CANADA'S PERIODICAL ON REFUGEES

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Focus: Refugee Movements From The Sudan

An Exemplar Report on IRB

Rebuilding Trust: The Report of the Review of Fundamental Justice in Information Gathering and Dissemination at the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) of Canada is imposing, far less because of the overlong title than for the carefully reasoned and empathetic treatment of an urgent issue in refugee determination. Couched in efficient and grammatically impeccable prose, this 80-page document deserves to become required reading for all concerned with the substance and method of refugee determination, not least, we hope, for all members of the IRB and of the Citizenship and Immigration Commission (CIC). Reviewer Prof. James Hathaway, buttressed by innumerable testimonies and depositions of Board, legal and nongovernmental communities, has interpreted his terms of reference to review and advise on:

> compliance by the Immigration and Refugee Board with the principles of fundamental justice in its information gathering and dissemination activities with particular attention to the matter of contacts between members and refugee hearing officers .... compliance ... regarding information gathering and dissemination [and] to provide any other advice and make any other recommendations in connection with this review and its findings .... (*Review of fundamental justice ....*, Terms of Reference).

These terms of reference extend somewhat more widely than is traditional for an in-house review, and fortunately so. Hathaway thereby examines some of the immediate context within which IRB members and staff discharge their duties and focuses on impediments to implementation of the nonadversarial procedures. Included among the major objects of attention are adversarial tactics of counsel, the anomalous role of refugee hearing officers and the fulfillment of the board members role of fact-finder and decision-maker. He uses the contextual approach to provide a structural analysis of serious impediments to the appropriate functioning of the Board and thus averts *cul-de-sac* reductions to personality indisposition or poor managerial style.

Among the forty well considered recommendations, six directly address an issue much in recent Board news — the process of appointment of board members. Taking direct aim at present practices, Hathaway recommends a wider process of advertising for prospective members, and the formation of Regional Advisory Committees, composed of representation from the Board, the bar, a delegate from the Canadian Council for Refugees, the federal tribunal and Privy Council. This committee would construct a

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short list of applicants from which the Privy Council would appoint or reappoint members. Moreover, any future appointments should be suspended unless and until this procedure is implemented.

Without any necessary reflection on the quality of the appointees, past or present, these recommendations amount to an advise to the Minister to break from the closed and privileged past practices. This line of argumentation responds to concerns that board members, personally charged with the critical and often vital responsibility of determining eligibility for membership in Canada, be *seen* to be selected by a process both transparent and thorough. It is no accident that Hathaway considers these recommendations most urgent in priority. It is ultimately the judgment of these members upon which the fate of claimants waits in the balance.

Yet Hathaway is not content to leave the matter of appointment procedure isolated from wider contextual concerns. The rest of the recommendations frame the appointment issue in a series of roles and role prescriptions — a period of mentored training for Board appointees, a more formal and circumscribed relation to hearing officers together with more efficient deployment of the latter; the fuller performance of CIC Senior Immigration Officers in fact-finding and reportage; and the restoration of the Documentation Information and Research Branch to serve all interested members to the process, not only those administratively closest to decision-making.

Admittedly, Hathaway confines himself to a review of the internal workings of the Board. This able and subtle analysis perforce pays less attention to the relation of the Board to its neighbouring administrative bodies, especially CIC, than to the wider community of those concerned with refugees and perhaps to other types of judicial bodies. Such an inquiry span, while necessary, lies beyond the well-delimited focus of this Report, which accomplishes its task admirably and thereby becomes an exemplar for further inquiry.

Likewise, coordination between the activities of the Board and the community of persons and organizations interested in refugees requires more attention. Training courses and special area- or crisis-related seminars, for example, have been and will continue to be mounted by university and other specialized centres on both regularized and periodic bases from which board members and staff benefit without diversion of their own scarce personnel resources.

We are indebted to Hathaway and the review process for providing an important début in what we hope will be a continuing examination, at once compassionate to refugees and responsive to public concern. ■

C. Michael Lanphier

Letter to Editor:

The article by Arul S. Aruliah and Anusha Aruliah "The Evolution of Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka" (*Refuge* 13, 3: 3-8) contains many omissions, biased nuances, and errors of fact.

...It is most disappointing that the editors of the special issue on Sri Lanka, which contained the Aruliah article, did not attempt to get a better balance on the contentious and controversial matters being discussed. Arul Aruliah's fitness to be taken as an unbiased commentator on Sri Lankan affairs, much less on its ethnic affairs, is a case in point. Readers may not be aware that Mr. Aruliah was one time Chairman of the Immigration (and Refugee Affairs) Committee for Tamil Eelam Society of Canada in Toronto. ...(The authors) in their capsule history of the conflict, make little mention of the role of Tamil nationalism in the evolution of the conflict and make no mention at all of Sri Lanka's neighbour (India) in fostering armed terrorism of Sri Lanka's extremist Tamils.

Asoka Weerasinghe,
Director of Communications,
Sri Lanka High Commission, Ottawa

(*Editor's note*: The foregoing is an extract from a 6000-word letter. If interested in the full text, please write to *Refuge*.)

Refugee Movements from the Sudan: An Overview Analysis

Ogenga Otunnu

> **Most refugees do not leave their home with a national passport in hand. Nor do they have prepaid tickets for their transport since they do not take national airlines or railways when they leave their countries. They leave in acute situations and for many of them their journey is hampered by acute problems. They flee in disguise, avoid the main roads; and are ignorant of what lies ahead since they travel through unknown territory often without guide. This makes flight for many a grope for safety in total darkness. And such flight is filled with numerous hardships and danger.** (Bulcha, M. 1988. *Flight and Integration: Causes of Mass Exodus from Ethiopia and Problems of Integration in the Sudan.* Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 138.)

The Sudan is the largest country in Africa, and was one of the earliest to obtain formal independence (1956). Like the rest of the countries of the Horn, it is one of the poorest in the world, with a chronically dependent agrarian economy. Its pre- and post-independence history has been characterized by almost unpunctuated bouts of high-level political violence; religious, racial, ethnic and ideological conflict; ecological crisis; economic decay; and external intervention. The interplay of these complex but related factors, past and present, has left a trail of human suffering: loss of lives, flight and internal displacement. The ferocious momentum of the crisis has defied half-hearted, ill-conceived and ideologically driven attempts at conflict resolution, early warning and economic development in the country. The failure to address the causes of the tragedy has, therefore, allowed the refugee crisis and internal displacement to blossom in the rugged and hostile desert soil of the Sahara. It has also exacerbated the political and economic marginalization of the country.[1]

The majority of the uprooted who managed to cross international borders circulated within the same ecologically, economically and politically turbulent states of Ethiopia, the Central African Republic, Djibouti, Egypt, Kenya, Uganda and Zaire. These host countries, like most states in Africa, were themselves desperately poor and faced severe political and social upheavals on the domestic front. In fact, some of these countries, including Ethiopia, Uganda and Zaire, were so unstable that they also generated and sent hundreds of thousands of refugees to the Sudan. A constellation of complex and harrowing factors also forced some Sudanese to migrate to the Gulf states. There were also a few who traveled the difficult and uncertain route to the industrialized states of Europe and North America.[2]

What were the causes of refugee migrations and internal displacement in the Sudan? Why does the crisis persist? At what point did the refugees flee their country? How did they flee? Where did they go? These are some of the questions this article seeks to examine within the national, regional, continental and international contexts. Lack of adequate data on Sudanese refugees in Europe and North America, however, constrain this study.

The Political History: An Overview

The genesis of the contemporary internal displacement and refugee-producing crisis in the Sudan may be traced to the turn of the nineteenth century. This era witnessed increasingly violent contact with the external world. During this period of external penetration and expansionist imperialism, the Sudan came under the ineffective, corrupt and autocratic Turco-Egyptian rule. A number of developments characterized this period of conquest. First, the conquest and occupation of the territories were carried out through violence and manipulations. The outcome of the encounter between the indigenous and external forces led to flight, loss of lives and internal displacement. This is not to suggest that the encounter did not benefit the local "collaborating class" that seized the new era to plunder and accumulate wealth for itself. Second, the timing and tempo of the external penetration of the non-Arab and non-Moslem South were influenced by the quest for slaves and ivory. Slaves were obtained through slave raids that led to loss of lives, destruction of property and socioeconomic and political systems, and generated internal displacement and refugee movements. This legacy of the North-South encounter created a wide gulf between the two Sudan. Third, for the first time in the history of the territories, peoples of diverse and heterogeneous nationalities, and at times with competing historical experiences, were forcibly lumped together. This was the forerunner to the colonial state formation, laden with tensions and conflicts. Finally, economic, religious, cultural, migratory and geographical links between northern Sudan and the Muslim region of the Middle East brought the former under the ambit of the Middle East geopolitics.[3]

The next major phase of the external penetration, conquest and occupation of the country was during the new era of European imperialism, in particular, the last three decades of the nineteenth century. This epoch of intense and feverish European rivalries for global economic and political power brought the Sudan into the family of territories to be parcelled out among imperial powers. Among other things, the Sudan was of considerable strategic importance because of its links to the Nile, Egypt and the Suez Canal. Its proximity to the Red Sea was of addi-

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is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
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tional significance to the imperial strategy. Two intervening developments influenced the timing of European conquest and occupation of the country. First, the bondholders economic crisis in Egypt jeopardized the security of the Canal and led to the Anglo-Egyptian war of 1882. Armed with gunboats and maxim guns, the British decisively won the war and occupied Egypt. Second, the Mahdist revolution in the Sudan challenged Turco-Egyptian hegemony and sent shock waves to the citadel of British power in Egypt. The cardinal objectives of revolt or the *jihad;* led by Mohammed Ahmad al-Mahdi (1881-1885), were the revival and purification of Islam and its spread to the whole world, by force if necessary. The unstated but equally important objective was the resistance to the abolition of the slave trade that had benefited the northern ruling elite and the economy of the area. To achieve the stated objectives of the revolt, the first battle was waged against the *infidels,* especially the alien rulers. The revolt or resistance that threatened the security of the Suez Canal was suppressed by combined Anglo-Egyptian troops in 1889. The effects of the revolt included heavy loss of human lives, flight, internal displacement, the emergence of a new and local "collaborating class," the expansion of Islam as a religious and a political ideology in the Sudan and the British occupation of the Sudan.[4]

During the British rule, a dual colonial administrative policy of divide and rule was developed for the country. The North was administered by local colonial agents, appointed from the ranks of those Muslims who had opposed the Mahdist revolt and collaborated with the colonial regime. The South on the other hand was administered using the "Closed Door" policy or the "Southern Policy." This Southern Policy, which was abandoned only after World War II, attempted to insulate the region from Arab and Islamic domination. One of the colonial ideological strategies used to insulate the South from the North was the spread of Christianity. The contradictory colonial policy, among other things, insulated the South from economic development, leaving it in a severely disadvantaged position and strengthening the North-South divide. Later attempts to integrate the two Sudan, therefore, would not only be difficult and elusive, but also violent.[5]

When the 1949 Ordinance established the Legislative Assembly to provide space for limited political participation of Sudanese in government, it became clear that the two Sudan had different political visions. For example, while the North felt that its economic and political advantage would be enhanced in a unitary state, the South knew that its marginal position could only be improved in a federated state. In the end, however, the direction and tempo of the debate was decided outside the corridors of the Legislative Assembly by the 1952 Nasser revolution in Egypt. The political and security tremor the revolution generated sent two important messages to the regime. First, that it was living on borrowed time in the region. Second, that the honourable way out of the crisis was to craft an independence agreement for the Sudan before the revolution became contagious. In retrospect, the impetus for the 1953 Agreement, which paved the way for the 1956 independence, was mainly the result of the imperial contradictions elsewhere. By accident of colonial history, the terms of Agreement largely reflected the concessions the British made to the northern Sudanese.[6]

On the eve of independence in 1955, the self-government of Ismail el-Azari ordered the southern Command to relocate to the North and the replacement of British military officers in the South by Northerners. This order, however, provoked existing grievances about the alienation of the South and resentment of northern domination. As a result, the soldiers mutinied in Torit and other military posts in the South. The state responded with brutal violence to crush the resistance. A number of points should be highlighted from this revolt. First, the violence that dragged on into the postcolonial era symbolized the birth of a post-independence state chained in the contradictions of the colonial state. Second, while the arrival of independence was celebrated by the North, the South buried their dead and fled. As such, independence meant different things to the two Sudans. These developments suggested to the South that without access to the resources allocated by the faltering postcolonial state, it had no future in that country. Third, the ideology of nonviolent struggle for fair representation, economic development and federalism in the South was now resting on bare soil. Indeed, socioeconomic and political demands would be negotiated in the battle fields. The imminent danger of such a negotiation was that it could not bring about lasting solutions to the conflict. Equally, the war that consumed much of the scarce national resources made a mockery of development programs. Finally, this period marked the demise of the nascent civil institutions. It also announced the beginning of major refugee movements to the neighbouring states of the Central African Republic, Uganda and Zaire.[7]

The regimes of Abdallah Khalil and his military ally, Gen. Ibrahim Abboud (1956-1958 and 1958-1964), were paralyzed by endless ethnic, religious and ideological competitions. During this period, a number of events redefined the terrain of political struggles and violence in the Sudan. First, the northern-dominated Constitutional Commission rejected the demand for federalism. In a symbolic way, this dealt a devastating blow to the demands of the South. Second, the escalation of military repression in the South provoked increased armed struggle in the area and led to the formation of the Any-nya. This armed group received direct and indirect political and military support from Israel, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda, thus further internationalizing the conflict in the country. Admittedly, this led to increased violence which in turn uprooted more people. Third, the

state assumed full responsibility for education in the South. Thereafter, secondary schools were relocated to the North. This policy undermined human development in the South and sparked off a mass exodus of students to Uganda and Zaire. Fourth, the state imposed Arabic as the state language and Friday as the weekly day of prayer and rest. Among other things, this policy forced most of the southern elites who had been trained in the English language to flee to neighbouring states. Fifth, the devastating famine and flood of 1962-1963 in the South uprooted many people. This combination of human-made and ecological disasters exacerbated the crisis in the South. Finally, the cost of the civil war, the poor harvests of 1963 and 1964, and the foreign exchange crisis produced serious political and economic upheavals in the North that finally led to the capitulation of the Abboud regime.[8]

Similar socioeconomic and political upheavals devoured the regimes of el-Khatim el-Khalifa (1965), Ahmad Mahgoub (1965-1966), Sayed Sadiq Al Mahdi (1966-1967), Mohammed Ahmad Mahgoub (1967-1969) and Abubakar Awadallah (1969). To be sure, between 1967 and 1968, half-hearted attempts were made to reach a negotiated settlement with exile opposition groups from the South. This move, however, failed because of four main reasons. First, the state was not committed to reaching a comprehensive settlement. In fact, the impetus for the negotiation came from the growing and persistent cost of the war in the South; chaos within the army; economic hardships, aggravated by the closure of the Suez economic lifeline during the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict; and ideological and religious conflict in the North. Second, although the South had a "common enemy," it was utterly divided along ethnic, ideological and class lines. As a result, it was only the faction of the Sudan African National Union (SANU, previously known as Sudan African Closed District Union) led by William Deng that embarked on a serious but futile negotiation with the state. Third, the Anynya took advantage of the ceasefire and chaos within the army and stepped up its military campaigns in the area. The response by the military, among others, resulted in the Juba and Wau massacres. Fourth, Khartoum was too preoccupied with the Arab-Israeli conflict to devote any meaningful effort in seeking a settlement with the South. The regime was rewarded for its participation in the Arab-Israeli conflict with massive military and financial assistance from Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The assistance fuelled and greased the war machine in the South. Also, Sudan's support of the Arabs led to the collapse of diplomatic relations with the USA. In keeping with the Cold War power politics, the USSR promptly rushed in and occupied the power vacuum, thus widening the scope of the conflict.[9]

In May 1969, Col. Ja'far Nimeiry seized power with the support of the Sudan Communist Party (SCP) and promised to tackle the problems of the country within a socialist framework. His reign was defined by a number of developments. First, on February 27, 1972, the Addis Ababa Agreement was signed between the regime and the majority of opposition groups from the South. The Agreement essentially ended the civil war that had raged from 1955 to 1972. It also facilitated the resettlement of some 500,000 to 800,000 internally displaced persons in the South and the repatriation of hundreds of thousands of Sudanese refugees from the neighbouring states. The Agreement further provided space for a considerable flow of international assistance to southern Sudan. Second, with the common enemy barricaded by the Agreement, internal contradictions and power struggles within the South erupted. This provided the regime with the opportunity to manipulate and exploit ethnic and ideological differences in the South, while at the same time, assuming the role of referee in the local power conflict. Undoubtedly, the conflict in the South prolonged the life span of the regime. Third, a protracted opposition developed in the North—especially from the Muslim Brotherhood—to the terms of the Agreement that provided autonomy to the South and recognized historical and cultural differences between the two Sudan. In an attempt to deter the growing and immediate threat to its existence, the regime caved in to the demands of the Islamic fundamentalists in the North, and imposed Arabic as the national language and the *Sharia* laws of Islam upon the country.

Fourth, the settlement gradually collapsed beneath its own weight due to a series of related events: the discovery of huge oil reserves in the South by Chevron in 1970 and the ensuing conflict that emerged concerning the location of the oil refinery; conflict over the construction of the Jonglei Canal in the South to improve the flow of the Nile to the north and Egypt; and the dismissal of the Southern Assembly and the dissolution of the Regional Government by the regime in October 1981. Fifth, the regime ordered southern Sudanese soldiers to relocate to the North. The order was promptly disobeyed and the day of reckoning arrived with military engagement, the proclamation of the state of emergency in April 1984, and the suspension of much of the constitution. With these last developments, the carcass of the Addis Ababa Agreement lay bare on the hostile soil. The collapse of the Agreement led to loss of life and property, internal displacement and refugee flows.

Sixth, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) emerged under the leadership of Col. Dr. John Garang de Mobior as the most powerful opposition group to the regime. During its formative period, the SPLA eliminated opposition to its supremacy from other southern groups. This was achieved through a combination of negotiation, co-option and violent coercion. Once it had acquired a position of cohesion, organization and dominance, the SPLA secured military, financial and political support from Ethiopia, Israel, Kenya, Libya, the USA and the USSR. Seventh, when the regime proposed a

union with Libya and Egypt, and a new relationship with the Eastern block, its ally, the SCP, opposed the move towards the proposed union. Conflict between the two led to the short-lived coup of July 1971, the expulsion of the USSR and resumption of cordial relations with the USA and the West. Also, the regime supported the Camp David accord on the Arab-Israel conflict and received massive military and financial rewards from the West. However, as opposition to the accord grew among Islamic fundamentalists and the evacuation of Ethiopian Jews to Israel through Khartoum continued, the regime imposed the Sharia laws as a domestic compromise. With this last development, the regime became a risky liability and was deserted by its conservative Arab allies and the West. Finally, the cost of the civil war, drought, escalating debt service, economic mismanagement and ideological conflict at the helm of the state led to serious social unrest that brought down the regime in April 1985.[10]

The regime of Sayed Sadiq Al-Mahdi, which assumed power from the transitional military government in May 1986, had a very fragile power base. A number of notable developments took place during the existence of the regime. First, attempts to reach a comprehensive settlement with the SPLA failed due to the shifting power base of the regime, the formation of a coalition government with the Islamic Front in January 1988, and the dawning of a civilian aircraft by the SPLA at Malakal. Second, by the end of 1987, the SPLA had gained an upper hand in the war and had limited the presence of the military in southern Sudan to major towns such as Wau, Juba and Malakal. Third, both sides in the war deployed desperate military strategies including a scorched-earth policy, and the use of food and famine relief to achieve political and military control over the area. This resulted in massive starvation, dislocation, internal displacement and refugee migrations. Most of the refugees fled to Uganda and Ethiopia. Fourth, the regime inherited a state that was practically bankrupt, with a debt of over ten billion U.S. dollars and a war that consumed an estimated one million U.S. dollars a day. The crisis was exacerbated by low world prices for cotton and other export commodities, low production of agricultural raw materials, severe drought and famine and the shutdown of oil wells due to the war and high debt service. In July 1987, the regime declared a state of emergency in order to curb political instability, and to control the flight of foreign exchange, prices of commodities and smuggling. In an attempt to attract more aid to keep the regime afloat for a while, Al-Mahdi improved relations with the West and in return received food and financial assistance. Fifth, the regime also improved relations with Libya, most Arab countries, the Soviet bloc and neighbouring African states (except for Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia and Chad). Finally, the regime was forced out of power in a military coup in June 1989.[11]

The military government of Gen. Bashir seized power with the support of the National Islamic Front. With its local ally, the regime imposed a stricter Islamic law throughout the country and embarked on silencing and eliminating its opponents in the North. On the southern front, the regime was able to rout out the SPLA from most of the areas it had previously controlled. Among other things, three factors explained the military success of the regime. First, it received massive military assistance from Libya, Iran and Iraq, thus giving it a clear edge in the war. Second, power struggles within the SPLA weakened the movement. Finally, the collapse of the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia in May 1991 deprived the SPLA of its most important military and political base in the region. In fact, the new governments in Ethiopia and Eritrea were quite hostile towards the SPLA for having assisted the Mengistu regime in military campaigns against them. Since the SPLA also had some control over Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia, the post-Mengistu government induced over 380,000 Sudanese refugees to return to the Sudan. A large number of the returnees were killed by the Sudanese military. The split within the SPLA and the major military setback it is facing have generated massive refugee flows into Uganda, Kenya, the Central African Republic and Zaire (see table 1).[12]

When Did Flight Take Place?

This question refers to the point at which people were forced to flee from the country. Generally, the "decision" to flee depended on a number of interrelated factors such as one's position in society; the nature, magnitude, duration, speed, location, timing and period of conflict and/or disaster; proximity and accessibility to international borders; opportunity, capacity and ability to flee; individual and collective responses to violence; and formal and informal networks.

As in the rest of the Horn, flight among the Sudanese occurred only when people had exhausted coping strategies. Three groups whose "decisions" to flee at the particular time differed slightly will be highlighted. The first category is what we shall refer to as "elite-cum-student decision." This category was composed of southern Sudanese elites and students whose flight began effectively in the 1960s following the imposition of Arabic as the official language, Islam as the only religion and the closure and relocation of secondary schools to the North. It had become clear to the elites that they would never gain access to state-controlled jobs and other resources. Consequently, they embarked on migrations to foreign lands. The students were convinced that they could not pursue their education in the new environment. They, too, had exhausted their coping strategies and decided to flee to neighbouring states.

Undoubtedly, both groups made their decision in a situation of civil war. These groups fled to neighbouring African states. Some proceeded to Europe and North America with the help of the UNHCR, religious organizations and informal support networks.[13]

The second category is referred to as "labour decision." This category comprised northern Sudanese who fled and/or migrated to Egypt and the Gulf states. Some members of this group were students who went to these countries to study and decided to "overstay" or to proceed to Europe and North America for "further studies." The majority went to the Gulf states and sought employment because of the severe economic and political crisis at home. They were also encouraged by the national labour migration policy. Here, linguistic, religious and cultural ties, proximity and accessibility to international borders and the perception of how to cope with the national crisis were important in the pre-migration decision. Internal conditions in the receiving oil and capital rich countries of Bahrain, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates also facilitated the decision to migrate at that particular time. Indeed, these countries experienced rapid economic growth in the 1970s and 1980s, and needed migrant and domestic labourers. Other factors that facilitated the timing of migration were: the liberal labour and migration policies; formal and informal networks; uncontrolled borders and religious pilgrimage to Mecca. Later, however, internal conditions in the Gulf states hindered migrations.[14]

The last category which will be referred to as "mass decision," comprised the overwhelming majority of the southern Sudanese refugees. This group fled in large numbers to the neighbouring African countries due to the harrowing effects of the war. The group fled when it could no longer cope with the violence and disaster which threatened every aspect of their existence. More often than not, the decision to flee was made collectively or in groups. Here, proximity and accessibility to international borders, informal networks, asylum and refugee policies of neighbouring countries, the timing and intensity of the conflict and the location of the crisis influenced the timing of the decision to flee.[15]

What Were the Modes of Flight?

The mode of flight depended on a number of factors such as the location, speed and intensity of the conflict; the tactics used in the conflict such as targeting main roads and vehicles or mining possible escape routes; the direction and destination of flight; and the capacity to afford a particular mode of flight. The first category, "elite-cum-student," for example, used a combination of transportation including travel by foot and vehicles, and later, by air to North America and Europe. As migrations overseas required travel documents and entry visas, this group sought assistance through the UNHCR, the Red Cross and other NGOs. The second category, "labour decision," often used official channels and controlled exit points. The modes of transportation used included foot, vehicle, boat, ship and air. The last category, "mass decision," walked through the rugged terrain and over long distances. At times, they had to avoid aerial bombardment by travelling at night. The predominant mode of flight was by foot, though occasionally a combination of means of transportation was used.[16]

What Were the Flight Destinations?

This question provokes two other related ones: Why did they flee to their respective destinations? Why did they not flee elsewhere? As pointed out, the first and third categories fled mainly to the neighbouring African states of Uganda, Kenya, Zaire, the Central African Republic and Ethiopia (see table 1). These destinations were mainly determined by proximity, kinship ties, location of conflict, asylum and refugee policies of the countries and accessibility of international borders. While physical proximity remained constant, other factors changed from time to time. For example, in Uganda, Sudanese refugees were warmly welcomed by the state and their "kinsmen" in the North of the country in the 1960s. Later, however, hospitality fluctuated depending on the political and security considerations of the host country. First, during the 1960s, the refugee crisis in Uganda as elsewhere in Africa, was seen as a temporary phenomenon which required temporary solutions. As such, implementation of liberal refugee policy worked to the advantage of Sudanese refugees. Second, Uganda, under the leadership of Dr. Milton Obote (1962-1971), was quite sympathetic to the problems facing southern Sudan. Third, the presence and influence of Israel in Uganda drew the country directly into the Sudanese crisis. It is important to remember that Israel actively provided military and financial assistance to southern Sudan in an attempt to break the anti-Israeli sentiments in the Arab world and Black Africa. Toward the end of the Obote regime, the rise of Nimeiry to power in the Sudan suggested that the two countries could work closely together. This loose ideological alliance was reinforced by two other factors: the deteriorating relations between Uganda and Israel; and Uganda's internal domestic crisis which threatened the Obote regime and demanded friendly relations with its neighbours. These new elements in domestic and foreign relations, curbed refugee flows from southern Sudan to Uganda. On January 25, 1971 Gen. Idi Amin came to power and embarked on expanding the military by recruiting from areas that would not threaten his power. Among the groups recruited into Amin's security organizations were southern Sudanese, Zairians and Rwandese refugees. This factor in the domestic policy favoured refugee flows from southern Sudan. When Amin was overthrown, Sudanese refugees fled back to southern Sudan because they feared retaliation from the advancing Tanzanian and Ugandan armed forces. Also, during the Amin era, the main target was the Luo of northern Uganda. As such, the participation of some southern Luo in the government eroded kinship ties between the two Luo groups. On January 25, 1986, Lt. Gen. Museveni seized power and initiated a positive policy toward southern Sudan. This policy

was influenced by internal security considerations. To begin with, the groups that were opposed to the Museveni regime had fled to southern Sudan. Therefore, to get rid of such opposition, the regime allied itself with the SPLA to dislodge the Ugandans from southern Sudan. There were three important outcomes of the policy. First, the SPLA attacked the refugee camps in the area, killing a large number of the refugees and forcing hundreds of thousands to repatriate to the war zone in northern Uganda. Second, the SPLA was rewarded with close military and political support from the Museveni regime. Finally, with the major military setback the SPLA suffered, a large number of Sudanese refugees fled to northern Uganda. Migrations of Sudanese refugees to Uganda have, therefore, been influenced by security and political considerations of the host state.[17]

Similarly, flight to Ethiopia could be explained in terms of national, regional and international politics and security considerations; proximity to accessible national borders; and favourable refugee and asylum policies. In fact, until the overthrow of Mengistu, the regimes in Khartoum and Addis Ababa were at each other's neck. According to the dictum of regional power politics: the enemy of your enemy was your friend. Therefore, Sudanese refugees were welcomed to Ethiopia, and correspondingly, Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees were welcomed to the Sudan. However, following the change of regime in Ethiopia, the dictum changed: the enemy of your friend is your enemy or the enemy of your friend is not your friend, hence the forced repatriation of Sudanese refugees. Refugee flows to Zaire and the Republic of Central Africa are explained more in terms of kinship ties, traditional trade routes and proximity, and accessibility to international borders.

Flight to Chad, on the other hand, was hampered by the hostile buffer between the South and the neighbouring state. Here, southern Sudanese had to first penetrate the area under the control of the Khartoum regime before reaching Chad. Similarly, flight to Egypt and the Gulf state would have

Table 1: Refugee Movements From and To the Sudan (1980-1993)

Year	Country of origin	Country of asylum	Number
1980	Ethiopia	Sudan	303,000
	Sudan	Ethiopia	11,000
1981	Sudan	Ethiopia	11,000
	Ethiopia, Uganda, Chad and Zaire	Sudan	490,000
1982	Sudan	Ethiopia	11,000
	Ethiopia, Uganda, Chad and Zaire	Sudan	500,000
1983	Sudan	Ethiopia	5,400
	Ethiopia	Sudan	350,000
	Sudan	Uganda	150,000
	Chad	Sudan	5,000
	Zaire	Sudan	8,000
1984	Sudan	Ethiopia	39,000
	Ethiopia	Sudan	484,000*
	Uganda	Sudan	200,000
	Chad	Sudan	1,000
	Zaire	Sudan	5,000
1985	Sudan	Ethiopia	72,000
	Ethiopia	Sudan	718,000*
	Uganda	Sudan	250,000*
	Chad	Sudan	121,000
	Zaire	Sudan	5,000
1986	Sudan	Ethiopia	110,000
	Ethiopia	Sudan	656,000*
	Chad	Sudan	93,000*
	Uganda	Sudan	165,000*
1987	Ethiopia	Sudan	677,000
	Sudan	Ethiopia	205,000
	Uganda	Sudan	90,000
1987	Chad	Sudan	45,000
	Zaire	Sudan	5,000
1988	Ethiopia	Sudan	660,000*
	Sudan	Ethiopia	350,000
	Chad	Sudan	25,000
	Uganda	Sudan	3,600
1989-90	-	data n/a	
1991	Sudan	Central African Rep.	5,100
	Sudan	Ethiopia	398,000
	Sudan	Uganda	64,000
	Sudan	Zaire	32,000
	Ethiopia	Sudan	700,000
	Sudan	Zaire	32,000
	Others	Sudan	26,500*
1992	Sudan	Central African Rep.	8,000
	Sudan	Ethiopia	1,500
	Sudan	Kenya	92,000
	Sudan	Uganda	75,000
	Sudan	Zaire	104,000
	Ethiopia	Sudan	690,000
	Chad	Sudan	27,000
1993*	Sudan	Central African Rep.	17,000
	Sudan	Ethiopia/Eritrea	16,000
	Sudan	Kenya	20,000
	Sudan	Uganda	90,000
	Sudan	Zaire	120,000
	Others	Sudan	20,500*

* Estimates vary widely

Source: *World Refugee Survey* (various issues)

been suicidal because those fleeing from the South would have had to penetrate northern Sudan before legally becoming refugees. Therefore, the absence of informal networks, the location of the major conflict and the inaccessibility of international borders explain why southern Sudanese refugees did not flee to Chad, Egypt and the Gulf states.[18]

Another factor that affected where and how many refugees, and the internally displaced fled (see table 2), was the military and political policy of control devised and implemented by both the SPLA and the Sudanese army. For instance, by mid-1987, the atrocities committed against unarmed civilians by both the SPLA and government troops, made it impossible for southern Sudanese to either relocate to areas under SPLA control or to cross international borders near the SPLA sphere of influence. A case in point was the movement of over one million southern Sudanese to the unfriendly territory of Khartoum during the SPLA reign of terror in the South. Having lost faith in the SPLA's ability to protect them from its own atrocities and those of the state, the people decided that they would rather die trying to reach some relief assistance in the North. The SPLA policy of "protecting" the internally displaced and potential refugees in its area of control, for political and military reasons, and to prevent unsanctioned cross-border flight, also made it extremely difficult for southern Sudanese to escape from the violence. Indeed, each time a mass refugee flow occurred, it was largely because the SPLA was losing military control over a given area. It is, equally important to remember that both parties to the conflict controlled internal and refugee movements.[19]

Table 2: Estimated Number of Internally Displaced Persons in the Sudan

Year	Number
1987	1,500,000
1988	2,000,000 - 3,200,000
1989	2,000,000 - 3,200,000
1991	4,500,000
1992	4,750,000
1993*	5,000,000

*Only part of 1993.

Source: *World Refugee Survey*, various issues.

Note: Reported numbers vary widely for most periods. The estimates depend on who counts, how, when and why.

Migration to Egypt and the Gulf states depended largely on the existing socioeconomic and political conditions in the country of origin; the history of contacts prior to and during flight; and linkages between the Sudan and those countries; proximity; and the asylum, labour and migration policies of host countries. Egypt, which had been a colonial power, an ally and agent of British colonialism and a sub-neo-colonial power in the Sudan, built institutional linkages with the northern part of the country. These linkages, especially in the fields of military, education, religion, culture, administration and finance, encouraged limited migration from the North to Egypt. Three factors explained why very few Sudanese migrated and/or sought asylum in Egypt. First, most of the people who went to Egypt were students and government officials who were sent by the Sudanese government. Some of the Sudanese overstayed and/or used well developed institutional linkages between Egypt and the West to migrate to the industrialized countries. Further, there were no job markets in Egypt to encourage mass migrations because Egypt itself was sending skilled administrative labour to the Sudan. Also, Egypt had to rely heavily on the West to address its serious socioeconomic and political crisis. Second, Egypt's interest in the security of the Nile dictated an overall non-confrontation policy towards the Sudan. In that respect, it could not afford to become a major asylum country without jeopardizing its security interests in the Sudan. Finally, the South, which generated the bulk of refugees and internally displaced persons, was cut off from Egypt's immediate border. Equally, no viable institutional linkages were developed with the South during and after the colonial period. On somewhat of a different note, Egypt as a surrogate power, barricaded the Sudan from the West, thus stifling the development of institutional linkages between the Sudan and the West; linkages that could have encouraged migrations and/or flight to the West.[20]

Migrations to the Gulf states were influenced by internal and external, as well as push and pull factors. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, a number of developments curtailed migrations from the Sudan and other countries including Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Thailand, Indonesia, Taiwan and the Philippines. First, the oil-rich countries imposed new labour and migration policies. The primary objectives of the policies were to control illegal or clandestine migrations and reduce the rapid growth of migrant labour communities in the host countries. Second, the oil boom had evaporated, and as a result, the need for cheap foreign labour drastically declined. Finally, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism such as in the Sudan, threatened the political status quo of the moderate Arab states of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Opportunities in the Gulf were further reduced by the Gulf War and the controversial "humanitarian intervention" in Iraq. These factors collectively made it increasingly difficult for Sudanese to gain access to the shrinking and unstable labour market in the region. With the data presently available it is difficult to provide a conclusive view on the socioeconomic and political effects of the decline in regional migration. However, by examining the labour remittances to the country which stood between 1.3-1.4 billion Sudanese £ in 1987, it can be inferred that the economic impact was devastating to the national economy.[21]

Refugee Migrations to the Industrialized States of the North

The refugee movements from the Sudan to the industrialized countries of

the north accounted for a very small proportion of the uprooted. The movements of population were influenced by: formal and informal institutional linkages, migration and asylum policies of the industrialized countries, socioeconomic and political conditions in the industrialized countries, physical distance from industrialized countries, occupation, and the capacity to exit from the Sudan and/or from a first country of asylum in Africa.

To Europe

As noted above, Britain was a colonial power in the Sudan. However, it did not develop viable institutional linkages with the country for a number of reasons. The North was ruled by Egypt under the tutelage of the British colonial power. Later, even when a handful of northern Sudanese became colonial administrative agents, they were still somewhat barricaded from Britain by Egypt. As a result, no independent and viable institutional linkages were built between northern Sudan and Britain. This is not to deny the existence of rudimentary linkages in areas of education and finance in the immediate colonial era. On the southern front, there was no effective colonial presence. Furthermore, the "Closed Door" policy practised in the area prevented the penetration of colonial and international finance capital. As such, the only institutional linkages which existed between southern Sudan and the outside world were those religious and educational institutions created mainly by Christian religious organizations from Britain and Canada. In a nutshell, no institutional linkages which could facilitate mass migration existed.

By formal the end of colonialism, Britain was in a state of political and economic decline, thus making it impossible to build strong linkages with the Sudan. Further, wartorn southern Sudan remained predominantly a peasant society, tied to the land and never contemplating resettlement in a faraway country. Most of the refugees fled without any material resources, and hence they did not have the capacity to go and/or send their children to Britain. Furthermore, asylum and migration to Britain did not guarantee the recognition and admission of southern Sudanese as refugees. Indeed, recent implementation of asylum and migration policy, including attempts to harmonize policies in Europe, made it increasingly difficult for people from developing countries to seek asylum and/or migrate to Britain and the rest of the European Economic Community. Those Sudanese who managed to get to Britain were either students, (ex-)government officials, military personnel, or Christian religious ministers. These people were supported in their migration or flight by nongovernmental organizations such as the World University Services (UK), Pilkington Charitable Trust, UNHCR, OXFAM (UK) and church and relief organizations. Formal contacts that some of the refugees had developed either prior to, or during, their flight were also utilized. There were also those who managed to get to Britain because of kinship and family networks.[22]

Tables 3 and 4 show the number of Sudanese and Ghanaians who claimed

Table 3: Refugees Granted Asylum or Refugee Status in the U.K. (By country of origin 1982-1991)

Origin	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	Total
Ghana	0	199	73	89	72	47	39	35	5	10	569
Sudan	3	2	2	6	1	11	34	60	5	5	129

Table 3a: Refugees Granted Exceptional Leave to Remain
(By country of origin 1982-1991. Dependents included up to 1989.)

Origin	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	Total
Ghana	12	126	59	48	49	115	113	110	30	20	682
Sudan	0	1	0	0	23	7	1	5	5	-	42

Table 3b: Refusals of Asylum, Refugee Status or Exceptional Leave to Remain
(By country of origin 1982-91. Dependents included up to 1989.)

Origin	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989†	1990†	1991†	Total
Ghana	28	199	157	252	40	197	58	20	50	70	981
Sudan	0	3	5	8	10	14	1	5	5	5	56

Table 3c: Applications at Port of Entry in Country (by nationality 1990-1991)

	1990†			1991†		
Country	Total	At Port	In-country*	Total	At port	Inz-country*
Ghana	1020	90	930	2405	195	2210
Sudan	255	10	245	1150	70	1085

† Figures rounded to the nearest 5. In-country figures and totals may be under-recorded
*In-country figures include a small number of applications recorded as having been made overseas and referred to the Home Office for decision.
Sources: Refugee Council, *UK Asylum Statistics 1982-1992*. London: The Policy and Information Division, Refugee Council: 12, 14-16, 18.

Table 4: Applications Received in the UK for Asylum
(excluding dependents, by nationality, 1985–1991)
Number of Principal Applicants

Nationality	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989†	1990†	1991†	Total
Ghana	141	196	125	172	330	1020	2405	4389
Sudan	16	18	20	22	110	255	1150	1591

†Provisional figures rounded to the nearest 5. 1990 figures may underestimate because of delays in recording.
Source: *British Home Office Statistical Bulletin*. London: Research and Statistics Department, June 24, 1992: Table 2.1.

asylum in the UK. The comparative data supports the main thrust of the arguments about factors which influenced the refugee flows from the Sudan. To begin with, both countries were former British colonies. However, there were marked differences between them. First, colonial and postcolonial institutional linkages between Ghana and Britain were well developed. The middle class was also comparatively well developed in Ghana. As we have noted with the Sudan, the opposite was and still is the case. Second, the duration and intensity of political violence, and economic and ecological crisis were far more pronounced in the Sudan than in Ghana. Third, the capacity to exit and reach Britain either by flying directly or through another country was much better in the case of Ghanaians. Indeed, some went on study and official or unofficial visits. The Sudan, for that matter southern Sudan, did not have a similar capacity. Fourth, Ghanaians developed complex and viable informal migration networks between Britain and their home country. Such networks are not available in the case of the Sudanese. Recently, however, Sudanese refugees started building their informal networks with the U.K. Finally, the implementation of asylum and refugee policy, for the most part, was fairly uniform. Recently, however, the policy became stricter on Ghanaians, yet their movements continue to be significant.[23]

Flight to the rest of Europe was also constrained by lack of strong institutional linkages, unfavourable asylum and migration policies, and the incapacity to exit and reach European countries. Since there is inadequate data at this point in the research, only general observations will be made. First, there is a small and scattered population of Sudanese refugees in European countries such as Belgium, Finland and Greece. Most of them went to these countries mainly through the assistance of European based NGOs. More often than not, members of this group spent many years "strategizing" and trekking from one country to the next before reaching their final destination. Others went on official tour and/or to study and decided to seek asylum. An important point is that existing institutional linkages facilitated this limited migration. The linkages, however, were too weak and too young to generate and sustain mass migrations. Second, generally, both the Cold War and post-Cold War asylum and migration policies in Europe exhibited a very high level of racial discrimination toward Africans and other peoples from the underdeveloped world. This has been compounded by the socioeconomic crisis, the feverish growth of xenophobia in Europe and the efforts by the EEC to harmonize their asylum and migration policies. It is, however, not clear to what extent the policies of refugee and migration deterrence have managed to further curtail refugee flows from the Sudan. Finally, refugees from the Sudan who could barely survive in the overcrowded and famine-like settlements in the neighbouring African states, could not afford air tickets to Europe to make in-country claims. This, however, must be qualified because a few young [male] Sudanese refugees did show their ability to struggle against numerous odds to reach some industrialized countries. It should also be noted that very weak formal institutional linkages developed between the USSR and the Sudan, especially in the field of technical and military cooperation. However, those Sudanese who went under such arrangements and decided to seek asylum, had to go to other European countries or North America because of the strict immigration policies of the USSR.[24]

To North America

Refugee and migration movements from the Sudan to North America are recent developments (see tables 5 and 6). During the Cold War, the USA provided military and financial support to Khartoum, thus creating some dependent institutional linkages. These linkages were essentially between the northern-based government and the USA. As such, the linkages could not be utilized by the majority of the southern Sudanese refugees. As noted above, the development of stronger neocolonial ties were hampered by the uneasy relations between the two governments. Furthermore, since Egypt became its most reliable client state and the regional centre for the U.S. military, cultural and financial activities, it was thought that through Egypt, institutional networks would be built to incorporate and/or contain the Sudan. This strategy did not work largely because the actions of the ruling regimes of the Sudan often contradicted American hegemony. The failure of U.S. financial, military, cultural, ideo-

Table 5: Refugee Arrivals in the U.S. from the Sudan, 1983-92

Year	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	**1983-92**
claims	4	0	3	0	2	1	6	59	6	127	**208**

Source: Report to Congress. Washington, D.C.: Refugee Resettlement Program, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (January 31, 1993), Table 2.

logical and political capital to penetrate the Sudan provides some explanation for the weakness of the formal networks which could not sustain refugee flight to the USA. Another important factor in the direction of flight was the U.S. asylum and migration policies which have been largely anti-African. Finally, the essentially Western-sponsored UNHCR policy which discourages resettlement to a third country also curtailed the resettlement of Sudanese refugees in the U.S. As a result of these factors, including their inability to reach U.S. ports, very few Sudanese settled in the U.S. The majority of those who resettled in the U.S. went as students and government officials. There were also those selected for resettlement from overseas and those sponsored by NGOs or through their informal contacts. Another group came under the U.S. family reunification admission policy.[25]

Migrations and refugee flows to Canada were influenced by Canada's role as a non-colonial middle power state; its membership and participation in the Commonwealth and the UN organizations; its support for the Southern African Development Conference (SADC); its physical distance from the Sudan; its migration and asylum policies; the provision of relief and development assistance; and the absence of Canadian consular services in areas of major refugee settlements. Other factors were the inability of the overwhelming majority of refugees to make it to Canadian ports and their "decision" to stay close to their home country.[26]

Canada's interests and influence in Africa are recent and date back to the late 1950s and 1960s when the struggle for formal decolonization had gained irreversible momentum on the continent. R.O. Mathews explained Canada's neo-realist policy:

> Despite the rhetoric of government officials, Africa has always been of marginal interest to Canada; our policies towards Africa were designed not so much to serve the needs of African states as the interests of Canada which, in any case were only indirectly related to Africa. Indeed our interests in Africa were, at least initially, derived in large part from our broader concern to maintain a strong and united alliance with the West (including Britain, France and Portugal) against the Soviet bloc; from desire to foster the growth of the Commonwealth; from necessity to search out markets for Canadian goods and services and outlets for Canadian investment; and from a deeply felt need to sustain a favourable image of Canada as a nonracist and forward-looking state.[27]

Such a policy led to the expansion of military, technical, capital and relief assistance to many countries in Africa, including the Sudan. The main beneficiaries of this policy in non-Francophone Africa, however, were Nigeria, Angola, Mauritius, Ghana, Kenya and South Africa. As far as the Sudan was concerned, these linkages were too weak to facilitate major refugee flows to Canada, partly reflecting the fact that they were largely the work of NGOs.[28]

Since 1967, Canada's asylum and migration policy has undergone a serious and positive surgical change. However, the lack of Canadian embassies located in the region where most of the Sudanese refugees resided, and the strict selection criteria which emphasized age, language (English or French), education, occupation and kinship ties, largely worked to the disadvantage of the majority of the uprooted. Two factors which somewhat cushioned the negative effects of the policy were the absence of visa requirements for Sudanese, and the media, NGOs and public sympathy with the crisis since the 1980s. What the policy meant in practice was that those who could manage to reach ports of entry into Canada were almost assured of being granted asylum. By default, this policy strengthened informal networks which in turn progressively facilitated limited refugee flows. For the majority of those who lacked informal networks and could not afford to reach Canada, their fate rested in the hands of the UNHCR and with the Canadian overseas selection process. As table 6 shows, very few Sudanese managed to resettle in Canada.[29]

Conclusion

The foregoing analysis suggests that the main causes and persistence of refugee flows from the Sudan were: colonial violence; racial, religious, eth-

Table 6: Refugee Claimants from the Sudan — Canadian Admissions

Year	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
No.	-	7	1	18	21	153	150

Landed Under In-Canada Refugee Determination

Prior-to 1984	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	Total
15	3	0	3	8	46	105	152	280	34	646

Sudanese Refugees Processed Overseas

1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	Total
8	2	32	69	32	20	19	78	35	78	144	102	86	705
Male Claimants													
5	2	25	49	20	7	16	49	23	48	99	63	57	464

Sources: Immigration and Refugee Board (Sept. 13, 1993.)

nic and ideological violence; the uncivil nature of the postcolonial state; external interventions, especially by the superpowers, the Arab states and Israel; and ecological violence. Economic underdevelopment and economic crisis also fuelled political conflict which resulted in and has sustained refugee flows and internal displacement. In retrospect, there is no rigid dichotomy between economic and political, political and ecological, internal and external, past and present factors, forced and unforced migration. Also, the post-Cold War politics of "order" and "the right to stay" perpetuate violations of human rights and sustain the crisis. It has also been argued that refugees fled their home country only when they had exhausted every conceivable coping strategy. The intensity, timing, duration and location of violence, the history of violence and flight, physical capability and capacity to flee, and individual and collective responses to the crisis were also important considerations in the timing of flight. On the question of the modes of flight, it is suggested that the majority of refugees trekked across the hostile terrain to international borders. There were a few who used a combination of means of transportation, especially those who moved from one country to the next. The means of transportation was determined by the nature, location, timing and duration of violence and access to other options of travel. Where the refugees went was influenced by a number of related factors: proximity and accessibility to international borders, informal and formal institutional networks, the location of violence, preflight occupations of the refugees, national and international politics and asylum and migration policies of host countries. It is maintained that these factors explain why the overwhelming refugee population from the Sudan circulated within the neighbouring African states. Also, it is pointed out that the neighbouring states were themselves quite poor and involved in the population exchange. This point generally highlights the myth and the reality of the concept of a "refuge" in the context of wartorn, ecologically weak and chronically poor African countries. It is, therefore, clear that unless the causes of the human tragedy are addressed, the plight of Sudanese refugees and the internally displaced will continue unabated. ■

Notes

1. See, for example, M. Abdel-Rahim, *Changing Patterns of Civil-Military Relations in the Sudan.* Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1978; A.Z.A.R. Ahmed, et al., *War Wounds: Development Costs of Conflict in Southern Sudan.* London: Panos Institute, 1988; H. Assefa, *Mediation of Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies in the Sudan Conflict.* Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987; G. Morrison, *The Southern Sudan and Eritrea: Aspects of Wider African Problems.* London: Minority Rights Group, 1971.
2. See A.R. Zolberg, A. Suhrke and S. Aguayo, *Escape from Violence: Conflict and Refugee Crisis in the Developing World.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1989: 50-56, 103-120, 122; Zolberg, " The Refugee Crisis in the Developing World: A Close look at Africa," in G. Rystad, ed., *The Uprooted: Forced Migrations as an International Problem in the Post-War Era.* Lund, Sweden: Lund University Press, 1990: 110-116; M. Bulcha, *Flight and Integration: Causes of Mass Exodus from Ethiopia and Problems of Integration in the Sudan.* Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1988; H.E. Harrell-Bond, *Imposing Aid: Emergency Assistance to Refugees.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986; P.B. Henze, *The Horn of Africa: From War to Peace.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991;L. Timberlake, *Africa in Crisis: The Causes, the Cures of Environmental Bankruptcy.* London: Earthscan Publications, 1988; P. Gibbon, Y. Bangura and A. Ofstad, eds. *Authoritarianism, Democracy and Adjustment: The Politics of Economic Reform in Africa.* Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1992; The World Bank, *The World Bank Annual Report,* various issue, especially 1983: 65-68; 1984: 79-84; 1985: 85-91; 1986: 79-84; 1987: 75-82; 1989: 105-113; 1991: 109-116; 1992: 111-119; U.S. Committee for Refugees, Washington, D.C.: *World Refugee Survey,* various issue; *Africa Confidential,* London, various issue; T. Wallace, *Displaced Labour: A Study of Employment Among Educated Refugees from the Horn of Africa.* London: WUS(UK), 1986; I. Serageldin, et al., *Manpower and International Labour Migration in the Middle East and North Africa.* Oxford University Press, 1983: 6, 14, 48, 59, 68-69, 71, 82; European Consultation on Refugees and Exiles, *Report of ECRE Biannual General Meeting.* Geneva: ECRE, October 1992.
3. See, for example, A.A. Boahen, ed., *General History of Africa.* California: James Currey, 1990: 39; P.E. Lovejoy, *Transformations in Slavery: A History of Slavery in Africa.* London: Cambridge University Press, 1983: 15-18, 147-150; D. Austin, "Africa Repartitioned?", *Conflict Studies,* 193: 6-7; P. Woodward, "War - or Peace - in North-East Africa," *Conflict Studies,* 219: 7-8.
4. See R. Robinson and J. *Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism.* London: Macmillan Press, 1974; Boahen, Ibid: 41-2; G.N. Sanderson, *England and Europe and the Upper Nile, 1882-1889.* Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1965; J.S. Galbraith, "The Trial of Arabi Pasha," *Journal of Imperial Commonwealth History,* VII (1979): 274-292; A.G. Hopkins, "The Victorians and Africa: A Reconsideration of the Occupation of Egypt, 1882," *Journal of African History,* 27 (1986): 363-391.
5. See J. Markakis, *National and Class Conflict in the Horn of Africa.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987: 146.
6. Ibid: 76
7. Ibid: 77-8, 149-156.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid: 80-86, 157, 160; P. Woodward, "Rivalry and Conflict in North-East Africa," *Conflict Studies,* 199: 2-6; Woodward, War - or Peace - in North-East Africa?" op. cit: 8; D.G. Morrison, et al., *Black Africa: A Comparative Handbook.* New York: The Free Press, 1972: 347.
10. R.O. Collins, *Eastern African History.* New York: Markus Wiener Publishing, 1990: 177-194; Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo, *Escape from Violence,* op. cit.: 52-55; P. Woodward, "Rivalry and Conflict in the North-East Africa," *Conflict Studies,* 199: 2-5; "War - or Peace - in North-East Africa?" op. cit: 8-10; C. Legum, "The Horn of Africa: Prospects for Political Transformation," *Conflict Studies,* 254: 8-9; Harrel-Bond, *Imposing Aid,* op. cit: 36-7.
11. Woodward, "War - or Peace - in North-East Africa," Ibid: 9-11; C. Legum, ed., *Africa Contemporary Record.* New York and London: Africana Publishing Company, 1986-1987: B565-B592.
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Racism and Migration

David Matas

How can we combat racism against refugees and migrants? The answer is, it depends. It depends on the sort of racism we are attempting to combat. Racism against migrants and refugees is both official and unofficial, structural and personal. Personal racism, verbal and physical attacks on individuals by other individuals, overt, and explicit discrimination are the most visible and extreme forms of racism. These forms of racism must be combated by techniques of prevention, such as education; and by techniques of cure, such as prosecution. Since personal form of racism can be violent, it is the most dangerous. But at least it is easy to see and easy to denounce.

Structural racism against migrants and refugees is more indirect. It is discrimination, both in the governmental and nongovernmental arena, in the supply of services, in hiring, in promoting, that is not overt. The motivation may be discriminatory, but nothing racist is said when discrimination is inflicted. The effects are nonetheless discriminatory. Statistics show the discrimination when nothing else does. Combating structural racism against migrants and refugees involves techniques such as affirmative action, reasonable accommodation and the establishment and involvement of human rights commissions. The antidote is directed against racism as such.

Official racism, that is policy racism against migrants and refugees, is the most sophisticated, the most subtle, and the most indirect type of racism. Like structural racism, it does not manifest itself explicitly. However, unlike structural racism, it is impossible to demonstrate statistically, since there is no point of comparison. Structural racism can be demonstrated statistically by comparing the treatment of migrants and refugees with the treatment of nationals. Official racism against migrants and refugees cannot be demonstrated in the same way, since nationals are, by definition, neither migrants nor refugees. Migration and refugee policy never affects nationals.

Statistics can show discrimination between migrants and between refugees. Nationals of some countries require visas. Others do not. Nationals of some countries are put through secondary examination at airports. Nationals of other countries are not. Visa posts are few and far between, and delays in processing visa applications are gargantuan in some areas of the world. Elsewhere, visa posts are plentiful and delays in granting visas are short. Refugee claimants from some countries are readily granted recognition, while refugee claimants from other countries, although fleeing similar levels of repression, are systematically denied recognition.

This sort of racism can be demonstrated by traditional methods. But where the racism is manifested in a policy that is directed against all migrants or all refugees, indiscriminately, these traditional methods fail. The terrain of debate shifts. The traditional anti-racist vocabulary, anti-racist techniques are of little use here. A different vocabulary and different techniques are needed. Debates revolve around the wisdom of policies which have racial impacts. The debates themselves are about everything but race. Racial impact looms in the background as a consequence. However, racial impact is not an express justification for the policies.

Debates about migration and refugee policies become surrogates for debates on racism. Racial impact is the result of which no one speaks but of which everyone knows. The terms of the debate mask the racial impact at stake. Migration and refugee policy has to be debated at two levels. There has to be a debate at the level of content. At all times, during the substantive debate, anti-racists must not forget the racial implications of migration and refugee policies.

Racism cannot be fought just by fighting racist expression, or racist attacks, or by combating discrimination in employment and services. Racism must also be fought by joining debates which, at least in appearance, are about subjects altogether different from race. Yet, the outcome of these debates has a definite racial impact.

Migration, or refugee outflows are by nature racial or ethnic. Migration or refugee outflows are the movement of people from a country where they are nationals to other countries where they are not nationals. Opposition to migration, to refugee protection, whatever the vocabulary used, is opposition to the arrival of the foreigner, the stranger. The opposition is strongest when the migrants are forced migrants, or refugees. Refugees arrive precipitously. They arrive any which way they can. They arrive in large numbers all at once. Because they are forced to flee, they have not planned to come. They have not planned to integrate in the country of arrival. They may know nothing of the language or culture of the country of arrival. Their reception and integration is not arranged in advance by local nationals.

To discourage them from arrival, refugees may not be allowed to work. But, if they cannot work, they are seen as a drain on the economy. When xenophobia exists, it is strongest against refugees. Refugee protection debates revolve, for example, around the scope of the refugee definition. In many

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countries, the refugee definition is narrowly interpreted, effectively denying protection to many real refugees. The substantive debate is a debate about the scope of the refugee definition, but the impact of the debate is racial. A broad interpretation means openness to those who are different. A narrow interpretation is saying no to strangers.

A second example of racism is the "credibility" debate. Refugee protection is often denied to claimants on the basis that they are not credible, that they are lying. This skepticism can reach epidemic proportions, denying protection to refugee claimants wholesale. Those concerned with refugee protection have to approach the issue of credibility at the substantive level, to argue for the proper application of sound principles when assessing credibility. Those concerned with racism must join this debate. Here, too, the impact is racial. The implication of large numbers of denials based on credibility assessment, is, after all, an assumption that those different from us are dishonest—an implication that must be resisted.

Yet another terrain of debate for refugee protection is the source country condition information. Refugee claimants are rejected on the grounds that conditions in the countries they have fled have changed, or that conditions are not as bad as they claim. This debate seems to be about nothing other than what is happening in the country of origin. In reality, the debate is also about whether the stranger can stay or must go home. Those who want to expel the stranger will paint an overly rosy picture of the situation in the country of origin. Those who wish to welcome the stranger must be prepared to combat this false optimism.

The unfairness of refugee procedures is another example of racism. Claimants are denied access to counsel; they are denied adequate interpretation; and they are not allowed hearings for their claims, or an opportunity to respond to objections before a decision is made. Decision makers are not independent from governments who use the determination procedure to enforce anti-refugee policies. Furthermore, there may be no possibility to appeal a negative decision.

Unfair procedures generate inaccurate results, and the inaccuracy is invariably on the side of those wishing to restrict entry. As a result, real refugees are often erroneously rejected as false claimants. Here the substantive debate is about the nature of procedures, what is fair, what is unfair, and what due process requires. I would not accuse everyone who advocates for stricter refugee controls of racist motives, but I would not absolve every such person either.

While many who argue for narrow interpretations of the refugee definition, strict credibility determinations, benign interpretations of country conditions, or rough and ready determination procedures are not motivated by racism, it would be naive to think that all those who argue against generous refugee protection policies have no racist intent. Racism by impact is often a polite form of racism by intent. Sophisticated racists know enough to keep their beliefs quiet. They know that open expressions of racism are not considered acceptable, so they go about being racist without voicing their opinion. Racism in refugee protection is an attitude that dares not speak its name. The injection of racist attitudes into refugee debates means that these debates are too important to be left to refugee experts. If racists go about the business of discrimination, without signalling their intent in advance, anti-racists must offer an cure.

The issues here may appear to be of apparent technicality, best left to experts. Certainly, there are expert opinions that are relevant. There are positions in this area over which experts may reasonably differ. However, the field must not be left to experts alone to combat racist tendencies. The public interest in combating racism is also important. Not every person in favour of stricter migration and refugee controls is a racist, but every racist is in favour of stricter migration and refugee controls. Racists are present in migration and refugee debates, arguing their side. Anti-racists must also be present, to argue the other side.

Yet another manner in which refugee protection is restricted is by deterrence and disincentive measures. Claimants are made to lead lives so miserable that they are deterred from making or sustaining claims. Mobility within the country of refuge is denied. Claimants may be detained or kept in camps. If not detained, they may not be allowed to work or go to school. They may be denied social assistance or welfare. Family unification from abroad is also prevented.

Inhumane treatment has to be combatted at the substantive level by the application of humanitarian principles. Given the context, there is every reason for having those who wish to combat racism engage in this debate. Perhaps the most dramatic form of denial of refugee protection is the denial of access. Countries of admission impose visa requirements on citizens of refugee producing countries. Admission to the country of destination is impossible without a visa granted abroad by the government of the country of destination and carriers are penalized for transporting those without proper documentation. The result is that planes, ships, trains and buses will not transport refugees fleeing feared persecution to countries of destination, unless the refugees have visas from the government of the country of destination. Yet, no government will grant a visa to allow a person to come forward to make a refugee claim.

Along with visa requirements and carrier sanctions is the designation of safe third countries. Refugees are forcibly returned to countries designated as safe through which the refugees have passed in transit to the country of destination. Airport zones are yet another mechanism used to deny access. Claimants are kept notionally outside the country of destination by being detained at airports until they are forcibly removed. The most visible form of denial of access is interdiction. Refugees are stopped on the high seas or overland by the government of the destination country or their agents and

prevented from arriving and making claims.

Denial of access is the most dramatic form of denial of refugee protection, because it is numerically the most significant. For racists, it is the ideal solution. The stranger is not just expelled. The stranger is never allowed to arrive. Debates about carrier sanctions, visa requirements, airport zones, and interdiction may seem to be highly technical debates concerning domestic and international law. Certainly, they are more complicated than debates about racial violence. Yet, at the end of the day, the outcome of these technical debates is going to have as much impact on racial equality as the outcome of these other simpler debates about overt or structural racism.

Refugee claimants who do manage to get access to countries of destination only to be rejected by the claims procedure are not automatically returned to the country of origin. Most, if not all, countries allow some rejected claimants to stay on humanitarian grounds. Many countries have a "B status" that allows claimants to stay without refugee status.

There is a whole host of problems associated with the decision to grant this secondary status. Criteria may be overly narrow. Due process may be denied here too. Status, when granted, may be only temporary and uncertain. The privileges that go along with the status may be overly restrictive, creating, in effect, another set of disincentives to discourage people from staying. Here is one more example of a debate where the substance has nothing to do with race, but the impact has everything to do with race. Here is one more terrain of debate anti-racists cannot afford to ignore. Refugee protection in several countries is not restricted to claimants who arrive on their own initiative and are recognized as refugees. Governments admit refugees recognized as such by the UN and / or by visa posts abroad. Each year the UN attempts to place refugees identified as being in need of resettlement. Several governments accept those UN identified refugees and, in the case of a few governments, others besides.

However, the UN only identifies a small portion of the refugees in need of resettlement. Even this small portion is not, in fact, resettled. Despite the small numbers identified, there are always too many for the resettlement countries. Those with racist motivation, who make every effort to prevent refugees from arriving to make claims; who treat claimants as miserably as possible to discourage the maintaining of claims; who falsify determination procedures to generate undeserved rejections; who do everything they can to ensure rejected claimants are not allowed to stay on humanitarian grounds; are obviously not going to turn around to encourage the admission of large numbers of refugees for resettlement from abroad. It should be just as obvious to anti-racists that, if they want to combat racism, they must work to ensure that refugees abroad who are in need of resettlement are in fact resettled.

Refugees are sometimes called "irregular migrants." That is one form the attack against refugees takes. The suggestion is that those claiming to be refugees are really motivated by something other than a need for protection; that the motivation is economic; that these persons have moved in an illegal, irregular way, in order to circumvent legal obstacles that would deny them entry.

One reason racist nationals promote refusal of asylum seekers is selfishness, to avoid sharing their standard of living with foreigners. The racism of nationals thus has an economic dimension, a desire to keep the national wealth from foreigners. This economic motivation is then projected onto asylum seekers. This is essentially a case of blaming the victim for his / her victimization. Asylum seekers are accused of the vice from which racist nationals who work to deny them entry suffer—circumventing the law out of greed. Because racist nationals have an economic motivation—to keep the country's wealth for nationals—they assume that asylum seekers have a similar motivation. Because racist nationals distort the law to deny refugees protection, they assume asylum seekers try to get round the law in order to immigrate.

In reality, the motivation for asylum seekers is quite different—the need for protection. In one sense, this projection of economic motives from racists onto asylum seekers is just a particular form the attack on the credibility of asylum seekers takes, and it can be combated as such. However, this dichotomy between refugees and irregular migrants masks another significant distinction, and one with significant implications—the distinction between forced migration and voluntary migration.

Not every person who falls outside the refugee definition is a voluntary migrant. A refugee is a person with a well founded fear of persecution for listed reasons. A person who has a well founded fear of persecution for a reason not on the list is not a refugee, but that person can hardly be considered a voluntary migrant.

Persecution is any serious violation of human rights. Persons may flee from violations of human rights not considered serious enough to bring the person within the refugee definition. For instance, a person may flee in order to avoid discrimination that has not degenerated to a level grave enough to

Persons may flee from violations of human rights not considered to be serious enough to bring the person within the refugee definition. For instance, a person may flee in order to avoid discrimination that has not degenerated to a level grave enough to make the person a (Convention) refugee. That person cannot be considered to be just a voluntary migrant.

make the person a refugee. That person cannot be considered just a voluntary migrant.

Individuals may flee war zones in order to avoid the conflict. However, the notion of persecution in the refugee definition is individualized. While the refugee definition can encompass whole groups, there has to be a sense in which each member of the group is a potential target. When the flight is from random violence, the persons fleeing may not be refugees. They are also certainly not voluntary migrants. A person may move because of economic or environmental disasters. The move may not be just a matter of improving the quality of life, it may be a matter of survival. These people too are neither refugees nor voluntary migrants.

Involuntary migrants who are not refugees need help as much as refugees do. But unlike refugees, there is no international regime that offers protection. There are regional regimes that promise protection in Latin America and Africa, however, these regional regimes are of no help to those seeking protection outside of those regions. The plight of non-refugee involuntary migrants is ignored outside of Latin America and Africa. Such persons are simply categorized as irregular voluntary migrants.

There needs to be a regime to offer protection outside of Latin America and Africa to involuntary migrants who are not refugees. The racial implications of establishing this regime are obvious. Expanding the notion of protection to cover all involuntary migrants would expand the number of strangers offered resettlement abroad exponentially. Needless to say, racists would be opposed. Anti-racists should work to counter that opposition. The debate about racism and migration does not end with refugee protection. It does not end with the offer of a safe haven to all involuntary migrants. The existence of voluntary migration presents its own debates.

One debate is over nationality rights. In many countries, voluntary migrants are allowed to come, but not allowed to stay. If allowed to stay, they are not allowed to become nationals at all, or only with great difficulty. Their inability to become nationals means that they are residents without a voice in the country. Their marginalization becomes easier because of the society's reluctance to integrate them. Because they are not and often cannot become citizens, their fate is decided by others without their own participation in the decisions.

The rights of nationals leads us into debates over nationality and citizenship laws. Yet these debates are not just debates about the technicalities of citizenship laws, they are also debates about whether we welcome strangers or turn a cold shoulder to them. For voluntary migrants, a second area of debate is family unification. In principle, families should be united. Yet the laws of many countries prevent that unification. In the foreground, the debate is about such things as defining the family, or the standard of proof. Are brothers and sisters to be considered family members for the purpose of family unity? Does the right to family unity cover adult children or only non-adult children? Are spouses to be allowed unification only when the genuineness of the marriage is established beyond a reasonable doubt, or is a balance of probabilities sufficient? In the background, the debate is about race. Are we going to allow those who may seem alien to us to enter to be with their families, or are we not?

For voluntary migrants who do not seek family unification, difficulties of access are at their most extreme. For refugees, the regime of refugee protection offers at least an argument for access to countries of refuge. For involuntary migrants who are not refugees and voluntary migrants who seek family unification, humanitarian principles can support arguments for access. For voluntary migrants who do not claim family unification, neither refugee protection principles nor humanitarian principles are available.

There is, nonetheless, a human rights principle in play here, other than the right to equality and freedom from discrimination. It is the evolving right to freedom of movement. Freedom of movement is often recognized internally in domestic human rights instruments as a right granted to nationals. It is not yet generally accepted as an international human right.

Freedom of movement is a simple and direct way to allow access to refugees fleeing feared persecution, as well as to other involuntary migrants, however, it has a value far beyond that. It is also a statement that all are welcome, no matter from where they come. Promoting the right to international freedom of movement may be the hardest battle of all to fight. For those with racist tendencies, international freedom of movement is the ultimate horror. For those with an anti-racist commitment, international freedom of movement should be an ideal to be achieved.

Voluntary migrants, without family in the country of destination, are admitted on economic grounds, on the basis that their admission is beneficial to the economy of the admitting country. Here the substantive debate is over whether the arrival of migrants will lead to nationals losing jobs or gaining jobs, over whether migrants will go on welfare or be self-sufficient. The reflex of the racist is that migrants harm the economy and, ostensibly for that reason, should not be admitted. Anti-racists need to develop countervailing economic arguments to show how migrants benefit the economy in order to combat that racism.

During the Cold War, there was the fear of an invasion from the East, expressed by the phrase: "The Russians are coming." Now that the Cold War is over, this fear continues in another form. The fear is no longer of an armed invasion, but of an unarmed flood of migrants. The fear is still: "The Russians are coming."

Now that the Eastern European countries have raised the Iron Curtain that surrounded them, the West has brought down a new curtain, a Gold Curtain around itself. When Eastern Europeans could not come to the West because they were not allowed to

leave, they were welcome in the West as refugees. Now that Eastern Europeans are free to leave, they cannot come, because the West will not admit them.

Europe, which was divided before by the Cold War, remains divided by migration controls. The Helsinki process, the process of confidence building measures through human contact, generated by the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe signed in Helsinki in 1975, remains frustrated because freedom of movement within the Helsinki space is restricted. Migration controls cut the Helsinki space in two. The concept of Europe—the ideal of the Helsinki process—can be made to work only if migration controls end, and if racism in migration policies ends.

To return to the original question: how do we combat racism against refugees and migrants? The battle against racism directed towards refugees and migrants cannot be fought only at the level of grand anti-racist principles and schemes. It must be fought also at the level of technical detail of refugee and migration policies. Demonstrations and prosecutions against racism are not enough. Even human rights, affirmative action, and reasonable accommodation programs are not enough for a generous interpretation of the refugee definition.

In addition, we have to fight for fair procedures, accurate assessment of source country condition information, and reasonable credibility assessment. We have to work to ensure our governments each admit their fair share of refugees in need of resettlement abroad. We need to stand for a safe haven for all those fleeing forced migration. We must be on the side of ready access to nationality for migrant residents. We must promote the principle of family unity for migrants and refugees.

We must be prepared to marshall the arguments which show that migration helps the domestic economy. Finally, we must endorse freedom of movement for all. Only then will the battle against racism inflicted upon refugees and migrants be fully joined. ■

Live Again in Community: Hispanic Refugees and the Church

John F. Duggan, S.J.

Torture and other forms of physical assault are systematic attempts to undermine a personal sense of safety by violating our most symbol-laden possession, our body. Often victims of torture are stripped in the torture process, a gesture that emphasizes the vulnerability we all experience just below the surface of our lives. (Schreiter, 33)

It was my personal friendship with Salvadorans that led me in 1988 to become involved in starting a Spanish language mass at St. Thomas More Church, just east of the corner of Markham and Ellesmere in Toronto. Although the mass was a new beginning at this particular parish, the group that came to the liturgy were already a community with their own history in Canada. In a general way, I knew they were people who had escaped a situation of guerrilla war and brutal repression that continued over the last decades in El Salvador. While studying Spanish language and theology in Mexico City in late 1982, I had been involved in translating a torture testimony. I was aware of the specific inhumane obscenities practised by the torturers. However, until I asked questions about the founding of the St. Thomas More community I did not know how tightly tied this community was to the trauma of torture. To know that history is to recognize the cross at the centre of their personal experience and religious vision. It is to recognize also that their experience of oppression and marginalization did not end when they came to a new land.

Remembering the Story of the Community

This account draws on conversations with central members of the community and a number of counsellors working with them. It depends also on my own acquaintance with the community. I have tried to correct and revise the account as I received feedback on earlier drafts.

For some of these newcomers to Canada the past intrudes on the present and there is no escape from the concerns of their distant homeland. A worker for the Catholic Immigration Bureau tells her story. She discovered that both a torture victim and his torturer were approaching her for counselling. By some strange coincidence these two, whose lives had been so horribly joined in their homeland of El Salvador, found themselves in one of the tall, multi-dwelling apartment buildings of Scarborough living on the same floor with their apartment doors facing one another across the hallway. The torturer had been in the lower echelons of the army and had been assigned the dirty work of torture. He had fled the army and been captured and in turn brutally tortured himself. The person he had tortured, knowing that the torturer was living just across the hallway was afraid to go out the front door of the apartment. The counsellor carefully scheduled separate appointments so that the two would not encounter one another. To complete the scenario a third Salvadoran lived next door to the tortured person. This person was also a refugee, neither torturer nor tortured, but displaced from their homeland by the general conditions of war.

This is a single episode that sets a local context to the life of the worshipping community that grew as a response to the needs of one group of newcomers to Canada in the early 1980s. The Spanish language Mass that has been celebrated in Scarborough for the last decade emerged from a therapy group for Salvadoran refugees

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who had been tortured. The group was called OASIS. Members of that early torture therapy group still participate at the heart of the life of the St. Thomas More Hispanic community. However, to speak of the St. Thomas More Hispanic community is to jump over the beginning years of the community.

Beginnings in Scarborough

In 1982 there began an influx of refugees from El Salvador into the Scarborough region of Metropolitan Toronto. Miranda Pinto, who had been involved in pastoral ministry among the poor in Peru, was hired by the Catholic Immigration Bureau (CIB) to set up an office in St. Boniface Church on Markham Road. As she moved into her relationship with the Hispanics in the area, Miranda found herself conscious of something not being said, particularly by the men who would pass time at the CIB office. Finally, one of the men in talking to her broke down and spoke of being gang-raped while in custody. The dilemma was that this tortured man and others like him felt they could not talk to either men or women about their experience. They were fearful of men and embarrassed to talk to a woman. The affirmation and positive response of that first encounter between this one man and Miranda led to many others coming forward with their stories. Very quickly, Miranda found herself overwhelmed by the demands on her skills, time and energy. She worked by herself for the first six months until a second staff person, a male counsellor, was hired.

Further help came in the person of two church volunteers. Miranda wrote up the project proposal that brought into the work two returned missionaries, Robert Smith of the Oblates of Mary Immaculate and Betty Dilio a religious Sister of the Congregation of the Holy Cross. These two, who had worked together in Peru, began ministering to Hispanics in the Scarborough area in 1983. Father Bob and Sister Betty were delegated by their communities and joined with Miranda Pinto out of the CIB's office in the basement of St. Boniface Church on Markham Road north of Eglinton. At a later point (1984), Sister Betty was taken on in a staff position at the CIB.

During this period, Central Americans, primarily from El Salvador, were beginning to arrive in Canada and a good number were finding apartments in the Scarborough area. Many of these early arrivals had been, for the most part, politically active in El Salvador. They had experienced the trauma of harassment and torture by the military and death squads of that country. With Miranda, Father Bob and Sister Betty drew on their experience of forming community in Peru in order to begin to shape a community. They held Bible studies and entered into a process of leadership formation. Many of the Salvadorans, alienated from the Church in their own country, who at first had looked on this nascent community purely as a base for organizing political and financial support for the struggle in El Salvador, began to experience what Sister Betty has termed a 'conversion'. They began to find real value as well in community life, prayer and worship as they experienced healing within community and were strengthened for the challenges of life. In the struggle against the forces of degradation from their past they were able to recover dignity and meaning by linking their "narratives to other, larger narratives" (Schreiter 1992, 34). The celebration of community worship became a zone of safety in which to join personal stories with the larger Gospel story. The community benefited from the openness of Father Tom Day of St. Boniface Parish. Father Day gave the Hispanics a sense that they were welcome in the church, he presided at weekly liturgy in his own struggling Spanish and he encouraged leadership formation. He was aided in his ministry by an experienced Salvadoran church worker.

The Arrival of the Catechists

The tenor of the religious life of the small community was affected by the next influx of refugees from El Salvador in 1984. At this time in El Salvador the military and the death squads had begun to actively attack, torture and murder church workers. Many catechists were killed and some managed to escape the country. The new group of arrivals in Scarborough brought with them pastoral knowledge and skills that they had learned in the small church communities of El Salvador. They were committed to the church and competent to evangelize and to prepare their fellow community members for sacraments and participation in ministries in the church community.

Helpful background to understand this group of catechists is the book *Don Lito of El Salvador* (Vigil 1990). This is the record of a series of conversations with a Salvadoran campesino, a committed Catholic and an activist. The conversations were taped in 1981 by Maria Lopez Vigil and transcribed and supplemented by factual information and photos for the book. Don Lito recalls his own transition from being the trusted assistant of the priest in a situation in which the church and priest blessed the status quo of exploitative government and poverty. Inspired by a younger priest sent to replace the former pastor, Don Lito grew in awareness of the relation between the Word of God and the more fully human community. From being concerned with fiestas and processions his church community re-centred on forgiveness and helping one another. The Catholic church under the leadership of Monseñor Romero and some dedicated priests and many devoted catechists became identified with the poor. The conversations record the involvement of ORDEN and other organizations in the life of the campesino, the successful manipulation of some and the growing awareness and radicalization of others. Don Lito laments the murder of many of his friends and recalls the hardships of times spent hiding in the hills. What is remarkable is the continuing strength of his faith in Christ, his lack of fear of death and his desire to treat those who opposed him not as enemies but as friends.

The Charismatics

At this time (1984-1985), another kind of group was arriving from El Salvador, those who had been influenced by the charismatic movement. Though they were relatively apolitical, the climate of paranoia in El Salvador had made them suspect. From the perspective of the security mentality any people who gathered in groups for whatever purpose were considered dangerous. These Roman Catholics affiliated to the charismatic movement began to experience threats and to feel insecure and therefore sought means to flee the country. Their addition to the community in Scarborough at St. Boniface's added resources of prayer and religious practice but also brought tensions. The charismatics tended to work independently of the normal leadership and in their enthusiasm they sometimes gave the impression to others that they considered themselves superior in spiritual experience. For the most part, the longer they were involved with the community, the more they grew to be enthusiastic and supportive members.

The Chileans

After a few years Father Smith left for another assignment and Sister Betty carried on the pastoral ministry. Sister Betty and Miranda Pinto were, at the same time, involved in the daily routine of settlement work for the CIB. Many of the clients of this settlement agency were Hispanics and also participated in the life of the Hispanic Roman Catholic community that met at the church. During these years, the worship community also benefited from the support of Scarborough Foreign Mission priests on leave from pastoral assignments in Latin America. The community developed an effective and dynamic youth group and an enthusiastic and talented music group. Numbers during this time at the liturgies were in the range of 80 to 100. There was a liturgy planning committee that encouraged families to take responsibility for particular liturgies. The masses were lively, often including dramatic re-enactments of the Gospel. As the mass became more of a public event advertised in the community it began to attract Chileans from the apartments nearby. The Chileans included some who had conservative notions of church life.

The Chileans who came to Canada with the overthrow of Allende in 1973 were of socialist and communist party background. They were campesinos and unionists fleeing a policy of murder and torture systematically carried out by the Chilean military under the direction of General Pinochet. The Chileans who came later in the 1980s tended to be of the middle class, religiously more traditional, Christian Democrats frustrated by the lack of opportunity for political expression and seeking economic opportunities. They preferred not to be intensely involved in the community life. They were not happy with the demands put on them by the community and some vehemently protested the requirements for baptismal preparation. The pastoral leadership group thus found themselves at times in conflict with members of the Chilean community.

The Nicaraguans

The community benefited in 1985-86 from the assistance of a member of the Holy Cross congregation, Santiago Mendes-Vides, a student of theology in the Master of Divinity programme at St. Michael's College. Santiago, a citizen of Guatemala, was especially interested in the formation of leaders and dedicated himself enthusiastically to various programmes with the community. Nicaraguans also began to arrive in the area. Many of this group were traditional in their view of church life. As with the Chilean group many of them would attend but not actively participate in the life of the community. In Nicaragua, the influence of the popular (progressive) church within the institutional church had declined significantly since the coming to power of the Sandinistas in 1979. It has encountered the opposition of both the Nicaraguan hierarchy and the Vatican. As well, it has not been able to discover a clear role for itself within the revolutionary process after the overthrow of Somoza. The progressive church works with a communitarian model of church, with authority residing in the Basic Ecclesial Communities, with the priest functioning as a partner in the church communities. As well, the progressive church relates more directly to the oppressed classes. This "preferential option for the poor" clearly has political implications (Williams 1992, 129-130). The Nicaraguans who arrived in Canada were predominantly those who were alienated from the Sandinista government and the popular church that supported it. The Salvadorans in the community were those who have had positive links to the popular church in El Salvador and were alienated from the military and ARENA dominated government. Santiago's skills as a facilitator and reconciler came more and more in demand.

The Dispersal

In 1987, the community experienced a major crisis. The pastor of the parish where the community gathered, Father Tom Day, was transferred from St. Boniface to another church in the centre of Toronto, St. Paul's. The incoming pastor, a priest from Malta, simply did not want the Spanish community at this church. His stated rationale for this position was that there were other ethnic groups in the parish, like the Filipinos and Italians, who had not asked for their own language mass. Sister Betty and the other CIB workers could find no way forward at that point. The members of the community dispersed, some attended liturgy at St. Peter's in the centre-city, while others simply stopped participating in church life. Sister Betty and Miranda Pinto continued to work in their settlement and advocacy roles out of the office of the Catholic Immigration Bureau in the basement of the church. It was a point of interest to note that the pastor allowed the Spanish-speaking charismatic prayer group to continue to meet at St. Boniface. In 1989 the Scarborough office of the CIB transferred from the basement of St. Boniface to another

location on Heron Avenue in the buildings of the St. Joseph community across from Providence Villa.

The Community Comes to Life Again

It was on the occasion of a visit to my friends, a Salvadoran family I was close to, that I heard of the dispersal of the community that had been celebrating at St. Boniface Church. Don Victor Alegre, a Salvadoran and a central figure in the life of the community, laid before me the problems. At that time I was still an Associate Pastor at Our Lady of Lourdes but had recently finished my work on a Doctor of Ministry (Duggan 1987) and was ready to take on further responsibilities. I felt close to the Hispanic community and so I volunteered to do what I could if a church was arranged for the mass. Don Victor promised to talk with the members of the community and particularly to Santiago Mendes-Vides about the possibility of reactivating the mass. Don Victor also undertook to talk with the acting pastor of St. Thomas More church where he was a parishioner. A later phone call confirmed that we were ready to begin the liturgy, the people informed and the parish ready to give us a time on Sunday afternoon.

We celebrated our first liturgy at St. Thomas More on September 18, 1988. In those early years (1988-1991) at St. Thomas More the community benefited from the capable involvement of Santiago Mendes-Vides and Tony Cosentino. The community attempted to model its structure on that of the small faith communities that the people were familiar with from their own countries. This has meant that much of the ministry is carried out by members of the community. There has been a high level of participation in community life and decision making. Both Santiago and Tony have moved on to other involvements. Santiago is ordained as a priest for the Holy Cross Order and at this time is working in Peru. Tony, after a stint with the CIB in the Scarborough area as a full-time worker dealing with Hispanics, pursues further studies. Most recently, he has been working one day a week for the Toronto office of the CIB stimulating refugee sponsorships in the parishes. Otherwise, he is to be found with guitar and flute busking in the Toronto subways.

Good Friday People

> As interworked systems of construable signs . . . culture is not a power, something to which social events, behaviours, institutions or processes can be causally attributed; it is a context, something within which they can be intelligibly—that is, thickly—described. (Geertz, 14)

St. Thomas More church is a low modern style structure built some 30 years ago, to the back of which is attached the parish rectory with offices and quarters for the priests. Coming along Ellesmere, I kept my bicycle close to the curb aware that I was an alien and unexpected event on these thoroughfares built with only automobiles in mind. It was just coming up to 11:00 a.m. when I walked into the church. There were very few people there, although from what Porfirio had told me the way of the cross was scheduled for 11:00 a.m. Don Victor Alegre caught my eye as he was wearing a suit, an unusual practice for him. I greeted the people and moved quickly across the sanctuary and back into the sacristy. I sat down with the sacramentary to study the service. Soon Father John, an Associate Pastor in the parish who had been helping with the ministry to the Hispanic community, came in. He told me that he would be with me in the service to help out. He also told me that the church was not able to accommodate the Sunday afternoon Easter liturgy for the Hispanic community. This was unacceptable and I asked him to phone a nearby parish to see whether or not we could say the mass there. Father John soon returned looking relieved to say that, yes, Saint Rose of Lima parish on Lawrence Avenue could accommodate us at our regular 4:00 p.m. time Sunday afternoon.

Meanwhile, the way of the cross led by Don Victor had begun in the church about 20 minutes after the scheduled starting time. When I looked out the church was filling up. As the hour approached noon, Father John and myself vested in the red robes of the Good Friday liturgy and were led by two altar boys with their candles into the church. We walked in silence down a side aisle and then up the centre aisle to stretch out prostrate in front of the altar. After a few minutes we rose and went around the altar to begin the service with an opening prayer. The service was a long one with of a reading of the passion in the Gospel of John—the narrator and Pilate at a microphone on the left of the altar, myself as Jesus in the centre and Sister Eszaura and Marissa at the lectern on the right as Peter, the crowd and the various servants. I gave a short homily and Father John and I sang the special prayers of petition. Then came the carrying of the large, wooden cross from the entrance of the church up the main aisle singing three times "*Mirad el árbol de la cruz ...*" (Behold the wood of the cross). After Father John and I venerated the cross, the people came forward. With devotion and one by one—the congregation by now had grown to some 300 people—they knelt and then touched or kissed the cross. This was done in a solemn and orderly fashion while the choir sang a lament. Father John at one point whispered across to me—"Is there any way we can speed this up?" I couldn't think of a way to do this gracefully and so answered "no." The people were showing their devotion and I could not see denying them that opportunity.

The veneration of the cross was followed by preparation of the altar for the communion service. At this point, two ushers went down the rows to collect whatever offering the people might make. Father John had gone into the sacristy to process in with the two saboria. After giving the host to the two altar boys, both of us went around the front of the altar to distribute communion. The communions went quickly and the choir sang once again. Then there was an announcement by one the pastoral council that the Easter mass had been changed to St. Rose of

Lima. After that, I said the final prayer and blessing and we left the altar in silence directly into the sacristy.

The event of this Good Friday service has been too briefly described. The people of this community are well-acquainted with suffering. They have experienced persecution and torture. They have fled the land they loved. Coming from lands of sunshine and warmth they have struggled to establish themselves in a cold and sometimes humanly inhospitable country. The long service of adoration of the cross is a symbol of their own deep relationship to the challenge of suffering. They linger at the cross of Jesus. The tension for the "Canadian" presiders is that punctuality and efficiency are high values within our own culture. We feel under our own self-generated pressure to move the service along more expeditiously.

The decision not to make the church available for the Easter Sunday mass of the Hispanic community invites reflection. From the perspective of the community it is a denial of the opportunity to celebrate Easter fully in one's own language, with one's own people. Considered symbolically, it stirs memories of other attempts to deny these people their experience of resurrection. The activities of the death squads, the subversive strategies of the power brokers at the centre of the American empire, and the hostile reading of the popular church by local bishops and Vatican bureaucrats have conspired to deny life. From another perspective it is simply a hasty decision in a mainline suburban church with too much going on and too few priests. The community adapts and there is good turnout at St. Rose of Lima on Easter Sunday. The generosity of that parish is a healing balm for the feelings of rejection.

One reason for the tensions that developed between the main church and the Hispanic community was that the main parish office could not handle the many Spanish speaking people coming with their requests. Father John, the priest on staff who had been helping with the Hispanics, was overburdened by his various responsibilities. The community was once again threatened with dispersal. My attendance at the meetings of the Spanish-speaking priests have acquainted me with Bishop Nicola De Angelis, a newly consecrated bishop responsible for the ethnic communities. On learning of the tensions between the parish and the Hispanic community the bishop intervened to support the community.

At the end of August of 1993, the Hispanic communities gathered for a liturgy with Bishop De Angelis at Midland on the grounds of Martyr's Shrine. For the first attempt to gather a Hispanic pilgrimage group, this was a successful event with representatives present from the six Hispanic worship communities in the Metropolitan area. Well over 2,000 people were in attendance. The high point of the liturgy was a dramatization of the Gospel spearheaded by the youth of St. Thomas More Hispanic community. The bishop was obviously moved and thanked the youth for their presentation: "Mother Church loves you," he said. At the altar and again at the end of the day the bishop told me how impressed he was by the presentation the youths made.

Happy Endings so Far

I arrived for the liturgy one Sunday afternoon early in September 1993 to discover that bishop responsible for the eastern zones of the Archdiocese, Bishop John Knight, was making a visit to the whole parish. He had decided to preside at the Spanish mass and to preach. He told me that he had made it clear to the church that the Spanish mass was to be considered a ministry of the whole parish and that it was to be supported. Bishops De Angelis and Knight took a strong stance in support of the St. Thomas More Hispanic community. Very soon after this, the pastor hired Porfirio Garcia to be in the parish one day a week and to ensure that there was proper communication between the parish and the Spanish-speaking people seeking pastoral services.

Since the departure of Santiago the coordinator of the community has been Porfirio Garcia, originally from El Salvador. Porfirio combines studies in theology at Regis College of the Toronto School of Theology with part-time work. Porfirio's wife Marissa also demonstrates the new level of integration being achieved by Hispanics in the Canadian church. Marissa has completed her courses for the Master of Divinity and will soon graduate from St. Michael's College with her degree. At present, the members of the St. Thomas More Hispanic community are feeling more rooted and their community has been more actively embraced by the local church and its bishops.

The St. Thomas More Hispanic Community Today

Today, in January of 1994, the St. Thomas More Hispanic community is larger and more diverse. The membership is comprised of some 400 or more people primarily from El Salvador and Nicaragua but also from other Latin American countries such as Panama, Colombia, Chile, Peru and Guatemala. There are even a few active members who are Canadian born but attend the 4 p.m. Sunday eucharist with Hispanic friends and are eagerly learning to speak Spanish. The community is directed by the pastoral council of some 20 people who try to meet every three weeks.

There is an active choir of 25 people supported by guitars, a social committee that arranges recreational outings during the summer and facilitates coffee and doughnuts after the Sunday service, and senior members of the community who do baptismal preparation, give pre-matrimonial talks and prepare children for their first communion. A religious sister, Sister Eszaura, has been helping with the youth group of the community. Each week one member of the community, a Nicaraguan, prints out a bulletin for the community. There are occasional events like retreats for the whole community, opportunities for couples to do marriage encounters, and appeals for financial and personal support for particular people in need. On various occasions talks relating to immigration

status and settlement needs have been held after the liturgy in the parish hall. More and more English is heard spoken among the young children of the community.

We can expect that the St. Thomas More Hispanic community will meet new challenges as second and third generation children mature. My confidence is that the community will always draw on the courage and faith of its first founding group—those tortured people who have met the challenge to live again in community. ■

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Immigration and Refugee Board

Convention Refugee Determination Division

Claims Process Period: January 1 - September 30, 1993

Regional Summary

	Atlantic	Ottawa	Quebec	Ontario	Prairies	B.C.	National
Claims heard to completion (includes cases before 1993)	271	800	6,191	11,757	428	867	20,314
Decisions rendered	252	782	6,224	10,955	432	876	19,521
Claims rejected	106	188	2,802	4,722	147	608	8,573
Claims upheld	146	594	3,422	6,233	285	268	10,948
Withdrawn/abandoned	20	78	854	2,276	35	257	3,520
Decisions pending *	33	132	567	2,199	38	198	3,167
Claims pending **	547	1,148	5,359	11,282	322	1,982	20,640

* ***Decisions pending*** *include all claims heard to completion for which no decision had been rendered by the end of the reporting period.*

** ***Claims pending*** *include all claims referred to the Convention Refugee Determination Division that have not been finalized (i.e. by a positive or negative decision or by withdrawal or abandonment) as of the end of the reporting period.*

Statistical Summary by Major Source Countries

	Country of Alleged Persecution	— Claims — Heard to Completion	Withdrawn Abandoned	Decided	Convention Refugee Status Yes	No	Accept. %
1	Sri Lanka	3,773	155	3,683	2,917	766	79.2
2	Somalia	1,933	100	1,954	1,873	81	95.9
3	Pakistan	934	319	921	314	607	34.1
4	Iran	930	98	897	636	261	70.9
5	Israel	794	226	508	116	392	22.8
6	Lebanon	695	94	706	255	451	36.1
7	India	692	161	653	157	496	24.0
8	USSR	675	196	537	238	299	44.3
9	China	612	80	726	134	592	18.5
10	Russia	601	71	499	307	192	61.5
11	Romania	477	45	437	208	229	47.6
12	Peru	456	24	426	314	112	73.7
13	El Salvador	447	111	530	111	419	20.9
14	Guatemala	411	94	436	242	194	55.5
15	Bangladesh	394	70	390	182	208	46.7
16	Ghana	365	201	383	49	334	12.8
17	Haiti	360	19	359	250	109	69.6
18	Ukraine	319	40	272	178	94	65.4
19	Zaire	307	16	339	214	125	63.1
20	Nigeria	285	99	264	48	216	18.2
21	Moldova	267	8	164	119	45	72.6
22	Sudan	257	8	252	233	19	92.5
23	Argentina	245	79	210	31	179	14.8
24	Cuba	234	31	201	145	56	72.1
25	Yugoslavia	223	96	189	179	10	94.7
	Top-25 countries	**16,686**	**2,441**	**15,936**	**9,450**	**6,486**	**59.3**
	Total	**20,314**	**3,520**	**19,521**	**10,948**	**8,573**	**56.1**

Source: *Immigration and Refugee Board, Ottawa; News Release, December 10, 1993.* / A.S.A

Reflection on the Visit to Turkey

Mehran Banaei

A number of years ago my eyes were badly injured during a recreational soccer game. As a result of this injury, I was temporarily blinded for a few weeks. Although this was a traumatic and frightening experience, it was not without its rewards. The whole ordeal was a lesson in blindness. It taught me how I took my vision for granted all along. It taught me empirically what it means to be deprived of one of the most precious senses. Above all, it taught me how easy it is for one to suddenly lose his vision. When I recovered, I begun to cherish my eyes and used my sense of vision with a great deal of pride, care and appreciation.

Last summer I had the opportunity to work as a graduate intern at the UNHCR head office in Ankara, Turkey. My first duties included researching various refugee-related issues. Eventually, I was given the opportunity to interview asylum seekers and screen them according to the UNHCR's refugee determination criteria.

This experience was similar to my eye injury, because, although it was very depressing, it was nonetheless very rewarding. It brought me close enough to witness the plight of those refugees who were in serious financial, psychological and even physical pain. The uniqueness of such an experience is the realization of the same ubiquitous reality that one witnesses night after night on the television screen, but this time perception of this reality is aided with more than one sense. The focus of this perception is on displaced people who are human beings like everyone of us with flesh, feelings and hopes, but are dehumanized by having been turned into file numbers. One of the most unforgettable incidents while I was there took place during an early morning interview. A middle-aged asylum seeker was just admitted to the office for his first interview. Although the man appeared healthy, he was under so much stress that as soon as he started to reveal his grounds for asylum he collapsed with a heart attack. He died in the office, right in front of the legal officer and an interpreter. I was told later that this was "nothing," incidents such as someone burning himself in front of the UNHCR building or somebody throwing his sick child in front of a vehicle to relieve the child of the pain were common incidents there. My daily experiences were particularly depressing for a new employee who had to face the misery of destitutes—and then make a yes or no "moral" decision. Indeed, reading Locke, Hume, Hobbes and all other theoretical writings on ethics meant nothing when it came to a real life situation. It was striking to see that the permanent employees were very accustomed to this situation. It frightened me to think that the same thing could have happened to me if I had stayed there a little longer. There, in the legal unit of the UNHCR, legal officers are involved in making decisions on the future of these applicants. They act like quality control inspectors on an assembly line—filtering out unwanted goods. The irony in this process is that the *needless* determine the fate of the *needy* in accordance with ethical values which are relative and culturally biased. Being involved in this pedagogical process was indeed my greatest difficulty, especially when the system is known to be deficient from experiences elsewhere.

Mehran Banaei is a research assistant at CRS, and recently completed his M.A. in Philosophy and a Diploma in Refugee Studies at York University.

As one of the consequences of the Gulf war, the majority of the refugees coming to Turkey were Iraqis, who were fleeing the severe economic hardship imposed on the them by Western economic embargos. The distinction between convention refugee and migrant worker is clear in the UNHCR Determination Handbook, and of course "the UNHCR does not act as travel agency" in population movements. Thus, those who do not fit the convention definition are doomed to be rejected. None of the asylum seekers get any benefit from the UN, unless they are first recognized as a convention refugee. The result is tantamount to a disappointing brush-off for a great number of those who seek asylum. The standard and ubiquitous cliche: "we regret to inform you that..., thank you for your interest in UNHCR, we hope that you are successful elsewhere in your future objectives" appears in the only correspondence that a refugee receives from the UNHCR. Indirectly, the rejectees are treated as though they are guilty of committing an embarrassing crime like shoplifting or plagiarizing an essay, while their only "misdeed" is trying to provide better living conditions for their family. "You migrant worker, how dare you impersonate a convention refugee." A "crime" that without any hesitation anyone of us would commit being in their position. Often both the *needless* and the *needy* are where they are due an accident of birth and fate. The *needless*, seeming immune from displacement, are indifferent to the needs of the *needy*. The *needless* never think that they too may easily become one of the *needy*, just as we hardly ever consider that we may lose our precious eyesight.

The rejectees often remain in Turkey illegally, hoping to reach their destination through smugglers. The smugglers, who can hardly be trusted, often prey ruthlessly on the vulnerability of these desperate people. They charge as much as U.S.$8,000 to provide them with a forged passport and an airline ticket. While in Turkey, if

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they are caught, they are subject to prosecution and deportation by the Turkish authorities.

As a result of this obviously faulty process, many NGOs and refugee rights advocates have campaigned for broadening the 1951 UN definition of a refugee. Although concerned for human rights, I personally never favoured the idea of changing the "outdated" definition of a convention refugee in order to accommodate the larger number of asylum seekers of 90s. That is because, I believe that we should always seek an optimal solution as opposed to a band-aid approach and false comfort. Therefore, we must handle any problems at the foundational level, to see what has caused the cracks in the structure in the first place. Thus, we ought to remove the sources which have generated the defects, rather than just dealing with symptoms. Furthermore, if we try to revise the 1951 definition of refugee in order to accommodate the current situation of 90s, then what are we going to do in the next few decades when the 90s definition is also outdated? Therefore, it seems that changing the definition every once in a while is far from being an optimal solution or a foundational approach. The solution does not lie in allowing more Iraqis to settle in the West. The solution ought to be in eradicating the problem from its root, which is indeed viable if our priorities are just and correctly focused. For example, if the UN economic blockade against Iraq is lifted then many of these refugees whom I met in Turkey would not abandon their homeland, possessions, culture, way of life, family and beg for membership in a foreign and often hostile society. These refugees are the victims of the so-called "New World Order", which evidently breathes disorder. So long as such a causative factor is left untouched, the plight of refugees will continue to exist. Until then, I believe there is a serious and urgent need for helping the downcast non-convention refugees who are wandering around Turkey and elsewhere in the world. ◼

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CALL FOR PAPERS ON

Refugee Issues in the Horn of Africa

The Centre for Refugee Studies will publish a special issue of *Refuge* on the socioeconomic, political and environmental issues of the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and Djibouti and the neighbouring countries). The issue will deal with topics such as:

- The cycle of refugee movements within the Horn of Africa
- Settlement and/or resettlement
- Repatriation and development
- Role of NGOs, both local and international
- Role of international agencies—UNHCR, UNDP etc.
- Reaction of host countries, vis-à-vis the growing number of refugees
- Reaction of refugee countries of origin, vis-à-vis returnees and displaced people

Priority will be given to papers based on field work and participatory observation that reflect the objective and subjective reality of the given region. Papers written in French (with an abstract in English) will also be considered for publication. Submission should be sent by March 1, 1994.

The paper length may not exceed 16 pages double spaced, and may be sent on disk, in IBM or Mac formats, or by email to the attention of:

Yohannes Gebresellasie
Guest Editor, Special Issue on the Horn of Africa
Centre For Refugee Studies
Suite 322, York Lanes, York University
4700 Keele Street, North York ON M3J 1P3
Canada

Tel: (416) 736-5663 • Fax: (416) 736-5837
email: yohannes@ vm1.yorku.ca

CENTRE FOR REFUGEE STUDIES

ANNUAL DINNER AND MEETING

LICHEE GARDEN RESTAURANT

595 Bay Street, Concourse Level, Atrium on Bay, Toronto

February 17, 1994 • 6:30 p.m.

DONOR INFORMATION

Corporate Patron	A table for ten to the dinner *plus* a subscription to ***Refuge*** and notification of events sponsored by the Centre	**$600**
Patron	One ticket for the dinner *plus* a subscription to ***Refuge*** and notification of events sponsored by the Centre	**$125**
Friend	One ticket to the dinner	**$60**
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❒ I cannot attend, but I am sending a donation to the Centre.

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SUMMER COURSE ON REFUGEE ISSUES

TORONTO • JUNE 22-29, 1994

UNIVERSITÉ YORK UNIVERSITY

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- **History of Nation States and Refugees**
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Fees for Full Course, inclusive of materials:

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After March 1, 1994: $750 *(subsidised to $450 for nongovernmental groups)*

Food and accommodation are extra. Modest cost on-campus accommodation is available as well as quality hotels nearby. A variety of restaurants with varying prices are available on campus.

For further information and registration, please contact:

Dr. Tom Clark, Summer Course Coordinator, Centre for Refugee Studies
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Canada
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