SPECIAL ISSUE

Population Displacements

Vol 21 • No 1 • 2002

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Introduction

Population Displacements: Causes and Consequences

Ogenga Otunnu

While the international community is frantically engaged in developing more credible terror policies against refugees and immigrants and is feverishly occupied with the politics of the U.S.-led war on terrorism, over thirty million internally displaced people endure persecutions and remain caged in turbulent and inhumane conditions in their home countries. Some fifteen million externally displaced persons or refugees also languish outside their home countries without basic human rights and human security. These victims of violations of human rights and political violence are uprooted from their homes by a number of interrelated factors, internal and external, past and present.

Historically, mass displacements of populations have been intimately linked with violently contested legitimacy of the state, its institutions, and their incumbents. Legitimacy of the state demands that the construction and/or the preservation of the political entity reflect the vital interests, values, and expectations of its members. Human rights, including the rights to development, human security, and social justice, are central to the political legitimacy of the state and its institutions. When a state meets these criteria, its members, in turn, will identify and co-operate with it and its institutions. Such a state, whose sovereignty is derived from its members, is also likely to conform to international norms, customs, principles, conventions, and obligations by which relations between states and international persons are governed.

States that are major sources of contemporary displacements of populations, however, suffer from a profound and chronic legitimation deficit. The origins of this pervasive and harrowing crisis of legitimacy reflect how these predatory juridical states were constructed and preserved. In Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America, these states were constructed to meet the vaulting socio-economic, strategic and political interests of imperial powers. Since the primary motives for imperialism did not conform to the interests, values, and expectations of the conquered and dehumanized inhabitants of the colonial creations, the states experienced profound crises of legitimacy. These states also became important sites of violations of human rights and political violence, including terror.

The profound legitimation deficit of the state and its incumbents was exacerbated by the imperial violence that accompanied colonial state formations. This violence included herding the target populations into concentration camps, scorched-earth policies, patronage, and manipulation of nationality and/or religious contradictions. Many lives were lost and many inhabitants of the colonial territories were violently uprooted as well.

The notoriously arbitrary boundaries of these states intensified the crisis of legitimacy of the faltering colonial states. Paper boundaries, which were imposed on these societies, often cut across national, cultural, linguistic, and economic entities. For example, in the Middle East, the Kurds and the Palestinians were displaced and left stranded in many neighbouring countries. Similarly, in Africa, the Akan, Ewe, Yuruba, Hutu, Tutsi, and Somalis, for example, found themselves in a number of colonial states. The imposed and hostile boundaries, compounded by colonial administrative and economic policies, also left some of the states so small or immense in area or population that they were not viable entities.

Although during anti-colonial struggles some local political leaders had criticized the artificial nature of the boundaries, as soon as they assumed power they defended the boundaries. Where national groups demanded self-determination, the new rulers used the same institutions and agents of terror to suppress such demands. The politics of

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national integration, through administrative fiat, were also characterized by political violence, political manipulation, and displacements of populations.

These fractured societies also inherited imperial economic policies that created absolute dependency on the imperial powers and led to the vertical integration of the economies into the international economic system. In Latin America, for example, imperial economic policies—characterized by plunder of minerals, forced labour in the mines, and the enslavement of Africans—turned the states into suppliers of raw materials to industrializing Europe. The development of the economies of the imperial powers that controlled Africa, Asia, and the Middle East was part of a similar dialectical process.

These structures of severe exploitation, underdevelopment, and dependency are more embedded today than during the period of formal colonialism. Contemporary economic decay also stems from corruption by local rulers, lack of political accountability, widespread nepotism, militarism, economic mismanagement, political instability, the debt crisis and the politics of international economic system, multinational corporations, private banks, globalization, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These crises have compelled some states, including Uganda, not only to rely on foreign loans and foreign aid for their annual budgets, but also to hand over the (mis)management of their economies to the World Bank and the IMF.

These economic crises—which leave the industrialized countries, with approximately 20 per cent of the global population, an island in a violent sea of poverty—condemn over one billion people in the underdeveloped world to absolute poverty. Absolute poverty means poor health, high incidence of HIV/AIDS, high infant mortality, lack of adequate and proper nutrition, lack of relevant education, mass unemployment, persistent insecurity and hopelessness, increased crimes, and life-threatening labour. The crises also intensify struggles over scarce resources and lead to widespread violence, political repression, torture, and displacements of population. Ironically, victims of national and international economic *cum* political policies, past and present, who seek asylum, are dismissed as bogus refugees or economic refugees.

Another significant cause of displacements of populations in these states is dictatorship. This dominant factor draws heavily from the colonial heritage, when institutions, policies and rule rested on terror and authoritarianism. Whether or not the retreating colonial powers introduced colonial versions of experimental democracy, refugee-producing states in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East experienced some forms of revolutionary dictatorship or single-party dictatorship or civilian *cum* military dictatorship. In these states, dictators dismissed democratic pluralism as a Western form of government that did not fit situations in underdeveloped societies. Some dictators promised to allow democratic pluralism in the future, when what is historically necessary to provide political legitimacy and durable peace is historically possible.

Dictatorships, even when they are described by some Western leaders and scholars as African or Asian democracy, have led to disappearances of political opponents, detention and torture, political repression, militarization of society, and displacements of populations. Since avenues for peaceful transition of power are blocked or socio-economic and political exclusion has intensified, some political opponents have engaged in armed violence against the incumbents and their supporters. Often, armed encounters develop into civil wars and uproot more people from their homes.

During the Cold War, the two leading hegemonic powers, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, took advantage of internal conflicts and violence in some of these states. In the violent scramble, the superpowers and their allies in Europe and/or North America provided substantial arms and political and economic support to corrupt and despotic regimes or despotic opposition groups in these predatory states. While this struggle for global hegemony was a form of cold war between the superpowers, there were hot wars that destroyed hundreds of thousands of lives, maimed and violently uprooted millions of people, further undermined the legitimacy of the faltering states, and decimated the economies of the victim/client states. For example, superpower rivalry turned Afghanistan into a battlefield that claimed over a million lives, permanently maimed over three hundred thousand Afghans, generated over six million refugees, and left over a million internally displaced people. The war between the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul and the Mujahedeen armed opposition (supported by the U.S., Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan) also destroyed cities, schools, hospitals, pastures, and livestock, and left millions of anti-personnel mines in the ravaged and poverty-stricken country. The displacement of population continued during the U.S.-led war against the Taliban.

Internal wars, violent conflicts, severe socio-economic crises, and systematic violations of human rights have contributed to a number of genocides and displacements of populations. Genocidal societies are critically polarized, have a long history of violent conflicts and policies of exclusion, and experience socio-economic hardships. Often, the victims or target groups are identified in terms of nationality, race, political ideology, and/or religious affiliation. Perpetrators of genocide use effective and dehumanizing propaganda and slogans to present the "other" as

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subhuman, evil, and a threat to the survival and prosperity of the society. In such situations, genocide, including mass rapes and ethnic cleansing, is disguised as a normal response to extraordinary crises and a patriotic duty.

Population displacements and destruction of human lives and property also result from "environmental violence," including the ravages of cyclones, tidal surges, hurricanes, floods, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, pollution, droughts and famines, "development projects" or "development" policies and deliberate destruction of the "enemy's environment." Although such displacements are often caused by a complex combination of socio-economic and political policies and "ecological violence," both local and international, displaced victims, including those who cross international borders in search of asylum, are labeled "environmental refugees" or "environmental migrants." Such labels not only exclude the externally displaced, who flee life-threatening violence, from qualifying for refugee status, but they also gloss over socio-economic and political conditions under which displacements occur.

Another type of environmental violence is landmines, used in insurgency/counter-insurgency warfare to kill, terrorize, maim, and displace unarmed civilians. Landmines also prevent victims of violations of human rights and political violence from fleeing to safe zones, thereby forcing the uprooted population to languish without protection and assistance. In addition, tens of millions of these unexploited blind weapons of mass destruction, scattered in at least sixty-two countries, prevent safe repatriation and resettlement, intensify poverty and underdevelopment, and hinder humanitarian assistance and post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction.

The consequences of displacements are especially severe for the victims. Many perish, while many more are tortured, terrorized, detained, raped, harassed, humiliated, dehumanized, traumatized, and left without protection. The overwhelming majority of these victims of systematic violations of human rights languish in hostile, war-torn and poverty-stricken countries. Whether they are caged in life-threatening concentration camps in Northern Uganda or confined to hostile refugee camps in Pakistan, or are in prison-like detention centres in Europe or locked up with criminals in prisons in the U.S., the uprooted population know that countries of the industrialized Western Europe and North America, that claim to champion human rights and democracy, support regimes that champion violations of human rights and despotism. They also know that the champions of human rights and democracy defend forced repatriation, interdiction, and detention of asylum seekers and immigrants. They are then compelled to conclude that human rights in practice only apply to those who are racially, economically, and political relevant.

These voices that some scholars and the media ignore seem to have been vindicated by the growing xenophobia and asylum and immigration terror policies. Anti-refugee and anti-immigrant terror policies in industrialized Western Europe and North America have been conveniently justified as war against international terrorism. The war against international terrorism has also attracted the support of some rulers from the underdeveloped countries who are terrorists and major violators of human rights in their own countries.

This issue of *Refuge* examines some causes and consequences of displacements of populations. Anita Gagnon, Lisa Merry, and Cathlyn Robinson highlight some of the effects of forced displacement on refugee women's reproductive health. Their extensive literature review revealed a paucity of data to support or refute claims of greater reproductive health risks for refugee women. The authors encourage policymakers, practitioners, activists, and scholars to pay special attention to this group.

Maureen Lynch focuses on environmental consequences of forced displacement. Drawing from her distinguished field experience and case studies, she presents an elaborate list and analysis of environmental problems that big refugee settlements cause. These problems also generate socio-economic and political tension between refugees and host communities. Although there are no easy solutions to the complex problems—compounded by chronic poverty, lack of resources, and lopsided policies—she suggests underlying principles that can mitigate some of the problems.

Michelle Lowry provides an analysis of some of the effects of displacement of populations on refugee and immigration policies in Canada. The growing anti-refugee and anti-immigrant policy in Canada, which mirrors the harmonized policies in industrialized Europe and North America against refugees and immigrants from underdeveloped countries, is presented by the government in terms of national security. Using a feminist approach to examine the contradictions between national security and human security, the article demonstrates how the new policy creates insecurity for refugees and migrants, discriminates against refugee women and children, exacerbates racism, and undermines Canada's policy of multiculturalism. In addition, the article observes that Canada's definition of "terrorism" ignores the fact that some people and groups in underdeveloped countries are engaged in wars against violent and oppressive regimes.

Anthony H. Richmond's article is an excellent examination of social exclusion or global apartheid, which is both a cause and effect of displacement and instability. Although

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the study focuses largely on Britain, it provides useful examples of global social exclusion, including genocide, xenophobia, globalization, discrimination, racism, and deportations. The article also demonstrates that contemporary responses to perceived threats of mass migrations to industrialized societies rely on instruments of global apartheid: forcible repatriation of refugees to the so-called "safe third countries," interdiction, visas, and denial of citizenship.

MacDonald E. Ighodaro provides a critical analysis of theories and practices of repatriation. Applying critical anti-racist discursive frameworks, the article highlights the politics and failure of one of the so-called durable solutions to the refugee crises: voluntary repatriation. It also demonstrates that the overwhelming majority of refugees are forced to repatriate during violent conflict because asylum is a tragic myth. Unless the causes of displacements are addressed, including historical and contemporary oppression, exploitation, dictatorship, and systematic violations of human rights, the paper concludes that the African refugee crises in particular will defy imposed and discriminatory durable solutions.

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A Systematic Review of Refugee Women's Reproductive Health

Anita J. Gagnon, Lisa Merry, and Cathlyn Robinson

Abstract
Resettling refugee women may be at greater risk than other women for several harmful reproductive health outcomes as a result of their migration experience. The objective of this study was to determine differences in reproductive health status between refugee women in countries of resettlement and non-refugee counterparts. A systematic review of the literature culled from five electronic databases and web searching of international agencies and academic centres focusing on refugees was conducted. Of the forty-one high quality studies identified, fourteen looked at refugees exclusively; only nine of the fourteen focused on the reproductive health of refugees; six of the nine directly compared refugee to non-refugee women's health. There is a paucity of population-based data to support or refute claims of greater reproductive health risks for resettling refugee women.

Résumé
Les femmes réfugiées en situation de réétablissement pourraient bien être plus susceptibles que d'autres femmes de souffrir d'un certain nombre de conséquences néfastes en matière de santé génésique suite à l'expérience de la migration. Le but de cette étude était de cerner les différences entre le niveau de santé génésique des femmes réfugiées dans les pays de réétablissement et leurs congénères non-réfugiées. Pour ce faire, un examen systématique de la littérature provenant de cinq bases de données électroniques a été entrepris, ainsi que des recherches sur le Web d'agences et de centres académiques internationaux. Des 41 études de haut niveau identifiées, seules 9 de ces études se concentraient sur la santé génésique des réfugiées ; 6 de ces 9 études effectuaient une comparaison directe entre la santé des réfugiées et celle des non-réfugiées. Il existe en fait un manque de données démographiques qui permettraient de soutenir ou de rejeter l'affirmation selon laquelle les risques sont accrus en matière de santé génésique chez les femmes réfugiées en cours de réétablissement.

Introduction

There are currently fifteen million refugees and asylumseekers worldwide,[1] a percentage of whom will resettle in host countries. The health of resettling refugees is not well known since health data are rarely reported for refugees separate from all immigrants combined. Refugees, individuals forced from their homeland and unable to return for a period of time due to socio-political instability (paraphrased from UNHCR[2]), and asylum seekers arriving in resettlement countries are thought to be at greater risk than the general population for several harmful health outcomes as a result of their migration history. Anecdotal reports from professionals suggest that childbearing and other aspects of reproductive health add an additional burden on female refugees, which places them in a particularly disadvantaged position. These suppositions have not been systematically examined.

Reports would suggest that screening and care provided to resettling refugees is anything but systematic.[3] Policy makers and program planners, however, generally see knowledge of health "events" (including illness episodes and health/social services use) as required for optimal health planning.[4] The extent and nature of health "events" and their determinants in resettling refugee women and their infants becomes even more relevant when the role of

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development from birth to six months of life on future health outcomes is considered.[5]

Review of the Literature

Refugee Women's Reproductive Health Prior to Resettlement

Refugee women experience several challenges to their health. Published review articles and case studies describe the experience of refugees in transit or in camps. The issues considered can be grouped into five broad categories: (1) fertility regulation, (2) sexually transmitted infections, (3) sex and gender-based violence, (4) pregnancy and childbirth, and (5) health services availability and use.

There are differing opinions of the effects of migration on fertility and family planning.[6] One suggests that forced migration increases fertility as refugees satisfy their desire to repopulate, in order to replace deceased children or soldiers and as migration produces a healthier, more stable environment (for example, in some camp situations) with improved health care services and nutrition. The opposing opinion suggests that migration decreases the fertility rate of refugees because of perceived uncertainty of the future, economic instability, and marital separation. Fertility rates have also been found to vary with knowledge and availability of contraception. In sum, there are no known common fertility patterns of refugees.

Refugee women appear to be at greater risk than other women for sexually transmitted infections (STIs), including human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), for a variety of reasons.[7] Migration often occurs without the accompaniment of spouses, thereby increasing the likelihood of sexual activity outside stable relationships. Military operations have been found to be associated with an increase in STI transmission and many refugees are fleeing war-torn areas or must travel through or encamp in those areas. Economic disruption may require refugee women to be involved in sexual activity to acquire food or other goods for themselves or their children. Psychological stresses, including the need for protection from soldiers or men living in or near the camps, may also lead to the granting of sexual favours. Men entrusted to ensure the travel of refugee women to a safe haven may demand sexual favors. Migration appears to increase the incidence of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV; e.g., rape, forced impregnation, and other forms of violence), which in turn promotes the spread of STIs.

The use of SGBV by one group to oppress another has long been in existence in times of war. Incidence is difficult to estimate since it is grossly under-reported. The use of SGBV as a weapon of war has come to light more recently, due to the atrocities in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.[8] Systematic rape may be used as a weapon for ethnic cleansing. Women less than twenty-five years of age, and of a particular ethnic background, are thought to be at greater risk for SGBV, as are women of low socio-economic status who live in circumstances with poor security. SGBV leads to the spread of HIV and STIs; can lead to genital, anal, and other physical injuries and to unwanted pregnancies; and accounts for a variety of psychosocial difficulties for women.[9]

Domestic violence plagues many women worldwide and this form of violence may begin or escalate during pregnancy, or patterns of abuse may be altered with more injuries to the abdominal area attempted.[10] Physical and psychological torture has been extensively reported to occur to both women and men and takes many forms.[11] All organ systems may be affected and in particular the musculoskeletal and nervous systems. Post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, depression, somatization, and other psychological effects are common sequelae. Refugee men may be subject to general physical torture while refugee women are subject to sexual abuse.

Female genital mutilation (FGM) affects one hundred million girls and women worldwide and is considered by many to be a form of SGBV. It is performed in twenty-six African countries and by groups in Oman, South Yemen, the United Arab Emirates, Indonesia, and Malaysia.[12] In addition to the chronic health effects of these procedures, including urinary tract infections, painful menstruation, and scarring, difficulties can arise in passing the infant through the birth canal and there is increased risk of uterine rupture.[13]

It is generally assumed that refugee women have poorer pregnancy outcomes than other women, although few data are available to refute or support this claim. It is likely that infant and pregnancy health outcomes such as mortality are poorer in war-affected populations although perhaps no worse than in their own country of origin once restabilization of the country or population occurs.[14] This may be explained by the relatively greater availability of health care services in refugee camps. There is also a dearth of data on other maternal health outcomes such as morbidity and nutritional status. Safe motherhood is thought to be determined by factors shared by settled populations: socio-economic status, age, education, access to services, and urban vs. rural habitation.[15] However, what distinguishes migrating refugee women from settled women is their increased exposure to war, SGBV, abuse and torture, and STIs/HIV.

Several reports have considered the needs of refugee women[16] and the reproductive health care services that they are receiving.[17] A great deal of effort is now being placed on ensuring that a minimum set of reproductive health services is made available to refugee women in camps.

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Migration and Health in Resettlement Countries

Immigration classifications vary by country, although the concept of the ability to freely return to the country of origin usually distinguishes immigrants, who have that option, from refugees, who do not. The differences in experiences between those in these two broad categories have been reviewed.[18] When examined together, immigrants are multi-ethnic, their mother tongue and language used vary, and they have a variety of religious traditions, lifestyles, and political alliances. As opposed to refugees, other immigrants choose to resettle. They are motivated to leave their countries and re-establish themselves in a new country in the hope of a better life. Their departures are planned and they are able to return to their countries of origin if they choose. On the other hand, refugees are forced to leave their countries to ensure their survival. Their arrival in the new country is in many respects involuntary and they are not able to return to their countries of origin. Their departures from their homelands are often from violent situations in which they have not been able to put closure to important relationships and they may feel guilty for leaving their families or friends. All immigrants will go through phases of adjustment, although the permanent, forced nature of the refugee migration experience makes their integration into society more difficult.[19]

There is a paucity of systematically collected data on health statistics as they relate to migration history.[20] Most available reports are of small studies, each with its own objectives, methods, and measurement strategies, dissimilar from the others. One review has summarized some of the apparent trends in health due to migration, specifically migration within the European Union.[21] The quality of individual studies reviewed, in particular sampling strategies, which might suggest that results are representative of the population under investigation, was not addressed. With this limitation in mind, that review suggested that there are trends towards a rise in tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, cardiovascular diseases, and certain cancers in immigrants. It also suggested that there is a greater number of avoidable accidental injuries at work and at home. Another study suggested that communicable disease prevalence is high in certain immigrant population groups.[22] Also reported are difficulties in communication, problematic interpretations of patient symptoms, lack of health-care provider understanding of traditional remedies for common ailments, unemployment, depression, and under-utilization of services.[23]

Psychosocial problems appear to be common and may result from resettlement policies stressing geographical dispersion of migrants to areas where there are few "like" community members in an effort to quickly integrate them into mainstream society. Separation and divorce are reported to be frequent.[24] Additional family difficulties are said to occur if children are seen to be integrating more quickly than their parents by acquiring the language skills of the new country, resulting in a capacity to more easily function in the new society with a shift in power from the parent to the child.

Refugee Women's Health during Resettlement

As with studies of migration and health generally, many studies of resettling refugee women's health have also been small, and, for the most part, did not define "refugee" consistently nor did they rely on representative sampling or make a direct comparison between refugee women and their host country counterparts. These limitations preclude drawing conclusions with regard to the prevelance of health concerns within the population of resettling refugee women and their relative importance in comparison to host-country women. They do, however, suggest health issues that should be considered with regard to refugee women. These include: conflicts arising in women concerning control of their own sexuality,[25] perinatal health,[26] the reintroduction of FGM,[27] mental health,[28] health service needs, occupational health risks, and discrimination.

Many immigrant and refugee women are reported to have difficulty controlling their sexuality.[29] There is a great deal of confusion with regard to the maintenance of virginity, with family values and those of the new society often clashing.[30] This can lead to requests for hymenal reconstruction by some women who are expected to be virgins when they marry and must provide evidence of this through blood-stained sheets. Girls may suffer a fear of being put to death if it is determined that they are not virgins.[31] Women from some African countries are not taught or socialized to say "no" to sexual advances by their husbands.[32] This stands in stark contrast to many refugee-receiving countries in which a woman may refuse her husband's advances and if he forces himself on her, he can be charged with rape. If women suggest the use of condoms to husbands having extramarital affairs, this can lead to violence by the husbands towards the women. These women risk being abused in their attempts to protect themselves against STIs and unwanted pregnancies. Infertility or sub-fertility is also thought to cause a great number of problems, especially in groups in which fertility gives rise to social standing.

Perinatal health outcomes are cited as an area of concern.[33] Infants born to migrants from certain countries have been reported to be of lower birthweight and shorter gestational age, and to experience higher perinatal and postneonatal mortality than infants of nationals. Only limited reference has been made to other areas of reproductive

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health. Nutrition, including breastfeeding, was cited as another area of concern. Initiation and continuance of breastfeeding is thought to be decreasing in migrants[34] and nutritional problems in their children are reported to be common.

FGM is being reintroduced into Europe and North America by certain immigrant communities. The Centers for Disease Control in the U.S., for example, estimates that approximately 168,000 girls and women living in the U.S. in 1990 either had or may have been at risk for FGM. An estimated 48,000 of these were under eighteen and about 75 per cent of these were born in the U.S.[35]

Several mental health issues have been cited as important to resettling refugee women. These include anxiety, depression, somatization, social isolation, and domestic violence.[36] A review of childbearing and women's mental health noted studies reporting psychiatric disorders during pregnancy and postpartum.[37] In addition to other psychiatric disorders, post-traumatic stress disorder was reported.

Inadequate health services due to language barriers, or inappropriate sex or culture "matching" between the woman and her care provider, have been reported.[38] General health services delivery issues relevant to resettling refugee women are reported to include: general attitudes toward disease, attitudes towards receiving care by male health care professionals, and religious taboos.[39]

Occupational health issues are another area to consider. Refugee women may be employed in certain types of industry for which they are over-qualified and in which the general health risks are important due partially to poor protection by employers.[40] Some of the general health issues include repeated movement injuries; eye, lung, and skin exposure to toxic substances; long hours of factory employment followed by long hours of home care; and accidental injury.[41] Foreign-earned educational credentials, which some refugee women may possess, are an asset to the receiving society in terms of the knowledge base gained.[42] They can, however, lead to psychological problems in the woman due to her drop in social status when those credentials are not recognized by the receiving society.[43] Unfamiliar environments may pose very real challenges to resettling refugee women. Even household items such as dishwashers and fireplaces and practices such as usual garbage removal may need to be explained to women.[44] Discrimination based on colour, physical features, or race is another issue that must be dealt with by many refugee women,[45] not only in the workplace but in every aspect of their lives.[46]

Summary

Studies reviewed on resettling refugees *suggest* health concerns to consider with regard to women's reproductive health; however, they do not provide insight into *the extent* to which these health concerns prevail across various refugee populations. The studies reviewed were, for the most part, unsystematic and uncritical reviews, published reports, or case reports, which provide insight into the particular situations of certain individuals. Well-conducted population-based studies are required to provide an estimate of the prevalence of reproductive health issues of concern in resettling refugee women and their relative importance when compared to non-refugee host-country counterparts. The literature reviewed thus far suggests that there may be several reproductive health-related factors to consider with regard to resettling refugee women. These are summarized in Figure 1 on the next page.

Research Question

Are there any differences in reproductive health indicators between refugee or asylum-seeking women in countries of resettlement and their non-refugee counterparts?

Methods

The methods chosen to answer the research question were based not on an interest in the specifics of a particular refugee group, but rather on an interest in the potential similarities of women's health issues across refugees resettling in various countries worldwide and the extent to which issues suggested in the qualitative literature and in non-representative studies were supported in population-based reports. It was thought that identifying common issues across resettling refugee women might enlighten policy makers in various refugee-receiving countries as to the health issues to be considered in defining immigration policies and in planning for resettlement.

Criteria for Considering Studies for This Review

Types of studies: original research

Types of participants: refugees and "unspecified" immigrants (i.e., migration history not specified); sample comprising at least 50 per cent women or data provided separately for women

Types of outcomes: any quantitative indicator of physical or mental health or health services use

Search Strategy for Identification of Studies

Literature was culled from five electronic databases – Medline 1966–2001, CINAHL 1982–2001, HealthStar 1975–2001, PsychInfo 1887–2001, and Sociofile 1963–2001 –

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Figure 1:
Factors Related to the Reproductive Health of Resettling Refugee Women



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after consultation with a university librarian regarding optimal search strategies and database-specific terminology. Selected terms related to refugees, immigrants, multiculturalism/culture were used, producing 183,361 citations. When these terms were combined with "women's health" or related terms, 1,568 citations were identified. This list of citations was reviewed, and relevant abstracts obtained. Abstracts clearly describing studies not meeting inclusion criteria were excluded from further consideration. All remaining full-text articles (n = 193) were obtained for review. The specific search strategies applied to each database are detailed in Table 1. Bibliographies of relevant studies were reviewed and additional articles retrieved. Abstracts from the Conference Proceedings of the Reproductive Health for Refugees Consortium, 2000, were also reviewed. Web sites of multilateral and bilateral agencies that address refugees' concerns and academic centres focusing on refugees were searched for relevant literature. A web search was also conducted using the Google search engine, applying the terms "refugee women" and "reproductive health."

Procedure for Consolidating Studies Identified

The full text of studies identified from the various sources was reviewed and inclusion criteria were applied to them. Those of refugee women in camps or in transit were removed from further consideration. Remaining studies were subsequently assessed for their methodological quality in terms of providing a population estimate of a health event.

Table 1
Search Methodology in Electronic Databases

Variable Search Terms	*Medline 1966–2001*	*CINAHL 1982–2001*	*HealthStar 1975–2000*	*PsychINFO[1] 1887–2001*	*SocioFILE[2,3] 1963–2001*
Refugee*	Refugees or asylum.tw or refugees$.tw	Exp. Refugees	Exp. Refugees or asylum.tw	Exp. Refugees	Exp. Refugees or Asylum seeker.mp
Immigrant*	Emigration & Immigration or population dynamics	Exp. Immigratns/ or immigrants, illegal.mp or transient.mp	Exp. Emigration & Immigration	Exp. Immigrants Exp. Immigration	Exp. Immigrants Exp. Migrants Exp. Emigration
Multicultural*	Exp. Cultural diversity or exp. Ethnic groups or culture	Exp. Cultural diversity/ or exp. ethnic groups/	Exp. Cross-cultural comparison/ or exp. Cultural diversity/ or ethnic groups.mp	Multiculturalism[4] Cultural Sensitivity Cross Cultural Diff. Minority Groups	Exp. Culture Exp. Cultural Contrast
Women's Health*	Exp. women's health[5]	Exp. women's health	Exp. Women's health[6]	Exp. Health and Exp. Human Female	Women's health care = 111 Exp. Health/ and exp. Women's health care = 108 Female = 16 106
Total	C = 538 = 967[1]; kept = 88	C = 339; kept = 50	C = 160; kept = 23	C = 68; kept = 23	C = 463; kept = 9

Number of "combination" articles = 1568
Number of "kept" articles = 193

* And related terms
Exp. = explode term
.tw = text word
C = search term combined with women's health or related term
Kept = the studies that were kept from the search

1 No pertinent data from 1887 to 1967.
2 Difficult search; "women" and "women's health" were not relevant search terms; "female" as a search term was vague; none of the searches produced relevant articles.
3 Combined all search terms with "women's health care" and with "female."
4 Term is not used before 1984.
5 "Women's health" is not a searchable term from 1966–1974, 1975–1986. Exploded "health" and exploded "women." No relevant articles were found
6 "Women's health" was not a strong search term from 1975–1991. "Health/or women's health" was used as a search term.
7 Number of hits found when combining "health" and "exp. Cultural diversity," etc. from 1966 to 1986.

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Methodological quality was determined through assessment of the likely presence or absence of biases that might have affected the internal validity of the studies' results. These included assessments of (1) the adequacy of the sampling strategy and completeness of follow-up and (2) appropriateness of the measurement strategy including the use of reliable and valid questionnaires administered in appropriate language and cultural contexts.

Based on this assessment, studies were graded as "low quality" in terms of providing a population estimate of a health event if the sampling strategy was not representative of the population of interest *or* if it was not described, *and* if the measurement strategy employed questionnaires or other measurement strategies with no reliability or validity data to support their use in that population *or* was not described. They were graded as being of "moderate quality" if the sampling strategy was not clearly representative of the population of interest but employed a quasi-representative approach *and* if the measurement strategy included some consideration of cultural/language variations in obtaining needed data *or* if there was representative sampling with weak measurement strategies *or* vice versa. Studies were considered to be of "high quality" if the sampling strategy was clearly representative *and* if measurement strategies employed were known to be reliable and valid for the population under study. Studies were grouped into low, medium, and high quality for purposes of discussion; no statistical analyses were used to combine the data due to the large variation in health events selected for measure in each of the studies.

As the scoring scheme suggests, those studies not deemed to be of high quality had important limitations, suggesting that health event estimates provided by them might lead to inaccurate conclusions regarding the health status of refugee and other women. Only data from high quality studies, therefore, were used in attempting to answer the research question.

Results

The various search strategies employed resulted in a large number of citations potentially eligible for inclusion (n = 1,568) and application of initial inclusion criteria resulted in retrieval of a large number of articles (n = 193). Once reviewed, a total of forty-one studies met the "high quality" criteria; twenty-three met moderate quality criteria, and twenty-five were found to be of poor quality.

Fourteen of the high-quality studies looked at refugees exclusively, nine of which focused on reproductive health indicators.[47] The remaining twenty-seven studies included "unspecified" immigrants, nineteen of which focused on reproductive health indicators and eight of which focused on other health indicators.

Of the fourteen "high quality" studies on resettling refugee women, eight were published in the 1980s,[48] five in the 1990s,[49] and one in 2000.[50] Of the fourteen, twelve were conducted with Indochinese refugees, including Khmer, Vietnamese, Laotian, Cambodian (Kampuchean), Chinese-Vietnamese, and Thai.[51] Eleven of the twelve were conducted in the United States, one in Australia.[52] The twelve studies taken together shed some light on the health status of Indochinese refugee women in industrialized resettlement countries. Eight of the studies examined reproductive health and four, mental health. Five of the reproductive health studies made some comparison to the resettlement population.[53] These comparisons revealed that Indochinese refugee women have higher fertility rates[54] and higher rates of low birthweight infants,[55] but lower infant mortality rates[56] when compared with host country populations. More recent arrivals (e.g., in the resettlement country for less than three months) appeared to have the highest levels of fertility[57] and highest rates of low birthweight infants.[58] Other factors found to have affected reproductive health included greater parity, older mothers, shorter interpregnancy intervals, inadequate utilization of prenatal care,[59] previous adverse outcomes,[60] and limited education.[61] Moreover, the number of children born prior to arrival in the resettlement country, the number of years married, and the level of economic and cultural adaptation were all shown to be associated with decreased fertility, whereas aspects of migration history (e.g., time spent in refugee camp) were associated with increased fertility.

The three studies of Indochinese refugees that do not make comparisons to the resettlement population suggest that: refugee women from a rural background have higher fertility levels than those of women in urban areas;[62] those in resettlement countries for shorter periods present at greater risk, lacking prenatal care, having more infants of low birthweight and more pregnancy complications;[63] and a high number of refugee women are infected with intestinal parasites and other infections.[64]

The four studies on Indochinese refugee women focusing on mental health show that a number of these women suffer from somatization,[65] post-traumatic stress disorder,[66] depression,[67] and psychological distress.[68] One of these studies compared refugees to immigrants and found that somatization was higher in refugees.[69] Associated with mental illnesses were the following factors: low income,[70] low levels of acculturation,[71] exposure to violent/traumatic events,[72] lengthy time spent in a refugee camp, and older age.[73]

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The two studies that do not consider Indochinese refugee women look at Bosnian women[74] and refugee women from Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, the Middle East, and Africa[75] and examine these populations resettling in Sweden and Greece respectively. Results suggest that Bosnian women have poorer overall health than Swedish women, namely, low quality of life as measured by poor appetite, memory loss, little leisure time, and low levels of mental wellness as evidenced by low energy, patience, sleep, mood swings, and more physical symptoms. Refugee women in Greece, when compared to indigenous Greek women, were found to have similar rates of low birthweight and pre-term delivery.

The nineteen studies which focus on the reproductive health of "unspecified" immigrant women defined their population as foreign-born without specifying immigrant status. They are included in this report because of a paucity of evidence specific to refugee women. Two studies indicate that immigrant status was measured, but do not present results based on status differences.[76]

Unlike the fourteen studies discussed above, these nineteen studies were conducted in a wide range of ethnic populations. Eleven included all immigrants in their study (i.e., anyone born outside of the host country)[77] and/or described the population by source continent or race.[78] The remaining eight studies looked at specific ethnic populations including Mexicans or Puerto Ricans;[79] Turks, Filipinos, or Vietnamese;[80] and Ethiopians.[81] Study settings also varied, with nine of the studies having taken place in the U.S., five in Canada, four in Australia, and one in England.

The results of these nineteen studies suggest overall that foreign-born women experience the same risk, or better birth outcomes in terms of birthweight and/or incidence of pre-term births and/or rate of infant mortality,[82] and these positive outcomes progressively worsen as time in the receiving country lengthens and/or they become more acculturated.[83] Two studies found foreign-born women to have a significant rate of low birthweight infants,[84] while two other studies completely contradicted the above findings, contending that foreign-born women have worse birth outcomes, including higher rates of stillbirths, of peri/post-natal death,[85] and a higher incidence of low birthweight infants.[86]

As in the refugee-specific studies, fertility rates were found to be high in the "foreign-born" population and higher for those with shorter periods of time in resettlement countries.[87] Other results included: dissatisfaction with prenatal care;[88] reduced prenatal care (fewer than three prenatal visits) associated with a lack of insurance benefits (irrespective of citizenship);[89] infant care behaviours that vary with number of years since immigration;[90] and an increased rate of premarital childbearing amongst immigrant Puerto Rican women when compared to women in their homeland.[91]

The remaining eight high-quality studies which focus on other health indicators do not differentiate refugee women from immigrants and also present results on the "foreign born" as a whole. Three of these studies looked at psychological illness in immigrants and found them to suffer from somatization[92] and psychological distress.[93] Psychological distress is shown to be associated with low sense of coherence, poor sense of control, economic difficulties, trauma and/or violence experienced and/or living,[94] and numerous relocations.[95] Results of these studies also indicate that immigrants are healthier than the host population in terms of chronic illnesses, life expectancy, and disability and dependency, with immigrants in host countries for the shortest time being the healthiest.[96]

Discussion

In this systematic review of refugee women's reproductive health, studies of high quality were identified which provide data on population estimates of a narrow range of health events, and these largely in Indochinese refugee women resettling in the U.S. Although there is a great deal of literature on refugees, and refugee women's reproductive health is taking on added importance due to massive movements of people across continents, few data are available to inform immigration health policy in this area. Little has been published on the effect of refugee versus non-refugee migration history on women's health outcomes. In fact, only six studies of high quality comparing reproductive health effects of migration history were identified in this search of five electronic databases and several web sites. The current study adds to the existing body of literature on resettling refugee women's health by highlighting the increased risk, over U.S. nationals, for resettling Indochinese refugees to give birth to low birthweight infants and for them to experience somatization. This review also highlights the lack of clarity employed in published literature in defining study populations by immigration status, migration history, and sex. Extremely few high-quality population-based data are available to support the conclusions of smaller reports described in other literature and represented in Figure 1. This systematic review suggests that there is extremely little evidence available upon which policy and clinical decisions related to the reproductive health of refugee women can be made given the paucity of high quality population-based data.

Limitations

The results of this study are based on the use of electronic databases, which are searched using keywords input by a

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librarian. It is possible that the keywords used to describe a given article when creating the database and those used for this study could have differed. Further, non-English language keywords would not have been identified in this search. Extensive consultation with a university librarian and additional searching of citations of literature obtained in the initial search were methods applied to reduce the possibility of missing key studies. Studies that have not been published were not included in this review because no such studies were identified from the non-database searches.

Clinical/Policy Implications

The results of this study indicate that health-related indicators identified in non-population-based studies of refugee women are generally not supported in the high-quality population-based studies currently available with the exception of Indochinese refugee women resettling in the U.S. In that population, care should be taken to ensure adequate assessment for potentially giving birth to low birthweight infants and for the presence of somatization, since both of these health indicators occur more frequently in this population group than in the non-refugee group.

Other factors identified in non-population-based studies were not confirmed in high-quality population-based studies but likely need to be considered in clinical care until they have been ruled out as having been idiosyncratic to a particular subset of refugee women. A thorough clinical assessment should include bio-psycho-social factors, including screening for tuberculosis, intestinal parasites, experience of malaria during pregnancy, and changes in socioeconomic status. Written translations of patient instructions need to be made available to improve comprehension. Risk factors for torture should be assessed including refugee or political asylum-seeking status, immigrant from totalitarian regime, civil war in country of origin, residence in refugee camp, prisoner of war, multiple family members deceased due to trauma, history of arrest or detention, and leadership in anti-government organizations.[97]

Professionals need to affirm that all forms of SGBV are unacceptable in all forums available to them, especially policy forums. Professional bodies need to publicly defend health professionals detained in the performance of their duties and in the maintenance of ethical standards.98 Legislation to prevent FGM needs to be put forward and supported.

Research Implications

The background literature presented suggests that there are several indicators of health to be explored on a population level to determine the extent to which reports of health problems in a few individual women is, or is not, a widespread problem requiring greater investment in human and financial resources. Several of the issues to be examined are difficult, although not impossible, to address on a population level due to their delicate nature, histories of SGBV and spousal abuse being among them. However, these and others do require confirmation on a larger representative population. Having determined the extent of the problem, implementing and evaluating solutions to them will be required. The weaknesses of several of the studies attempting to provide population estimates must be avoided. These include non-representative sampling strategies and use of culturally inappropriate approaches to obtain needed data. A wide body of literature on translation theory can be tapped for appropriate methodology.

Conclusion

The results of this systematic review of refugee women's reproductive health suggest there are a woefully inadequate number of studies directly comparing the health events experienced by resettling refugee women to those of their non-refugee counterparts. This paucity of data prohibits planners and policy makers from making informed decisions regarding the distribution of resources. Results further show that, of a large number of factors suggested by other literature to be important, none have been confirmed in high-quality population-based studies of refugee women from a wide variety of backgrounds. There is an urgent need for more studies examining refugee women specifically. In doing so, better definitions of immigration status should be used, optimal translation procedures and culturally sensitive methodology should be exploited, and sampling of populations should be done in a representative fashion.

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Reducing Environmental Damage Caused by the Collection of Cooking Fuel by Refugees

Maureen Lynch

Abstract

The collection of fuelwood by large numbers of internally displaced people and refugees for the purpose of providing energy for food preparation and cooking can cause environmental devastation and adversely affect the socio-economic balance with local populations. There is no simple solution. Reducing environmental impact, and thus easing societal tensions, requires addressing a complex set of issues including supply of and demand for natural resources, aid agency operations, willingness to utilize refugee knowledge and experience, the effects of forced displacement, poverty, and lack of land. The key to establishing sustainable solutions, whether fuel or non-fuel alternatives, requires being able to identify and understand the interaction between human needs and behaviour and the local environment. This paper explores the scope of the problem and offers case examples, describes efforts taken and alternatives available, presents outcomes of evaluations that have been performed, and outlines lessons learned to be used in future crises.

Résumé

La collecte de bois de chauffage par un grand nombre de personnes « déplacées internes » et de réfugiés pour préparer la nourriture peut provoquer des destructions écologiques et déséquilibrer les relations socio-économiques avec les populations locales. Cependant il n'existe pas de solution aisée. Pour minimiser l'impact écologique et ainsi apaiser les tensions sociétales, il faudra confronter un ensemble complexe de problèmes, comprenant l'offre et la demande de ressources naturelles, les opérations des agences d'aide, l'acceptation d'utiliser la somme de connaissance et d'expérience des réfugiés, les conséquences des déplacements forcés, de la pauvreté et de la pénurie de terre. Pour arriver à des solutions durables, que ce soit concernant l'utilisation ou non de combustibles, il est impératif de pouvoir identifier et comprendre l'interaction qui existe entre les besoins et les comportements humains d'une part, et l'environnement local d'autre part. Cet article explore l'étendue du problème et propose des exemples concrets, décrit les efforts entrepris et les alternatives possibles, présente les résultats des évaluations qui ont été entreprises et résume les leçons apprises qui pourraient être valables à l'occasion de crises futures.

Introduction

Movement of thousands of people and the establishment of refugee camps can have a serious impact on local ecology, as well as on the welfare of nearby communities. Refugees collect wood as fuel for cooking and for warmth and fell trees to build shelters. As a result, land surrounding the refugee camps may be stripped of trees and vegetation. News headlines bear titles such as "Firewood Row at Refugee Camp Leads to Killings" and "Officials in Western Ethiopia Accused Sudanese Refugees of Destroying almost 6,000 Hectares (15,000 Acres) of Woodland Every Year."

Refugee agencies by necessity put immediate life-saving humanitarian needs above environmental concerns, but the links between the well-being of human populations and

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a healthy environment are increasingly being taken into consideration. Aid agencies encourage refugee populations to become more closely involved with environmental management and rehabilitation. Most programs address the fuelwood issues through management strategies (i.e., improved stoves and cooking practices), but it has been reported that savings of up to 40 per cent can be attained with improved stoves, and this has not been replicated in field trials. The key to reducing environmental damage caused by demand for cooking energy is identifying and understanding the interaction between human needs and behaviour as well as the local environment.

The number of refugee crises has not dropped and environments will remain at risk. This paper outlines the problem and case examples, efforts taken and alternatives available, outcomes of evaluations that have been performed, and provides a compilation of lessons learned to be used in future crises.

Overview of the Problem

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates a world population of about fourteen million refugees and between twenty and twenty-five million internally displaced persons.[1] The large and rapid influx of refugees (both cross-border migrants and internally displaced populations) may have different types of impact on the surrounding environment, varying from the degradation of forests resulting from the collection of firewood to soil erosion, contamination of ground water, or damage to protected areas and national parks, including loss of natural habitat.[2] There are also impacts on the socio-economic situation at the local level and health effects at the individual level.

It is the demand for energy that often leads to the most serious environmental problems associated with refugee flows.[3] Existing levels of energy consumption among local communities are often more modest than those of incoming refugees.[4] This can reflect the longer cooking times of refugee rations compared with fresh food, and sometimes unrestricted access to resources. In the case of firewood, initial per capita consumption of about three kg/person/day is typical of refugee camps situation – subject of course to local factors and the cultural background of the refugees themselves.[5]

The intensity of environmental impacts around a refugee camp or settlement is determined by a combination of human and environmental factors including the size of the population, duration of residency and dependence on natural resources, environment-related factors such as the degree of habitat fragility, local levels of biological diversity and climate, and socio-economic factors.[6]

Refugee use of fuel for cooking is generally the single biggest drain, and the biggest determinant of fuel consumption is food supply.[7] The primary energy source in the majority of refugee situations is wood, or wood-based products such as charcoal.[8] Other sources, such as coal, kerosene, liquid propane, and electricity, are used less frequently, and usually in urban areas, where the type and scale of impact involved are of a generally less severe nature than those produced in rural areas. The main cooking system used by refugees is an open fire surrounded by three stones on which cooking materials rest. Simple, but inefficient in terms of energy loss, the result, in some instances, has been an excessively high consumption of firewood, with consequent environmental damage.[9] Refugees may extract standing vegetation to meet their energy needs, implying in some cases the widespread cutting of trees. Even if biomass eventually recovers its original levels, it is possible that biodiversity will be permanently affected. The problem can be more serious where refugees are located in or adjacent to sensitive or protected areas.[10]

Deforestation and land degradation carry with them an indirect economic cost for the local population, as does the reduced availability of fuel derived from nearby forests. The local poor are often affected adversely as refugee demand forces up prices of fuel. Meanwhile some members of local communities may be able to benefit from trade in firewood, charcoal, and other products sold to refugees.[11] In addition, the host government may experience a loss of revenue from natural resources if refugees deplete reserves. Extraction of firewood, for example, may deprive a government of royalty payments and may also lead directly to more seriously degrading activities such as illegal lumbering or poaching, both of which are likely to result in loss of official revenue.

The environmental impact of a sudden influx of refugees may create hostility between local communities and refugees. Where natural resources such as firewood or water are scarce, people compete for access to these resources. In addition, newly arrived refugees are often unaware of local traditions or laws to protect wildlife resources or sacred sites – a common source of conflict. Behaviour regarding firewood collection and improved stoves is dominated by social customs. While it is often assumed that men have little impact on cooking methods, husbands rank high as a social reference for advice.[12]

There are known linkages between health and long-term exposure to cooking fuel pollutants, particularly among women and children.[13] Biomass which is not properly dried may cause acute respiratory infections, lung disease, heart disease, destruction of red blood cells, eye disorders, and a variety of infant ailments; coal produces a lot of smoke and a variety of pollutants, including sulphur dioxide and heavy

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metals. Kerosene presents the risk of starting a fire as it is usually stored in containers inside shelters. It is a poison, with special risk for children.

It is important to note that biomass can be burned with no releases other than the products of complete combustion: carbon dioxide and water. This demands that the fuel be dried properly and fully burned in a well-ventilated area. Charcoal use is reported to produce little smoke.[14] Gas stoves release less than one-fiftieth of the pollution that is emitted by burning firewood, however.[15] The association between exposure to raw biomass smoke, acute respiratory illness, and the death of malnourished children has received very little attention by humanitarian assistance providers. Improving the efficiency of the stove and efficiency in wood use do not eliminate the negative health effects of exposure to raw biomass smoke. Areas outside camps, where women go to gather firewood, can be dangerous due to the presence of anti-personnel landmines or because of assault to which women are subjected.[16]

Case Examples

The situation for refugees in Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, and Sierra Leone testifies to the impact collecting cooking fuel has on the environment in Africa. In Benguela Province of Angola,[17] internally displaced (IDPs) women have to walk very long distances to find suitably wooded areas. Collecting enough wood for a week can take up to one full day away from home. They have to prepare food for the family in advance and to organize supervision for the children they leave behind, and they cannot participate in a food-for-wood activity on that day. Walking long distances from the camp to isolated areas can cause fear of getting lost. They are afraid of assaults and rape that can occur on the way. In order to be protected, they form groups and ask men to accompany them. If they are single and cannot approach husbands for protection, they sometimes have to pay protectors with a share of the collected wood.

Angola is also one of the most heavily mined countries in the world. Mine accidents can occur when women who are not familiar with the area collect water or firewood. Also, local residents impede access by formally prohibiting access to certain areas reserved for residents, or by regulating what type of trees can be cut. They use threats of myths and magic to worry the new settlers by, for instance, telling them that a particular path leading to a wood collection area is frequently used by "the big snake" that allows only resident people to pass and attacks strangers. The results of one appraisal exercise showed that even though women were most concerned with acquiring water and fuelwood, they asked for support for agricultural production more urgently, because yields would permit them to buy fuelwood.

Between the years 1994 and 1996, while the Rwandan refugees from the camps and other individuals plundered the Virunga National Park in the Democratic Republic of Congo (then Zaire), an estimated thirty-six million trees were cut within the park boundary. Another way to view the problem is that some 410 to 770 tons of forest products (mainly wood for fuel) were removed daily.[18] At the height of the crisis, between 25,000 and 30,000 people took wood from the park each day. Most of this was for firewood for cooking the disaster-relief foods that were distributed in the camps.[19]

In Ethiopia,[20] shortage of vegetation has had important implications for the refugees. Firewood and charcoal are the primary sources of heat for cooking. Surveys that collected information on wood intake, household energy, camp market, stove utilization, and catering, showed that 75 per cent rely on firewood and use the traditional three-stone cooking system. Five per cent of the population uses charcoal exclusively in a type of stove known as the "girgir." The remaining 20 per cent of families use a combination of firewood and charcoal and possess both a three-stone system and a girgir stove. Overall, women carry 26 per cent of all wood loads while children bring 24 per cent. Men carry slightly fewer loads, 22 per cent, but their overall contribution is actually 8 per cent greater than women's in terms of weight. The mainstay of the refugee diet is wheat grain, most of which is eaten whole after boiling in water (or water with milk) and which takes up to three hours to cook. It is estimated that 20 per cent of the grain is also milled. Other staples include rice, pasta, and soup. Although many food items in the refugee diet cook relatively fast, it is the slowest-cooking dish – whole-wheat grain – which is the one most commonly prepared. In evenings there is widespread non-cooking use of fires, with 72 per cent of families using the fire for heat, 69 per cent for light and 33 per cent for social family gatherings.

Land around refugee camps in Kenya has been stripped clean of trees and vegetation. The average Kenyan spends about 40 per cent of earned income on fuel, 74 per cent of which is used for cooking.[21] Women spend about five hours a day searching for fuelwood to last for three days. The use of solar cookers and hence less need to collect fuelwood has provided women with more free time which may be used for social betterment such as caring for children or for improvements in agricultural practices. The United Nations estimates that solar cooking will reduce the felling of trees around the camps by 40 per cent, a tremendous benefit for the environment in soil erosion reduction. Further benefits that resulted from the solar cookers in the refugee camps were increased cleanliness and improved nutritional

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content of food as compared to food cooked using traditional methods of cooking.

The implementation of solar cookers in two refugee camps in Kenya has been regarded as a success. Since the introduction of the new model of cooker has taken place only recently and because the costs of the cookers in many cases were heavily subsidized, it remains to be seen whether or not the solar cookers will be affordable. It is estimated that the new model of cooker would cost two to three dollars (U.S.), which may be a relatively large investment for certain Kenyans, especially if a traditional cooking area is still required.

Malawi hosted over one million refugees at one single time period.[22] The presence of such a proportion in relation to the local population, at the ratio of 1:10 (one refugee to ten Malawians), posed a big strain on an already fragile environment. The high rate of deforestation ensuing from demand for more farmland, firewood, and timber for construction has caused a myriad of environmental and social problems. Nongovernmental organizations and government departments in collaboration with UNHCR made efforts to reduce the rate of environmental degradation in the refugee camps/settlements. They produced fuelwood-saving stoves and distributed them to the refugees, and planted trees in and around the settlements. Although this had a significant contribution in conserving fuelwood and saving the few remaining surrounding trees and shrubs, the rate of tree felling for various reasons (charcoal burning, firewood selling to generate income) was beyond the limit that the control mechanism could cope with.

In Sierra Leone, fuel is not included in the non-food items refugees receive. They go to the forest to find and collect firewood to sell in order to buy one or two ingredients and to cook. They cut firewood with their hands because they don't have tools. At times they get hurt, attacked, or raped on their way to the forest. Those who cannot go to the forest send their children to panhandle, and those who have lost their children to the war panhandle themselves. Single mothers with infants and lots of children to take care of go to the streets and beg in order to survive. They also go without food most times because they give priority to their husbands and/or children when their food supply gets too low. When new Liberian refugees go out and collect wood, Sierra Leoneans will chase them.

Within Asia, the countries of Afghanistan, Nepal, and the Thailand/Burma border have notable environmental difficulties caused by refugees. As a consequence of more than twenty years of war and uncontrolled resource exploitation, Afghanistan's environment is under serious threat. The area covered by natural forests has decreased from around 6 per cent in 1977 to less than 2 per cent today.[23] Some such changes also have social impacts such as conversion to inferior cooking fuels (including animal manure) and greater household expenditure on energy for cooking and heating. Nearly all Afghans, with the exception of a small urban wealthy population, depend entirely on firewood for both heating and cooking fuel. The small and ever decreasing amount of wood available in local bazaars will be prohibitively expensive for many, and is predicted to be exhausted by 2005.

The return of more than one million refugees from Iran and Pakistan has exacerbated existing problems by making the use of construction materials and fuel from natural forests even less sustainable and by adding significantly to urban populations. Return in the coming years can be expected to add to existing environmental pressures.

In Nepal, the major influx of refugees occurred from 1990 to 1993, and the camps still exist today. In the area where the camps are, more than 70 per cent of the total land area has been cultivated, and the remaining forest resources occupy 10 per cent and 16 per cent of the land area. Deforestation is considered the most serious threat arising from the presence of the refugees, the population influx adding to the existing pressure on the local forest resources, though no formal study on the impacts of refugee firewood gathering has been carried out.[24] In some cases the land now occupied by the refugee camps had already suffered from previous human interference and was already in degraded or bare condition. To minimize the reduction in forest-cover several reforestation projects have been successfully applied in the Beldangi camps.

On the Thailand/Burma border, where refugees are no longer able to go out of the camps to forage in the forest or earn a cash income and are living in camps too crowded for gardens or livestock, many Karen refugees are now more dependent on NGO assistance. Where refugees are not allowed to cut bamboo or gather firewood, NGOs have had to provide building materials, cooking fuel, and supplementary food. The moves themselves cause insecurity as refugees lose access to their gardens and opportunities to forage, while having to expend more energy in moving and rebuilding. They may be arrested for harvesting Thai bamboo.

The Northern Caucuses have not escaped environmental devastation. In Azerbaijan, forest statistics do not show noticeable deforestation, but there is evidence of it around refugee camps and areas affected by the 1992–1994 war with Armenia over Nagorno Karabakh.[25] Without other sources of energy, internally displaced people have had to rely on fuelwood. People displaced from Chechnya describe ruined forests and barren and burning fields where homes once stood.[26] "The ecological situation in Chechnya is cata-

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strophic," said Zalina Abiyev, a 57-year-old refugee who fled Grozny. "We're all afraid to go back because we'll die like flies there, guaranteed." "Not a single refugee camp has sufficient supplies of firewood or coal." Many of the walnut trees and oaks that once lined the main highway leading west from Grozny have been whittled down to stumps by Chechens seeking firewood.[27]

Agency Guidelines

UNHCR has long dealt with environmental issues in and around refugee camps and settlements. The Office of the Senior Coordinator on Environmental Affairs was established in 1993, and in the following year, the Interim Guidelines on the Environment were prepared. In December 1994, UNHCR's Senior Management Committee established an internal Working Group on the Environment. A geographical information system (GIS) environmental database was initiated in 1994 and includes worldwide geographical locations of refugee camps, numbers of refugees, and main environmental parameters (such as topography, hydrology, vegetation and forest cover, and protected areas) surrounding these camps. There was also the drafting of UNHCR Environmental Guidelines that are built on four basic environmental principles of integration, prevention, cost-effectiveness, and local participation.[28]

Integration of environmental concerns into the Agency's operations has meant incorporation of environmental concerns into sectoral guidelines and manuals, the establishment of UNHCR environmental policies, preparation of a user-friendly environmental sourcebook of ideas for implementing environmental projects, and further promotion of environmentally friendly procurement. Sectoral guidelines include: Forestry Guidelines for Refugee Situations; Domestic Energy Guidelines for Refugee Situations; Livestock Guidelines for Refugee Situations; and Environmental Guidelines for Refugee Agriculture. The UNHCR *Handbook for Emergencies* recommends inclusion of an environmental specialist in the emergency team, preparation of an Environmental Strategy and Action Plan, establishment of a local environmental task force for regular coordination among major actors concerned, and inclusion of a section on environment in budget submissions.

For field operations, there must be coordination of policy and planning with other United Nations agencies, to ensure coherent environmental activities in the field. It is important to promote the participation of the beneficiaries as well as of the local populations in setting objectives, planning, and implementing activities; this is considered crucial to making environmental measures sustainable. Particular attention has to be given to poor and vulnerable persons, as well as refugee women and refugee children, who suffer disproportionately from refugee-related environmental problems.

Cooking Energy Alternatives to Firewood

The greatest challenge is to find technologies that are as efficient and non-destructive as possible and yet are adaptable to socio-cultural norms. Alternatives to firewood include briquettes, charcoal, cow dung, diesel and petrol, electricity, fast-growing plants, gas from bio-latrine, gelfuel, grassburning stoves, kerosene, loose residues, liquid propane, natural gas, peat, and solar energy. These systems are briefly described below.

There are several types of burnable briquettes.[29] The primary limitations of any of them are that large quantities of raw material are needed and supply may fluctuate seasonally. Careful packaging and transportation is needed to avoid crumbling or moisture damage. They need a special stove that provides proper ventilation, and this is not easy to light. Moreover, the production of briquettes is relatively expensive.

Charcoal production often grows into a local economy around refugee camps. However, since the charcoal is sold, many refugees cannot afford to buy it, causing them go out to collect fuelwood anyway. Cow dung is often used where there are few other alternatives for fuel. It is usually formed into cakes or put onto sticks or walls to dry. Its use reduces its function as fertilizer, but provides a fuel mix for meeting energy demand.[30]

Diesel and petrol are normally the short-term fuel choice for electricity generation, being simple to use and readily available worldwide. There are, however, polluting, nonrenewable and normally imported. They also tend to promote a culture of wastefulness, as power output is effectively unlimited given sufficient generator units. It has been suggested that electricity should not be used for cooking due to the amount of waste and energy inefficiency that can occur with its production. Manual electricity can be used as a back up, or even as a principal source. Games may be created for children and adults to participate in which actually produce electricity, pump water, or grind meal in the process.

Fast-growing plants are a fuel alternative with growing popularity. In situations where there are few alternatives, this approach should be considered.[31] But one fuel with considerable social resistance to its use is gas made from a bio-latrine.[32] In refugee situations the number of women and children is often disproportionately high and the diet is non-standard, the average waste output per person could be expected to be substantially lower that the standard three litres. Around fifty refugees are required to supply enough gas for about five persons.

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Gelfuel is based on biomass ethanol alcohol, which is produced through the fermentation and distillation of sugar cane, sweet sorghum, or other agricultural crops.[33] As such, it is 100 per cent organic and can be locally produced in most countries in Africa. Appropriate low-cost, high-efficiency stoves have been developed specifically for the gelfuel, and a gelfuel burner has been designed which can be retrofitted into more than fifteen traditional African cooking stoves.

Grass can be burned and has been shown to have positive results in areas of severe local fuelwood shortage. Grass accessibility depends very much on its seasonal availability and most refugees that have experimented with grass-burning programs have expressed a reluctance to store grass for future use. The use of kerosene is an option that is generally not liked because it is dangerous and expensive.[34] The fuel must normally be imported, which generates a foreign exchange burden and dependence on a non-renewable fuel. The main drawback with kerosene supply is the risk of sale of the fuel and the stoves, creating a grey market for kerosene and the cooking hardware that might spread far from the refugee-hosting area.

Loose waste/agricultural residues include sawdust, sugar-cane bagasse, cassava stems, coffee husks, maize cobs, coconut shells, sunflower husks, groundnut shells, rice husks, cottonseed residues, and grasses.[35] These are inferior to firewood and charcoal due to higher ash content that inhibits ventilation during combustion, and to lower density and calorific content with high transport costs per unit of energy. This system requires close tending.

Liquid propane gas or butane under pressure is an efficient, low-emission energy source.[36] Its thermal efficiency for cooking is very high due to the quality of appliances available. It has the same range of drawbacks as kerosene and is considerably more costly. Scientists have suggested switching to small stoves that burn natural gas, which is plentiful and clean.[37]

Peat can be cut manually from swampy areas and then dried before use.[38] Mechanized extraction is viable if the area is first drained and dried, but as this can take two years it is not necessarily suitable for refugee situations and is also likely to result in irreversible environmental damage, whereas cutting from undrained swamps is more likely to be compensated for by natural regeneration. The use of peat has high smoke emission, varies in quality, must be cut and used in a specific way, and is found only in localized sites under suitable moisture conditions.

Although solar cooking requires no fuel at all, this method does not replace, but only complements, other forms of cooking (and thus still requires traditional sources of fuel). Solar-powered ovens require no fuel at all. Durable solar cookers are expensive and the components are likely to be sold by those who receive them. There is little hard data about the real environmental savings involved in solar-cooking projects. One study found that "normal" solar cooker users saved 27 per cent of their firewood. The same study reported that "maximum" solar users reduced their firewood usage by 68 per cent. The use of solar cookers whenever the conditions are right has reduced the demand for firewood. Solar cookers are safe and there are no dangers of fire getting out of control. Solar cooking is clean and hygienic. Solar-cooked food retains its nutrients.[39] But solar cooking needs a high number of days of isolation, a high degree of remoteness, scarcity of firewood and inability (or great difficulty) of refugees to obtain alternative fuel, and some likelihood of acceptance of new ideas, at least by part of the refugee population. Frequent complaints of refugees include the cooker's slowness, its uselessness on cloudy days, and the lack of availability of beans or maize flour.

Non-fuel Solutions

There are also a number of non-fuel solutions that can be used to reduce energy usage in cooking. The simplest way of reducing the impact of refugees (though it is often not politically possible) is to set up a larger number of smaller camps, rather than a tiny number of large ones. The benefit of this approach is that fuelwood collection is automatically spread over a larger area. Other solutions include using fuel-efficient stoves and adjustments to food preparation and cooking methods.

One common alternative is fuel-efficient stoves.[40] Fuel-saving systems rely on the two principles of (a) enclosing and insulating the fire and (b) controlling the airflow. Improved stoves can be either user-built or manufactured. Types of fuel-efficient stoves include mudstoves, fabricated stoves, and haybasket cookers.

Grinding reduces cooking time by many hours and energy consumption by up to 80 per cent. Household-level grinding is not as efficient as mechanical milling, but results in less destruction of nutrients by heat. It requires slightly more preparation time, and these foods must be brought into the camp in the first place. Cutting food into smaller pieces makes it cook faster so that fuel savings of 20 to 30 per cent can be realized.[41]

In addition, the cooking time of hard grains and beans can be greatly reduced by soaking them in water for five to eight hours prior to cooking, resulting in energy savings of as much as 40 per cent. This is not a simple practice to introduce because people are likely to complain of a difference in flavour. Although such differences are rarely confirmed in field tests, the belief persists.42 One downside of presoaked food is that it normally loses colour and texture.

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The demand for energy can be reduced by using different pots. Metal pots should be used for boiling and preparing fast-cooking foods such as rice and potatoes.[43] Clay pots are ideal for dishes requiring extensive simmering such as maize and beans. Lids may be distributed and are not always the right size.[44] A tight-fitting lid can save 20 per cent of fuel. Pressure cookers, if available, are even more efficient. Simmering cooks food just as quickly as rapid boiling, while ensuring that more of the nutritional value is retained. Once food in a covered pot has been brought to the boil, it is often not necessary to add more fuel to the fire because the retained heat of the fireplace, stove, and pot is transferred to the food. Fuel can even be removed once boiling point has been reached, resulting in substantial energy savings of up to 50 per cent.[45]

Once the cooking is complete the fire can be deliberately put out rather than allowed to burn out naturally. This can save 15 to 20 per cent of fuel, but is only likely to be accepted if matches are available for relighting later on.[46] While one pot is on the fire a second can be placed on top to start getting warm. This second pot also acts as a lid. Fuel savings of 30 to 40 per cent can be achieved by proper shielding of fireplaces; this can be done using readily available material such as rocks, mud, or pieces of firewood in the process of drying.[47]

The option of using multi-family cooking will depend to a great degree on the social traditions of the refugees themselves, but it is certainly to be encouraged from an environmental point of view. There is an increase in the potential for disease transmission associated with the adoption of a multi-family cooking approach due to the generally high density of living arrangements prevailing in refugee situations.

Another important consideration is fuelwood delivery. While trucking in contracted fuelwood is expensive and often dangerous for the contractor, since s/he must often drive valuable materials through violence-prone areas, fuel delivery is a method that has been used to reduce the incidence of women being raped as they go to collect fuel. Most of the programs that have been implemented so far have shown marked success in lowering the numbers of reported rapes in refugee camps, but they have hardly been sufficient. A second benefit of trucking fuel is that it can ease devastation in the immediate area.

Evaluation of Energy-Saving Options

In the mid-1990s, UNHCR facilitated the study of several energy-saving cooking options.[48] The traditional open-fire system was used as the benchmark to which solar cookers and grass-burning stoves were compared, along with other strategies such as wood stoves and energy-saving cooking practices. They were evaluated for environmental impact. Field visits took place in Uganda, Tanzania, and Ethiopia from July to October 1998.

Overall, in a study of grass-burning stoves in Uganda, it was found that the promotion of grass stoves was not a cost-effective measure. It did not achieve the expected social or environmental benefits. Most of the manufactured stoves remained unused due to the lack of acceptance, which was attributed to cultural practices and economic constraints. In addition, it was not clear that cutting and burning grass was preferable, in terms of environmental impact. In Tanzania, there was relative success of the grass-burning stove program. Some problems emerged with sourcing grass, including the local tradition of grass burning, the seasonal availability of grass, and reluctance on the part of the refugees to store grass. The fact that stove distribution had been almost entirely donor dependent might affect the overall sustainability of this initiative unless significant efforts are made to coordinate this with the work of other agencies in the area.

The experience with solar cookers in Ethiopia revealed that, while enabling refugee families to substitute some of their fuelwood or charcoal consumption, adoption of the "Cookit" solar cooker encountered some barriers related to its slow cooking speed and inability to meet the requirements of above-average family sizes. While 60 to 80 per cent of recipients appeared to make some use of their cooker immediately after distribution, it seemed best suited to smaller families who could not afford to buy fuelwood. The fact that the plastic bag (inside which the pot sits) had a short lifespan led to a limited application of the cooker. As a result, the Cookit ended up being used only to prepare hot drinks and wheat grain for two-thirds of the year (when solar conditions were not considered optimal), and other foods for the remainder of the year.

Lessons Learned and Conclusion

There is no blueprint strategy or course of action for eliminating the environmental damage caused by the collection of fuel by refugees, but there are a number of underlying principles that can be utilized to reduce it. Advance preparation, involving the refugees and being ever cognizant of cultural and social norms, choosing the right cooking techniques to save energy, promoting the use of other energy-saving solutions, and collection of data all contribute to reducing the impact of fuelwood collection.

Before new crises arise, desk studies can be undertaken on areas where population movements are likely to occur, so that a basic understanding is developed before the emergency develops. Full use should be made of databases for countries that are likely to be involved in refugee crises, in

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due course. Such files should include information about areas of ample fuelwood resources (if any), border areas of each country most unsuitable for the establishment of refugee camps, and those that ought to be avoided at all costs.

Refugees possess a great deal of knowledge about natural resources, agriculture, and food preparation. They must be a key part in the decision-making processes at all phases. An interactive approach to household energy use, involving refugee participation in reducing consumption, is essential to any sustainable program. In addition, effort should be made to include women in resource management. However, it is important that information not be filtered solely through the elites, who may have reason to misrepresent the facts for political purposes.[49] The sustainability of any efforts will be limited if the ownership question is not resolved. Camp and local populations must be given equal treatment.

There is still need for better pre-emptive site planning, establishing inter-agency coordination from the start, and promoting better cooking techniques to reduce demand for fuelwood.[50] There should be camp-by-camp consideration of supply, demand, and protection of natural resources. Where natural resources are abundant, the promotion of tree planting and fuel-efficient stoves runs into serious constraints. Where natural resources around a camp are already degraded, the focus of environmental programs should be quite different. Guided cutting in carefully identified source areas can help meet domestic demand in an environmentally sensitive manner. Cultural, social, economic, and environmental aspects must all be taken into account. Tree and product rights must be defined. Priority should be given to those fuel-saving options that are most positive for health and nutrition, and which reduce rather than increase the burden of labour.

More realistic planning horizons should be used. Refugee camps have lifetimes spanning years rather than months. Every effort must be made to implement a fuel supply program which provides fuelwood cut in a sustainable manner, and includes controls over unauthorized harvesting of sources as well as economic and educational programs designed to reduce fuelwood consumption. Taking into account the local natural resource situation and refugee familiarity with alternatives, it is best to use what is available locally and is the most sustainable and economically viable. Homestead planting and agro-forestry are key areas that may be worthy of more support.

Collection of baseline environmental data should be undertaken from the earliest possible moment,[51] and should be repeated at regular intervals, on: consumption, rates of tree cutting, types of cooking systems and their efficiencies, and the effect of diet on energy demand. Energy supply and demand assessments should be instituted. Much cooking fuel is consumed by small-scale businesses, but these are rarely considered in fuel-saving initiatives or assessment. In addition, camp-based institutions with cooking energy demands include schools, hospitals, feeding centres, and orphanages, should be evaluated as well. To the degree possible, standard units should be employed to facilitate data storage and comparison.

Promotion of energy-efficient stoves must be carried out in conjunction with other environmental protection/management activities. And all possible adaptations to cooking systems should be widely explored and appreciated.[52] In addition to providing fuel cost-efficient foods in relief, and milling facilities can be included as a relief item.[53] Promotion of familiar fuels and cooking systems should take priority over unfamiliar ones. Introducing simple technology does not mean that simple training is sufficient. If possible, clear incentives (economic or other) can be used to promote efficient use of firewood and stoves should be manufactured on site and by the refugees themselves.

The matter of collection and use of cooking fuel by displaced populations is not only about environmental damage and sustainable resource management. It is a complex issue related to various mechanisms developed to cope with the effects of forced displacement, poverty, and lack of land. There are no simple solutions, but there are opportunities to utilize the past experiences and lessons learned to reduce the environmental impact of securing cooking fuel. The keys are identifying and understanding the interaction between people needs and behaviour as they relate to a new, and sometimes unfamiliar, local environment.

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Creating Human Insecurity: The National Security Focus in Canada's Immigration System

Michelle Lowry

Abstract

This paper explores the processes through which Canada's immigration system creates human insecurity for newcomers to Canada. With a focus on the new Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and post-September 11 security measures such as the Safe Third Country Agreement, I argue that the immigration system draws on and reaffirms national security discourses. Measures designed to create national security, in turn, create human insecurity for migrants and refugees. Using a feminist approach that explores how gender, race, and class oppressions intensify experiences of in/security, this paper suggests that the new national security measures within Canada's immigration system will likely have a disproportionate impact on classed, raced, and gendered asylum seekers.

Résumé

Cet article examine comment les processus utilisés par le système d'immigration du Canada créent un environnement d'insécurité pour les nouveaux arrivés au Canada. Me concentrant sur la nouvelle Loi sur l'immigration et la protection des réfugiés et les mesures de sécurité mises en place après le 11 septembre, tel que l'Entente sur les tiers pays sûrs, je soutiens que le système d'immigration se fonde sur les discours de sécurité nationale et contribue à les avaliser. Les mesures destinées à renforcer la sécurité nationale créent à leur tour des conditions d'insécurité pour les immigrants et les réfugiés. Utilisant une approche féministe qui explore comment les abus d'autorité basés sur des considérations de sexe, de race et de classe intensifient les expériences d'insécurité, cet article suggère que les nouvelles mesures de sécurité contenues dans le système d'immigration du Canada auront un impact hors de toute proportion sur les demandeurs d'asile victimes de discrimination basées sur ces mêmes considérations de classe, de race et de sexe.

Over the past year, Canadians have witnessed a dizzying array of changes to the laws, policies, and practices aimed at policing and regulating "foreigners." In the interests of national security the Canadian government has initiated a series of measures designed to police borders and restrict access to Canada, especially for those from the developing world. An overhaul of the Immigration Act represented the first of these reforms, and constitutes major changes to Canada's immigration policies. The new Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA or Act) was introduced to Parliament prior to September 11, and received Royal Assent on November 1, 2001. While the Act itself wasn't *directly* influenced by the terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington, it nevertheless contained reforms interested in curbing the potential dangers that refugees allegedly pose to Canada. The accompanying final Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations (Regulations) for the new Act were released on June 11, 2002. Post-September 11 jitters have also resulted in several new national security measures aimed at newcomers, including the proposed Safe Third Country Agreement, which will go even further in limiting the rights of asylum seekers to meaningful representation, due process, and protection.

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In this paper I argue that as Canada draws its borders tighter in the name of national security the human security of asylum seekers is being put at risk. As Canadian immigration practices and policies illustrate, "nationalism as an ideology and the national interest as an objective of state policy are often opposed to the satisfaction of *general* human needs."[1]

Defining Human Security

Security concerns of Western states have traditionally focused on the primacy of territorial security and sovereignty and on the belief that a state can achieve security through arms and deterrence. This external security focus heavily relied on military security and the activities of the state's intelligence community.[2] During the Cold War security policy was based on the assumption that international politics were a threat to peace and welfare. Communism, in particular, was seen as a threat to the nation and capitalist economic interests.[3] This point is well illustrated by the actions of the RCMP during the Cold War, as they kept tabs on about eight hundred thousand Canadians thought to be communist or sympathetic to communism.[4] In response to the perceived threat that communism posed, a militarized conception of state security was entrenched in the West[5] that was concerned with nuclear deterrence, military strength, power blocs, and interstate relations.[6]

However, recognizing that traditional security concerns did not create peace or stability in the world, public interest groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and activists transformed the concept of security into a concern with *human* security. In Canada, human security entered the vocabulary of the Liberal government in the mid-1990s[7] and would soon become the central focus of Canadian foreign policy.[8] However, the state approach to human security differs widely from the definition of advocates, activists, and academics.

For the latter, the human security approach "involves replacing the state as primary reference and giving primacy to human beings."[9] The starting point "is understanding security in terms of the real-life, everyday experience of humanity embedded within global social and economic structures."[10] In particular, human security takes into account structures that lead to poverty, unequal gender relations, and other inequalities.[11] A focus on social and economic factors that threaten the security of human beings necessitates a look at the "quiet killers": hunger, epidemics, internal violence, environment, prenatal defects, malnutrition, repression, pollution, etc. As many of these quiet killers manifest themselves within the so-called private sphere of family life,[12] they are of special importance to women and the in/security they experience.

As so much human insecurity[13] is experienced in the "private sphere," and as violence, sex, and gender oppressions perpetuate human insecurity for women, a feminist approach that focuses on unequal power relations of gender, race, and class is necessary to understand how women experience human insecurity. This approach asks: how do institutions and organizations design unequal power relations? How do they perpetuate these relations? How do unequal social relations make human insecurity?[14]

Human Security and the Canadian State

The concept of human security is central to Canada's foreign policy and Canada's humanitarian image at home and abroad.[15] However, official understandings of the concept are quite different from the feminist and/or activist oriented understandings that I have outlined above. Under former Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy, it was recognized that poverty and inequity caused human insecurity. However, responses to that insecurity were based on neo-liberal economic policies. More recent conceptualizations of human security explicitly combine the human security agenda with national security interests. Within these approaches to human security, there appears to be no attention paid to the specific ways in which women experience human in/security.

During his tenure as Foreign Affairs Minister, Axworthy argued that the Cold War approach to security was not able to bring about peace or security. Thus, he conceptualized human security as "much more than the absence of military threat. It includes security against economic privation, an acceptable quality of life, and a guarantee of fundamental human rights."[16] He noted the importance of addressing economic need and poverty abroad in order to eradicate human insecurity, and seemed to recognize that inequity between people is a cause of insecurity. Axworthy even identified factors that lead to external and forced migration, such as conflict and disaster. But a closer look at Axworthy's conceptualization of human security shows its roots in neo-liberal assumptions about economic development.

For example, Axworthy argued that Canada's foreign policy meets human security challenges through rules-based trade and multilateral trading systems, as well as through programs such as peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Further he suggested that: "rules-based trade creates a stable trade environment and counters those protectionist tendencies which often result from cyclical downturns. Rules, in short, level the playing field."[17] For Axworthy and the federal Liberals, encouraging a neo-liberal approach to development in the South leads to economic, political, and social stability. This approach to human security relies on

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institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank to prevent and manage economic crises, and often results in the imposition of structural adjustment programs. And, as Neufeld points out, this approach is imbedded in traditional notions of security, as the goal is to use finance as a means to prevent and manage crisis in other states.[18]

What this approach fails to appreciate is that economic globalization often creates conditions from which asylum seekers flee. In her study of human security and development, Caroline Thomas argues that two-thirds of the global population have not benefited from economic growth generated by globalization. It is the highly skilled and those in management who are reaping most of the benefits. Precarious workers, such as those employed under conditions where businesses are offered incentives (e.g., low labour costs), may gain temporary benefits from globalization but remain vulnerable to the marketplace. And it is the marginalized, those most at risk of human insecurity in the first place, who suffer under globalization. For example, with economic restructuring the poor must absorb the costs of formerly public, but now private, services.[19]

Thus Axworthy failed to recognize the costs of globalization to the poor and marginal. His conceptualization of human security also had no understanding of how gender relations, gender roles, and oppression perpetuate human insecurity for women. Before assuming that human security can be reached through neo-liberal economic policies, questions about women's experiences of neo-liberalism must be asked. For example: How do neo-liberal economic policies affect women's work in the home and in the workplace? How do they affect women's standard of living and ability to feed themselves and their children? Despite obvious gender concerns, the Liberal government seemed unable to formulate, or not interested in formulating, a gender analysis.

Within the last few years Canada's approach to human security has shifted. Canada continues to promote market-based strategies and its own economic interests abroad,[20] but the cursory nod to poverty and privation (however problematic) has been replaced by concern for market upheavals. In the 1999 "Speech from the Throne," the government prioritized conflict, disease, upheavals (economic and political), and environmental disasters. In particular, Canada has "chosen to focus its human security agenda on promoting safety for people from threats of violence."[21] In 2002, major threats to human security are further being defined as terrorism, drug trafficking, and the illicit trade in small arms. The Foreign Affairs website claims that: "this new generation of threats shows no respect for national borders and inevitably becomes the source of our own insecurity."[22] Thus, protection of Canada's borders is understood to be both a human security and national security concern.

This change in direction for human security is not simply a response to the terrorist attacks of September 11. As far back as 1999, the Foreign Affairs website explained that a focus on violence "is where the concept of human security has the greatest value-added as a complement to existing international agendas already focussed on promoting national security, human rights, and human development."[23] Thus, we can see, over the past few years, a movement away from broader human security concerns to a narrower definition. The renewed "human security" priority of violence and security threats seems to be tacked on to foreign policy already prioritized by the government. And, for the government, national security concerns frame how they chose to conceptualize human security. Thus, human and national security are understood by Foreign Affairs to be complementary:

> . . . people are made safer by an open, tolerant and responsive state capable of ensuring the protection of all of its citizens. At the same time, enhancing human security reinforces the state by strengthening its legitimacy and stability. A secure and stable world order is built both from the bottom up and the top down.[24]

Within this paradigm there is no discussion of the ways in which national security interests can negatively impact human security (let alone any thought to how this process may be raced, classed, or gendered), and at the same time some important human security concerns are removed from the agenda.[25]

National security agendas and human security needs are not compatible in the lives of those seeking asylum, as national security measures can in fact contribute to human insecurity. IRPA and the proposed Safe Third Country Agreement are meant to boost national security and protect Canada's borders. But, as I argue in subsequent sections, these national security measures negatively impact the human security of asylum seekers in Canada. The Canadian government understands human insecurity as something to be gained in other places, as something needed by "other" people. In the domestic context, human insecurity is thought to be under threat from "other" people and other places. However, I contend that the Canadian government needs to recognize and address the human insecurity it causes for asylum seekers in its domestic refugee and border control policies.

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The Refugee Crisis as the Refugee 'Threat'

Successive Canadian governments have tended to argue that immigration is good for business. It brings cheap labour into the country, boosts consumption of Canada's goods and services, and creates employment. Immigration policy relating to economic immigration serves nation-building and capitalism, and often those chosen for citizenship meet the vision of Canada.[26] Within this paradigm, independent or economic immigrants are seen as good for the country, and are the privileged class of immigrants within the system.[27] But, if economic immigrants are wanted, those in the family and refugee classes are merely tolerated. They are viewed as benefiting from our humanitarianism, rather than benefiting Canada. Refugees in particular are understood to be "charity cases," rather than human beings *entitled* to protection.[28] And, in the West's darkest fears, they are imagined to be a threat to the body politic.

In fact, since the emergence of the nation-state, refugees have been seen as a threat to the identity of the nation and its security.[29] In Canada, concerns about national security have historically been used against refugees, particularly those from non-white and/or working class origins. For example, in the years between the World Wars, communists, socialists, and unionists were deported as a means to silence social dissent and political organizing.[30] During the Cold War, however, Canada (and the West) had a different relationship to refugees, a time that Reg Whitaker refers to as the "golden era."[31] During this period, refugees were chosen on the basis of their ideological backgrounds, in order to add support to the ideological stance of the state. The influx of refugees from communist countries highlighted the superiority of capitalism and the inferiority of the politics and policies of the Soviet Union. Refugees from the political left who would question state ideology were admitted in small numbers. With the collapse of the USSR and the increased flow of racialized peoples from the Third World, states realized that refugees no longer provided ideological legitimacy.[32] In Canada, the refugee discourse has since shifted to the security of Canadians and the need to protect ourselves from false claimants and those who "abuse" the system.

It is within this context that refugee advocates, academics, and bodies such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) have noted the growing tensions between the "language of protection and the reality of rejection."[33] In this new "closing doors era,"[34] the discourse has turned to the "refugee crisis." However, the crisis of concern isn't necessarily that crisis experienced by refugees, but rather the crisis that refugees allegedly pose to receiving states. This sense of crisis has many causes. Among them are: (1) asylum seekers who bypass the system are viewed as a challenge to the sovereignty of states; (2) the conflicts that the Cold War held in check are now brewing or boiling over, thus displacing more and more people; (3) there is a widening gap between the North and South, causing many to flee the South in search of a better life; (4) security is being redefined to include the protection of national and cultural identities based on the assumption that migration threatens such identities;[35] and (5) it is feared that refugees bring with them the conflicts and instability they are fleeing.[36]

These concerns about the threats that refugees allegedly pose rest on many assumptions. First is the assumption that asylum seekers challenge state sovereignty. (This assumption itself is based on the belief that states have the right to determine who enters their borders, or that borders should even exist.) Yet it is clear that "participation in the refugee regime does not imply an open door policy nor an abrogation of [that] sovereignty."[37] On the contrary, the Canadian state has consistently used its authority to develop restrictions on who may and may not enter the country. Thus, while sovereignty is used as a reason for cracking down on "illegal" migrants, I suggest that the crackdown itself reinforces (the legitimacy of) state sovereignty.

Refugee crisis discourse also positions asylum seekers as posing a threat to the cultural security of receiving countries, as citizens fear being culturally and politically taken over.[38] Despite Canada's official multiculturalism policies, such concerns are clearly manifested here as new Canadians are expected to practice a neutral form of "difference." Cultural differences are tolerated when they are unthreatening – for example in the form of "saris, samosas and steel bands."[39] However, if a group makes political demands,[40] or if its members define their own experiences of difference and resist hegemonic understandings of their "otherness,"[41] they may be seen as a threat to the nation and the white culture. These concerns about the cultural and political threat posed by migrants are rooted in racism, and specific ideas about what constitutes the "self-citizen" and the "other." Concerns about the increasing "flood" or "tidal wave" of asylum seekers from the South are informed by the urge to protect national (white) culture. What those who espouse this discourse fail to appreciate is that colonialism was a crucial factor in the development of the North/South divide,[42] and that the North profits from the continuing exploitation of the South. Ultimately, it is these economic inequalities and resulting societal instabilities that create conditions from which people must flee.

But perhaps the greatest risk associated with asylum seekers is the threat that they allegedly pose to the security of the nation, specifically through acts of terrorism. The question that needs to be asked is whether or not asylum

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seekers actually pose a serious risk to Canada on terrorism or security grounds. And is this risk greater than that posed by the nation's own citizens? We now know that the terrorist acts of September 11 were not perpetrated by asylum seekers.[43] In fact, domestic terrorism has proven to be as much a threat to nations as international terrorism. Further, terrorists do not need access to Western nations in order to enact terrorism against those nations; they can simply target embassies or military bases abroad.[44] Thus, immigration and refugee controls cannot stop or prevent terrorist acts against the nation. Yet, despite the lack of terrorist activity perpetrated by asylum seekers, nations are choosing to crack down on refugees, framing them as a security threat.

Many scholars also argue that such fears are real. Nazare Albuquerque Abell, for example, suggests that potential threats are exaggerated, but "not without foundation as long as terrorism continues to be a global phenomenon."[45] Whitaker also suggests that pleas on behalf of refugees will not be taken seriously if they do not take into account the arguments put forward by those concerned with national security.[46] However, at the risk of not being taken seriously, I do not find arguments that focus on the threats that asylum seekers pose to national security to be compelling reasons to close our doors. Certainly, not as long as definitions of terrorism and security threats are informed by the political motivations and needs of receiving states, and in the racist attitudes of the West. Nor can I accept that my rights as a citizen of Canada should supersede the rights of asylum seekers to apply for and receive protection. I suggest that security measures such as interdiction, the imposition of eligibility criteria on asylum seekers, and inadmissibility provisions, which I discuss below, are rooted in fear (and fear-mongering) rather than in danger.[47] And, in turn, these strategies of exclusion pose a risk to the human security of asylum seekers.

Technologies of Exclusion in Canadian Refugee Policy

Within Canadian refugee policy, concerns about the threats that asylum seekers pose have manifested in various strategies to prevent them from gaining access to Canada. The 1976 Immigration Act, for example, maintained the state's ability to be *selective* in choosing refugees for resettlement by including those in "refugee-like" situations. (This also allowed the state to chose refugees with ideological value, as I discussed above.) By combining Convention Refugees and refugee-like classes we can be selective – take the "best" of an unwelcome lot, as it were. An outcome of this policy has been that most humanitarian intake is selected from areas with the least number of refugees and where the majority of those chosen are economically active men,[48] despite the fact that 80 per cent of the world's refugees are women and their dependent children.[49]

Another method the government has used to restrict access to Canada for asylum seekers is through its successful establishment criteria.[50] A refugee is accepted not only on her criteria as a Convention Refugee but on the basis of whether she will likely be able to establish herself in Canada. The Regulations for IRPA require the following for refugees, except those deemed vulnerable or in urgent need of protection: resourcefulness, presence of relatives or the sponsor in the community where they resettle, potential for employment, and ability to learn English or French.[51] Clearly, these criteria have nothing to do with one's status as a Convention Refugee. Rather they reflect the criteria used to select immigrants. And this determination process is not gender neutral. Citizenship and Immigration Canada's (CIC) own gender analysis finds:

> . . . current policy that includes an assessment of the ability to establish successfully has a negative impact on women at risk. Women claimants may be hampered by their responsibilities as primary caregivers, poor ability in either official language, lack of education or poor job skills, or a combination of these factors.[52]

The document goes on to suggest that the criteria should be gender sensitive, a suggestion that is clearly being ignored by CIC.

These practices now entrenched in the Regulations of IRPA clearly place the human security of asylum seekers at risk. For the CIC it is not enough to be a Convention Refugee; one must be a refugee most likely to find belonging and acceptance in Canada. Women, those from the South, and the poor in particular pay a price for these policies, as they are less likely to meet selection criteria and thus can be passed over for the more desirable asylum seekers. These policies marginalize the most marginal of refugees – women, the poor, and people of colour. Human insecurity – physical, emotional and psychological – is thus exacerbated by social relations of race, class, and gender. To purposefully attempt to exclude the most marginal of asylum seekers is to perpetuate and perpetrate human insecurity.

Exclusion and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act

Canada's new Immigration and Refugee Protection Act continues to exclude those deemed to be a threat. CIC's website promises that the Act "strikes a balance between measures to address the security and safety of Canadians and Canada's

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borders on the one hand, and our traditions of welcoming visitors and immigrants and protecting refugees on the other."[53] Further, they argue that it "allows us to say 'no' more quickly to those who would take advantage of our generosity and openness."[54] This all-too-familiar discourse reinforces problematic and widespread notions about the dangers that newcomers bring with them, the threat they allegedly pose to the security of Canadians, and the belief that asylum seekers abuse the system or jump the queue to get here.[55]

In Bill C-31 (the predecessor to IRPA) former CIC Minister Elinor Caplan said that one of her goals was to "close the backdoor to those who would abuse the system."[56] One of the ways in which CIC intends to do this is by continuing the practice of interdiction – stopping people without adequate identity papers from getting to Canada. Interdiction is based on the assumption that those without papers either abuse the system or pose a danger because they are not who they say they are. However, as advocacy groups such as Amnesty International (AI) and the Canadian Council for Refugees (CCR) point out, it may not be possible for some people to get to Canada with proper identity documents, as these documents must be obtained from hostile governments and situations from which asylum seekers are fleeing. Yet, increased interdiction practices, and announced increases in immigration control officers abroad, suggest that the CIC believes that the undocumented are not genuine refugees.[57]

Interdiction is particularly problematic for women. In yet another disregarded gender-based analysis performed on IRPA, CIC recognizes that:

> Women and children often have less access to documents because of prevailing traditions and cultural norms, the administrative inefficiency of source countries, remote geographical locations, overt discriminatory practices and persecution, or the destruction of documents through wars or armed conflicts. Proposals that place a priority on documentation, and that base credibility assessments on documentation, without weighing this kind of evidence against other forms of validation, could have disproportionate and negative impacts on women.[58]

Many of the same concerns can also be raised about the discriminatory impact interdiction has on racialized peoples from the South, as there is generally less infrastructure available to provide identity documents in poor nations. As interdiction disproportionately affects marginalized peoples, it is disturbing that the Act has no recourse or mechanism to allow exceptions and ensure that refugees are given access to the refugee determination system.

One of the ironies of interdiction is that freedom of movement is supposedly a universal human right,[59] even as states actively work against arrival. Thus, for refugees "who do not possess the means, and who do not have the skills required by affluent states, movement is far from free."[60] The Canadian state is interdicting people whom it simply doesn't want – self-selected asylum seekers. Why? Because once an asylum seeker makes a claim on Canadian soil, her case must be heard (with exceptions of inadmissibility, as I will discuss later). If the claimant is found to be a refugee she will be given status, and even failed claimants might receive permanent residence on humanitarian and compassionate grounds. Yet, these are not people that Canada chooses. While the state chooses immigrants, issues visas to temporary workers and students, and applies selection criteria to refugees applying from overseas, self-selected asylum seekers remain, to a very limited extent, outside the control and sovereignty of the state.[61] These asylum seekers often are racialized, poor people – undesirables in the eyes of CIC.

So, in the name of a sovereignty that is informed by raced, classed, and gendered notions of who belongs here, the human security of asylum seekers is put at risk through interdiction. Those who are intercepted before they reach Canada are unable to avail themselves of the protection needed to ensure physical safety and the emotional and psychological security that comes with escaping traumas and persecution faced in the homeland. In fact, those who are interdicted may even be at risk of being sent back to torture. Such an event is not unprecedented, as in 1998, 192 Tamils were interdicted on the seas, and returned to Sri Lanka where all were detained, and at least one was tortured.[62] Given this outrage perpetrated by the Canadian state against those asylum seekers, it is perverse that "Canada has boasted of preventing thirty-three thousand people from reaching Canada over a five-year period."[63]

With the difficulties that many asylum seekers face getting proper documentation and the risks of interdiction, human smuggling often becomes the only means by which to escape the home country. Yet, despite the danger that smuggling can pose, the section of the Act dealing with trafficking (migration involving force or coercion) and human smuggling (illegal entry into Canada organized by individuals or organizations) heavily emphasizes penalty as opposed to the protection of human rights for smuggled or trafficked persons.[64] But increasing the punishment for smugglers and traffickers may raise the cost of transportation and stop even more people from coming to Canada, making those who do more vulnerable to abuse.[65] Further, the Regulations will consider arrival through smuggling or trafficking when assessing the flight risk, and possible de-

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tention, of asylum seekers. Despite the fact that Article 31 of the Refugee Convention prohibits punishing those who arrive illegally, the Regulations suggest that those entering in this manner would likely be detained.[66]

While the CIC would argue that the problem is people coming to Canada illegally, I suggest that the problem is that people are forced to adopt the services of smugglers to reach Canada. Being cornered into using the services of smugglers can also pose a huge problem for women and children who risk sexual violence and exploitation. Women and children are in fact in a double bind as they are systematically disadvantaged by the overseas refugee determination process and at a high risk of abuse from smugglers.

The Canadian state has put a lot of energy into preventing people from making refugee claims on our shores. It has also developed criteria that exclude certain people from making a claim, should they reach our borders. In the new Act a permanent resident or foreign national is considered inadmissible to Canada under five major grounds:[67] security grounds, human or international rights violations, serious criminality, criminality, and organized criminality. Those found to be inadmissible will not receive a refugee hearing, nor a determination of risk in the event of deportation. In this next section I briefly outline some of the problems with the inadmissibility provisions regarding security.

In 1992 (under the federal Conservative government), Bill C-86 instituted "terrorism abuses" into the Immigration Act. The changes introduced a new form of criminality based on past or present membership in a terrorist group, thus labelling the member of the group a terrorist. In IRPA terrorism remains a grounds for inadmissibility. Under s. 34 of the Act security grounds include:

> (a) engaging in an act of espionage or an act of subversion against a democratic government, institution or process as they are understood in Canada; (b) engaging in or instigating the subversion by force of any government; (c) engaging in terrorism; (d) being a danger to the security of Canada; (e) engaging in acts of violence that would or might endanger the lives or safety of persons in Canada; or (f) being a member of an organization that there are reasonable grounds to believe engages, has engaged or will engage in acts referred to in paragraph (a), (b) or (c).[68]

Terrorism is not defined in the Act. However, "terrorist activity" and "terrorist group" are defined in the Anti-Terrorism Act (of 2002), and these definitions will likely be applied to the determination of inadmissible persons under s. 34 of IRPA. Under the Anti-Terrorism Act, the Criminal Code will be amended to define "terrorist activity" as an action that takes place either within or outside of Canada that:

> ... is an offence under one of the UN anti-terrorism conventions and protocols; or is taken for political, religious or ideological purposes and intimidates the public concerning its security, or compels a government to do something, by intentionally killing, seriously harming or endangering a person, causing substantial property damage that is likely to seriously harm people or by seriously interfering with or disrupting an essential service, facility or system.[69]

Groups whose activities meet the definition of terrorist activity will be designated as "terrorist groups." Thus, under IRPA anyone who has engaged in such activity, or anyone who there are reasonable grounds to believe is or was a member of a group that engages, has engaged, or may engage in such activity, is inadmissible to Canada.

There are many problems with these attempts to define terrorist activity and terrorist groups, and with the inadmissibility restrictions on security grounds outlined in the Act. First, any definition of terrorist activity or terrorist groups is an inherently political one. This definition is also constantly changing. Take the much cited example of the African National Congress (ANC), a group that engaged in acts of violence against apartheid South Africa but is now the ruling party of that country. The ANC, under the definitions outlined in the Anti-Terrorism Act, would be declared a terrorist group, and thus anyone who was or is a member would not be admissible to Canada under the provisions in IRPA.[70] But was the ANC a terrorist group, or was it an organization that, among other activities, engaged in armed struggle against an oppressive state? What is the line between armed struggle and terrorism? There are many groups in the developing world that engage in violent struggle, and do so against violent and repressive regimes. Often such groups also provide services to local communities, and may in fact be a quasi-state. To label a group "terrorist," when it has other important functions in its community, is too simplistic.[71] Further, there are some groups that are not engaged in terrorism, but have wings or factions that do engage in such activity.[72] Under the IRPA inadmissibility guidelines, such distinctions will likely not be made.

This example of the ANC also leads to the question of what constitutes a "member." Is a member of a terrorist group someone who pays dues to the organization, a volunteer in a local Canadian community centre sponsored by the group, a member of the executive leadership of that group, etc?[73] Clearly, there are problems here with guilt by association. It is unreasonable to punish a person for simply being a member of a group if that person was not respon-

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sible for terrorist activity. The Supreme Court of Canada in its recent decision in *Suresh* v. *Minister of Citizenship and Immigration* argues that those who "innocently contribute to or become members of terrorist organizations," should be able to apply for an exception to the inadmissibility rules.[74] Yet, there is no guarantee that such exception would be granted under IRPA. While *Suresh* may help protect those unaware of a group's activities, it does not protect those who have a general knowledge of those activities but do not take part in them. Such people will, without regard to their specific experiences, actions, or the context in which they lived, be denied access to Canada and protection as refugees.

It is also important to recognize that "legal and policy discourse on 'terrorism' [is]…informed by a moral panic."[75] Part of this panic is currently grounded in anti-Muslim rhetoric. Research by the CCR indicates that those currently inadmissible or in limbo on terrorism-related grounds include a significant number of Iranians, Kurds, Sri Lankans, Tamils, Sikhs, Algerians, and Palestinians.[76] Thus the wide scope of the terrorism provisions in IRPA will likely continue to disproportionately affect racialized peoples, particularly those of Muslim descent

There are alternative ways that the state can exercise its sovereignty and exclude those who have committed violent terrorist activities. Aiken has suggested, with regard to the former Immigration Act, that inadmissibility on security and terrorism grounds is not necessary as inadmissibility for criminality covers unlawful acts that include terrorist activity. This approach would also remove exclusion provisions for members of organizations classified as "terrorist." While this seems a more fair approach, I would also caution that we remain sceptical about the criminality inadmissibility provisions in IRPA. If a person has been convicted of a terrorist offence in another country, Canada must remain cautious about the justice system in that state and its rules of evidence and law, as well as possible motivations underlying such a conviction, such as racial and ethnic hatred and political repression.

Clearly, inadmissibility provisions will impact on the human security of asylum seekers as they could be prevented access to Canada and the refugee determination system. The United Nation's Refugee Convention does have provisions outlining those not eligible for or entitled to protection as refugees under Section E (those not in need of protection) and F (those who have committed crimes against peace, humanity, war crimes, serious non-political crimes in home countries, or are guilty of acts contrary to purposes/principals of the UN) of Article 1.[77] However, in the interest of human security and Canada's commitment to protection, I believe that it is crucial that all claims are heard, and that any allegations of criminality, security violations, etc. be considered within the context of a refugee claim. Claimants must be allowed to have their claims heard by the Refugee Protection Division, so that Convention Refugees and protected persons are identified and offered the protection to which they are entitled.

Another possible outcome of the inadmissibility sections is that a claimant could be deported to her home country to the threat of torture or death, without being granted a hearing. The international law about *refoulement* (return to death or torture) is somewhat contradictory. Under the Convention against Torture, which Canada signed in 1987, Article 3 prohibits *refoulement*. However, those excluded by Canada under sections E or F of Article 1 of the Refugee Convention are not believed to be in need of protection and could risk *refoulement*.[78] But the UNHCR holds that such exceptions should be applied restrictively and that the principles governing exclusion are supposed to reinforce the obligation to *non-refoule*.[79] The Canadian court, in *Suresh*, also agreed that the "better view is that international law rejects deportation to torture, even where national security interests are at stake." But the court also suggested that "there is a limited exception to the prohibition against removal to torture under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms."[80] Yet, despite these cautions against *refoulement* and our commitment to the Convention against Torture, IRPA allows for return to torture. In s. 115 (2) an exception to *non-refoulement* can occur if the claimant is (a) found to be inadmissible on serious criminality grounds and the Minister believes she is a danger to the public, or (b) if she is inadmissible for security reasons, for violating human or international rights, or participation in organized crime, if the Minister believes the claimant should be removed on the basis of the severity of the act or because she is a danger to the public.

Return to torture or possible death would obviously cause human insecurity – physical, emotional and psychological – to the person at risk. Torture is one of the worst abuses that can be perpetrated against the human body and mind. It is unthinkable that a country that claims to have a commitment to human security and protection against violence could even entertain the possibility of deporting someone to face that kind of terror, particularly as we have seen that determinations of inadmissibility can be informed by politics, racism, and problematic criteria.

Exclusionary Security Measures – Post-September 11

As an extension of the security measures undertaken in IRPA, Canada is also tightening security at the border to make it harder for asylum seekers to make claims here. On December 3, 2002, Canada and the U.S. announced they

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would be working together on "common security priorities" and the "deterrence, detection and prosecution of security threats, the disruption of illegal migration and the efficient management of legitimate travel."[81] They plan to accomplish this goal by: reviewing their separate lists of countries requiring visitor's visas with hopes of harmonizing that list;[82] placing more overseas officers to interdict those without documents; establishing biometric identification; and creating a Safe Third Country Agreement.

The Safe Third Country Agreement, also called the None Is Too Many Agreement by refugee advocates,[83] is based on the belief that an asylum seeker should seek asylum in the first safe country in which she lands. Under the terms of this agreement, a claimant seeking asylum at the border of either Canada or the U.S. would not be allowed to make that claim if she arrived through the other country. For example, if a claimant fled Afghanistan, arrived in the U.S., and then made her way to Canada to claim asylum, such an agreement would allow Canada to deport her to the U.S. to be processed by their system. Under Article 4 of the draft agreement, there are some exceptions for people with family members in the country of choice.[84] Such an agreement, if reached, will have a huge impact on asylum seekers wanting to come to Canada, as anywhere from one-third to one-half of refugee claimants in Canada enter from the U.S.[85]

This agreement is being sold as an attempt to cut down on false claims and "asylum shopping," and as a way for Canada and the U.S. to "burden-share." However, this agreement will likely add to the insecurity of claimants in several ways. First, it limits the agency and right of the asylum seeker to chose where she wants to live. In the case of the U.S. there may be many good reasons why claimants don't want to make claims there: our system is perceived to be more fair; asylum seekers may fear the racial tensions and violent crime that are more prevalent in the U.S.;[86] or they may have friends or a larger more established community in Canada.

The question of the fairness of the American system is particularly important, as advocates are asking: is the U.S. really a safe third country? A quick look at the facts suggests otherwise. The United States has a habit of detaining child migrants, many of whom are kept in either juvenile or adult jails. In Canada, the detention of a minor is supposed to be a "measure of last resort," under s. 60 of IRPA. The U.S. also refuses to ratify the Convention on the Rights of the Child.[87] The American state has disregarded international law with a policy to detain all Haitians who make a claim, as a means to deter other Haitians from doing so. They engage in expedited removals for those without documents, except for those with a "credible fear." However, the decision of what constitutes a "credible fear" is made by immigration officers, and the claimant has no right to counsel.[88] And, in the U.S., those who are in the country illegally have no constitutional right to appointed counsel in deportation hearings. Children are also not entitled to free representation because deportation hearings are a civil matter.[89] Finally, advocates are concerned that women making gender-based claims[90] of persecution will have a better chance of getting a fair hearing in Canada.[91]

Despite all of these concerns about the American system, Canada is willing to risk the security of children, women facing gender persecution, and all asylum seekers in general, in its bid to better control who can claim asylum here. Arbitrary detentions, deportations without a hearing, and a greater risk of *refoulement* are just some of the risks that those forced to claim status in the United States may face if this agreement is finalized. Once again, in the name of national security and the safety of citizens, the human security of the most marginalized peoples in the world are being put at risk.

Conclusion

These recent initiatives are about policing and protecting Canada's borders and the security of the nation. The discourse on which these plans are built suggests that Canadians have something to fear from newcomers, and positions asylum seekers as abject "foreigners." National security interests in our refugee system will likely come at a human cost for asylum seekers, particularly those already marginalized through racist, sexist, and class-based social relations. And, as I have argued, institutional practices within the refugee system systemically discriminate against women, the poor, and people of colour. Thus, contrary to the stance taken by the Canadian state, human security is not something that needs only to be addressed abroad. Nor is it simply about protecting Canadians from "dangerous foreigners." Rather, it would seem that asylum seekers need protection from Canada's refugee laws and proposed border policies, as they are likely, in and of themselves, to be a cause of human insecurity.

If it is true that "in prioritising the national interest as the foundation of security, we are often in practice constructing the very conditions that help to generate instability,"[92] then Canada needs to reassess its security goals. For true security to exist at the level of the nation, human security in its broadest sense must exist at all levels of society. It is human insecurity that leads to social and economic upheaval and threatens the stability and existence of states. To protect national security by allowing for human insecurity is short-sighted and may ultimately result in protection and safety for no one.

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1. Peter Wilkin, “Human Security and Class in a Global Economy,” in *Globalization, Human Security and the African Experience,* ed. Caroline Thomas and Peter Wilkin (London: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1999), 29.
2. Laura Reed and Majid Tehranian, “Evolving Security Regimes,” in *Worlds Apart: Human Security and Global Governance,* ed. Majid Tehranian (London: Tauris, 1999), 23–54.
3. Mark Neufeld, “Pitfalls of Emancipation and Discourses of Security: Reflections on Canada’s ‘Security with a Human Face,’” in *(Dis)Placing Security: Critical Re-evaluations of the Boundaries of Security Studies: Selected Proceedings of the 7th Annual Conference of the York Centre for International and Security Studies,* ed. Samantha Arnold and J. Marshall Beier (Toronto: York Centre for International Security Studies, 2000), 19–34.
4. Among those on whom the RCMP compiled files on were: Canadian author Farley Mowat, African-American singer Harry Belafonte, former Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, and current Governor-General Adrienne Clarkson. Peter Small, “RCMP Trailed ‘Communists’ until 1985,” *Toronto Star*, 2 March 2002, A7.
5. Heather Owens and Barbara Arneil, “The Human Security Paradigm Shift: A New Lens on Canadian Foreign Policy,” *Canadian Foreign Policy* 7, no. 1 (Fall 1999): 1–12.
6. William W. Bain, “Against Crusading: The Ethic of Human Security and Canadian Foreign Policy,” *Canadian Foreign Policy* 6, no. 3 (Spring 1999): 85–98.
7. However, Jennifer Ross points out that Canada began addressing what we now call “human security” in its foreign policy during the conflicts in Central America in the late 1980s. Jennifer Ross, “Is Canada’s Human Security Policy Really the ‘Axworthy’ Doctrine?” *Canadian Foreign Policy* 8, no. 2 (Winter 2001): 75–95.
8. Mark Neufeld.
9. Ruth Jacobson, Susie Jacobs, and Jennifer Marchbank, “Introduction: States of Conflict,” in *States of Conflict: Gender, Violence and Resistance,* ed. Susie Jacobs, Ruth Jacobson, and Jennifer Marchbank (New York: Zed Books, 2000), 6.
10. Caroline Thomas, “Introduction,” in *Globalization, Human Security and the African Experience,* ed. Caroline Thomas and Peter Wilkin (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), 1.
11. Lee-Anne Broadhead, “Re-packaging Notions of Security: A Sceptical Feminist Response to Recent Efforts,” in *States of Conflict: Gender, Violence and Resistance,* ed. Susie Jacobs, Ruth Jacobson, and Jennifer Marchbank (New York: Zed Books, 2000), 27–44.
12. Laura Reed and Majid Tehranian, “Evolving Security Regimes,” in *Worlds Apart: Human Security and Global Governance,* ed. Majid Tehranian (London: Tauris, 1999), 23–54.
13. In a recent issue of *Refuge,* Raquel Freitas notes that in the context of refugee security, human insecurity is associated with internal security and protecting the citizen from security threats. However, I am using the term differently. I see human insecurity for refugees as the lack of human security. Raquel Freitas, “Human Security and Refugee Protection after September 11: A Reassessment,” *Refuge* 20, no. 4 (August 2002).
14. Lee-Anne Broadhead.
15. Neufeld argues that the Department of Foreign Affairs provides ideological legitimacy for the state as it posits our foreign policy as a just and humane extension of Canadian domestic policy.
16. Online: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/english/foreignp/sechume.htm> (date accessed: 1 March 2002).
17. *Ibid.*, 5.
18. Mark Neufeld.
19. Caroline Thomas, *Global Governance, Development and Human Security: The Challenge of Poverty and Inequality* (London: Pluto, 2000).
20. William W. Bain, “Against Crusading: The Ethic of Human Security and Canadian Foreign Policy,” *Canadian Foreign Policy* 6, no. 3 (Spring 1999): 85–98; Mark Neufeld.
21. Online: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade <www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreignp/humansecurity/HS_program-e.asp> (date accessed: 1 March 2002).
22. “What’s New: Human Security in Action,” On-line: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade <http://www.humansecurity.gc.ca/whatsnew_action-e.asp> (date accessed: 28 July 2002).
23. Online: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade <www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreignp/humansecurity/HS_program-e.asp> (date accessed: 1 March 2002).
24. “Freedom from Fear: Canada’s Foreign Policy for Human Security;” online: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade <www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreignp/humansecurity/HumanSecurityBooklet-e.asp> (date accessed: 1 March 2002).
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28. Robert F. Barsky, “An Essay on the Free Movement of Peoples,” *Refuge* 19, no. 4 (February 2002): 84–93.
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30. Audrey Macklin, “Borderline Security,” in *The Security of Freedom: Essays in Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Bill,* ed. Ronald J.

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32. *Ibid.*
33. B.S. Chimni, "Response to Hathaway: Globalization and Refugee Blues," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 8, no. 3, (1995): 298.
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38. Nazare Albuquerque Abell, "The Impact of International Migration on Security and Stability," *Canadian Foreign Policy* 4, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 83–109.
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41. Magdalene Ang-Lygate, "Women Who Move: Experiences of Diaspora," in *New Frontiers in Women's Studies: Knowledge, Identity and Nationalism,* ed. Mary Maynard and June Purvis (London: Taylor & Francis, 1996), 151–63.
42. Stephen Castles and Alastair Davidson, *Citizenship and Migration: Globalization and the Politics of Belonging* (London: MacMillan Press, 2000).
43. Audrey Macklin.
44. *Ibid.*
45. Nazare Alburquerque Abell, 100.
46. Reg Whitaker.
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48. Susan J. Smith.
49. Eileen Pittaway and Linda Bartolomei, "Refugees, Race, and Gender: The Multiple Discrimination against Refugee Women," *Refuge* 19, no. 6 (August 2001): 21–32.
50. The draft Regulations mistakenly read "economically established." (It has been corrected in the final Regulations to read "successfully established.") However, given the neo-liberal economic agenda of the current government, one has to wonder if the misprint was in fact a Freudian slip.
51. *Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations Canada Gazette Part 11,* Vol. 136, Extra, s. 139 (g), p. 91.
52. "Gender Based Analysis Chart for Bill C-11;" online: Citizenship and Immigration Canada <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/ about/policy/c11-gender.html> (date accessed: 28 February 2002).
53. "What Is New in the Proposed Immigration and Refugee Protection Act;" online: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/about/policy/c11%2Dnew.html> (date accessed: 20 August 2001).
54. *Ibid.*
55. This discourse of "queue jumping" suggests that there is one big line in which all those seeking status in Canada wait. Such a line, so the story goes, is orderly and equitable. However, there are many lines, and each moves at a different pace depending on who is in it (refugees, business class immigrants, etc.). Further, discourses about refugees abusing the system seem to prioritize the integrity of rules and bureaucracy over the needs and realities of asylum seekers.
56. "What Is New in the Proposed Immigration and Refugee Protection Act;" online: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/about/policy/c11%2Dnew.html> (date accessed: 20, August 2001).
57. "Amnesty International Brief on Bill C-11;" online: Amnesty International <http://www.amnesty.ca/RefugeeBill_C11.PDF> (date accessed: 20 August 2001), 3.
58. "Gender Based Analysis Chart for Bill C-11" online: Citizenship and Immigration Canada <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/about/policy/c11-gender.html (date accessed: 28 February 2002).
59. The *UN Declaration of Human Rights* s.13 (1); also Robert F. Barsky, "An Essay on the Free Movement of Peoples," *Refuge* 19, no. 4 (February 2002): 84–93.
60. Colin J. Harvey, "Refugees, Rights, and Human Security," *Refuge* 19, no. 4 (February 2001): 95.
61. Reg Whitaker.
62. Audrey Macklin.
63. *Ibid*, 385.
64. In IRPA, it is an offence under s.117 to smuggle people into the country if they do not have a visa or other required documents. The penalties range from a maximum fine of $500,000 and less than ten years in prison to life imprisonment. For those trafficking in persons (s.118 (1)) the penalty may be a fine of one million dollars and/or life in prison.
65. "Brief on the Proposed Immigration and Refugee Protection Act;" online: National Association for Women and the Law <www.nawl.ca/immigrate_e.htm> (date accessed: 20 August 2001).
66. In s.245 detention can be considered if someone is deemed to be a flight risk. Factors to take into account in (f) include determining the claimant's involvement with people smuggling or trafficking that would make it likely that she would not appear to an examination or hearing, or be coerced by smugglers/traffickers to not appear.
67. An exception will be made if the person can convince the Minister that their presence in Canada is not detrimental to the national interest, or (in the case of criminality) that they are rehabilitated.

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68. Online: <http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/1/parlbus/chambus/house/bills/government/C-11/C-11_4 /C-11TOCE.html>.
69. "Backgrounder: Royal Assent of Bill C-36;" online: Department of Justice <http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/news/nr/2001/doc_28217.html> (date accessed: 28 July 2002).
70. "Comments of the Canadian Council for Refugees on Bill C-36, Anti-Terrorism Act;" online: Canadian Council for Refugees <http://www.web.net/~ccr/c36comments.htm> (date accessed: 28 February 2002).
71. *Ibid.*
72. "Refugees and Security;" online: Canadian Council for Refugees <http://www.web.net/~ccr/security> (date accessed: 28 February 2002).
73. *Ibid.*
74. "Comments on Proposed Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations;" online: Canadian Council for Refugees <http://www.web.net/~ccr/ccrcomments1-17c-11.htm> (date accessed: 28 February 2002).
75. Sharryn J. Aiken, "Manufacturing 'Terrorists': Refugees, National Security and Canadian Law, Part 2." *Refuge* 19, no. 4 (February 2001): 127.
76. "Comments on Bill C-11 Related to National Security and Terrorism;" online: Centre for Refugee Studies <www.web.net/%%Eccr/crsbrief.htm> (date accessed: 20 August 2001).
77. "Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees;" online: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees <http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home?page=publhttp://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-> (date accessed: 28 July 2002).
78. "Amnesty International Brief on Bill C-11," online: Amnesty International (date accessed: 20, August 2001), and s.98 of IRPA.
79. "Executive Committee of High Commission Programme Standing Meeting: Notes on the Exclusion Clauses", 8th meeting (30, May 1997).
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81. Citizenship and Immigration Canada, "Canada-United States Issue Statement of Common Security Priorities," news release; online: <www.cic.gc.ca/english/press/01/0126-pre.htm> (date accessed: 29, February 2002).
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83. The CCR explains the meaning behind the name *None Is Too Many* as follows: "During the Second World War, Canada denied protection to Jewish refugees fleeing Nazi persecution. The slogan from that period was 'None Is Too Many!' – the answer given by a Canadian official when asked how many Jewish refugees Canada would take." See "10 Reasons Why the US-Canada Refugee Deal Is a Bad Idea;" online: Canadian Council for Refugees <http://www.web.net/~ccr/10reasons.html> (date accessed: 28 July, 2002).
84. "Safe Third Country Agreement: Territorial Co-operation in the Examination of Refugee Status Claims from Nationals of Third Countries;" online: Citizenship and Immigration Canada <www.cic.gc.ca/english/policy/safe-third.html (date accessed: 17 July 2002).
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86. Bill Frelick, "Who's On First? The Canada-U.S. Moratorium of Agreement on Asylum," *Interpreter Releases: Report and Analysis of Immigration and Nationality Law* 73, no. 8 (26 February 1996): 212–25.
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88. "CCR Responding to Questions about the "None is Too Many Agreement;" online: Canadian Council for Refugees <www.web.net/~ccr/safethirdccr.html> (date accessed: 15 July 2002).
89. John K. Wiley, "Washington State Lawsuit Seeks Free Legal Help for Minors in Deportation Cases," *Associated Press*, 14 March 2002.
90. For detailed information and analysis of Canada's gender-based persecution provisions see: Sherene Razack, *Looking White People in the Eye* (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2001); Chantal Tie, "Sex, Gender and Refugee Protection in Canada under Bill C-11: Are Additional Protections Required in Light of *In re R-A-*?" *Refuge* 19, no. 6 (August 2001): 54–64.
91. In a letter to CIC Minister Denis Coderre, dated April 2, 2002, Karen Musalo and Stephen Knight of the Centre for Gender and Refugee Law Studies at Hastings College of the Law write that: "In the United States…this issue remains highly controversial and legally unsettled, and it is not uncommon for women fleeing gender persecution to have to litigate their basic right even to claim asylum, often without success."
92. Peter Wilkin, 30.

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Social Exclusion: Belonging and Not Belonging in the World System

Anthony H. Richmond

Abstract

The term "social exclusion" is defined. Research on social exclusion, undertaken in Britain, with particular reference to the situation of ethnic minorities and refugees is reviewed. It is argued that the phenomenon of social exclusion must be understood in a global context. Inequality, social exclusion, ethnic conflict, and terrorist activities, while not caused by globalization, have been greatly exacerbated by recent changes in the world system. The immigration and anti-terrorist measures adopted after 11 September are criticized, and policies that are needed to remedy the consequences of social exclusion are proposed.

Résumé

Le terme « marginalisation » est défini. Les recherches entreprises en Grande-Bretagne sur la marginalisation, tout particulièrement sur la situation des minorités ethniques et des réfugiés, sont passées en revue. On soutient que le phénomène de marginalisation doit être considéré dans un contexte global. Bien qu'il soit vrai que les inégalités, la marginalisation, les conflits ethniques et les activités terroristes ne découlent pas de la globalisation, ces phénomènes ont cependant été exacerbés par les changements récents intervenus dans le système mondial. Les mesures adoptées après le 11 septembre dans le domaine de l'immigration et de la lutte anti-terroriste sont critiquées et des politiques nécessaires pour remédier aux conséquences de la marginalisation sont proposées.

Definition of Social Exclusion

The term "social exclusion" was originally adopted by the European Commission to describe the inequalities, and the barriers to full participation in otherwise affluent societies, characteristic of countries experiencing a post-industrial revolution.[1] Academic sociologists adopted the terminology, insisting that social exclusion is not the same as poverty.[2] It means not sharing the same opportunities as the majority. This may be due to social isolation, as in the case of the elderly or disabled, or through discrimination based on nationality, language, "race," or religion. The denial of human rights to any category of persons is also a form of social exclusion.

In its most extreme form exclusion leads to genocide, i.e., the systematic large-scale extermination of a racial group or ethno-religious groups perceived as threatening the majority or a rival group. Since the atrocities in the former Yugoslavia, the term "ethnic cleansing" has been used to describe such attempts. Other less extreme manifestations lead to the partition of territory, the expulsion, exile, or deportation of minorities, and/or the repatriation of those previously allowed refuge or temporary asylum status. Struggles for power between rival ethnic groups have become militarized in the post-Cold War era, as formerly totalitarian regimes lose their dictatorial control and monopoly of weapons. Terrorism is one result. Victims of such political turmoil may flee the country but they do not necessarily find a welcome elsewhere.

While states reserve the right to control movement across borders and endeavour to prevent "illegal" immigration, migration occurs with or without legal sanction. People move from less developed to developed countries and regions, to perform menial or dirty work, supply field labour for agro-business, provide domestic services, or work in the sex trade. Many are victims of unscrupulous

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traffickers and smugglers. The victims of political and ethnic power struggles account for the large-scale movements of refugees that have occurred in eastern and central Europe, Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Developed countries in western Europe, North America, and Australasia are reluctant to give asylum to all those who flee persecution or seek to escape the economic and environmental disasters that occurred in the wake of such conflicts. Many displaced persons, as well as so-called "economic migrants," are being denied protection, because of a strict and narrow interpretation of the Geneva Convention criteria for full refugee status. Since September 2001, even more restrictive measures have been adopted in the name of improved security.

Various practices are used by wealthier countries to manage and control population movements. They involve classifying people according to their perceived eligibility to enter, or remain in, a particular territory. This is what has been called a form of "global apartheid."[3] The instruments for the enforcement of global apartheid are interdiction, passports, visas, residence permits, work permits, denial of citizenship rights, including access to education, government-funded health and welfare services, etc. The forcible repatriation of refugees to so-called "safe third countries" is now standard practice, together with the deportation of "illegal" immigrants. These forms of state control of immigration are seen as a legitimate response to the destabilizing effects of large-scale migration. They are discriminatory by "race" because the majority of refugees and asylum applicants come from, and are obliged to remain in, Third World countries. Only a few actually reach Europe and North America.

In contrast, capital moves freely around the world, and entrepreneurs with money to invest have little difficulty obtaining residence permits, immigrant status, or even citizenship of the countries they wish to operate in. Special immigration programs for entrepreneurs, investors, and the highly qualified are examples of this. It is not so easy for those who bring only their labour, or who are deemed alien in language, culture, or religion. When not labelled illegal and imprisoned or deported, such workers find only low paid employment in manual jobs, often clandestine employment below the minimum wage.

The situation is currently aggravated by the structural changes that are taking place in the global capitalist system as a result of technological innovation, international competition, and the availability of cheap labour in developing countries, where tax and duty-free manufacturing enclaves are set up. Worldwide economic recession further exacerbates the situation. The dismantling of the "welfare state," privatizing of many services, and the removal of established "safety nets" and the substitution of "workfare," are all symptomatic of a shifting balance of power in the global system. The consequent vogue for "downsizing," and the deindustrialization of advanced societies, has ironic consequences. Blue-collar and other workers in declining industries experience extreme insecurity. There is a consequent reaction against employment equity and affirmative action programs, which previously favoured women and visible minorities. Young males with little education, whether immigrant or native-born, also see themselves as victims of systemic discrimination. When unemployment is high the result is alienation, xenophobia, and increasing support for a right-wing political agenda. Some young people are attracted to neo-fascist movements and, in certain cases, fundamentalist religions. Racial and ethnic prejudices are inflamed. Britain in the last decade provides a good example of this phenomenon.

The U.K. Experience

The term "social exclusion" gained currency in Britain under New Labour. It led to the establishment of several academic research units, as well as a government unit advising on social policies.[4] The main focus of research at these institutions has been on youth policy, the chronically unemployed, the aged, single mothers, child poverty, and conditions in deteriorating housing estates with high crime rates. Surprisingly, until quite recently, the problems facing ethnic minorities have been largely neglected by researchers studying social exclusion.[5]

Studies in the U.K. have distinguished four dimensions of social exclusion, viz.: (1) exclusion from adequate income or resources; (2) labour-market exclusion; (3) service exclusion; and (4) exclusion from social relations. On all these dimensions ethnic minorities are more severely disadvantaged. One survey, carried out by a team of researchers in Birmingham, compared four groups: whites born in the U.K., compared with those of Bangladeshi, Pakistani, or Afro-Caribbean origin or parentage. The study showed that the ethnic minority groups were all over-represented in the low-income population. Nationally, households with Pakistani or Bangladeshi heads were also more likely to have no member in the workforce, high rates of unemployment, and the lowest household incomes.[6] Other research in Britain has drawn attention to the widespread incidence of racism and Islamophobia. Institutionalized racism is evident in the police and prison services. There is discrimination in the housing and job markets. Since 11 September, Islamic communities have been rendered even more vulnerable.

Islamic Communities in the U.K.

Given the events of 11 September, and the apparent involvement of some British-born Muslims with the Taliban in

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Afghanistan, it is interesting to consider the situation of Islamic communities in that country. The Islamic population is estimated to be approximately nine hundred thousand, or 1.5 per cent of the population of the U.K. They are an ethnically diverse population, including immigrants from Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, their children born in Britain, and some British-born converts. The majority of Muslims are from Pakistan and Bangladesh, or are the U.K.-born descendants of immigrants from those countries. Most of those of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin are geographically concentrated in the poorest neighbourhoods in London, West Yorkshire, and Greater Manchester. Other Islamic centres are located in the Midlands, including Birmingham, Tipton, and Leicester. There is also a high degree of concentration of Islamic immigrants *within* these cities and metro areas. West Yorkshire and the Greater Manchester area (including Bradford, Oldham, and Burnley, where race riots occurred in the summer of 2001) accounted for 27 per cent of all Pakistani origin and 11 per cent of Bangladeshi. Residential segregation within these cities is also very marked.

A dramatic example of the consequences of social exclusion and deprivation in Britain were the race riots that broke out in the late summer of 2001, before the terrorist attacks of 11 September. They occurred in Bradford, Yorkshire, followed soon after by further violence in Oldham and Burnley. These were once thriving towns, built around the textile manufacturing industry in the north of England. They attracted large numbers of Indian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi immigrants in the 1960s and 1970s at a time of low unemployment and labour shortages in Britain. There is now a large second generation, in their teens and young adult years. However, the post-industrial revolution and globalization left these towns and their inhabitants behind. As a consequence of globalization, textile manufacturing moved to the Third World. Poverty and unemployment are now exceptionally high and ethnic tensions severe in these towns in the north of England.

There is a huge gap between the relatively wealthy region of London and the south, and the northern towns with their crumbling housing stock and squalid neighbourhoods. In fact, the wealth gap between the rich southeast and the poor north is larger than the regional divide in any other European country.[7] Midland towns which have Islamic minorities, such as Leicester and Tipton, have also experienced high unemployment following a downturn in the automobile industry. Manufacturing industries have declined in importance in Britain. In 1966 they accounted for 35 per cent of the labour force; by 1997 the proportion was only 25.6 per cent and is still falling. It is now close to 20 per cent. Textile industries were particularly affected by globalization and competition from Third World countries (including, ironically, Pakistan!). Consequently unemployment levels in these areas are very high. In some parts of Oldham and Bradford, where Asian immigrants are located, unemployment is as high as 40 per cent. Housing conditions in many neighbourhoods have deteriorated to the point of dereliction and imminent slum clearance.

A study was commissioned by the Rowntree Foundation, some time before the riots occurred. It concluded that:

> [T]he Asian communities, particularly the Muslim community, are concerned that racism and Islamophobia continue to blight their lives resulting in harassment, discrimination and exclusion. People's negative attitudes about each other are formed and influenced in education, through the media, family and friends, and on the streets.[8]

By a cruel irony, the race riots broke out just as this report was about to be released. It included a long list of recommendations for improving community relations in Bradford. The riots were initiated by right-wing nationalists and led to several nights of violence, property damage, and clashes with the police. These were followed by similar violence in other northern towns. Since then a debate among policy makers has been concerned with the existence of a number of schools in which almost all the children attending from the immediate neighbourhood are of one ethno-religious background. The recent establishment of a separate school for Muslim girls is particularly controversial. It is feared that it will exacerbate existing barriers to communication and understanding between the Islamic community and others in the city. The existence of publicly funded schools run by the Anglican, Catholic, and Jewish faiths adds to the separation of young people of different ethno-religious background. Forthcoming legislation would permit the establishment of more faith-based schools. It has been severely criticized by those who fear even greater residential segregation and social isolation of Islamic communities and barriers to full inclusion of ethnic minority children.

Another report written after the riots had occurred highlighted the consequences of residential segregation. The researchers were particularly struck by the physical segregation and depth of polarization of the towns:

> Separate educational arrangements, community and voluntary bodies, employment, places of worship, language, social and cultural networks, means that many communities operate on the basis of a series of parallel lives. These lives do not seem to touch at any point, let alone overlap and promote any meaningful interchanges.[9]

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The problems facing Islamic and other immigrants, particularly recent refugees and asylum applicants, is not limited to Bradford, or other parts of Britain. Other European countries, including France and Germany, are facing similar problems of social exclusion and conflict. Various studies have noted the rise of anti-Islamic and anti-Semitic attitudes and behaviour in Europe and the consequential growth of political activism, as minorities address the problems created by economic insecurity and social exclusion. Transnational networks link ethnic, including Islamic, communities worldwide. Young men who feel excluded and alienated from society in one locality may be tempted to join wider extremist movements, or fundamentalist causes, inspired by the idea of 'jihad'; or, in the case of white youths, they may support the exaggerated nationalism preached by neo-fascist organizations.[10]

In the British government's own statements concerning "social exclusion" there is an emphasis on *citizenship*, which is understood to carry with it duties and moral obligations, as well as rights. The official response of the Home Office Minister, following the riots in Bradford and other northern towns, was to say that immigrants should be made to take an oath of allegiance to the Crown, overlooking the fact that most of those engaged in violent clashes were born in Britain. In fact, such a view was immediately endorsed by the extreme right-wing British National Party, whose members had been active in instigating the violence. The emphasis on "citizenship," and its responsibilities, also enables the government to "crack down" on alleged "welfare fraud," as well as on those it considers ineligible for the benefits of a welfare society, particularly so-called "illegal immigrants" and asylum seekers. When the latter are not imprisoned, or detained in segregated camps, they are eligible for a much lower rate of social benefits than the rest of the population in the U.K. They are also forced to disperse, from London and the southeast of England, to the run-down housing estates in the north of the country, including Scotland. In Glasgow, this led to clashes between asylum applicants and local residents, leading to the stabbing death of one asylum-seeker.

As well as denying refugee status to the majority of those who apply, the British government has also tried in vain to prevent illegal immigrants and asylum seekers from entering the country from France and other European countries. Many attempt to do so by stowing away on cross-channel ships, trains, and trucks and by endeavouring to walk through the Channel tunnel from camps run by the Red Cross in France. Punitive fines against those found guilty of carrying illegal migrants, knowingly or unknowingly, have been criticized by the courts as excessive and unfair. (The British government has since lifted the penalties on the Euro-Tunnel). When caught on the English side of the Channel, migrants are held in detention centres (mostly former prisons). Those considered to have a prima facie case for refugee status (including in some cases unaccompanied children) are then sent to public housing estates in the north, pending the outcome of their refugee hearing, which can take months, or years if there is an appeal. A new Immigration Bill, introduced in April 2002, closes so-called loopholes in immigration and asylum law and introduces tough penalties for trafficking. Some of its key provisions are summarized in Chart 1. In the House of Lords, the bill was amended in order to improve housing provision for asylum seekers, prevent school segregation, and limit the grounds for deportation. However, it is expected that the government will use its majority in the House of Commons to overturn these amendments when the bill returns to the Commons for final approval.

Global Dimension of Social Exclusion

What is lacking in the usual definition of "social exclusion" is a recognition that countries such as Britain, the rest of the European Union, Canada, the United States, and other OECD countries are the affluent part of a world system. It is true that there are huge gaps between the rich and the poor within these advanced industrial countries. Visible minorities and recent immigrants are particularly likely to fall below the poverty line, however that is defined. Single mothers and the elderly are also vulnerable. However, the inequalities, which undoubtedly exist within these countries, pale in significance when compared with the inequalities between them and the rest of the world. Poverty in Britain, Canada, and other OECD countries is a relative concept and has no similarity to the absolute levels of deprivation experienced in the Third World (see Chart 2). The average gross domestic product *per capita* of the advanced industrial countries is $27,510. This compares with $23,557 for the U.K. and less than $500 for Africa south of the Sahara and $460 in south Asia. Even within the NAFTA region there are huge discrepancies. The GDP per capita for the U.S. is $33,900, compared with $25,900 for Canada and only $8,100 for Mexico. The average for the whole of Latin America and the Caribbean is only $3,860.

There is a close connection between low levels of income and the incidence of violent conflict, including civil war. Afghanistan, in particular, has experienced both external and internal conflict, including invasion by the Soviet Union and, more recently, the United States and its allies, in the "war against terrorism." It is not surprising that Afghanistan has been the source of the largest concentration of refugees, located in camps in Iran and Pakistan. The numbers of internally displaced persons and refugees grew even more as a result of American bombing.

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Chart 1
U.K. Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Bill, 2002

- Power to search and detain suspected illegal immigrants
- Power to remove children born in U.K., if parents entered illegally
- Restricted rights of appeal against deportation
- New ID measures to be introduced at border controls
- Physical recognition equipment authorized to discover false identities
- New criminal offence of people trafficking for prostitution, & assisting illegal immigration
- Maximum penalty for harbouring unlawful immigrant up to 14 years
- New tiered system of Centres to house asylum seekers
- Limits obligation of local education authorities to provide schooling for children in Centres
- Airlines must obtain clearance for passengers before they begin journey to U.K.
- Banks, employers and public authorities must share information concerning suspected illegal entrants
- New citizenship ceremony and oath of allegiance
- New language, and knowledge of life in the UK, qualification for naturalization
- Power to deprive citizenship, if person has done anything seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the U.K. (If the Secretary of State deems information should not be made public, right to appeal limited.)

Chart 2
Gross national income per capita: Year 2000
U.S. dollars



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When all those of concern to the UNHCR are considered, including the internally displaced and returnees, Asian countries carry the heaviest burden, followed closely by Africa and the Middle East. There are an estimated 11.7 million "Convention" refugees and many externally and internally displaced persons today. Thus the UNHCR reported nearly 22 million persons of concern to that agency in 2001 (See Chart 3). To these must be added another 3.8 million Palestinians under the care of the UNRWA. Even before the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan that country was the largest single source of refugees in the world. There were 3.6 million Afghan refugees mainly located in camps on the borders with Pakistan and Iran. There were a further 750,000 displaced persons in Afghanistan in January 2001. The numbers have grown substantially since the war. The number of asylum seekers from Afghanistan reaching the west is small by comparison.

Refugees and asylum applicants are particularly vulnerable as a consequence of exclusion from fundamental human rights and the benefits of a welfare society. The number of asylum applications submitted in advanced industrial countries fluctuates annually as do the numbers accepted for full Convention refugee status, or other (mainly temporary) humanitarian status. The Convention status acceptance rate in the European Union averages 14 per cent. This compares with 46 per cent in Canada. The number of asylum seekers applying in Britain rose until the year 2000 when there were 80,315 about whom decisions were finalized, of whom 12 per cent received full refugee status and 11 per cent "exceptional leave to remain," i.e., temporary status. The number of asylum seekers fell slightly in 2001 to 72,000 (excluding dependants). The trends in asylum applications for selected countries are shown in Chart 4.

At the same time the number of refugees actually reaching Europe declined between 1992 and 1996, due to interdiction and the imposition of visa requirements. The latter were so drastic that the UNHCR Policy Unit expressed concern that it was becoming almost impossible for genuine asylum seekers to obtain legal entrance to an EU country, forcing people to adopt clandestine methods and to fall victim to unscrupulous traffickers.[11] However, the number applying for refugee status in Europe has risen again in the last five years. At a summit meeting in June 2002, the EU rejected a hard-line position on asylum seekers proposed by Britain and Spain. The latter would have penalized Third World countries that failed to stem the flow of migrants to Europe. Instead, it was agreed that countries should be given incentives to stop outflows of migrants rather than be punished with cuts to vital aid budgets. Nevertheless, new proposals for joint immigration policing operations at external borders represent another step toward a "Fortress Europe." Exclusionary policies may as-

Chart 3
Refugees and Others of Concern to UNHCR: 2001
N = 21,793,000 (includes returnees & internally displaced)



Source: UNHCR (does not include 3.8 million Palestinians in care of UNRWA)

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Chart 4
Asylum Applications: Selected Countries (1992–2001)



Source: UNHCR Statistical Unit (excludes dependents)

suage the xenophobic Right but they will not solve the problem. There is a need for a common European definition of "asylum seeker," and one that is more rather than less generous than at present.

Governments now use advanced technologies to maintain data banks on suspected terrorists, known criminals, asylum applicants, and alleged "illegal" immigrants. They institute "early warning systems" against mass migration, train airline officials in the checking of documents to facilitate interdiction, and enforce the "non-exodus" of unwanted populations. Electronic fences replace barbed wire and brick walls, while police and soldiers continue to back up immigration officials at borders, and gunboats support the coast guards as they herd people into internment camps, pending repatriation. The exclusion of refugees and asylum applicants recently reached dramatic and tragic proportions in the case of Australia's treatment of "boat people" escaping from Afghanistan and other Asian countries. Last year, several ships were prevented from reaching Australian territory. Instead they were escorted to remote Pacific islands where the UNHCR processed their refugee claims, without any commitment from the Australian government to accept those deemed to be victims of persecution. Asylum applicants who do succeed in reaching Australia are placed in remote camps under conditions that have given rise to hunger strikes, suicide, and other protests. These actions represent an exclusionist approach to refugees and asylum seekers which is at variance with the multicultural policies espoused by previous Australian governments.[12]

Even before the events of 11 September 2001, increased migration pressures, legal and illegal, led to a tightening of regulations in most developed countries, together with new legislation designed to deter migration, interdict undocumented travellers, reinforce border controls, and penalize airlines, shipping companies, and truckers if they are discovered to have knowingly, or unknowingly, carried passengers who do not have a legal right of entry. Canada introduced Bill C-31, which died when an election was called in October 2000. It was reintroduced as Bill C-11 and further amended in 2001. The new law increases the powers of immigration officers to refuse entry to Canada on grounds of criminality, security risk, or forged or inadequate identity documents. It imposes higher maximum penalties for human smuggling, and places the responsibility on airlines to identify and inform Canadian authorities concerning passengers who may be inadmissible to Canada.

Special efforts have been made to punish those involved in the organized smuggling of illegal immigrants across borders. The number of interdictions and removals from Canada has been increasing annually and Bill C-11, when

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fully implemented, will lead to a further increase. It is designed to partially "harmonize" Canada's laws and administrative procedures with those of the United States and other countries. The concept of a "safe third country" has been institutionalized, requiring asylum seekers to apply in the first country they enter after flight from persecution. Whether or not the new immigration law protects the rights of Convention refugees and others will largely depend on how the new regulations are administered and appeals dealt with. A major concern is that people genuinely in need of protection will be forced to return to situations where they risk persecution or serious deprivation.

Various countries have introduced legislation that requires refugees to be fingerprinted, restricts access by asylum applicants to public housing, permits deportation where an asylum claim has been refused, and requires airlines, or other carriers, to ensure that travellers hold a visa to enter, or even to pass through, one country en route to another. Potential refugees must have their asylum claims processed in the first "safe country" they land in. This gives rise to the phenomenon of "refugees in orbit" when no country wishes to accept them. Canada's interpretation of the UN Convention definition of a refugee has been more generous than that of some other countries.

There is growing fear, in Europe and North America, of large-scale economic migration from developing counties, induced by poverty and a sense of relative deprivation compared with the evident affluence of the West. Terrorists' threats and concerns about security have added to these apprehensions. Attempts to limit the flow of illegal economic migrants, refugees, and asylum applicants are part of a growing nostalgia for a less complicated world in which people felt secure in homogeneous communities, where neighbours shared "traditional" values. They are also a reaction to the insecurity felt by many who are faced with a rapidly changing global society. This is evident in the growth of racism, xenophobia, and religious and ethnic conflict in various countries, including those which have traditionally been receptive to both political and economic migrants.

Conclusion

The world is now a total system experiencing radical structural changes, political, economic, and social. The impact of these changes is particularly evident in respect of transportation, communication, and the transmission of information and pictorial images. However, although money, goods, and services may move relatively freely, people do not. Processes of inclusion and exclusion occur *both within* and *between* countries and regions. Irrespective of geographic distance, some individuals and collectivities are fully incorporated into the advanced industrial economy of this emerging global system, while others are marginalized or rejected altogether. Feelings of insecurity, and absolute or relative deprivation, lead to prejudice and ethnic conflict and to struggles for power, often precipitating violence.

The power struggle involves not only the boundaries of states, as traditionally understood, but also the boundaries between corporations and states, which are becoming harder to define as governments engage in "trade missions" to promote exports and facilitate transnational investment. Not least among the factors sustaining ethnic conflict and civil war is the hugely lucrative trade in weapons and other military equipment.[13] At present, the U.S., Britain, Canada, and other OECD countries subsidize their own arms manufacturers and encourage them to export small, intermediate, and powerful weapons, even to those countries engaged in civil war or aggression against their neighbours, giving rise to huge refugee problems.

There is a conflict of interest between those who wish to eliminate borders in the interest of trade and profit, and those who want borders to be reinforced in order to guarantee security from terrorism as well as to deter illegal immigration. In the U.S., Canada, Britain, and the European Union new measures have been introduced to deal with terrorist threats. Ethnic minorities in these countries, irrespective of their legal status in those countries, feel insecure, as do many majority group members faced with the uncertainties of a post-September 11 world.[14]

How is global social exclusion to be combatted? First and foremost, every effort must be made to ensure that the economic benefits of globalization are more equitably spread and that inequalities are reduced, both those within and between countries, regions, and continents. The new global division of labour must benefit the developing world, as well as those who are already wealthy. Within the wealthier countries, regional disparities must be reduced and opportunities found for those who have been left behind by globalization. Humanitarian aid should be increased. No developed country allocates anything like the UN-recommended proportion (0.7 per cent) of GNP to assist developing countries. More often than not the assistance is a disguised form of subsidy to the industrialized countries' own corporations seeking export opportunities. The actual percentage is only 0.22 per cent, representing a shortfall of one-hundred billion dollars annually.

Given the pressure to migrate, cross-border population movements must be facilitated through bilateral and multilateral agreements that ensure reciprocity in all dimensions of human rights. As a first step, the ratification of the ILO draft "Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families" by Canada, the U.S., and other industrialized countries is im-

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portant. This would go a long way toward removing some of the abuses currently associated with the employment of temporary workers.[15] As recommended by the UN Commission on Global Governance, there is a need for a "more comprehensive institutionalized co-operation," or multilateral management of international migration. The positive benefits of migration must be recognized and facilitated. Rather than imposing restrictions that only encourage clandestine migration, governments must facilitate temporary and permanent cross-border movements. Governments must promote a sense of civic pride and citizenship while, at the same time, promoting knowledge and understanding of the world system, or "global neighbourhood," to which we all belong. This calls for "a common commitment to core values that all humanity could uphold: respect for life, liberty, justice and equity, mutual respect, caring and integrity".[16]

Above all, we must not allow the panic which followed the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington to result in a closing of borders, a persecution of Islamic or other ethnic minorities, or a diminished concern for human rights, justice, and fairness. There must be respect for UN Conventions and the Charter of Rights. We must ensure the full social inclusion of minorities and marginalized peoples. Ultimately it is a question of belonging, or not belonging, in the emerging world system.

Notes

1. See European Commission, *Communication from the Commission to the Council: Draft Joint Report on Social Inclusion* (Brussels: COM, 2001).
2. For example, Anthony Giddens adopted the terminology, insisting that social exclusion is not the same as poverty. He stated, "Social exclusion directs one's attention to the social mechanisms that produce or sustain deprivation." He gives as an example the structural changes in the economy that reduced the demand for unskilled and semi-skilled male labour, as a consequence of deindustrialization and the growth of the service sector. Giddens also suggests that there can be social exclusion at the top, as well as the bottom, of the social ladder. He cites the withdrawal of elites from commitment to their social, economic, and fiscal obligations through retreat into gated, security-conscious communities at home and tax havens abroad. Anthony Giddens, *The Third Way and Its Critics* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), 104–5.
3. See Anthony H. Richmond, *Global Apartheid: Refugees, Racism and the New World Order* (Toronto: Oxford University Press Canada, 1994); and "Global Apartheid: A Postscript," *Refuge*, Vol. 19, no. 4 (2001): 8–13.
4. The Research Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion (CASE) was established in October 1997 with funding from the Economic and Social Research Council. It is located at the London School of Economics and Political Science. The Labour government's own research unit on social exclusion is attached to the Cabinet Office.
5. An exception is the "Parekh Report" (the report of the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, sponsored by the Runnymede Trust) which notes the limitations of the concept when applied to ethnic minorities. Bhikhu Parekh, *The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain* (London: Profile Books, 2000), 78–87.
6. L. Platt and M. Noble, *Race, Place and Poverty: Ethnic Groups and Low Income* (Rowntree York: York Publishing Services for the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 1999).
7. See *The Economist,* 15 December 2001, 23.
8. Norman Ouseley, *Community Pride and Prejudice: Making Diversity Work in Bradford* (Bradford: Bradford Vision, 2001).
9. Ted Cantle, *Community Cohesion: A Report of the Independent Review Team* (London: Home Office, 2001), 9–10.
10. See Fatima Husain and Margaret O'Brien, "Muslim Communities in Europe: Reconstruction and Transformation," *Current Sociology* 48, no. 4 (2000): 1–13.
11. John Morrison and B. Crosland, *The Trafficking and Smuggling of Refugees: The End Game in European Asylum Policy* (Geneva: UNHCR Policy Unit, 2000).
12. See Benjamin Haslem, "Refugees' Treatment Angers Father of Multiculturalism," *The Australian* 24 (January 2002).
13. In 2001, the UN Conference on Small Arms and Light Weapons failed to gain approval for a clause committing states not to supply small arms and light weapons to non-governmental entities. For a discussion of security issues following 11 September see Ernie Regehr, "Responding to Terror," *The Ploughshares Monitor* 22, no.3 (2001): 4–7.
14. As Audrey Macklin put it in her contribution to the Conference on Security and Freedom at the University of Toronto: "Boundaries of membership and modes of exclusion can be (and regularly are) redrawn from within the nation. They trace themselves along fault lines that erupt along the surface of our pluralistic, multicultural, democratic country when stressed by real or perceived crisis." Audrey Macklin, "Borderline Security," in *The Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada's Anti-Terrorism Bill*, ed. R.J. Daniels, P. Macklem, and K. Roach (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 396.
15. See W.R. Bohning, "The ILO and the New UN Convention on Migrant Workers: The Past and the Future," *International Migration Review* 24, no.4 (1991): 698–709; and " Protection, International Norms and ILO Migrant Workers Standards," paper presented at the ILO Regional Symposium for Trades Union Organizations and Migrant Workers, 6–8 December 1999.
16. Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighbourhood* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 206–8.

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A Critical Anti-Racist Interrogation of Voluntary/Forced Repatriation Theory: The Intersections of African Refugees' Dilemma

MacDonald E. Ighodaro

Abstract

The author examines the historical/theoretical voluntary repatriation framework, which asserts that refugees should only repatriate to their country of origin on a voluntary basis when the socio-political and ethnic situation that initiated their problem comes to an end. This theory articulates durable protection and resettlement initiatives for refugees in general. Also, the above theory is contrasted with the present re-articulated forced repatriation theories, which state that refugees should repatriate to unsafe conditions in their country of origin. Furthermore, the study interrogates the intersectionality of African refugees' dilemma and the apprehensions of refugees' host countries, and conceptualizes the specific ideology that legitimizes the forced repatriation of refugees, and the impacts of accepting the emerging theory using a critical anti-racist framework.

Résumé

L'auteur a examiné le cadre historique et théorique du rapatriement volontaire, cadre qui soutient que les réfugiés ne doivent être rapatriés vers leurs pays d'origine que sur une base voluntaire, et seulement lorsque les conditions socio-politiques et ethniques qui étaient à l'origine de leurs problèmes sont résolues. Cette théorie articule une protection durable et des initiatives pour le réétablissement des réfugiés en général. Par ailleurs, cette théorie est contrastée avec les théories courantes de rapatriement forcé élaborées récemment, qui soutiennent que les réfugiés doivent être renvoyés dans leur pays d'origine et ce, malgré les conditions d'insécurité. De plus, l'étude interroge le recoupement entre le dilemme confrontant les réfugiés africains et les appréhensions des pays hôtes, tout en conceptualisant l'idéologie particulière qui légitime le rapatriement forcé des réfugiés, ainsi que les conséquences de cette théorie émergente et ce, en utilisant un cadre d'analyse anti-raciste.

This paper begins with the investigation of the historical/theoretical voluntary repatriation framework, which asserts that refugees should only repatriate to their country of origin on a voluntary basis when the socio-political and ethnic situation that instigated their problem comes to an end. This theory articulates durable protection and resettlement initiatives for refugees in general. Also, the above theory is contrasted with the present re-articulated forced repatriation theories that have compelled many African refugees to repatriate to unsafe conditions in their country of origin. The values underlying the emerging theory have been interrogated in the following paragraphs utilizing critical anti-racist discursive frameworks.

Dei emphasized that an important academic and political goal of anti-racism is to understand current practices, social barriers, and new approaches to collective existences…. A critical anti-racism discursive framework deals

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foremost with equity: the qualitative value of justice.[1] Therefore, the author uses anti-racism theory to explicate how forced displacement and mass migration of African refugees is developing into a multifarious trend that has led to various intricate forms of terminology/theory within the academy and within different refugee agencies. In 1997, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) observed that the variety of terms in refugee issues alongside the well-known concept of a refugee displacement or mass exodus has shifted theoretically and practically, and has now assumed new pedagogical paradigms among academic analysts and humanitarian agencies. The UNHCR asserted that both refugee agencies and academic analysts commonly utilize the following concepts: asylum flow, mass expulsion, ethnic cleansing, disaster-induced displacement, development-induced displacement, forced migration, internal displacement, population transfer, population exchange, involuntary repatriation, and imposed return.[2] Each of these terms complicates the lives of refugees adversely.

The author argues that African refugees' displacement and migration have perpetually been strongly connected to social and political, colonialist and imperialist, ethno-cultural and religious conflicts that resulted in heinous human rights violations of refugees. Therefore, it is impossible to clearly comprehend the dynamics and magnitude of the present resettlement issues without articulating the historical/ contemporary context of resettlement and voluntary and forced repatriation theories.

It is critically imperative to articulate the theory of voluntary and forced repatriation of refugees, specifically because of the interplay between refugee migration and the apprehensions of refugees' host countries. Categorically, African refugees are confronted with increasing refusal when they endeavour to search for protection in another country. Moreover, the present paradigm shift in resettlement and repatriation theory calls for anti-racist conceptualization of the legislative obstacles formulated by Western countries to deter refugees' admission to safety.

Theorizing the historical voluntary repatriation of refugees in general would provide a critical anti-racism lens for analyzing the present reconceptualized and re-articulated theory and practice of voluntary/forced repatriation in the context of issues confronting African refugees in particular. Immediately after World War Two, durable resettlement was seen as the most appropriate solution to the European refugee problem, and refugees' resettlement was encouraged in actual practice. The theory of voluntary repatriation of refugees was articulated only in principle. In the 1980s there was a profound paradigm shift in theory articulation of refugee resettlement initiatives. Motivated by racism and Third World refugees' exodus to Western nations, ethnoracial preference was evident in the refugee selection process. Consequently, the durable resettlement practices were categorically rendered obsolete to mitigate refugee problems in general, particularly the magnitude of the Third World refugee crisis. As a result, ardent effort by the international community and agencies promoted voluntary repatriation theory and practice at the expense of durable resettlement in addressing refugee problems. Also, the concept of refugee voluntary repatriation and forced repatriation as feasible solutions to the refugee resettlement problem were gaining unwarranted currency in Western Europe and North America in particular.

Both theories of voluntary and forced repatriation have been advanced not only to weaken the original norms of voluntary repatriation, but also to relegate the international protection afforded to refugees. The ideology of voluntary and forced repatriation has been fostered in the developed countries to eliminate a durable approach to refugee problems, particularly as it pertains to African refugees.

This paper critically theorizes and interrogates the mechanism and specific ideology that legitimizes the present voluntary and forced repatriation of African refugees, and the consequences of accepting the emerging standard of voluntary and forced repatriation of refugees in general. The prevalence of racism and unwillingness of Western societies to accept responsibility for the factors producing refugees, and lack of meaningful assistance to Third World refugees, would help to explain the increasing acceptance of voluntary and forced repatriation as a viable solution to African refugee problems. Voluntary and forced repatriation of African refugees is extremely extensive and represents one of the contemporary forms of their migration process. The method of African refugees' voluntary repatriation and the intersectionality of their dilemma, particularly when they are adversely subjected to inhumane and abysmal conditions in refugees' host countries, will be conceptualized.

As observed by the authors Adelman, Zieck, and Stein, although there was unanimous consensus and perseverance among Western nations on the durable solutions and resettlement of European refugees immediately after the Second World War, millions of displaced refugees did repatriate to their country of origin, and millions were resettled in other countries.[3] The rise of Third World refugees in the 1980s prompted the preference for the theory and practice of voluntary and forced repatriation that obtained complete support from the UN General Assembly, even though the above theory and practice of voluntary and forced repatriation were vehemently rejected as a durable solution for European refugees after the Second World War.

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There are two main factors that contributed to the unanimous agreement for durable resettlement initiatives for European refugees, namely, economic and race factors. The Western nations were experiencing unprecedented economic growth, while at the same time experiencing huge labour shortages; therefore, the influx of refugees tremendously facilitated fast economic resurgence which counterbalanced the loss of the workforce during the War. Also, the zeal of the Western nations to advocate durable resettlement as a solution to the refugee problems in Europe was largely attributed to the racial element, because most of the refugees were White; therefore, Western nations were profoundly sympathetic to the conditions of refugees, and as a result they were against voluntary and forced repatriation as an option for resolving refugee problems. The Author asserts that the Western nations and UNHCR only acknowledged voluntary repatriation theory as the best solution in principle, while in practice, refugees' right to migrate out of fear and socio-political persecution and request asylum in another country were largely uncontested within the Western nations' ideological framework.

The influxes of African refugees and other Third World political asylum seekers into the Western world, particularly since the 1980s, prompted a demand for reconceptualization and retheorization of a new approach to refugee resettlement problems within the contextual framework of international refugee law. The paradigm shift in theoretical framework and rationalization of the new assumption regarding refugee problems was largely based on the grounds that African refugees were at present migrating to the Western world in huge numbers, while simultaneously Western societies were unwilling to accommodate different ethno-racial and socio-cultural traditions of refugees. Also, they feared the potential burden their migration would have on the overall economy and institutions, particularly the labour market. As noticed by UNHCR in 1997, since the beginning of the decade, more than five million claims for refugee status have been submitted in the industrialized states. Up to a million asylum seekers in those states are currently waiting for their status to be determined. Emphasizing that many of these asylum seekers are economic migrants rather than refugees, the governments of the more affluent countries have in recent years made a concerted effort to limit the number of new arrivals to their territory.

The above assumption was explicitly validated and rationalized by utilizing labour theory in the context of international migratory flow, which explains the relationship between international migration and the shortage of human labour in general. In this case, arguments were put forth to elucidate the lack of demand for refugees' labour; thus, the timing of the paradigm shift in reconceptualization and re-articulation of refugee resettlement initiatives intersects with racist and anti-Third World refugee migration sentiment in the Western nations. Adelman and Stein pointed out that, notwithstanding the UNHCR explication that the new initiative and shift in theory of voluntary repatriation had not been deeply evaluated by academics and advocacy groups, the Executive Committee Branch of the UNHCR went on to affirm the 1990s to be the decade of voluntary repatriation of refugees.

Academics such as Harrell-Bond, Douzinas and Warrington, and Sepulveda opposed the actions of the Executive Committee Branch of the UNHCR, and cautioned that there was no substantial published research that could be deployed to analyze the theoretical postulations which direct the practices of forced and voluntary repatriation of refugees in the international context. Accordingly, they observed that what is being endorsed as the most thoughtful and desirable resolution to the refugee dilemma is an inadequate understanding of the social and political experience of refugee conditions.[4] Nonetheless, the proponents of forced and voluntary repatriation of refugees basically theorize that all refugees preferred to repatriate themselves to their country of origin. The above ideological framework is grounded in racist inclination that places less emphasis on the validity of refugees' intention to go home in dignity and safety.

Scholars such as Boshyk, Basok and Simmons, Zieck, Zarzosa, and Rogge asserted that there are various conditions in which refugees resist repatriation to their country of origin where they fear persecution.[5] The above authors theorize that the course of time is critical when it comes to a decision for refugees to self-repatriate. However, second generation refugees may have the conscious desire to go back to a country they barely know as a result of mistreatment and violation of their human rights in host countries. The view of "home" is highly problematic; it can signify repatriating to a country other than the country of origin.

The above scholars deeply criticize the present reconceptualized voluntary and forced repatriation initiatives to curb the refugee dilemma. They warn against the danger of an imagined self-repatriation of refugees. As Zieck vividly elucidates, despite the fact that everyone wishes to repatriate to their country of origin, serious effort has not been given to examine the reliability of the hypothesis because it emerges, in the absence of other options,[6] to be essentially extraneous.

The argument that the refugees' host governments have exclusive authority to decide when refugee safety in the country of origin is feasible has been challenged by opponents to the theory of safe repatriation on the grounds that the proponents of safe repatriation successfully replace ob-

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jectivism in change of situations for the refugees' subjective evaluation, in so doing interfering with the meaning of "refugee." Pragmatically, once refugees' host country governments embark on objectivism, as opposed to integration of both subjectivism and objectivism in determining who is a Convention refugee, the norms of voluntary repatriation have been categorically weakened.

As asserted and observed by Gallagher, Adelman, Zieck, and Malarek, refugees are by definition self-selected and protected by the principle of non-*refoulement* which is legally enshrined in international refugee law.[7] Therefore, refugees are unrepatriatable as long as an individual refugee meets the refugee definition requirements. It is difficult to rationalize the proponents' reading of safe repatriation without implicitly obscuring the genuine meaning of "refugee." As a result, the paradigm shift in reconceptualization and retheorization of how to address the issues of refugee crisis is not a coincidence, but systemic strategy calculated to shift responsibility for refugees through the postulation of voluntary and forced repatriation theory that has no benefit for refugees.

The application of objectivism in refugee issues marginalizes the voices of refugees through the determination procedures of their cases leading to the final judgment of denying refugees international protection. Douzinas and Warrington describe objectivism as a profound form of social injustice in which the damage experienced by the victimized is accompanied by a deprivation of the means to prove it. Objectivism is perpetuated on the misguided assumption that there is reliable information to support and validate the decision to deny and/or terminate refugee protection. Consequently, objectivism tends to substitute the subjectivist acuities of the host governments for the actual lived experience of the refugees. The manipulation and reinterpretation of the 1951 UN Refugee Convention paved the way for objectivism that Western nations have been practicing and that continues to be fostered and practiced by some branches of the UNHCR, particularly in the context of responding to African refugees and other Third World refugee resettlement issues.

Accordingly, is it not peculiar for some aspects of subjectivism to be distinguished and extolled when they explain the voluntary repatriation of refugees to their homeland? Contrarily, it is interesting to observe strong opposition and deep-rooted criticism when they explain and involve a decision for refugees to remain in a host country indefinitely. The paradox demonstrated above speaks to an inequitable approach to refugees' issues; refugees are deemed to be logical human beings when they invoke their discretion to repatriate voluntarily to their hostile homeland, and attract profound public outcry and anti-refugee migration sentiments when they choose to resettle in their host country in durable terms.

Similarly, anti-racist scholars and refugee advocates are criticized for neglecting and marginalizing refugees' voices if they offer constructive disapproval of UNHCR approaches to refugee issues, particularly when they offer anti-racist critical interrogation into why the UNHCR promotes voluntary and forced repatriation under socio-political and religious aggression that occasioned refugees' displacement and exodus in the first place. Conversely, if both refugees and UNHCR perceive the danger and insecurity refugees are likely to face upon return, and if refugees voice/defend their reasons in favour of resettling or remaining in their host country until the socio-political situation improves, and UNHCR opposes African refugees' repatriation in these circumstances, marginal and token attention is given to their unified voices by the powerful nations of Europe and North America anyway.

The theory of objectivism in this context does not simply denote that the refugees' host country government determines when it is safe for them to repatriate voluntarily, but whether it is crucially imperative for refugees to repatriate to their country of origin where they feared persecution. In this contextual framework inappropriate decisions have been taken in the realm of refugee status determination process. Actually, the ideology of voluntary repatriation is categorically associated to the sustainable options available to refugees within their own country upon return. This paradigm essentially marginalizes and compounds refugee issues severely. Also, it simultaneously imposes voluntary and forced repatriation of refugees to their country of origin, it inflicts complex challenges in terms of their physical security and potential violation of their human rights, and it signifies that refugees have to experience the anguish of displacement and the prospect of possible brutal death all over again.

The mid-1990s witnessed explicit dogma of voluntary and forced repatriation of refugees among UNHCR officials. As articulated by Dennis McNamara, the Director of UNHCR's Division of International Protection, under the principle of "imposed return" refugees could be repatriated to less than optimal conditions in their home country against their will.[8] It is crucially imperative to interrogate the ideologies and values beneath voluntary and forced repatriation in the context of African refugees as expressed above from an anti-racist perspective. It is equally important to examine the actual repatriation process, and the intersectionality of their dilemma, especially when they are confronted with simultaneous and multiple resettlement problems, associated with unsympathetic/cruel treatment of refugees in host countries.

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The system of voluntary repatriation of African refugees has surprisingly gained enormous ground in academic and international discourse of African refugees' situation, even though most of the African refugees' voluntary repatriations usually happen under the political, social, and ethnic hostility that incipiently caused their displacement. The academic question that deserves extreme interrogation is: Why should the international community support this kind of repatriation theory and practice? Why should the international community applaud these efforts, after giving serious consideration to what might happen to refugees upon their return?

This is a grievous and salient contradiction of international obligation to most African refugees who choose to return to their habitat in light of perpetual endangerment of their lives. Refugees' action speaks to their space of hope, dignity, and destiny. Many recognize their source of agony, but the reality of being refugees spurs the relentless effort of those that strive on the surface to resolve their refugee problem. These self-repatriations generally take place without the assistance of the international community, without a repatriation treaty, without the formal entry authorization of their government or the government of their host country, and without any obvious alteration and settlement of their endemic socio-political antagonism:

> The ideal environment for the return of refugees is one in which the causes of flight have been definitively and permanently removed – for example, the end of a civil war or a change of government which brings an end to violence or persecution. This ideal is rarely achieved. Instead, refugees return to places where political disputes still simmer and occasionally boil over; where fragile cease-fires break down, are repaired and then break down again; where agreements are broken and trust is minimal. The great majority of returnees in the early 1990s have been going back to situations of just this kind – for example in Angola, Mozambique, and Somalia…. It is often difficult for external observers to understand why people choose to return in such uncertain conditions.[9]

Conceptually, if the conditions of African refugees have prompted them to repatriate voluntarily, then there is something seriously iniquitous in the contemporary international theory and practice of voluntary repatriation. Therefore, an anti-racist approach is necessary to how we deal with the African refugee crisis and repatriation initiatives. Also, refugees should not be neglected or abandoned to deal with the problems associated with the practice of self-repatriation. Realistically, there are many advantages in the theory of voluntary repatriation, if we carefully re-evaluate our moral and social obligation to African refugees. The following are brief descriptions and illustrations of African refugees' voluntary repatriations in recent years in Africa.

In 1985, thousands of Tigrayan refugees voluntarily repatriated themselves from Sudan to Ethiopia in light of the serious calamities caused by political upheaval, famine, and drought. This event was very paradoxical and simultaneous in nature, given the fact that huge numbers of refugees were being evacuated, while the first wave of self-repatriation was taking place. The local Relief Society of Tigray (REST) supported the repatriation, and the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front safeguarded the refugees in order to ensure their security. What is quite intriguing is that the UNHCR vigorously disagreed with the repatriation, and therefore offered no assistance to the refugees. In defiance of the tremendous apprehensions expressed by the international community and agencies, the majority of Tigrayan refugees arrived home safely. Of course, thousands of refugees voluntarily repatriated after the successful return of the first wave, at this time with minimum international help. Three years later, almost all Tigrayan refugees had successfully repatriated from Sudan to Ethiopia.

Similarly, in 1990 voluntary repatriation happened in Namibia after it got its independence, following several years of resistance, from colonial domination. The UNHCR assisted the voluntary repatriation of Namibian refugees, and unlike the Tigrayan refugees, they were airlifted from various countries of asylum to Namibia. Also, the Namibian refugees' return was better organized and supported with resettlement assistance to mitigate their adjustment process into the mainstream society.

While the repatriation of refugees may be similar in nature, the conditions of Mozambican refugees and their experience of voluntary repatriation seems different from the two above. According to Alberto M. DaSilva:

> The intensification of the war in Mozambique since independence in 1975 has given rise to an increasing number of refugees. . . . This movement of people has led them to various locations both inside and outside Mozambique. With the intensification of atrocities, violence and destruction, particularly for those living near the country's borders, the neighboring states became natural safe havens. With the continuation of the war over the years and the increasing levels of violence and destruction, the numbers of refugees have reached such proportions that currently there are more than one million Mozambican 'deslocados'.[10]

After 1975, independent Mozambique continued to be pervaded by civil war. The brutal RENAMO regime against innocent civilians not only created a massive exodus of refugees, but also constructed an inhumane state of dilemma for refugees, as those who originally fled the persecution

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decided to repatriate because of unpropitious treatment of refugees in neighbouring asylum countries and refugee camps. Notwithstanding the ferocious persecution of Mozambican refugees, in 1989 over two hundred thousand refugees repatriated spontaneously on an individual and small group basis to a sovereign state undergoing serious calamities caused by civil war, while simultaneously new refugees were fleeing Mozambique in search of safety.

Profound analysis of the foregoing voluntary repatriation shows that the Namibian refugees' situation seemed more appropriate in terms of its theoretical and practical grounding for refugees to return home safely. On the contrary, the Tigrayan and Mozambican refugees' repatriation processes portray the reality of most African refugees' vulnerable life experiences in a manner that is distinctive and powerful. The preceding complexities of African refugees' experiences do not fit well with the placid contemporary international theories, doctrines, and standards pertaining to their actual repatriation practices. Therefore, it is important to analyze the motivating factors for refugees to engage in such delicate and life threatening endeavour, after they had supposedly fled from violence to safety in another country.

Authors such as Bascom, Crisp, Gorman and Kibreab, Harrell-Bond, Pottier, Rogge, Rutinwa, and Sepulveda have written about and examined extensively the nature of African refugees' repatriation process and concluded that the eastern, central, and southwestern African refugees' voluntary repatriation generally has more to do with the quality of life in asylum countries than situations in their countries of origin.[11] Human rights violations were coupled with frequent extreme shortages of basic necessities of life, such as food, water, and medical supplies, in the refugee camps of the regions of Africa identified above. For example, in 1994 the problem of hunger and malnourishment was becoming principally severe in the Ugandan and Zairean settlement camps where food relief had been withdrawn, and the refugees who were suffering indefinitely as a result of the foregoing factors voluntarily repatriated to their various homelands. The authors also found that the security and support available to refugees has habitually been too inadequate to mitigate their preference to stay in host countries' camps. Instead they generally preferred to self-repatriate to ongoing insecurity and possible death/indiscriminate imprisonment in their homeland.

As discussed earlier, the obvious assumption would be that the international community, UNHCR, and refugee agencies have failed woefully to make sustainable provisions to resolve refugee problems in durable terms. Consequently, most African refugees are left with limited options, and for this reason, many choose to repatriate regardless of the circumstances in their country of origin. Clearly, I am not disputing the intentions of the UNHCR and other organizations that are willing to assist African refugees. However, I am contending that the international community, including the UNHCR and other international refugee agencies, has spuriously engaged in repatriation and humanitarian theory that is inappropriate and unproductive for the reality of the African refugee crisis.

In fact, most of the refugee agencies' efforts to alleviate the plight of African refugees have been utterly futile, because of the inadequate practices of voluntary repatriation and resettlement initiatives. With the exception of the token voluntary repatriation success in Namibia, I have not seen anywhere in Africa or other Third World countries where the current repatriation theory works. In other words, there is no international initiative to assist Third World refugees that seems to have materialized. Nevertheless, though not perfect, resettlement endeavours for Eastern European refugees/White refugees have always materialized, and have usually led to some kind of durable resettlement program. It's cogent to interrogate why the resettlement programs for African refugees haven't produced the intended result. Why have we not witnessed the airlift of refugees from Africa to Canada or other liberal societies, as we have perpetually observed in the case of the Eastern Europeans' refugee crisis?

It is clear there are some political challenges usually confronting the UN in its efforts to help refugees in many parts of the world. These challenges are very disturbing given their systemic nature of hindering the UN's endeavour to ease the suffering of refugees. The sovereign states' power to control the territory to which the refugees repatriate represents one of the greatest dilemmas in refugee resettlement initiatives. Correspondingly, the governments of refugee-producing countries prevalently invoke the ideology and the supremacy of the independent state under international legal rights to obstruct the work of the UNHCR and other refugee agencies.

The cynicism of the governments of refugee-producing countries revolves around the presumption that refugees who are willing to repatriate may be members of the rebellious group that stirred the conflict in the first place. As a result, refugees' entry permission may not be granted. Conversely, some refugees may be apprehensive about the genuineness of repatriation through the networks of UN officials, the refugees' host government, and the government of their homeland. Some refugees may perceive the repatriation initiative as a bogus enterprise that has nothing to do with their well-being. Contrarily, their government may sadistically view the repatriating refugees as a part of the rebellious group or citizens capable of treason against

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their own government. As a result the efforts of the international community could be seriously hampered.

The theory of voluntary repatriation could be advantageous and essential for refugees if the discrepancies regarding the voluntary repatriation theory were inclusive of all the mechanisms in which refugees actually return home. What I am alluding to is that, if refugees decide to repatriate for whatever reasons, their efforts are usually stigmatized and denigrated by international refugee agencies as "unorganized repatriation," simply because of their lack of involvement in the repatriation process. On the other hand, if international agencies and governments organize voluntary repatriation their efforts are usually praised, extolled globally, and validated as the only practical paradigm for refugees to return home. Conceptually, categorizing different types of repatriation process and marginalizing refugees' voluntary repatriation experiences have the tendency to dissuade refugees' efforts to consider international repatriation initiatives.

As mentioned earlier, most African refugees' voluntary repatriation happens under serious socio-political crisis and inhumane conditions. These perilous conditions raise crucial questions about the security and protection of refugees upon return to their violent homeland. Theoretically, there are several aspects to the conceptual framework elucidating refugees' repatriation under ethnic and political strife. The voluntary repatriation framework includes the following: political alterations with repatriation after major political transformation, for example, changes in autocratic, one political party system, monarchy system, or military regime to democracy; repatriation preceding political agreement that fails to terminate the ethnic or political crisis completely; repatriation to homeland under the authority of the government that incipiently occasioned the refugees' exodus, an example being Rwanda or Democratic Republic of Congo crisis; and repatriation rooted in degenerating political uncertainty in the refugees' host country, a good example being the simultaneous refugee repatriation from one neighbouring asylum country to another, for example, Yugoslav refugees migrating from one neighboring country to another, and Ethiopian refugees' voluntary repatriation from Sudan to Ethiopia and repatriation from Somalia to Ethiopia, and Rwandan refugees from Uganda to Rwanda.

It is imperative to investigate the intersectionality and process of African refugees' voluntary repatriation under political and ethnic antagonism, and how their individual self-disposition intersects and interacts with their valour to repatriate under conditions of serious violence. Theoretically, the treatment of refugees in their asylum or host country has a pivotal role to play in refugees' desire to repatriate voluntarily to conditions of violence in their homeland. If the refugees' host country marginalizes, subjugates, abuses, and alienates the basic fundamental human rights and well-being of refugees, their desire and decision to return home intersects with their previous illusions and hope of fleeing to safety in another country. The hope of refugees escaping to freedom, and the reality/deception they experience in their asylum or host country, consequently encourage refugees to take expeditious action to repatriate voluntarily without giving much consideration to what might happen to them upon return to their country of origin under serious calamity, because they are subjected to similar situations they were escaping.

Aside from the attitudes of the refugees' asylum or host countries, there are other factors influencing refugees' decision to repatriate voluntarily. They include political improvement in refugees' homeland, and the proximity of refugees' asylum country to their own sovereign state. Moreover, if refugees have access to their national boundary and if it is easily penetrable for refugees to maintain constant communication or visit relatives in their country of origin, these elements are very influential in African refugees' voluntary repatriation process.

The above factors usually intersect and interact with the circumstances prompting refugees' determination to repatriate. Conceptually, there are few elements refugees take into consideration concerning their determination to risk their lives and freedom through voluntary repatriation. Practically, refugees are a diverse group of people in terms of their educational level, socio-economic level, and socio-political level; therefore, refugees will behave differently with respect to voluntary repatriation according to their various social positions in a dangerous voluntary repatriation endeavour. It can also be hypothesized that refugees' willingness to migrate from violence to safety and from unwelcoming asylum/host country to conditions of violence exemplifies their fervid effort to have control over their lives and destiny.

The determination of African refugees to repatriate to their homeland is generally rooted in the attitude and treatment they receive in their asylum country, and the opportunity to assess if the conditions in their country have improved politically and socially. Also, their decision to return home is ardently rooted in the inappropriate practice of resettlement initiatives for most African refugees. Therefore, their perilous repatriation endeavour is really their desire to accomplish some degree of autonomous control in their lives. Clearly, African refugees' willingness to risk their lives through voluntary repatriation must be understood in light of their individual dispositions, perceptions, cultural values, religious convictions, and the fero-

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cious treatment they receive in their asylum or host country as emphasized earlier.

Again, based on the preceding assumptions, their ultimate desire to migrate from unfavourable conditions has to do with refugees' strong notion that their individual abilities to decide their lives and their life chances are completely flawed to afford them desirable security from socio-political and religious persecution.

Theoretically, for African refugees to ensure their group survival and have some control over their lives, they usually become attached to their common traditional way of life through adhering to the conventional practices of reconstituting the protection of their new community with familiar institutions. What is intriguing is that African refugees' initial migration pattern seems to be within close proximity to their accustomed environment, which they deem conducive in terms of continuing the socio-economic and socio-cultural aspect of their lives. Fundamentally, they strive to preserve their traditional skills and occupational practices in their new environment.

As discussed earlier, African refugees yearn for the opportunity to communicate with their country of origin in order to evaluate the political development, which will set the stage for repatriation to their previously entrenched socio-cultural identity, and consequently allow them to gain control over their own lives. Actually, the voluntary repatriation process of African refugees usually begins when the host government decides to relocate refugees from their initial settlement area to refugee camps, and the refugees usually perceive the host government's decision as a blatant infringement and a threat to the well-being they already started to re-establish. Also, refugees may feel that their chances of assessing the political improvement of their country would be extremely limited if they were relocated remotely from the borders.

The resistance of refugees to the above initiative often prompts their eagerness to repatriate voluntarily, which simultaneously, forcefully, firmly, and distinctively connects and intersects with the resettlement theory that has nothing to do with the well-being of refugees. Therefore, African refugees' voluntary repatriation is firmly rooted and intersects with the refugees' expectation for safety and protection of their basic fundamental human rights usually arising from political, ethnic, and religious persecution.

Another factor instigating African refugees' voluntary repatriation is the asylum/host government's effort to control refugees who are disseminated within their sovereign state boundary by relocating them to refugee camps in order to ensure firm supremacy in terms of their movement to other parts of the country. It becomes critically imperative for the refugees to determine whether to conform to the asylum country's initiative or endeavour to escape the government officials before they implement their refugee camp policy. Theoretically, if the refugees succeed in avoiding the officials and are not sent to the refugee camp, voluntary repatriation seems to be inevitable because they may not be able to provide for themselves the basic necessities of life; therefore, they may choose to return home out of frustration at not being able to secure reasonable employment. Conversely, for the refugees who decide to comply with the host government's initiative of going to the refugee camps, the aspiration of voluntary repatriation may be deferred because of official regulation to restrict their movement. Also, if they are treated with dignity and rights, they may decide to stay until better resettlement programs are in place to assist them. Usually, an effective resettlement program is an illusion for most African refugees.

The lack of workable resettlement programs for African refugees, combined with community alienation and inhumane treatment of them, often leads to refugees' organized resistance. Thus, the refugees who are forcibly transferred to refugee camps by asylum country officials and placed in an unfamiliar environment that may seriously impede their traditional way of life may not negate their desire to fight for their freedom in a vigorous manner. Generally, refugees resist their oppressor by forming an alliance with rebellious groups through the realization that their condition is an important component of the struggle for social, political, cultural, economic, and other basic rights. Not all refugees will be keen in the above political movement and activism; some may simply feel indifferent, while others may be cynical about the movement that will get them into more political problems.

Another factor initiating African refugees' voluntary repatriation is the improvement in their original country's political climate. When the intensification of the religious and political violence in refugees' homeland is reduced, this may pave the way for socio-economic reorganization that would encourage refugees to repatriate. Accordingly, their nation-state boundary may be enhanced and accessible as a consequence of political alterations in their homeland; this may create a safe atmosphere and opportunity for refugees to return home. When this happens and a huge number of refugees actually demonstrate their interest in voluntary repatriation, then the refugee agencies' attitudes begin to change, and they begin to look for ways to increase their assistance to make the repatriation process run smoothly. The refugees' asylum/host government will absolutely find ways to promote voluntary repatriation, through huge donations to refugee agencies in order to expedite the repatriation process, while the refugees' homeland government seeks ways to control the number of refugees returning home.

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As mentioned earlier, immediately voluntary repatriation becomes official through the effort of the UNHCR, the host country government, and the refugees' country government regarding multilateral agreements which provide the means for UNHCR and non-governmental organizations to assist refugees in their resettlement endeavour, some extreme conflicting issues may arise. The multilateral agreements may in some instances lead to a drastic reduction in the number of refugees who are willing to repatriate, simply because of the bureaucratic process involved. Many refugees may be apprehensive or see the administrative process of registering refugees as a mechanism to expose them to their government, which constructed the political crisis that made them become refugees. In addition, some may deliberately delay their repatriation process by systematically expecting the resettlement program assistance to be firmly implemented by all parties.

The following paragraphs provide comprehensive analysis of different systemic mechanisms and principles that authorize the current voluntary and forced repatriation of African refugees. Also, this section provides an in-depth examination of how the pervasiveness of racism and social difference among ethnic groupings, especially the economic marginalization/disparity and inequitable socio-political relationship between the Western nations and African countries, contributes to and explains the growing acceptance of the foregoing theory and practice.

The principle of imposed return articulated by McNamara, the former Director of the Division of International Protection, was categorically affirming that from now onward the UNHCR and his branch should not be expected to uphold the standard of UN Conventions relating to the status of refugees in certain situations, notably the African context. The origin of such doctrine and acceptance of its practice is not only equivalent to historical and contemporary genocide, but utilizes his authority and the power of the UN systematically to execute their racist mandate of exterminating ethno-racial and socio-cultural groups that were historically deemed inferior. McNamara's assertion represents a new hegemonic paradigm push of affirming superiority/inferiority among races and striving to exploit African political, ethnic, and religious antagonism to achieve colonial/hegemonic objectives in African contemporary society.

One of the serious dangers of the retheorized voluntary and imposed repatriation is that as soon as it is widely accepted, and made context and region sensitive, the issues confronting Third World refugees, particularly African refugees, are most likely to be abandoned. Additionally, it may pave the way for racist intellectuals to develop explicit resettlement theory and initiatives along ethno-racial and regional lines, which means refugee-producing areas of the world are neglected to deal with refugees' issues alone. Consequently, the above theory and practice may lead to international policy or treaty of "containment" of refugees in their region.

The work of Bayefsky and Doyle has launched such academic and intellectual discourse on new regional policy formulation pertaining to refugee issues under the auspices of the United Nations Security Council. The above authors utilized the Princeton University seminar report of 1998 on "Sustainable Refugee Return" to highlight "Formulas for Safe and Sustainable Refugee Return,"[12] which succinctly articulates the following guidelines: that the UN Security Council or pertinent regional authority could endorse a non-voluntary repatriation if it determined that the circumstances of refugees were (a) more dangerous and unbearable than those in the country of origin and (b) were not solvable by the measures of the refugees' host country government, in conjunction with international aid. Also, if the socio-political situations in the refugees' homeland warrant such determination, the ensuing criteria should guide refugee non-voluntary repatriation to their country of origin: (a) a reasonable anticipation and availability of fundamental human necessities that consist of basic human rights – freedom from violations of the dignity and integrity of the individual (murder, torture, indiscriminate imprisonment), shelter, and food and (b) the standard of human rights in the refugees' country of origin be enjoyed on an equal basis.

Clearly, the above policy proposal is an explicit rather than implicit call not only for refugee-receiving countries to deny protection and international aid to refugees themselves, but also for refugee host countries to construct unsympathetic and inhumane conditions in which refugees may be constrained from self-repatriation to their country of origin under extreme socio-political calamities. Additionally, such guidelines would only foster non-humanitarian and non-compassionate political dialogue among nations, creating a dangerous interrelationship in the field of ethnic and race relations in an international context.

Accordingly, the principle of non-*refoulement* that protects Convention refugees and those seeking political asylum would be violated if serious consideration is given to the proposed guidelines and position of McNamara, Bayefsky, and Doyle. In defending his position, McNamara contends that in the period of huge exodus of refugees, the principle of individual expression of freedom to repatriate has been rendered extraneous in contemporary discourse of refugee issues. He emphasizes that "what the world witnesses today are decisions by authorities and leaderships followed by acceptance by the masses."[13]

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Correspondingly, an anti-racist question to be posed in this context would be whether local government authorities and international leaderships generally represent the interests of the refugees in their decision-making processes. What I am contending is that it is time to challenge the Euro/North American socio-political traditional structure of making undemocratic decisions, and then imposing them democratically on refugees to live by. An anti-racist proponent's stand is to critically interrogate the decisions of government authorities and non-governmental agencies in order to further the interests of refugees – in other words, to voice the mechanisms that marginalize refugees' voice, while asserting compassionate and humanitarian theory and practice in addressing refugee issues. Furthermore, an anti-racism paradigm must be deployed to demolish the positions of the advocates of forced repatriation of refugees to their hostile countries. An anti-racism paradigm rejects unfounded argument that was advanced by McNamara that forcible return has become indispensable because of lack of money to assist refugees in their resettlement endeavour.

Even though the theory and practice of forced and voluntary repatriation is gaining ground in the academy, and in African refugees' situations, it is not too late to resist these abhorrent practices of *refoulement*. Some of the arguments put forth by McNamara regarding the pressure arising from the refugees' host countries as escalating because of their poor economic circumstances are profoundly legitimate. However, the issues of racism and ethno-cultural difference have restricted the Western countries to assume responsibility and to implement the principle of burden sharing in the context of African refugees. The reluctance to take responsibility for African refugees' situation and to implement the standard of burden sharing, particularly at the level of resources, has created and contributed to an extremely vicious environment which has not only precluded refugees from arriving at their territorial borders of Europe and North America, but compelled refugees to take expedited decisions to voluntarily repatriate to violent conditions that caused them to flee in the first place. As vividly articulated by Rutinwa, the disinclination of Western nations to share the burden of the poorer refugee-receiving countries at the level of resources has signified that the refugees must either repatriate, and/or become the main responsibility of the host nation.[14]

The salient constraints and inability of most African countries to assist refugees adequately are demonstrated through the Western nations' strategic method that disables entire economic institutions of most countries in Africa. The case in point is the role of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in relegating the economy of most African nations into a state of "economic debacle." Unquestionably, most African countries accept loans from the IMF and the World Bank to ease their economic problems. Therefore, the IMF and the World Bank impose stringent loan conditions, which range from charging fees for most public facilities and services, including education, hospitals, and local community social activities, to complete elimination of government financial assistance for essential amenities. Categorically, it is not feasible for nations in such economically destitute positions to handle refugees' resettlement issues or mass displacement of people adequately. An anti-racist and equitable approach to this complicated issue is to question what these signify for refugees in their actual daily living experiences. According to UNHCR among the countries most seriously affected by the problem of human displacement in Africa are Angola, Burundi, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Togo.[15] With the present day African reality the list is certainly longer.

Emphatically, African governments are normally not in a position to assume responsibility for the social reintegration of repatriating refugees and other internally displaced people. As observed by Gorman and Kibreab this reality brought to the forefront the problem with the traditional approach to refugees' repatriation that focused on the instantaneous consumption necessities of refugees returning home and did little to instigate and sustain a development process required to preclude further disasters and people's displacement in the country of origin.[16]

Theoretically and practically the function of UNHCR has been altered and profoundly changed in the face of current retheorization of voluntary and forced repatriation of refugees. Also, the concerns and future hope of refugees are seriously in question in terms of meaningful protection and assistance to alleviate the suffering of refugees. As Gorman and Kibreab assert, until contemporary times most UNHCR assistance programs were almost completely directed to countries of political asylum and refugees' host countries. Social reintegration and adjustment were basically considered the responsibility of the refugees' country of origin, and were anticipated to take place automatically in the context of national development. Nevertheless, UNHCR and its Division of International Protection on the one hand have become involved intensively in the enterprise of reintegrating refugees who repatriated voluntarily, and on the other hand engage in fostering voluntary and imposed repatriation of refugees to their volatile and antagonistic homeland.

The problem of theory re-articulation and the moral responsibility of the international community and those in positions of power who formulate global socio-political and economic policies has to be addressed. Meaningful

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financial assistance should be made available to the country to which African refugees are repatriating, and Western countries need to open their borders to refugees, particularly African refugees who are racially, ethnically, traditionally, and culturally different. Additionally, the global community should yield to the appeals of Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary-General, who states that there is a need to address the international economic factors that are responsible for the problems in the country of refugees' origin and which strongly contributed to constructing the environment in which people's displacements are occurring. Kofi Annan implores the international financial institutions (IMF and the World Bank) to reduce the conditionalities that generally accompany loans.[17] Theoretically, addressing the root causes of economic problems does not simultaneously solve the root causes of political contradiction that usually instigates the displacement and influx of refugees. Conversely, the imposed structural adjustment programs of IMF and the World Bank in most African economies would not solve the problem either. Profound understanding of anti-racism paradigm and inequitable relations between African countries and Western nations in an international context would allow for a genuine/equitable approach to the African refugee crisis. Genuine and anti-racist practice would rupture unequal international political structures constructed to create socio-political conflict in African countries. Interrogating and critiquing the source of power manipulation Euro/North America possesses would also pave the way for the interplay of equal relationships and mutual economic and political interests. The researcher's goal has been to broaden the terrain of anti-racism discursive framework in tackling both local and international political structures and refugee agencies that strive to sustain inequitable social order.

My position has been that the wealthier countries of the West, especially Europe and North America, impose their will and interests on the life chances of African refugees. I have argued that the powerful nations advance irresponsible voluntary/forced repatriation as a durable resettlement initiative for African refugee problems. I have warned against *refoulement* of refugees within the context of retheorized and reconceptualized imposed repatriation, which is being pursued as a viable solution to the African refugee problem.

In conclusion, the resilience, bravery, and capability of African refugees to deal with their own voluntary repatriations without much assistance from the international community is laudable, and their desire to return home represents an acute optimistic indication towards durable solutions to the African refugee crisis. But the fact that the root causes of African refugees' problems are deliberately constructed and forcibly imposed on them is a point to conceptualize when theorizing different ways to resolve their problems in durable terms.

The African governments, refugee agencies, and international community have failed abjectly to provide durable resettlement initiatives to the refugee crisis in Africa. The problem of resettling African refugees is compounded by fostering resettlement theory that has nothing to do with their well-being. The traditional international theory regarding voluntary repatriation and resettlement has been ill-implemented in Africa, and that is why the resettlement of African refugees has proved ineffective to mitigate resettlement and local integration initiatives. Also, the international community and refugee agencies seem to be promoting voluntary repatriation initiatives without real commitment to alleviating Africans' endemic political crisis.

If future resettlement and repatriation enterprise is to benefit Africa, any initiatives undertaken should include active and dynamic participation of Africans themselves. The artificial territorial boundaries created by colonialism/imperialism should be redrawn by Africans, to reflect ethnic groupings as Africans themselves know them, and to eliminate the tragic wars presently occurring as a result of the colonialist division of territory, which are a tremendous drain not only on the economy, but on the entire social structure of African society. All Africans must work together and, through vigorous participation in the reorganization and development of their own political, economic, and social structures, Africans themselves can begin the road to recovery from the political, social, and economic debacle presently pervading the continent.

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