CANADA'S PERIODICAL ON REFUGEES

REFUGE

Vol. 10, No. 4 April 1991

A Special Issue on Refugees from Ethiopia

In Memoriam

KATHLEEN PTOLEMY

I had the good fortune of knowing Kathleen as a colleague, neighbour and friend.

All those here who worked with Kathleen would, I think, agree that she was an absolute pleasure to work with. She was collaborative, dependable, thorough, thoughtful, absolutely honest and direct without being insensitive to the feelings of others.

She was an example of how to bring out the best in people. She used to say she was a process person - as concerned for the way a decision was made as the actual decision itself. At meetings she would always come fully prepared, not only for the issue, but also to listen to others before speaking herself. When she spoke she was clear and her focus invariably helped to resolve matters. It was these skills that enabled Kathleen to do so much for so many people.

To give you a sense of just how great her contribution was, I thought I would tell you of a conversation I had yesterday with Beth Ferris, a friend and colleague of Kathleen from the World Council of Churches in Geneva. Beth related to me the overwhelming sadness that so many people in Geneva felt upon hearing of Kathleen's death. While Beth expected that those who worked in Africa would be particularly upset at Kathleen's passing, because of all the work Kathleen had done there, Beth did not expect the response she got from other departments as well. One of her colleagues on the Middle East desk was most distraught, relating how Kathleen had done so much for Palestinians. Another colleague on the Latin American desk wept when remembering how Kathleen had been one of the first to respond to the desperate call for help by Chileans fleeing for their lives after the coup in their country.

As a neighbour, Kathleen epitomized all the old-fashioned values that are so hard to find today. Her door, both literally and figuratively, was always open. The Ptolemy kitchen should perhaps be protected as a historical site for so numerous have been the visitors and world travellers that have found comfort there. Kathleen, I know, would want it to be said that she herself drew enormous enjoyment and support from her neighbours. Her commitment to community was constantly fuelled by the kindness of those that lived near her.

As a friend, Kathleen was warm, generous, supportive and absolutely loyal. She was all too willing to put aside her own needs and agenda for someone close to her. Yet, as I think about her friendship, I realize that no matter what I say about Kathleen, a more powerful portrait can be drawn from the words of the lady herself.

Several weeks ago I asked her if, when looking over her life, she had any regrets. She said no, that although she could have done a few things better as a teenager, she had no regrets. She then quietly added that she knew she had never compromised herself.

In speaking about death, Kathleen said that she did not fear it. Her anguish and grief in dying was in being separated from Dave, Margie, Rob and others that she dearly loved. As for death itself, Kathleen felt it marked a new beginning. She believed that if you lived a decent life, at death you joined in communion with other decent souls who had died before you. Her philosophy was close to

that of Teillard de Chardin. In describing his most "dearest and profound conviction" this French scientist, anthropologist, and "seer" to some wrote:

> I believe what gives the universe ...its consistence is not the apparent solidity of the materials from which bodies are made. Rather it is the flame of organic development which has been running through the world since the beginning of time, consistently building itself up...Far from being impermanent and accidental, *it is souls, and alliances of souls, it is energies of souls that alone progress infallibly,* and it is they alone that will endure...

What radiates from living beings is more valuable than their caresses.

What radiated from Kathleen is, I believe, ultimately more valuable than her mortality. As I loved her, I shall miss her, more deeply than words can express. But I *can* celebrate her life. It will be a beacon for me, a constant reminder that one can live with integrity, and with compassion for others in the larger world in which we live.

Ninette Kelley

ICCR MOURNS

The Inter-Church Committee for Refugees mourns the untimely death at 51 of Kathleen Ptolemy, its first Coordinator. Kathleen most recently served as Anglican church consultant for Refugee Affairs. She was a former Secretary of the Canadian Council for Refugees. Kathleen championed the rights of the refugee. She was nurturer, encourager, prober, information source and personal helper for many refugee workers and refugees.

Emilio Castro, General Secretary of the World Council of Churches said in his letter of condolence, "We shall cherish ... her passionate solidarity with the "least among us", and her firm commitment to truth and justice ..."

The funeral took place in Toronto on Saturday, March 16, 1991.

Memorial donations to:
Quaker Committee for Refugees
c/o Nancy Pocock
52 Elgin Avenue
Toronto, Ontario M5R 2V8
or to:
The Primate's Fund
Anglican Church of Canada
600 Jarvis Street
Toronto, Ontario M4E 1N3

Condolences to:
David, Margie and Rob Ptolemy
28 Bracken Avenue
Toronto, Ontario M4E 1N3

CANADA'S PERIODICAL ON REFUGEES

REFUGE

Centre for Refugee Studies, York University,
Suite 234, Administrative Studies Building,
4700 Keele Street, North York, Ontario, Canada M3J 1P3
Telephone: (416) 736-5663 Fax: (416) 736-5837
Electronic Mail via Bitnet Address:
REFUGE @YORKVMI

Guest Editor: **John Sorenson**
Editor: **Howard Adelman**
Assistant Editor: **Judy Hosein**
Circulation Manager: **Helen Gross**
Assistant to the Circulation Manager:
Ching Man (C.M.) Wong

Refuge is dedicated to the encouragement of assistance to refugees by providing a forum for sharing information and opinion on Canadian and international issues pertaining to refugees. It is published four times a year by the Centre for Refugee Studies. It is a non-profit, independant periodical supported by private donations and by subscriptions. It is a forum for discussion, and the views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of its funders or staff.

Subscription rates for one year are:
Canada $25.00
Overseas $30.00 (U.S.)
Please enclose payment with your order.

Layout and Typesetting:
Alpha Desktop Publishing, (416) 897-5678

Logo Design:
Dreadnought Co-operative Inc., Toronto

Second Class Mail Registration No. 5512 ISSN 0229-5113

RESEARCH FELLOWSHIP

The Centre for Refugee Studies at York University has announced the inauguration of **the Kathleen Ptolemy Research Fellowship.**

This fellowship, worth $15 000, will be made available to assist a visiting scholar from developing countries to undertake reaserch on refugees.

Preference will be given to scholars interested in the study of refugee women who have protection problems.

Donations welcome.

Please direct your inquires to **the Centre for Refugee Studies, York University.**

IN THIS ISSUE...

ETHIOPIA'S REFUGEES

John Sorenson, *University of Manitoba*

There are approximately two million refugees in the Horn of Africa, most of them Ethiopian. The exact number is hard to judge. The figure could easily double the figure given here. Most estimates do not include the internally displaced or those who are undocumented or outside the mandate of refugee organizations. Despite appalling conditions in many parts of the country, Ethiopia also provides asylum to hundreds of thousands of refugees from the neighbouring countries of Sudan and Somalia. The regional situation is thus a vortex of human misery, with Ethiopia at the centre. While the Horn of Africa gained public attention in the 1980s as famine ravaged the region, the focus of international concern has long since shifted, despite the continuing crisis.

Several factors account for these vast flows of refugees. Most important are the wars which have ravaged Ethiopia for decades. Eritrea, the former Italian colony on the Red Sea coast, was federated with Ethiopia in 1952 and annexed a decade later. Since that time, an armed independence movement has opposed Ethiopia's claim to Eritrea. In the late 1960s, the first waves of Eritrean refugees fled the lowland areas and crossed into Sudan as Emperor Haile Selassie's forces launched a series of attacks on rural villages. These massacres continued into the 1970s and included the use of napalm and cluster bombs, poisoning of wells and the deliberate targeting of livestock, all designed to deprive the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) of support from the local population.

After Haile Selassie was deposed in 1974 by a military junta (known in Amharic as the Derg), repression intensified; in the cities death squads executed suspected Eritrean nationalists. A turning point was reached in 1978, when a massive input of Soviet-supplied weapons allowed the military dictatorship of Mengsitu Haile Mariam to defeat a Somali invasion of the Ogaden region and then turn its full force against Eritrea. At the same time, divisions in the Eritrean movement led to civil war and the eventual emergence of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) as the dominant force. However, the EPLF was largely restricted to the remote northern areas until 1988, when it won substantial victories which appear to have changed the course of the war.

In Tigray, resistance to the central government was sporadic until the formation of the Tigrayan Peoples' Liberation Front (TPLF) in 1975. Formerly, the TPLF advocated independence but now states its goal as self-determination within a democratic Ethiopia. Following intensification of drought in 1984, the numbers of refugees from Tigray increased dramatically. In 1985, 40,000 Tigrayans who had crossed into Sudan returned home, indicating that economic and environmental conditions were the reason for their original flight. However, refugee movements have continued in response to military and environmental changes and the Derg's forced resettlement program.

Many refugees in Sudan live in desperate poverty, under appalling conditions and with few opportunities to improve their condition.

By the late 1970s, the Oromo Liberation Front had begun operations in Hararghe, Arsi, Bale and Wollega regions. The Oromo live throughout Ethiopia and are the largest group speaking a mutually intelligible language. When the Emperor Menelik conquered the Oromo in the early part of the century, many Oromo were enslaved and their language and culture were suppressed and replaced with that of the Amhara. The OLF sees itself as fighting an anti-colonial struggle and seeks to establish an independent state, Oromia. In 1976, Oromos fled to Somalia to avoid war between the OLF and the Derg. They were quickly joined by large numbers of ethnic Somalis who fled the Ogaden war and Ethiopian reprisals against the region in 1978.

Ethiopia's refugee crisis is not caused only by wars based on ethnic or national differences. Ecological crisis has also created huge population movements. Large numbers are women, children and older people. Substantial numbers of Amhara refugees have also fled extensive violations of human rights, political repression, forced conscription, environmental disaster and economic crisis in Ethiopia. In some cases, the situation of Amhara refugees may be among the worst. At the Shelembod camp in Somalia, Amhara refugees have been singled out for differential treatment. From 1977 to 1982, the refugees were imprisoned and 500 were then released to the camp under the control of the Ministry of Defence. These refugees were treated as prisoners of war, denied rights to work or talk to foreigners and kept under surveillance while UNHCR was denied access to them. Forced inactivity and despair encouraged psychological deterioration. Although most were moved to Hargeisa in 1985, other refugees remain in isolation.

While considerable numbers of young, urban, educated Ethiopians have fled to the Middle East, Europe and North America, most refugees have fled to Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti and Kenya. As these are among the least developed

countries, the vast numbers of refugees arriving have a huge impact on these countries. The socio-economic characteristics of the refugees also have specific implications for the host countries. The already-limited opportunities existing in the host countries affect harder on the refugees.

Most refugees are from the rural areas. These groups have crossed the border hurriedly, settled wherever possible and hope to return home. Few facilities are available in the remote areas where many of these people settle. Urban refugees tend to have had a more organized flight from Ethiopia. These individuals are more educated and hope to continue their education or obtain employment; most seek to leave the camps as soon as possible and move to the cities. Here, they compete with the residents for resources and the few existing opportunities for employment. In areas such as Kassala, in Sudan, the facilities are so limited that refugee children are forbidden to attend school. Many refugees in Sudan live in desperate poverty, under appalling conditions and with few opportunities to improve their condition. Serious health and psychological conditions have resulted from overcrowding and unsanitary conditions. Refugee life often forces social changes. Women may be compelled to wear the veil and refrain from work in the fields. Many women are forced into prostitution, a situation which is not only perceived as degrading but which also represents serious health risks, particularly with the spread of AIDS throughout Africa. In some of the camps, the lack of opportunity, overcrowding, boredom, despair, political factionalism, as well as alcohol abuse and prostitution, have transformed life into a nightmare for the inhabitants.

Because of the competition for restricted opportunities and resources, refugees may be brought into conflict with local populations. This applies not only to employment but to pasturage and supplies of water and firewood. Refugees have had an impact on wages as well. Because they have few choices but to work wherever possible, refugees form a pool of cheap labour which tends to drive wages down. Programs intended to benefit refugees may exclude local inhabitants or, in some cases, may benefit local elites most directly. Some areas of eastern Sudan have been subject to a virtually constant flow of refugees for decades. This may result in the refugees being scapegoated; some incidents of violence against refugees have been reported in Sudan.

Fearing such a negative impact, the government of Djibouti exercises a very restricted definition of what constitutes a refugee, insisting that proof of persecution be furnished. In 1983, a repatriation programme sent 150,000 refugees back to Ethiopia. There were many reports that the repatriation was coerced and UNHCR was accused of ignoring human rights abuses. With the publicity surrounding the drought in 1984, the program was temporarily halted, but was resumed in 1986. During one incident at that time, 125 refugees were locked in a metal freight container on a train bound for Ethiopia; six died of suffocation. Although large numbers of refugees have been deported from Djibouti, many keep returning.

Refugee settlement also can have a positive economic influence in the host country. It is widely believed that the Somali government exaggerated the number of refugees living within its borders because of economic benefits it received from international organizations. In 1985, the Somali government claimed that 840,000 refugees were under its protection, despite the fact that UNHCR had reported that nearly half of these had been repatriated to Ethiopia.

Despite the imminence of political change in the Horn of Africa - change which may include the fall of the Derg and the independence of Eritrea - the situation for refugees is unlikely to improve soon. The Derg is determined to fight to the last, and famine looms over the Horn. Up to 11 million people are at risk in southern Sudan and about half that many face starvation in Eritrea and Tigray. As conditions in the region deteriorate, the need for a concerted international effort to address fundamental problems becomes ever more critical.

FROM WATER TO WORLD MAKING

African Models and Arid Lands

Edited by Gisli Palsson

The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, 1990

This volume is a valuable collection of essays presented at a work-shop on "Symbols and Resource Management in African Arid lands" held in Helsinki in November, 1989. All the contributors are social anthropologists concerned with the ways in which subsistence producers adapt to extreme environments, i.e. the arid lands in Africa.

As mentioned by the editor, this book focuses on *'how humans make their world in the sense that their reality is inevitably mediated by their cultural context'.*

Most of the articles deal with pastoral societies in eastern Africa, pointing out their ways of life and their own cultural representation. Two essays throw light on the cultural significance of wells and well-water (Dahl and Mergessa) as well as livestock products (Talle). The cognitive and symbolic dimensions involved by the activity of animal husbandry (Brochdue, Hurskainen) are also emphasized. Other articles deal with major issues each as pastoralism and environmental degradation (Poulsen, Ndagala), the responses of pastoral societies to drought (O'Leary) or the symbolic identification of an ethnic pastoral group (Salih). All of these articles emphasize the changes pastoral societies have undergone in recent decades.

Apart from pastoralism, two articles are concerned with social change among Mountain farmers (Manger) and cultural representation of fishing among fishermen (Palsson). There are a large number of excellent articles, all based on field work results and full of ethnographic details. Without doubt, this book attempts with success to illuminate the complex interactions between ecology and society and the range of representation developed by human producers.

Reviewed by Veronique Lassailly-Jacob; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris, France, and Centre for Refugee Studies, York University, Toronto, Canada.

BURDEN OR BOOM

Tom Kuhlman, Amsterdam
VU University Press, 1990
and

ENDURING CRISIS

Edited by H.J. Tieleman & T. Kuhlman
Leiden, African Studies Centre, 1990

Large numbers of refugees, mainly Eritreans but also Tigrayans, have been moving into eastern Sudan since the mid-1960's. The region has now become a haven for one of the world's largest refugee concentrations. Despite the duration and extent of the crisis, the situation has received astonishingly little attention from academic researchers. Most information exists in the form of internal reports from government and NGOs. Tom Kuhlman's *Burden or Boom* and *Enduring Crisis*, edited by Kuhlman and Tieleman are, therefore, a welcome contribution.

There is considerable overlap between the two books. For example, Kuhlman's contribution to the edited volume is a chapter from his own book, which explains the political background to the refugee crisis. This may disappoint readers who purchase both volumes, but the explanation is succinct and, importantly, corrects the widespread but inaccurate perception of the Eritrean issue as a case of ethnic separatism, so perhaps it bears repeating. Walter Kok's chapter on the economic impact of self-settled refugees is very useful but some will have read this when it appeared in the *Journal of Refugee Studies*. Because of the quality of their work, it is disappointing not to have new articles by Kulhman and Kok in this volume.

An anthropological study by Moniek Boerenkamp and Arjan Schuthof raises the very interesting issue of ethnicity among refugees, but remains somewhat general and strikes a rather jarring note by referring to the refugees as 'Baria' rather than Nara. As the authors themselves observe in a footnote, the former means 'slave' in Tigrinya, while the latter is the term the people use for themselves. Similarly, Jan Bouke Wijbrandi's chapter consistently refers to the refugees as 'Ethiopians' while the data indicate the refugees' self-identification as Eritreans. Particularly in the latter instance, because the issue of identity lies at the crux of the refugee situation, the choice of terminology is often seen as a political intervention on its own terms. Nevertheless, a sensitive approach should acknowledge the terms a people apply to themselves. Despite these drawbacks, all the essays in the book are useful and several refer the situation to broader theoretical issues.

Kuhlman's book goes in much greater empirical detail into the economic and social impact of refugees on Kassala and the surrounding area, examining the agrarian sector, labour market, infrastructure and social services. The answer to the question contained in the book's title is a qualified one. Kuhlman suggests that refugees have a positive effect on the economy in the secondary (manufacturing) sector by increasing demand for goods and thereby creating more jobs. However, as Kuhlman acknowledges, this depends on the existence of certain conditions, such as supply of natural resources, capital and functioning economic institutions. Furthermore, the refugees have kept wages low because they are an illegal, thus exploitable, work force. Relief aid is inadequate for subsistence and most refugees must engage in some form of small-scale commercial production or wage labour, but this aid allows refugees to survive by accepting lower wages than Sudanese workers. The refugees are therefore a boon to employers but they are resented by other workers against whom they are placed in competition.

Kulhman concludes that, overall, refugees have had a positive effect on the Sudanese economy and that most refugees are well-integrated economically. This conclusion is somewhat at odds with Kok's assessment, in the edited volume, of an overall negative impact. The researchers do concur in their assessment that there is less a single, specific impact of refugees but rather differential effects by time, region, and in terms of various social groups. Some elements of Sudanese society have profited from the influx of refugees while others have suffered. Integration does seem to have been more successful in the Kassala region than in other areas, such as Port Sudan and Gedaref. There is no spatial segregation; severe ethnic conflict is absent and, with certain exceptions, there has been no exclusion of refugees from the labour market. However, it is clear that whatever integration has occurred has taken place in a context in which the majority of the population is desperately poor and the refugees have been concentrated at the lowest level of employment and subsistence. Furthermore, the influx of refugees has to be considered in the broader context. The development policies, which promised to transform the country into the 'bread-basket' of the entire region, have instead wrought environmental havoc and, coupled with corruption, political instability, war and devastating drought, have plunged Sudan into chaos. As the situation throughout the country deteriorates the poorest, including refugees, suffer appalling deprivation; the need for a more appropriate government response, coupled with increased humanitarian aid, is urgent.

The authors demonstrate that refugees are not merely a passive population dependent on aid but rather that they are most industrious. However, they also indicate that the potential economic contributions which refugees can make to Sudan have not been fully utilized. One way in which the situation for refugees could be alleviated, however, would be to legalize their status as workers, thus preventing them from becoming an underprivileged and easily-exploited minority. There is a great need to improve services for refugees, especially in terms of health care, water supply and housing, but policies to deal with the refugee situation must be integrated with appropriate development policies for the region as a whole.

These books both make a significant contribution to understanding the situation of refugees in eastern Sudan and to determining the influence of refugees on the host population.

Reviewed by John Sorenson

Stranded 'Birds of Passage'?
ERITEAN AND ETHIOPIAN REFUGEES IN KHARTOUM

Gaim Kibreab, *University of Uppsala, Sweden*

INTRODUCTION

The government of Sudan has consistently accepted refugees on a humanitarian basis since the mid 1960s. The refugees in the country are in: (i) reception centres; (ii) organized wage-earning and semi-urban settlements; and (iii) urban and rural areas where refugees have self-settled among the local population. The main concern here is the self-settled urban refugees, with more emphasis on those in the capital, Khartoum.

In the beginning of 1989 there were a total of 770,000 refugees throughout the country. Among them, 60,000 were from Uganda and 5,000 from Zaire residing in Southern Sudan. Another 75,000 Chadian refugees were in Western Sudan. The majority, about 630,000, were in the Eastern and Central regions, and were all from Eritrea and Ethiopia; there is no breakdown of the proportion, but the majority are Eritreans. Of 770,000 refugees, only 38% were assisted by the UNHCR as of 31 July 1988. The others managed their own affairs by sharing whatever services were available to Sudanese nationals. Among the 630,000 Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees in the Eastern and Central regions of the country, about 25% are in organized wage-earning and semi-urban settlements. Another 17% are in transit centres living on international aid and about 60% are spontaneously settled. These data are, however, indicative rather than conclusive.

Self-settled or spontaneously settled refugees are not provided with any kind of assistance. They are scattered both in the rural and urban areas. According to government sources, there are about 210,000 refugees in urban centres (Khartoum: 45,000; Gedaref: 35,000; Kassala: 50,000; Port Sudan: 50,000 and another 30,000 in the small towns of Es Showak, Wad Madeni and Damazin with about 10,000 in each). A recent census of the refugee population in Khartoum, however, found that the total number of refugees in the capital was about 35,000 instead of 45,000. Even though the census was based on a total enumeration, it is reasonable to expect some refugees may have evaded the census.

GOVERNMENT POLICY ON URBAN REFUGEES

Generally the Sudanese Government has one of the most generous refugee policies in the world. Despite economic difficulties caused by a range of factors such as civil war in the South, drought, unfavourable terms of trade, declining productivity in all sectors of the economy, debt burden etc., its doors still remain open. Until 1988 even environmental refugees (those whose flight was prompted by severe environmental degradation) were provided with succour. After 1988, however, there has been an intention, at least at a policy level, to refuse entry to those who flee their countries of origin due to environmental degradation which poses a threat to their lives. For instance, the Minister of Refugees, during his visit to the Eastern region, instructed the authorities in the area and in the Central region not to admit additional refugees. He stated that "refugee status is to be granted only to war victims."

It is not clear how the government intended to distinguish war victims from drought victims. In the refugees' countries of origin, war and environmental degradation are interwoven.

It is not clear how the government intended to distinguish war victims from drought victims. In the refugees' countries of origin, war and environmental degradation are interwoven. Similarly unclear is how the government's new policy has affected the inflow of new asylum seekers. According to the General Project Manager, Syd H. M. Osman, the new restrictive policy had resulted in a considerable decrease in the number of new arrivals.

Some evidence suggests that the government was determined to implement its restrictive refugee policy. For example, on January 15, 1988 the newspaper, *Ayam*, reported that "concerned authorities in the Eastern region have refused to grant asylum to 30 Ethiopians". According to COR authorities, the decision was based on the country's new policy towards refugees (*Ayam*, Issue 6230, Jan. 15, 1988). However, there is no concrete evidence showing that the country's refugee policy has become more restrictive than it was in the past.

Even though it has accepted refugees from neighbouring countries in the past three decades, Sudan has always attempted to place all refugees in organized camps and settlements. One concern has been national security. The most important reason seems to be the minimization of the strain such a large influx of refugees may cause on the country's economy, social services and common property resources such as water, grazing and woodlands. By placing refugees in spatially segregated sites, the government wants to achieve two things. First, it wants to discourage the refugees from competing with nationals for scarce natural resources, employment opportunities, consumer goods and physical and social services. Second, it wants the international donor community to meet their needs until they voluntarily return to their countries of origin.

The Asylum Act of 1974, which regulates refugee status in the country embodies the basic principles of the 1951 United Nations and the 1969 OAU Conventions. Not only is it seen as generous, but it is also viewed as a model legislation for emulation by other Third World countries. However, there are certain serious restrictions which, on the one hand, influence the future anticipation of refugees, and, on the other, constrain the ability of refugees to engage in meaningful economic activities commensurate with their skills and previous work experiences.

Section 10(2) of the Asylum Act forbids a refugee to leave a place of residence specified for him/her by the authorities concerned. This constitutes a serious deprivation of freedom of movement. Formally, the government can legally restrict the freedom of movement of refugees within its territories by making reference to Art. 26 of the 1951 Convention as stipulated in Art. 42 of the same Convention. The deprivation of the right of freedom of movement imposed by section 10(2) of the Asylum Act is, however, inconsistent with the recommendations of the 1979 Arusha Conference and with the spirit of the OAU Charter of Human and People's Rights (see Recommendation 5 of the Arusha Conf. and Art.12.1 of the Charter).

As indicated, most refugees in Eastern and Central Sudan are self-settled. Formally, residence outside organized centres is illegal and refugees who reside outside the camps or settlements without authorization are subject to harassment, detention, fine and deportation to remote rural areas. According to the Regulation of the Asylum Act, refugees must register upon entry, but the overwhelming majority do not, mainly for fear of being sent to the reception centres in the unfamiliar rural areas or because the authorities do not insist on registration. Refugees with urban backgrounds see no future in the rural camps or settlements. They try to avoid relocation by not reporting to the authorities upon arrival. The majority are self-settled without proper documents. Legally, they are not refugees because their status is not determined by the authorities concerned.

Sudan's settlement policy appears extremely unrealistic because it does not take into account the huge amount of capital and natural resources required to implement such a policy. It seems that the government is aware of its inability to implement its own policy. The awareness of this may have led to its tolerance of spontaneous settlement by the refugees in the urban areas without formally sanctioning it. However, as long as Sudan does not officially sanction spontaneous settlement of refugees in the urban centres, such tolerance only paves the road to abuse by municipal and police authorities.

Whenever aggrieved, they cannot seek redress from formal government structures because they are not legally entitled to reside in the urban centres.

Technically, unregistered refugees have no legal rights. They are not entitled to protection or work. They are not allowed to engage in income-generating activities, nor do they have access to public amenities. Yet, not only is there no single case of refoulement, but a considerable proportion do engage in income-generating activities (wage-labour, trade, etc.), send their children to school, enjoy access to the available health services, etc. without being formally entitled to such rights.

However, since such entitlements cannot be claimed by the refugee communities by right, access can be denied arbitrarily by municipal authorities. Refugees pay bribes to secure residence and work permits or to escape harassment for illegal residence in the urban areas. By adopting a policy which it cannot implement, the government has unintentionally rendered the refugee communities vulnerable to the whims of corrupt bureaucrats, police officers and municipal authorities. Despite its determination, the government has not been able to phase out spontaneous settlement.

The effects of this unrealistic policy have been detrimental to both the country and the refugees. If refugees were allowed to participate freely in the economic life, they would have contributed to Sudan's social progress and economic growth. One constraint faced by the industrial sector is high turn-over of Sudanese skilled labour to the Gulf States (Bank of Sudan: 1980;1987). The uninhibited participation of refugees in the labour market may partially overcome the skilled manpower bottleneck in Sudan. Sudan has not invested in education or training of refugee labour. Refugees would have represented an asset if the government had a policy that favoured tapping such a resource.

Many refugees have never lived in rural areas, but government policy does not take this into account. All refugees, regardless of their social or professional backgrounds, are expected to stay in camps or settlements in rural areas. As long as the government does not address the question of urban settlement, its policy will not only remain ineffective, but it will exacerbate the plight of the self-settled refugees.

The government says it does not want refugees in urban centres, but it has no place for them elsewhere. It is not willing to provide assistance to refugees and it also does not allow aid agencies to fulfil this function for fear of attracting more influx from the rural areas. Refugees can only survive by engaging in income-generating activities to which they are not formally entitled.

Their weak legal status has, therefore, made their position extremely vulnerable. They are often harassed by corrupt police and security officers who threaten them with deportation to the rural areas. To escape this, refugees are often forced to pay bribes in cash or services. Greedy employers take advantage of their undocumented position and landlords also charge them exorbitant rents. Whenever aggrieved,

they cannot seek redress from formal government structures because they are not legally entitled to reside in the urban centres. Fear of deportation to rural areas is universal, and problems are often solved through an informal network of inter-personal relations which are often biased in favour of those who have better contacts and resources.

Fearing deportation to rural areas and not seeing any future for themselves or their children in Sudan, most refugees are too insecure to make investments in the cities. Aid agencies have also been reluctant to alleviate their plight because they are discouraged by the government. The majority of the agencies are also reluctant to provide assistance to refugees in urban areas because they do not consider their situation as stable.

Consequently, most refugees in Khartoum dream of returning home or emigrating to the Gulf states or to the West. Among 500 refugee household heads I interviewed in Khartoum, less than 20% of the Eritrean refugees were planning to stay in the Sudan until the circumstances in connection with which they fled their country were eliminated. Among Ethiopian refugees, none thought of either returning home or staying in Sudan, but did dream of migrating to OECD countries.

Other researchers have also found the same results. H. Schönmeier, for example, states:

> Almost all the refugees in Khartoum would like to leave their present location. The majority of them would like to leave the Sudan either in the direction of the Gulf States or of the northern industrial states (1988).

A. Pezaro also states that all her interviewees, except two, wanted to be resettled in the Western industrialized countries. Not only that, but most of her women interviewees preferred not to give birth in the Sudan. She further states:

> Some of them even excluded marriage from their future plans as long as they cannot either go back to Eritrea or leave for resettlement. This was partially ascribed to the economic problems they faced, but a more important factor seems to be the feeling that there is no future for the children if they are born in a situation of being somewhere "in-between" or not really at home (1987).

Other studies confirm the refugees in urban areas perceive no viable points of reference to plan for a new life in the Sudan.

Some reports claim a discernible difference between attitudes of Moslem and Christian refugees regarding willingness to put roots in Sudan. A 1984 report by the US Embassy in Khartoum, for example, states that the Moslem refugees in Port Sudan have successfully acculturated and have ceased to be refugees except in a technical sense.

What the report overlooks is that the factor which has facilitated adaptation of the refugees is not religion as such, but common ethnicity between the host society and the refugee community. Religion was not decisive. Moslem refugees from the Eastern low lands and the Eritrean highlands are as alienated as their Christian brethren in all the urban centres of Sudan. Among the refugees in Kassala, T. Kuhlman found ethnicity as one of the factors that facilitate refugee integration. In areas where there is no common ethnicity between the host and the refugee population, as in Khartoum, there is no discernible difference of attitude between Moslem and Christian refugees regarding future anticipation. This is noted in all the available studies.

Theoretically, a community that sees no future in a certain environment would be expected to be resigned and lethargic, but available evidence shows that the majority of refugees are hard-working, resilient and creative.

In Pezaro's study, the refugee women, who were unwilling to give birth and who excluded marriage from their future plans as long as they remained in Sudan, were Moslems. Respondents in my study comprised Moslems and Christians and there was no discernible difference regarding determination to leave the Sudan. All were equally determined to leave Sudan, given the chance.

Yet despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of the refugees saw no viable future in Sudan, they kept on applying for extremely limited resettlement opportunities without being discouraged by rejections; the majority leave no stone unturned to earn an income both for survival and saving to facilitate departure from Sudan. Most activities they engaged in were far below their qualifications and skills.

Theoretically, a community that sees no future in a certain environment would be expected to be resigned and lethargic, but available evidence shows that the majority of refugees are hard-working, resilient and creative. What underlies the unwillingness to stay in Sudan? In addition to the unfavourable government policy towards refugees, already discussed, additional likely factors spring to mind: (1) Lack of international assistance; (2) Cultural incompatibilities; (3) lack of economic opportunities; (4) exaggerated expectations of opportunities in the industrialized countries. These are in turn discussed in the following.

1. LACK OF ASSISTANCE

When a refugee leaves his/her country of origin, there is always an expectation of a better future not only in terms of physical safety and security, but also in terms of material assistance at least at the initial stage. There is an expectation of an organized reception. On arrival, the refugee concerned finds out that s/he has to rely on her/his own ingenuity both for survival and for acquiring the necessary documents to be able to proceed to the border towns.

For many, the movement does not end at the border towns, but a considerable number aim for the capital city—Khartoum—and from there to the Gulf States or Western Europe, Canada, USA and Australia. For the majority, this represents an up-hill task which may never materialize. Whether one succeeds with such tasks is determined by the amount of money, personal

contacts with Sudanese authorities, influential refugees, relatives and friends both within and outside the Sudan. Those refugees who lack the necessary financial resources and/or social networks often fall easy prey to corruption and abuse. The majority of the refugees belong to this category. Those who take advantage of such vulnerable groups are not only Sudanese, but also refugees who work independently or with Sudanese. As will be revealed in the following discussion, the situation is more burdensome to women.

For example, a woman whom they see greeting a man in the street, or a woman who does not wear a tobe *(veil) is likely to be mistaken as a prostitute.*

The absence of organized reception is exacerbated, as we saw earlier, by a government policy which forbids refugees from residing in the urban centres. For the majority, residence in the urban areas is crucial, not only because the urban environment is familiar, but it is only if they live in the urban centres, mainly Khartoum, that their dream of emigration to the Gulf States or to the OECD countries may materialize.

All the embassies are situated in Khartoum. For the majority, residence in the capital is only possible either by obtaining documents through non-formal channels (through payment of bribes) or by evading controls. The groups that victimize them are aware of their vulnerability and use different means to force them into social networks of dependence. Emigration, especially to the OECD countries, is, therefore, perceived by the majority as a form of liberation from being socially degraded and economically exploited.

2. CULTURAL DIFFERENCES

Civil society is more secularized in Ethiopia and Eritrea than in the Sudan. In Sudan social norms, values and gender relationships are defined by *Sharia*. The dominant culture is Islamic and rigidly paternalistic. Roles are defined with a very low degree of tolerance for non-conformity, especially when the non-conformist is a woman. Refugees come from patriarchally and paternalistically determined social organizations, but these are not on the same level as in Sudan. Compared to Sudan, cultural pluralism, at least in urban centres, is relatively more tolerated in the refugees' countries of origin. All schools are open for both men and women from early childhood. Women socialize relatively freely with men, not only in private, but also in public spheres. Sudanese society, at least the Islamic north, is rigidly divided along gender lines and there are rules which govern interaction between the sexes. Non-conformity to these tacit and explicit rules, especially by women, often leads to ostracization and humiliation.

Eritrean and Ethiopian refugees, regardless of their religious affiliations, do not fit easily into this cultural pattern. The reason for this does not only derive from original cultural dissimilarities between the two societies, but also from the drastic changes refugees undergo in lifestyle as a result of flight. When young refugees flee their country, they not only escape persecution, but also authoritative parental controls. Young refugees, who were socialized to conform to norms and to accept the values and standard behaviour of their society, find themselves suddenly freed from such authoritarian socialization mechanisms.

In the new environment, they try to enter into inter-personal relationships which would have not been allowed even in their countries of origin. For the host society the cultural contrasts, namely the behaviour patterns, the norms, thought and belief habits of the refugees, become too radical to the extent of being considered as a threat to cultural hegemony. To many conservative Sudanese, the behaviour of refugee women is considered to be unacceptable and dangerous. They fear that emulation of such behavioural patterns by Sudanese youth, especially by young women, may "contaminate the cultural purity" of Sudan.

For example, a woman whom they see greeting a man in the street, or a woman who does not wear a *tobe* (veil) is likely to be mistaken as a prostitute. Pezaro, in her study of the situation of Eritrean refugee women in Khartoum, found that the way Eritrean women handled the rules that govern gave rise to conflicts in daily life in which:

> refugee women have to be afraid of their reputation, if they — as they are used to in Eritrea — talk or interact in an "easy" way with Eritrean as well as with Sudanese men. They [the refugee women] complain about being considered either as potential marriage candidates by certain Sudanese boys or as prostitutes. They feel, therefore, restricted in their leisure-time activities or generally in their freedom of movement (1987, 15).

The response of refugees is varied and the factors influencing the nature of their responses are quite complex. In the short-run, however, many refugees tend to make some modifications in their behaviour, especially in those aspects "detestable" to the dominant culture. Generally, however, they tend to cling to their former way of life, especially when no serious costs are to be incurred or serious consequences to be suffered as a result. On the whole, the refugee communities constitute distinct and separate communities in the different residential areas of Khartoum.

The intolerance of the dominant culture to non-conformism is considered by many refugees as constituting a fetter to social progress for which, in their view, no solution exists, other than emigration either back to their countries of origin or to the OECD countries.

In my study, among the refugees in Khartoum, I found discernible differences in terms of perceived solutions entertained by Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees. For the Ethiopian refugees, the only solution they perceived was emigration to the OECD countries, while for the majority of the Eritreans, repatriation following the elimination of the circumstances in connection with which they fled their

country was the most acceptable solution. Emigration to the OECD or the Gulf countries was preferred only if the circumstances in their countries remained unchanged. Another difference which emerged from the results of the study was that while none of the Ethiopians wanted to stay in Khartoum, some Eritreans said they would be willing to stay if the government changed its restrictive policy towards urban refugees.

The Sudanese seem to consider their culture superior to those of the refugee communities. As a result, they look upon the behavioural patterns of the refugees with contempt. Karadawi states:

> The Sudanese core-culture despises what is considered as the moral laxity of the refugees. The incomplete family life, unrestricted movement in town and the liberated socialization by females are both alien and detestable to the reserved, male-dominated and chauvinistic Khartoum society (1978, 19)).

It is noteworthy to point out that many of the refugees looked down upon the Sudanese way of living. A considerable number of the refugees I interviewed had an oversimplified view of the Sudanese lifestyle. For example, the seclusion of women from public life and the extreme male domination that characterizes Sudanese culture was seen as being oppressive and backward. For a large proportion of the refugees, language also represents a serious barrier, because a large majority, especially among the Ethiopians, do not speak Arabic.

The consequence was that, for the majority of refugees, an alternative long term solution outside such a society was seen as being more preferable, rather than radically modifying their culture to fit with the styles of living of their host society. Sudan is viewed by the majority as a stepping stone for further emigration. In fact, even though the argument may sound counterfactual, one may safely assume that no matter how favourable the cultural environment in Sudan may have been, there would still be some who would wish to emigrate to the OECD countries, given the chance. It can be said that this category came to the Sudan due to sheer geographical proximity and not to seek durable asylum.

3. LACK OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES

Agriculture is the backbone of the national economy of the Sudan, which contributes about 35% to GAP. Over 90% of the country's total export earnings derive from it. About 80% of the population is dependent for its livelihood on the sector (The Six Year Plan of Economic & Social Development: 1977; Kibreab: 1987).

The manufacturing sector presents a small fraction of the national economy not only in terms of contribution to GAP, but also in terms of the amount of labour employed. Between 1982/83 and 1986/87, the contribution of manufacturing and mining to GAP was only 7% (Bank of Sudan: 1987). The industrial sector has been suffering from serious problem of under-utilization of capacity throughout the 1980s due to obsolete and inefficient machinery, failure in electric power, shortages of supply of raw materials and spare parts, high skilled labour turn over to the oil-rich Gulf States, inefficient management, and transportation bottlenecks (Bank of Sudan: 1980; 1986; 1987; The Six Year Plan of Economic and Social Development: 1977). The level of capacity under-utilization in the industrial sector, in the 1980s, has been estimated at 20-40% (Bank of Sudan: 1985).

The material standard of living in the OECD countries compared to that in the Sudan is also higher, and relatives abroad genuinely believe that the living conditions of their relatives would considerably improve if they joined them.

The fact that the modern manufacturing sector constitutes a small fraction of the national economy and suffers from reduced production capacity suggests that employment opportunity in the urban sector is either little or non-existent. The consequence of this for the refugees' possibility to be absorbed in the modern industrial sector is extremely limited. The lack of employment opportunity in the urban sector is also, as indicated earlier, exacerbated by language difficulties. Since one of the constraints on industrial production is emigration of skilled labour to the oil-rich Gulf States, the presence of skilled individuals among the refugee population would have, under favourable government policy, filled the vacuum created by the departure of the Sudanese skilled labour force. This is, however, blocked partly by structural problems, such as lack of knowledge of Arabic, but above all by the stubborn resistance of the labour unions to open up membership to the refugees. The exclusion of union membership has in effect meant denial of entry into the industrial labour market (see Document of the Office of Refugee Affairs, US Emb.: 1983; 1984). The majority of the refugees in Khartoum are mainly employed in the service sector often in activities which do not correlate to their skills and past work experiences. Most of the refugee women are, for example, engaged in domestic labour regardless of their education or professional background.

Even though there are some self-employed refugees in the informal sector, there are a whole range of structural problems which constrain effective refugee participation (Kibreab: forthcoming). These limited employment and other economic opportunities create, on the part of the refugees, a sense of pessimism. As a result, many see no future either for themselves or their children in the Sudan. Consequently, they become obsessed either with dreams of repatriation to their home country or resettlement in one of the OECD countries.

4. EXAGGERATED EXPECTATIONS

A considerable proportion of the refugees in Khartoum have relatives in the OECD countries. One would, therefore, expect them to have some information about the kind of life awaiting them in the countries of

resettlement. Judging from the data elicited among the refugees in Khartoum, I was struck by their level of ignorance in this regard. The majority had an oversimplified picture of life in the OECD countries. They perceived life in the countries' of resettlement as being free of problems. This is attributable to many factors. Most of the refugees in the capital have had, since their childhood, a lifestyle which is uncritically Western-oriented. This orientation is further reinforced by their to the core culture in Sudan, which is increasingly influenced by Islamic fundamentalism. Their relatives do not give them a true picture of the living conditions in the OECD countries. Several factors account for this. It is unusual among such communities to tell bad news to relatives in distant places for fear of creating worry and anxiety. The general tendency is rather to tell one's relatives that everything is fine even when this is not true. The material standard of living in the OECD countries compared to that in the Sudan is also higher and relatives abroad genuinely believe that the living conditions of their relatives would considerably improve if they joined them.

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WOMEN REFUGEES: EMPOWERMENT AND VULNERABILITY

Helene Moussa, *O.I.S.E.*

Much of the literature on women refugees depicts them as victims and as vulnerable because they are women. They are portrayed as being passive and dependent with limited abilities to survive, cope and adapt. This perception in turn hinders chances for resettlement in countries such as Canada because the expectation is that refugees, like immigrants, will become economically independent and adjust in a relatively short period of time. Focusing on vulnerability places the problem on women rather than on the aggression perpetrated against them because they are women.

As I listened to and reflected on the life journeys of women refugees, I was deeply moved by their strength and courage, their determination to survive, to maintain their identities and integrity, and to struggle to fulfil life goals. Their concern for the future of their country and peoples also awed me. I came to recognize their actions as forms of resistance. This understanding has made me see them as victimized rather than as victims, and as shapers of their personal and collective lives. These women have, in effect, challenged state power, violence, and persecution, in their decisions to flee their homes and country.

Flight journey experiences differed in terms of routes taken and the people with whom they fled. The age range of women at the time of flight was 14-36. All married women fled without their spouses. All children fled with their mothers. Most single women travelled alone or with a group of strangers. A few fled with a close relative or friends. Women who travelled overland did so with the assistance of guides (nomads) or The Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF) or the Tigrayan Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) militants. Only one woman had ever travelled outside of Ethiopia prior to flight.

Whatever the route and whomever they travelled with, women took many risks. To be caught fleeing the country is an act of betrayal under the Ethiopian Criminal Code. The punishment is imprisonment with hard labour from 5-25 years. Those fleeing overland risked being caught in the war zones.

These women usually travelled by night to avoid being bombed by the Ethiopian air force. One of the many hazards of night travel was falling prey to wild animals. Rape was another actual and/or potential risk, in flight, as well as upon arrival at borders.

In retrospect, however, all the women interviewed felt that even if they had been conscious of these risks before leaving their homes, they would have made the same decision. One woman said:

> I would not have believed that it was any more dangerous than the violence I experienced daily in my neighbourhood. At the beginning you think you will not make it, but once you accept the hardships you can look forward to your safe arrival at your destination.

All women experience fears and risks during flight, but all said that the decision to leave their homes revealed their strength and ability to challenge socially prescribed dependency roles. This was expressed succinctly by one woman who said:

> I learned that I could make decisions alone and take risks that I would never have realized I was capable of as a woman. Before, all major decisions in my life would be taken by my family.

All women, however, felt that the price for this insight was too high to value the experience in and of itself. Enforced separations under state repression, the terror that engulfed their lives prior to flight, and the experience of becoming refugees are experiences with which many still have to come to terms.

SEXUAL ABUSE

While African states such as Sudan have been noted for their open door and non-refoulement policies with regards to refugees, the experiences of women fleeing to Sudan and Djibouti were intermingled with the encounter of the status of women in Islamic culture and the double bind of being women-refugees.

Prior to flight, torture and sexual assault was an actual and/or imminent experience whether women were imprisoned or not. Those who lived in war zones were also at risk. In flight and in asylum, women's search for safety does not end when they leave Ethiopian borders. One woman stated that,

> You have to belong to a man ...There is no way to have protection as a woman alone. Because a woman travels alone it is proof that she is a prostitute.

She further described the gender differences within the limited protection refugees have in asylum:

> I was walking with [her husband] when a man stopped us and started feeling my arms and my shoulders. [Her husband] wanted to fight him but I stopped him because we have no rights as refugees. He would be jailed and then I wouldn't have *any* protection.

Single women described their powerlessness as women and how they tried to link themselves with others so that they would never be walking alone in the streets. Some women get married for the sole purpose of being "protected" by a male. One woman said that she never left the house of the family she stayed with for the six months she waited for papers that allowed her to fly to Italy. In Djibouti-ville, women pointed out that women must be accompanied by a man, preferably several men, when they register at the UNHCR Office.

The plight of women refugees in Djibouti has received little attention. Roberta Aitchison described the horrifying experiences of rape in exchange of "safe passage" across the border, the direct complicity of guards in refugee camps and police in the city of Djibouti-ville. According to those I interviewed, the situation of women refugees has not changed.

The situation of Ethiopian women (and men) in Djibouti was exacerbated by the Somali-Ethiopian War (1977) and continuing tensions between the two states. They may have been refugees, but they also represented "the enemy." Women in my study had a very clear understanding of the differences in the types of violence perpetrated against

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men and women who arrived at the border. Men were beaten up, imprisoned and threatened with repatriation. Women were also threatened with repatriation. They, however, had to submit to the sexual demands of guards if they were to be permitted to cross the border. Those women who were jailed then had to face multiple rapes. Often women are "employed" as servants where they have to provide sexual "services." Women who were sent to refugee camps were also vulnerable to rape even if they were accompanied by husbands, relatives or male companions.

Many women who managed to live in Djibouti-ville have resorted to prostitution both as a means of survival and as a way of controlling their lives. One woman reported:

> Women who have been raped are so bitter. One of them said "why shouldn't I be paid rather than let myself be raped?" ... they have no feelings left in their body and they are very bitter about their future.

She also described how these women would financially assist other refugees who had no means of support. One of her best memories was how "everyone helped anyone in need." Women were very supportive of each other, "because we could understand why women became prostitutes and if we were not raped we knew that it could happen to us at any time." One of the worst fears of women who were raped was that they would bear a child. Abortions are illegal and the health consequences of side-street abortions can be very serious.

Women related stories of situations where women were "forced" to marry nomadic tribesmen. They accept because they are safer that way. There is this girl who lived for two years with a nomad. She accepted their ways and even had two children. One day she went to the UNHCR Office and spoke in English. Everyone was surprised.

Another woman who was a refugee in Djibouti pointed out that the French navy and army are the major "customers" of refugees who have become prostitutes. Some of these women are able to live with a military man while he is stationed in Djibouti. This semblance of stability is not long lasting. Once the military are transferred, women are abandoned. One woman also admitted that women refugees were "used by our own people. Some men (refugees) are pimps."

In 1980 a Tripartite Commission, which included representatives from the UNHCR, the Ethiopian and the Djibouti governments, was established to examine the voluntary repatriation of Ethiopian refugees in Djibouti. While there has been a great deal of criticism about the manner in which refugees "volunteered" and the actual safety afforded to Ethiopian refugees upon return, there is no mention about the implications of this agreement on women who have experienced rape or resorted to prostitution as a desperate means of survival. These women could never return to their home towns or villages for the following reasons:

> Sex in our culture is not for enjoyment, it's to have children. It's a big shame to lose your virginity outside of marriage. So they lose their dignity when they are prostitutes and/or raped.

Reflecting on her experience another woman in my study said:

> I don't want to remember. I have seen the worst. Now I am safe. I am happy. But I can't forget when I think of all the women who were not as lucky as me and who are still in Djibouti. I wish there was a way to help them.

Chances for these women to resettle in the West, particularly if they have no family, are slim. Women I spoke with were torn between a sense of responsibility and a sense of powerlessness to relieve the plight of women refugees in Djibouti.

POLITICIZATION

Despite the dangers of fleeing through war zones, women who fled with the assistance of the EPLF and TPLF were challenged to consider their role in society by the efforts of these movements to reach more equitable gender relations, the development potentials of their

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peoples and the depth of political commitment of the liberation movement members. One woman said that the journey had challenged her to reflect on her class formation.

Eritrean and Tigrayan women were very much aware of war in their regions. Indeed a major reason for their flight was the effects of these wars on their lives and the persecution they and their families experienced because of their national identities. They were, however, surprised to see development projects in liberated areas. Not only were they impressed to see the underground hospitals, small factories, and fruit and vegetable farms, but as one woman put it, " I realized that if a human being has the will anything is possible." This realization not only helped her endure the hardships of becoming a refugee but also influenced her determination to "make something of my life once I was safe."

The flight through liberated areas was instrumental in politicizing these women. One woman observed:

> Until then I was not good in politics. I know something now because of what I learned and what I saw in the liberated areas and from discussions with the liberation fighters.

Women noted development of a new consciousness of women and men. In liberated areas of Eritrea and Tigray, women saw the actualization of the potential of women and conscious efforts of both men and women to change the socially prescribed subordinate roles of women. They were surprised to see

- that women had the right to own and cultivate land;
- that literacy programmes were arenas for husbands and wives to discuss the status of women;
- that both movements had education programmes to curtail the practice of female circumcision;
- that the minimum age of marriage was 16 years and that consent of both partners was an expected; and
- that women were trained in non-traditional trades as well as in professional roles.

If some women had earlier ambivalences about gender values with respect to their personal experiences, family and community relations, this ambivalence now shifted to the role women can play towards changing society. The experience also challenged them to actively support the struggles of their people once they were resettled in Canada. Some, for instance, speak in public forums and others help raise funds and material aid for war orphans and hunger relief.

Those who fled through liberated areas were particularly impressed with the stamina of women militants:

> I learned a lot. Specially in terms of women. It's unbelievable what women do. I heard about women I knew how strong they became physically and psychologically. They can be just eating *kollo* [a porridge] and wheat but they are so physically strong... As a woman I learned that there is nothing that prohibits women as a female..... they walk for four days and then they fight! ... You know the land is redistributed and peasants, even women including widows and single mothers can now own land.... There is nothing to block them. I always believed that I could achieve anything mentally like a man, but I learned a lot from them. It made me realize that I can contribute to changing the conditions of my people.

Women are active in the military and administrative activities of both the EPLF and the TPLF. The bravery of women fighters and their role in the struggle impressed another woman in her flight journey:

> Women have a very important role in the liberation movement. When I was with the fighters it was amazing to see how the women were teaching. They were more active than the men! Almost half the fighters were women. They were brave and even encouraged the men! I was surprised. I saw women as front line fighters.

This is a major shift in gender consciousness since, as early as 1943 during an earlier rebellion in Tigray province (the Weyene rebellion), war prisoners, spies and collaborators were dressed-up as women and paraded in the markets to be ridiculed for being as weak as women. Women in Ethiopia, however, took part in warfare even prior to the Italo-Ethiopia war (1935.) They also took up arms on the eve of the Italo-Ethiopian war despite a decree prohibiting them from enlisting. Tsehai Berhane Silassie argues that this law silenced women's participation in Ethiopian history and in the consciousness of the present generation. Nevertheless, women in the liberation struggles have become role models because of their courage and dedication to the betterment of their people. One of them concluded, "all this makes me believe that one is not born for our selfish needs but to contribute to society."

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Hardships of flight made one woman reflect on her class values:

> On this trip we met peasants and we lived like them . They were so generous. They shared the little food they had, and if they did not have food they would go to neighbours. We ate like them. Even the water that was full of worms and insects. I got an awareness that we are equal as human beings. Money, status and even education does not mean everything. The poor gave us what they had... What is in your heart is the most important thing. The peasants had a better life. We were living a false life. We did not have a cent when my father left [he fled the country ahead of his children because of impending imprisonment] I learned what it means to suffer. I was so bourgeois at home that I would even ask a servant to bring me a glass of water...How could I be living in Ethiopia and Eritrea and be so detached?

Women's experiences before becoming refugees, in flight and during asylum, will differ and will inevitably impact upon their adjustment process. More importantly however, these experiences can lead to empowerment through a process of politicization and self-awareness, as well as disempowerment (as a result of brutality and violence) - and as is generally depicted in available literature on women refugees.

The experience of being a refugee tends to involve a process of identity formation in terms of discontinuities, continuities, resistance and identity reconstruction. Viewed from this perspective, one should expect that refugee women who have experienced this process of empowerment will become functional, highly-motivated members of society after resettlement in countries such as Canada.

(Helene Moussa is a doctoral candidate at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, Toronto, Canada.)

"RESETTLED REFUGEES FROM ETHIOPIA: WHO GETS INTO THE UNITED STATES?"

Peter Koehn, *University of Montana*

Introduction

Success in flight from one's country of origin does not guarantee a secure place of refuge. Most refugees languish for years, even decades, in a neighboring country of first asylum. In general terms, relocation in the industrialized North depends upon individual initiative and application of receiving-country admission policy. This article identifies main waves of post-revolution refugees from Ethiopia who have managed to secure resettlement in the US and investigates characteristics which distinguish the admitted from their counterparts who have not moved beyond first refuge in Sudan.

The First Step

Experiences of Ethiopians and Eritreans in Sudan reveal much about the initial and subsequent steps in the refugee-migration process. The trip to Sudan typically is harsh and risky. Most migrants walk the entire way. Refugees from Ethiopia's urban areas usually must travel longer distances to reach protection in Sudan in comparison with rural residents.{1} In some cases, families must sell their property, including their homes, in order to pay fees charged by guides to lead a son or daughter through inhospitable terrain. Although they faced no threat that Sudanese government authorities would turn them back, nearly 15 percent of the respondents in Mekuria Bulcha's survey {2} reported suffering armed attack, robbery, or another form of violence during flight. About 40 percent of this group of refugees lacked food and water for some part of the trip, and 12 percent contracted malaria or another disease.{3}

Rural refugees generally settle at the first point of safety within the receiving country. Spontaneous border settlements have existed since the outbreak of fighting in the Eritrean liberation struggle.{4} While the flight of rural refugees tends to be a single-step phenomenon, most urban exiles engage in multiple-step migration.{5} Migrants from urban centers usually continue their journey further into Sudan.{6} The educated often end up in Khartoum.{7} The prevailing reasons refugees give for moving on to Khartoum are the search for employment and for third-country resettlement.{8}

First Asylum in Sudan

In light of the fact that many refugees from Ethiopia have relied upon Sudan as a place of first asylum, it is important to understand the conditions that political migrants face there. The majority of refugees live in rural areas; less than half reside in one of Sudan's cities. In 1984, about 80 percent of the refugees from Ethiopia lived in spontaneous residential circumstances; that is, they were "self-settled and lived scattered among the local population."{9} The remaining 22 percent inhabited 23 organized settlements in eastern and central Sudan operated since 1980 by the Sudanese government with international assistance. There are two major categories of organized settlement. In the land settlements, refugee families are awarded small plots of land and are expected to subsist through food-crop cultivation, animal husbandry, and occasional wage labor.{10} In the wage-earning settlements located in close proximity to large-scale commercial farms or government agricultural schemes, political migrants survive by providing unskilled labor.{11} Many Eritreans, in particular, encounter continued agitation from political activists who pressure them to serve as a rear support group for the guerrilla forces.{12} At the same time, exile political organizations perform an important role by operating their own assistance and educational programs, in mobilizing refugees and preserving their sense of identity, in informing newcomers about employment and educational opportunities, and in mediating on their behalf when they must interact with domestic and international agencies.{13}

In light of the fact that many refugees from Ethiopia have relied upon Sudan as a place of first asylum, it is important to understand the conditions that political migrants face there.

Upon arrival in Sudan, the refugee must adapt to a different language and culture and meet the challenge of basic survival. Shelter and subsistence top the list of initial problems reported by respondents in six settlement sites.{14} Lack of free health care adversely affects refugees living outside of organized settlements. In two rural spontaneous sites studied by Mekuria Bulcha, 30 percent of the children in the sampled refugee households died within the first year and 20 percent of all family members perished within the space of four years.{15} Laws restricting refugee movement within Sudan and the acquisition of work permits and licences present additional barriers to economic adjustment.{16} Finally, many are burdened by the pain of separation from close family and isolation from the homeland community that previously provided one's sense of belonging and identity.{17}

After five years in the Sudan, the vast majority of refugees from Ethiopia interviewed by Mekuria Bulcha had not resolved all of the initial problems they encountered. In fact, over 20 percent of those who settled spontaneously in a Sudanese village or town had solved few or none of their problems.{18}

Most refugees from Ethiopia find it difficult to subsist in rural Sudan. Mekuria Bulcha's 1982 interviews revealed that, "above two-thirds of the respondents were unable to achieve economic self-reliance and were therefore on the brink of starvation."{19} Families led by women are the most vulnerable since the rate of unemployment is much higher among female than male household heads.{20} Underemployment rates are high for all refugees in the labor market. Most household heads rely upon seasonal agricultural employment for five to six months in good years. Wages are low and various forms of exploitation are widespread.{21} Only 40 percent of all households retained any income after meeting food and shelter expenses alone.{22} Most refugee families, moreover, cannot count on breaking out of economic dependency and destitution over time. According to Mekuria, "the incidence of material poverty was as frequent among those who had been in the Sudan between 4 and 8 years as those who had been there just a year or two."{23}

Khartoum's refugees face problems comparable to those experienced by their compatriots living in eastern Sudan. At least 20 percent of the refugees from Ethiopia living in urban areas were unemployed in 1984, and a higher proportion struggled to subsist through underemployment in low-paying work.{24} In one large-scale survey, "over two-thirds of the sample reported that they received less daily income than is required to provide food, shelter, and basic necessities."{25} One survival response is to occupy shared-living quarters with up to 12 people.{26}

Skilled urban refugees, often lacking documents authorizing residence in Khartoum, are subject to exploitation at the hands of Sudanese landlords and employers as well as to arrest and involuntary relocation.{27} Refugees are routinely refused credit, barred by law from owning fixed assets, and blamed for Khartoum's economic problems.{28} Marginally integrated into the receiving society and economy, many seek "an external solution to their survival problems."{29} Meanwhile, the Sudanese government provides no assistance to urban refugees and they are virtually ignored by international donor agencies.{30}

The focus on refugee migration to Sudan yields important insights. First, most Eritreans and Ethiopians who sought protection there have experienced a decline in their standard of living. Nearly everyone left all of their possessions behind. Unemployment and underemployment is much higher in the new location than prior to flight. In short, "flight entails instant impoverishment" — even for those who were wealthy in the country of origin.{31}

Many refugees resort to agricultural wage labor in the countryside, and to petty trade, domestic work, and various informal-sector economic activities in towns and urban centers.{33} Availability of low-paying employment opportunities continues to shrink in the face of drought and increasing numbers of refugees and Sudanese migrant laborers in the rural areas along with competition from "unskilled but Arabic-speaking and documented Sudanese" in the cities.{34} The end result, then, has been little progress toward self-reliance among many of the refugees who live in Sudan.{35} This is consistent with the African refugee experience described in 1982 by Art Hansen:

> [F]or almost everyone the process of becoming a refugee is a transition from relative security and prosperity to uncertainty and poverty. Some starve; many become undernourished. Illness, exhaustion, and accident accompany many on their journey and await others after the rigors of the trip. Political sponsorship is abandoned in that the refugee rejects the protection of the only government under which he or she has the rights of a citizen or resident. Material wealth is lost or abandoned, and the refugee is also stripped of an important means to generate more wealth — the access to resources that is an aspect of the political and social relationships that are abandoned or destroyed.{36}

U.S. Resettlement

The population transfer from Ethiopia to the United States has involved a small proportion of the total refugee population. The U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service allowed some Ethiopians and Eritreans to enter the country as seventh-preference (refugee) immigrants by the late 1970s.{37} Many others joined the initial wave immediately following enactment of the Refugee Act in 1980. The larger second post-revolution wave of official refugees from Ethiopia covers the peak years from 1982 to 1984 through the present. Between 1982 and 1987, 12,551 resettled refugees from Ethiopia arrived in the United States.{38} Annual admissions have declined substantially in recent years, however. This is primarily because INS circuit riders in Sudan have virtually exclusively approved applicants with family ties in the U.S. — a criterion which few Africans can meet.{39}

In order to learn more about the backgrounds of those granted admission, the author coded available information related to household heads and independent applicants admitted with official-refugee status from a 10 percent sample of the bio-data forms received by 1984 at the Refugee Data Center in New York City ("RDC Bio-data sample"). These forms are numbered sequentially, and are arranged by date of entry in the U.S. and by country (or area) of application for resettlement. The procedure for this study involved a systematic sample with a random start from the 12 file boxes of applicants from Sudan, 2 of Djibouti applicants, and one each for refugees from Somalia, Kenya, Egypt, and via Europe. The results from the Refugee Data Center Bio-data sample of refugee household heads who reached the U.S. by 1984 allow for selected comparisons between the first and early second waves admitted from Ethiopia.{40} The next sections compare

the two waves by nationality, occupation, education, and family ties.

Nationality

Table 1 indicates that refugee household heads identified as Amhara constitute a plurality (36 percent) of the first wave. The rest of this arrival group is roughly evenly split among Eritreans, Tigreans, Oromo, and the combined category of other ethnic groups. Eritreans clearly predominate within the second wave, however. Among those who arrived between 1982 and 1984, 44 percent are Eritrean. During this interval, only 26 percent of the entering refugee household heads are Amhara.{41} The representation of Tigrean refugees remains constant during both waves, but the proportion of Oromo and "others" declines dramatically over time.

TABLE 1
Ethnicity of Refugee Household Heads from Ethiopia By U.S. Arrival Wave

	ETHNICITY				
Arrival Wave	Eritrean	Amhara	Tigray	Oromo	Other
% 1981 or before (N=166)	16.9%	35.5%	16.9%	12.7%	18.1%
% 1982-1984 (N=339)	43.7	25.7	18.6	5.0	7.1

Source: R.D.C. Bio-data sample.

Home-Country Occupation

Table 2 shows that there is no substantial decline among household heads from Ethiopia arriving during the second wave in the proportion from high-status occupational backgrounds and no significant increase in the percentage who were farmers and laborers.{42} The only major changes are the increase in former students entering as official refugees after 1981 and the decrease in homemakers and the unemployed from the first to the second wave.

TABLE 2
Home Country Occupational Background of Refugee Household Heads from Ethiopia By Wave

	ARRIVAL WAVE	
Principal Home-Country Occupation	%'81 or prior (N=175)	%'82-'84 (N=375)
Professional, top policy maker	1.7%	1.7%
Owner, mgr large business	3.4	0.8
Public servant, teacher, medical worker	23.4	20.8
Trader, owner small business	7.4	7.2
Skilled worker	6.3	4.8
Secretarial	12.0	12.4
Farmer, worker	18.3	20.3
Student only	13.1	26.9
Unemployed, homemaker	14.3	5.3

Source: R.D.C. Bio-data sample

Educational Attainments

Table 3 displays the educational attainments of the sampled refugees by wave. A higher proportion of second-wave than first-wave refugee household heads from Ethiopia had at most completed a primary education (26 percent versus 17 percent). On the other hand, there are more university-educated persons in the second wave than in the first group (9 percent to 3 percent). There are noteworthy variations in these results by ethnicity. The educational levels attained by admitted Eritreans decline considerably from the first to the second wave. To a lesser extent, this pattern also prevails among the Amhara in the sample. Among the Oromo and "other" groups, however, educational attainments

TABLE 3
Educational Attainments of Refugee Household Heads from Ethiopia By Wave

	EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT LEVEL				
Arrival Wave	Primary or less	Some Post-primary	Compltd Sec. or equiv.	Some Post-Sec.	Univ 1st or Adv degree
1981 or earlier (N=181)	16.6%	26.5%	33.7%	19.9%	3.3%
1982 -1984 (N=381)	26.2	24.7	22.3	17.6	9.2

Source: R.D.C. Bio-data Sample

actually increase from the first to the second wave.

Family Ties

Exactly the same percentage of first- and second-wave principal applicants admitted from Ethiopia (14 percent) reported that they knew of a close relative who resided in the U.S. at the time of application for resettlement. These low percentages suggest that family reunification is not an important factor among the second-wave refugee household heads from Ethiopia who settled in the US during the first decade following the revolution. Since 1984, however, the admission of official refugees under the U.S. resettlement program increasingly has been restricted to persons who can demonstrate the presence of caring family members who already are legally settled in the receiving country.{43}

Who Gets In?

Only a small proportion of the total number of refugees from Ethiopia are ever accepted for resettlement in the North. How do the individual household heads selected for placement in the U.S.A. resemble and/or differ from their compatriots who remain in neighboring countries of temporary asylum? Although the answer to this important question promises to enhance our understanding of the step-migration process, detailed comparative data along these lines have not been available in the past. The following discussion provides a focused comparison of U.S.-resettled and non-resettled refugees from Ethiopia who first received protection in Sudan.

Sudan Focus

Most Eritrean refugees and non Somali-speaking Ethiopians have fled to Sudan. In 1990, Sudan accommodated roughly 660,000 refugees from Ethiopia — mainly Eritreans and Tigreans. Some have lived in Sudan for over 20 years.{44}

Information on the refugees who remain in Sudan is drawn from two sources of local field work: Jerry Weaver's 1984 survey of urban refugees from Ethiopia living in the Khartoum area and Mekuria Bulcha's 1982—1983 eastern Sudan sample taken from three

TABLE 4
Selected Characteristics of Refugees from Ethiopia Still Living in Sudan and Resettled in the U.S. by 1984

CHARACTERISTICS	SUDAN Khartoum Study (N=1012)	SUDAN E.Sudan Study (N=413)	U.S. R.D.C. Bio-data (N=359)
Gender			
Male	90.0%	84.7%	88.9%
Female	10.0[a]	15.3	11.1
Age			
21 or less	21.7	15.3[b]	8.9
22-25	26.8	44.4[b]	26.3
26-30	24.7	--	34.4
31 and older	27.3	40.3	30.4
Year Arrived in Sudan			
Prior to 1976	c	10.6	0.0
1976-1979	c	59.6	18.7
1980-1982	c	29.8	63.9
1983-1984	c	--	17.4
Ethnic Identification			
Eritrean	67.1	59.0[d]	42.2
Tigrean	15.6	----	22.9
Amhara	14.5	25.0	31.0
Oromo	1.4	16.0	2.8
Other	4.0	--	1.1
Religious Identification			
Ethiopian Orthodox			79.8
Other Christian	82.5	80.0	12.9
Muslim	16.4	20.0	7.3
Educational Attainment			
Completed University	1.3	2.7	1.7
Some post-secondary	3.5	--	16.2
Completed secondary or equiv.	12.4	7.5	24.9
Some post primary	32.1	--	27.9
Completed primary	21.0	15.0	7.5
Some primary	--	--	15.9
No formal	29.2	74.8	5.9

[a]Household heads only.
[b]20 or less; 21-30.
[c]No information available.
[d]Reported only by language spoken.

Source: Weaver, "Sojourners," 149; Mekuria Bulcha, **Flight**, pp. 98, 150, 153—154; R.D.C. Bio-data sample.

organized settlement sites and five spontaneous settlement areas in urban, semi-urban, and rural settings.{45}. Table 4 presents data on six background characteristics across the three subsets of refugees from Ethiopia who fled to Sudan.{46}

Gender, Age, Vintage, Ethnicity, and Religion

Gender and age prove not to be particularly interesting variables, although the household heads admitted to the U.S. are somewhat more likely to be in their twenties and less likely to be younger. Striking is the much greater tendency for later migrants to secure resettlement and for the earliest refugees to remain in Sudan. Table 4 also shows that Amhara and Christians who fled to Sudan have succeeded within the U.S. resettlement program in numbers that are disproportionate to their presence in the total pool of refugees from Ethiopia who currently live in Sudan. Eritreans and Muslims in Sudan have been particularly disadvantaged in obtaining third-country resettlement in the United States.

Education

Table 4 suggests that educational background exerts the greatest influence over prospects of entry to the US. While less than 5 percent of political migrants living in Sudan had attended a university, nearly 20 percent of resettled household heads had attained this educational level. Less than 30 percent of the resettled sample had a primary education or less; half of the Khartoum sample and 90 percent of the eastern Sudan group possess such limited formal educational attainments.

...the findings reviewed here point to educational and occupational background factors as particularly influential considerations affecting the third-country resettlement stage of the refugee step-migration process.

TABLE 5
Homeland Occupational Background of Refugees from Ethiopia Still Living in Sudan and Resettled in the U.S. by 1984

	SUDAN		U.S.
Homeland Occupation	Khartoum Study (N=1012)	E.Sudan Study (N=413)	R.D.C. Bio-data (N=345)
Subsistence farmer/herder	7.0%	23.0%	5.5%
Homemaker	18.9	18.9	2.0
Student only	29.2	4.1	22.0
Domestic helper	1.3	6.1	2.3
Unskilled laborer	9.1[a]	11.7	16.8
Trader, artisan	3.6[b]	8.0	5.8
Skilled labor	11.1	0.7	2.6
Clerk, secretary	2.0[c]	-	9.3
Teacher, clergy	0.0	-	11.1
Soldier, police	3.4	9.2	4.1
Public servant	0.0	-	10.7
Professional, manager	6.7	-	4.0
Other	0.0	8.3	0.3
Unemployed	6.8	9.9	4.1

[a]"Service." [b]"Self-employed." [c]"Office."
Source: Weaver, "Sojourners," 152; Mekuria, Bulcha, **Flight**, p. 155; R.D.C. Bio-data sample.

Occupation

Occupational background also relates to entry under the U.S. resettlement program. Table 5 indicates that nearly 40 percent of admitted household heads had worked as a teacher, professional, manager, administrator, secretary, or soldier in Ethiopia. Since only about 10 percent of those who remained in Sudan reported such occupational backgrounds, we can safely conclude that applicants with these particular work experiences in the sending country have a better chance of third-country resettlement. Former subsistence farmers and herders, on the other hand, are the least likely to move beyond rural settlements in border regions and are the most under-represented component of the home-country labor force in the resettled sample. The data also suggest that most of the former skilled workers managed to gravitate to the capital of the initial receiving country. Although relatively few of the skilled laborers have been selected for admission to the US, many have moved on to jobs in the Middle East.{47}

Conclusion

While only suggestive, the findings reviewed here point to educational and occupational background factors as particularly influential considerations affecting the third-country resettlement stage of the refugee step-migration process. Although not required to do so by legislation dealing with refugee resettlement, U.S. administrative gatekeepers in Sudan have given preference in the screening process to applicants with educational and occupational backgrounds deemed most conducive to adaptation in the receiving society.{48}

NOTES

1. Mekuria Bulcha, *Flight and Integration: Causes of Mass Exodus from Ethiopia and Problems of Integration in the Sudan* (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1988), pp. 135—136; Lucia A. McSpadden, "Ethiopian Refugee Resettlement in the Western United States: Social Context and Psychological Well-Being," *International Migration Review* 21, No. 3 (1987):804.

2. Mekuria Bulcha, *Flight*, pp. 106, 132.

3. Partly as a consequence of their demanding and exhausting flight, many refugees proved susceptible to health problems upon arrival in Sudan. Mekuria Bulcha, *Flight*, pp. 139—141. On the experiences of Somali refugees, who tended to flee in small groups, see Sidney R. Waldron, "Somali Refugee Background Characteristics: Preliminary Results from the Qoriooley Camps" (mimeo, 1983), p. 7.

4. Leon Gordenker, *Refugees in International Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), p. 147.

5. Mekuria Bulcha, *Flight*, pp. 137—138.

6. Of course, some rural migrants also make their way to the larger towns in Sudan. See Ahmed Karadawi, "The Problem of Urban Refugees in Sudan," in *Refugees: A Third World Dilemma*, edited by John R. Rogge (Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1987), pp. 116, 119—120.

7. Mekuria Bulcha, *Flight*, pp. 136—138. Nearly half of the respondents in Eyob Goitom's survey of 320 Khartoum refugees originated in Asmara. Eyob Goitom, "Systems of Social Interaction of Refugee Adjustment Processes: The Case of Eritrean Refugees in Khartoum, Sudan," in *Refugees: A Third World Deliemma*, edited by John R. Rogge (Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1987) p. 137.

8. In discussing the results of one local study, Jerry Weaver refers specifically to resettlement in the United States. Jerry L. Weaver, "Sojourners Along the Nile: Ethiopian Refugees in Khartoum," in *Journal of Modern African Studies* 23, No. 1 (1985):150—151. An earlier research project (cited in Mekuria Bulcha, *Flight*, p. 138) found considerable interest in migration to Europe and the Middle East as well as to the United States. Also see Karadawi, "Urban Refugees," pp. 121—122; Eyob Goitom, "Eritrean Refugees," p. 137.

9. Mekuria Bulcha, *Flight*, p. 30.

10. The Somali government introduced income-generating programs and pilot agricultural schemes for a small section of its refugee-camp population in 1982. Hanne Christensen, "Spontaneous Development Efforts by Rural Refugees in Somalia and Pakistan," in *Refugees: A Third World Dilemma*, edited by John R. Rogge (Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1987), p. 200.

11. Mekuria Bulcha, *Flight*, p. 30; Hiram Ruiz, *Beyond the Headlines: Refugees in the Horn of Africa* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1988), p. 32. This applies to settlements in and around Gedaref, for instance. Karadawi, "Urban Refugees," p. 118.

12. Mekuria Bulcha, *Flight*, pp. 82—83; Eyob Goitom, "Eritrean Refugees," p. 140.

13. Karadawi, "Urban Refugees," pp. 121—122; Eyob Goitom, "Eritrean Refugees," p. 141.

14. Mekuria Bulcha, *Flight*, p. 140.

15. Over half of the interviewees who complained of poor personal health had contracted their affliction after arrival in Sudan. Mekuria Bulcha, *Flight*, pp. 141, 171.

16. Mekuria Bulcha, *Flight*, p. 142.

17. Mekuria Bulcha, *Flight*, pp. 198—199.

18. Mekuria Bulcha, *Flight*, pp. 142—143.

19. Mekuria Bulcha, *Flight*, pp. 162—163.

20. Mekuria Bulcha, *Flight*, p. 164. On the barriers to employment of women outside of service and domestic jobs in Khartoum, see Weaver, "Sojourners," 152—153; Eyob Goitom, "Eritrean Refugees," p. 138.

21. Mekuria Bulcha, *Flight*, pp. 172—173.

22. Moreover, they "still were not free from malnutrition." Mekuria Bulcha, *Flight*, pp. 155, 170.

23. Mekuria Bulcha, *Flight*, p. 163.

24. Weaver, "Sojourners," 153; Eyob Goitom, "Eritrean Refugees," pp. 139—140.

25. Weaver, "Sojourners," 153.

26. Eyob Goitom, "Eritrean Refugees," p. 139.

27. Weaver, "Sojourners," 153—155; Gordenker, *Refugees*, p. 148; Al Santoli, *New Americans: Immigrants and Refugees in the U.S. Today* (New York: Viking, 1988), p. 95.

28. Weaver, "Sojourners," 154—155. Specifically, they are blamed for the shortage of housing and rising rents, pressures on public services, and insufficient supplies of consumer goods. Karadawi, "Urban Refugees," pp. 124, 116; Santoli, *New Americans*, p. 96; Eyob Goitom, "Eritrean Refugees," p. 139.

29. Weaver, *Flight*, p. 148.

30. Weaver, "Sojourners," 147; Karadawi, "Urban Refugees," p. 126.

31. Mekuria Bulcha, *Flight*, p. 200.

32. Furthermore, 67 percent had owned productive assets in Ethiopia, whereas only 12 percent possessed such property in Sudan. Mekuria Bulcha, *Flight*, p. 171.

33. Mekuria Bulcha, *Flight*, pp. 155-158; Weaver, "Sojourners," 152.

34. Weaver, "Sojourners," 153; Mekuria Bulcha, *Flight*, p. 158.

35. Mekuria Bulcha, *Flight*, p. 200.

36. Art Hansen, "Self-Settled Rural Refugees in Africa: The Case of Angolans in Zambian Villages," in *Involuntary Migration and Resettlement: The Problems and Responses of Dislocated People*, edited by Art Hansen and Anthony Oliver-Smith (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), p. 32.

37. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 allowed the "conditional" entry of 6 percent of the total annual immigration quota (i.e., about 17,000 principal applicants and 25,000 persons) under a seventh-preference category established for those who had fled communist-dominated countries, or a Middle Eastern country. John A. Scanlan, "First Final Research Report Submitted to the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy," in *U.S. Immigration Policy and the National Interest*, Appendix C to the Staff Report (Washington, D.C.: The Commission, 1980), pp. 105—106.

38. United States, Immigration and Naturalization Service, *Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1987* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), p. 50.

39. Beverly G. Hawk, "Africans and the 1965 U.S. Immigration Law" (Ph. D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1988), pp. 112-114, 161, 287.

40. The actual date of arrival usually is not recorded in the bio-data files. In its place, we relied upon the year in which an applicant received approval to enter the U.S. since this corresponds in most cases with the year of arrival. At the time of research, nearly 70 percent of the total sample (84 percent of the Eritreans) had arrived in the U.S. during the second wave (i.e., after 1981).

41. These data do not support Beverly Hawk's assertion ("Africans," p. 126) that most resettled refugees from Ethiopia are Amhara.

42. The available FY 1987 data continue to support this conclusion. See U.S., INS, *1987 Yearbook*, p. 40.

43. See Donald J. Cichon, Elzbieta M. Gozdziak, and Jane G. Grover, *The Economic and Social Adjustment of Non-Southeast Asian Refugees*, Vol. I (Falls Church: Research Management Corporation, 1986), p. 29.

44. Tessa Williams, "Sudan: Twenty Years on," *Refugees* 72 (February 1990):31.

45. See Weaver, "Sojourners," 147—150; Mekuria Bulcha, *Flight*, pp. 92—97. Most refugees from Ethiopia live in eastern Sudan. An estimated 200,000 inhabit Sudan's largest cities of Khartoum, Gedaref, Kassala, and Port Sudan. Williams, "Twenty Years," 31. Mekuria Bulcha's research included the town of Gedaref.

46. The R.D.C. sample consists of principal applicants for refugee status — almost all of whom are heads of household or independent individuals. About 35 percent of the Khartoum group are the spouses of male household heads who were away at work at the time the survey took place. Weaver, "Sojourners," 150. Mekuria Bulcha's team also interviewed some wives in place of absent male household heads. He found it necessary to make such substitutions in nearly 20 percent of the sampled households in two of the three organized settlements. Mekuria Bulcha, *Flight*, p. 95.

47. Also see Mekuria Bulcha, *Flight*, p. 138; Eyob Goitom, "Eritrean Refugees," pp. 138—140.

48. It also is conceivable that the narrow definition of "refugee" which guides U.S. admission practice amounts to a formidable class barrier to further migration. However, overseas gatekeepers generally have not enforced a particularly narrow definition in the refugee-resettlement process. See Peter H. Koehn, *Refugees from Revolution: U.S. Policy and Third World Migration* (Boulder: Westview Press, forthcoming).

CROSS-CULTURAL UNDERSTANDINGS OF INDEPENDENCE AND DEPENDENCE: CONFLICT IN THE RESETTLEMENT OF SINGLE ETHIOPIAN MALES

Lucia Ann McSpadden*, Ph.D.

The vast majority of Ethiopian refugees are rural, poor, and illiterate, reflecting the reality of their country. However, most Ethiopians who have reached the U.S. and Canada are well-educated by Ethiopian standards having, at a minimum, an 8th grade education. They come from a small segment of Ethiopian society, the urban or semi-urban elite. Typically they left for political reasons, fearing arrest, imprisonment, torture and death. Some were caught up in the civil war either as combatants or suspected combatants (McSpadden 1989)

The number of Ethiopian refugees in the U.S. and Canada is quite small. In the U.S., for example, in 1979 only 169 were admitted as refugees. The ceiling for African refugees in the FY 1987 was 3,500 and later was reduced to 2,000, most of whom were Ethiopians (World Refugee Survey 1988:4). By the end of 1989 approximately 17,500 Ethiopians had been admitted to the U.S. as refugees. The number admitted to Canada is substantially smaller. The vast majority of these refugees are single young men, here without families and often without previous friends from Ethiopia.

This paper is based on a larger analytical study of the psychological well-being of Ethiopian refugees. It began because of reported high levels of depression and suicide among Ethiopian refugees, especially young, single men. Over 100 refugees were interviewed in Northern California, Seattle, Washington, and Reno, Nevada using open-ended interviews and two structured questionnaires: the short form of the questionnaire developed by Goldberg (1972) to identify and assess non-psychotic mental illness, and the Self Anchoring Striving Scale developed by Cantril (1960; 1971) addressing the hopes and fears of the respondent. Participant observation was also used in my profession as a refugee resettlement coordinator in Northern California and Northern Nevada.

Characteristics of single male Ethiopian refugees which puts them at increased risk are as follows:

1. They represent an age group likely to experience special difficulty in satisfactory resettlement—19-35 years old (Charron and Ness 1981).
2. They represent the class level most likely to experience immediate downward social mobility, i.e., middle-class, well-educated (Smither 1981).
3. They are single or here without wife, away from a supportive family structure, yet from a culture in which family is strong and especially supportive for single young males (CAL 1982; Levine 1965).
4. Due to the small resident Ethiopian community in the U.S. and Canada, they have a very small ethnic support community. Social contacts are pervasive indicators of mental health for refugees (Verwey-Jonker and Brackel 1957).
5. Ethiopia is an ethnically and linguistically diverse country with social/economic/political status and power associated with such divisions. These divisions continue to be important in the U.S. and Canada and weaken supportive community relationships when the numbers are so small (Haile: personal communication).
6. They have high aspirations and the basic technical skills necessary to achieve them, i.e., English language and experience with formal education. However, their job skills/experience are essentially non-existent due to age, their social status in Ethiopia, and the disruption of the refugee experience.
7. Besides the common refugee experience, Ethiopians face additional discrimination due to being Black.

The single male Ethiopian refugee is also at an important but unstable stage of his life, the transition from childhood into adulthood, from dependence to independence. He is "moving into his future" as many Ethiopians say. Normally, this is the time to enter a vocation and develop an economic place in the society, to form one's own family and to develop a supportive network of friends.(Erikson 1959) It is a time to begin to put together aspirations and achievements.

The basic difficulty is that this normal world is not the one in which they are existing at the moment nor will be for the foreseeable future. This is true of all refugees, but for Ethiopian refugees this situational ambiguity is coupled with the role tasks and uncertainties of the single young adult male resulting in a high level of anxiety and discontent, in large discrepancies between aspirations and actual achievements. They are additionally confused about how to strategize and behave in order to close that gap and bring achievements in line with aspirations, to regain their expected life plan and former status.

It is the attempt to develop a strategy, to follow a plan to minimize this discrepancy between aspirations and achievements which becomes the basis of intense, often volatile, interactions between these Ethiopian refugees and their sponsors, either

*Director of Research and Refugee Concerns Coordinator, California-Nevada Annual Conference United Methodist Church, P.O. Box 467, San Francisco, California, U.S.A. 94101

NOTES:

1. I will be using the term "Ethiopian" to refer to both Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees. In the context of the war situation between Ethiopia and Eritrea that can be taken as a political and partisan statement. I do not mean it as that in any way. It is strictly in the interests of time since the social situation of both Ethiopians and Eritreans can be understood as part of the same phenomenon.
2. All the names and locations of these refugees have been changed; the situations are accurate.

agencies or church congregations. It is this interaction and the cultural understandings behind it which I wish to address.

I am focusing specifically upon refugees during their second stage of resettlement, the last half of the first year and the second year, a time of great stress and confusion. Initial coping strategies are developed, tried and altered if necessary. The need for guidance from and interaction with the sponsor is most significant (Stein 1981:328).

...cultural models which refugees have for achieving goals and cultural models sponsors have for appropriate tactics are significantly different.

Interviews revealed several consistencies: (1) levels of stress were strongly and directly associated with their employment/self-sufficiency situation. Those employed at what they considered a job with a future or in training/schooling which appeared to lead to appropriate future status and a "good job" had lower stress than unemployed or under-employed English-speaking refugees; (2) Their hopes and fears were explicit, i.e., the marker of a good life in this country was to "succeed by my own efforts," to be financially self-sufficient, to have a good job, frequently after some time in schooling or college. Their fears can be summed up in such phrases as "to be a beggar," "not to stand on my own feet," "to always be on welfare," "not to be able to take care of my mother."

Their American and Canadian sponsors would heartily endorse and support such goals and would understand such fears as being motivational for sustained effort. They are the same goals as the sponsors have for the refugees. Therefore, one might logically expect that interactions between refugees and sponsors would proceed relatively smoothly toward common goals with common fears behind the goals.

However, cultural models which refugees have for achieving goals and cultural models sponsors have for appropriate tactics are significantly different. The salient concepts around this "split screen" (Stein 1981) are those of independence and dependence, as both a goal and a tactic, and the concept of the roles of the institutions of education and the family/sponsor/patron.

Negussie's experience serves to illustrate this "split screen" (Stein 1981:327) interface between sponsor and refugee. Negussie, a second year student at the University in Asmara, Eritrea, fled Ethiopia after being jailed along with his father and brother. He has not seen nor heard of them since. His mother is living in Asmara, caring for his two younger siblings, and in a difficult economic condition. He was sponsored by a church which was delighted to help a refugee who was obviously well-educated and who, they assumed, was highly motivated to succeed. At first his sponsorship went well, He lived with an American family, enjoying the personal interaction and obvious concern.

However, the situation soon degenerated as Negussie was given a job as a gas station attendant. After one week he quit saying the work was "too hard." Several other jobs were found, minimum wage, full-time, obviously easily within Negussie's capabilities. Negussie refused to take them. They were not "good jobs"; they were too menial. He wanted more prestige, more pay, more appreciation for his skills. He wanted to go to school rather than work at such jobs. His sponsor was outraged. She found Negussie a job at a Christmas tree lot, rented him a room at the YMCA for a month, and told him he was on his own. She didn't want any more to do with him! He was demanding, lazy, stubborn, and unworthy of more effort from her. Her reaction is similar to the head of a resettlement agency who refused to interact with an Ethiopian refugee who turned down a reasonable job offer. She will no longer make the services of her agency available to him until he is willing to accept whatever job is offered.

I submit that the conflict illustrated by the tense, confusing, and degenerating interaction is due to the difference in operational cultural models rather than to the difference in actual resources available to the refugee. The difference in the understanding of independence and dependence and the difference in what are considered culturally appropriate tactics to reach the same goals are the key elements. In contrast to American or Canadian society every Ethiopian has a clearly defined place in the social structure. An individual does not, indeed cannot, change that social position by hard work or individual initiative under normal circumstances.

In Ethiopia one's job is an extension of one's family and social status. In a society of rigid social hierarchies it is not possible to move from the status of the "server" to that of the "served". In recent years the role of the educational institutions is to train a small percent of persons to move into a basically guaranteed social status in Ethiopian society. Young people are "obsessively aware of the value of further schooling,"

Ethiopian moral order rests on two pillars; Christianity and "the institution of respect". This means that all people in higher social positions must be shown fastidious deference.

for it is the surest way to a well-paying job (Levine 1965:109). Under modernization, schools are a vehicle for some social mobility, a mobility which would have been unknown a generation or two before (Levine 1965:115). Thus the traditional hierarchical image of a superior and privileged status group is perpetuated. "All Ethiopians who have graduated from secondary school may...be considered members of a secular elite, those with college and graduate degrees enjoying correspondingly higher status within

this elite" (Levine 1965:190). However, such education is a scarce resource which further adds to the selectivity of this group. In 1962 less than 1% of the eligible population completed elementary school (Levine 1965:193)! Along with coming from high status, well-connected families, education is *the* essential element in ensuring high status, economic security and influence. With this comes one of the most important results - respect. The journey toward self-reliance and independence is shaped by status considerations (Levine 1965:81-82). Unskilled manual labor is traditionally relegated to slaves and servants from "inferior" tribes. Ethiopian moral order rests on two pillars; Christianity and "the institution of respect". This means that all people in higher social positions must be shown fastidious deference. Not to do so is a sign of *balage*, "rudeness" (Levine 1965:104-105).

For a well-educated, high-status Ethiopian to do manual labor or low-status work is almost incomprehensible. The family focuses its energy toward enabling a young man to be a student so that he is able, as an adult, to fulfill the social status position of the family as well as his own. The role of the family is to free the young man from all other obligations so he can direct his energies to his education. Students' lives are filled with going to school and meeting their friends "for tea and talk." They are not expected to work to put themselves through school nor to help their families. Rather, all the family and personal energies are directed to enable the student to be as successful as possible. Thus, the student is enveloped in the protection and expectation of the family: protection from outside demands and the expectation that the student will be part of the educated elite, a person of high status and secure position, a person who will be served.

The young Ethiopian man moves in a predictable manner toward independence and full adulthood. First comes education, then a good job followed by marriage and family. During the time of education, the young man lives at home and is cared for. Only after establishing himself as an adult does he move away and become independent. Therefore "dependence" is a logical, respected and expected situation leading toward subsequent and predictable "independence." In fact, Ethiopian young men speak of being independent and free to go to school. Independence is, at this stage of life, equated with freedom to work intensely toward one's future; to be independent is to have one's physical needs cared for so that one's education can receive total attention. Success is then assured: a job of perceived high status is the mark of success—with this comes respect.

The ethnic community is fractured by language and political difference; people are suspicious and do not form new friendships quickly or easily. Affectional needs are postponed or appear impossible. The number of single women Ethiopian refugees admitted to the U.S. and Canada is very small.

For the American or Canadian, however, independence is solely connected with being financially self-sufficient (Stewart 1972). To be dependent financially or even emotionally is shameful for an adult. Success is achieved by hard work and is the responsibility of the individual alone. We are status-by-achievement societies, whereas Ethiopia is essentially a status-by-ascription society. We see America and Canada as lands of opportunity, not lands of the "free handout". As one sponsor stated when informed that two Ethiopian refugees wanted a loan of $1500 to buy a car to go to school, "I wouldn't even do that for my son!".

It is possible and expected to move in the U.S. and Canada from the status of the "serving" person to the status of the "served" person, to use Ethiopian categories. Education, training, and experience are the keys to doing this, institutionally. Job switching, up-the-ladder, is customary. One is supposed to appreciate this opportunity to advance and thus to work to be economically self-sufficient (Stewart 1972). No job is too menial nor too hard if it will enable a person to be independent financially. Beginning jobs and/or part-time jobs for a young adult are understood to be temporary and not related directly to eventual status in U.S. and Canadian society. Future success and a good job are not assured: they are understood to be dependent upon hard work and upon perseverance.

Thus the stress is exacerbated and confusion reigns. The Ethiopian single male refugee is supported financially for a one to three month period during which a job search is conducted by the sponsor. He is expected to take any job and be grateful for that...for he is now independent and, therefore, a self-respecting adult. However, the Ethiopian says "but what of my future?" "I must be free to go to school", or "My sponsors must find me a good job (translated—a high status job)." Mebratu literally screamed as he explained his refusal to attend a meeting with his sponsors, a refugee committee of a church: "They are all *dumb, dumb, dumb.*" "When they suggest a dishwasher's job, they look at me as if I were an animal. They see a dishwasher. I am *not* a dishwasher. I am a *good* man. I must have a *good* job."

One young man summed up the cultural tensions:

I never tell my parents what I am doing! My mother would be so ashamed. We are all the same. We don't tell our mothers what we are doing. These jobs we have—never in Ethiopia—never! It is a shame. Only if you are poor do you do what we do here. To work in a restaurant—ooh! But here it is what we have to do so we can live, so we can go to school. But we never tell our mothers.

And so the essential dichotomy is played out, the interaction of two disparate cultural models of moving from childhood into adulthood, of moving from dependence to independence, come into direct clash.

The Ethiopian refugee is, of course, far away from his natal family. There are few, if any, Ethiopian adults to take a parental role. He looks to his sponsor (church or agency) to fill the role of family or patron institutionally and emotionally. He expects the sponsor to appreciate the horror of the refugee experience, to protect him, to support him, to listen to him, to send him to school, to find him a *good* job. The sponsor, on the other hand, moves quickly to make the refugee financially self-sufficient. The Ethiopian's familiarity with the English language is often mistaken for familiarity with the culture and system. The refugee is left alone, as an independent adult, once the initial job is found. The sponsor is thus "successful". It is implicitly assumed that the refugee will be able to build his future from this financially secure base. It is his personal responsibility to do that. Efforts by the refugee to be financially dependent to pursue schooling full-time, or to wait to find a "good" job are strongly discouraged and/or made impossible. In the U.S., for example, many states will not allow a person receiving public assistance to be a full-time student, and a part-time student cannot receive federal student aid.

This difference in cultural models of how to move into adulthood is all the more serious for these young men as other life tasks are either very difficult or actually impossible for the moment. The ethnic community is fractured by language and political difference; people are suspicious and do not form new friendships quickly or easily. Affectional needs are postponed or appear impossible. The number of single women Ethiopian refugees admitted to the U.S. and Canada is very small. Consistently, when asked about getting married, these young men answered, "I cannot think about that now. I have to think about my future, about a job, about school. A family will have to be later."

Given this severe reduction in cultural inventory (Scudder 1982), for the Ethiopian single refugee and the strong differences in cultural models as to how to become an independent adult, the sponsor as both change agent and culture broker becomes extremely important, perhaps even more important than for other refugee groups. In the analysis of stress levels among these men, the intensity and style of interaction of the sponsor (either agency or individual) was a variable strongly related to relative satisfaction with one's current situation and progress, to having an appropriate job and/or going to school. Those refugees who were closely involved with their sponsors, who had Americans to turn to for advice as "their family," had a lower level of stress. These sponsors tolerated an "un-American" level of dependence,emotionally if not financially. They encouraged a high level of personal interaction, gave advice directly and openly, took the concerns of the refugees seriously even if they could not meet all of them, worked strongly to open doors of opportunity including education and/or training and were clear about steps needed to reach goals. Yohannes (who is going to school full-time in the day with a Pell Grant, a money gift from an American friend of Yohannes' and Yohannes' own money from his full-time job on the swing shift doing electronics assembly) said:

> I could not have had all this happen without so much help—so many people helped me. The woman at the college helped me get my registration changed to a resident: I had to fight a lot to get that to happen; they kept telling me 'no'. A man showed me how to get a Pell Grant. One woman gave me $750 of her own money as a gift so I could go to school. A man at the church got my transcript translated from Russian to an English official translation with a seal. The college accepted it then and transferred my 61 units. I am a junior now. See this apartment—everything here is from the church. I haven't had to buy anything. I have had so much help. I couldn't do it by myself. By myself I would give up with all of this. It is too much to do alone (McSpadden 1989: 190).

Enabling personal interaction, developing short-term plans which are realistic in the U.S. and Canada but which take the educational and employment goals of these young men seriously is essential in order to reduce stress and promote appropriate and successful activity.

Such sponsors fit the Ethiopian cultural model of the family, or of the parent, or of the patron. As one agency director said, "I am like their Godmother. I tell them what to do and how to do it. I let them know what I will do and what I expect them to do." A personal connection perceived as caring is developed. Nejmadine said of his church sponsor. "I owe her my life: she sacrificed so much for me, got me in school, found me a place to live."

Refugees with the highest level of stress were either underemployed or unemployed although their English was adequate for employment and/or schooling. They were left alone by their sponsors, asking advice from other Ethiopian refugees, looking through the newspapers for jobs. They were left to go for job interviews on their own even though, in the research, every refugee who was employed needed someone to intervene for him in that first interview. When asked if they knew how to plan toward their idea of a good future, they said", go to school and get a good job." When asked if they knew how to do that, typically they said "no" or "keep on putting in applications." The sponsors often said "they know where we are; if they have problems or questions, they should come in and get help." These sponsors expected personal independence, active problem solving, and individual responsibility. Most often these sponsors appeared to consider a college education to be a luxury for a refugee and did not offer help in pursuing higher educational goals.

Thus, the ability of the sponsor, church or agency, to utilize some aspects of the cultural model of the Ethiopian refugee in the resettlement process is

crucial, i.e., to utilize a cultural pluralism rather than a host-conformity approach (cf. Gordon 1964). Enabling personal interaction, developing short-term plans which are realistic in the U.S. and Canada but which take the educational and employment goals of these young men seriously is essential in order to reduce stress and promote appropriate and successful activity. The young Ethiopian refugee, "away from his mother" as he frequently says, without a cohesive ethnic community, without a realistic way to build or rebuild a family, without the financial resources to act out his own cultural model of moving from dependence to independence, from childhood to adulthood, depends, often unrealistically, perhaps inordinately even for a refugee, upon his sponsor for understandable cultural guidance and concrete help. Hopefully, he will then develop a functional, transitional third cultural model which will guide his movement into a psychologically and economically satisfactory independent adulthood.

With this goal in mind, the energy of the resettlement personnel should be devoted to developing access to the economic and social resources of this society to enable social and economic mobility rather than just self-sufficiency. This is an approach that fits with the Ethiopian aspirations as well as being effective in incorporating the Ethiopian into a hopeful social/class position. This would mean access to the following:

1) credentials that Americans and Canadians recognize and respect (not just refugee-related credentials).

2) information that will allow culturally-appropriate choices to be made, e.g., what is required to enter into a course of study at the local college; how a part-time job can be put together with financial aid so that a person can attend college; what training/experience is necessary to obtain the sought-for job.

3) access to appropriate training that Americans and Canadians understand and recognize and that will be likely to connect the refugee to a valued job.

4) access to regular, not just refugee-related, schooling. This is especially important for Ethiopian refugees who speak functional English.

5) access to jobs with an acceptable status and which provide the opportunity for social mobility.

As Finnan (1981) notes in regard to Southeast Asian refugees, the category "acceptable status" can be redefined by the refugee to alleviate social and cognitive dissonance and subsequent distress (cf. Rumbaut, 1986). An "acceptable job" may be understood as one that will allow the Ethiopian to pursue important long-term goals, rather than be an end in itself. A janitorial job is much more acceptable as a function enabling enrollment in college than it is as an adult job a person will pursue for the rest of his life. The primary self and social identification is then that of "student".

For many refugees resettlement processes determine future experiences and options that will be available, that is; what will "independence" finally mean for the Ethiopian in the U.S. and Canada?

Although the resources that the refugees bring vary, the actual resettlement process is a prime incorporating mechanism. Its operation can effectively direct the refugee toward a particular class membership in our society. Such class membership, and the opportunities it provides, are initially a function of the access to resources that the resettlement entities provide.

For many refugees resettlement processes determine future experiences and options that will be available, that is; what will "independence" finally mean for the Ethiopian in the U.S. and Canada?

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ANNOUNCEMENT

TOWARDS PRACTICAL EARLY-WARNING CAPABILITIES ON REFUGEE FLOWS

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For the last two years, ***the Centre for Refugee Studies at York University and the Office for Research & the Collection of Information (OCRI)*** *of the Offices of the Secretary General of the United Nations* have been discussing the possibility of working together to develop an early-warning network to help determine areas where refugee-flows are likely to occur. Recent events in the Gulf have heightened our awareness of the need to develop a better system of coordination for the determination of these flows in order to respond to crises in a more timely manner.

This interest has been generated by the expanding numbers of refugees and displaced persons worldwide. There is also the realization by all those involved that co-ordination and planning require some ability to anticipate refugee flows. This anticipation, based on informed analysis, will allow governments and international agencies to respond to emerging crises more effectively.

Growing attention from concerned international governmental organizations, states, NGOs as well as the diplomatic and scientific community has resulted in the realization that they need to get involved in the elaboration of a global early-warning network.

As part of this process, the Centre for Refugee Studies at York University, in co-operation with ORCI, is hosting a workshop on the topic *"Towards Practical Early-Warning Capabilities"* to be held in Toronto on May 29-31, 1991.

Representatives of organizations involved in Early-Warning work have been invited to attend.

For further information, please contact:

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