CANADA'S PERIODICAL ON REFUGEES

REFUGE

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Ethnic Purification and Its Three Types of Refugees

Images of "ethnic cleansing" in Bosnia and the millions of internal and external refugees that it has produced are familiar to people throughout the world. The international community has been appalled by the reports of bloody massacres, rapes of young girls, concentration camps and massive uprootment of the Muslim population of this region. Unfortunately, what is happening in former Yugoslavia today can be replicated in a number of other regions of the former Soviet bloc countries that have received far less media coverage. Policies of ethnic purification have been adopted by nationalist governments in the Baltic, central Asia and the Caucasus. In some instances these policies have translated into discrimination against members of ethnic minorities in these states. In others, they have involved more violent clashes.

We can identify three types of refugees in the area. First, there are those refugees who have been displaced through armed confrontations. Among them are Croatians and Bosnian Muslims from former Yugoslavia, Armenians from Azerbaijan, Azeries from Armenia, Ossetians from Georgia, Ingushetians from northern Ossetia (southern Russia), Greeks and Russians from Abkhazia (Georgia), Jews in central Asia and in southern Russia, and members of conflicting tribes in Tadjikistan.

Second, there are those refugees who are pushed out of their homes through less violent means. Among them are two million Russians who have been forced out of the Baltic, Central Asian and Caucasian states by such policies as denial of employment, of the right to educate their children in Russian, of citizenship, of a right to own property, and of franchise. Many Russian-speaking Jews in these regions have received the same treatment. However, unlike the Russians who flee predominantly to Russia, Jews have

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opted to leave the area of the former Soviet Union and migrate to Israel, the United States or Canada and other countries. Most Germans from Central Asia would like to emigrate to Germany. Since Germany has set a limited annual quota for resettlement of ethnic Germans from the former Soviet Union, many have chosen to move to Ukraine and Russia in the meantime.

In the case of Jews, some of the means adopted to force them out of their home regions have included open assaults, threatening letters and telephone calls. However, most of these attacks have been aimed at individual families and there have not yet been any widespread pogroms against Jewish communities in these regions.

And finally, the third type consists of potential refugees or those who, for various reasons, have not left their homes yet, although they have experienced discrimination, harassment and, at times, violence. Among them are Jews throughout the former Soviet Union who have received invitations to migrate to Israel, but who are reluctant to move because of serious hardships the Soviet alia have experienced in Israel in the last few years. More than twenty million Russians are still found outside Russia and are expected to join the ranks of those who have already become refugees. However, the persistence of the institution of *propiska* (residency permit) in Russia prevents most of them from moving there. Over two million Germans and their families (which include non-Germans), dispersed throughout the territory of the former U.S.S.R., are also hoping to migrate to Germany. Their gradual resettlement may take over twenty years. Israel and Russia have opened their doors wide to members of their own ethnic groups. Yet because of respective economic, political and social problems (rejection by the host population in the case of Israel) in these two countries, many of their potential refugees presently prefer to stay at home. This situation may change if they experience a stronger push by the ethnic majority in their countries to leave. Many of the Germans in Russia would leave for Germany now if Germany changed its policy, which is not likely in the near future.

Many of these refugees have been victims of extreme violence, but have not received international attention and support. Successful settlement of these refugees requires careful analysis of their needs and ways these needs can be met, as articles by Huseby-Darvas, Meznaric and Zlatkovic Winter, and Schwarzer and Hahn in this issue show. However, while the case of Bosnia has been the most dramatic example of ethnic cleansing in the former Soviet bloc countries, the articles by Benifand and Basok show that a potential for genocide against ethnic minorities exists in other parts of this region and that thousands of people can be turned into refugees by other means that are less bloody. In order to deliver adequate assistance to refugees, it is important to report on the violations of human rights of various ethnic minorities, on less violent strategies used to force them out of their home regions, and to monitor those conditions that convert potential refugees into real ones. ▨

Tanya Basok and Alexander Benifand

Forced Migration and Refugee Flows in Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina: Early Warning, Beginning and Current State of Flows

Silva Meznaric and Jelena Zlatkovic Winter

Europe is presently confronted with the biggest refugee crisis since World War II. By October 1992 2.5 million people from the former Yugoslavia were forced to leave their homes, thus constituting almost 20 percent of the total of twelve million refugees and displaced persons in the world. In August 1992 there were 1,979,476 refugees and displaced persons within the borders of the former Yugoslavia, which makes 8.4 percent of the total population of former Yugoslavia. (According to a census taken in April 1991, Yugoslavia had 23,473,000 inhabitants.) Most of the displaced persons are in Bosnia and Herzegovina, while Croatia took the highest number of refugees (Table 1).

In addition to these figures, in August 1992 the UNHCR estimated that there were 541,500 refugees from the former Yugoslavia in European countries: 275,000 or 51 percent in Germany; 60,000 or 11 percent in Hungary; 50,000 or 9.2 percent in Austria. Women and children make up the majority of refugees and displaced persons. In Croatia (partial records, August 1992) women of all ages make 58.8 percent of displaced persons; most of them (39.8 percent) are between eighteen and fifty years old. Children younger than fourteen years represent 23 percent of the total population. Most of them (13 percent) are at the elementary school level.[1]

EARLY WARNING SIGNS OF FLIGHT

There is substantial evidence that current forced migratory and refugee flows in the former Yugoslavia were preceded by "ethnohomogenization" movements from ethnically mixed areas of particular republics towards main national territories. Demographic data from the 1981 and 1991 censuses about intra- and interregional (interstate) migration show considerable net immigration rates, mainly due to movements out of ethnically mixed areas in Bosnia, Vojvodina and Kosovo to the territories of Croatia, Serbia and Slovenia. There were three principal movements: movements of Serbs from Muslim areas in Bosnia towards Serbia, movements of Serbs from Albanian Kosovo towards main Serbia, movements of Croats from Serbian/Muslim parts of Bosnia towards Croatia, and movements of Muslims and Croats (from the areas where they have comprised the majority of the population) towards Croatia and Slovenia. Since the former Yugoslavia's internal borders were not significant until 1990, internal migrations were treated as normal movements of people from the undeveloped south towards the more developed north; hence it was hard to disentangle economic from ethnically forced migrations.

FORCED MIGRATION AND RESETTLEMENT HAVE A HISTORY IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Forced migration and resettlement virtually preceded or followed almost every major conflict in the Balkans. World War I induced the migration and settlement of thousands of people in the former Yugoslavia. Then northern parts of Croatia and Vojvodina were colonized by 200,000 Serbs from poor southern areas. They were mainly soldiers who were promised lands as a reward for fighting in the war, but were never fully settled and accommodated. In the current Croatian/Serbian conflict, these colonized areas on Croatian territory were the prime Serbian targets.

Table 1: Refugees and Displaced Persons within the Former Yugoslavia (September 1992)

Present Location	From Croatia	From Bosnia & Herzegovina	Total	% of the Total Pop.
Croatia	271,798	335,985	638,109	13.4
UN-patrolled areas	87,000	0	87,000	—
Serbia	162,337	252,130	414,467	4.3
Bosnia & Herzegovina	93,000	588,000	681,000	15.6
Montenegro	6,743	50,857	57,600	9.3
Slovenia	1,000	69,000	70,000	4.3
Macedonia	2,500	28,800	31,300	3.5
Total	**624,378**	**1,324,772**	**1,979,476***	

*Includes 30,326 refugees from Serbia (Vojvodina: 18,540; Kosovo: 11,786)

Sources: UNHCR, Public Information Unit, Zagreb, September 1992; Census 1991, Republic of Croatia, Doc. 810, Zagreb 1991.

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After World War II, the government organized the resettlement of Serbs from Bosnia and Croatia to Vojvodina. About 460,000 people left southern mountainous areas and settled around large farmlands. Also, 200,000 Turks left for Turkey, thousands of Italians opted for Italy, and at least 50,000 Croats fled (mostly illegally) Yugoslavia. An estimated total of two million people of all ethnic backgrounds changed their residences between 1948 and 1960.

For decades following World War II, most of the emigrants from the former Yugoslavia were from Bosnia and Croatia. According to the 1981 census, emigrants from Bosnia made up 22 percent of the total population that emigrated from Yugoslavia to elsewhere in Europe. Bosnia also had the greatest number of municipalities (twenty-four) in the former Yugoslavia where more than 20 percent of households had at least one member working abroad in Germany or Austria. Certain areas were developed due to financial assistance and help from those who were abroad. It led also to the specific redistribution of population around medium-size towns so that between 1971 and 1981, the populations living in the municipal centres increased by approximately 35 percent. Such towns developed on an ethnically mixed basis in Bosnia and Herzegovina; today, they are the main targets of attacks (or defence) of all military groups. Those on Serbian expansion interest areas were the first targets for ethnic cleansing.[2]

ARMED CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE IN BOSNIA: ETHNIC CLEANSING AND REFUGEES

Coined by journalists as a catchword for forced migration that aims to ethnically homogenize previously mixed areas, "ethnic cleansing" is the main framework of Serbian aggression in Bosnia. It is estimated that 2,500,000 people fled their homes from threatened or occupied areas in Bosnia/Herzegovina. According to the Croatian Agency for Refugees, there were 670,000 refugees in Croatia (13.4 percent of the total population) and 75,000 in Slovenia (4.3 percent of the total population) in October 1992. Most of them are Muslim women, children and men over fifty-five years old. Men of drafting age are not permitted to enter Croatian or Slovak territories.

According to unconfirmed data, ethnic cleansing is continuing in Serbian-dominated territories and municipalities. It usually starts as extrainstitutional violence and ends up as coerced displacement; people either flee or are moved to concentration camps. There are many similarities with the pre-Holocaust period in Germany, among them a law that requires the depossession of forced migrants.[3]

REGULATION AND HELP

For devastated Croatia, such an influx of refugees already results in considerable foreign debts. The government paid about U.S. $60 million each month for meeting the refugees' basic needs. This cost is now 30 percent higher. Before the massive aggression against Bosnia, the quality and scope of international humanitarian aid given to Croatia was adequate. However, the dramatic increase in the number of refugees from Bosnia within the last two months caught the UNHCR, UNICEF, International Committee of the Red Cross and the World Health Organization by surprise. They were not logistically or financially prepared for meeting the needs of such a large influx.

ADMISSION PROCEDURES IN CROATIA

By the beginning of 1992, the newly established Office for Refugees and Displaced Persons was responsible for refugee policy in Croatia. According to official definition, a displaced person is an individual who was forced to leave his or her home but remains within the borders of Croatia, while a refugee is a displaced person who fled his or her home and crossed the state's border. The status and rights of refugees are defined by the Act of Refugee and Displaced Persons. Croatia's Ministry of Internal Affairs issues permits for temporary stay and social welfare centres are responsible for the refugees' accommodation and food. Since June 13, 1992 Croatia is no longer taking in refugees from Bosnia. Refugees in transit to other countries must have documentation verifying this. In July 1992 the governments of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia signed the agreement about joint efforts to return refugees (men between eighteen and sixty and women between eighteen and fifty-five) to those areas in Bosnia that were declared safe by legal authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Mothers of young children are not included.

It is difficult to estimate the number of illegal entries from Bosnia to Croatia. The Office for Refugees states that they learn about refugee settlements often only after they have been set up on sites chosen by refugees' self-appointed leaders. The media mention some 100,000 unregistered refugees who are settled on derelict construction sites or sheltered by relatives. While the armed conflict persists, refugees have been gathering along the Croatian-Bosnian border even though Croatia denied further admissions. Many of those who left before the outbreak of war were granted refugee status, while those who fled when directly threatened by aggression cannot obtain such status.

SELF-ORGANIZATION OF REFUGEES

Many refugees started various self-help organizations using some existing networks and facilities in large cities nearby. Refugees organized health care, education and creative activities. In their most developed forms, self-organized activities were institutionalized as "homeland clubs," where refugees from administrative units in Bosnia or Croatia register themselves as local community agencies. According to our findings, they

- collect information about deceased and lost persons, document damages done and collect documentation on property that was left behind
- help to organize the distribution of humanitarian aid
- organize information and lectures for refugees
- establish the international network of refugees and emigrants abroad
- organize evidence and protection for orphaned children

THE ATTITUDES OF THE HOST POPULATIONS

Croatia and Slovenia are on the brink of new elections and the refugee issue is being debated by every party's electorate. It is evident that "refugee culture" is creating divisiveness. Some right-wing groups are arguing in favour of expulsion, while liberals are willing to discuss the open societies solution. It is quite likely that with the overwhelming pauperization of Croatia and Slovenia, prejudices—even violence—against refugees could gain momentum.

THE FUTURE?

Recent research findings show that the majority of refugees intend to return home once the war ends.[4] The rebuilding of their homes and normalization of their lives will necessitate a massive joint effort. Those whose hometowns are destroyed may stay or move elsewhere. Even with the possibility of security zone settlements in Bosnia, thousands of refugees will still not be properly provided for. Moreover, security zones in Bosnia are very close to European migratory tracks. It is quite possible that the populations in these areas will be, in a generation or two, among the main pools of migrants in Europe. Therefore, the sound approach to the refugee crisis in the Balkans would be to avert mass flows by eliminating the conditions that cause flight. ▨

NOTES

1. D.I. Cepek and B. Salvari, *Analiticki odjel Ureda za izbjeglice*, Zagreb.
2. According to the former Yugoslavia's 1991 Census, Serbs made up 31.3 percent, Muslims 43.7 percent and Croats 17.3 percent of Bosnia and Herzegovina's population; Muslims were the majority in forty-four municipalities, Serbs in thirty-four and Croats in twenty municipalities.
3. Before being displaced or forced to move to camps, people are usually asked to sign the "depossession papers." By signing them, they "voluntarily" cede their property to Serbian local government. Such acquisitions will be used for "ethnic homogenization" of the area, for future settlers of Serbian nationality.
4. M. Mesic, *Osjetljivi i ljuti ljudi*, Zagreb 1992.

IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BOARD*
Convention Refugee Determination Division
Statistical Summary Period: January 1, 1992 – December 31, 1992
Acceptance Rates** for Refugee Claims
From Top Twenty-five Source Countries

		Credible Basis Processing				Full Hearing Processing					
	Source Country	Claims Concluded	Acceptance Yes	No	%	Claims Processed	Wdn	Acceptance Yes	No	%	Overall Rate %
1	Sri Lanka	5,742	5,729	11	99.8	5,297	113	4,831	297	94.2	**94.0**
2	Somalia	3,372	3,365	7	99.8	3,517	87	3,338	254	92.9	**92.7**
3	Pakistan	1,624	1,588	27	98.3	973	65	570	354	61.7	**60.6**
4	China	1,321	1,254	56	95.4	1,382	52	292	1,143	20.3	**19.4**
5	Iran	1,288	1,277	4	99.3	1,194	70	922	226	80.3	**79.8**
6	U.S.S.R.	1,245	1,206	34	97.3	1,244	123	721	540	57.2	**55.6**
7	El Salvador	946	900	34	95.8	1,102	112	337	693	32.7	**31.4**
8	Lebanon	908	895	4	99.0	964	63	435	442	49.6	**49.1**
9	India	884	823	44	93.9	598	57	137	377	26.7	**25.0**
10	Yugoslavia	793	765	17	97.6	380	43	240	117	67.2	**65.6**
11	Ghana	765	684	65	91.2	778	129	214	612	25.9	**23.6**
12	Israel	641	629	12	98.1	245	21	68	103	39.8	**39.0**
13	Romania	622	600	17	96.9	562	27	270	309	46.6	**45.2**
14	Bangladesh	612	601	10	98.2	498	19	234	250	48.3	**47.5**
15	Guatemala	581	569	9	97.9	559	44	342	183	65.1	**63.8**
16	Zaire	573	565	7	98.8	559	12	362	164	68.8	**68.0**
17	Haiti	515	498	5	97.3	498	32	275	218	55.8	**54.3**
18	Peru	483	469	12	97.5	417	18	299	108	73.5	**71.6**
19	Sudan	480	480	0	100.0	504	4	480	21	95.8	**95.8**
20	Nigeria	444	409	29	93.4	391	72	104	265	28.2	**26.3**
21	Ethiopia	431	420	5	98.6	602	21	370	280	56.9	**56.1**
22	Argentina	397	314	78	79.9	319	63	54	258	17.3	**13.8**
23	Iraq	389	387	1	99.7	384	8	369	16	95.8	**95.6**
24	Uruguay	356	322	25	92.5	300	27	107	144	42.6	**39.4**
25	Russia	341	333	6	97.9	207	19	121	39	75.6	**74.1**
	Subtotal	25,753	25,082	519	97.8	23,474	1,301	15,492	7,413	67.6	**66.1**
	All claims total	31,431	29,883	1,199	95.8	27,971	1,867	17,437	9,871	63.9	**61.2**

* Source: Immigration and Refugee Board news release dated February 12, 1993

** Acceptance rates are computed on adjudicated claims only; withdrawn [wdn] claims are not included.

Claims Processing By Regions

Claims Concluded	Altantic	Quebec	Ontario	Prairies	B. C.	National
Credible Basis	556	11,296	17,494	623	1,462	31,431
Full Hearing	480	10,293	15,299	555	1,344	27,971

A.S.A

Needy Guests, Reluctant Hosts? Refugee Women from the Former Yugoslavia in Hungary

Éva V. Huseby-Darvas

In the late spring of 1992 I conducted preliminary research in Hungary.[1] On the one hand, I was interested in how the refugee experience affects women's perception of their ethnic and gender identities, cultural heritage, and social, economic, and familial roles. On the other hand, I was eager to examine the host population's reactions to the refugee situation and some of the perceptions of self and others amid what was rapidly becoming a refugee crisis.[2] I conducted most of my fieldwork on refugees at the refugee camp at Nagyatád and Bicske.

Wanting to go home was the leitmotif of stories I heard from the great majority of the people from former Yugoslavia. They were representative of their group in this respect, as illustrated by the fact that over 95 percent of the refugees asked only for temporary asylum. Of course, this is not unusual; as Sylvana Foa, spokesperson for Sadako Ogata, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) said, "99 percent of the refugees in the world want to go home. People don't give up their culture, home, friends and belongings lightly."[3] Not surprisingly, the refugees who did not want to go back home but asked for permanent asylum in Hungary or wanted to emigrate belonged to a *double* minority group, for instance, families of Hungarian Gypsies from northern Yugoslavia did not want to return. As I was told by a Rom in his early fifties, the memory of over 200,000 Gypsies who were put into Croatian-operated concentration camps and murdered during World War II was still "burning in our hearts—we were afraid."

At the time of my fieldwork, it was estimated that only about 15 percent of the Croatians and ethnic Hungarians actually stayed in camps. Those who had friends or relatives in Hungary stayed with them, and the ones who had money were paying guests in pensions, hotels and private homes. Many of the refugees were simply not registered. It is therefore very difficult to establish the exact number of refugees in Hungary. In March 1992 just over 50,000 were registered refugees from Yugoslavia, 40,000 from Romania, and several thousand from elsewhere. In addition, according to Istvan Morvay's report a month later,[4] there were an estimated 25,000 illegal (unregistered) refugees from Romania, 50,000 from the former Yugoslavia, and about 100,000 from Asia, Africa and elsewhere. An influx like this in Hungary, a country with a population of 10.5 million, would be compatible to a sudden flood of over 400,000 refugees to Canada or four million newcomers to the United States. Of course, these comparisons are neither fair nor realistic. Hungary is a much smaller, more densely populated and considerably poorer country than either Canada or the United States. Hungarian society is still reeling from the regime change, struggling politically, economically and culturally amid an identity crisis.

By July 1992 there were serious concerns that the entire refugee-supporting infrastructure would soon crumble in Hungary. The concerns were well founded: only 20 percent of the costs to house, clothe, feed and care for refugees came from the United Nations and other Western sources. The remaining 80 percent was either advanced by Hungary or covered by Hungarian sources without the hope of reimbursement.[5]

As elsewhere in the contemporary refugee population, which, according to UNHCR, is an estimated twenty million worldwide, about 65 to 70 percent of the refugees in the camps from the former Yugoslavia were women and their young dependants.[6] My informants told me that some men were killed before the women left home. In other cases the husbands, fathers and sons left with their families, then returned to fight. In still other cases, men encouraged the women to leave with the children, while they stayed home to fight. In those cases where the young or middle-aged men came with their families and stayed on in the camps, the most frequently and heatedly discussed topic was returning to their home towns, so they can be counted there in what already seemed to be an escalating crisis. Thus, in late May 1992 most of the population in the camp at Nagyatád in southwestern Hungary was composed of women and children. The average age appeared to be thirty-two, but this was due to the over-representation of seniors (mostly women) and children. While most professions were represented, most adults were agrarian workers, peasants or commuting worker-peasants living in small towns and villages before they were forced to flee their homes. The ethnic composition of the refugees was as follows. In November 1991 60 to 65 percent of them were Croatian and 25 to 30 percent were Hungarian. On June 6, 1992, as a result of "ethnic cleansing," 2,000 Bosnian refugees arrived in the camp, and on July 9, 1,273 more Bosnians were returned by train from Vienna because Austria, along with the rest of western Europe, refused to take in any more refugees. As a result, the ethnic composition in the camp has changed so that approximately 60 percent of the refugee population was Croatian, 30 percent Hungarian and 8 percent Bosnian.

Before August 1991, the refugee camp at Nagyatád was a major Hungarian army post with the maximum capacity for 3,000 men. Thus, the camp has all the characteristics of socialist architec-

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ture and workmanship. The bathrooms were obviously designed for men only; there are no locks on the doors, for instance, and there are many more urinals than lavatories. The barracks are multistoried, with huge rooms that can accommodate up to fifty soldiers. For the refugee women, most of whom were used to living in individual village houses surrounded by household plots and orchards, forests and vineyards, living in the camp was very difficult, but not necessarily because of these drawbacks. As Magda, an ethnic Hungarian woman in her fifties from a small town just across the border, told me, "These Hungarians don't really know how to work, and they don't like to work either. But the other day I saw this woman work in her field. It just broke my heart. Who is working my land? They give us everything here. I would be lying if I complained about anything. They are kind to us, feed us, the kids are in school, they set up everything right here for us, but someday I'll just go crazy. I had my own orchard. I miss it, I miss working on the land. Here we are just pacing, walking up and down several times a day, eating, sleeping a bit and talking. We are talking so much."

A number of studies,[7] including those by my colleagues, my own research on immigrant and refugee women in North America for over a decade, as well as my personal experience as a refugee, show that refugee women's experiences are tremendously complex. It is commonplace, for instance, that numerous aspects of the refugee experience have both positive and negative aspects, many gains and losses for an individual. While refugee women often appear to gain a considerable amount of independence, at the same time they are frequently very vulnerable and considerably exploited. Clearly, women are greatly influenced by the radical changes in family structure, values, expectations and changes that are direct results of the refugee experience. Family violence is more frequent and much more visible in the camp environment than it was before. As these studies show, separations become more frequent and divorce rates often increase. These were obvious in the camp at Nagyatád.

The physical and psychological effects from the loss of a home, but particularly the loss of traditional support systems of networks of female kin, as well as those within neighbourhood and village communities, were painfully evident. Grieving and post-traumatic stress disorder were common among the refugee women. Particularly (but not only) the women in the infirmary were decidedly confused about where they were, why they were there and where they were in relation to their homes. The uncertainties about their own plight and future appeared to be overshadowed by the constant worries about the whereabouts of their sons, husbands and brothers, and about the younger children's activities in the camp. Even among those whose menfolk were not in the camp, domestic violence was present and becoming more and more frequent. One widow, who was born in 1930 and whose son, daughter-in-law and grandchildren were all living in the camp for over five months, complained of increasing physical abuse from her son and her grandchildren, and of daily verbal abuse by her daughter-in-law, stating over and over again, as if excusing them, "My son was so good to us before the war. Their nerves suffered from having to leave our home. There is nothing to do for us here. He just sits and thinks all day about whether to go back home or stay here. We were always busy at home. What is there to do here? The kids could be busy with school and play here in the camp, but what about the rest of us?"

It was obvious that there is a dire need for small-scale ethnographic studies that would give the women's views on their new circumstances and serve as a much needed testimony for them. From these accounts we could easily and more precisely examine what happens to family patterns, gender roles and women's status during the refugee experience.

Confusion and frustration, boredom and alienation were frequently expressed. Even those ethnic Hungarian women who were intimately familiar



A disoriented elderly woman from Croatia in the infirmary of the Nagyatád camp for refugees
(Credit: Éva Huseby-Darvas)

with the area of southwestern Hungary because for decades they regularly crossed the border to shop and at times to sell at the markets and fairs in this region, and who consequently built various social networks there, were alienated and often confused.[8]

While there were numerous signs that the traumatic experience contributed to family and community disruption, there were extraordinary and repeated emphases on the structure, continuity and significance of kinship, fictive kinship and just recently developed solidarity. For instance, terms of kinship, fictive kinship and neighbourhood were extended beyond the traditionally used spheres and often shifted across boundaries of the ethnic groups. The way refugee women dressed up in their best clothes and promenaded on the streets of the camps, or decorated rooms in the barracks, or the way in which older women sat outside the barracks after sunset, were all attempts to create a community away from home. Thus, it seemed that, despite the extreme trauma of the refugee experience, a number of women were well adjusted and tried to reestablish meaningful lives in the new environment of the camp. It was painfully evident that telling and retelling the stories of how, why, when and with whom they fled their homes and what they left behind was immensely important to the women. Their stories were like a reenactment of a ceremonial or a confirmation of ritual among other political refugees. They too had a great desire to talk, to tell each other and the interested outsider the circumstances of how, when, why and with whom they had escaped. Some tell their stories over and over again to one another. I had no difficulty eliciting the stories from these women. Rather, while some of the men were openly suspicious, none of the women seemed distrustful or hesitant.

In the Nagyatád camp on looms on loan from Hungarian folk museums, using wool yarn donated by a Maltese religious order, older women from a nearby village were weaving the traditional patterns of their community into pillowcases, tablecloths and rugs. Like so many of the other women in the camps, they told their stories too: "Our village is no more. Our houses are burned down, the church steeple was shelled and fell. But we still want to go home.... We will not have any furniture left to put these [woven items] on, but we will manage if we could only go home."

Until the beginning of the ethnic cleansing, much of the asylum-seeking migration from the former Yugoslavia was understood to be—certainly by those asking for asylum—temporary. In some cases, the entire process of escaping was initially interpreted lightly. For example, I was told that some of the Croatians and ethnic Hungarians took their vacation times, left their homes in Osijek or a nearby town or village to travel with their families to spend what they initially believed would be a few weeks in Hungary. As one man told me, "At first we were convinced that the madness cannot last much longer, surely it will be over soon. I no longer know what to believe."

The escalation of war and the accompanying insanity of ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia brought on the very worst refugee crisis in Europe since World War II.

The escalation of war and the accompanying insanity of ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia brought on the very worst refugee crisis in Europe since World War II. Part of this crisis was that by mid-July 1992 the West was not only reluctant to accept refugees, but in fact closed its gates, and in Hungary there were very serious concerns that the entire refugee-maintaining infrastructure would crumble. Incidentally, this was at precisely the same time when the UNHCR declared that Hungary's actions in the refugee crisis was most valued and that Hungary was showing an outstanding humanitarian example to the world. On July 20 the camp in Nagyatád was filled beyond its capacity: in addition to the barracks, numerous tents were erected all over the camp. It was closed to all newcomers, except for cases of family reunification or for old or sick refugees or for those with children.

The second question I asked in my research was what this great flood of refugees means to Hungarians. Particularly, how does it affect their perception of self, their ideas about Hungary's place in the world, in the so-called New World Order? Not only was I listening and asking questions in Hungary, but I have also been doing a version of what anthropologists call studying cultures from a distance. In trying to comprehend the reactions of the host population to the refugee crisis in that country, I deliberately chose to look at a number of different sources for this information: ongoing telephone and electronic mail communication with my colleagues and informants, reading Hungarian and other newspapers, supplemented by daily reports of Radio Free Europe.

Reading the studies of my colleagues,[9] looking at results of polls and listening to informants talking about the refugee question in Hungary was not merely fascinating and informative but also contradictory and confusing. Endre Sik discusses the problem from the perspective of public opinion, a deteriorating economic situation, and the formation of stereotypes that are based on half-truths amid a dire shortage of "political and other institutionalized mechanisms to moderate the collective mood of the population," and concludes that "among the population inevitably, refugee related prejudice is on the rise."[10] In the same vein, Zavecz[11] projects that in the future—when there will be fewer ethnic Hungarians among the refugees—serious problems are likely to result from the settlement and accommodation, even temporary asylum of refugees.

While there are perhaps as many different responses to the refugee situation in Hungary as there are respondents, I will discuss two types and a few subtypes of reactions. First, I found a humanitarian response. Although in

October 1991 there was concern in public opinion polls that the country will become exhausted in supporting the refugees, there was and still is pride in many Hungarians for taking the refugees in because it is the "humane thing to do." There is also anger towards the "proud, wealthy and compassionless West" for turning away trainloads and boatloads of refugees. At the same time, as a prominent intellectual wrote in reaction to the disclosure that Jacques Attali, a representative of the International Monetary Fund and UNHCR, once again promised but did not send enough money for the maintenance of the refugees, "the West is turning away from us and from our needs, so we are, once more, behind the back of God and the West."

A more extreme version of this response is one that stresses the victimization of Hungary and Hungarians. On the one hand, what are emphasized are the goodness, helpfulness and humanitarian ways of Hungarians. On the other hand, there is also a concern best expressed by the following quote: "Once again we are being put upon: the West is, once again taking advantage of us, once again we are the protectors of European humanitarian values, but we are once again pushed out on the semiperiphery between the Balkans and the European community." Reports are written and published about the average, simple-hearted, hard-working man of the street, people who are disturbed that "again Hungary, this little island of peace, is taken advantage of by the West and used as a *vegvar*" (final fortress) in a Christian civilized Europe.[12]

Europe prides itself on being affluent and civilized while turning away from helping the unfortunate, but Hungary is still helping—in spite of the tremendous economic burden that the great flow of refugees means to a country that is already struggling with unemployment and inflation, while experiencing political and socio-economic hardships.[13]

Then there is another type of reaction that is negative and hostile. Its proponents construct and pass on different types of stereotypes than those discussed in the previous passages. It is best illustrated by what some of my informants told me. For example, a forty-two-year-old clerical worker in Budapest said indignantly: "Demszky [the mayor of Budapest] wanted all these foreigners to come here. Don't ask me why, I don't know. So now all the Gypsies, Romanians, Yugoslavs and other foreigners are all over the place. To top it off, Demszky urges us to give these foreigners clothes, blankets and food, but from what? We hardly have enough for ourselves anymore. Listen, today there are people in Hungary who are starving. There are the decent people on fixed incomes, on retirement and disability pensions. There are people who go to the streets and chant in processions of tens of thousands that 'we are hungry, we are cold'. So why should we give anything to these foreigners? They come here, and then decent Hungarian folks are fired from their jobs so the foreigners can be hired because they are willing to work for a quarter of what the decent Hungarians were paid. Where is the justice in this? Tell me."

A few days later, the same person said to me, "even when I turn on the tap, instead of water, news about refugees pours out. Enough already! Who the hell cares?"

There are many people who blame not only the economic problems on the refugees but also the explosive growth in street crime, drug and prostitution rings. I found this kind of scapegoating strikingly similar to that elsewhere throughout western, as well as eastern and east central Europe in the late spring and early summer of 1992.[14]

Another informant, a commuting skilled worker in his late thirties, told me, "Now here is this mob. Strangers, you know—rabble from only God knows where. Not that long ago they killed a decent Hungarian kid nearby. No wonder everyone is against them. Everybody curses them in the factory too. The government set up a proper camp for the *Yugok* [Yugoslavs]. So I told the wife, 'Soon they will be eating better than we are eating'. Imagine—meat every day, in

In the Nagyatád camp, refugee women from the former Yugoslavia are weaving with wool sent by the Maltese Order on looms lent by the Hungarian Ethnographic Museum. (Credit: Robert Darvas)

these hard times. So what did this foreign mob do? They rebelled and beat up the decent, hard-working Hungarian guards. Let the barbarians in and this is what you get for thanks."

Here, clearly the identities of "us"—the good, decent, helpful, hard-working, humane Hungarians are juxtaposed to those of the "other"—the evil, barbarous, foreign rabble whose lot by some weird quirk of fate has destined them to become privileged people at the expense of their host population.

Similar to these reactions but more extreme is the reaction of the far right. Hungary's skinheads—who proudly declare themselves to be "number one in eastern Europe," and whose leaders carefully cultivate their association with German, Austrian and other Western skinhead organizations—generally focus their frequent verbal and written attacks on foreigners, particularly on students of color from the Third World who study at various Hungarian universities and colleges, and on Hungary's Jewish and Gypsy populations that are estimated to be 80,000 to 100,000 and 600,000 to 800,000, respectively, depending on who is doing the counting and for what purpose. The slogans of the far right, "Hungary for the Hungarians," and "Arabs, go home" are central to their ideology,[15] while "Foreigners, out!" is the more recent cry of battle of other organizations of similar ilk, like the Hungarian neo-fascists.[16]

It is crucial to emphasize, however, that even though these and similar xenophobic voices have been clearly heard since 1989 in postsocialist Hungary as much as they have been in other parts of Europe,[17] in Hungary the growing number and increasing visibility of refugees have not elicited the kind of rampant xenophobia characterized by blind, pogrom-like eruptions against foreigners as it did, for instance, in Germany or Italy. Still, there is considerable official concern, as evidenced by the April 1992 statement of Hungarian Prime Minister Jozsef Antall: "It is clearly the case that there is direct correlation between acute economic problems, unemployment and the fall in the standard of living, and growing xenophobia. However, our government tries everything in its power to curb xenophobia in the country."[18]

Indeed, in Hungary, as elsewhere in the former Soviet bloc, these are critical times. The transition of the economy from central control to market orientation is a very difficult one. The number of unemployed, particularly in certain counties has grown rapidly to an estimated 17 percent by late 1992. Among the various attempts to fill the ideological vacuum is the effort of a still relatively small, but rabidly fanatical and loudly belligerent group. This group, using the rhetoric and symbols from the very darkest period of recent Hungarian history, incite xenophobia and foster similar hatreds and fears among a growing number of followers. With Hungary beyond the saturation point in playing reluctant host to an increasingly needy and growing refugee population,[19] the imbalance is becoming critical between the real, tremendous economic and social problems and the ideal self-image of Hungarians as the noble, helpful, nurturing folks who are helping the downtrodden while the rest of the world is turning its back.

Yet sadly it looks as if it is still true what Jane Kramer[20] wrote—that in the West "the panic about immigrants from East Europe has been mainly a financial panic." It is time for it to be a thoroughly informed and carefully considered humanitarian concern. Somewhere a reporter commented that an event is only attractive for the media if it is dynamic, photogenic and if it happens in a narrow and well-defined space. The refugee crisis is none of these and rapidly getting less photogenic and much more widely scattered.

So the question remains: what is the West—Canada, the United States, the European Community and Australia — going to do with the current refugee crisis in southeastern Europe? In addition to more funds, more clothes, diapers, blankets, toys, sanitary napkins, toilet paper, decent shoes and boots that are desperately needed now, there is dire need for more attention, more understanding and, most importantly, a more flexible, open and reasonable immigration policy. ▨

NOTES

1. I am most appreciative of the help of my colleagues, Endre Sik and Ákos Róna-Tas, without whose kind help my research on which this work is based would have not been possible. János Einvachter, director of the refugee camps at Nagyatád and Bicske, was also very helpful, cooperative and most hospitable. For securing research permits with the greatest speed and ease and the least amount of bureaucracy that I have ever experienced in Hungary in more than a decade of research, Dr. Ágnes Ambrus, Department of Refugee Affairs, Hungarian Ministry of the Interior, deserves recognition and many thanks.
2. After the exodus of Germans from East Germany via Hungary to West Germany in 1989, and the massive wave of refugees from Romania, the people escaping from the former Yugoslavia actually composed the third major wave of refugees in about as many years in Hungary.
3. Cited both by Susan Martin Forbes, *Refugee Women* (London: Zed, 1992), and by Felicity Barringer, "Repatriation Is the Trend for Refugees Worldwide," *The New York Times* (November 17, 1991).
4. *Hírmondó* (April 12, 1992).
5. *Hírmondó* (July 20, 1992).
6. This was not the case with the refugee population in Hungary from Romania a few years earlier. Data on the refugees in Hungary from the former Yugoslavia cited here by the kind courtesy of the Nagyatád camp's staff.
7. See, for example, references cited by Abadan-Unat (1977), Martin Forbes (1992), Marokvasic (1981), Gozdziak (1990), Sik (n.d.), Markowitz (1986, 1988), Whiteford (1978), as well as the studies in the special issue of *Anthropological Quarterly* 1976 Vol. 76 on women and migration.
8. On the importance of premigration economic and social contacts, see Sik (n.d.).
9. Particularly those of Endre Sik (1992, 59-74) and Tibor Zavecz (1992, 49-58).
10. Sik (1992, 59-74; and also 1991, 366-78).
11. Zavecz (1992, 57).
12. Keri (1992).
13. Verebes (1992).
14. See, for example, Jan Rydl and Sabina Slonkova, "A Russian, Ukrainian, Uzbek and Chechen Mafia in Czechoslovakia: A Report," *Prague News*, No. 11, May 29-June 12:3. Of course, amid all this

demographic transformation in Europe, ethnic and national identities are newly fabricated and continuously rearticulated, as Anderson (1992), Lutz (1991) and Liebkind (1989) discuss.

15. Gerloczy (1991).
16. Hajba (1992, 1, 4).
17. Riding (1991), Kinzer (1991, 1992).
18. Cited in *Hirmondó* (April 1, 1992).
19. Here I am dealing with the refugee situation in Hungary. At the same time, I am certainly aware that other countries in the region, particularly Slovenia and Croatia, are also struggling with a tremendous refugee crisis.
20. Kramer (1991).

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The Russian Policy and the Intensification of Civil Wars in Georgia, Tajikistan and Moldova

Alexander Benifand

There are more than two million refugees in Russia, most of whom are in Moscow, St. Petersburg, the Krasnodar, Stavropol and Rostov regions. Even in the Siberian Altai region there are about 20,000 refugees roaming the Kulunda steppe in search of help. They have come from Central Asia, Transcaucasia, Tatarstan, Tula, Buryatia, Bashkiria and Yakutia. About 90 percent are Russians and the others are Germans, Ossetians, Kazakhs and Moldovans.

In the vast territory of what used to be the Soviet Union and its satellites, there is clear potential for many Yugoslavia-type civil wars. Many of these countries share the preconditions for armed conflict: the collapse of strong central authority, economic crises, persistent violations of minority rights, border disputes and very limited experience with democracy.

A profound economic crisis plays a significant role in intensifying social and ethnic conflicts. In the first quarter of 1992 alone, the Russian economy declined by 14 percent. An opinion poll conducted by a sociologist, Boris Grushin, in the Russian Federation, produced the following results: 80 percent of the people felt that life was better before *perestroika* than now; 67 percent of the respondents favoured socialism; and 50 percent of the respondents (predominantly older people) have favourable thoughts about Stalin.[1] Under these conditions, patriotic and nationalist forces are gaining more influence and popular support. Because the economic reforms have failed to bring prosperity and stabilize the Russian economy, many active members of the democratic movement are looking for answers among the conservatives and nationalists.

Ultranationalist forces attack Yeltsin's reforms. They hope to restore Russia's glory. The idea of a great Russian empire holds strong appeal for the masses. The emerging nationalist ideology produces xenophobia inside Russia and a sense of solidarity with twenty-five million Russians living outside Russia in the former Soviet republics. This concern about the violation of rights of Russian minorities in the Baltics and other newly formed states is shared by those in the democratic movement. What distinguishes the nationalists is that they also view Russian ethnic minorities as the "fifth column" in their struggle to restore the Russian empire.

Furthermore, some argue that the entire landscape of the former U.S.S.R. is of vital geopolitical interest to Russia.[2] Yevgeny Ambartsumov, chairman of the Supreme Soviet's Joint Committee on International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations, has made the following recommendations on Russian foreign policy: "As the internationally recognized legal successor to the U.S.S.R., the Russian Federation should base its foreign policy on a doctrine declaring the entire geopolitical space of the former Union to be the sphere of its vital interests ... and should strive to achieve understanding and recognition from the world community of its special interests in this space."[3]

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Yeltsin is walking on quicksand. His political rating has dropped significantly. To stay in power he is moving more and more towards conservative forces. He is hoping to raise his popularity by placing the issue of the protection of minority rights of Russians on the negotiation table with other CIS and Baltic states. More importantly, the Russian government wishes to maintain its ever-present influence throughout the former Soviet Union.

Russia moves very slowly towards the withdrawal of its troops from the Baltic, Moldova and other regions. It also interferes in internal affairs of the CIS states by sending troops to contain the conflicts and protect the rights of the Russian minorities. One example is the Russian policy in Abkhazia (Georgia), Moldova and Tajikistan.

ABKHAZIA

The armed confrontation between Abkhaz and Georgian forces began before the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. Political turmoil started when Abkhazia, which used to be a part of the Georgian Soviet Socialist republic, declared independence. After the formation of the Georgian independent state, Abkhazia continued its struggle for independence. However, the heterogeneous ethnic composition of the region complicates matters. There are 90,000 Muslim Abkhazians living among 500,000 Christian Georgians, Russians and Armenians in Abkhazia. They constitute only 17 percent of the region's population. The remainder are 46 percent Georgians, 15 percent Russians and 15 percent Armenians.[4]

Originally two parties were involved in the conflict: the Abkhaz and the Georgian National Guards. In addition, the Abkhazian struggle attracts volunteers from the mountain peoples of Northern Caucasus, which is presently part of Russia.[5] The confederation of mountain people issued an ultimatum to Georgia to withdraw its troops from Abkhazia and pay compensation for the damage it caused. If Georgia did not comply, the confederation threatened to declare the start of hostilities against Georgia.

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Abkhazia has tremendous strategic significance by virtue of its location on the Black Sea. Most important ports are located there. Furthermore, a major railroad also crosses the region. It is no wonder that Russia is very interested in its fate.

Originally Russian troops arrived in Abkhazia by invitation from the Abkhaz Parliament, which argued that Russia could not remain indifferent to the situation in Abkhazia as some 90,000 Russians live there. The Abkhaz were hoping that Russia would be able to protect them from Georgia's control. This invitation played into the hands of Russian nationalists and those wishing to protect Russia's economic interests there. The idea of sending troops to Abkhazia was supported by the Russian Parliament. Russian President Boris Yeltsin told the Russian Supreme Soviet that Russia would not stand by while Russian citizens' interests were being trampled on, nor would Russian troops hesitate to defend themselves if attacked. Political observers say the Abkhaz conflict is being used by Yeltsin's hard-liner opponents in Parliament as a test of the president's devotion to important national causes.

Even though Yeltsin claims that the Russian forces would maintain neutrality, the Georgian State Council Chairman Eduard Shevardnadze accused Russian troops of transferring military technology to the Abkhaz forces and creating obstacles to Georgian forces. Russian troops are blocking the airspace of Georgia in the Abkhazian region and sea approaches. The Georgian foreign minister said, "This is a clear demonstration of the violation of the norms of international law, and crude trampling on the sovereignty of Georgia."

Yeltsin's policy is criticized both inside Russia and abroad. One political observer said, "It would be ironic if the great defender of freedom and democracy was forced to enter an essentially imperialist Soviet-style war."[6]

Even before the Russian troops were sent to the region, the armed confrontation in Abkhazia has claimed hundreds of lives. Thousands of people have been uprooted. With the Russian troops there, the situation has become more complicated. It is expected that masses of people will become refugees. On January 5, 1993 Edward Shevardnadze asked the UN to send a peacekeeping force to Abkhazia.

MOLDOVA (TRANS-DNIESTRIA)

Present ethnic conflicts in Trans-Dniestria have long historic roots. When Stalin masterminded the U.S.S.R., he put delayed-action bombs against the structure, i.e., conflicts in border regions. Trans-Dniestria is one of such places. In the twentieth century, the area frequently changed its masters. At first, the zone was part of the Kherson Region and then the Odessa Region (presently in Ukraine). During the Civil War (1919-21) it was successively occupied by Germans, Denikin's troops, French, Romanians and finally by the Red Army. Afterwards, the Tiraspol area was incorporated into the Odessa Region. Then it became the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and eventually the Moldavian Soviet Socialistic Republic. In 1941-44 the territory was occupied by Romania, and was included afterwards into the Moldavian Autonomous Republic again. However, local people were never once asked their opinion. The change-over was forced upon them each time. As a result, local people of all ethnic backgrounds began to hate all forced changes.

The independent Moldova is seeking its identity as a European nation, perhaps as part of Romania, into which some hope to become incorporated in the future. But this means that residents of the strip of land along the Dniestria are again going to be included into the Balkan system. The Russians, who comprise a significant part of the 800,000 people in this area, do not look favourably at this development. Their demands for autonomy and independence from Moldova is fuelled by Moscow.

On June 23, 1990 the Supreme Soviet of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic passed a declaration on sovereignty and a document denouncing the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact as an act of aggression and unlawful occupation of part of Romania's territory and the August 2, 1940 decision of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet to establish the M.S.S.R. Moscow was thrown into commotion. The office of Anatoly Lukyanov (a former Parliament speaker and one of the organizers of the August 19 coup) started negotiating with representatives of the Russian and Gagauz population, stirring their separatist feelings and encouraging them to create two independent republics—Trans-Dniestria and Gagauzia.[7] On September 2, 1990 deputies at all levels from the Left Bank districts of Moldova proclaimed the establishment of a Trans-Dniestria Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic as part of Moldova, but with a firm intention to remain part of the U.S.S.R.

Abkhazia has tremendous strategic significance by virtue of its location on the Black Sea. Most important ports are located there. Furthermore, a major railroad also crosses the region. It is no wonder that Russia is very interested in its fate.

The first sessions of Moldova's Parliament, elected in February-March 1990, was marked by the triumph of the nationalist idea. At the Congress of the Popular Front of Moldova (PFM), held in late June 1990, a resolution was passed, which recommended that Parliament rename the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic into the Romanian Republic of Moldova. The horror of unification was widespread in Trans-Dniestria. On August 25, 1991 the Supreme Soviet in Tiraspol (Trans-Dniestria) proclaimed the independence of the Left Bank. On September 6 a resolution was passed on the transfer of everything—from enterprises to the KGB—to the "young republic's" jurisdiction. During this time no one on the Left Bank was willing to negotiate a new state set-up of the Republic of Moldova. Moldova did not try to follow

the route of political negotiation and used the diplomacy of guns.

On June 19-21, 1992 the city of Bendery was heavily shelled. The Bendery slaughter claimed 620 lives and left 3,500 wounded. Thousands of refugees from this region fled to Russia, Ukraine and other parts of Moldova. This massacre left a very bitter after-taste. Federation with Moldova is completely out of the question. At the same time, the Russian presence in the region is ever-growing. The 14th Army (which is under the Russian jurisdiction) is permanently stationed there under the command of Alexander Lebed, a former deputy commander of the Air Force of Russia. At his first press conference, Lebed firmly stated that Trans-Dniestria is Russian land. At the beginning of October, the "Dniestria republic" leaders in eastern Moldova celebrated the bicentennial of the founding of Tiraspol as a would-be capital of a military settlement of the Russian empire.

Trans-Dniestria intends to form its own army with the help of the 14th Army. Ministries of defence and national security have already been established. The Dniestria leaders passed an edict, imposing the Russian alphabet instead of the Latin alphabet on the Moldovan language of the region. Russian ultranationalist supporters of the "Dniestria republic" hail the progress of "this first republic free of democrats." The Council of Atamans of Russian Cossack Hosts, which convened in Tiraspol, asked Yeltsin to recognize the "Dniestria republic" and give it assistance, including military.[8] The Abkhazian and "Dniestria" authorities have signed an alliance agreement.[9]

By maintaining its army on the territory of Trans-Dniestria, setting up institutions (such as banks and security) directly linked to those in Russia, and lending moral and material support to the Trans-Dniestria government, Russia set up a satellite on the territory to which it has no claim, since Trans-Dniestria is located between Moldova and Ukraine. The artificiality of this territorial creation has a potential for intensifying serious ethnic, territorial and political conflicts in the future.

CENTRAL ASIA

The uprooting of people in Tajikistan is caused by an armed conflict between two political forces. On the one side there are supporters of the former president Rakhmon Nabiev, supported by the Communist forces, whose leaders traditionally came from the economically developed northern part of the country where Islamic influence is relatively weak. His opposition, which seized power from him in May 1992, is a weak coalition of prodemocracy and Islamic forces from the economically depressed south, where Communism did not take root.[10]

... the war in Tajikistan ... will reach beyond the boundaries of Tajikistan because of ethnic kinships, the weakness of statehood and the absence of borders.

The first six months of the war caused 20,000 casualties.[11] It also produced a massive displacement of people. Refugees escaping the fighting in southern Tajikistan have fled into Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan. Thousands of refugees from Kurgan-Tyube, the opposition stronghold, have picketed the Russian ambassador's residence demanding an end to Russian interference in Tajikistan. According to the ITAR-TASS report of December 31, there were 537,000 refugees officially registered in Tajikistan and around 70,000 who fled to Afghanistan (Radio Free Europe, January 4, 1993). This was a reaction to rumours that the Russian forces have given weaponry and equipment to supporters of deposed president Rachmon Nabiev. Leaders of the opposing sides in the civil war say they have no control over 20 percent of their forces.

The situation is analogous to Afghanistan not only because the latter is Tajikistan's neighbour and its ethnic relative, but also because this strategically important region, rich in natural resources, particularly uranium, has become an object of external pressure by various groups of the Mojahedin, Iranians, Turks and Uzbeks. This pressure intensified the disintegration of Tajik society in political and regional terms. The northern part of Tajikistan is drawn towards Uzbekistan, while the southern region is immersed in a civil war that is becoming part of Afghan feuding. Russia cannot stand aloof in the Tajik conflict, which threatens 600,000 Russians living in the republic and jeopardizes Russia's interests. Therefore, there is a strong Russian military presence there.

Some Russian political analysts, such as Vladimir Kulistikov, believe that the war in Tajikistan may have wider regional implications. This war will reach beyond the boundaries of Tajikistan because of ethnic kinships, the weakness of statehood and the absence of borders. Especially dangerous is a possible disintegration of Kazakhstan, whose population is mostly Russian. This in turn will endanger stability in Russia itself.[12] There are different interpretations of the role of the Russian troops on the territories of Abkhazia, Moldova and Tajikistan. Some feel that they play the role of a mediator and a peacekeeping force.[13] It is my contention, however, that to be a peacekeeping force, it would have to include forces of several CIS members. Yet at the present, it is comprised only of Russian troops, which arbitrarily assume the role of peacekeepers, often without an invitation and in spite of demands for their withdrawal. Their presence contributes to the escalation of the conflict and not its resolution, and will cause more bloodshed and displacement. ▨

NOTES

1. Radio Free Europe Daily Report No. 185, September 25, 1992.
2. A. Mygranyan, "Real and Illusory Guidelines in Foreign Policy," *Rossiiskaya Gazeta* (August 4, 1992): 7. Andranik Mygranyan is a director of the CIS Centre of the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of International Economic and Political Research.

3. Konstantin Eggert, "Russia in the role of 'Eurasian gendarme'?" *Izvestia* (August 7, 1992): 6.
4. "Georgia Hits Coastal Town on Black Sea," *The New Times* (October 4, 1992).
5. The mountain peoples of Northern Caucasus, including Chechnya, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Northern Ossetia and Dagestan, have formed a federation. They demand a formation of a mostly Muslim confederation of independent states and the withdrawal of Russian troops from their territory. Abkhazia aspires to be a part of this confederation. In addition to sending volunteers to Abkhazia, the mountain people of Northern Caucasus have sent aid.
6. Olivia Ward "Shevardnadze, Yeltsin Caught in Escalating Caucasus Fight," *The Toronto Star* (October 4, 1992).
7. Igor Gamaunov, "Krovavya zgatva Anatolya Lukyanova," *Novoe Russkoe Slovo* (August 18, 1992).
8. Oazu Nantoi, "On Moldova and Not It Alone," *Moscow News Weekly* (November 29, 1992); Valery Litskaya, "Conquer or Kill," *Moscow News Weekly* (November 29, 1992); Alexander Kakotkin, "War with No Special Cause," *Moscow News Weekly* (November 27, 1992); "Russia between Dniestria's Two Banks," *Moscow News Weekly* (November 27, 1992); Ksenia Myalo, "Pridniestrovie: Vesna Tsveta Khaki," *Novoe Vremya* (November 16, 1992).
9. The Georgian and Moldovan foreign ministries said that the Abkhazia-"Dniestria" alliance treaty just signed in Tiraspol promotes armed conflict, seeks to consolidate unlawful power structures within states, and violates national and international law as well as the spirit and goals of the UN and the CSCE. The precedent being set is potentially dangerous to the international system as a whole, the statements said (Radio Free Europe Daily Report, no. 21, February 2, 1993).
10. Yuri Zarakhovich, "War in a Vacuum," *Time* (October 12, 1992).
11. John Gray, "Anarchy Sweeps Tajik Capital," *The Globe and Mail* (October 26, 1992).
12. Vladimir Kulistikov, "Afghanistan Has Caught Up with Russia, But This Time in Tajikistan," *New Times*, no. 37 (November 1992).
13. Sophie Pons, "Russia Becomes Policeman and Mediator for CIS Nations," *We* 1, no. 15 (October 5-18, 1992).

Jews in Moldova, Central Asia, Azerbaijan and Georgia

Tanya Basok

The rise of nationalism in Moldova, Central Asia, Azerbaijan and Georgia has had significant repercussions for Jews residing in these regions. Even in those communities where Jews have peacefully coexisted with other ethnic groups for centuries, ethnic resentments and hostilities are beginning to make them extremely anxious about the present and future. There have been individual incidents of break-ins and attacks reported by word-of-mouth to journalists and representatives of organizations concerned with human rights. No research on the subject has been done in these regions. And even systematic reports on anti-Semitism there are very rare. Unlike their Russian counterparts, anti-Semites in these regions did not form impressive Pamyat-like organizations and do not seem to publish newspapers. This makes it difficult to monitor their activities.

One can judge how alarming the situation is by examining the growing numbers of Jews who have expressed interest in or who have moved to Israel. Presently the number of Jews from these regions who have come to Canada as refugee claimants is relatively small. However, if the exodus of Jews from these regions increases and Israel continues facing tremendous hardships related to settlement of the former Soviet *olim* (immigrants), many of them will attempt to come to Canada.

There are more than 1.2 million Jews in the former Soviet Union who have invitations to repatriate to Israel. Not all of them are ready to leave their home country. Their decision depends on the political and economic conditions in their country of origin, as well as policies and conditions of absorption in Israel. In the first eight months of 1992, over 40,000 of them decided to come to Israel. In the first six months of this year the total number of Soviet *olim* was 27,330, averaging 4,555 people per month. In the next two months the number of Jews arriving in Israel from the former Soviet Union went up to 6,575 in July and 6,461 in August. This increase can be accounted for by a growing outflow of Jews from regions experiencing civil wars and ethnic confrontations—that is Central Asia, Caucasus and Moldova. According to Simha Dinitz, the chairman of the Jewish Agency, the average monthly arrival of Jews from these regions would be 10,000 people at the end of 1992, reaching a total of 150,000 *olim* from these regions in 1993.[1]

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ISLAMIC REPUBLICS (CENTRAL ASIA)

There are a total of 200,000 Jews, both Bukharan and Ashkenazi, in the Islamic republics of the former Soviet Union.[2] Many of them are beginning to leave the region because of the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. When Tadjikistan started on a road of Islamization, local nationalists were tolerant of the Bukharan Jews who had been living there since the eighth and ninth centuries. Azhkenazi Jews, on the other hand, being Russian speakers and having immigrated to Central Asia recently from the European parts of Russia, were identified with the Russian culture and population. Together with other Russian-speaking people, they began fleeing the region. Lately, however, even Bukharan Jews have started fleeing. As one of them said, "The attitude towards Jews has changed suddenly. Tadjik friends don't want to see you anymore. Their philosophy is that Muslims should live in their state and Christians and Jews should get out. There is virtual anarchy in the city; no one is responsible for anything, human life is worth nothing. There is an impression that a tragedy can erupt any moment. We decided not to tempt fate."[3] Anti-Semitic incidents are becoming widespread, while local law enforcement agents refuse to take action. In one reported incident, three Uzbeks broke into an apartment of a Jewish family on February 20, 1991. They beat the father unconscious, tried to rape the older sister and forced the mother and other children on their knees to beg for forgiveness. "Why have you not left for Israel?" they yelled.[4]

In August 1992, 750 Jews repatriated from the Muslim republics to Israel. In the summer months their exodus surpassed that from Russia and Ukraine. In the last two and a half years 6,500 Jews left Tadjikistan. The remaining 12,000 are anxious to escape the armed confrontations between the supporters of the deposed president, Nabiev, and his opponents.[5] After Israel organized an airlift of 146 Jews from the Tajikistani capital of Dushanbe, some 10,000 Jews of Tadjikistan have expressed interest in repatriating to Israel.[6]

CAUCASUS

There are 22,000 Jews in Georgia of whom 7,000 are Azhkenazi. Of the 1,300 Jews in Abkhazia, 300 are Ashkenazi. It is the latter who are in most danger because they are equated with the Russian-speaking population. But even the Georgian Jews who have lived in this region for centuries are beginning to pack their bags. In Abkhazia, Jews are caught in a cross-fire between Abkhazian separatists and Georgian nationalists. Anti-Semitism is on the rise in the rest of Georgia.[7]

The ethnic confrontation between Armenians and Azeris in Azerbaijan has affected its Jewish population as well. During the 1990 Armenian pogroms in Baku, many Russian-speaking Jews also fled, fearing that their turn would come next. Attacks on mountain Jews by Muslims in some small, predominantly Jewish communities, such as Kuba or Oguz, are forcing entire communities to flee.[8]

MOLDOVA

The armed conflict between the Romanian and Slavic populations of the Trans-Dniestria region has alarmed many Russian-speaking Jews. In the last two and a half years 32,500 Jews came to Israel from Moldova. There are 40,000 Jews still living in the region, 70 percent of whom have Israeli letters of invitation. Among them 8,000 live in the Trans-Dniestria region, with 2,500 in Bendery and Tiraspol. One-third of the Jews who fled the armed confrontations in that region are already in Israel, while others are becoming very anxious to leave.[9]

Armed conflicts and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism are forcing Jews out of Central Asia, Georgia and Moldova. Simultaneously, the growing number and power of nationalist forces in Russia have repercussions in the other regions of the former Soviet Union. The open demands of these nationalist organizations for a reunification of the Russian empire makes many Jews residing in the newly formed independent states wary of the future. ▨

NOTES

1. Shimon Chertok, "Prognozi—Vesch Netochnaya" ('Forecasts Are Not Exact'), *Novoe Russkoe Slovo* (September 25, 1992): 6.
2. Ben Rose, "Jewish Agency Plays Key Role in Rescuing Jews, Says Dinitz," *The Canadian Jewish News* (September 3, 1992): 2.
3. Shimon Chertok, "Prognozi—Vesch Netochnaya."
4. Georgii Samoilovich, "Izgnanie Naroda" ["Expulsion of a Nation"] *Novoe Russkoe Slovo* (June 26, 1992): 6.
5. Shimon Cherton, "Prognozi—Vesch Netochnaya."
6. Batsheva Tsur, "Airlift from Tajikistan Arrives," *The Jerusalem Post International Edition* (October 3, 1992).
7. Georgii Samoilovich, "Izgnanie Naroda."
8. Batsheva Tsur, "Ahkhazi Jews Set for Exodus," *The Jerusalem Post International Edition* (August 29, 1992): 4.
9. Shimon Cherton, "Prognozi—Vesch Netochnaya"; Allison Kaplan, "Moldavian Jews Arrive," *The Jerusalem Post International Edition* (August 15, 1992).

Psychosocial Changes in East German Refugees

Ralf Schwarzer and André Hahn

During the breakdown of the communist system in 1989, more than 300,000 East German citizens left their country and moved to West Germany. As part of this exodus, more than 50,000 refugees settled in West Berlin. Some came via the West German embassies in Warsaw, Prague or Budapest, while others fled under various dangerous conditions. However, many crossed the border after the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989.

A study was launched in October 1989 (before the fall of the Berlin Wall) to examine the emotional reactions, coping strategies, social adaptation and health of these refugees in their new environment. The project was planned as a longitudinal study, with three measurement points during the first two years after their flight. The East German refugees, who were contacted individually in their temporary living quarters, were asked to take part in a psychological investigation on their new life in the West. The first stage of the study took place in the fall and winter of 1989-90, the second-stage data were obtained in the summer of 1990, and the third set was collected in the summer of 1991. A total of 1,036 refugees agreed to participate and, thus, constituted the first-stage sample. The analysis was performed on the basis of 235 refugees who had participated in all three stages. These 126 males (mean age was 31 years) and 109 females (mean age was 32 years) filled in a questionnaire measuring (among other variables) employment status, social support, anxiety, depression and health complaints.

There was a stable relationship between one's employment status and self-reported ill health, but this relationship was further elucidated when sex differences were taken into account. More extreme symptoms were reported for men than for women. Apparently, joblessness is more detrimental for men, or else initial health problems inhibited job search and hiring. At all three stages, women reported more ill health than men.

A related research question was whether social support could buffer the effect of joblessness on ill health. Those refugees who were employed reported low physical symptoms, regardless of whether or not they received social support. For the refugees who were always jobless, however, social support made a considerable difference. Those who suffered from two stressors simultaneously, i.e., unemployment and lack of social support, continued to report the highest level of ill health at the three points of study. It was most interesting that those who remained jobless but received social support showed a remarkable decline in ill health over time.

This is an example of the often hypothesized buffer effect of social support within the stress and health relationship. Similar results were found for depression and anxiety (Schwarzer, Hahn and Jerusalem 1993). ▨

REFERENCE

Schwarzer, R., A. Hahn and M. Jerusalem. 1993. "Negative Affect in East German Migrants: Longitudinal Effects of Unemployment and Social Support." *Anxiety, Stress, and Coping: An International Journal* 6 (in press).

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MOLDOVA

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Book Review

Refugee Communities

by Steven J. Gold

Newbury Park: Sage, 1992

Reviewed by John Sorenson

Steven J. Gold's *Refugee Communities* offers a comparative ethnographic study of adaptation to resettlement in California on the part of two refugee groups, Soviet Jews and Vietnamese. The book is based on the author's experience as an English-language teacher and resettlement worker from 1982 to 1990 and provides a number of useful and interesting insights into the adaptation process.

The comparative approach is particularly suited to discerning the contextual aspects of adaptation and avoiding ethnocentric interpretations of behaviour. As well, Gold rejects what he terms an artificial distinction between refugees and immigrants and, emphasizing the self-determining aspects of both groups, draws upon literature on migration to illuminate these communities. He suggests that previous studies of refugee adaptation have been guided more by the policy- and problem-oriented approach of social services agencies than by sociological inquiry, and that this has created a literature that overemphasizes community solidarity among refugee populations. Based on his work with these two groups in California, Gold argues that ethnic mobilization and the development of ethnic communities are not inevitable for all migrants, and that refugee populations are equally likely to be characterized by diversity and fragmentation. His research depicts a lack of community-wide organization and a prevalence of informal associations at the local level. Diversity rather than ethnic solidarity emerges as the defining characteristic of both groups, although Gold does allow the possibility that such solidarity may emerge over time.

The book provides concise summaries on the background of each refugee group and describes their characteristics as enclaves in California. These chapters are accompanied by what the publisher describes as photographic essays, but the photographs themselves do not seem an integral part of the book, nor do they add very much to our understanding of either refugee group. The text, however, provides some very interesting information on internal differentiation and factionalism within each group, which does much to correct certain stereotypes of refugees.

There is diversity in both groups in terms of class, ethnic and national identity, religion, region and ideology. Gold notes that the Vietnamese group is divided into distinct subgroups and "waves": the elite South Vietnamese who came in 1975, and the "Boat People" and ethnic Chinese who came later.

While the Soviet Jews are more homogeneous, Gold finds that the community is characterized by mutual suspicion and, contrary to what might be expected, there is little development of formal organizations. Gold suggests that one explanation for this may exist in the compulsory organization that existed in the former Soviet Union, as well as a system that required one to manipulate personal connections.

One of the most important aspects of the book is the manner in which it points out the differing agendas of refugees and the various resettlement agencies that have been created to assist them. Clearly, the agencies and the refugees have different priorities in many respects. For example, Gold suggests that settlement agencies may find themselves competing for funds and try to find jobs for as many refugees as possible in a short time. Yet he finds that many Soviet Jewish refugees in particular seek higher-status jobs and resent being pushed into what they regard as menial positions. Those who have worked with refugees will recognize this as a common complaint, particularly from professionals. While it may sometimes reflect refugees' unrealistic expectations, Gold indicates that the staff of resettlement agencies may feel threatened by client autonomy and maintains that refugees should be regarded as "able partners, not dependent adversaries."

Related to this is Gold's discussion of the relationship of Soviet Jewish refugees with American Jewish groups who were active in sponsoring the refugees. He describes how a number of Jewish settlement agencies made religious indoctrination a part of their programs, such as English language classes, while the refugees were much less interested in religion and more concerned with practical aspects of settlement. There were a number of other cultural differences between the refugees and American Jewish groups. For example, the refugees have had a more right-wing political orientation and conflicts arose because they viewed some Americans as being too soft on socialism or the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, although the mobilizing efforts of anticommunist activists among both of these refugee groups would seem to offer a natural area for comparison, Gold does not devote much attention to the important but much-neglected discussion of the politics of refugee communities.

There is, however, an interesting discussion of entrepreneurial activity on the part of refugees. Typically, the development of small businesses among immigrant communities has been explained either by cultural theories that suggest that certain groups are naturally inclined towards entrepreneurial activities, or theories that suggest that such groups go into business because they are disadvantaged and excluded from opportunities in the broader society. Gold rejects both explanations, dismissing cultural theories as tautological and finding no evidence that self-employment exists as a direct alternative to unemployment. Instead, he suggests that independence is a key motivation for immigrants to go into business for themselves. Self-employment limits contact with the unfamiliar host culture, provides employment for relatives and unique opportunities within refugee communities.

Noting that businesses have a symbiotic relationship with ethnic communities and may foster community development, Gold also discusses exploitation and paternalism within immigrant businesses and notes that entrepreneurs from both groups prefer to hire more docile Latino workers. *Refugee Communities* is recommended as an interesting book that will be useful to all those who seek a better understanding of the refugee experience. ▨

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