



CANADA'S PERIODICAL ON REFUGEES

REFUGEE

Volume 11, Number 2

December 1991

Refugee Determination

Bill C-55 Revisited

Introduction

Bill C-55 is to be revisited, again! Once more we are going to debate whether the refugee determination system is being abused, and in danger of being overrun. What is one to do with the people who arrive at an immigration officer's desk at Pearson Airport and claim to have no documents?

This won't be the only question raised by those critical of the number of refugees entering the refugee determination system. Should the Safe Third Country provision be implemented, at least for the United States, even if only to put pressure on the Americans to introduce visas for Somalis and Sri Lankans? Can't the process be altered so that rejected claimants actually get deported?

For those who support refugees, the issue will not be rebutting the

assumptions behind such questions, but ensuring these are not the central questions. It will be important to formulate the issues so that *all* aspects of the problems are dealt with and not

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just the problems of enforcement, or humanitarianism for that matter. Even if the proposal is to strike a balance between these two poles, it could mean fairness is sacrificed to control. What is really needed is fairness period. Enforcement is a critical ingredient of ensuring fairness.

C-55 once again. But let's not all rush out to work the ramparts for either side. Let's cooperate together to find a system that is even fairer than the present one; fair not only to the refugees but to all Canadians and to those who carry the primary responsibility for guarding the entry into Canada.

Compassion Versus Control

Where are immigration and refugee issues going in the 1990s? On the 19th and 20th of November, for the first time in nineteen years, the Deputy Minister of Immigration invited

all Canada Immigration Centre managers to Aylmer, Quebec to meet with headquarters management and their partners from other branches and departments for an Immigration Strategic Planning Conference. They came to help set the department's direction. The central issue repeated at all the

"pavilions" was the spontaneous arrival of refugees. Preparations are underway again to change immigration legislation in Canada, particularly Bill C-55.

What is the department's view of the problems Canada faces? First, they see millions of people on the move. Second, they regard their freedom to develop policy limited by three constraints: the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Federal-Provincial relations and the budget. Third, they view strategic planning, based on innova-

tive approaches, as the means to finding answers.

Strategic planning entails a partnership with other stakeholders — not only those employed to deal with immigration and refugee issues, but those committed to the same goals. That is why it is crucial that people committed to refugees help define those goals. Strategic planning, as the Associate Deputy Minister Peter Harder has said, involves both poetry and plumbing; both the vision and the operational plan to achieve that vision.

Positive precedents are already in place. The extensive planning exercise to develop the five-year plan on immigration is over. So is the Canada Immigration Centre Equals Service (CIC=Service) task force which set in place a plan to improve services to clients. For instance, nannies and other clients no longer have to line up at 4:00 a.m. to get their permits renewed or to become landed. It is now handled by mail. Strategic planning entails a set of targets and an analysis of the means to reach them. Unless both dovetail, strategic planning is a waste of time.

That is why the immigration department managers are critical. Unless they share the goals and see that the instruments are in place to deliver fair and efficient services, the hallmark of immigration and refugee policy will be incoherence.

There is a need to reconcile an immigration levels policy and a heartfelt commitment to quality of service.

This can never be achieved as long as the method of setting such targets ensures the impossibility of providing quality service. The department has set goals on integration for those who arrive here as immigrants. They also have interdiction and deterrence programs to prevent others from getting here. A coherent goal concerning refugees still has to be worked out. No integration policy is in place for those who arrive spontaneously, claim refugee status and get accepted. At the same time, genuine refugees are clearly prevented from arriving here by an interdiction and a deterrence policy directed at any illegal movements. A major Case Management branch preoccupation concerns legal challenges to refugee determination and the handful of sensational cases of "criminals" claiming refugee status. A goal has yet to be articulated that integrates our legislated commitment to humanitarianism and the necessity for controls. How we deal with and revise the refugee determination system will be the fulcrum upon which all immigration policy for the nineties will be decided.

Is the refugee determination system "overburdened and in danger of collapse" as depicted in the briefing booklet provided to the managers and then repeated by the port of entry managers in their feedback to National Headquarters? Or is the system in balance, as indicated at the Immigration Strategic Planning Conference itself, processing as many claims as enter the system and needing only

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REFUGE

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fine tuning to make it work even better?

Is the goal of the whole system to deter as many refugee claimants as possible from reaching our shores, whether genuine or not, while providing a reasonably fair system if the claimants are ingenious enough to traverse all the hurdles put in their way? Or is the goal to ensure that all refugees in need of protection are fairly and considerately treated and that Canada accepts a fair share of the burden of this obligation?

This is a very different goal than one based on the spectre of loss of sovereign control, masses of economic migrants abusing the refugee determination system and impossible burdens on our social and economic structures. It is a very different vision than one in which the media, spurred on by refugee advocacy groups, is viewed as an enemy more concerned with the risk to individual claimants than the danger to Canadian society and institutions. A very different strategic plan will be developed if one sees the main challenge as assuaging irrational fears that can give rise to a backlash versus ensuring that refugee determination is fair and expeditious.

Bill C-55 again. New proposals will soon go to Cabinet. How does the Minister view this challenge?

In his opening address to the conference, the Honourable Bernard Valcourt hit the following themes: a strong commitment to immigration: Canada's need for immigrants of the highest quality; an unwillingness to be compromised by self-selection and disrespect for the law — enforcement is not a dirty word; compassion is both a goal and a legal requirement that requires good judgment to main-

A MAJOR CASE MANAGEMENT BRANCH PREOCCUPATION CONCERNS LEGAL CHALLENGES TO REFUGEE DETERMINATION AND THE HANDFUL OF SENSATIONAL CASES OF "CRIMINALS" CLAIMING REFUGEE STATUS.

tain the integrity of the system.


Stan Oziewicz, *The Globe and Mail* immigration specialist, told me he was struck by the repeated stress on enforcement by both the Minister and senior staff. Certainly, the stress was on control over compassion. But in examining my notes on the speech, the vision was not clear. Was it necessary to ensure enforcement and then allow fairness to be dispensed only to those who got through the controls?

Or was enforcement an aspect of ensuring fairness, both for the refugee claimants and for Canadians? Or did fairness to those refugees *really in need*, as some of the immigration managers told me, require restricting the refugee determination system and its enormous costs as much as possible? Further, if there was a commitment to "qual-

ity" immigrants, did this goal mean that spontaneous arrivals, whose quality could not be checked in advance, should be restricted in their access to the Canadian system as much as was legally and internationally possible?

The emphasis on control and enforcement emerged in several of the workshops I attended, most clearly, as would be expected, in the workshop run by the enforcement branch. Their display dealing with the prob-

CLAIMS PENDING (INITIAL + FULL HEARING STAGES)



* ESTIMATE (Includes approx. 2,500 decisions pending)

** ESTIMATE (based on EIC data, Includes 3,000 claims not yet referred to hearing offices)

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All charts and graphs in this issue, unless otherwise indicated, are reproduced courtesy of the Immigration and Refugee Board.

blems they faced and the instruments being developed to detect phoney visas and passports, and to interdict illegal movements was impressive. But their absolute commitment to enforcement without any apparent consideration of the humanitarian obligations of our legislation was a matter of distress. Those in the enforcement branch face huge challenges — people using every illegal means possible to get into Canada, huge numbers and far too few resources to protect Canadians and their legal system. Bleeding-heart journalists and refugee advocates are often viewed as enemies undermining enforcement officers' efforts. And it is true that most refugee advocates rhetorically grant a need for enforcement but pay little or no attention to how one can reconcile the problem of control with humanitarian concerns.

If the enforcement people displayed a sense of discipline and go-get-em-gung ho spirit, the managers concerned with ports of entry were frustrated and demoralized. They are responsible for controlling entry into Canada, but a large group of individuals, who they believe are largely economic migrants, enter Canada without documents simply by saying they are refugees from country X. Most of them are fast-tracked without anyone satisfactorily confirming whether or not they actually come from the

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LEEDING-HEART JOURNALISTS AND REFUGEE ADVOCATES ARE OFTEN VIEWED AS ENEMIES UNDERMINING ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS' EFFORTS.

country they say they do and, when they are given the benefit of the doubt, that they are indeed refugees. Hardly anyone is deported.

This is how a port of entry manager views their situation:

The refugee determination system in place prior to January 1989 was considered unworkable. C-55 gave the promise of regaining control. The results thus far have been disappointing in that Canada continues to attract large numbers of economic migrants. The "pull factor" is highly evident at our airports. Our generous social services and the all-encompassing rights accorded by the Charter are incentives to attracting claimants to Canada. These factors support the statements that Canada stands in the forefront as one of the most tolerant and generous countries to refugees, be they economic migrants or genuine asylum seekers. The lack of a Safe-Third Country policy combined with our inability to remove in a timely fashion com-

pound "the pull-factor" [my emphasis]. At some of our major international airports staff are bombarded with refugee claimants, most of them without passports or airline tickets, arriving at peak traffic times.

Of course, the managers have no evidence that these claimants include large numbers of economic migrants. Nor do they have evidence that social

welfare acts as a pull factor. Their frustration at the wide disparities between their control responsibilities and their obligation to allow entry to refugee claimants, even if they destroy or pass on their ticket stubs and passports, emerges in an expression of demoralization. What they claim to be facts may be the inherited myths of the department, but they also may be true. Unless one develops a refugee determination system that establishes the "facts" and takes into account, in its structure, the frustrations of officers responsible for controlling the borders, we will not have developed a system that is both fair to refugees and to the staff responsible for meeting those refugees in the first place.

The challenge may not be to construct better enforcement mechanisms, nor to ensure the refugee determination system is fairer to all refugees in need of protection. The challenge is to ensure that we have a better enforcement mechanism so that refugees can be fairly treated, so that the Canadian immigration system serves guests and immigrants who we want and who want to come to Canada, and so that Canadians who are here can extend the hand of justice without that hand being twisted by criminals and those who would abuse our hospitality and our legitimate interest in our own welfare and improvement.

This issue of *Refuge* is dedicated to providing material so that those concerned with refugee issues can enter the debate on refugee determination system reform with a better understanding of some of the issues at stake.

REMOVALS

	NOT CONVENTION REFUGEES				REMOVED			
	January - August				January - August			
	1989	1990	1991	Total	1989	1990	1991	Total
INITIAL	570	966	991	2527	325	401	587	1213
FULL	562	2913	4700	8175	24	162	399	585
TOTAL	1132	3879	5691	10702	349	563	986	1898

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Guest Editorial

Refugee Determination *What's Next?*

By Guy S. Goodwin-Gill

As soon as it was in place, Canada's new procedure for determining refugee status came face to face with numbers of claimants running twice as high as expected. Not queues of migrants looking for a way around immigration selection this time, but people from countries in conflict, many with a distinctly well-founded fear of persecution, or otherwise facing unacceptable degrees of risk in their homelands.

Case-by-case determination is an expensive business, no matter where you are. In Canada, besides the claimant, the law mandates interpreters, two-member panels, counsel, and case and hearings officers be present at hearings, all of whom have to be scheduled and paid for.

But what are the objectives of determination proceedings? Identifying who are the refugees in need of protection, and making sure they don't get sent back to situations of danger? Yes. Fulfilling our own *Charter* obligations? Certainly.

The U.N. General Assembly, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and supporting States all talk of "fair and expeditious" proceedings. "Fairness," it may be assumed, implies a reasonable measure of correctness, rather than mere procedural formality. Efficiency and expedition will serve both the refugee's interests (protection, security and stability) and those of the State (assuring itself and its people that protection goes to those who need it). Like it or not, and many

don't, good management and the integrity of the processes of refugee determination also means returning those who do not meet the criteria and have no alternative claim on our protection or hospitality.

To that extent, Canada has been "fortunate," receiving the majority of its refugee claimants from countries in conflict. This has allowed the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) and the Canada Employment and Immigration Commission (CEIC) to implement administrative "streaming" of claims most likely to succeed. Save in a tiny minority of cases, some seven or eight percent of the total, the controversial initial hearing into eligibility and credible basis has been effectively abolished.

This sort of experience tells us we need flexibility. There's no sense locking ourselves into structured hearings, if we all know the answer is "yes" (though a minority of counsel might disagree, ever anxious to represent our interests at conception and grave, and all stages in between). The apparently sound cases should be moved rapidly through the process to solution.

But that still leaves the potentially negative claims, the borderline and the just plain hard. If our source countries changed, if conditions became just too difficult to judge with accuracy, could we cope with substantial numbers?

It's questions like these that periodically engage refugee advocates in countries now facing requests for asylum and protection. For many the answers are simple: first, keep people away with visas and airline sanctions; second, if that fails, have an official armed with broad discretion make a

first decision, free from the constraints of due process, appeal or judicial review. Canada's experience over the last three years, however, suggests that a more positive response, both nationally and between States, is possible.

Frequently criticized from overseas for its "high recognition rate," Canada's procedure since 1989 is nevertheless worth a second look. First, Parliament took a decision for the asylum-seeker, by requiring unanimity for negative decisions. Whatever the "efficiency" of two-member panels (and they *are* institutionally rare), that choice by Parliament uniquely incorporates the benefit of the doubt. Secondly, though somewhat circumspectly and not in all cases, Parliament opted in principle for an informal and non-adversarial process. And thirdly, IRB decided to put considerable resources into making accurate, up-to-date country of origin information available to counsel and decision-makers.

Of course, this does not mean we get correct or perfect decisions all the time. Certain attitudes and inclinations remain untouched by facts, unimproved by training. But overall these elements offer a rational basis for distinguishing the Canadian approach to refugee determination from many others.

That difference is not a reason for self-satisfaction, but rather leads us to ask, what are the core elements in our process that could be enhanced? What additional improvements could be made? How, if at all, can dollars be saved, and perhaps earmarked for other critical areas of refugee assistance? Where does Canada's contribution fit into the often forgotten in-

ternational dimension of refugee protection and solutions?

A Non-Adversarial Process Works Best

Though suspected criminal or national security cases may require a different process, refugee determination is best dealt with in a procedure that is informal and essentially non-adversarial. This approach, which does not mean abandoning inquiry in the face of inconsistency, is relatively new in Canadian decision-making. Its potential is gradually being worked out, particularly between refugee hearings officers and counsel. What it offers in a hearing, is that element of flexibility which is most conducive to case presentation and eliciting a narrative.

Two-Member Panels Work Well

Some argue that decisions could be taken by a single decision-maker, more cheaply and more accountably, but that is not the only issue. What is important is that key responsibilities, namely, the assessment of the claimant's credibility and the risk which he or she may face, if returned, are *shared* in a process which allows the benefit of the doubt. This is not a soft option; it reflects the very real problems in weighing the evidence and the narrative. Do away with two-member panels, and an in-depth review of the first decision is inescapable.

Country of Origin Information is Essential

Good decisions depend on good information. Canada's system for gathering and disseminating information is recognized, nationally and abroad, as a model for what can and should be done. Accurate information has a way of influencing outcomes; but it has to

be used, and decision-makers are equally responsible for its appropriate use and dissemination.

Judicial Review is Not the Answer

Refugee cases are fact-specific. Ninety-five percent turn on the assessment of risk and the assessment of credibility. The Federal Court, far removed from the claimant (and incidentally no respecter of confidentiality or risk), is ill-suited to review such issues, though it will often wrestle its way into the transcript to point up faulty reasoning or inappropriate inferences. Its most usual province is in reviewing administrative legality, often the least concern of the rejected claimant, and it is not designed or resourced to act as a full court of appeal. Better therefore to concentrate on improving the first decision, and on institutionalizing a transparent process that generates confidence in its capacity to do justice.

Any Appeal?

A continuing concern of refugee advocates in Canada is the absence from the present process of any "appeal on merits." No international rule mandates such an appeal, though in 1977 the UNHCR Executive Committee recommended that rejected applicants be accorded an administrative or judicial opportunity "to appeal for a formal reconsideration of the decision." In this regard, what can be achieved in light of the objectives described above? A full re-hearing is impractical from time and management perspectives, and wasteful of resources. But it may be essential if the first decision-maker sits alone to rule on credibility and risk. Maintain a two-member panel, operating in a non-adversarial context with doubt formally resolved in favour of the claimant, and a re-hearing is arguable unnecessary. Optically, taking a second look at negative decisions does

make sense, however, and may well avoid committing the system to removals in cases which should not have slipped through. The art is to design such a second look in a way that maximizes effectiveness, while not bottlenecking proceedings, perhaps by structuring the process around a new sense of the record of the hearing or making use of tapes, for example, rather than transcripts.

Not Home Alone

The international system of refugee protection is not just the sum of its individual component parts. Canada's contribution is essential to the resolution of the human side of coerced migration, but lasting answers will not be found without increased cooperation.

Back in 1951, and even in the time of the League of Nations, States accepted that the refugee problem was international in scope, and not to be borne by any one State alone. The processes of cooperation are still being developed, but progress is coming. National perceptions, however, often lag behind.

The bureaucrat who sees his or her country as the only desirable destination for every refugee, asylum-seeker or migrant has a replicate in the advocate who thinks that this is as it should be, and that only in his or her country can the refugee, asylum-seeker or migrant find justice (or at least a better deal than anywhere else). The irony is that though the bureaucrat and the advocate rarely speak to one another (they may shout, but that's another matter), they are joined by the same common chauvinism — a petty nationalism still unable to embrace, let alone imagine, an international cooperative approach to refugee issues, or a response other than one circumscribed by the narrow rules of recognition and denial.

States participating in the international regime of refugee protection

have obligations and responsibilities. These include not only the specific duties accepted on ratification of conventions and covenants, but also general responsibilities towards the system as a whole: ensuring that the criteria of protection are applied, generously and appropriately; ensuring that no other State bears a disproportionate share of the charge upon the international community as a whole; engaging with other States in undertakings and arrangements designed to improve the overall performance of the system and enhance the refugee's chance of a lasting solution to their plight.

The so-called "Safe Third Country" provisions of Bill C-55 have never been brought into force, for obvious politi-

cal and humanitarian reasons. They represented a unilateral basis for disposing of those deemed to be some other country's responsibility. The lack of agreement among States on this issue has long been a major problem for refugees unable to find a country of refuge. From the perspective of the international protection of refugees, there can therefore be no objection to arrangements between States to this effect, provided, that is, they conform to prevailing standards. If States are to agree on their shared responsibility in the determination of claims, this presupposes conformity with basic procedural and interpretative guarantees, as well as agreement on the quality of the solution to be offered.

Such objectives will not be achieved without some form of international supervision and monitoring, or without international involvement in implementation. If those conditions can be met, the formal approach to State responsibilities may become a substantive path to improved standards of national protection.

The standards which Canada sets and maintains in protection and the refugee status determination will have their impact on the whole system. Already, we are better able to understand the individual side to flight. We should not lose that resource or jettison the means for tapping in. We should work effectively with others to resolve and avert the problems to come.

Invitational Workshops*

**These two workshops,
originally scheduled for
November 1991, have been
rescheduled for the week
of 3 - 7 February 1992.**

HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

The emergence of a novel international practice for securing the safety of persons within a particular state or region (eg., the case of the Kurds) has motivated the need for a new framework of analysis, where state self-interests are not the ultimate rationale.

Partners: CRS and YCISS

Place: York University

Date: 4 February 1992

Contact: Farhana Mather (416) 736-5663

PHASE II:

TOWARDS A PRACTICAL EARLY WARNING SYSTEM: REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS

The ability to anticipate refugee flows and develop practical implementation plans for early warning systems is the subject of this workshop, now in its second phase of discussions.

Place: King City, Ontario

Date: 3,4,5,6, 7 February 1992

Contact: Farhana Mather (416) 736-5663

* Attendance at the above workshops is by invitation only.

Refugee Determination

Commentary by Howard Adelman

The International Context

The Cold War is over. The necessity for Western countries to prove they protect human rights while the communist states persecute their own citizens is no longer required. Further, the current international crisis replacing the Cold War is testimony to the disintegration of multinational states, the fragmentation of sovereignty and the weakening of state controls in general. This has been accompanied by a dramatic increase in national conflicts and an exchange of populations more characteristic of refugee flows between the first two world wars than the refugee regime that became pre-eminent after the beginning of the Cold War. While Iranians flee a repressive regime and Somalis and Sudanese flee civil war, Kurds, Croats from the areas of Croatia bombarded and captured by Serbia, Soviet Jews and Armenians, Tamils from Sri Lanka, and many others flee due to inter-ethnic conflict and persecution.

At the same time, Western states have become pro-active on behalf of the protection of refugees. Instead of insisting

that Turkey follow the U.N. Convention and allow the Kurds in Northern Iraq fleeing Saddam Hussein's vengeful massacre into Turkey, the Turks were allowed to close their doors, and France, Great Britain and the United States intervened militarily *within* Iraq to create a safe haven for the Kurdish refugees.


At the same time, the UNHCR now stresses repatriation. Only 45,000 refugees are cited by UNHCR as in need of permanent resettlement. By this reckoning, virtually none of the Somalis need to be resettled in Canada.

There have also been moves to har-

monize refugee determination so that the procedures do not lead to such radically different results. For example, the Schengen Treaty groups France, Germany and the Benelux countries in a common system of regulation. In Europe, Turks had a 38 percent acceptance rate in France, but only 3.2 percent in Germany. There seems to be no consistency in a system that was purportedly based on a *universal* human rights doctrine. In North America, hardly any Salvadoreans were accepted in the United States until recent changes in U.S. legislation, while Salvadoreans had high acceptance rates during the same period in Canada.

Complementing dramatic changes in the international political system, there have been dramatic changes in the domestic politics of countries where refugee claims are being made. These include a voting public that increasingly distrusts politicians, a new upsurge in populism and populist parties, which have increased their support by exploiting anti-immigration sentiment. Recognition rates of refugee claimants have fallen in virtually all refugee

CLAIMS RECEIVED AND PROCESSED
INITIAL AND FULL HEARINGS
(MONTHLY AVERAGE)



* BASED ON REVISED EIC INTAKE DATA
** INCLUDE CLAIMS WITHDRAWN/ABANDONED

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determination systems, giving the impression of an upsurge in non-bona fide claimants, but it may be the result of governments tightening up the process and refugee adjudicators becoming more experienced and better able to recognize repetitious tales.

Canada is in a severe recession. But so is most of the rest of the world. If Canada's costs for refugee determination are in excess of \$200,000,000, the total world cost is estimated to be in excess of \$5 billion.

What then is the result of the whole process? Only a small percentage of those rejected are actually deported. If one calculates the costs per case deported, the figure is enormous. For how can you deport someone if they have no documents to establish their country of origin? Almost 70 percent of all arrivals are now undocumented. The result is that public support for the system is undermined and the staff responsible for controlling our borders are demoralized. No one can understand why all this money is being spent — to do what?

Why Now?

Cabinet will once more be asked to change the way refugee claimants are considered and dealt with in Canada.

Why?

We still have the rest of the backlog to clean up. For the first time since the upsurge in refugee claimants began in the 1980s, the number of refugee claims has actually declined from the year before. For the first time the refugee determination system is functioning well enough that we are not building a new backlog. More cases are being handled and processed than are being received.

Why then is refugee determination up for reconsideration?

There are four factors at work. They can be summarized as a matter of feet, guts, heart and head. What do I mean by this?

First, there is the matter of costs — money enough to put shoes on the feet of refugees all around the world. Per refugee processed, Canada has

MAJOR SOURCE COUNTRIES NATIONAL

	% TOTAL 1989	% TOTAL 1990	% TOTAL 1 JAN - 30 SEPT 1991
SRI LANKA	16%	12%	13%
SOMALIA	14	11	12
LEBANON	10	6	4
IRAN	6	6	5
CHINA	6	8	5
EL SALVADOR	6	6	5
POLAND	4	2	*
PAKISTAN	2	3	3
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	2	1	*
GHANA	2	3	4
BULGARIA	1	7	2
U.S.S.R.	*	1	6
OTHERS	31	33	40
TOTAL INTAKE	20,742	36,559	22,641

SOURCE: EIC

*LESS THAN ONE PERCENT

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the most expensive refugee determination system in the world. If we add onto the \$90,000,000 it costs to administer the refugee determination system, taking into account only the costs of running, administering and backing up the Refugee Board, the costs of legal aid estimated at \$30,000,000 at a minimum, the costs of welfare estimated at another \$60,000,000 (the longer the procedure leading to the initial inquiry, the greater the costs), and the costs to the Canadian Employment and Immigration Commission (CEIC) and other departments for adjudication, federal court costs, deportation, etc., we have a system that costs over \$200,000,000. Some would argue the expenditures on refugee determination are actually much higher, particularly if the costs of the various other bureaucracies at the federal, provincial and municipal levels are taken into account as well as the large costs to the department itself in dealing with refugee entry on a case-by-case basis that undermines all the systems put in place to control borders. This is at a time of huge budget deficits and a severe recession, when the costs of all government departments are up for scrutiny and welfare rolls have swollen beyond

anything Canadians have ever imagined since the Great Depression. When the UNHCR, dealing with 15 million refugees around the world compared to the 30,000 we deal with inside Canada, has a budget only slightly more than twice Canada's to deal with 200 times more refugees, and when it is faced with the challenge of assisting in the repatriation of up to half of those 15,000,000 refugees to Vietnam, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Mozambique, etc., the need to run a lean operation is readily apparent. The question is, will it become mean in order to be lean?

There is a second reason — fear. Germany has 260,000 refugee claimants. France has over 80,000. Will Europeans be faced with as many as 5,000,000 or more people in flight from the effects of the disintegrating Soviet Union. The Europeans are already tightening up their systems. Britain, which experienced an upsurge of claims from 5,000 to an estimated 50,000 this year, introduced a new Asylum Bill in October 1991 to fingerprint refugee claimants and create a common European data base on refugee claimants. In spite of a stinging rebuke of the proposals by the UNHCR, Kenneth Baker, the Home

Secretary responsible for the legislation, is forging ahead with its legislation. Refugee claimants determined to be coming from Safe First Countries, that is, countries deemed to be non-refugee producing, will be deported within 48 hours as will claimants arriving from other European countries deemed automatically to be Safe Third Countries.

The Dublin Agreement made the country where the refugee claimant first arrived carry the primary responsibility for determining the claim. This is to prevent refugee asylum shopping and duplicate claims. Eight other tests will be used to deny a refugee claimant credibility: failure to apply immediately on arrival, failure to make prompt and full disclosure of all facts, lack of travel documents, involvement in political activities in the U.K., which might make them targets back home, the failure to seek refuge in another part of their country where they would not be under threat. (Canadian justice department lawyers are already researching the legal basis for such a rule, which could for example be applicable to Tamils from Sri Lanka.) Other refugee claimants will be fast-tracked, given only a paper review if they are deemed to have little merit. (Denial of an oral hearing was made illegal in Canada based on the Singh case, the catalyst for creating the current refugee determination system.) Legal aid for refugee claimants to obtain independent legal counsel will be abolished, as well as entitlements to housing. Though the refugee claimant queue is now about fourteen months, Britain plans to process a refugee claimant within three months.

This is but one step in the alleged attempt to create Fortress Europe, whereby governments are reacting to the rise of vigilante action against refugees and the increase in support for populist parties running on anti-immigration, anti-refugee and racist platforms. Le Pen is only the best known of these. In the last Swedish election, there was a burst of support for a populist anti-immigration party. The political efforts are not only di-

rected towards dramatically toughening up the refugee claims system but at drastically reducing the ELRs, those granted Exceptional Leave to Remain. For although Europeans permit a far smaller proportion of refugee claimants to win their claims, they deport only a very small proportion of those rejected.

As the Europeans tighten their system, Canadian officials anticipate Canada will more and more become the asylum country of choice. Refugee claimants will be drawn towards the system which is the softest or most liberal. The overflow from Europe will impact on Canada. The Yugoslav crisis has alone produced one million displaced persons, half of whom have fled Yugoslavia altogether. This is the result of a multinational state disintegrating. There are a myriad of others.

Thus, although the number of refugee claimants arriving in Canada has begun to shrink, and the existing world refugee population is expected to decline dramatically as repatriation proceeds, Western states are haunted by fears that they are vulnerable to forces they cannot control or handle once set in motion. If Canada merely declared the United States a Safe Third Country, one-third of the claimants who arrive via the United States could be sent back for processing there. Somalis and Tamils who arrive via New York would be sent back to the U.S., putting pressure on the American Government to impose a visa requirement on those countries that are sources of refugee claimants.

In addition to money and fear, very basic and primary forces, there are others just as fundamental though not as spectacular in terms of money and numbers. These include political sensitivity to the consequences of stories appearing in the press about people allegedly either taking advantage of the refugee process or being victimized by it. No minister or department likes to see headlines and front page stories day after day as convicted murderers in the United States or terrorists elsewhere use the refugee process to delay and hopefully prevent extradition. Bambi may have

been the victim of a frame-up. But is a victim of a miscarriage of justice in the United States a refugee? If she is, does that open the door to every criminally convicted individual to escape to Canada and claim refugee status where the Canadian Government, at great cost to the taxpayers, will be required to determine whether there indeed has been a miscarriage of justice. When the stories tell a tale of an individual allegedly victimized by the American justice system, the Minister and the department get it from both sides, condemned for coddling a convicted murderer and for using the full weight of the bureaucracy to force a poor victim back into the jaws of a conspiratorial system of which she is a victim. No minister likes to read that an Iranian woman, who was allegedly arrested at a private party for not wearing a veil and then tortured, is about to be deported as a rejected refugee claimant. Because of the privacy of a file, the Minister cannot explain why the claimant was rejected or why he did not accept the claimant initially on humanitarian grounds. The clear public impression is that the system has inflicted further cruelty on a woman who has already suffered more than enough.

Money! Fear! Sensitivity! But there is also another reason. This is an excellent time to make repairs to a system that is not presently under pressure. Further, there is a general move towards rationalization and harmonization amongst the receiving countries — the Dublin Agreement, the Schengen Treaty, etc. The requirement of rationality has been given an impetus in Canada. We will be hosting an informal consultation of Western states on refugee determination in June 1992. Canada wants to show its system at its best. That means putting in process measures to correct flaws in the system now for implementation prior to the June consultation.

For Canadians concerned with the protection of refugees, however, the question remains the same. Will Canada follow Britain's lead and implement the Safe Third Country provision of Bill C-55? In the effort to

make the system more efficacious, will fairness be sacrificed? Or will the search for rationalization make the system more effective so that it is fairer both for the refugee and the Canadian taxpayer, citizen and voter?

Issues of Access

The best way to manage a refugee determination system is to allow as few claimants as possible entry into the system. It will keep out abusers, claimants fleeing refugee producing situations and perhaps many who would be considered Convention Refugees even under the most restrictive system. What are the techniques?

Visa controls are one way to limit the numbers of those who can arrive at the ports of entry of your country. Interdicting people about to board airplanes with illegal documents is another method. Fining airlines for transporting individuals with improper documents is a third technique. All three are widely used now, though many airlines don't pay the fines (KLM) and dare the Canadian Government to take them to court. The airlines prevent many from gaining access to the port of entry so that they cannot even access the refugee determination system.

There are another set of techniques available to turn people back who reach a port of entry. They are simply denied access to the refugee determination system. The new British legislation will provide for designating countries as Safe Countries of Origin — SCOs (not to confuse Safe Country of Origin with Safe Third Country). Sweden would presumably be designated as such. Though there is the odd American and European who claim refugee status in Canada, these are few and far between. Since such a provision has been deemed to be in breach of the Convention by the UNHCR and would likely be deemed by the Supreme Court of Canada to be in breach of the Canadian Charter, it hardly seems worth the effort. For the substance of a refugee determination hearing is to determine whether the

INITIAL HEARING

Objectives

- to deny access to persons:
 - who, for example, have been recognized by any other country to be Convention refugees or who can have the merits of their claims decided in another "safe" country
 - whose claims have no "credible basis"

Decisions

There are three types of decisions made at the initial hearing, in the following order:

1. immigration issues (adjudicator only):

- is the person inadmissible to Canada?
- has the person violated immigration law?
- should the person be admitted, allowed to come into or remain in Canada?
- should the person be detained or released?

2. eligibility (adjudicator & Immigration and Refugee Board member):

- did the claimant pass through a "safe third country"? [not implemented]
- does the claimant have refugee status in another country?
- has the claimant, since last coming into Canada, been finally determined to be a refugee?
- has the claimant, since last coming into Canada, been finally determined not to be a refugee or to have abandoned his or her claim?

3. credible basis (adjudicator & IRB member):

- is the claim *arguable*? (I'm a refugee because I was unemployed")
- is the claim *believable*? (I was persecuted because of my religion")
- this access test has a low threshold: it was intended to deter the most flagrant forms of abuse

Step-by-Step

1. Senior Immigration Officer (SIO)

- admits to Canada or "directs back" to USA until hearing date is available
- "out of status" claimants:
 - prepares report for immigration inquiry
 - photographs and fingerprints claimants
- schedules initial hearing and refers to Case Presenting Officer (CPO)

2. Case Presenting Officer (CPO)

- reviews Personal Information Form (PIF); decides whether to contest or concede "credible basis"
- if *conceded*, Simplified Inquiry Process (SIP):
 - completes paperwork to allow:
 - claimant to concede certain facts at issue;
 - EIC to concede that claimant is eligible and has a credible basis
- if *not conceded*, presents case to adjudicator and Refugee Division member
- makes recommendation respecting conditional removal order or departure notice

3. Adjudicator & IRB member

- if *contested*, claim is heard by adjudicator and IRB member; other participants: CPO, interpreter, claimant, counsel
 - adversarial: CPO can cross-examine
- if *not conceded/no credible basis*: in inquiry cases where the allegations are founded, persons are subject to removal *pending* review, with leave, by Federal Court of Appeal (FCA)

DEFINITION OF SAFE THIRD COUNTRY

The safe country provisions are found in s. 46.01 of the *Immigration Act*

46.01(1)(b) in the case of a claimant who is the subject of an inquiry caused pursuant to paragraph 23(4)(a), the claimant came to Canada from a country, other than the country of the claimant's nationality, the country of the claimant's habitual residence,

(i) that has been prescribed as a country that complies with Article 33 of the Convention, either universally or with respect to persons of a specified class of persons of which the claimant is a member, and

(ii) whose laws or practices provide that all claimants or claimants of a particular class of persons of which the claimant is a member would be allowed to return to that country, if removed from Canada, or would have the right to have the merits of their claims determined in that country;

(3) For the purposes of paragraph 1(b)

(a) a claimant who is in this country solely for the purpose of joining a connecting flight to Canada shall not be considered as coming to Canada from that country; and

(b) a claimant who comes to Canada from a country shall be considered as coming to Canada from that country whether or not the person was lawfully in that country.

(4) For the purposes of paragraph (1)(b), where a person who has come to Canada in a vehicle seeks to come into Canada without a valid and subsisting passport or travel document issued to that person and claims to be a Convention refugee, the burden of proving that the person has not come to Canada from the country in which the vehicle last embarked passengers rests on that person.

country from which the refugee is fleeing is a refugee-producing country. Preempting the decision by government fiat undermines the very purpose of the system.

Safe Third Country does not have the same problem. The refugee claimant is not being returned to the country from which they fled, but to the country they transited, which is a signatory to the Convention with a refugee determination process.

But a rose is not a rose is not a rose. There are almost as many genera of refugee claims systems as there are countries that have signed the Convention. Denmark, the U.K. (up until now) and Australia still base their systems on a minister conducting an investigation to determine whether a refugee claimant qualifies as a refugee. In Denmark, the decision is based on a paper review of the transcript of a police interview and, in the U.K. from an interview with an immigration official. There are no oral hearings, rights to counsel or independent adjudicators.

In other countries, such as France, Germany and the United States, the situation is more akin to the old days of the Refugee Status Advisory Committee (before the inauguration of oral hearings); they use the services of an independent decision making body to investigate the claim rather than a police or immigration department official. But there are relatively few oral hearings, no legal aid and no right to counsel in France. There are oral hearings in Germany and the United States, but no legal aid and only some legal representation.

Further, not only do the procedures differ, but so do the definition of persecution and how evidence is to be assessed. Much of the evidence in Canada is assessed based on giving the claimant the benefit of the doubt, while in most other jurisdictions a stricter rule measuring the balance of probabilities is used, while in still others the onus of proof is on the claimant.

Thus, if Safe Third Country is implemented we would be sending

claimants back to countries with generally stricter screening and adjudication systems that are less independent and more subject to ideological factors. That is, of course, if the country of transit would accept the claimant back. And why should they if documents have already been destroyed or passed back to the agent who had provided the false documents just before boarding an aircraft. If it could not be determined how long the claimant had sojourned in the Safe Third Country, or if no one could establish that the refugee claimant had not merely been in transit, a terrific political uproar would result. The refugee support community would then be energized again to attack the government, with little actual change in a system neither more efficacious nor fair to the refugee. Charter challenges would ensue. At the same time, the politically feared forces of anti-refugee sentiment would be stirred up.

Why, then, would officials consider implementing the Safe Third Country

provision in the present law? One reason is the need to distribute responsibilities among Western countries. One way to do that is to follow the precedent of the Dublin Agreement and make the country where the refugee first arrives process the claim. But the effect of this measure is likely to be refugees shifting towards the system with the fairest system of adjudication and/or, even more importantly for claims unlikely to be successful, towards states which have a poor history of deporting unsuccessful claimants.

It is a system based on putting the greatest pressure on the weakest (or fairest, though the two are not equivalent) access point in the system, thus pressuring everyone to tighten up rather than attempting to create a system that is fair to refugee claimants, fair to those responsible for carrying out the responsibilities of controlling borders and processing claimants and, most of all, fair to the refugees themselves.

One method of speeding up the process is to provide some incentive for lawyers or legal-aids to ensure that the Personal Information Forms so critical to scheduling are filled out as quickly as possible. At the present time, for weak claims, there is every incentive to drag the process out as long as possible both for the claimant and the counsel for the claimant charging the fees to legal aid.

The key access issue are:

- Safe Country of Origin;
- Safe Third Country;
- Visas;
- Interdiction;
- Airline Fines;
- Direct-Backs;
- Documentation;
- PIF — Personal Information Forms.

LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS

The following are the direct-back provisions in the *Immigration Act*

20(2) Where an immigration officer at a port of entry is of the opinion that it would or may be contrary to this Act of the regulations to grant admission to or otherwise let come into Canada a person who is residing or sojourning in the United States, the officer may, where a senior immigration officer to whom the officer would otherwise make a report pursuant to paragraph 1(a) is not reasonably available, direct that person to return to the United States until such time as such senior immigration officer is available.

23(5) Where, pursuant to subsection (4), a senior immigration officer is required to cause an inquiry to be held with respect to a person who is residing or sojourning in the United States, the officer may, where an adjudicator is not reasonably available to preside at the inquiry, direct that person to return to the United States until such time as a adjudicator is available.

Hearings

Do we need the initial hearing? It slows down the process. It uses up resources. The threshold for passing the credible basis test is low so that only a small percentage are contested at the first hearing.

But where a case is contested, we, in effect have virtually a full hearing. To establish a credible case, virtually everything needed to establish a refugee case is put on the table. Further, since the hearing is adversarial rather than investigative, the wrong tone is set from the beginning.

Even from a management perspective it is a bad policy. It divides re-

sponsibility between two very different branches of government so that one branch cannot be made accountable for the results. It lengthens the hearings. In Canada, 10-20 cases per officer per month can be processed, whereas in Germany the equivalent figure is 40 and in the United States it is 72. Even from a file management point of

view, it means two duplicate systems — one in CEIC and one with the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB), or else passing files between agencies with all the risk of misplacement. In effect, integrated case management is made impossible in order to contest less than ten percent of cases.

To speed up the process, an average of about 40 percent of claims are expedited, that is, never given a full hearing but accepted upon a paper review. Any negative result requires a full hearing.

At present, no legislative provision is included in the Act to allow for an expedited process. The system is rather inflexible in law. It does not

CREDIBLE BASIS CONCEDED BY CPO

	QUE/ATL	ONT	PR	BC	NAT'L
1989	94%	90%	74%	84%	91%
1990	90	94	66	91	92
JAN-SEPT 91	93	92	63	89	92

NOT CONCEDED AND SUCCESSFULLY ARGUED BY CPO

	QUE/ATL	ONT	PR	BC	NAT'L
1989	51%	49%	38%	43%	47%
1990	41	46	51	61	54
JAN-SEPT 91	43	76	44	44	58

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allow for a positive determination at any stage in the process where a claim is manifestly founded. It does not allow for generic rather than case-by-case determination. Because a hearing requires so many people — the Refugee Hearing Officer (RHO), two board members, an interpreter, the refugee claimant, counsel for the refugee claimant — there are many opportunities for adjournments with few incentives in the process to get on with the case.

Further, the adversarial nature of the initial hearing and the formal court style introduced in some jurisdictions at the full hearing acculturated some lawyers to a litigation culture in which the responsibility of counsel was not simply to make sure any relevant fact was not overlooked, but to make sure every fact and every possible argument was set before the Board.

Eliminating the first hearing and ensuring the full hearing was truly investigative and not adversarial would free up an estimated half of the processing time. Can changes also be made at the Full Hearing Stage to speed up the process?


Though the Full Hearing Stage is working rather well, a number of improvements in both style and conception could allow for dramatically improved efficiency. Others could only be introduced at the cost of fairness.

For example, a change from two member panels to one hearing officer would make significant savings, but only at great cost on the appeal side and on the learning curve for the board members. It is probably true that sharing a panel reduces the sense of responsibility and accountability of any one Board member. But shared responsibility, particularly when there is only one full hearing, is important.

Similarly, arguments will be put forth to shift the onus of proof from giving the benefit of the doubt to the claimant, to one of a balance of probabilities, or even putting the onus of proof on the claimant. For those who want a higher rejection rate, this would be a crucial change.


But the issue, surely, is not high or

PROCESSING TIMES INITIAL AND FULL HEARINGS SEPTEMBER 1991



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EXPEDITED CLAIMS: % OF ALL CLAIMS HEARD



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low acceptance rates, but a system which errs on the side of the claimant and is at the same time speedy so that it is not abused and refugee claimants are processed expeditiously and fairly. What puts the system in doubt is that the public does not understand why 8 percent of Czech claims, 19 percent of Polish claims or even 55 percent of Argentinean claims are being accepted, when these are now supposed to be democratic regimes. Nor, on the other hand, is there any understanding of why the acceptance rates of those fleeing the Peoples Republic of China have dropped so dramatically when Western leaders going to China receive so much publicity about their protests to the Chinese leadership concerning human rights abuses.

Appeals

Other than the initial hearings, which now seem redundant, the main issue is one of appeal. Most rejected cases request leave to appeal to the Federal Court. Over 25 percent are granted leave to appeal and over half of these are allowed at appeal. This means that of the cases turned down by the Board, about 15 percent are reversed at the appeal stage.

This reversal rate is enough to justify an appeal system. But can it be expedited while protecting refugee claimants? Does the absence of a review mechanism within the Board lead to more appeals and more reversals? Would it be prudent, cost effective and fair to allow for a review officer at every full hearing who, while not participating in the hearings, would have the power to reverse the decision? For consistency, that review officer could also work with other officers on a central panel to set guidelines for board members.

This would not eliminate the need for retaining a right to appeal, but it might cut down the number of cases the Federal Court granted leave to appeal. Further, it might reduce even further the number of cases given stays of deportation.

After all, 95 percent of cases heard are fact specific. The only way one can

FULL HEARING

Objectives

- *meet Convention and Charter obligations to protect genuine refugees against return to country against which the claim to refugee status is made*
- *Singh decision requires only one oral hearing on merits of claim*
- *safeguards to reduce need for appeal on merits:*
 - *2 decision-makers*
 - *non-adversarial hearing*
 - *independent and expert body (IRB)*

Decision

- **Is the claimant a "Convention refugee"?**
 - Act contains definition used by 1951 Geneva convention and protocol
 - "well-founded" fear of persecution: race, religion, nationality, social group, political opinion
 - claimant must demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution, but may be given the "benefit of the doubt"
 - all evidence must be unclassified and available to claimant for response

Step-by-Step

1. Refugee Hearing Officer (RHO)

- checks Personal Information form (PIF) and decision at initial hearing
- may hold pre-hearing interview with claimant and counsel
- decides whether to concede ("expedited" process) or contest ("traditional" process)

2. Board Members

"Expedited" Process (concede)

- one member holds hearing to confirm RHO's recommendation
- if RHO's recommendation is confirmed, claimant is eligible to apply for permanent residence ("landing")

"Traditional" Process (contest)

- two members preside over hearing on merits of the refugee claim
- **RHO** presents facts at issue
 - uses country information from IRB documentation centre
 - may question claimant, present other evidence
- lawyer or other counsel presents claimant's case
- *if accepted*, claimant is eligible to apply for permanent residence
- *if rejected*, may remain in Canada pending disposition of appeal, with leave, to the Federal Court of Appeal

really understand if an injustice has been done is to hear all the facts. Yet, a full rehearing of any appeal leads to considerable delay and much greater cost. A paper review might not provide enough protection to satisfy the Federal Court so that appeals to it are granted less frequently. Further, there is no present method of ensuring consistent guidelines are provided to board members in different regions, though a panel undertaking a paper review might be an improvement on this issue.

An appeal mechanism on the substance of the case could ensure fairness while reducing costs and delays.

An Overview


Quite aside from reforms of the Immigration Act, three other areas should be addressed to improve the existing system. The first I refer to as the Xeroxing of CEIC. The second is a move towards multilateralism in processing refugee claims. The third is the expansion of a pro-active policy on behalf of the U.N. to protect refugees and intervene in circumstances producing refugees.

Xeroxing CEIC

At the meeting of the various immigration office managers referred to at the beginning of this special issue of *Refuge* on refugee determination, the Chair of the Board of Xerox gave a luncheon speech describing how Xerox had been in danger of going down the tubes and how strategic planning reversed the process. One critical aspect of strategic planning entails setting a common set of goals for all parts of a corporate structure. If one part is pulling in one direction and another part in another, the organization is schizophrenic.

CEIC is clearly schizophrenic. The enforcement branch, which seems dedicated, efficient and committed to protecting Canadians from unwanted visitors and arrivals, is also dedicated to ensuring that as few refugee claimants reach our shores as possible. After

FULL HEARING STAGE: CLAIMS COMPLETED (MONTHLY AVERAGE)



* INCLUDES CLAIMS WITHDRAWN AND ABANDONED

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ACCEPTANCE RATES (FULL HEARING STAGE)

	JAN-DEC 1989 %	JAN-DEC 1990 %	JAN-JUN 1991 %	JUL-SEPT 1991 %
QUE/ATL	87	74	71	58
ONTARIO I	90	81	83	69
ONTARIO II	-	-	80	64
PRAIRIES	90	86	71	60
BC	86	55	57	50
NATIONAL	88	77	76	62

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ACCEPTANCE RATES (FULL HEARING STAGE)

	JAN-DEC 1989	JAN-DEC 1990	JAN-SEPT 1991
ARGENTINA	69 %	35 %	55 %
BULGARIA*	N/A	47	33
CHINA*	74	44	23
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	75	14	8
EL SALVADOR*	85	78	73
ETHIOPIA*	85	84	94
IRAN*	91	88	88
LEBANON*	87	78	86
PAKISTAN*	85	87	71
POLAND	73	21	19
ROMANIA*	89	79	65
SOMALIA*	97	92	93
SRI LANKA*	96	89	95
U.S.S.R.	50	59	72

*ONE OF THE TOP 10 COUNTRIES IN THE IRB'S CASELOAD IN 1991

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all, in their calculations, for every refugee claimant that does not arrive, the Canadian taxpayer saves \$50,000 U.S. in administrative and processing time. They understand the protection of Canada aspect of their mandate, but the humanitarian aspects of the Immigration Act are not seen to be their responsibility.

As a result, a major preoccupation of the enforcement branch is interdicting, through Operation Short Stop, the arrival of refugee claimants using false documents, instead of working with refugee and ethnic organizations to detect the movement of criminals, drug dealers and professional people smugglers. If the CEIC enforcement branch would endorse that a common goal of CEIC is to provide protection to genuine refugees, and that this goal is as much a part of their mandate as that of any other branch, we would go a long way to restoring refugee support groups' trust in the CEIC. Then these groups too could and should assume some sensitivity to and responsibility for enforcement instead of merely giving it a rhetorical assent.

McCamus, the Chair of Xerox, not only stressed the need for everyone in the system to support all the goals so that the corporate structure develops coherence, but that each member and part of the organization had to recognize who their clients are, understand

them and be dedicated to giving them top quality service. The clients of one part of an organization are *not* other parts of the organization.

When Xerox employees began to see their job primarily in terms of putting out fires and participating in public relations exercises, it was a sure sign that rot had entered into the organization. The depressing reality of the situation was that one part of the organization saw that its prime clientele were other parts of the organization.

Yet that is precisely how the Case Management Branch defines its mission and clientele. Instead of seeing its job as the elimination of situations which give rise to contentious cases, just as Xerox redefined the mission of its damage control branches, it sees its responsibility as the effective management of cases appealed to the Minister or sensitive and high-profile cases. As such, it sees its clients as the Minister (the equivalent to the Chair of the Board of Xerox), National Headquarters and the regional offices. But the clients are the immigrants, the refugees and the refugee support groups.

The result of this misconception of goals and clients, and of the incoherence in the organization is that those at the front lines — ports of entry at border crossings and airports

— are given a schizophrenic task. They are responsible for deciding in 45 seconds whether a person has a proper passport, identity, the appropriate visa, etc. Yet anyone who simply says they are a refugee can waltz right by and enter the system with relatively few ever being deported. Officials at entry points don't understand why they exercise such care, on the one hand, and the system seems so careless on the other. Clearly, enforcement and humanitarianism must be integrated and not seen as polar opposites splitting the organization.

At the same time, the case-management personnel must redefine their focus to concentrate not on the various parts of the bureaucracy as their clients; rather, they must become partners to those on the front lines of decision making to serve those who are properly defined as CEIC clients.

The problem within CEIC is not one of lazy or incompetent civil servants. Everyone with whom I have ever dealt in CEIC, with very few exceptions, is both dedicated and overworked. They are bright, intelligent and committed. But they are working within an organization that has not yet given coherence to its twofold mission. They are working in an organization that has not properly defined its clientele. Obviously, CEIC could benefit from the lessons of Xerox in streamlining its operations, providing internal coherence to its entire structure and, perhaps most importantly, defining its clientele. What is needed is the Xeroxing of CEIC.

Towards Multilateralism

But the cure, and not just more palliative action, requires something else beyond the borders of Canada. Refugee claimants are a problem for the whole Western world. An isolated Canadian solution could merely shift more of the problem on to others if we are mean-spirited, or possibly onto ourselves if we are fair and generous. Further, in a system supposedly based on universal principles, the inconsistencies, ideological distortions and

OVERALL ACCEPTANCE RATES*

	JAN-DEC 1990	JAN-JUNE 1991	JULY-SEPT 1991
SOMALIA	92%	94%	89%
IRAN	88	90	85
SRI LANKA	88	95	94
PAKISTAN	82	75	48
ETHIOPIA	82	96	82
LEBANON	77	87	75
EL SALVADOR	76	76	62
ROMANIA	69	58	71
BULGARIA	44	36	26
CHINA	43	25	15
ARGENTINA	9	23	40
JAMAICA	0	0	0
TRINIDAD&TOBAGO	0	0	0

*BASED ON TOTAL NUMBER OF CASES CONCLUDED AT INITIAL AND FULL HEARING STAGES, INCLUDING WITHDRAWN CASES.

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FEDERAL COURT (FULL DETERMINATION)

	LEAVES			APPEALS	
	REQ'D	DEC'D	% GRANTED	# DEC'D	% ALLOW'D
1989	655	496	28%	4	50%
1990	2242	1728	28	24	63
01-08 1991	3480	1869	26	107	52
TOTAL	6377	4093	27	135	54

OVERALL RATE OF SUCCESS AT APPEAL

	% GRANTED LEAVE	% ALLOWED AT APPEAL	OVERALL SUCCESS RATE
1989	28%	x	50% = 14%
1990	28%	x	63% = 18%
01-08 1991	26%	x	52% = 14%

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wide variations in the system add little to enhance its credibility. Bilateral or multilateral arrangements that merely shift the problem from one jurisdiction to another do little to address the core of the refugee protection problem for those who claim to be Convention Refugees.

What we need is a multilateral (perhaps initially bilateral) quasi-judicial organization for processing refugee claims as well as an agreement to burden share and resettle successful claimants. What we have instead are irregular structures repeated from country to country. We invite asylum shopping by the very structures we build. The refugees, then, are blamed for abusing a faulty system that invites such practices.

Wouldn't a multilateral system tend to move toward the meanest system rather than the best one? There are many reasons to argue that the reverse could be true if the system is not built on a beggar thy neighbour principle. The best elements of various systems would be integrated.

This is particularly true of the border between Canada and the United States. Of 113,000 entries into Canada

last year, 106,000 came from the United States. The vast bulk of our resources are used to control entry from a country with whom we now have a free trade agreement, but only capital, not people, move freely back and forth. If our control resources could be redeployed to control the entry of 7,000 rather than 113,000, how much more effective could they be?

The development of a bilateral, and eventually a multilateral, refugee claims system would be a step in this direction. The Americans are already using our country profiles. Moves towards greater integration would mean that any Safe Third Country provision would be a waste of resources. But such a move will require the best of both systems and not the worst.

Pro-active Intervention

With the intervention on behalf of the Kurds in Northern Iraq, we witnessed either idiosyncratic behaviour or a new precedent for protecting refugees. If it is the latter, such measures could eventually prevent the need for any refugee determination process in the first place.

Annual Dinner

The Centre for Refugee Studies' annual dinner will be held on Thursday, 6 February 1992, 6:30 p.m. at the International Restaurant, 421-429 Dundas St. W., 3rd Floor, Toronto and will feature a 10-course meal.

Tickets are \$60.00.

The Vincent Kelly Award, presented each year by the Centre for Refugee Studies to Canadians for outstanding work on behalf of refugees, will be presented at the dinner.

Please see page ?? for more information.



Canadian Council for Refugees(CCR)

Fall Consultation and Annual General Assembly Meeting

November 22-24, 1991, Ottawa, Ontario

The following is a partial list of the CCR resolutions relevant to refugee determination issues. The resolutions were passed at the above-mentioned meeting in Ottawa on 24 November, 1991. Although all of the resolutions were officially passed at the meeting, it should be noted that some minor changes may be made to some of them before the final draft is available. The adjustments will not, however, change the substance of the resolutions.

RESOLUTION 2: PUBLIC DISCOURSE ON REFUGEES

Whereas:

1. The act of asking for asylum is a positive act permitted under Canadian law and the fulfillment of our obligation as a signatory to the Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees;
2. Canada should be proud to be considered a country of refuge for the persecuted of this world;
3. The lack of proper documentation is not an impediment to making a valid refugee claim and indeed the absence of such documentation may be a consequence of the persecution which refugees have suffered;
4. The tone of recent government statements in the media and in government documents tends to convey to the Canadian public that refugee claimants are cheaters, criminals or persons who abuse our system(see pg. 11 of the Annual Report to Parliament, November, 1991);

Be it Resolved that:

The CCR Executive convey to the Canadian government our dismay at the deteriorating tone of government statements regarding refugees and refugee claimants, and urge in future a positive presentation of the plight of refugees and the reasons that bring them to our doors.

RESOLUTION 3: PERSECUTION ON GENDER BASIS

Whereas:

1. Randy Gordon, departmental assistant to Bernard Valcourt, Minister of Immigration, has referred to a refugee woman's gender persecution by commenting in NOW magazine, November 19, 1991, that the

Minister would not intervene in refugee women's cases "if it is only gender persecution" and further that "...the definition is quite clear. Women are not one of the categories and you are just going to open a can of worms about the way women are treated in different cultures";

2. Canada is a signatory to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against All Women (CEDAW);
3. Persecution and discrimination contravene international human rights instruments, regardless of gender;

Be It Resolved That:

1. The CCR Executive write a letter to Minister Valcourt, censuring his departmental assistant, Randy Gordon, and asking the Minister to clarify his government's position on the definition of persecution and discrimination with respect to women;
2. The Working Group on Refugee Women initiate a letter writing campaign on this issue.

RESOLUTION 8: INDOCHINESE REFUGEES

Whereas:

1. The Canadian government is a signatory of the 1989 Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) regarding the situation of Indochinese refugees;
2. The CPA is being incorrectly carried out due to an arbitrary, flawed, and unfair process used by the governments of the countries of first asylum in Southeast Asia, on behalf of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, to determine the refugee status of asylum seekers;
3. The above has resulted in numerous genuine refugees being denied the opportunity of resettlement in third countries;

Be It Resolved That:

The CCR request the government of Canada to make representation to the UNHCR for a thorough review of:

- a.) the refugee status determination system;
- b.) the cases where people were denied the refugee status in order that corrective actions can be taken where necessary.

RESOLUTION 11: SOMALIAN REFUGEES IN AFRICA

Whereas:

1. Somali refugees in countries of first asylum in the East African region are suffering harsh and often life-threatening conditions;
2. The current situation in Somalia appears to be deteriorating rather than stabilizing, thus diminishing prospects of safe repatriation;
3. A support of relatives and community exists in Canada to provide assistance with resettlement and integration;

Be It Resolved That:

The federal government be asked to implement a Fast Track programme to accelerate processing for resettlement of Somalians from the region by:

- a.) increasing staff and resources at consular and visa offices in the region;
- b.) increasing the level of government-assisted sponsorship;
- c.) utilizing currently available resources of Canadian and regional NGOs operating in Africa to accelerate the processing of applications for both family class and sponsorship cases.

RESOLUTION 13: INDEPENDENCE OF THE IRB

Whereas:

1. The CCR has always advocated for an independent decision-making body to decide on refugee determination cases in Canada;
2. The Immigration and Refugee Board has been established to decide on refugee determination cases in Canada;
3. The chairman of the IRB, Mr. Gordon Fairweather, has recently made public comments concerning the need for the Immigration Commission to deport more rejected claimants;
4. The CCR is concerned that such statements appear to bring into question the independence of the IRB and its Chairman.

Be It Resolved That:

The CCR Executive forward a letter to the Chair of the IRB, Mr. Gordon Fairweather, expressing the CCR's concerns regarding his recent public comments concerning the need for more deportations and the issues this raises concerning the independence of the IRB and its Chairman.

RESOLUTION 14: CCR POSITION ON APPEAL

Whereas:

1. The CCR has always maintained that a meaningful appeal is an integral part of Canada's refugee determination process;
2. There are indications that the government is considering legislative changes to the Immigration Act in 1992;
3. The CCR feels that it is important to press the government to consider the inclusion of a meaningful appeal in any legislative changes to the Immigration Act.

Be It Resolved That:

The CCR take steps to press the government for consideration of a meaningful appeal in any upcoming legislative changes to the Immigration Act.

RESOLUTION 15: ACCOUNTABILITY OF MINISTER OF DEPORTATIONS

Whereas:

1. The CCR is concerned about the increasing rate of rejection for refugee claimants in Canada;
2. The CCR is opposed to the deportation of rejected refugee claimants in the absence of a meaningful appeal in the refugee determination process;
3. The CCR believes that it is crucial for the Minister of Immigration to intervene to protect cases of rejected refugee claimants who may be at risk if deported from Canada;
4. The decentralized process of reviewing rejected cases on humanitarian and compassionate grounds does not replace the ministerial review on errors in the determination system;
5. At the time of the coming into force of Bill C-55 promises were made by the Minister of Immigration that steps would be taken to ensure that refugees mistakenly rejected by the refugee determination system would not be deported from Canada;
6. There are indications that the Minister is refusing to intervene on an increasing number of cases.

Be It Resolved That:

1. The CCR Executive write to the Minister of Immigration insisting that he continue to consider representations from the NGO community concerning rejected refugee claimants and that he intervene to protect cases where persons may be at risk if deported from Canada.
2. The Working Group on Refugee Protection take other appropriate action to achieve this aim.

RESOLUTION 16: STANDING COMMITTEE MEETING ON DEPORTATIONS

Whereas:

1. The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Labour, Employment and Immigration is currently examining the government's policy on deportations;
2. The Chairman of this committee has invited the Assistant Deputy Minister, Mr. Peter Harder, to appear before the committee on Wednesday, November 27, 1991 to report to the committee respecting deportations;
3. Many member organizations of the CCR are involved in making representations to the Minister with respect to cases of rejected refugee claimants who would be at risk if deported from Canada;
4. It is important for the CCR to express its concerns about deportations to the Standing Committee on Labour, Employment and Immigration;

Be It Resolved That:

The CCR Executive fax a letter to the Chairman of the Standing Committee on Labour, Employment and Immigration requesting that one or more representative of the CCR be permitted to appear before the committee on the subject of deportations.

RESOLUTION 17: DEPORTATIONS OF SRI LANKANS

Whereas:

1. The CCR Resolution #13 of the 1990 AGM called for a moratorium on the removal from Canada of Sri Lankan nationals;
2. The situation of hostilities against the Tamil population has not abated, but has increased in recent weeks;
3. The Minister in his recent reply implies that except in a few cases return to Sri Lanka is acceptable;
4. The UNHCR continues to have a general policy against the involuntary return of Tamil Sri Lankans from the North to Sri Lanka;
5. Amnesty International advises that deportees to Sri Lanka are subject to extreme measures on arrival in Colombo;
6. In recent weeks there has been a significant increase of deportation orders against Sri Lankans;
7. Individual case review situations are not being handled sympathetically, but rather only dealt with under extreme pressure;
8. Deportation orders are not being given to Sri Lankans who were determined not to be refugees at the time prior to the summer of 1990 when the IRB

erroneously believed that stability had returned to Sri Lanka, and whose cases by law may not be reopened;

Be It Resolved That:

This CCR meeting reaffirm its strong position opposed to the deportation of Sri Lankans and urge the Minister to declare a moratorium, permitting those persons affected to apply for permanent residence status from inside Canada.

RESOLUTION 21: INLAND PROCESSING FOR SPOUSES

Whereas:

1. There are rejected refugee claimants who have been ordered to leave Canada but who have subsequently entered into legitimate marriages with Canadian citizens or permanent residents;
2. These marriages have been accepted as *bona fide* by the Commission and in the past have been facilitated for inland processing;
3. Director P. Pirie of the Ontario region has issued a directive stating that such inland processing should no longer occur;
4. Such a directive will result in great hardships and suffering;

Be It Resolved That:

The CCR Executive write to the Minister, the Associate Deputy Minister Peter Harder and Mr. Pirie expressing our opposition to the recent directive and calling on them to continue to act humanely and allow inland processing for those spouses who are being told to leave Canada and that the Minister issue a directive allowing inland processing for *bona fide* marriages.



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CENTRE FOR REFUGEE STUDIES FELLOWSHIP AND AWARDS

Kathleen Ptolemy Research Fellowship

An annual \$C15,000 Kathleen Ptolemy Research Fellowship has been set up to permit a visiting scholar from a developing country to undertake research on refugees. The candidate must have a desire to pursue research on refugees and an excellent academic record in refugee and migration issues and related fields. Scholars interested in the study of refugee women who are in need of protection will be given priority. Preference will be given to applicants with a demonstrated commitment to refugee rights advocacy or service to the disfranchised.

Annual Research Awards

The goal of these research awards is to provide funding to a number of graduate students while they undertake research projects under the auspices of the Centre for Refugee Studies. These awards are available to students who are/will be registered full time in a graduate programme at York University whose intended research area is Refugee and Migration Studies. International students are eligible to apply.

Value of Awards

Naomi Harder Refugee Award - \$C15,000

\$C8,000 scholarship and \$C7,000 Graduate Assistantship

The Naomi Harder Award may not be held in conjunction with an external scholarship or any other teaching or research assistantship.

General Refugee Awards - 5 awards of \$C9,000 each

\$C2,000 scholarship and \$C7,000 Graduate Assistantship

The General Refugee Awards may be held in conjunction with an external scholarship but may not be held in conjunction with any other teaching or research assistantship.

Candidates should submit a completed application to the Centre for Refugee Studies, together with a statement of their qualifications to receive the awards, **by the 15th of March, 1992** to:

**Helen Gross, Student-Faculty Liaison
Centre for Refugee Studies
Suite 322, York Lanes
York University
4700 Keele Street
North York, Ontario M3J 1P3
Canada**

**OSGOODE HALL LAW SCHOOL and the CENTRE for REFUGEE STUDIES
are offering the**

**JACQUELINE GREATBATCH MEMORIAL FELLOWSHIP
and
ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN MEMORIAL FELLOWSHIP**

A \$C10,000 Jacqueline Greatbatch Memorial Fellowship and a \$C10,000 Atle Grahl-Madsen Memorial Fellowship have been established by the Centre for Refugee Studies and the Graduate Programme in Law, York University, Toronto, Canada, to permit two individuals to pursue studies leading to the degree of Master of Laws or Doctor of Jurisprudence at the Osgoode Hall Law School. Each fellowship will be awarded annually to the candidate possessed of an excellent academic record in law and who desires to pursue graduate research in international refugee law or a closely related field. Preference will be given to applications with a demonstrated commitment to human rights advocacy or service to the disfranchised, and to the advancement of human dignity through public international law, respectively.

The Greatbatch and Grahl-Madsen Fellows will, in addition to conducting their own graduate research, contribute throughout the academic year to the work of the Refugee Law Research Unit of the Centre for Refugee Studies.

Value of Fellowships

Jacqueline Greatbatch Memorial Fellowship - \$C10,000

\$C5,000 Scholarship from the Centre for Refugee Studies and \$C5,000 Graduate Assistantship from Osgoode Hall Law School.

Atle Grahl-Madsen Memorial Fellowship - \$C10,000

\$C5,000 Scholarship from the Centre for Refugee Studies and \$C5,000 Graduate Assistantship from Osgoode Hall Law School.

Candidates should submit a completed application to either the LL.M. or D. Jur. program, together with a statement of their qualifications to receive the fellowship, **not later than January 31, 1992** to:

**The Director, Graduate Programme in Law
Osgoode Hall Law School
York University
4700 Keele Street
North York, Ontario M3J 1P3
Canada**