of the people the project is supposed to help.

In recent years, we see a move towards instrumentalizing North/South power relations in order to facilitate new modes of extraction in migration management and containment. These relationships often have imperial dimensions, reproducing lasting colonial patterns of trade and dependency.[67] Harnessing humans as resources in this way, this article has argued, is really a program of extraction for the benefit of governments and investors. Rather than creating livelihood opportunities for refugees, the Jordan Compact demonstrates a high degree of control and coercion over individuals. This is justified by some, such as the Jordanian

government, by receiving financial support and international kudos for the future; by European governments, for the value of militating against the movement of refugees to Europe; and by others, including contracted NGOs, the economic and/or moral value of contracts associated with refugee integration provisions. Ultimately, instead of focusing on the profoundly political problems that underpin the drivers of forced migration, such as increased conflict, the compact runs the risk of abdicating global responsibility, regulating people's movement in line with value-laden interests.

Conclusion

This article has questioned whether employment programs in Jordan offer meaningful work for Syrian refugees or whether they are arrangements for extracting value. What was stark throughout my fieldwork was the many disadvantages for the compact's perceived beneficiaries. Although presented by the international community through buzzwords like *innovation* and *self-reliance*, and helping refugees *help themselves*, my findings indicated that Syrian refugees (and non-Syrian refugee and migrant worker populations) in Jordan all too often end up in hazardous or precarious informal work in the quest for government and organizational gain. Indeed, the ramping up of assistance operations has created thousands of jobs within the humanitarian response sector as well as numerous indirect jobs across other sectors.[68] Yet while refugees are immobilized in Jordan, deprived of movement to wealthier countries with established resettlement systems, their immobility makes possible the mobility of value outside of Jordan's borders. Now, the spectacle of border-making generates a multitude of images and discursive formations that fuel anti-immigrant sentiments for European political and organizational profit.[69] In the process, a range of actors can extract political, economic, and moral value while refugees' bodies stay in Jordan.

At the same time, the global visibility of arrangements like the Jordan Compact induces new policies to be taken up and embedded in different contexts. Migration studies scholars have identified a trend in asylum outsourcing and development projects as a means for states to shrink spaces of asylum and subvert international refugee law.[70] Nation states use financially struggling states to warehouse migrants and isolate them from asylum claims processes. Jordan is part of a fashion of geopolitical cooperation between wealthier former colonial states and poorer dependent ones around frontiering projects. In an age of refugee demonization, the Jordan Compact model is now being trialled for other countries as a "solution" for European countries keen to deter migrant and asylum seeker arrivals. Financing refugee hosting capacities in countries viewed as ones of transit for migrants potentially seeking refuge in Europe have spanned locations such as Ethiopia, Lebanon, Mali, Nigeria, Niger, and Senegal. This tendency signifies a new form of extractive capitalism, which taps into forms of neo-colonial domination and asymmetric relations of dependency.

NOTES

1 UNHCR, "2018 Total Persons of Concern," https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/36.

2 Rawan Arar, "The New Grand Compromise: How Syrian Refugees Changed the Stakes in the Global Refugee Assistance Regime," *Middle East Law and Governance* 9 (2017): 298–312.

3 Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iran, Pakistan, Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Chad, and the Democratic Republic of Congo host the majority of the world's refugees. These statistics are obtainable from the UNHCR, "2018 Total Persons of Concern."

4 World Bank, "Jordan's Economic Outlook—April 2018," 2017, https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/jordan/publication/economic-outlook-april-2018.

5 See, for example, Vernonique Barbelet, Jessica Hagen-Zanker, and Dina Mansour-Ille, T*he Jordan Compact: Lessons Learnt and Implications for Future Refugee Compacts* (London: ODI, 2018); Daniel Howden, Hannah Patchett, and Charlotte Alfred, "The Compact Experiment: Push for Refugee Jobs Confronts Reality of Jordan and Lebanon," *Refugees Deeply Quarterly*, December 2017, http://issues.newsdeeply.com/the-compact-experiment. For examples of scholarship that calls for field-based ethnographic work, see Heaven Crawley, "Why Jobs in Special Economic Zones Won't Solve the Problems Facing the World's Refugees," *Conversation*, April 6, 2017; Jennifer Gordon, "For Refugee Compact to Talk Jobs, It Must Listen to Migration Compact," *Refugees Deeply*, March 5, 2018, https://www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/community/2018/03/05/for-refugee-compact-to-talk-jobs-it-must-listen-to-migration-compact; Cindy Huang, Nazanin Ash, Katelyn Gough, and Lauren Post, "Designing Refugee Compacts: Lessons from Jordan." Forced Migration Review 57 (2018): 52–4; Victoria Kelberer, "Negotiating Crisis: International Aid and Refugee Policy in Jordan," *Middle East Policy* 24, no. 4 (2017): 148–65; Heliodoro Temprano Arroyo, "Promoting Labor Market Integration of Refugees with Trade Preferences: Beyond the EU-Jordan Compact," *European University Institute RSCAS Working Paper*, 2018.

6 Heaven Crawley, "Migration: Refugee Economics," Nature 2, 544 (2017): 26–7; Gordon, "For Refugee Compact to Talk Jobs"; Kelberer, "Negotiating Crisis"; Katharina Lenner and Lewis Turner "Making Refugees Work? The Politics of Integrating Syrian Refugees into the Labor Market in Jordan," *Middle East Critique* 28 (2019): 65–95.

7 Sara Elizabeth Williams, "Jordan Looks to Turn Refugee Crisis into Economic Boon," IRIN *News*, March

21, 2017, https://www.irinnews.org/feature/2017/03/21/jordan-looks-turn-refugee-crisis-economic-boon.

8 Elisa Pascucci, "Refugees in the IT Sector: Young Syrians' Economic Subjectivities and Familial Lives in Jordan," *Geographical Review* 109, no. 4 (2019): 580–97.

9 Rebecca Harris, "Transforming Refugees into 'Illegal Immigrants': Neoliberalism, Domestic Politics, and Syrian Refugee Employment in Jordan" (BA thesis, Brown University, 2016); Kelberer, "Negotiating Crisis"; Lenner and Turner, "Making Refugees Work?"; Katharina Lenner and Lewis Turner, "Learning from the Jordan Compact," *Forced Migration Review* 57 (2018): 48–51.

10 Lenner and Turner, "Making Refugees Work?"

11 Alisa Reznick, "Syrian Worker Programme Faces Hurdles in Jordan," *Al Jazeera*, September 23, 2016, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/09/syrian-worker-programme-faces-hurdles-jordan-160919073944811.html.

12 Julia Morris, "Power, Capital and Immigration Detention Rights: Making Networked Markets in Global Detention Governance at UNHCR," *Global Networks* 17 (2017): 400–22.

13 Jordanian Response Plan, 2017–19.

14 Lenner and Turner, "Making Refugees Work?"

15 Kelberer, "Negotiating Crisis."

16 Lenner and Turner, "Learning from the Jordan Compact"; Lenner and Turner "Making Refugees Work?"

17 Julia Morris, "Violence and Extraction of a Human Commodity: From Phosphate to Refugees in the Republic of Nauru," *Extractive Industries and Society* 6, no. 4 (2019): 1122–33, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2019.07.001.

18 Jerry K. Jacka, "Environmental Impacts of Resource Extraction in the Mineral Age," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 47 (2018): 61–77.

19 Alberto Acosta, "Extractivism and Neo-Extractivism: Two Sides of the Same Curse," *Beyond Development: Alternative Visions from Latin America* (2013): 61–86 (Quito: Rosa Luxemburg Foundation).

20 Chris Ballard and Glenn Banks, "Resource Wars: The Anthropology of Mining," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 32 (2003): 287–313.

21 Ruben Andersson, *Illegality, Inc.: Clandestine Migration and the Business of Bordering Europe* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014); Nicholas De Genova, "Spectacles of Migrant "Illegality': The Scene of Exclusion, the Obscene of Inclusion," *Journal of Ethnic and Racial Studies* 36, no. 7 (2013): 1180–98.

22 Hein de Haas, "Myths of Migration: Much of What We Think We Know Is Wrong," blog, March 29, 2017, http://heindehaas.blogspot.com/2017/03/myths-of-migration-much-of-what-we.html.

23 Cecilia Menjivar, "Immigration Law beyond Borders: Externalizing and Internalizing Border Controls in an Era of Securitization," *Annual Review of Law and Social Science* 10 (2014): 353–69.

24 Feyzi Baban, Suzan Ilcan, and Kim Rygiel, "Syrian Refugees in Turkey: Pathways to Precarity, Differential Inclusion, and Negotiated Citizenship Rights," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 43, no. 1 (2017): 41–57.

25 This is not to present this scholarship as any less entangled in the dynamics of power that define academic research, but to underline the point that practitioners are also caught up in the political economy of value, while exposing important realities.

26 Tania Golash-Boza, "The Immigration Industrial Complex: Why We Enforce Immigration Policies Destined to Fail," *Sociology Compass* 3, no. 2 (2009): 295–309.

27 Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and Ninna Nyberg Sørensen, eds., *The Migration Industry and the Commercialization of International Migration* (London: Routledge, 2013).

28 Anne Peters and Pete Moore, "Beyond Boom and Bust: Eternal Rents, Durable Authoritarianism, and Institutional Adaptation in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 44 (2009): 256–85.

29 Kelberer, "Negotiating Crisis."

30 Charlie Dunmore, "UNHCR's Grandi Hails Jordan's Job Scheme for Syrian Refugees," UNHCR, February 12, 2018, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2018/2/5a81bd504/unhcrs-grandi-hails-jordans-job-scheme-syrian-refugees.html.

31 Timothy J. Piro, *The Political Economy of Market Reform in Jordan* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998).

32 Curtis D. Ryan, "Peace, Bread and Riots: Jordan and the International Monetary Fund," *Middle East Policy Council* 6, no. 2 (1998): 54–66.

33 Peters and Moore, "Beyond Boom and Bust."

34 Awwad Titi, Rami Al Rawashdeh, and Khalid Al Tarawneh, "Peak Phosphate in Jordan," *International Journal of Mining and Mineral Engineering* 10, no. 1 (2019): 27–50.

35 For a discussion of the intersections of mineral and migrant resource extractive industries, see Morris, "Violence and Extraction of a Human Commodity."

36 Françoise De Bel-Air, "Migration Profile: Jordan," Migration Policy Centre Policy Brief, European University Institute, 2016, 6.

37 Jane Harrigan, Hamed El-Said, and Chengang Wang, "The IMF and the World Bank in Jordan: A Case of Over Optimism and Elusive Growth," *Review of International Organizations* 1 (2006): 263–92.

38 Anne Marie Baylouny, "Militarizing Welfare: Neo-liberalism and Jordanian Policy," *Middle East Journal* 62, no. 2 (2008): 277–303.

39 Kelberer, "Negotiating Crisis."

40 Operational Portal, "UNHCR Jordan Factsheet February 2018," https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/62241.

41 Geraldine Chatelard, "Jordan: A Refugee Haven," Migration Policy Institute, August 31, 2010, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/jordan-refugee-haven.

42 Kelberer, "Negotiating Crisis."

43 Jordan has experienced economic benefits from the Syrian conflict; however, the proximity of the conflict has also had negative impacts on the country. See Elizabeth

Parker-Magyar, "Jordanians See More to Worry About in Their Economy Than Syrian Refugees," Lawfare, September 15, 2019. https://www.lawfareblog.com/jordanians-see-more-worry-about-their-economy-syrian-refugees.

44 Alexander Betts and Paul Collier, *Refuge: Rethinking Refugee Policy in a Changing World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). Collier himself was an advisor at the WANA Institute and former director of the Development Research Group of the World Bank.

45 World Bank, "The Economic Effects of War and Peace," Middle East and North Africa Quarterly Economic Brief 6 (January 2016).

46 Kelberer, "Negotiating Crisis," 157.

47 Deutsche Welle, "The EU-Turkey Refugee Agreement: A Review," 2018, https://www.dw.com/en/the-eu-turkey-refugee-agreement-a-review/a-43028295.

48 Interview with NGO representative contracted for refugee integration work in Jordan, March 19, 2018, Amman.

49 Jordan INGO Forum, "The Work Permit Maze," 2016, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/53371.

50 Jordan has a history of zonal development policies, which have offered duty-free and quota-free access to Jordanian companies for international markets. See Shamel Azmeh, "Labour in Global Production Networks: Workers in the Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZs) of Egypt and Jordan," *Global Networks* 14, no. 4 (2014): 495–513.

51 Sara Elizabeth Williams, "Jordan Looks to Turn Refugee Crisis into Economic Boon," *IRIN News*, March 21, 2017.

52 Interview with NGO practitioner contracted for refugee integration work, March 10, 2018, Amman.

53 Informal chats with refugees and NGO practitioners, March 2018, Amman.

54 Interview with Syrian refugee, March 18, 2018, Amman.

55 Informal chats with refugees and NGO practitioners, March 2018, Amman.

56 Human Rights Watch, "'I Have No Idea Why They Sent Us Back': Jordanian Deportations and Expulsions of Syrian Refugees," October 2, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/10/02/i-have-no-idea-why-they-sent-us-back/jordanian-deportations-and-expulsions-syrian; Petra Molnar, "Discretion to Deport: Intersections between Health and Detention of Syrian Refugees in Jordan," *Refuge* 33, no. 2 (2017): 18–31.

57 Alexander Betts and Paul Collier, "Help Refugees Help Themselves: Let Displaced Syrians Join the Labor Market," Foreign Affairs, November/December 2015. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/levant/2015-10-20/help-refugees-help-themselves.

58 Laura Buffoni, "The Jordan Compact Could Work Better if We Listen to Women Refugees," Refugees Deeply, May 28, 2018; Camille Dupire, "Syrian Refugee Women Still Struggle to Access Employment," *Jordan Times*, September 6, 2018, http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/syrian-refugee-women-still-struggle-access-employment-%E2%80%94-

report; Saira Shackle, "Safe Spaces: As the Syrian Crisis Forces Women to Fend for Themselves, Female Refugees in Jordan Are Learning to Cope," *World Policy Journal* 35, no. 1 (2018): 99–106.

59 CARE International, *On Her Own: Women Forced to Flee from Syria Are Shouldering Increased Responsibility as They Struggle to Survive*, 2016,

60 Interview with UNHCR representative, March 20, 2018, Amman.

61 Interview with Syrian refugee, March 10, 2018, Amman.

62 Susan Razzaz, "A Challenging Market Becomes More Challenging: Jordanian Workers, Migrant Workers and Refugees in the Jordanian Labour Market," International Labor Organization, 2017.

63 James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999).

64 For discussions of the ways in which Syrian refugees have pushed back against contentious policies, see Rana Khoury, "Aiding Activism? Humanitarianisms' Impacts on Mobilized Syrian Refugees in Jordan," *Middle East Law and Governance* 9, no. 3 (2017): 267–81.

65 Oliver Bakewell, "'Keeping Them in Their Place': The Ambivalent Relationship between Development and Migration in Africa," *Third World Quarterly* 29, no. 7 (2008): 1341–58.

66 As international investments have begun to decline, however, discussions have moved to the possibility of initiating formal returns projects for Syrian refugees in Jordan. See Julia Morris, "The Politics of Return from Jordan to Syria," *Forced Migration Review* 62 (2019): 31–3.

67 Julia Morris, "Violence and Extraction of a Human Commodity: From Phosphate to Refugees in the Republic of Nauru," *Extractive Industries and Society* 6, no. 4 (November 2019): 1122–33, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2019.07.001.

68 WANA Institute, "Executive Summary: The Syrian Refugee Crisis in Jordan and Its Impact on the Jordanian Economy," 2019, https://www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/1_SyrianRefugeeCrisisImpactJordanEconomyExecSummary.pdf.

69 Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson, *Border as Method, or, The Multiplication of Labor* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013).

70 Alice Bloch and Liza Schuster, "At the Extremes of Exclusion: Deportation, Detention and Dispersal," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 28, no. 3 (2005): 491–512; Andonea Dickson, "Distancing Asylum Seekers from the State: Australia's Evolving Political Geography of Immigration and Border Control," *Australian Geographer* 46, no. 4 (2015): 437–54.

Julia Morris is assistant professor of international studies at the University of North Carolina Wilmington. She can be reached at morrisjc@uncw.edu.

Seeking Status, Forging Refuge: U.S. War Resister Migrations to Canada[1]

ALISON MOUNTZ

Abstract

Often people migrate through interstitial zones and categories between state territories, policies, or designations like "immigrant" or "refugee." Where there is no formal protection or legal status, people seek, forge, and find safe haven in other ways, by other means, and by necessity. In this article, I argue that U.S. war resisters to Canada forged safe haven through broadly based social movements. I develop this argument through examination of U.S. war-resister histories, focusing on two generations: U.S. citizens who came during the U.S.-led wars in Vietnam and, more recently, Afghanistan and Iraq. Resisters and activists forged refuge through alternative paths to protection, including the creation of shelter, the pursuit of time-space trajectories that carried people away from war and militarism, the formation of social movements across the Canada-U.S. border, and legal challenges to state policies and practices.

Résumé

Souvent, les migrants se trouvent dans des zones et catégories interstitielles entre les territoires des États, les politiques publiques et les désignations comme « immigrant » ou « réfugié ». Là où il n'existe pas de protection et de statut légal formels, les gens cherchent, forgent et trouvent refuge d'autres façons, par d'autres moyens et par nécessité. Dans cet article, je soutiens que les résistants à la guerre étasuniens au Canada se sont forgé un lieu de refuge à travers de vastes mouvements sociaux. Je développe cet argument en examinant les histoires des résistants à la guerre étasuniens et je me concentre sur deux générations: les citoyens américains venus pendant les guerres menées par les États-Unis au Vietnam et, plus récemment, en Afghanistan et en Irak. Les résistants et les militants se sont forgé un refuge à travers des voies alternatives vers la protection, incluant la création de lieux d'hébergement, la poursuite de trajectoires menant les gens à s'éloigner de la guerre et du militarisme, la formation de mouvements sociaux par-delà la frontière entre le Canada et les États-Unis et la contestation judiciaire des politiques et pratiques étatiques.

People migrate routinely through interstitial zones and categories between state territories, policies, or technical or legal designations like "migrant" or "refugee." Where there is no formal protection or path to legal status, people seek and forge safe haven in other ways, by other means, and for shorter times than legal status would

confer. This article documents this phenomenon through examination of U.S. war-resister migration histories to Canada, focusing on two generations of resisters: people who emigrated during the U.S.-led wars in Vietnam and Iraq. No single causal or "push" factor explains war-resister migration. Like other people, war resisters migrate for diverse reasons. Researching across generations offers opportunities to understand the patterns and divergence in outcomes across their journeys, as well as the distinct policy pathways, legal landscapes, and geopolitical relations through which they entered Canada at different historical moments. Whereas most resisters who migrated to Canada during the Vietnam War found safe haven by immigrating through Canada's new points system, those who came during Iraq made refugee claims and did not—for the most part—find safe haven.

Even where they did not find refuge in legal status, U.S. war-resister migrants forged refuge, even where none was formally available. Resisters and advocates forged refuge through alternative paths to protection, including the creation of shelter, the pursuit of time-space trajectories that carried people away from war and militarism, the location of safe spaces of protection at finer-than-national scales, the formation of social movements across the Canada-U.S. border, and in legal challenges to state policies and practices. Study of such alternatives to formal, legal refugee status—which may be temporary—promises to expand understandings and explore alternative forms of protection and also offers the opportunity to centre human agency and politicization in analyses of human displacement and migration in the form of war resistance.

As such, this article shares findings from a research project that explored Canada's role as safe haven for war resisters crossing the border from the United States. These arrivals are about the histories of individuals, households, and communities, but also about shared cross-border histories, and the geopolitical relations between Canada and the United States, which change over time. During the Vietnam War, the Canadian government and society eventually welcomed 50,000 U.S. war resisters, providing safe haven from militarism and a mandatory draft.[2] A more recent cohort of approximately 300 U.S. resisters began entering Canada in 2004, with 50 among them making refugee claims after service and tours in Iraq and Afghanistan. While some were able to stay and forge alternative forms of refuge informally, all had their formal refugee claims for protection rejected. Nine were deported and served time in military prison. Both groups found and forged spaces of safe haven in Canada, albeit in very different ways. For some, these were paths to citizenship and a new home; for others, shelter was temporary. These are two important historical moments in the relationship between the two countries. The project enhances knowledge

and archives, explained below in more detail. While there is a robust literature on resisters from the earlier generation, less literature documents the more recent migration. This project bolsters documentation of both generations and contributes a focus on the resonance and interactions between them.

The research sought to understand meanings of safe haven and to situate these not only in geopolitical histories between Canada and the United States, but also in migration histories of war resisters. Objectives included those to (1) advance knowledge and extend historical records through documentation of resister histories, timely because of the age of the first wave and the recent memory of the younger generation of resisters; (2) increase understanding of meanings of asylum through analysis of the diversity of resisters' experiences of integration and return; (3) probe understandings of U.S.-Canada relations through asylum claims from soldiers; and (4) better understand how war resisters utilize and challenge policies and practices in Canada.

This analysis proceeds with acknowledgment of the complexity of researching Canada as both provider and denier of refuge as a settler colonial state. Exploring the mythology surrounding Canada's reputation as a refuge here unfolds on sovereign territory that dispossessed Indigenous peoples of *their* traditional sovereign territories. As scholars observe, refugee resettlement is also leveraged to mask geopolitical histories such as Canada's complicity in the Vietnam War.[3]

In the next section of this article I briefly discuss research methods. In the third section I explain the histories and historical context of U.S. war-resister migration to Canada, mapping broad strokes—including parallels and divergent trajectories and geopolitical contexts—across the two generations. In the fourth section I discuss research findings that demonstrate the forging of safe haven as an alternative solution to public policies. The final section offers brief analytical discussion of these findings, outlining key contributions and whether they are applicable in other contexts for thinking about alternative solutions to public policy.

Research Methods

This research examines the past in order to understand its implications for contemporary immigration and refugee policies and border governance. Methods were designed to better understand and enhance historical records and bring cross-border communities and generations with shared histories into dialogue.

The project's main research question asked what kinds of refuge U.S. war resisters have sought, forged, and been granted or denied access to in Canada. In order to answer this question, two methods were pursued. The first involved archival research on knowledge and data related to the history of U.S. war-resister migration and social movements to

support this migration to Canada. The second method collected about fifty oral histories with the two generations: with people who resisted conscription into the Vietnam War and those who came during the fifteen years prior to publication. Participants include people who stayed in Canada and those who returned to the Unites States from each cohort, as well as advocates and activists involved in the social movements that supported each generation. Additional methods include analysis of governmental and civil society responses, media coverage, and resister campaign archives, and focus groups where members of both cohorts reflected on meanings of safe haven. While many people observe that the two cohorts are distinct because there was no mandatory conscription for the second,[4] the research found parallels in their migration histories and experiences of integration, as I will demonstrate. What began as semi-structured interviews with advocates and activists became oral histories. The interconnected nature of advocacy and resistance in this movement meant that it made more sense to pose the same questions in the same way, with conversations about life histories informing the general direction of the oral histories. Many activists were themselves resisters, as many resisters became activists on arriving in Canada. This considerable crossover and shared history meant that oral history proved most appropriate for understanding the life trajectories, world outlooks, and personal experiences that informed participation in social movements and involvement in war resistance.

Oral histories involved discussion of events that unfolded over a long period, with attention to context. Basically "two people sitting and talking about the past," oral histories allowed for a combination of agreed-upon topics and flexibility in the telling.[5] These particular oral histories explored migration journeys, beginning with circumstances surrounding the decision to migrate, followed by the process of making arrangements and crossing the border. The interview also involved recollections of life in Canada, from early experiences, to applications for status, and decisions rendered. Interviewers and participants explored forms of transition and isolation, community-building and network-formation, and support. The conversations also addressed integration into Canada and eventual return to the United States, including voluntary and involuntary return (or deportation), time in prison, return to community, and interpretations of this migration history. Discussion also explored meanings of Canada as potential safe haven prior to migration, and its meanings as well as participants' forms of self-identification years or decades later.

Approximately fifty oral histories were conducted. While most were done with individuals, some included partners as simultaneous or sequential participants. In a couple of cases, partners were interviewed together; in a couple of other cases divorced partners were interviewed separately (though this was never requested, it was offered and when offered, pursued and important in illuminating gendered relations and disparate experiences of resister migration). Most oral histories were conducted in the private spaces of home, with some in private offices in workplaces or public spaces including cafes, parks, and libraries.

The project's planned methods evolved as field research proceeded, with new opportunities emerging through collaboration with the Toronto-based War Resister Support Campaign (WRSC). As a result of collaboration between researchers and the campaign, three new outcomes emerged. The first involved archiving of the fifteen-year social movement of the WRSC, a collection that will be housed in the Thomas Fischer Special Collections at the University of Toronto, alongside the older archives of the Vietnam-era social movement (also in Toronto and extending across North America). The second unexpected outcome involved creation of an art show, in collaboration with the WRSC and the Just Seeds Collective (a collection of artists working in Mexico, the United States, and Canada on social justice). Framed visual pieces were assembled to narrate the history of the campaign, collaboration with Iraq Veterans against War, and engaging issues related to war resistance more broadly. These were shown at a workshop in Waterloo in 2018. The third project was also exhibited at this workshop: a documentary film that evolved from the research, undertaken as a collaboration between the author and U.S.-based filmmaker Lisa Molomot, and Iraq war resister Corey Glass on second camera. Each offered a new medium through which to more deeply understand, contextualize, and share these histories anew and in interdisciplinary fashion: visually, orally, and affectively in the live telling of one's migration history that can be achieved through film.

Context: U.S. Resister Migration as Search for and Forging of Safe Haven

From African Americans fleeing slavery, to Loyalist and Indigenous migrations after the American Revolution, to conscientious objectors fleeing participation in the First and Second World Wars, Canada has a long and complicated history as safe haven for people leaving the United States. During the Vietnam War, Canada offered safe haven to resisters fleeing conscription. In 1969 Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau famously remarked, "Canada should be a refuge from militarism." Some 50,000 resisters migrated, with arrivals totalling about 100,000.[6] Many stayed; others returned.[7] More recently, approximately 300 U.S. military personnel arrived as war resisters fleeing tours in Afghanistan and Iraq and seeking refuge in Canada.[8] A few dozen of these made refugee claims, but eventually faced rejection, deportation, and

imprisonment.[9] While most people in the earlier cohort found safe haven in Canada in the form of pathways to legal status (becoming permanent residents and citizens), this new generation, generally speaking, with exceptions, did not.

People who fled conscription during the Vietnam War sometimes self-identified or were known popularly as "draft dodgers" or draft evaders, as well as deserters who went AWOL. The former had an easier time entering at the border and acquiring residency because they tended to score more points for higher education. More recent arrivals resisting repeat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan were deemed "deserters" by U.S. authorities, but self-identified as resisters, a framing drawn from the earlier generation.[10] This shift in perception proved crucial to their reception in Canada and also signals shifting grounds in Canada-U.S. relations and in domestic immigration and refugee policies. Resisters fleeing these different wars entered distinct legal and policy landscapes within Canada. People fleeing conscription in the Vietnam War entered Canada through its newly developed points system, implemented in 1967 as resisters came. They had to prove suitability to Canadian society within the terms measured and defined by the points system (e.g., language, education, work skills). The newer generation entered Canada by making claims for refugee status. Still others in each cohort remained invisible, living underground during each war.

Mandatory conscription of soldiers is often seen as *the* main difference between cohorts; often overlooked are the influence of geopolitics on asylum-seeking outcomes and distinct forms of violence through which individuals frame claims. Enlistment in the U.S. military is highly racialized and classed.[11] Many young people join the U.S. military for economic reasons: to support family, secure health insurance, access to higher education, or immigration status. Experiences within the military are also gendered, with gender-based discrimination common.[12] Recent resister refugee claims were lodged in Canada for various reasons, among them lack of access to conscientious objection and different experiences of violence within the military. No single explanation encapsulates any war resister movement, and therefore this project took an intersectional approach to tease out the complexity of war resistance.

Researchers have documented important dimensions of the earlier migration of an estimated 50,000 (documented) to 100,000 (documented and undocumented) U.S. resisters searching safe haven in Canada.[13] These histories focused on early experiences of flight, arrival, resistance, and integration, as well as social movements that were founded by resisters to support resisters.[14] Some early resisters went to rural locations, forming collectives on geographical margins of Canadian society, such as small island communities and remote interior towns of British Columbia.[15] Others went to

Canadian cities such as Vancouver and Toronto, the latter identified by Hagan (2001,) as the "eye of the storm of the Canadian resistance."

A handful of Iraq war resisters based in Toronto became vocal spokespeople in mainstream and social media about resistance. Among these was Jeremy Hinzman, the first among this cohort to arrive in Canada and file a refugee claim in 2004, after a tour in Afghanistan. Hinzman spent three years in the U.S. army, applying twice for Conscientious Objector Status—his request denied both times. Canada's Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) rejected his claim. Hinzman pursued appeals and status on "humanitarian and compassionate grounds." While ordered to leave in 2008, he appealed and won the right to stay in 2009. In contrast, another resister and refugee claimant, veteran and conscientious objector Joshua Key, was granted support on appeal by ruling of the Federal Court that the IRB reconsider his refugee claim on the basis of the requirement that he systematically violated Geneva Conventions during his service in Iraq.[16] Brandon Hughey became the second resister to seek asylum that same year. He also had his claim rejected but, like Hinzman and Key, was allowed to stay on humanitarian and compassionate grounds.

Other soldiers made claims of identity-based persecution. For example, nineteen-year-old lesbian Bethany Smith fled homophobic threats to her personal safety on base in Fort Campbell, Kentucky, and arrived in Canada in 2007.[17] In 2009, a Federal Court ordered Canada's IRB to reconsider her case because it was not *only* a claim from a conscientious objector. According to Judge Yves de Montigny, "At the heart of the applicant's claim is that she is a lesbian member of the U.S. army, who was harassed and threatened at the same base where a gay member of the army was beaten to death, and who feels she could not rely on her superiors to secure protection. She fears that she could be punished for leaving an environment that could not secure her protection."[18]

While Hinzman, Key, Hughey, and Smith were allowed to stay, most others were not. Robin Long was the first resister deported from BC in 2008, sentenced to fifteen months as prisoner of conscience.[19] Cliff Cornell was deported and sentenced to twelve months in military prison. In 2012, Kimberly Rivera was the first woman among the cohort arrested when she returned to New York State and was sentenced to ten months in military prison.[20] Rivera was pregnant at the time of deportation, gave birth to her third child, and was separated from her children while serving time.

The War Resisters Support Campaign was founded in Toronto in 2004, approximately two years after military action began in Afghanistan and four decades after the earlier campaign was founded in the same city.[21] The campaign ended in 2019 when the last of fifteen resisters received

permanent residency in Canada. The campaign garnered public support, lobbied the federal government for status, and publicized histories. Canadian citizens submitted over 95,000 telephone calls and postcards to parliamentarians in support of granting legal status to resisters.[22] In 2007 Parliament's Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration moved that U.S. war resisters and immediate family be granted the right to stay.[23] With 64 per cent of the Canadian public in favour of allowing resisters to stay, the House of Commons passed a non-binding motion (by vote of 137 to 110) directing the government to stop deportation proceedings and allow them to remain.[24] Although resisters enjoyed majority support, the minority government did not enact the legislation, and deportation orders were issued.[25] The campaign continued for nearly fifteen years, fuelled by appeals, court decisions, the release of Wikileaks documents about motivations for U.S. military action in Iraq, deportation orders, and renewed attempts by U.S. war resisters to make refugee claims in 2014.

While individual journeys and their outcomes differed across cohorts, there are also parallels, from the challenge of acquiring conscientious objector status and the decision to enter Canada, to formation of resistance campaigns in Toronto. There also is variety in individual decisions to migrate, including racialized, classed, sexualized, and gendered experiences of crossing, immigration, and settlement in Canada and return to the United States.

Although claimant systems are meant to provide a fair hearing for individuals, research shows that geopolitics shape mobility, asylum claims, and outcomes, and hearings are not always "fair."[26] During the Cold War, for example, asylum claimants from communist governments found higher rates of acceptance in the United States.[27] The earlier generation of resisters arrived at a time when the United States and Canada diverged more in foreign policy, with prolonged U.S. involvement in Vietnam causing domestic turmoil. Canada eventually welcomed those who opted out. Under recent administrations, the two countries aligned more closely in foreign policy and immigration and refugee policies, especially with intensified border securitization following terrorist attacks on 9/11. Canadian forces participated in Afghanistan, but not Iraq, in response to mass opposition to the war in Iraq across Canada. For many reasons, Canada would not send a message to the United States that its military personnel were in need of protection, shifting Canadian foreign policy among them. When a claimant finds acceptance or rejection, that decision reflects the credibility of the individual story as well as national priorities and geopolitics between countries.

Additionally, since the 1990s, public discourse about asylum seekers has gradually eroded public belief in the notion of "authentic" claims that fit the 1951 convention, replacing them in public discourse with terms like "bogus refugee."[28] In 2009 Minister of Immigration Jason Kenney referred to U.S. war resisters as "bogus refugee claimants."[29] In 2010 Citizenship and Immigration Canada released Operational Bulletin 202, which instructed Canadian immigration officers processing cases involving deserters to refer them to senior advisors. This raised concerns that the government was criminalizing resisters and exercising discretion in handling their cases more centrally.[30]

The decision to leave home and seek asylum involves not only ethical, legal, and political struggle, but complex emotional terrain, as participants' oral histories demonstrate. Consideration of the violence of militarism and meanings of safe haven must attend to emotional geographies, a burgeoning field that informs this analysis. As Divya Tolya-Kelly notes, "The field of 'emotional geographies' is the location of the recovery work that embraces embodied experience … and the political materialities that resonate from and that are formed through emotions."[31] Having discussed briefly in this section the shifting geo-political and policy contexts, in the next section I engage in this embodied "recovery work" with resisters. Their histories offer the possibility of expanding understandings of safe haven as a collective, non-state, organized response to violence, trauma, and resistance to war.

Forging Safe Haven Where Legal Paths Remain Unclear or Unavailable

While the earlier cohort generally found safe haven in Canada as a legal form of belonging, this new generation did not (with exceptions). Although largely denied legal status, evidence shows that members of both cohorts *did* collectively find and forge safe havens *beyond* legal status, such as accommodation, refuge in churches, and campaign meetings.[32] I distinguish the notion of *forging refuge* from more formal policies of protection (through refugee resettlement and private sponsorship) and sanctuary. Well-documented histories of sanctuary across North America[33] involve formal decisions by institutions such as churches or municipalities to act as a safe haven by formally not cooperating with federal enforcement authorities. This section outlines four ways in which U.S. war resisters forged safe haven where legal paths to more formal and lasting forms of protection, such as legal status, remained unclear, uncertain, or unavailable.

Forging Safe Haven through Collective, Cross-Border Social Movements

Both cohorts of resisters joined forces with other members of civil society, in many cases founding and leading collective, cross-border social movements and their campaigns. Faith-based institutions provided sanctuary and pressured governments to accept resisters. So too did other non-governmental

organizations. Hagan documents the important role of the Toronto Anti-Draft Programme (TADP) in providing information and counselling to potential draft resisters before they left the United States and once they arrived in Canada. This was accomplished through a vast transnational movement of young people working across Canada and the United States to train draft counsellors and distribute information on how to avoid the draft and how to emigrate to Canada. In our archival research, we reviewed materials used by draft counsellors and saw the geographical reach of distribution of the *Manual for Draft-Age Immigrants to Canada,* recorded in logs of mailings of the manual to churches and university campuses across the United States.[34] Many participants who secured the book explained how important it was to their knowledge and decision-making.

The contemporary War Resister Support Campaign drew on the political and logistical strategies of the earlier campaign by TADP and other organizations across Canada. The newer campaign emerged through cross-border protests and alliances and conversations with Iraq veteran families against war and activists in Toronto. When the first resisters arrived and made claims in Toronto in 2004 and 2005, activists were catalyzed to build on these early connections and conversations to organize. While initiated by a broad-based swath of civil society (e.g., steelworkers, unions, feminists, peace activists, and faith-based groups), their first serious push for outreach to build membership was to invite Vietnam-era resisters to join them. These earlier resisters joined at the first meeting and became the heart of the campaign. They were able to share personal histories and political strategies, carrying living memory into the new movement. The new campaign studied the archives and tactics of their earlier counterparts, whilst joining forces with them. They also provided connection, understanding, and social acceptance of resisters.

Lee Zaslosky was one such Vietnam-era resister from New York City.[35] Lee was drafted into the Army and served time in basic training, but fled to Canada before deployment to Vietnam. Lee decided he would set about becoming Canadian as soon as he arrived in Toronto and built a political career organizing in Canada. He was invited to attend the first meeting of the campaign and eventually worked part time for the campaign. During this time, he answered phones, helped potential resisters to learn about Canada, and welcomed them when they arrived at the bus station downtown. One of Lee's many contributions to the campaign was his identification with the new cohort of resisters and his firm commitment to demonstrate care for and acceptance of them as soldiers in exile and potential future Canadian citizens. As Lee explained in his oral history, when he met new arrivals at the bus station, he hugged them, welcomed them to Canada, and told them, "I love you, because you're a war resister like me." In turn, several Iraq-era resisters interviewed narrated their phone conversations and live encounters with the campaign as embodied by conversations and encounters with Lee.

Resisters from both generations found common cause and forged community in the War Resister Support Campaign. Weekly meetings at Steelworkers Hall in downtown Toronto were followed routinely by drinks at Grossman's Tavern on nearby Spadina Avenue. Grossman's was popular among resisters whose community was centred in Toronto's Kensington Market during the height of Vietnam War–era resistance in the 1960s and 1970s. Grossman's was but one of several experiences shared by the two generations.

As the fifteen-year campaign went on, resisters made personal decisions for themselves and families, and they made different decisions—to stay, leave, resist, face imprisonment, or go underground. But before and during their time in Canada, and in several cases once they returned to the United States, they were able to support one another. They forged safe haven through interpersonal relations and collective work with the campaign.

Most resisters interviewed knew little about Canada, and most had never visited Canada prior to arriving. For those arriving as deserters opposing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, participation in the campaign and early encounters even over the phone offered social networks and—importantly—acceptance. This involved not only engagement with the campaign in Toronto, but assistance from US-based Vietnam War veterans offering to help deserters leave the military by assisting with travel to Canada.

Forging Safe Haven by Providing Shelter in Collaboration with Civil Society

Broadly based participation of civil society in resister support campaigns within Canada meant that resisters were immediately exposed to, supported by, and sheltered with many different kinds of people in Canada. For Dean Walcott, who had done two tours in Iraq and a third in Germany, where he developed debilitating PTSD, the safe haven he found in the campaign began with telephone calls to campaign headquarters. Lee answered his call and spoke with him several times about the history of resister migration to Canada, recommending reading that might help him to better understand this history as he went through his own decision-making about whether, when, and how to cross. As Dean explained, "It was like I found a home over the phone." Even this early exposure to people who thought like him affirmed to him for the first time that he was "not alone," "not so crazy," and that there was the possibility of a home for him somewhere beyond the United States. Dean's exposure to home through the campaign moved from being something abstract (telephone conversations with people he had not yet

met) to something more material. When he first arrived, the campaign had arranged for Dean to stay in an extra room in the home of university faculty in Toronto.

As campaign organizers explained during their oral histories, a key function of the campaign was to find housing when resisters arrived. A housing committee was devoted to finding space. New arrivals like Dean would stay with families who volunteered shelter in their homes, until longer-term accommodation could be secured. Brandon Hughey described the first night that he spent sleeping safely in a spare bedroom of a family in St. Catharines, a city near the border, on the night of his crossing as a time of relief and "one of the most memorable days of my life."

Resisters also worked together with campaign volunteers to provide shelter for one another. Franklin's role in sheltering new arrivals is instructive. Franklin joined the U.S. National Guard in 2003 and in 2005 was notified of his deployment to support Operation Iraqi Freedom. During his two years of enlistment and deployment, he grew disenchanted with his role in the military, tired of balancing full-time military service, school, and work, and skeptical of the U.S. role in the conflict. During his time in Iraq, Franklin witnessed violence and corruption and spent his time retreating from it. He was eventually placed in the Green Zone and tasked with supervising others. During this time, he eventually decided to lay down his weapon. Once he communicated that, he was sent on ten-day leave, during which time he fled to Canada.

Once in Canada, Franklin became a leader among peers and very involved in the campaign. After securing his housing with a local landlord sympathetic to resisters, he divided his apartment to make space for new arrivals. Every piece of living space was accounted for, including converting the kitchen to a bedroom. Eventually he secured a second small apartment and carved that one up too, so that resisters could function more independently and also contribute to the work of the campaign as they forged community together. Franklin also helped peers to find work, and together they established a set of sympathetic employers willing to hire resisters, at nightclubs in particular. Franklin worked for two years collecting bodies after deaths all over the GTA, but lost his job after his efforts to unionize workers. He then worked at a nightclub as custodian, eventually employing other resisters. During his twelve-year struggle to secure legal status, Franklin appealed and somehow managed to outlast three deportation orders and a prolonged legal battle until there was a change in government. Now with status, he remains a leader, routinely fielding calls and reporting to others when one seems adrift, whether struggling with mental health or homeless and in need of work and shelter.

While still struggling for legal status and leading precarious lives, like their predecessors, Iraq war resisters supported

one another in material and emotional ways in pursuit of shelter, livelihood, and education. The recent campaign created a short version of the *Manual,* updating its services, assisting with legal bureaucratic requirements, and finding work and housing.

Forging Provisional Safe Haven through Time and Space Away from War, Militarism, and Imprisonment

Even when resisters returned to the United States— forcibly or by choice—they returned prepared with new resources: moral support, time spent in healing and exploring legal options, a transnational community, attention of the activist community to their continued plight post-return, and support of peace communities and Iraq veterans against war. This support extended to legal support to stay out of prison and to survive once imprisoned (through letters and visits, for example). Time in Canada, however short, offered opportunities to heal from the physical and emotional stress of military service and the violence of war.

Robin Long was the first Iraq War resister deported in 2008, after entering Canada in 2005 and lodging a refugee claim for protection in Ontario. Long was raised Mormon in Boise, Idaho, but forced from home when he decided to leave the church at sixteen. He then hitchhiked, eventually landing in a job corps program in the U.S. South. When he scored well on aptitude tests there, he was approached by military recruiters and offered a signing bonus for enlistment worth US$12,000. During his time in training, the Iraq war unfolded. Robin trained to repair tanks and spent much of his time in training to prepare troops for ground combat in Iraq. He was frequently assigned to play the enemy and eventually began to identify with Iraqi civilians and question the motives behind U.S. war-making in Iraq. Alone with these thoughts, Long became suicidal and as punishment for his mental health crisis was assigned rapid deployment to Iraq. He had ten days to say goodbye to friends and family before deployment to Iraq on his own (not with his company), assigned to a depleted company in Fallujah. Long had been in the army for two years. On the day that he was scheduled to fly to Iraq, he reported to the airport, boarded the plane, then deplaned and went into hiding. Eventually, Long fled to Canada.

In his oral history, Robin spoke emotionally of the community and acceptance he found among a traveling band of environmentalists who were making a documentary about waste. He encountered this group shortly after entering Canada in Saskatchewan and traveling to Nelson, BC. He travelled with them from coast to coast. He recounts this time and his friends fondly, explaining that they listened to his stories, accepted him and his history, and met his needs for food, shelter, and healing, after surviving a traumatic period of mental health duress and attempted suicide while on base.

During his time in Canada, Long fell in love with Canada, found support and community with whom he could share his story. He partnered with a Canadian woman with whom he had a son. Eventually, his refugee claim and subsequent appeals and efforts to remain in Canada failed. He was the first resister deported to the United States in 2008, handed over to U.S. authorities for punishment. After deportation from Canada, he was banned from re-entry for ten years, forced to witness his son's growth from afar, with occasional visits to the United States. After his high-profile military court trial in Colorado, Long received a felony conviction and spent one year and four days imprisoned in a naval brig in San Diego. Although most people are not prosecuted for deserting the U.S. military, it is believed that these resisters were punished more harshly than most because they had spoken out during their time in Canada.[36]

Robin's time in Canada enabled him to forge refuge through community formation in his cross-country trip, including the ability to share truths and not hide his history. As he describes that first summer in Canada, "It was an amazing summer that brought back my humanity…. That summer saved my life." He found support and understanding among people in Canada. "In Canada, you could just be completely free and open, and people seemed to understand you." Even though he was deported three years after he had arrived, Robin carried these healing experiences back with him. Robin believes that his time in Canada prepared him by allowing to heal and find strength needed to recover and then survive the trial, time in prison, and family separation.

Like Robin, many people were fleeing not only the stress of war, but the stress and violence of time in the military. Participants described this time as oppressive, suffocating, and stressful, with one likening his time after being drafted into the army during the Vietnam War to doing time in prison.

Iraq war resisters explained the mental health struggles that they themselves survived, and the mental health crises they witnessed among other soldiers. These narratives featured PTSD, suicidal ideation and attempts, and periods of severe depression and anxiety. Some resisters who came to Canada had such severe PTSD that they had trouble leaving their homes and therefore securing work or pursuing refugee claims.

While much has been written of the trauma caused by war and its long afterlife, less has been written about cultures of militarism *within* the military and among war resisters.[37] A key finding of this study, made possible by comparing two generations, is that resisters much later in life still experience the trauma of conscription, enlistment, desertion, and flight, as though it happened yesterday. These histories settle in and haunt lived daily experience as acute forms of anxiety and fear. One deserter explained that even nearly fifty years later, these worries and fears still repeat in his mind "like a tape, like a monkey on my back." He moved several times to get farther away from the Canada-U.S. border, but still remembers as though it was yesterday and struggles with acute anxiety.

One Iraq-era resister ultimately forced to return to the United States explained, "People don't just have post-traumatic stress disorder from war. They have post-traumatic stress disorder from the platoon…. How can you go to war and see the atrocities of war, and then return back to your platoon and face abuse? How can a person handle that?" Linjamin was trained as a social worker and a careful observer of people around him. During his first month in basic training with the army, a fellow soldier in his platoon attempted suicide. As a social worker, Linjamin felt he had a duty to report his fellow soldier's duress. As a result of reporting, however, he was discharged from the army, punished for his decision to challenge conformity and silence. He eventually re-enlisted after a period of homelessness and living in and out of shelters in New York City. After re-enlisting, he stayed for a longer period of time in the military. However, he never wanted to go to war in Iraq and knew that he was about to be deployed. Linjamin entered the military for economic survival but never wanted his own economic survival to come at the expense of someone else's in another country where he felt he had "no business." Like the others, Linjamin's claim for refugee status failed. However, his time in Canada allowed him to develop his own identity and paths to livelihood outside of the U.S. military. As he describes his stability in Canada, "It was socially the most stable I have probably been in my whole life." Linjamin recounted invitations to stay in people's homes and visit for dinner at homes in London and Toronto, where they asked about his past, listened to his stories, and affirmed and supported his decision to emigrate. This time enabled Linjamin to prepare for the new life that he would build once he returned to the United States, where he returned to pursue higher education.

Legal Strategies and Challenges

Accompanying the day-to-day logistical dimensions of forging safe haven discussed thus far (participation in social movements, shelter, and healing space away from militarism and the violence of war), resisters and the campaign simultaneously pursued legal strategies to forge and extend safe haven. Even when these strategies failed in the courts or failed to secure legal status, they extended resisters' time in Canada and involved the international community in testing the Canadian government's legal boundaries for safe haven. In this sense, pursuit of legal strategies mirrored diverse efforts to provide sanctuary for asylum seekers.[38] Many of these legal manoeuvres related to testing Canada's

implementation of its commitments to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, and the status of claims based on war resistance therein. Jeff House and Alyssa Manning were Toronto-based refugee lawyers who worked with the campaign and represented most resisters, developing new legal strategies with each failed claim.

As Hagan demonstrates with the use of the points system to reduce discrimination toward Vietnam-era deserters by immigration bureaucrats, the legal strategies designed for the new generation were developed to combat the landscape in which U.S. soldiers seeking protection received negative decisions from the IRB. Whereas the IRB process tended to not see these applicants as demonstrating a well-founded fear of persecution for membership in a social group, subsequent appeals tested alternative arguments. These included participation in an illegal war in Iraq and the requirement that soldiers violate Geneva Conventions while there.

In addition to the development of legal arguments, the appeals and court cases also provisionally extended time forged for safe haven away from punishment to be meted out when resisters were deported back to the United States. As Brandon Hughey explained, resolving his legal case took more than ten years but was well worth this time, for the opportunity it afforded him to find safe haven, and when he eventually secured legal status. For the fifteen resisters who were eventually granted legal status, the change in government from Conservative to Liberal drew the end of their waiting game nearer, as they had persuaded the Liberal government to commit to supporting their hopes for legal status as Justin Trudeau campaigned to become prime minister.

Conclusions

This article discussed two generations of U.S. war-resister migrations to Canada in order to explore alternative, often informal ways of forging safe haven where paths to legal status are absent or limited. Resisters and activists worked collectively as members of civil society to forge refuge, motivated by solidarity, belief in peace, opposition to war, contestation of public policies, and a belief that historical cycles will recur and test Canada's potential as safe haven in the future.

Juxtaposition of two generations proximate in time and space offers opportunities to better understand the resonance across their journeys, as well as the distinct landscapes they entered in Canada. Even where U.S. resisters did not find formal refuge, they forged refuge collectively with other members of civil society—even if temporary. This forging involved alternative paths to protection, including shelter, pursuit of time-space trajectories that carried people away from war and militarism, location of safe spaces of protection at finer-than-national scales, formation of social movements across the Canada-U.S. border, and legal challenges to exclusionary state policies and practices. Study of such alternatives to formal, legal refugee status can expand understandings of protection and also centre human agency and politicization in analyses of human displacement and migration.

Even pursuit of legal challenges and status at times involved formal processes set in motion for goals alternative to those for which they were designed. Status acquired through the points system and on humanitarian and compassionate grounds, for example, allowed formal forging of safe haven through policies not originally developed to respond to or account for war resisters.

The resisters' searches for safe haven are similar to and different from other forms of displacement and migration. Nonetheless, this analysis is applicable and can be extended to other contexts and alternative understandings of solutions. Research remains to be done, including more work on other alternative solutions to formal provisions of refuge. While a particular set of migrations in a particular location, these lessons can be applied and are readily apparent in other contexts. Recent reporting, for example, examined the highly organized democratic governance structures of the caravans of Central American asylum seekers moving through Mexico to the border with the United States and the forging of safe haven, however temporary, within those moving structures.[39] Much scholarship examines unauthorized migration where people move through interstitial zones, jurisdictions, and categories between state territories, policies, or designations—like migrant or refugee. As I have shown, occupation of these zones between legal categories and territories proves fertile ground and the need for collective practices and movements to forge safe haven where there may be no legal pathways. Where there is no formal refuge or legal status, people seek, forge, and find safe haven in other ways, by other means.

Notes

1 This research was funded by Insight and Connection grants from the Social Sciences and Humanities Canada. I thank Jennifer Hyndman and Joanna Reynolds for their work in organizing the excellent workshop that gave rise to these articles. I'm grateful for collaborations with resisters, the War Resister Support Campaign, Just Seeds Collective, filmmaker Lisa Molomot, and geographers Shiva Mohan, Ileana Díaz, and Jacque Micieli-Voutsinas. Any errors rest with the author.

2 John Hagan, *Northern Passage: American Vietnam War Resisters in Canada* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001). As Hagan notes, these estimates varied widely. While it is believed that more than 100,000 people

migrated temporarily during this time, the census records approximately 50,000 who regularized their status and remained in Canada after the war ended.

3   Anh Ngo, "'Journey to Freedom Day Act': The Making of the Vietnamese Subject in Canada and the Erasure of the Vietnam War," *Canadian Review of Social Policy* 75 (2016): 59–86.

4   Sarah Hipworth and Luke Stewart, eds., *Let Them Stay: U.S. War Resisters in Canada 2004–2016* (Toronto: Iguana Books, 2016), 2.

5   Rebecca Sharpless, "The History of Oral History," in Thomas Charlton, Lois Myers, and Rebecca Sharpless, eds., *The Handbook of Oral History* (Lanham, MD: AltaMira, 2006), 38.

6   Susan Hardwick and Ginger Mansfield, "Discourse, Identity, and 'Homeland as Other' at the Borderlands," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 99, no. 2 (2009): 391.

7   Hagan, *Northern Passage*, 3.

8   This figure is a conservative estimate based on communications between resisters and the War Resister Support Campaign over the course of the campaign.

9   Wil S. Hylton, "American Deserter: Why AWOL U.S. Soldiers Are Most at Risk in Canada," *New York Magazine*, February 23, 2015.

10 *New York Times*, "War Dodgers," March, 23, 2008.

11 Associated Press, "Military Makes Little Effort to Punish Deserters: Although Numbers Rising, Only 5 Percent of Lawbreakers Reprimanded," June 28, 2007, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/19489285/ns/us_news-military/t/military-makes-little-effort-punish-deserters/#.VCwhQWB-Lo9Q; Amy Lutz, "Who Joins the Military? A Look at Race, Class, and Immigration Status," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 36, no. 2 (2008): 167–88.

12 Jennifer Boldry, Wendy Wood, and Deborah Kashy, "Gender Stereotypes and the Evaluation of Men and Women in Military Training," *Journal of Social Issues* 57, no. 4 (2002): 689–705. Sara Corbett, "The Women's War," New York Times, March 18, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/18/magazine/18cover.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.

13 Hardwick and Mansfield, "Discourse, Identity and 'Homeland as Other,'" 391.

14 Alan Haig-Brown, *Hell No We Won't Go: Vietnam Draft Resisters in Canada* (Vancouver: Raincoast Book Distribution, 1996); Renee G. Kasinsky, *Refugees from Militarism: Draft-Age Americans in Canada* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1976); Jessica Squires, *Building Sanctuary: The Movement to Support Vietnam War Resisters in Canada, 1965–1973* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013).

15 Hardwick and Mansfield, "Discourse, Identity and 'Homeland as Other.'"

16 Joshua Key and Lawrence Hill, *The Deserter's Tale: The Story of an Ordinary Solder Who Walked Away from the War in Iraq (as Told by Lawrence Hill)* (Toronto: Anansi, 2007).

17 *Toronto Star*, "Gay U.S. Soldier Gets Second Shot at Refugee Claim," 21 November 21, 2009.

18 *Toronto Star*, "Gay U.S. Soldier Gets Second Shot."

19 War Resister Support Campaign, 2014, http://www.resisters.ca/index_en.html.

20 Associated Press and Canadian Press, "U.S. Soldier Who Fled to Canada to Avoid Iraq War Gets 10 Months in Jail," April 29, 2013, https://www.macleans.ca/news/u-s-soldier-who-fled-to-canada-to-avoid-iraq-war-gets-10-months-in-jail/.

21 Hagan, *Northern Passage.*

22 War Resisters Support Campaign, 2014.

23 War Resisters Support Campaign, 2014.

24 War Resisters Support Campaign, 2014.

25 War Resisters Support Campaign, 2014.

26 Jennifer Hyndman, "The Geopolitics of Migration and Mobility," *Geopolitics* 17, no. 2 (2012): 243–55.

27 Carl Bon Tempo, *Americans at the Gate: The United States and Refugees during the Cold War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

28 Sean Hier and Joshua Greenberg, "Constructing a Discursive Crisis: Risk, Problematization and Illegal Chinese in Canada," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 25, no. 3 (2002): 490–513; Audrey Macklin, "Disappearing Refugees: Reflections on the Canada-U.S. Safe Third Country Agreement," *Columbia Human Rights Law Review* 36 (2005): 365–426.

29 War Resister Support Campaign, 2014.

30 Hipworth and Stewart, Let Them Stay, 226–43.

31 Divya Tolya-Kelly, "Affect: An Ethnocentric Encounter? Exploring the 'Universalist' Imperatives of Emotional/Affectual Geographies," *Area* 38, no. 2 (2006): 213-17.

32 Hier and Greenberg, "Constructing a Discursive Crisis": Macklin, "Disappearing Refugees."
    War Resister Support Campaign, 2014.

33 Randy Lippert and Sean Rehaag, eds., *Sanctuary Practices in International Perspectives: Migration, Citizenship and Social Movements* (New York: Routledge, 2012); Graham Hudson, Idil Atak, and Charity-Ann Hannan, "(No) Access TO: A Pilot Study on Sanctuary City Policy in Toronto, Canada," *Ryerson Centre for Immigration and Settlement Working Paper Series* 1 (2017).

34 Mark Satin, *Manual for Draft Age Immigrants to Canada* (Toronto: House of Anansi, 2017).

35 Full name indicate participants who chose to be named in this research, whereas use of first names only indicate pseudonyms used to protect identities.

36 Hipworth and Stewart, *Let Them Stay.*

37 Pamela Moss, "Shifting from Nervous to Normal through Love Machines: Battle Exhaustion, Military Psychiatrists and Emotionally Traumatized Soldiers in World War II," *Emotion, Space and Society* 10 (2014): 63–70; D. Cowen, *Military Workfare: The Soldier and Social Citizenship in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008); Deb Cowen and Emily Gilbert, eds., W*ar, Citizenship, Territory* (New York: Routledge, 2008).

38 Lippert and Rehaag, *Sanctuary Practices in International Perspectives.*

39 Jesús Rodriguez, "How the Migrant Caravan Built Its Own Democracy," *Politico*, December 12, 2018, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/12/12/migrant-caravan-tijuana-border-government-222856.

Alison Mountz is professor and Canada Research Chair in Global Migration at Wilfrid Laurier University. She can be reached at amountz@wlu.ca.

Book Reviews

No Friend but the Mountains

❧

Behrouz Boochani
Sydney, Australie: Picador Pan Macmillan Australia, 2018, pp. 373.

Behrouz Boochani est un journaliste kurde qui a fui l'Iran. Intercepté sur un bateau en route depuis l'Indonésie pour l'Australie en 2013, Boochani a été emprisonné dans un centre de détention australien sur l'île de Manus (Papouasie-Nouvelle Guinée) entre 2013 et 2017, année où la Papouasie a déclaré une telle détention illégale. Boochani demeure dans l'impossibilité de se rendre en Australie, même s'il a été reconnu comme réfugié. Depuis juillet 2013, les gouvernements australiens successifs interdisent la réinstallation en Australie des réfugiés interceptés en mer. Cependant, en novembre 2019, il a pu se rendre temporairement en Nouvelle Zélande pour participer à des évènements littéraires. Pour se faire, il a dû passer par les Philippines, le gouvernement australien lui interdisant de transiter par le territoire australien.

No Friend but the Mountains décrit le voyage en mer puis les premières années d'incarcération de Boochani dans la prison de Manus avec des centaines d'autres demandeurs d'asile et réfugiés, principalement des hommes (l'Australie a envoyé les familles interceptées dans un autre centre de détention sur l'île de Nauru). Ce compte-rendu se concentre sur trois contributions majeures que l'ouvrage fait à l'étude des migrations forcées : sa valeur en tant que combinaison de témoignage depuis l'intérieur du système carcéral d'immigration australien et de réflexion théorique sur ce système ; sa production, le résultat d'un effort collectif facilité par les technologies d'information contemporaines ; et l'impact qu'il a eu en Australie depuis sa parution.

L'ouvrage n'est pas le premier à livrer un témoignage personnel éloquent sur les «camps» australiens. Par exemple, *Walking Free* (2014), raconte la fuite d'Irak de Munjed Al Muderis puis sa détention au camp de Curtin en Australie de l'Ouest avant qu'il ne devienne un chirurgien orthopédique

reconnu; *They Cannot Take the Sky* (2017) est un recueil de témoignages de détenus sur le territoire australien, à Nauru et sur l'île de Manus; et *Dignity in a Tea Cup* (2019) relate les cinq ans que Christine Cummins a passé comme travailleuse sociale auprès des demandeurs d'asile enfermés dans la prison de Christmas Island, territoire outre-mer australien. Mais *No Friend* est unique de par son style et dans son analyse profonde du système carcéral en place. Le livre combine prose et vers. Ses observations sur la désensibilisation des prisonniers au milieu d'une végétation équatoriale luxuriante sont particulièrement émouvantes. Lorsque les prisonniers arrivent sur l'île, ils sont émerveillés par la nature et en prennent soin. A mesure que le temps passe, ils perdent intérêt et négligent leur environnement. Pour Boochani, la nature est une échappatoire intellectuelle mais aussi physique. L'agilité qu'il a acquise lors de son enfance de montagnard lui permet, comme un chat, de grimper sur le toit de la prison et éviter la surveillance afin de voir ce qui se passe dans les cellules d'isolement. Le titre du livre est un proverbe kurde mais peut aussi être lu comme une référence aux montagnes du Kurdistan, où la famille de l'auteur trouva refuge pendant la guerre entre l'Iran et l'Irak.

Boochani décrit la prison comme un «Kyriarchical System» (124), un terme emprunté à la théorie féministe qui met en avant l'intersectionnalité et la complexité des oppressions dans un système patriarcal. Boochani présente une hiérarchie des oppressions au sein de la prison où la plupart des individus sont, dans une certaine mesure, oppresseurs et opprimés. Cette hiérarchie inclut les différents types de gardes australiens, les gardes locaux, puis enfin les prisonniers. Même si tous semblent devenir des «rouages du système», les prisonniers ne constituent pas une catégorie

homogène, bien au contraire. Boochani décrit plusieurs détenus en termes d'archétypes ayant des talents singuliers, tels « The Cow » (la vache), particulièrement apte à faire la queue pour les repas de par sa « persistance, determination and tenacity » (200). Les seuls prisonniers dont les noms sont révélés sont les treize détenus qui, en date de parution, avaient perdu la vie dans la prison de Manus, tels Reza Barati, « the Gentle Giant » mort sous les coups des gardes.

No Friend but the Mountains se distingue aussi par son mode de production, qui fait l'objet de deux essais par son traducteur Omid Tofighian en ouverture et conclusion de l'ouvrage. Boochani l'a rédigé en persan, sur un téléphone portable dissimulé aux autorités carcérales (téléphone finalement découvert, confisqué, puis remplacé à plusieurs reprises). Le manuscrit a été transmis sous forme de longs messages texte ensuite effacés par Boochani. Même si sa rédaction était confidentielle Boochani et Tofighian ont pu en discuter lors de visites de ce dernier sur l'île de Manus. Boochani était également en conversation soutenue avec des amis auteurs en Australie et en Iran. *No Friend but the Mountains* peut donc être vu comme le résultat de la circulation irrépressible du savoir par-delà les pires frontières que l'on puisse imaginer. Il illustre les potentialités subversives des réseaux de l'information pour les migrants forcés, alors que ces réseaux font maintenant partie intégrante des mouvements migratoires aussi bien que des systèmes de surveillance aidant les Etats à contrôler ces mouvements.

Depuis sa parution, *No Friend but the Mountains* a eu un impact considérable en Australie. Dans la préface du livre, l'écrivain Richard Flanagan décrit Boochani comme « un grand écrivain australien » (x) et le livre a reçu plusieurs prix prestigieux en Australie, d'habitude réservés à la « littérature australienne », dont le prix le mieux doté au niveau national,

le Victorian Prize for Literature, et le National Biography Award. Il contribue ainsi à une réflexion sur l'attachement territorial d'un auteur qui lui-même tient avant tout à quitter l'île de Manus, et vivre libre, plutôt que de résider en Australie. C'est aussi un ouvrage de référence lors de protestations contre la politique de détention des demandeurs d'asiles et réfugiés du gouvernement australien. Par exemple, la lecture d'un passage de *No Friend but the Mountains* fut l'élément principal d'une journée d'action anti-détention sur de nombreux campus à travers l'Australie en octobre 2018, et l'Université de Nouvelle-Galle du Sud a nommé Boochani professeur auxiliaire. Boochani lui-même est activement présent par ses écrits journalistiques dans des médias tels que *The Guardian* mais aussi en tant que réalisateur et protagoniste d'œuvres d'arts réalisées sur l'île de Manus. Enfin, l'ouvrage est un succès de librairie. L'édition que j'ai lue pour ce compte-rendu est la huitième en 2019 ; le livre avait déjà été réimprimé trois fois en 2018, et il est en cours de traduction dans plusieurs langues, dont le français.

Cependant, le gouvernement de Scott Morrison, dont la coalition parlementaire a été réélue en mai 2019, a réaffirmé son soutien aux restrictions en place, conduisant à une nouvelle vague de désespoir parmi les demandeurs d'asiles et réfugiés incapables de quitter Manus. Il est à espérer que la popularité de *No Friend but the Mountains*, en plus de nourrir notre champ de recherche et de galvaniser les défenseurs des droits des réfugiés, contribue un jour à une évolution tangible des politiques australiennes.

Adèle Garnier is a senior lecturer at the Department of Modern History, Politics, and International Relations, Macquarie University. She can be reached at adele.garnier@mq.edu.au.

Fully Human: Personhood, Citizenship, and Rights

⌇

Lindsey N. Kingston
New York: Oxford University Press, 2019, 299 pp.

*F*ully Human: Personhood, Citizenship and Rights*, by international human rights scholar Lindsey N. Kingston, is an ambitious academic study of the global hierarchies of belonging.

As Kingston alternatively puts it, the work deals with "citizenship gaps and ensuing complexities" as well as "broader questioning of political membership, personhood,

and universal norms" (ix). She exposes the failures of the global human rights regime to actually apply its provisions to all people in all places. Kingston uses examples of the differentiated enjoyment of rights across groups of people to highlight the imperfect application of the universalist human rights discourse in practice. Instead of personhood (i.e., the simple fact of being a member of the human race),

she proposes that functioning citizenship conditions access to basic rights.

As her central argument, Kingston attributes the failure of the institution of human rights to eradicate inequality and injustice to a "lack of functioning citizenship." Rather than providing a precise definition for this term, she offers a selection of case studies to illustrate the concept's broad scope in her work. Kingston proposes that her readers consider "citizenship problems" beyond the strict legal (*de jure*) definition of statelessness: i.e., not having nationality of any state at all. Instead, she argues that citizenship problems occur whenever an individual's mutually beneficial relationship with the state breaks down. Kingston's examples make clear that other groups and individuals may experience forms of marginalization similar to the *de jure* stateless, often including those from nomadic, Indigenous, mobile/displaced, and minority backgrounds. Echoing her previous work, she convincingly presents the basis for considering the dialogic nature of marginalization in relation to defective citizenship: that statelessness and "lack of functioning citizenship" are both a cause and symptom of marginalization.

She does so through an impressive breadth of case studies spanning continents, while engaging with a wide range of global phenomena. Kingston connects events with which readers may be familiar from recent headlines (e.g., the Black Lives Matter movement and child refugees from Syria) to lesser-known cases of exclusion and marginalization such as Indigenous communities of North America. The comparative richness of her study is evident in her illustration of the situation of nomadic communities through the cases of European Roma and Travellers, the Maasai in Tanzania and Kenya, and the Bedouin of the Middle East and North Africa. Her exposition of non-functioning citizenship covers the thematic contexts of asylum, migration, internal displacement, minority mobilization, nomadism, and racial identity construction. Somewhat surprisingly, Kingston's thesis gives little weight, however, to considerations of gender and sexual identity, which might similarly condition citizenship experiences.

In the introduction, Kingston focuses on the international human rights framework, particularly the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as a foundation for the person-based approach to rights. She identifies two key bundles of rights as necessary for a life of human dignity: first, rights to place (including freedom of movement and residence, freedom from arbitrary detention and deportation); and second, rights to purpose (employment, study, marriage, family and property). In explaining that "rights to place are necessary for the protection of rights to purpose" and that "the second social good cannot be fully achieved without attaining the first" (11), Kingston echoes Hannah Arendt's famous phrase for citizenship being "the right to have rights." However,

Kingston extends the phrase beyond its relation to *de jure* statelessness alone and applies it more widely to all those she considers to have "non-functioning citizenship."

Kingston argues that "a narrow emphasis on citizenship acquisition is misguided" (ix), and that "statelessness [in the strict *de jure* sense] is one tool of oppression that is utilized within a broader process" (66). Indeed, this argument fits well for groups like the Kurds of Syria, where the state has deprived one section of the community of citizenship since 1962 within a comprehensive, multi-faceted project of discrimination and persecution against Kurdish society and identity at large. As such, stateless Kurds seldom consider their statelessness in isolation from other state violations of human rights. Building on this, scholars of statelessness might have appreciated more exploration of the intersections between *de jure* statelessness and other forms of non-functioning citizenship. For instance, is there an increased prevalence of *de jure* statelessness within the nomadic and Indigenous communities that Kingston considers to be subject to other forms of marginalization? What do these case studies add to the emerging literature on the nexus between nomadic and Indigenous identity and statelessness? How might those with non-functioning citizenship be at greater risk of statelessness?

While Kingston highlights the important structural marginalization that often affects minority socio-political groups, the generalized presentation of such categories of people as experiencing a "lack of functioning citizenship" risks essentializing these identities as innately associated with vulnerability and victimhood. Understanding the heterogeneity within and across the categories and groups of people Kingston portrays as having non-functioning citizenship is vital for recognizing the individual political agency she argues is often assumed as absent. Despite her critique of state-sponsored and state-centric membership models, Kingston somewhat ironically gives little consideration to the importance of the individual's relationship with community and society in redefining citizenship as an inclusive concept. She argues, "The ideal of functioning citizenship acknowledges the persistent power of the state and seeks to build mutually beneficial relationships between individuals and governments" (223).

While states are indeed the key duty-bearers for human rights in the modern international system, the influential role of society and community in shaping citizenship experiences (both negatively and positively) should not be undervalued. Indeed, it is important to consider social marginalization alongside legal and political exclusion. In overlooking the potential of community-led movements and sub-state forms of identification and protection (that often provide significant comfort for those marginalized from/by the state), Kingston minimizes the capacity of solidarity to fill

the gap left by non-functioning citizenship. She further gives an overwhelmingly negative description of civil society. She considers "the rise of nonstate actors, from terror networks to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)" in exacerbating the shortcomings of models privileging state sovereignty without reflecting on how civil society action might otherwise challenge the system and advocate for the rights of those excluded from it (23).

While compelling as a concept to analyze contextually disparate forms of exclusion, reliance upon the conveniently neat terminology of "non-functioning citizenship" risks obscuring accountability within these mechanisms of marginalization. Using "non-functioning citizenship" as an elastic catch-all phrase may thus inadvertently disguise the interests and motivations of actors responsible for the human rights violations Kingston describes. In order to counter such exclusion, might it be more useful to break down the "lack of functioning citizenship" to pinpoint which specific human rights are ineffectively protected? More so, for the term to achieve its full analytical and ethical credibility, its use must be accompanied by more robust consideration of the context-specific agents and power structures perpetuating these protection gaps.

In presenting the problems around non-functioning citizenship, Kingston's book helps to recognize the reality that "citizenship itself is a gradient category, with most people fitting on a spectrum somewhere between full and noncitizenship" (221). However, the richness of her case studies naturally presents challenges in bringing these disparate contexts into robust analytical conversation. Her call for a reassessment of how the institution of citizenship functions (or does not) raises the question of whether state recognition can ever ultimately be fully inclusive. As she points out, if rights are attached to citizenship (and its effectiveness), we are ultimately dealing with a politically limited model of equality. More functioning forms of citizenship can partially ameliorate, but not eliminate, this systemic problem of modern human rights.

Thomas McGee is a PhD researcher at the Melbourne Law School's Peter McMullin Centre on Statelessness. He can be contacted at thomas.mcgee@student.unimelb.edu.au.

The Refugee Woman: Partition of Bengal, Gender, and the Political

❧

Paulomi Chakraborty
New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2018, 313 pp.

*T*he Refugee Woman: Partition of Bengal, Gender, and the Political examines the Partition of India, the result of which is known today as two countries independent of British rule: India and Pakistan. Paulomi Chakraborty's book is a rich tapestry of prose. Through several conceptual themes, Chakraborty elucidates the broad question of the relationship between woman, as a figurative category, and the political. The first theme shows that political *collectives,* as referred in dominant discourse, are also gendered— "woman" symbolizing the collective. In the second theme, *nation,* the refugee woman is doubly marginalized; she is an in-between figure, within and without national location. The third theme, *Partition,* connects the concept of the "everyday world" framed through domestic lives of women, to the political world, during a violent historical event. She specifies *the political* as encompassing being, idioms, culture, practices, and belonging.

Chakraborty's book is an ethnography that interrupts the dominant discourse around the 1947 Partition, which aligns with patriarchal rules of representation, tends to silence women, and objectifies them as bodies meant for reproduction of the nation. From introduction to conclusion, the book imagines the refugee woman post-Partition and outside of the nationalist discourse; in chapters 2, 3, and 4 she analyzes three narrative texts in support of the argument that recognizes political participation, desire, and agency of women. Throughout the book, Chakraborty intentionally avoids sequencing historical moments chronologically, to emphasize her point that there is no clean sense of progress in the representation of woman, as a figure, and the political world. In this study she consistently discusses contradictions in women's political activism. Where appropriate for the book, Chakraborty translates readings of original texts from Bengali to present her analysis of rhetorical traditions in Partition representation.

Chapter 1 is titled "The Problematic: 'Woman' as a Metaphor for the Nation." In this chapter she presents the problem of women's bodies as the location for "nationalist"-communal

violence and postulates why. In each of the three succeeding chapters Chakraborty analyzes a selected text as a mode of intervention that supports her argument. The texts "show how a different way of imagining woman is being shaped post-Partition around the refugee woman" (18). She argues that the problem is cyclical: "The nation [is] reified as a woman, women are abstracted; their agency, subjecthood, and desire are erased. When women embody the nation, they are reduced to physical bodies, empty vessels, in order to hold the reified nation" (96). The three texts through which Chakraborty challenges the issue are Jyotirmoyee Devi's *Epar Ganga, Opar Ganga (The River Churning)*, Ritwik Ghatak's film *Meghe Dhaka Tara (Cloud-Capped Star)*, and Sabitri Roy's *Swaralipi (The Notations)*. Each chapter begins with a summary of the text, and, crucial to her argument, a biography of the author, providing deep insight into the texts' ability to reflect the themes. In presenting the reader with a detailed account of each author's experience of subordination in career and life path, Chakraborty further strengthens her arguments. The effect is a *mise en abyme,* an insertion of a story within a story as a non-linear continuum, in support of the problematic that locates woman as a metaphor for the nation.

Chapter 2 analyzes Devi's *Epar Ganga, Opar Ganga.* First published in 1967 and translated into English as *The River Churning* in 1995, Chakraborty describes the book as a "textual intervention in the discursive process of metaphor formation." Chakraborty maintains that myths enable the persistence of narratives denied by history. *The River Churning* changes the way women are read by telling the story from a woman's viewpoint rather than present her narrative as myth. Partition as myth reduces its extraordinary violence to historical and, implicitly, ordinary times. The novel targets the violence of Partition and the subsequent patriarchal violence. Chakraborty emphasizes that all refugees in the novel are women. Bearing this in mind, the nation as an institution of colonial modernity and women's gendered experience translates as a continuum of an extreme form of everyday violence. Throughout the book she critiques the absence of a documented women's history; for Chakraborty, the novel uses the mythical in place of the absence of documented collective public memory. Chakraborty's reflections on *The River Churning* illuminate the historical silencing of women. The novel "understands Partition violence as violence perpetrated by patriarchy; it puts an emphasis on commonality of women" (112). The protagonist of the novel is a Hindu refugee caught in a border riot and given shelter in a Muslim home. The author chooses only to allude to the rape of the woman and does not use the scene of trauma as a literary device within the plot. "The novel critiques a characteristic of patriarchal society by refusing to give evidence. Simultaneously, the novel critiques *the readers*' inclination to not trust a woman's silence and

[public] desire to probe the details" so that she may be judged and others' treatment of her may be assessed (129).

Chapter 3 is a compelling depiction of Ghatak's 1960 film, *Meghe Dhaka Tara (Cloud-Capped Star).* Chakraborty's brief biography of Ghatak includes his reputation as a filmmaker marginalized for his unconventional approaches, compared to the Bombay Hindi film industry. He used Brechtian aesthetics to make the familiar strange. His style of filmmaking, which did not follow codes of realism, made his audience uncomfortable. Posthumously, his work generated a cult following. His approach to cinema radicalized notions of the melodrama as established by the commercial films of India's Hindi film industry. For Chakraborty, the film illustrates patriarchy against women in the abstract figure of *mother. Mother* as a figurative category is depicted as at once chaste and simultaneously the site of reproduction for saviours of India. Woman is thus a mystical symbol of the nation and land as body. On both sides of Partition, ethnic conflict gave permission for the objectification of women's bodies; claimed as possessions needing protection as well as subjects of violence. Rape of both Hindu and Muslim refugees on the "opposite" side of the division was accepted as an act of nationalism. The film's narrative tends "towards the exploitative, sacrificial aspect that is forcefully planted onto [the role of] motherhood" (177), which is contrary to romantic ideals of mothers as always giving, selfless, and compassionate. It exposes the notion that normative motherhood is constructed motherhood.

The fourth and final chapter is titled "Beyond the Metaphor," a telling of the refugee woman as an agent of radical politics. Sabitri Roy's *Swaralipi (The Notations)*, a 1952 novel, is committed to socialism over feminism. Though Roy writes from a feminist perspective, feminist liberation is not the political goal of the novel; Chakraborty attributes this to an historical distrust of the left in India during Roy's time. Set against the two years following Partition, it critiques the practices and corruptions of the Communist Party of India. "The refugee women in [the novel] are key figures who straddle [divisions such as] the private and the public; the personal and the political; the home and the world; the emotional and the rational" (217). Chakraborty provides overviews of Roy's novel, its plot and characters, and expands on the perceived and practised divisions. It is written from the vantage point of lived gendered experience, of women's participation in politics. "As alternatives to the pervasive divides, the novel attempts to compose a way of living in which there is no disjunction between personal and political ethics" (222). The novel explores the question of what kind of political collective is possible and desirable (215). It is critical to note that *Swaralipi* was denounced by the Communist Party three months after its publication.

The Refugee Woman: Partition of Bengal, Gender and the Political inspires further investigation of the argument

that woman, as a figure, can rewrite her gendered script. Chakraborty offers visual interpretations of three texts creating thick descriptions of how each addresses language, history, and myth as a driver of a continuum of extreme forms of everyday violence. The book interrogates normative representations of the Partition of India and has the capacity to deepen the audience's knowledge, no matter the level of familiarity with the topic. Though the book does not read like a poem, there is an overall rhythm to it as Chakraborty thoughtfully circles back to themes and analogies. "This book is a study of the relationship between women and the nation in what postcolonial studies would describe as the

early decades of postcolonial nationhood in the Indian context" (271). Chakraborty concludes the book by addressing why she focuses on the Hindu woman. She acknowledges the absence of the Muslim woman in her study and states that her intent is not to perpetuate a view that the Partition of Bengal was only the site of Hindu trauma.

Natasha Lan is a master's student in education and an administrator at the University of Toronto. She can be reached at natasha.lan@utoronto.ca.

Unravelling Europe's "Migration Crisis": Journeys over Land and Sea

❧

Heavan Crawley, Franck Duvell, Katherine Jones, Domon McMahon, and Nando Sigona
Bristol: Policy Press, 2018, 183 pp.

Despite popular conceptions, large-scale migration into, within, and out of Europe is not a new phenomenon, let alone a "crisis." If anything, as Crawley et al. demonstrate, the "migration crisis" is a policy-driven predicament: a creation of mismanaged, disjointed, and inhumane migration policies that fail to consider the geopolitical and historical contexts of global movement. Migration in itself is not the "crisis." Rather, it is the ill-informed responses to contemporary mobility flows that contribute to the exacerbation of humanitarian predicaments around the world. The prevailing notion that migration across European borders constitutes a "crisis" of epic proportions has dominated the public and policy spheres across the continent. Crawley et al. argue that such "crisis"-driven narrative fuels ineffective responses that fail to address the needs of refugees and migrants arriving on European shores.

Prioritizing the journeys and decision-making of refugees and migrants themselves, *Unravelling Europe's "Migration Crisis"* provides insights into the drivers, triggers, and mobility constraints of refugees and forced migrants; their lived experiences during their precarious journeys; and their reception upon arrival in Europe. This comparative study of four European countries is a result of in-depth data analysis of over 500 interviews with refugees and migrants who initially arrived in Greece, Turkey, Italy, and Malta during the "peak" of the migration "crisis" from late 2015 into early 2016.

Each chapter takes readers on a journey along the path of migration. The book first describes different itinerant

patterns emergent from distinct migration routes; it then takes the readers through the decision-making processes of refugees (i.e., when, where, and how to leave); next, it critically examines the role of smugglers in navigating border controls; it then proceeds to describe the dangerous journeys that refugee and migrants embark upon to reach safety and a new place to call home; and finally, it looks at how Europe responds to arrivals of refugees and migrants at its borders. Several key findings from this book demystify common assumptions about migration into Europe. First, the research debunks the myth of migration as a single flow of refugees and migrants across the Mediterranean. The second myth exposed is that migration across the Mediterranean Sea is driven solely by economic opportunities. A third myth debunked is that the refugees and migrants coming into Europe undertake a direct journey from their countries of origin into an intended European state.

Myth #1: A Single European Migration Flow
Crawley et al. highlight the fact the migration into Europe is not a single (Mediterranean) flow, but rather composed of multiple routes and journeys of people from different countries of origin—such as Middle Eastern countries (Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, and Syria), as well as African states (Gambia, Nigeria, Ghana, and Eritrea)—who are driven away from their home countries. A key finding reveals that most people arrived in Europe "after making *multiple* decisions about where and when to go rather than by making a singular and

direct journey to Europe" (74). The research focuses on two distinct migration routes into Europe: an Eastern Mediterranean route that originates primarily in Central Asian, Middle Eastern, and North African states transiting through Turkey and arriving in Greece; and a Central Mediterranean route that originates primarily from African states transiting through Libya and arriving in Malta and Italy. However, the book fails to explore another important but less common migration route: the Western Mediterranean route originating in Algeria and Morocco into Spain. As the research highlights, it is important to understand and recognize the unique characteristics and circumstances of each migration flow, including the different countries of origin, demographics of refugees and migrants, drivers and reasons for fleeing, and settlement patterns in Europe.

Myth #2: They Are All Economic Migrants

Highlighting the distinction between "primary" and "secondary" drivers of migration, the research also reveals that the decision to leave one's country of origin is not made lightly by refugees and migrants and often includes complex and interconnecting reasons/motifs. The "primary" drivers for leaving seem to be security and safety from conflict, persecution, insecurity, and human rights abuses. These decisions are motivated mainly by fear and desperation, and the prospects of a safer life for themselves and their children. The "secondary" drivers of migration relate closely to economic and social factors such as the inability to find employment or access social services, and the hope for a better future for their families. Often there are mixed motivations for leaving one's homeland, as illustrated by a forced migrant: "First we wanted to be safe and second, we wanted to build a better future for our family" (65). As the authors highlight, there is an intricate relationship between "forced" and "economic" drivers of migration. While the primary motivation to leave one's homeland is triggered by intolerable conflict and insecurity, economic factors such as poverty, lack of employment opportunities, and the desire to have a better life for their children often overlap with the aforementioned political and security factors.

Myth #3: Migrants Undertake a Direct Journey into Europe

Perhaps most revealing are the findings highlighting that most refugees and migrants never intended to migrate to Europe. The vast majority had no particular destination in mind when leaving their homelands and made decisions about where, when, and how to move at segments throughout their journeys. Most refugees and migrants interviewed spent months, if not years, in neighbouring countries before arriving in Europe. As Crawley et al. demonstrate, it becomes easier to understand the decisions that refugees and migrants make to risk their lives to cross the Mediterranean in the context of knowing what preceded their journeys. Often media, politicians, and policy-makers focus solely on the dangers of sea crossings when reporting/engaging with the topic. In doing so, they neglect to delve into the specifics of their entire journeys. Findings from Crawley et al. highlight that, prior to arriving at sea, refugees and migrants undertaking these risky seaborne journeys also faced dangerous journeys over land though interactions with smugglers, state officials, difficult terrain, and non-state actors.

Crawley et al. debunk these common assumptions about the nature and dynamics of migration into Europe though a compilation of rich data based on the lived experiences and decision-making processes of refugees and migrants. Unravelling ill-informed assumptions about migration into Europe can lead to the formation of more compassionate and humane migration policies that take into consideration the drivers, motivations, and complex decision-making processes of those on the move. The authors highlight the need to rethink the response to migration that centres and prioritizes the needs of refugees and migrants. *Unravelling Europe's "Migration Crisis"* is essential reading that contextualizes the dynamics of migration over land and sea and has important policy implications not only for the European context, but for the rest of the world as well.

Harini Sivalingam is a PhD candidate in socio-legal studies at York University. She can be reached at hsivalingam@gmail.com.

Human Security and Migration in Europe's Southern Borders

❧

Susana Ferreira
Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019, pp. 211

L'ouvrage de Susana Ferreira est issu d'une thèse de doctorat s'inscrivant dans l'étude du nexus entre la migration et la sécurité. Il prend pour point d'appui l'analyse du régime de gouvernance européen des migrations au sein du pourtour méditerranéen. Au regard de la difficile gestion de la « crise des migrations » par l'Union européenne

(ue) et ses États membres, l'autrice cherche à promouvoir à travers ce travail l'émergence d'un modèle plus efficace de gouvernance des migrations dans l'espace méditerranéen. Ce modèle reflèterait l'ambition des États européens de renforcer le contrôle des frontières et des mouvements de population, tout en protégeant les droits fondamentaux des migrants.

Pour atteindre cet objectif, Ferreira propose de guider le lecteur dans sa compréhension du régime européen de gestion des migrations en abordant d'abord plus largement l'analyse du développement des politiques migratoires et de gestion des frontières européennes, avant de se pencher sur leurs répercussions dans l'espace méditerranéen, pour finalement conclure sa démonstration en analysant les conséquences et adaptations locales de ces politiques à travers les exemples italien et espagnol. L'ouvrage offre donc en premier lieu un survol des théories applicables à l'étude du régime migratoire européen, avant de poursuivre avec une discussion fondée sur les résultats des propres recherches de l'autrice, qui ont été alimentées par plusieurs terrains de recherche en Espagne et en Italie. La parole des agents de la Guardia Civil espagnole rencontrés au cours de ces séjours sur le terrain est d'ailleurs la plus fréquemment mobilisée par l'autrice pour illustrer ses propos.

Les premiers chapitres retracent à la fois les évolutions qui ont marqué les politiques migratoires européennes, ainsi que les principaux courants d'étude qui ont permis aux chercheurs d'en expliquer les contours. Reconnaissant la prédominance récurrente de la dimension sécuritaire dans l'approche européenne en matière de gestion du phénomène migratoire, l'autrice, sans toutefois nier son adhésion à la logique de contrôle des mouvements de personnes promue par les États européens, prône la nécessité d'accorder une plus grande importance à la garantie des droits des migrants. À la lumière de son analyse des mouvements migratoires dans l'espace méditerranéen, Ferreira souligne d'ailleurs le «succès» de certaines stratégies pensées par les États européens pour freiner les migrations irrégulières, succès mesuré à partir de l'observation de la diminution du nombre de migrants en situation irrégulière sur le sol européen (155). Même si les répercussions engendrées par ces stratégies sur les droits des migrants sont ici peu documentées, elle insiste sur la nécessité d'instaurer un cadre qui viserait à garantir aux migrants en situation de vulnérabilité, tels les migrants en situation irrégulière, un ensemble de standards minimums qu'elle conceptualise sous l'appellation de «European Migration Minimum Standards» (26). Bien qu'intéressante, cette proposition n'est lancée que comme une piste de réflexion en début et en fin d'ouvrage et aurait pu bénéficier d'une plus grande visibilité en la mettant en relation avec une analyse des dérives de la mise en œuvre des politiques de gestion

des migrations et des frontières européennes, italiennes et espagnoles, en matière de respect des droits des migrants.

L'on ne saurait donc passer sous silence le parti clairement pris par l'autrice en faveur du discours politique ambiant promu notamment par les États européens sur les risques posés par les migrations sur la sécurité des États, que l'on perçoit tout au long de la seconde et de la troisième partie de l'ouvrage, qui plongent dans l'analyse du régime de gouvernance européenne des migrations dans l'espace méditerranéen. En omettant plus souvent qu'autrement de remettre en question certains des postulats et amalgames avancés par les États européens pour justifier leurs préférences pour des politiques et des pratiques sécuritaires qui ont conduit à plusieurs reprises à enfreindre les droits des migrants, l'autrice affirme ainsi son positionnement favorable à cette vision du monde, comme en témoigne ce passage : « In my view, there is a clear relation and interaction between both concepts [migration and security]. The rise of terrorism and other transnational threats have brought migration and security closer together, which translated in the adoption of securitarian frameworks to address migration-related issues […] » (37). Sans plus étayer les motifs de son ralliement à cette relation, elle se positionne en opposition à de nombreux chercheurs dont Jürgen Habermas qui « ne reconnaissent pas de liens directs entre la migration et la sécurité » (37).

Cette propension à associer la migration à une forme de «menace transfrontalière» au même titre que le terrorisme international, voire même corrélée à ce phénomène comme le sous-tend le passage précédent, explique l'adhésion de l'autrice à un modèle de gestion des migrations et des frontières qui repose pleinement sur une logique restrictive de contrôle ainsi que la faible place accordée aux critiques pourtant nombreuses de ce modèle porté par l'ue (pensons notamment au rapport du Rapporteur spécial des Nations unies pour les droits de l'homme des migrants de 2013).[1] La conclusion de ce rapport sur les incidences de la gestion des frontières extérieures de l'ue sur les droits de l'homme des migrants rappelle d'ailleurs que «le discours politique dominant qui associe l'immigration clandestine à la criminalité et à l'insécurité, repris en boucle par les États membres, légitime plus encore les pratiques consistant à externaliser le contrôle des frontières par le biais de mécanismes tels que le placement des migrants en détention, les renvois et les réadmissions […] Cependant, au cours des quatre visites de pays qu'il a effectuées, [le Rapporteur spécial] a constaté que les garanties en matière de droits de l'homme et les garanties juridiques n'étaient pas suffisamment solides, ce qui remettait en cause la légitimité, la légalité et la validité de ces mécanismes» (Rapport du Rapporteur spécial sur les droits de l'homme des migrants, 2013). Cette posture amène aussi l'autrice à appuyer avec peu de réserves les mécanismes d'externalisation des contrôles des

migrations mis en œuvre par l'UE avec ses pays voisins, malgré l'absence ou la piètre efficacité de systèmes de protection des migrants, qui se retrouvent ainsi coincés dans ces espaces et incapables de faire valoir leurs droits. En mesurant l'efficacité de la coopération européenne avec les pays d'Afrique du Nord par la diminution du nombre de migrants en situation irrégulière en sol européen, Ferreira encourage les États membres de l'UE à poursuivre leurs efforts concertés afin de « réduire la pression migratoire », arguant même de renforcer la coopération avec la Libye, perçue dans ce domaine comme un allié européen (173). Il nous paraît primordial de nuancer cette prise de position.

D'une part, en proclamant une responsabilité commune des États d'Afrique du Nord et des États européens dans la gestion des migrations, l'autrice omet de prendre en compte la construction européenne du « problème » de l'immigration irrégulière en provenance de cet espace. L'accroissement des franchissements irréguliers des frontières européennes qui survient dans les années 1990 et que mentionne Ferreira coïncide avec l'avènement de l'espace Schengen et entre autres mesures corollaires, l'introduction d'une politique des visas toujours plus restrictives. Ainsi, l'idée de cette « responsabilité partagée » de la gestion des frontières souvent évoquée par l'UE et aussi par l'autrice (170) est fortement remise en cause dans ces espaces, que l'on pense au Maroc ou à la Tunisie, alors que de nombreux acteurs de la société civile et même de certaines institutions gouvernementales rejettent les relations asymétriques instituées par l'UE hors de son territoire, ainsi que le rôle de gendarme des frontières européennes qui leur a été attribué avec peu de consultation. Ces derniers revendiquent notamment une approche européenne davantage respectueuse des droits de l'homme. Finalement, nous demeurons dubitatifs quant à cette affirmation en faveur de la « responsabilité partagée » de la gestion des migrations promue par l'autrice, surtout lorsque le transfert de cette responsabilité permet à l'UE de contourner ses obligations internationales, tout particulièrement en matière de protection internationale. En effet, rappelons que la pratique de l'externalisation du contrôle des migrations dans certains États composant la « zone tampon » de l'UE immobilise certains migrants en quête d'une protection internationale dans des États où aucun système de protection n'existe.

L'inclusion de points de vue divergents de ceux promus par les autorités responsables de la gestion des frontières et du contrôle des migrations rencontrées par l'autrice aurait permis de nuancer son propos et de mettre de l'avant des recommandations plus convaincantes pour que l'UE soutienne davantage les droits fondamentaux des migrants les plus vulnérables. Bien que l'ouvrage ait annoncé l'ambition de traiter des paradoxes de la gestion des frontières et de réconcilier les impératifs liés à la sécurité avec la protection des droits de l'homme des migrants, ce dernier aspect apparaît finalement partiellement évacué de la discussion, bien qu'il aurait mérité une plus grande attention compte tenu des dérives documentées du régime européen de gestion des migrations dans l'espace méditerranéen.

Référence

1 Crépeau, François, 2013, Rapport du Rapporteur spécial sur les droits de l'homme des migrants. Étude régionale : la gestion des frontières extérieures de l'Union européenne et ses incidences sur les droits de l'homme des migrants, A/HRC/23/46, 23e session du Conseil des droits de l'homme.

Martine Brouillette is an associate researcher at Laboratoire Migrinter, Université de Poitiers. She can be reached at martine.brouillette@univ-poitiers.fr.