

Cont. from page 5

ports on the number of refugees following the recent invasion of Lebanon by Israel.

Israel Gravinsky, head of the Lebanese Relief Section within the Finance Ministry of Israeli government, was reported to have estimated that there were 20,000 "roofless" people in Israeli-occupied southern Lebanon in July of 1982. The caption under a picture of a devastated Palestinian refugee camp south of Beirut published in an August issue of *Newsview* also reported that 20,000 people were left homeless by the Israeli invasion. On the other hand, a full-page advertisement in the *New York Times*, sponsored by the Ad Hoc Committee in Defense of the Palestinian and Lebanese People, protested vehemently against the invasion which produced 700,000 refugees. An advertisement in the August *New York Review of Books*, sponsored by the American Friends Service Committee, solicited donations to help the 600,000 refugees resulting from the recent attack on the Palestinians and Lebanese.

How many refugees were there in Lebanon following the invasion? 20,000 or 700,000? To answer the question in a useful and accurate way that can contribute to planning relief, you have to categorize the refugees according to their situations and clarify terminology accordingly.

First you must distinguish Lebanese nationals, who would technically be described as internally displaced persons, from Palestinians in Lebanon. The Lebanese in turn have to be divided into five groups:

(1) those in southern Lebanon whose homes were destroyed or so damaged as to be uninhabitable as a result of the Israeli invasion. In August 1982, there were approximately 250 homes destroyed in Tyre and four times that many in Sidon, resulting in about 6,250 Lebanese refugees or "roofless nationals" in southern Lebanon.

(2) those who, as a result of the Israeli defeat of the Palestinians in southern Lebanon, returned to homes destroyed or so damaged as to be uninhabitable as a result of the civil war and, in particular, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) conflict with Lebanese in 1975-76 and after. Six hundred Lebanese Christians have returned to the town of Damour, which was occupied and totally destroyed by the PLO in the 1975-76 war. Of the 6,000 people who once lived there, some have found new homes, but many have been in temporary shelters and may wish to return.

These estimated 5,000 Lebanese refugees are also "roofless nationals", but their situation predated the Israeli invasion; even though some are still "roofless", they can be said to have benefited from the war because they have at least regained their land on which they

can rebuild their homes.

(3) those who were refugees as a result of the 1975-76 war but who recovered their homes and their lands following the invasion. 50,000 Lebanese refugees from Nabatieh returned to that city following the ouster of the PLO by the Israelis.

Loz  
Re  
Lc  
An (

The Honourable  
Minister  
and

Dear Mr. Axworthy,

In the *Toronto Star* of October 6, 1982, your advisor on immigration, Ian Rankin, suggests that Canada's refugee intake will be reduced in response to financial constraints of the federal government. In the *Globe and Mail* of October 7, 1982, you suggest that a reduction is being considered in response to our unemployment problems. Neither rationalization is valid. Reducing Canada's refugee intake because of these economic constraints is both inappropriate and unnecessary.

It may be one thing to reduce overall immigration levels in response to high unemployment in Canada. It is quite another to reduce the refugee intake. People who are persecuted; people who are stateless; people who are mired in the hopelessness of refugee camps, should not suffer further from our economic problems. Canadians' problems are fairly minor by comparison. It should not be forgotten that unemployment levels were invoked to keep out Jewish refugees in the 1930's.

As for the financial constraints of the government, reductions in unnecessary government expenditures should be made whenever possible, in good times and in bad. But reductions should not be made at the expense of refugees. Fortunately, we know that we can reduce the costs of resettling refugees without reducing the numbers of refugees we take in. How? The research reports of your ministry point the way. By combining the

human support of private sponsors with government financial resources.

Privately sponsored Indochinese refugees were resettled at a direct cost of approximately one third less than government-assisted refugees. This was not because the private sector was more efficient. The employees of your department working in this field were dedicated, knowledgeable and extraordinarily hard-working. But civil servants cannot be expected to look for an old unused chest of drawers in their aunt's basement or to rustle up jobs and housing through friends and acquaintances. By adopting a new model for sponsorship that would involve private sponsors in the resettlement of every refugee in Canada, we could bring in the number of refugees we brought in last year for the reduced amount of money that is available this year.

The annual refugee plan could be established on the understanding that the private sector would participate fully in meeting the levels in the plan. If sufficient effort were forthcoming on the part of the private sector, then, since the costs of resettling each refugee would be higher, the intake would be reduced to fit within the budget allocations for refugee resettlement.

Such a plan might include the following provisions:

1. All refugees brought into the country during the first half of the

(4) those who have fled Beirut and are temporarily without shelter. 30,000 -60,000 citizens of West Beirut have fled the city, some of whom have lost their homes, but the majority of whom have simply fled the battle scene and are temporarily homeless. These people would

technically be described as temporarily displaced persons.

(5) those whose homes are destroyed or so damaged as to be uninhabitable as a result of the Israeli - PLO fighting in West Beirut

(6) those whose homes were destroyed in the internecine fighting in

West Beirut. The numbers of such Lebanese citizens are estimated in the thousands.

Thus, it is accurate but terribly misleading to say that there were over 100,000 Lebanese refugees following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. There may have been 100,000 Lebanese citizens uprooted in the turmoil in Lebanon in the past few years, but the situations of these people, the causes of their situations and their present needs, differ radically.

If reports on the Lebanese refugees are confusing, those on the Palestinians are even more so. Some Palestinians are registered refugees: basically those who arrived in 1948 following the creation of the State of Israel, and their children. These refugees are entitled to rations and benefits from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Some are unregistered: basically those who arrived in 1970 following King Hussein's slaughter of the PLO in Black September. Other Palestinian refugees have become Lebanese citizens but have never been struck from the official rolls of UNRWA.

Furthermore, the basic information on camp populations before the invasion is confusing. For example, the official population of the camp that was totally razed, Ein Hilweh, was 24,340 refugees. However, an UNRWA official said that since 1969 the PLO had not allowed them to check their figures. Deaths were often not reported and to compensate for this, UNRWA had adopted a policy of not registering more than five children in a family unless a death was also registered. Some registered Palestinians had moved into town or were working abroad in Bahrain or Kuwait or Abu Dhabi and had leased their camp homes to Egyptian or Syrian migrant workers. Also, PLO volunteers from Pakistan and Bangladesh lived in the camp. In addition, it is estimated that as many as 10,000 unregistered refugees lived in the camp, including many militants and their families. The destruction of Ein Hilweh alone can be estimated to have produced as many as 30,000 "roofless refugees", most of whom would be stateless Palestinians.

According to UNRWA there are approximately 107,000 registered refugees living in southern Lebanon, of whom around 60,000 lived in camps and 47,000 in towns and cities. Some refugee camps were only slightly damaged in the fighting and Palestinians, both registered and unregistered, remained in those camps. On the other hand, Ein Hilweh in Sidon and Rashidieh in Tyre were completely destroyed in the battle between the Israelis and the PLO. El-Buss and Burj el-

Cont. on page 8

# ring gees els

## Letter

Lloyd Axworthy,  
Employment  
Migration

year would be privately sponsored, with the exception of any urgent cases for which sponsors were not forthcoming. Based on the number of sponsorship applications made, projections would be made for the second half of the year to indicate the amount of the refugee resettlement budget that would be needed for the sponsorships involving private groups. Any remaining funds would be spent on direct government sponsorship of refugees. In this way, the total intake would be a direct reflection of the efforts of the private sector.

2. All private sponsorship groups would receive a basic allowance of \$500.00 from the government for each refugee sponsored within the levels tabled in Parliament.

3. The allowance would be increased by \$500.00 if the refugee sponsored did not have a minimum proficiency in English or French.

4. The allowance would be increased by \$500.00 if the sponsorship group did not share with the refugee some kinship such as family, ethnic or religious identification.

5. A further \$500.00 per refugee would be available in a back-up fund to be disbursed to sponsors upon proof of necessary expenditures beyond the basic allowances.

6. Private sponsors would provide the government with audited statements of their expenditures, indicating that any funds left over from the allowances had been donated to an approved charity involved in assisting refugees (e.g., a church or a refugee aid organization).

This model undoubtedly has some shortcomings, and it is only one of many possibilities. But we do not have to solve the problem of a specific model at this time. Legislation requires only that the levels for refugee intake be tabled in Parliament. The same levels as last year could be tabled with the clear understanding that the resettlement efforts will have to be undertaken within greater financial constraints; and that therefore, in order to meet the levels, the involvement of the private sector will be needed. The private sector can then be invited to work out an effective plan for meeting the levels *within* the government's financial constraints — a plan which at the same time can be fairer to sponsors and more effective for refugees.

Yours Sincerely,



Howard Adelman