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Some Thoughts on Early Warning

Susanne Schmeidl

Recent devastating conflicts in Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, Liberia and Somalia remind us that the international community is still struggling with solutions to humanitarian disasters. Despite having vowed, "never again" after Second World War, both Yugoslavia and Rwanda came and went, and other conflicts (like Burundi) keep coming. Can we claim that we were swept away by rapidly unfolding events and therefore unable to do anything? Are we playing the games of children: "I will only try to do something if you do it first," or "I am too small, what can I do?" With respect to Burundi, one might well ask if we will ever learn anything about conflicts and possible ways of intercepting the chain of events that led up too them in order to prevent humanitarian disasters.

This is not to say that we have not thought about issues of conflict resolution or prevention, and the notion of the early warning of conflicts. Many of these ideas have been around both the academic and the non-academic communities for years. In addition, with the rising number of conflicts and the

continuation of humanitarian emergencies in the form of long-standing refugee camps, such ideas have received significant attention since the early 1980s, and have been seriously considered by the United Nations, NGOs and governments since the beginning of the 1990s in particular.

The basic idea is that by predicting humanitarian emergencies, we will be

able to pre-empt, or at least lessen the costs associated with, emergency assistance. To illustrate this fact, let us focus on one humanitarian problem—refugees—and consider what failed conflict prevention costs us. If refugee assistance per refugee costs twenty cents per day (an amount that would probably lead to starvation), multiplied by the current number of sixteen

million refugees (U.S. Committee for Refugees 1996), we would incur a cost of 3.2 million dollars a day which is 22.4 million dollars a week, or over one billion dollars a year. This simple calculation does not include the cost of most bureaucratic apparatuses in Western countries that determine genuine asylum, or the cost of peace keeping, or the cost of rebuilding a country that is totally destroyed and infested by land mines. Furthermore, we have not even addressed the human cost of war and conflict and the immense suffering and irreversible trauma involved. Given these figures, one cannot help but be surprised that we have not already created an early warning system with a set of possible responses to imminent crises.

The above illustration addresses the benefits of having an early warning system in place from an humanitarian and financial perspective. If we were to survey individuals, governments, and (international) organizations, we would likely find agreement that early warning is a desirable exercise. Yet, at the same time, we would probably also receive many 'buts': "But early warning is not as easy as it sounds?" or "But what do we mean exactly by early warning?" or "But how are we supposed to do it?" or "But who would be responsible for such a system?" These questions show that there are many fundamental problems with early warning that still need to be addressed. Employing various perspectives the articles in this special issue of *Refuge* consider the problematic of early warning. The contributions range from critical treatments of early warning (Schmeidl and Jenkins, Rusu, and Cottey) to on-going and proposed efforts to put early warning in place

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(Rupesinghe, Adelman and Schmeidl, Rusu, and the summary of other efforts and research). A common theme that runs through all of these contributions is the attempt to tackle the issue of how early warning could and should be carried out, while considering the barriers we have encountered during past conflicts that have made early warning difficult, if not impossible.

It is worth noting the development of the definition of early warning over the past years. In a way, one can see an evolution of the perception of early warning and how it has become politicized. Initially, early warning was seen as a way to predict a crisis in order to be better prepared for emergency relief, thus focusing on the humanitarian side. Early warning, however, has shifted away from this simple focus on the gathering of information. The articles herein clearly point toward the political side of early warning: the prediction of humanitarian disasters with the purpose of prevention, or at least mitigation, in order to lessen human suffering. For this purpose, early warning efforts focus on analytical forecasting as a tool that is tied into response research and the communication of information to actors who can engage in preventive action.

The focus on response that runs throughout the contributions in this issue demonstrates a sense of responsibility when engaging in early warning. The authors call for a shift away from observation to action, insisting that there is a responsibility to act. There are no innocent observers; how can we innocently observe genocide without condoning it through our inaction? The words of Martin Luther King are fitting: "What frightens me is not oppression by the wicked, [but] ... the indifference of the good" (quoted in PIOOM 1995). Also relevant are the words of Pastor Niemöller, victim of the Nazis, reflecting on the manner in which we deny responsibility for human misery as long as we believe it does not affect us:

> First they came for the Jews
> and I did not speak out—
> because I was not a Jew.

Then they came for the communists
and I did not speak out—
because I was not a communist.

Then they came for the trade unionists
and I did not speak out—
because I was not a trade unionist.

Then they came for me—
and there was no one left
to speak out for me.

Early warning of humanitarian crises is inherently linked to the necessity of acting to prevent atrocities. Early warning research does not seek to collect information on impending crises for the simple end of obtaining knowledge, but for the sake of using such knowledge to avert catastrophe.

Early warning, then, is an eminently sensible activity on political, economic, and moral grounds. One might wonder what more there is to be said on the matter. If we can all agree that this is a crucial activity, why are we continually caught by surprise by each new humanitarian disaster? And when we do foresee such a disaster coming, why are we so woefully unable to respond? The articles contained within illustrate both the difficulties of establishing reliable early warning and response systems, as well as the progress underway to overcome these difficulties. Each article provides a different focus on early warning, and therefore contributes to the ongoing debate on the subject.

The first set of articles addresses the difficulties in the process of warning itself, and in identifying high-risk situations, as well as the thorny question of what is to be done once such situations are recognized. The first article, by Schmeidl and Jenkins, examines the problem of quantitative modeling in early warning analysis by considering the utility of indicator and large-scale quantitative analysis. The authors, while themselves involved in quantitative prediction of refugee migration, examine the limits of such an approach and the problems that need to be addressed for the purpose of using indicator models as a meaningful forecasting device. The following two papers address the difficulties in translating such information into action.

Rusu scrutinizes the 'Early Warning debate,' raising definitional issues (what is early warning?) as well as political issues (who are the actors?). Rusu's article surveys existing efforts on early warning from a critical perspective and raises many questions concerning the institutional obstacles that still need to be addressed before we can arrive at a working early warning mechanism for the purpose of conflict prevention. Cottey's paper follows a similar bent, assessing the nature and functioning, as well as the actors, of early warning, and the shortcomings of the current process. Despite their cautionary tone however, the authors are guardedly optimistic about the involvement and responsibility of certain state actors in early warning. Guarded optimism, in fact, characterizes all the contributions. Early warning is confronted by many problems, but they need not be insurmountable.

The next set of papers provides us with descriptions of on-going, and proposed, efforts on early warning. These papers present a sampling of the different approaches to establishing reliable early warning systems, from an NGO, United Nations and academic perspective respectively. In the first piece, Rupesinghe introduces the efforts of International Alert, a British NGO. This article focuses on the utilization of NGOs for the purpose of early warning. The second paper provides a description of one of the two main efforts on early warning within the UN system, ReliefWeb, established by the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. (The other UN effort—Humanitarian Early Warning System—is included in the "Selected efforts on Early Warning" compilation at the end of this issue.) ReliefWeb parallels the effort of International Alert to some extent, concentrating on the utilization of UN agencies in coordinating responses to complex humanitarian emergencies. The final paper in this set is a proposal by the Centre for Refugee Studies on an academic-NGO consortium for the purpose of collecting, analyzing, and communicating early

warning information. This proposal argues for an incorporation of previous efforts (including those presented here) into an early warning network that uses the Internet for the dissemination of information. While each of these three efforts focuses on a different group of actors, all share the conviction that it is both possible and essential to move from recognizing to averting humanitarian disasters.

This special issue on early warning presented here provides only a glimpse; many other opinions and efforts exist, which, unfortunately, could not be included in this issue. For those who wish to pursue the matter of early warning, there is a descriptive listing of various other projects, along with brief accounts of their research and efforts. It was compiled from responses to a query sent out on the Internet asking 'who is doing what' in the area of early warning. Those involved in early warning efforts who do not use the Internet are therefore absent in this summary. Nevertheless, this compilation is part of an effort at the Centre for Refugee Studies, in collaboration with International Alert, to create a directory on early warning. So please contact us concerning any efforts that were excluded. In addition, due to space limitations, we have only presented those responses that focus on larger systematic research and efforts; we would be grateful, however, if individual researchers as well would contact us about their work for inclusion in the directory.

The questions raised here concerning early warning are not completely answered; the issue of early warning is still "a work in progress." We welcome your participation in the on-going discussion around early warning. ▣

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Issues in Quantitative Modelling in the Early Warning of Refugee Migration

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Abstract

This article discusses the problems associated with indicator analysis for the purpose of early warning. While the authors endorse the idea of quantitative EWM, they are sceptical of the understanding that many have of what EW analysis entails. In this article, they identify the limits of quantitative EW analysis and address many of the major problems that confront those who are committed to quantitative EW analysis. In particular, the authors discuss the following issues that need to be addressed when engaging in quantitative early warning analysis: the problem of "late warning;" problems of contextual sensitivity; problems of temporal development; data availability and measurement; and problems with the definition of the appropriate unit of analysis.

Résumé

Cet article traite des problèmes rattachés à l'utilisation d'indicateurs en matière d'alerte préventive. Tout en faisant état de la pertinence de l'élaboration de modèle quantitatifs, les auteurs émettent des doutes à propos des conclusions obtenues à partir de ces analyses. Les limites de ces modèles et les principaux obstacles rencontrés dans la conduite de ces analyses sont identifiés. Les problèmes rattachés à une alerte lancée en retard, au caractère évolutif des situations conflictuelles, à la disponibilité et a l'évaluationde l'information, à la définition et au choix de la méthode d'analyse appropriée ainsi qu'a l'article et à la susceptibilité des parties impliquées sont évoqués de manière particulière.

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Early Warning Models (EWMs) have largely been used with success in the forecasting of ecological disasters such as droughts or storms but are as yet unproven in the forecasting of humanitarian disasters such as refugee migrations, human rights violations, and conflict. Recently, a number of scholars have begun systematic work on the development of quantitative EWMs so that eventually we will be able to foreshadow humanitarian disasters and thereby inform both policymakers and the academic community of the risks of such events. For example, there are EWMs of communal conflicts (Gurr 1994), genocides (Fein 1993), politicides (Harff 1994), armed conflicts (Bond and Vogele 1995) and population movements (Clark 1983, 1989). Each of these EWMs suggests that eventually we will be able to deal with humanitarian disasters in a fashion similar to ecological ones. Once early warning signs are identified, such information can be "received, digested and brought into decision-making by those who can prevent a man-made disaster or cope with its results" (Gordenker 1986, 185).

While we endorse the idea of quantitative EWM, we are skeptical of the understanding that many have of what EW analysis entails. In this paper, we identify the limits of quantitative EW analysis and address many of the major problems that confront those who are as committed as we are to quantitative EW analysis.

Our main point can be best demonstrated through a comparison with ecological EWMs. Humanitarian EW analysis is inherently reactive. With ecological EWMs, once we know that a storm, flood or famine will occur, we can only prepare to lessen its consequences by properly sheltering or evacuating people and providing relief. In the case of humanitarian disasters, however, we have two options: We can try to provide relief, or, optimally, we can try to prevent the disaster from occurring. Since human disasters have an intrinsic element of human agency, it is always possible to negotiate or apply pressure for peaceful (re)solutions. This, of course, makes humanitarian EWMs all the more appealing since they might allow for the possibility of preventive intervention. Yet, this very aspect of human agency also makes the early warning of humanitarian disasters much more unpredictable than the early warning of ecological disasters. In fact, we would argue that this makes the goals of humanitarian EWMs qualitatively different. Instead of attempting to develop predictive models, our primary aim should be to foreshadow humanitarian disasters and subsequently inform human actors about potential sources of humanitarian disaster. Because of this inherent reactivity of human action, the major aim of early warning is preventive, rather than being strictly a forecasting device. As such, humanitarian early warning requires a detailed analysis of three important elements: actors, situations, and contexts. Although we do not believe that EWMs will ever to be able to predict the exact timing of the outbreak of a humanitarian disaster, we do believe that they could eventually foreshadow such events and thereby alert the policymakers and the international community to conditions in countries which are likely to lead to a crisis. Therefore, the main issue is not to predict exactly when and where a humanitarian disaster will occur, but to learn as much as possible about the

underlying patterns of such crises in the past (which includes quantitative analysis) and integrate such information into a context rich study of a specific region in crisis, which, in turn, should be derived from extensive case-based knowledge. Such knowledge can then be used by policymakers to develop scenarios and strategic alternative responses to prevent, or inhibit, the escalation of the factors most likely to cause conflict and refugee migration.

In the past, then, early warning has been interpreted as necessitating a model that adequately predicts humanitarian disasters. As social scientists, we agree with this goal for scientific purposes. However, for EWM purposes, this is potentially misleading. It is important to understand the limits of EWMs with the respect to humanitarian disasters at the outset and to address problems of indicator construction within that context.

Past EWM Research

Currently, there are numerous efforts by academics and policymakers to develop early warning on quantitative basis. As previously mentioned, in the past such academic efforts have largely

and the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA). Although partially engaging in case studies, these works essentially attempt to construct valid indicators that can be used with large samples of countries and regions to predict specific types of humanitarian disasters. However, we think such work (including our own) has to address a number of problems:

1. the problem of "late warning"
2. problems of contextual sensitivity
3. problems of temporal development
4. data availability and measurement, and
5. problems with the definition of the appropriate unit of analysis.

The Problem of "Late Warning"

"Late warning" is a major problem, particularly for academic researchers, due to a reliance on indicators that are collected from official documents (including event data derived from electronic newswires), or indicators that lag one or more years behind the occurrence of relevant events. This time lag impairs a timely analysis and leads to a "late warning": an analysis that shows whether or not we could have predicted a certain event or pattern of such events. While "late warning" (or

tional wire services that we all depend on for information. Journalists and governmental experts typically arrive on the scene after the events have become troublesome. Second, relevant information may be withheld from widespread distribution (such as on the Internet) and thus remain inaccessible. Third, the existing automated systems are unable to contextualize critical information and thus make it relevant to policymakers. For example, in the PANDA system (with which one of the authors is associated), we may be able to accurately count the number and characteristics of wide-spread political protests, but we cannot identify the goals or specific meanings of these events, and thus we are unable to judge the extent to which they are likely to lead to a crisis. At this point, we need to integrate quantitative indicators with the expertise found in each country, thereby bringing expert methods together with standard indicator approaches.

Contextual Sensitivity

Learning of political events out of context leads to the second problem, contextual sensitivity. In the early warning literature there is an acknowledgement of the multi-leveled conditions that can produce humanitarian disasters. These are usually distinguished as root (long-term) causes, proximate (medium-term) events, accelerating factors, triggering events, and intervening conditions. Typically these various conditions are treated as if they were mutually exclusive, but in fact, we suspect they are not. Clark (1989), for example, argues that in the early warning of refugee disasters, proximate events can also be intervening factors. Collective action among the population, for instance, could either a) lead to refugee out-migration through a threat to the government, which, in turn increases repression, or b) present an alternative to flight. The outcome of collective action depends on context, especially the availability of escape routes, the responsiveness of the regime, and so on. In quantitative modelling context sensitive measures

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relied on a formal model approach, in search of the best indicators. Notable efforts include the monitoring of major armed conflicts (Singer 1994; Wallensteen and Sollenberg 1995; Bond and Vogele 1995), ethnic conflict (Gurr 1993), genocide (Fein 1993), politicide (Harff 1994), refugee migrations (Schmeidl 1995), environmental disasters (Homer-Dixon 1994; Lee 1994), and human rights (Jongman 1994). Among policymakers, the most prominent recent examples are the State Failure Project (Gurr 1995), sponsored by the United States government, and the efforts by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

in scientific terms, retrodiction) is a very useful exercise in testing certain indicators, it does not really fit the aim of EWM, that is early warning. The computerization of information and the ability to code from computer generated news has improved this considerably, and we suspect that in real time forecasting may soon be feasible given the automation of event data collection. Nonetheless, this remains a major problem.

Even assuming automation reduces the time lag inherent in "late warning," significant problems remain. First, areas in crisis are typically underreported in the standard interna-

that capture this complexity must be devised. We recommend strongly that EW analysts begin considering methods of contextual analysis widely used in the social sciences and adapt these to their purposes. This also points to the need to become knowledgeable about specific countries and cases, so that we can better understand how these complex contexts work.

The Timing Problem

A third problem is the timing of indicators. We may never resolve the issue of exact timing, since "each incident of forced migration has particular characteristics" (Gordenker 1992, 4). Long-term (or root) causes may occur years or even decades before the exodus, while medium-term (or proximate) causes may occur only months

still very little guidance in the literature as to how long it really takes for certain events to lead to humanitarian disasters. While it might be self-evident that genocide and war will lead to refugee migration, the temporal structure of these developments can vary. In some cases, the outbreak of a war and/or genocide may directly correspond with the start of refugee movements; then again, it may take months, or longer for people to pick up and leave. Migratory movements also vary in accordance with different types of generalized violence. During civil wars, people have been known to refuse to leave despite intensive violence (e.g. Peru); while elsewhere people turn to resistance and/or flight readily. What this suggests is that we need to experiment extensively with

lack of information. Related to this is the problem of access (including security and proprietary data). Government agencies and transnational corporations often have relevant data, but are unwilling to share such sensitive information.

Measurement Issues

We often have to rely on very crude indicators for important events. For example, we may know whether or not there was a war or a genocide, but it may be more important to know the intensity of such a war or genocide when trying to predict a certain outcome such as refugee migration. Death estimates of such humanitarian disasters, however, are problematic. After all, mass graves in Bosnia and Rwanda are just now telling the tale of the extent of genocides that took place few years ago and that have been a subject of dispute among several sources. Similarly, we may never know the exact number of people affected in a war. This information, often very crucial, is almost impossible to obtain. We do not know the number of deaths (let alone the toll of the injured), of houses burned or destroyed, of women raped. All this could aid us in assessing the intensity of a humanitarian crises, yet the information is unavailable, and we are forced to rely on very crude estimates. This discussion can be extended to the amount of weaponry involved in a war or dispute, the number of people participating in conflict and protest, etc. All this information is often very sensitive and thus not readily available; when available, its veracity is highly contested.

The main problem with the unit of analysis is the uneven coverage of countries and regions, especially with the creation of new states and the increase in subnational or regional conflicts and disasters.

before out-migration. Since the time point of the causes could be decades before the refugee movement occurs, it may be difficult to find indicators that fit into a model aimed at explaining refugee migration.

Triggering events are the most difficult to place. Theoretically, they would occur almost simultaneously with, or only days before, flight. In addition, most conventional methods in the social sciences (including time-series analysis) are unable to evaluate the close timing associated with triggering events. Due to these problems, EWM researchers have shied away from more immediate causes, such as triggering events, and typically focused on root, proximate and accelerator factors. However, it is important to point out that for policy purposes, triggering events are critical in preparing for emergency relief.

In our own research on refugee early warning, we have experimented with several time lags, up to ten to fifteen years for some root causes. Yet there is

varying time-lags and to incorporate an awareness of contextual variation into this temporal process.

Availability of Data

The largest problem of all is suitable and reliable data. Most of us are intensively involved in indicator construction precisely because of the absence of suitable and reliable indicators of relevant processes. Such indicators need to provide both geographic and temporal coverage; otherwise we will not be able to generate useful assessments. However, important variables such as income inequality or land inequality are only available for a small number of countries and for a limited time period. Furthermore, sometimes regional information might be very important, which is even harder to find (we will discuss this 'unit of analysis' problem later). Thus, a researcher engaged in quantitative analysis is often compelled to ignore important factors (e.g., inequality) or important cases (e.g., the poorest countries) because of

These measurement problems greatly limit the type of EWMs that can be constructed. Schmeidl's (1995) analysis of the early warning of refugee migration illustrates this issue. Although she was able to predict refugee migration over a twenty year period (1971–1990) across 109 countries, she encountered several problems. First, there were many countries that did not follow the general pattern described in the model. Some countries expelled considerably more refugees

than expected and some countries less. This suggests that the major indicators were not sensitive enough to explain refugee migration. However, crude estimates of the intensity of wars and genocides (instead of a simple dichotomous variable of occurrence and non-occurrence) did not improve the results and, in some cases, produced inferior results. This may reflect poor quality estimates of the intensity of violence, but it may also reflect the difficulty of linking violence to particular time periods. Thus, a simple dichotomous variable proved statistically more useful, despite the fact that substantively it should be inferior.

The Unit of Analysis

The main problem with the unit of analysis is the uneven coverage of countries and regions, especially with the creation of new states and the increase in subnational or regional conflicts and disasters. The breakup of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and Ethiopia, along with the growth of regional conflicts, have created a need for a new level of analysis for which we are lacking (for the most part) suitable data. Cross-national scholars have focused on developing national indicators but largely ignored sub-national differences. We are all aware of countries with major regional or internal inequalities and differences but, aside from crude estimates (e.g., sectoral inequality, ethnic differences) we have neglected these indicators. For the policymakers, however, such sub-national measurement is becoming of increasing importance.

Similarly, the most important indicators are often relational indicators, such as the relationships between different groups and populations, yet these are barely explored. Gurr (1993) and associates have made an heroic effort to tackle this issue with ethnic minorities. This kind of research needs to be extended to other kinds of vulnerable populations (e.g., women, children, the elderly, regional subgroups) so that we can accurately gauge the populations at risk.

Conclusion

Despite our scepticism, our aim has not been to disavow the importance or the eventual promise of quantitative EWM. In fact, we are practitioners of the art as well as its champions. Our aim has been to identify the major analytic problems that quantitative EW assessment currently confronts so as to promote a better understanding of the task ahead. In an ideal world, EWM will eventually be able offer: 1) a global reach in terms of the number of countries and time periods concerned; 2) a comparison of positive as well as negative cases of the development of humanitarian disasters and their major determinants; and 3) the incorporation of sub-national and regional information as well as relevant indicators of the risks of specific populations. Eventually, we will have a deeper understanding of the causes of specific types of humanitarian disasters, their timing, and their contextual sources. Ultimately, we will be able to use the reactivity of human agency to our advantage by providing timely information that can be used for policy purposes as well as academic analysis. ▣

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Early Warning: Much Ado About Nothing?

Sharon Ruso

Abstract

This article provides a critical view of the history of early warning as well as existing early warning efforts. The author scrutinizes the "early earning debate," including what early warning is and who the actors might be. The paper surveys existing efforts on early warning from a critical perspective and raises many questions concerning the institutional obstacles that still need to be addressed before we can arrive at a functional early warning mechanism for the purpose of conflict prevention.

Résumé

Cet article présente sous un angle critique l'origine et l'évolution du concept d'alerte préventive et des efforts actuellement menés dans ce domaine. L'auteure analyse le débat portant sur la notion d'alerte préventive, notamment la question de la définition du concept ainsi que des acteurs qui peuvent être impliqués dans le domaine. L'article effectue un examen critique des efforts menés actuellement et soulève plusieurs questions concernant les obstacles institutionnels qui doivent encore être surmontés avant d'en arriver a établir un système d'alerte efficace en matière de prévention des conflits.

"What is early warning?" you may ask "It depends on who is asking" is an apt reply in that it conflates the definition with the question. Yet, whether we speak of early warning as the reliable forecasting of natural disasters, like hurricanes or earthquakes, or of complex emergencies like Rwanda, Liberia and the former Yugoslavia, we are all

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The views expressed are the personal views of the author and are not necessarily shared by the United Nations or the Department of Humanitarian Affairs.

generally talking about the ability to predict the possible movement or displacement of people as a result of nature, conflict or coercion. The real questions are: who is responsible for prediction especially in so-called complex humanitarian emergencies, and what, if anything, comes after? On the natural disaster side, responsibility and responses are fairly clearly demarcated. Not so for complex emergencies.

A recent multi-donor study, evaluating international emergency assistance to Rwanda, viewed as a failure the efforts of the international system to collect and analyze relevant data over time and to compare these to equally relevant past incidents of slaughter in Rwanda and Burundi (Adelman and Suhrke 1996). In general, the study brought together a significant amount of data as supporting evidence of the failure of many actors at different levels to live up to their responsibilities: first, to act on the warnings given and, later, to regulate the conflict in Rwanda.

Based on the view that early warning covers many issues and concerns, such as military conflict, military coups, impending humanitarian disasters such as famine and flows of refugees, slaughters and, at the extreme, genocide, the multi-donor study underlined that in the Rwanda case, all of these were involved at different stages. Throughout, the authors provide evidence of how the warnings that were made were, in some instances, interpreted in purely technical terms, as in the case of the UN Rapporteur's report in 1993 (Deqni-Ségui 1994); how both the UN system and the NGO community failed to link human rights reports to genocide; and, further, the failure on the part of key actors to acknowledge the genocide for reasons ranging from lack of interest (as on the part of the USA) through complicity (as on the part of France and Zaire). Finally, the

authors answer "yes" to the question, "Did those with the capacity to prevent and mitigate the genocide have the information from which such a conclusion might be drawn?" In fact, they note that specific information about plans and conspiracies towards this end was picked up by the UN system, most significantly in the notorious "Black File" of January 1994 (Millwood 1995).

If the Rwanda crisis has taught us anything, it is that an effective early warning system for humanitarian emergencies should be designed around objectives which are the result of cooperation among a range of actors in the UN system and directed to initiating political action at the highest level. A number of effective early warning systems already exist, but it is as though their predictions go unnoticed. We had ample warning on the former Yugoslavia, Somalia and Rwanda, but none appears to have benefited from "early action." As for those areas in which early intervention or preventive measures were successful as a result of early warning, it is difficult to describe them since these events are not featured on CNN.

The Early Warning Debate

A rather small group of decision makers and those who advise policymakers on early warning, conflict prevention and intervention, are generally responsible for the polemics that inform the early warning debate. Among these, though careful not to define early warning, is the group that is anxious to point out that early warning is not conflict prevention. This group chiefly comprises those who support the view that early warning is somehow related to security issues and is really an arm of traditional intelligence gathering. They are quite happy to live with the contradictions inherent in defining what early warn-

ing is not without acknowledging the root causes of displacement and conflict prevention as major elements in this regard. This group is the most sceptical about early warning as a concept and downright cynical about the potential of any early warning system to become the centre for international alerts.

In the middle of the same spectrum stands the group that, though still sceptical, has reflected on what an early warning system, if it existed and worked, would do. They posit the view that an effective early warning system must alert the international community to impending displacement, either for pre-emptive (notice, not *preventive*) action or preparedness. Related to this latter view is the belief that effective early warning should identify risk fac-

and exchange in the interests of early warning. Nor is there a decentralized system that could be viewed as authoritative. What we do have are opinions as to the nature and extent of conceptual frameworks through views on the need for fewer models and more implementation and methodology.[1]

In fact, the range of views on early warning speaks also to the heart of the reluctance of decision makers at all levels of international affairs, including the United Nations, to pay more than lip service to early warning initiatives. How, we ask, can this continue after Rwanda? The answer, in part, lies in what the multi-donor study identified as a system that does not know what its objectives are. In this regard, a number of contributing factors were identified: the lack of specialized information

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tors which can then be used to identify vulnerable constituencies and lead to a more effective assessment of the need for intervention, either graduated or immediate—that is, what is the best action and at what time? Some among this group also believe that early warning can only really be accomplished outside the UN system most probably with and among the international non-governmental sector.

At the other end of this spectrum are the groups who are actively pursuing the development of theoretical models. Some have even developed a global system of alerts and have applied them to actual situations. For now, I simply point out that the work of this group, though known and respected by some in the international community, does not receive the kind of legitimate recognition necessary for policy intervention and change. In fact, despite the work being done on a number of levels, there is no single coherent international mechanism for information collection, verification

units in the field; the need for methods of prioritizing by human rights monitors in order to bring significant attention and resources to bear on important cases; the need to link early warning with contingency preparedness; and the fact that the UN system effectively lost its capacity to analyze early warning information when it disbanded the Office for Research and Collection of Information (ORCI). Other units asked to take on the role formerly played by ORCI are too operational in focus to act as the central repository for the kind of 'soft intelligence' needed to generate early warning signals for contingency planning in preventive diplomacy and peace-keeping operations. Add to all this, the cloak of secrecy and self-interest that continues to permeate national and international fora in respect of humanitarian assistance and response, and you begin to understand why there has been little significant progress in relating early warning to early action (Millwood 1995).

The Actors

Reviewing what is being done today on early warning supports what has been said about dissonance among major actors. There is a distinct lack of coordination and communication between those who are actively working in the field, and those who could profit from a reliable early warning system. On the active side, those most engaged are either academics or NGOs.

Ted Robert Gurr (Centre for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland) and Barbara Harff (U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD) are leading researchers in the fields of genocide and political violence. In their work, they have come up with a series of indicators that measure and predict the degree of risk faced by various minority groups worldwide. The system of indicators developed by Gurr and his academic associates derives from a complex data set aggregation exercise, and findings come out at regular intervals in various academic journals. The work of Alex Schmidt of PIOOM (Interdisciplinary Research Programme on Root Causes of Human Rights Violations, Leiden University, Netherlands) has a similar objective, but focuses on human rights and the rule of law as the parameters for the study. Although Gurr and Schmidt have made excellent progress in their areas of research, their systems are as yet neither operational as a basis for 'soft intelligence' reporting, nor standardized in ways that would make application to the sensitive areas of political analysis feasible for most policymakers.

Gurr and Schmidt are not alone. A number of social scientists are engaged in the development of conceptual frameworks in early warning theory. Some participate in an ongoing discussion within international studies concerning the design of a system to provide the UN system with early warning of a variety of international crises. The October 1995 issue of the *Mershon International Studies Review* continues the debate on the develop-

ment of an Internet-based early warning system, aspects of which are discussed below.

At the level of policy research, interest is centred in the liberal tradition of institutions like the Brookings Institute, Harvard University and the Carter Institute in Atlanta with ongoing studies of conflict resolution, peacekeeping, development, internal displacement, and related governance issues based in and on shifting statist and humanitarian norms.

NGO involvement in early warning has focused on conflict prevention. A noteworthy recent initiative, led by Kumar Rupersinghe, the Director of International Alert in London, brings together a consortium of humanitarian NGOs to discuss ways to develop coordinated modalities for conflict prevention based on an effective early warning network. Rupersinghe has tried to involve others, like Gurr and associates, and to incorporate the results of the efforts of the United Nations Inter-Agency Consultations of New Flows of Refugees and Displaced Persons that met regularly until Spring 1995. This latter group produced a list of "41 Indicators for the Early Warning of Population Movements at a Country Level" which would profit from testing in the context of countries of origin. The hope is that the NGOs will take it on as the Inter-Agency Consultations have ceased, and there appears to be little support for their resumption without a more practical mandate than in the past.

The United Nations and Early Warning

The UN is developing two early warning systems, both within the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA). The first is the Humanitarian Early Warning System (HEWS) which resides at DHA, New York. HEWS has specific responsibility for early warning and for some time has been the focus for the development of a system of reliable alerts to warn the international community of impending complex humanitarian emergencies. The unit does not produce reports for the public domain, and most of its achievements have been internal, supporting information needs on complex emergencies through, for example, the production of country profiles and daily HEWs Flashes that summarize media and internal UN reporting on hot spots worldwide.

The second UN initiative is ReliefWeb, a dynamic, interactive global information system, on the Internet, for assisting the humanitarian relief community.[2] The idea is to have several categories of information available on a 24-hour basis that will cover a wide gamut of information from the emergency-specific and logistical through financial tracking and policy analysis. It is an ambitious project that will require resources, support at the highest levels by donors and the UN system, careful coordination, and multiple platform dissemination to link field operations to the global network. At the same time, it must ensure that relief agencies communicate between and among themselves in the field where it counts. Whether or not ReliefWeb will act as an early warning system will depend on the willingness of agencies to share reliable and time sensitive information from field operations. Most importantly, it will depend on how that information is translated into action. That is the critical need and the least likely to receive support at the highest levels of policy and decision making.

International Cooperation

No single organization has the capacity or resources to collect and disseminate the information required to serve humanitarian operations and the agencies involved. Consequently, cooperation at all levels, with governments, international organizations, other members of the UN family and non-governmental organizations must lead to helpful divisions of labour in regard to the collection, treatment and exchange of information. Moreover, all the relevant actors involved in the development of an effective early warning system must be brought together in order to avoid duplication, take advantage of what already exists, and introduce the principle of cooperation along with the virtue of trust in a system that is almost hopelessly cynical of its own best interests. In order that necessary steps are taken at the highest political level, agreement between and among major stakeholders must include support for early warning initiatives that speak directly to the need to link a system of reliable alerts with early action. In establishing such a system, the challenge for the international community will be linking information to policy planning and implementation. Moreover, systems that allow for rapid and frequent dissemination of such reports to major actors are as important as the knowledge that the information received is verifiable. Most importantly, the designation of a lead agency, with a mandate for early warning and conflict prevention, outside the UN system, has the potential to go the distance in successfully addressing and transcending some of the rival prerogatives inherent in the existing system which impede much-needed swift and decisive action in the face of uncertainty.

Recently, a proposal arrived from the Centre for Refugee Studies at York University in Toronto, Canada, for the development of an academic-policy consortium to create a workable, effective, economic, and cost-recoverable early warning system to deal with humanitarian emergencies, complex emergencies, and conflict areas.[3] But as Peter Brecke of the School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology asserts, warning is not a politically neutral activity: "Early warning concerning natural calamities that demand humanitarian relief efforts is not problematic. Early warning of violent conflicts so that conflict-prevention activities can be initiated causes anxiety for many. Although conflict early warning may reduce the need to provide humanitarian relief, it creates pressure to act in ways that collide with state sovereignty (and in some cases cost a lot of money)." Given this reality, Brecke (1995, 322) contin-

ues, " [T]he issue is not how to get wide participation in early warning. The real issue is how to get broader participation in global-scale decision-making." Perhaps the proposed academic policy consortium could contemplate encouraging participation of this nature as a principal task?

These are the issues. We can debate their relative merits, but, in the end, we come back to the key issues. Should we invest in early warning? If yes, who is responsible, where and how should it be done? And, can we develop an effective and useful early warning system? If yes, how and to what end? Whatever steps are taken, lessons learned from past and recent humanitarian crises must and should form the background and foreground for the focus of international action and individual endeavour. ■

Notes

1. This is discussed by Gavan Duffy, Ted Robert Gurr, Philip A. Schrodt, Gottfried Mayer-Kress and Peter Brecke in "An Early Warning System for the United Nations: Internet or Not?" in the "The Forum," *Mershon International Studies Review*, Vol. 39, Supplement 2, October 1995, 315–26.

2. See "ReliefWeb: Mandate and Objectives" in this issue.

3. See "Towards the Development of an Early Warning/Response Network" in this issue.

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Early Warning and Conflict Prevention

Andrew Cottey

Résumé

Ce bref article porte un regard critique sur les mécanismes d'alerte préventive en place actuellement et évoque des enjeux similaires à ceux soulevés par l'article de Sharon Rusu. L'auteur tente ici de décrire la nature et le fonctionnement du système existant, les acteurs qui y sont engagés ainsi les imperfections et lacunes de processus dans son état actuel.

Increasingly, large-scale refugee movements and other humanitarian disasters (famine, environmental crises, economic collapse, the breakdown of state structures) are caused by wars, especially civil wars, and prolonged internal conflicts. If humanity is to avert such disasters, we need to develop new means of conflict prevention. This in turn depends, in part, on developing effective mechanisms to provide early warning of potential conflicts.

Since the end of the Cold War, policy-makers and governments have accepted the need to develop new means of conflict prevention. In *An Agenda for Peace*, United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali highlighted the importance and potential of various forms of 'preventive diplomacy.' The Clinton administration views conflict prevention as a central element of the United States' post-Cold War foreign policy. Many other governments are sympathetic to the idea. Regional bodies such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) now see conflict prevention as one of their key roles.

Putting conflict prevention into practice, however, is more difficult.

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The development of effective mechanisms for early warning of potential violent conflicts is inherently problematic. Political instability, economic decline, disputes over borders or ethnic minorities, mobilization of peoples and increased arms flows may be signs of impending conflicts. However, many, perhaps even most, countries are characterized by some of these features. Determining which particular regions and countries are most likely to escalate to warfare—and therefore require urgent attention—is far more difficult. Although the UN and regional organizations are beginning to develop mechanisms to provide early warning of impending conflicts, how far these mechanisms can be truly effective is not yet clear.

Even if effective early warning mechanisms are established, they will be of little use if warnings are ignored or side-lined. Internal UN reports, for example, warned of plans for the genocide that was to occur in Rwanda in 1994, but were suppressed because they were politically inconvenient for some governments. Many observers warned from Tito's death in 1980 onwards of the potential for conflict in the former Yugoslavia, and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency specifically warned in 1990 of impending conflict.

Further, even where the political will to take action exists, developing effective policies is difficult. Neutral mediation and conflict resolution efforts may be effective in some circumstances. In many conflict situations, however, positions are deeply entrenched or the parties involved have an active interest in perpetuating the conflict. In these circumstances, 'rational' diplomatic persuasion and 'good offices' are unlikely to resolve real differences. Bringing pressure to bear on parties to a conflict, however, is difficult and poses its own dilem-

mas. Economic sanctions are a blunt instrument, whose record of success is dubious. Some analysts argue that preventive military intervention may sometimes be the only realistic option. But this also raises obvious risks and dangers.

An underlying problem is the disjuncture between states commitments to the idea of conflict prevention and the resources they are willing to invest and the risks they are willing to take to prevent conflicts. Many observers argue that had the major Western powers been willing to deploy a substantial preventive force in Bosnia in late 1991 or early 1992 the subsequent conflict might have been avoided. Similarly, some suggest that had the UN presence in Rwanda been increased when violence escalated in the spring of 1994 much bloodshed could have been averted. Instead, the UN Security Council, wary of the risks of deeper involvement, chose to reduce the UN peacekeeping force in that country. Whether those states with the power to take more effective action have the will or the interest to do so is therefore open to doubt.

Some Third World states also fear that early warning and conflict prevention could become an excuse for growing Western interference in their internal affairs. With most conflicts occurring within states, early warning and action to tackle conflicts inevitably implies increased monitoring, of and intervention in, the domestic politics of states where conflict may be likely. Such fears have led some Third World states to oppose the setting up of an inter-agency early warning mechanism within the UN, stalling progress in this area. More broadly, there is a risk that Western-led efforts to develop early warning and conflict prevention mechanisms could come to be seen as part of a new 'neo-imperialism,' contributing to the growing polarization of North-South relations.

If these various problems are to be overcome, there is a need to develop approaches which are less dependent on the short-term attention and narrow interests of particular states and governments. Strengthened international organizations, whose action does not always depend on the active support of governments, are one way forward. Within the UN, the Department of Political Affairs was set up by Boutros-Ghali specifically to support conflict prevention and resolution. Its confidential mediation efforts have probably helped to prevent a number of latent conflicts from escalating to violence. Within Europe, the OSCE's High Commissioner on National Minorities has helped to promote dialogue in a number of potential ethnic conflicts and is widely regarded as an important success story for conflict prevention.

Another approach is to support the development of non-governmental groups involved in grassroots conflict resolution and peace-building efforts. Some analysts, disillusioned with the failure of more traditional state-centric and government oriented approaches, suggest that this may be a key area for development. Bodies like the European Union, for instance, could provide far greater financial support for non-governmental conflict prevention and resolution efforts in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union and Africa.

Conflict early warning and prevention face very real problems. We are, however, at a relatively early stage in their post-Cold War development. The UN Department of Political Affairs and the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities provide an indication of the potential for success. If we are to make further progress, there is a need for a wide range of new and imaginative approaches. The conflict prevention agenda, further, needs to be broadened to address the underlying causes of conflict in many parts of the world (poverty, the lack of democracy and respect for human rights, environmental degradation, arms proliferation). ▣

The Role of International Alert in Advancing Early Warning and Early Action

Kumar Rupesinghe

Abstract

This paper focuses on the role of International Alert in promoting early warning and early action in areas of international conflict. It begins by introducing the percepts of preventive diplomacy as used by International Alert. A number of the organisation's objectives and activities are highlighted, showing the many ways in which the principles of conflict prevention and early warning are being developed in areas of potential violence and amongst a wider interdisciplinary audience. In conclusion, the main aims of International Alert and our objective to create a global network with different sectors of the international community and to motivate the creation of a non-military early action mechanism to prevent the escalation of violent conflict are presented.

Résumé

Cet article fait état du rôle joué par International Alert en matière d'alerte préventive et d'intervention rapide dans des situations de conflits internes. Dans un premier temps, les principes de la diplomatie préventive tels que mis en oeuvre par International Alert sont présentés. Un certain nombre d'objectifs et d'activités de cette organisation sont ensuite mis en lumière, illustrant les multiples façons dont les principes en matière de prévention des conflits et d'alerte rapide peuvent être exploités dans les situations de violence potentielle et la façon dont ces notions peuvent être discutées au sein d'un public varié. En conclusion, les objectifs fondamentaux d'International Alert et le projet de créer un Réseau global sont

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présentés. Ce dernier, en réunissant les divers secteurs de la communauté internationale impliqués en matière d'alerte préventive, vise à répondre à la nécessité de créer un mécanisme non-militaire destiné à prévenir l'éclatement et la propagation des conflits violents.

Introduction

In 1985, a small group of scholars and human rights activists headed by Martin Ennals, founder of Amnesty International, recognised that far too often conflicts within a country undermine efforts to protect human rights and promote sustainable development. Globally, there was evidence to suggest that inter-state wars were decreasing, but there were dangerous signs of intra-state conflicts increasing. Conflicts rooted in identity, and unresolved disputes that had been suppressed during the Cold War period, were emerging. The United Nations, whose prime function is to arbitrate and mediate in international disputes, was unlikely to intervene successfully in internal conflicts for which it had no mandate at all. So it was evident that the world had no structure or procedure through which these future wars could be prevented or resolved. International Alert was founded as an action-based non-governmental institution devoted to the study of internal conflicts, preventive diplomacy, and early warning systems which could help identify tensions and avert potential crises.

Preventive Diplomacy

Preventive diplomacy is a strategy to prevent the outbreak and escalation of violence in conflict. As developed by International Alert (IA) and others in the field of conflict prevention, preventive diplomacy arises out of the failure of traditional forms of state-based international diplomacy in dealing with internal conflicts. There are a number of key issues that can be raised here. First, though they are in many ways more complex than inter-state conflicts, it is still possible to prevent internal conflicts and to end violence. Prevention, however, requires carefully developed strategic contingency plans that take account of military and non-military responses. Second, the lack of action and a failure of political will often allow conflicts to drag on. Inherent to political will is the question of selectivity. The international community may mobilise its forces to intervene in Bosnia based on media attention, geographical proximity, or powerful lobby groups in the United States or Europe, but the lack of any such external pressure can isolate a country like Burundi and allow governments to use the principle of sovereignty to justify their doing nothing.

The recognition of a sovereign government is a fundamental obstacle to intervention in internal conflicts. External governments and the UN can only become involved if they are officially invited (UN Charter Art.II.vii). If there is no state consent to intervention, then there is less chance of access to all parties involved in the conflict. Conversely, intervention by one agency alone will not resolve the conflict. Many of those who have tried to intervene have later been accused of abandoning their neutrality. The United Nations, for example, is often viewed with suspicion because of its strong governmental links. It is therefore essential that governmental and non-governmental institutions try to cooperate and complement each other's efforts and so as to mitigate biases as much as possible.

This leads to a final consideration, which is the need for a structured approach to prevention. The structured approach refers to a well coordinated

multi-track action mechanism, based on a division of labour that draws upon the comparative advantages and strengths of each agency. It recognises and addresses the different levels of conflict that need attention and has been described as "a web of interconnected parts (activities, individuals, institutions, communities) that operate together, whether awkwardly or gracefully, for a common goal: A world at peace" (Diamond and McDonald 1993). This perspective is substantially different from traditional military responses, for it advocates a strategic coalition between inter-governmental, governmental and non-governmental agencies in conjunction with local peace constituencies and other relevant actors.

Early Warning and Preventive Diplomacy

By definition, preventive action is a response to warnings. Many of the early warning systems that already function efficiently are geared to identifying potential refugee flows, so that effective contingency plans can be activated. In the field of conflict prevention, however, early warning is concerned with the ability to forecast potential conflicts. It is based on information gathering, informal and formal fact-finding, and, most importantly, a system of synthesising the data with political indicators to assess and analyse the threat to peace and the action that needs to be taken (Boutros-Ghali 1992). Contingency planning for victims is part of the system, but the prime focus is victim prevention.

Early warning as a tool for conflict prevention requires regular monitoring and updating of a situation. A flow of information is essential to an early warning system, but the gathering of that information and subsequent analysis can raise problems. For a start, intelligence systems are geared to national security. It is also understandable that within undemocratic regimes, people are suspicious of any attempts to develop new intelligence systems as these regimes often use their intelligence networks to identify

signs of organised resistance. Consequently, it is essential that the primary aim of any system is the protection of vulnerable sectors of society against gross human rights violations, terror, genocide or politicide. The intention is to predict trends leading to an escalation in violence, long before the violence becomes a reality. The objective is to initiate a proactive response to the conflict, using a network of regional and local NGOs and civic groups.

The Role of International Alert

The role of International Alert in advancing early warning and early action is twofold. On the one hand IA, though not primarily an early warning agency itself, has pioneered and advocated a commitment to early warning and preventive action. A number of published research papers discussing the concept of early warning, and surrounding issues, have been influential in the field of conflict prevention and amongst a wide inter-disciplinary audience.[1] More recent theoretical developments are discussed below. In addition, IA has acted as a catalyst to encourage inter-governmental bodies and other humanitarian and development institutions to recognise the need for an early warning system. A number of these activities are outlined at a later stage in this paper.

IA's conceptual approach to early warning is multi-faceted. First, we believe that a single monolithic global early warning system is an unlikely development; rather, an effective system would be a function of a series of smaller networks. Furthermore, there is a danger of an 'information glut,' resulting in too many people being 'warned' of too many things, but not enough people being able to take the necessary actions. This is predominantly due to the fact that most organisations are unwilling to take action based on information gathered by others, so ownership of the information plays a key role in promoting action.

Ironically, despite the abundance of information, much needs to be improved in the area of data collection. Unfortunately, there is still a lack of

coordination between information gatherers, who vary from being members of Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Inter-governmental Organizations (IGOs) through to church organisations, the media, and others. In addition, there is still a gap between quantitative data analysis and more qualitative, narrative-based reports. Quantitative analysis can be useful in monitoring and recognising the trends, particularly where figures of human rights violations are shown, but they have limited impact when political decisions need to be taken. This is a key problem in any discussion about the role of early action mechanisms, for it refers to the lack of co-ordination between early warning and early action. It also raises other questions regarding the nature of the action that needs to be taken and the time frame that needs to be in place at each stage of managing the conflict.

Co-ordination, Complementarity, and Capacity-building

At present, joint action is not, for the most part, being taken. This problem arises out of a number of practical considerations. First, many NGOs are limited by their mandates. For example, the International Committee of the Red Cross has its own information gathering system, but cannot share this openly with other NGOs, nor can it act on data provided by others. Second, every organisation has its priorities. Amnesty International's focus on Nigeria at a particular time, for example, may not bear relevance to Oxfam's programme, which may be simultaneously focused on India. It is therefore necessary to develop means through which organisations are themselves involved in the gathering and 'owning' of information. A recent study concluded by the Netherlands Institute of International Relations confirms this. While examining the early warning and preventive actions of a number of inter-governmental organisations, the lack of effectiveness and cohesion in their operations was revealed. No well-developed early warning systems have yet been devel-

oped although many organisations such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Association of South East Asian Nations, (ASEAN), United Nations (UN), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and Organization of African Unity (OAU), are aware of the need for such a system (Siccama et al. 1996).

There is still a need for the coordination of data collectors at the theoretical level. In other words, it is important to agree on a set of definitions for terms and concepts such as "conflict," "serious dispute," "potential conflict" and others that are often inter-changed. Secondly, an agreed upon set of indicators must be developed and tested by data collectors. Thirdly, standardised reporting formats should be developed to ease the exchange of information. Finally, IA is interested in the creation of an early warning clearing house which could collect and disseminate regular early warning data to a network of early action agencies. With access to information databases worldwide and a range of web sites on the Internet, the clearing house could synthesise the information gathered and offer a range of standardised reports on subjects such as countries at war, potential conflicts, minorities at risk, as well as thematic issues such as arms proliferation. The clearing house could also act as a referral system, with information on recognised experts and information brokers who could provide more in-depth analysis.

The early action network should be comprised of human rights organisations, humanitarian agencies, development agencies, governments, regional and global inter-governmental organisations such as the OAU, European Union (EU), and UN, the corporate sector, and the academic community amongst others. The aim would be to ensure that a diverse set of organisations have access to regular and reliable information about ongoing and potential conflicts, allowing them to determine a coordinated plan of early preventive action.

Through coordination, there is also complementarity and a structured division of labour. This has two main results. First, the early action network would be decentralised, so that for each region or country only a selected group would be involved in planning strategic action. This is efficient, as those actors with a particular interest or involvement in a region will be more willing to take early preventive action. Secondly, a cooperative division of labour would permit each agency to concentrate on its areas of strength and not be forced to deal with the complexity of a conflict in its entirety. For example, agencies with strong governmental ties could focus on advocacy, while others inform the media; those with local connections and facilities could concentrate on activating support in the conflict area. Furthermore, IA is currently encouraging the development of national coalitions of NGOs to work on specific regional or thematic issues. This gives NGOs a more unified and influential voice, thus enabling them to take more effective action.

The current lack of action also stems from another problem. It is often assumed that a good early warning system amongst the rich nations in the "North" will lead to preventive action by local actors in the "South." The warning of potential violence by external forces, however, will not quell the tension and conflict which exists in a country. It is therefore, necessary to develop early warning and preventive action mechanisms that draw on external and internal capabilities. Strengthening grassroots and civic movements, assisting them in handling their own early warning systems and developing regional focal points, and working with organisations such as the OAU and regional African NGOs are intrinsic to IA's approach.

As a means of developing and strengthening grassroots involvement in peace-building, IA organises training seminars and workshops for local communities in conflict areas. The programmes have both long- and short-term objectives. On the one hand,

training programmes aim to introduce the concepts of multi-track diplomacy to those directly affected by violence. The purpose is to encourage locals to participate in peace-building initiatives and to explore ways in which violent conflict can be transformed peacefully. On the other hand, the long-term objectives of training and capacity building are intended to enable local actors to take more decisive action against the surge of violence at an earlier stage. In other words, grassroots capacity building is an early action to ensure that early warning of violent conflict will not be necessary in the future.

IA's Practical Approach

In its efforts to encourage the development of a truly global network of early preventive action, IA has sponsored and participated in a number of regional conferences focusing on the issues surrounding early warning mechanisms. The aim of such conferences is to introduce the principles of prevention to a wider audience and, as well, to encourage broader participation in the conceptual debate and practical application of preventive diplomacy.

To this effect, one aim has been to foster cooperation between NGOs and the UN. In January 1993, IA and the National Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA) of Tokyo and the United Nations University (UNU) co-hosted an Expert's Round Table on 'Preventive Diplomacy and the UN's Agenda for Peace' (held at UN headquarters in New York). The purpose of the event was to share and evaluate experiences in preventive diplomacy, with particular reference to the UN. NGO and UN cooperation was also discussed. The following recommendations were made:

1) that the UN Secretariat undertake an initiative to integrate the early warning work that was being duplicated by the various UN agencies and to increase ties with relevant NGOs;
2) that NGOs and the academic community should participate in the

implementation of a computerised early warning system in the Secretariat and that the monitoring of different regions be undertaken by UN staff and external experts;

3) that a 24-hour early warning centre be created to monitor reports and disseminate information to relevant senior figures in the organisation (Daws 1993).

The early warning centre is now in operation in New York. However, joint participation with outside experts is still very limited.

Such cooperative efforts comprise part of the attempt to establish an NGO platform on early warning and preventive action. In May 1995, sixty representatives from key European agencies in the fields of development and humanitarian relief, and peace, along with human rights organisations and UN agencies met in Oslo to discuss ways in which conflict prevention could be placed on the agenda in European policy. The development of an early warning platform which could gather and disseminate information regarding countries at risk was among the conference themes (Adrian-Paul 1995). In particular, a steering committee for the development of an NGO consortium was agreed upon. Links between 160 organisations are maintained through the CPEN e-mail network.

The main objective following from this conference was the creation and establishment of national platforms primarily in European countries to advocate and advance preventive diplomacy in those countries, and to develop links with NGOs specialised in particular regions and local experts. The need for greater commitment and cooperation with development, human rights and humanitarian agencies was also emphasised

Another IA sponsored conference sought to explore an interdisciplinary approach to the issues of early warning. In June 1995, the Steering Committee of the Conflict Early Warning Systems (CEWS) Research Programme met at IA's headquarters in London (CEWS is part of the International

Social Science Council). The aim was to provide a positive, interdisciplinary, social scientific response to Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali's *Agenda for Peace*. The strategy is to seek ways in which NGOs and the UN can cooperate and complement each other's activities, particularly in the development of early warning systems and preventive action. The Committee has two objectives. The first is to create and disseminate (via the Internet) a set of comparative, interdisciplinary case studies of conflict prevention successes and failures. The results will be published in a book with contributions from members of the Steering Group. Secondly, they plan to improve and extend accessibility to a database on conflict prevention, including analyses of historical cases, and conceptual developments (Alker et al. 1995).

These efforts all continue the process of developing models and addressing policy issues. In 1993, IA and the Centre for International Development (CIDCM) in Maryland jointly sponsored a workshop on the Early Warning of Communal Conflicts and Humanitarian Crises, bringing together primary and secondary data holders from a variety of disciplines. The objectives of the workshop were to discuss the issues surrounding the coordination of data collection and possible models for early warning systems. Problems of policy and lack of political will on the part of Western powers, and the need for building public awareness regarding preventive action and planning specific responses were also discussed. Six major recommendations arose from the workshop seminars:

1) Electronic networks should be developed for the sharing of early warning information;

2) Key variables must be identified in the way information is gathered and shared;

3) Researchers should establish and strengthen their networks regarding the collecting and coding of relevant information;

4) A 'common language' for classification of data must be developed;

5) The network between NGOs, researchers and activists should be broadened to include groups from within the regions of conflict;

6) A simulation meeting focused on one country or region should be held, so that NGO representatives and regional experts could engage in the early warning process.

Capacity-building in Africa, and increased communication among Africa-based NGOs, has been of particular concern. In September 1994, IA and the Ad Hoc Committee for Peace and Development of Ethiopia sponsored a joint conference on *The Challenge for Peacemaking in Africa: Conflict Prevention and Conflict Resolution*. Over 250 participants made up of NGO representatives, scholars, women's groups, grassroots organisations, and local and international donors attended. This was the first conference of its kind in Africa, and the cross-sectored discussions resulted in a series of recommendations. Especially with regard to early warning and conflict prevention, the following recommendations were made.

1) An information database should be created as an analytical tool for researchers and practitioners, with a strong early warning component;

2) Multi-sectored alliances need to be developed between governments, NGOs, the media and research institutions;

3) Focal points should be identified at the sub-regional level and national level and alliances formed;

4) National advocacy and early warning platforms should be formed, aimed at decision makers;

5) The early warning system should ensure that decision makers are held accountable;

6) An informal network within the NGO community should be established to build trust (International Alert 1994a).

Following from the 1994 conference, a Focal Points workshop was arranged by IA and the Inter-Africa Group bringing together participants from throughout the African continent. The purpose of the workshop was to facili-

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tate the establishment of an early warning mechanism among Africa-based NGOs and to increase the capacity of local NGOs to take more decisive and effective action. Cooperation and collaboration between the NGO and inter-governmental sectors was also explored (International Alert 1994b). Several recommendations were made:

1) A new bi-monthly publication (and on-line web page), *Early Warning News*, produced by Inter-press Service Africa would be used as an indicator for action. Data would be gathered from various constituencies (media, church, legal and human rights organisations, academics, NGOs, and other civic groups) invited to participate in a forum for debate;

2) The UN Economic Commission for Africa and the Inter-Africa Group agreed to establish a database of local, regional, and international actors in the region;

3) The Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) and the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) agreed to build a conflict specific core research group, allowing scholars to exchange data and making the CCR resource Centre available for wider use;

4) IA agreed to hold an annual meeting between participants to discuss on-going initiatives and new developments;

5) The group plans to establish closer ties with the OAU and other regional inter-governmental fora, through regular meetings of a consultative committee;

6) The participation of women was encouraged. In particular women's roles in information dissemination should be developed.

Sub-regional focal points meetings will take place in Tunisia, West, Central, Eastern and Southern Africa in November 1996. The objectives will be to strengthen and develop platforms for early warning and early action.

In addition to these links to early warning projects in Africa, IA has been working with groups in the former Soviet Union. IA has had close links with the network created by the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology (IEA) of the Russian Academy of Science and the Conflict Management Group (CMG) located in the United States, since 1992. In 1995, IA undertook a feasibility study on their behalf for an early warning network in the former Soviet Union. The IEA/CMG network now has over forty members throughout the Russian Federation and CIS countries. In September 1996, network members will meet at IA headquarters in London to share experiences of early warning and discuss conflict situations in the region.

Developing Common Standards and a Menu of Options

IA's current and future work in early warning will continue to centre on the development of regional focal points and cooperation with local NGO groups. We are also involved in developing standards for reporting, assessing, and responding to early warning. Working closely with PIOOM (Dutch abbreviation for Interdisciplinary Research Program on Root Causes of Human Rights Violations) in the Netherlands, the Centre for Documentation and Research at the UNHCR, Human Rights Information and Documentation Systems International (HURIDOCS) in Geneva and the Centre for International Development and Conflict Management in Maryland, our aim is to create a standard format for monitoring, developing, and testing sets of indicators, and plan how information can be pooled or disseminated to people who can respond. A menu of options for action using the different tools and approaches of conflict prevention will also be developed and applied on a case by case basis to provide recommendations for action by internal and external parties.

In addition to being a major participant in the above gatherings, IA is also very active in the field of advocacy and lobbying of parliamentary groups and inter-governmental organisations such as the EU, OAU, and OSCE. In the EU especially, IA has been directly in-

volved in promoting the concept of preventive diplomacy and a need for early warning, through the Michel Rocard initiative for the establishment of a European Analysis Centre for Active Crisis Prevention. It has also been active in the formation of the Bernard Kouchner's Parliamentary Intergroup on Crisis Prevention which meets monthly. In parallel to the Rocard Initiative, IA is jointly working with Saferworld in lobbying for conflict prevention measures to be introduced to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the Maastricht Treaty which is currently being revised and reassessed (IGC began in March 1996). In May 1996, IA co-hosted a conference on Conflicts in Africa with the North-South Centre and Synergies Africa (Adrian-Paul and Win 1996). The main objectives were to influence the CFSP by developing a policy framework for conflict prevention in Africa within the EU, and to develop a plan for future cooperation. IA's advocacy programme is part of a wider objective to make preventive diplomacy a strategic goal for the 21st century.

The prevention and resolution of conflicts, the establishment of early warning networks and structured action programs cannot be achieved single-handedly. It is beyond the capacity of any single organisation or indeed any single sector to realize such goals. This does not imply that prevention itself is impossible; rather, that to succeed in diffusing a potential war, coordinated efforts must be made. ▣

Notes

1. For a comprehensive list of such papers, please contact International Alert at the address listed in the "Selected Efforts on Early Warning" elsewhere in this issue.

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ReliefWeb: Mandate and Objectives

Sharon Ruso

Résumé

Cet article donne un aperçu de ReliefWeb, projet mené en matière d'alerte préventive par le Département des Affaires Humanitaires des Nations Unies basé à Genève. La structure et les grands objectifs du ReliefWeb y sont mis en évidence.

The UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), established in 1992, aims to mobilize international community efforts to meet human needs in disasters and emergencies, to coordinate the response to complex humanitarian emergencies and sudden natural and technological disasters in a coherent and timely manner, and to promote disaster prevention and preparedness. In order to meet its responsibilities for ensuring that reliable information is available for the purposes of prevention, preparedness and rapid response, DHA has been requested by the international humanitarian community to develop an international global network for communication and information support known as ReliefWeb.

As an integral part of DHA's global strategy, ReliefWeb's mandate and objectives are:
- to act as the principal information system for prevention, preparedness, and rapid response for the humanitarian community;
- to ensure that UN system agencies, governments, other international organizations, and nongovernment organizations have access to such an information system at the earliest moment and preferably in advance of an emergency;

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- to ensure the availability of continuously updated information on disasters and humanitarian emergencies as they unfold in order to provide substantive support to decision making systems, with respect to relief, logistics, supply and contingency planning;
- to strengthen the capacity of all relevant actors, particularly in disaster and emergency-prone countries, to receive and use information more effectively in support of the development of complimentary approaches on prevention, relief activities and operations.

In pursuit of these objectives, Relief-Web strategy will include:
- the development of an online distributed information system, easily and publicly available through existing networks and using the latest information technology;
- in support of such an online system and in the interests of timely and reliable information between and among principal actors during emergencies, the development of regional information centres capable of meeting the challenges of reporting both in advance of and during complex emergencies and disasters;
- the promotion of common standards for information collection, analysis, integration, exchange, and dissemination;
- the design and adoption of a system of alerts to ensure prompt and effective humanitarian responses;
- in support of current initiatives on prevention of conflicts, the development of a concrete information approach, through networking with regional actors like the Organization for African Unity (OAU), that focuses on the collection and dissemination of information on root causes of natural and complex humanitarian emergencies.

Structure and Modalities

ReliefWeb, when complete, will comprise two complementary structures. The first, ReliefWeb online via the Internet, is in development. The second, regionally-based information centres, is envisaged as part of a staggered development over five years. To fully comprehend the ReliefWeb concept of a global information network, these structures should be viewed as inter-independent and mutually supportive.

As an online distributed information system (http://www/reliefweb.int), ReliefWeb is easily and publicly available through the Internet and other networks that feature gateways to the Internet. Those who lack access to the World Wide Web will be linked via email through regional networks like Mango and Fido. However, such an online system, regardless of its sophistication, cannot alone support the diverse information needs of the humanitarian system.

To achieve superior value-added modalities, ReliefWeb will need to take additional steps. In this regard, a regional network of information centres is proposed which will be responsible for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information both online and within the region by the most convenient means. During emergencies, these centres will be responsible for the deployment of emergency information units to ensure on-the-spot coverage of assistance activities through daily and as-needed dissemination of reports and alerts. Such an information network makes it easier to identify and define operational responsibilities that will be mutually supportive. It also has the advantage of representing the common interest and allows for the complementarity of activities that characterize assistance efforts during complex emergencies and natural dis-

asters. Moreover, a regional base in high risk areas allows for areas of cooperation in the sharing and use of information based on lessons learned and in advance of an emergency.

These centres will draw on existing mandates and arrangements of the international humanitarian system. They will build upon the regional capacities of relevant organizations, helping to ensure the systematic pooling, analysis, and dissemination of information on natural disasters and other emergencies. Future sites should include the Great Lakes region of Africa, the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, the Caucasus, the Balkans and Latin America.

Policy

Those governmental, nongovernmental, international and UN agencies which together originally conceived of and helped to develop the ReliefWeb prototype have acted as a provisional Commission for the direction of ReliefWeb during its first eighteen months. Between November 1994 and January 1996, reporting has taken the form of two conferences and a working group meeting. Since August 1995, ReliefWeb's daily activities have been under the general direction of DHA, Geneva, where they continue under the overall supervision of the Director of the Chief Information and External Relations Branch. Ideally, ReliefWeb will soon take policy direction from the Inter-Agency Support Committee (IASC), whose members are the Heads of the major UN and nongovernmental relief agencies. This solution would provide for direction at the highest level of involvement, and ensure that the network develops in ways consistent with the changing needs of the major international agencies responsible for humanitarian assistance, and that it is maintained and resourced accordingly. Effective coverage of policy implementation may be entrusted by the IASC to a Focus Group. The Focus Group would have responsibility for *inter alia* the establishment of policy directions including financial control, periodic assessments of system per-

formance, sustainability, and appropriate fundraising appeals based on need and performance evaluations.

Sources of Information

In choosing information sources for ReliefWeb, the Project Team has been guided by the results of an information requirements analysis carried out in December 1995 and by the deliberations of a Working Group on Information (formed as a result of a recommendation issuing from the January 1996, Working Group Meeting in Geneva), whose membership represents the interests of major UN, international, governmental and nongovernmental relief agencies. The information required by the humanitarian community appears to fall in two broad categories: country situation reports and emergency/logistical. The principal needs of the main users (desk officers, logistics specialists, programme officers, planners, donors, and policy analysts) are to have available timely and trustworthy information upon which to prepare and respond to complex emergencies and natural disasters, as well as the longer term needs of those engaged in policy analysis, at all levels, and those concerned with research on root causes and conflict prevention.

Access

Ensuring rapid access to information is a major requirement of the Relief-Web system. The responsibility for guiding the design of an electronic system that will ensure rapid access lies with the ReliefWeb Technical Working Group whose membership parallels that of the Information Working Group with the addition of representatives from UN Information Computing Centre (UNICC) and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). This group will guide the activities of the Project Team in the development of a competent and easy-to-use search engine and support the Team's efforts for linking regional centres, daily updates, and the promotion of common technical standards between and among relief agencies.

In addition, the need for fast, reliable, and secure communications channels must also be addressed. ReliefWeb aims to ensure that such a system allows for specific and reliable communications channels between principal actors. Moreover, the system will also need to address those who are not yet able to access the Internet. How to effectively distribute the system regionally, where and what models to apply, are still in the planning stages.

Cooperation between agencies is a requisite for undertaking a project of this nature and scope. To ensure continuous and reliable updates of information for emergency management and related activities, ReliefWeb will necessarily rely on the information management resources of sister agencies. A sustainable system for such an endeavour began during the second phase of the ReliefWeb Project and will require further refinements hereafter.

Country Situation Reports

ReliefWeb will aim to become the central link to country situation reports and will focus on those areas of special interest to key humanitarian actors as a result of expressed needs, lessons learned, and agreements on cooperative reporting. Information of a general and historic nature will be complemented by regularly updated holdings that cover, for example, specific groups (political, religious, ethnic) or the situation in specific areas. Such literature, in and of the public domain, will be the result of linkages to holdings in remote databases, like those developed by the World Food Programme (WFP), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, as well as to the country reports (which include financial tracking and early warning alerts) offered by DHA On-Line.

Full use will be made of the latest information and communications technology to search for, and link with, existing online sources and, later, to

regionally-based information centres. Finally, there is a need for summaries of situation reports available daily on potential "hot" spots or in the midst of an emergency. No provision has as yet been made regarding responsibility for such reporting.

Emergency/Logistical

In order to provide timely and credible information, and to be recognized as authoritative on the major aspects of the provision of information needed for emergency preparedness and response, ReliefWeb will require information that is essentially operational in nature and not always readily available in the public domain. In order to achieve maximum coverage, reports from regionally-based information centres will be essential as will agreements and compliance from participating agencies in supplying up-to-date information that covers, for example, assessments of risk and need, interactive maps that feature logistical and deployment-specific information, as well as links to registers of emergency management capacities and reference materials like field handbooks and specialized contact lists.

Standards

Information is not neutral. The user must judge the reliability of content and the biases in reporting, and the sources of that information must be recognized as reliable. Here standards develop over time. Certain sources are inherently reliable, but only because time and challenge have worked their effect. Other sources need backup. In each case corroboration helps. And it always helps to know the source of a report: if it is an NGO, what is its philosophy? If an intergovernmental organization, what is its mandate? If a newspaper, what are its politics? If a government, what is its record in the area of human rights and the rule of law? If a report by a UN rapporteur, what mandate determined its content, and under what restrictions? Even the most "objective" information can be subject to manipulation either directly or by inference.

Judging the reliability of information is essential, just as it is also important not to rule out any particular source. On the contrary, a coherent body of information requires multiple sources, each ideally have something to corroborate or qualify in the other. By avoiding single reports of events as presumptively expert in favour of contrasting various reputable points of view, allows for all-important challenge and criticism. In practice, public domain sources appear more than adequate, while confidential information has its role in the protection of sources under certain circumstances.

ReliefWeb will aim to address this controversial issue of sources by identifying the source, who is the author or issuing authority, as well as the date of issue. To ensure the reliability of such identification, the ReliefWeb Project Team will develop a banner-type system which will feature title headers for each screen of information. Moreover, ReliefWeb will feature a search engine that allows for string searching and multiple results across a broad range of data. These efforts, along with the possibility of accessing multiple sources of information on similar topics will allow for comprehensive searches of a wide range of information as well as the potential for comparison and contrast of sources which allows for all-important comment and challenge.

Further Considerations

ReliefWeb cannot deliver solutions. What it can do, if well-planned, supported, and resourced, is to act as a kind of navigator to sources of information whose nature, scope, and timeliness will necessarily inform decision making.

With the addition of regional information centres, it could, for the first time in history, provide for ongoing management of information in trouble spots, early identification of trends, and, during emergencies, keeping major actors and the world informed on a daily basis. All this is now possible with modern information and communications technology.

What is still required, however, is the political will to cooperate on the advancement of a global network for the good of the humanitarian community and not simply in the interests of a single agency or self-styled consortium. An initiative of this magnitude requires agreement at the highest level and matching resources to ensure that such a system will be realized.

These are the challenges facing the idea of ReliefWeb today. Success for the Project is a double-edged sword. On one hand, without major effort on the part of the Project Team to deliver on substance and value-added modalities, the Project cannot expect future resourcing. On the other, in order to take the Project to a level of viability, investment now, and for the next five years, is an absolute prerequisite to success. Without it, ReliefWeb will remain a mandate statement and nothing more. ▣

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Towards the Development of an Early Warning/Response Network

Howard Adelman and Susanne Schmeidl

Abstract

This article outlines a proposal put forth by the Prevention/Early Warning Unit at the Centre for Refugee Studies, York University. The article describes the problems with early warning and how an early warning network (EWNET) can address these existing difficulties. This EWNET is described as an academic-NGO-policy consortium that over a period of a few years will become self-sufficient through the involvement of business. Utilizing the Internet, EWNET will collect information from all over the world, analyze and disseminate such information. The link to policy makers and the importance of properly communicating alerts are discussed. While a central management team oversees EWNET, there are several units working on administration, sales and research. Furthermore, the research unit is broken down into indicator, communication, response and area study research; the latter being linked to twenty crises area nodes. This structure assures that EWNET will comprise a broad resource network as

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well as the links necessary for sending uniform early warning signals.

Résumé

Rédigé sous l'égide de l'Unité pour la détection et la prévention des conflits du Centre d'Études sur les Réfugies de l'Université York, cet article fait état des principaux problèmes existant en matière d'alerte préventive et propose la création d'un consortium réunissant des experts oeuvrant dans le domine de la recherche et au sein d'organisations non-gouvernementales afin de faire face à ces difficultés. Établi sur Internet, le Réseau EWNET, destiné à être autonome sur le plan financier d'ici quelques années grâce à l'apport de capitaux privés, doit rassembler, analyser et disséminer des informations en provenance de toutes les parties du monde en matière d'alerte rapide et de prévention des conflits. Structuré autour d'une équipe principale de supervision, EWNET est constitué de plusieurs sous-unités fonctionnelles travaillant sur les aspects de l'administration, du financement et de la recherche d'indicateurs, la communication de l'information, la formulation de réponses aux problèmes rencontré et l'étude de situations régionales dans une vingtaine de régions conflictuelles. Cette structure vise à assurer au réseau une capacité d'action globale tout en lui garantissant la cohésion nécessaire à l'envoi effectif de signaux d'alerte. Les problèmes rencontrés dans la réalisation de cette tâche ainsi que la question des liens à établir et du travail de sensibilisation à effectuer auprès des décideurs politiques sont aussi évoqués.

The G-7 meeting of leaders in Halifax, Nova Scotia in June of 1995 called for exploring the means to improve the analysis and utilization of disaster- and conflict-related early warning information. It was noted that the issue was not one of collecting more information, but rather the enhancement of analytical capacity and the availability that analysis to decision makers. This G-7 meeting merely echoed the many calls both within and outside the UN calling for the creation of a workable early warning system to assist decision makers. However, there is a difference between providing widespread support for an early warning system rhetorically and actually implementing one.

Early warning is defined as the communication of information on a crisis area, analysis of that information, and the development of potential strategic responses to the crisis in a timely manner. Early warning differs from intelligence systems in at least two respects. First, early warning is not concerned with a direct threat to the gatherer or analyser of the information or those contemplating a response. Rather, it is concerned with the protection of, or the provision of emergency aid to, a population within a territory in which there is either an inability or an unwillingness by the state to provide protection over that territory because the state itself, or its agents, are the victimizers, or because of the breakdown of the state itself. Inherently, early warning is motivated by universal humanitarian rather than national interests and is focused on issues concerned with interethnic violence, gross human rights violations or genocide. Second, early warning information and analysis tends to be transparent rather than secretive in nature, unlike intelligence analysis.

We propose the development of a comprehensive academic-NGO policy consortium to create a workable, effective, economic and cost-recoverable early warning system to deal with humanitarian emergencies, complex emergencies and conflict areas. This proposal outlines initial steps to be taken towards the development of a

comprehensive early warning network or EWNET that will include proposed modes of communication as well as responses appropriate both to the analysis of a situation and the capacities of various international players. In addition to providing a link between researchers engaged in early warning (both quantitative and qualitative) and in-depth information and analysis within governmental and nongovernmental agencies, a feedback system will be created among these with other scholars engaged in indicator analysis, theoretical modelling, case study research and communication research studies on appropriate responses.

Summary Description of the EWNET

The EWNET will utilize the Internet to develop one central coordinating unit for the EWNET and twenty regional crisis area nodes (CANs). Each CAN would have a coordinating team which would be located in a local institution, a counter research team with great expertise in that crisis area located outside the CAN area, and a state with commitment to and concern for that specific crisis area. The members of the CANs would be located anywhere (locally and abroad). The EWNET itself would allow researchers in crisis areas, field workers working with Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) and International Nongovernmental Organizations (INGOs), and policy advisers dealing with that crisis to share information. A wider list would allow others to access that information, while a limited number of researchers would be given the responsibility of analysing the information. Each CAN early warning unit would be managed by a small team. The CAN would be linked to both the special research team on the area, and the central coordinating unit to enable all three units to interact and also enable the CAN to receive guidance on formats, key indicators, modes of communicating results, and a tool bag of potential responses. There would also be links of the CANs, the

special research units, the central coordinating unit with partners who assume responsibility for political and public alerts.

The envisioned results would be based on the development of interactions on a more continuing and denser foundation. Accomplishing this would require, in part, the creation of a directory of researchers and analysts who work in each crisis area, as well as the creation of a directory of researchers who work on the modes of translating early warning signals into appropriate responses, and make it available to the policymakers, NGO and INGO personnel and other academic researchers. The foundation would also include the development of a policy network as an integral part of the information/analytic network to enable policy parameters and issues to be fed into the area early warning net. In return, this would enable the

crisis to provide norms for the classification of information and the ranking of early warning dangers, avoiding either U.S. or UN centredness while being compatible with initiatives in both. EWNET would balance the need for transparency with the need to develop trust and reliability and include business linkages as a method of providing self-financing to an early warning system.

From Early Warning to Response

The *raison d'être* of early warning of human-made crises that result in extensive human suffering is the desire to be better prepared to alleviate such crises when they occur, or, better yet, to prevent them from happening in the first place. Doing the latter requires a knowledge of the range of means that can address various sources of a crisis such as ethnic conflicts, gross human rights repression, civil wars, and geno-

[Early Warning] is concerned with the protection of, or the provision of emergency aid to, a population within a territory in which there is either an inability or an unwillingness by the state to provide protection over that territory ...

feedback of analysis and the development of scenario outlines and possible strategic alternatives to be available to decisionmakers who are active participants of the net. This policy network would create a partnership of organizations that can translate these evaluations into alerts and link general theoretical and empirical studies with comparative and area-specific case studies so that the information and analysis of all types form a feedback loop. Finally, this process would connect response and communication research as integral elements of early warning analysis.

EWNET would attempt to achieve these goals and outputs in accordance with a number of criteria. These would include the introduction of principles of coherence and comprehensiveness into the analysis and the creation of response scenarios through the development of an indicator code for evaluating the type and extremity of the

cide, and which means are likely to be most effective in given settings. It also requires connecting that knowledge to functioning organizational entities where analysts can assess the applicability of alternative response options to specific situations, and decisionmakers can wield their authority to activate preventive measures.

This issue of response has cast a number of doubts upon the utility and importance of EW. The two major ones claim that EW is useless and/or will never function due to poor communication channels between the "warners" on the one hand and the "decisionmakers" on the other, and note the lack of political will on the part of decisionmakers. The first criticism is the fairly self-evident argument that even though effective mechanisms for connecting information, analyses, and appropriate responses are beneficial, the fundamental problem resides in the unwillingness among states to act

on the warnings proffered. Thus, although effective mechanisms for connecting information, analyses, and appropriate responses are valuable, the fundamental and essential missing ingredient is said to be political will. The first criticism argues that even if early warning is important, the most critical issue is not information or even analysis, but the failure to communicate that information and analysis to key decision makers (Bush 1995), a problem that has plagued intelligence analysis in the past (Lebow and Stein 1994).

As mentioned above, we are in agreement that the issue of response—who responds and how—is the most critical, followed by the importance of communicating any analysis to decision makers. Whereas considerable work has been done in identifying early warning signs of various incipient crises, much less knowledge exists so far about what options are effective

many of the problems associated with failures in communication and response.[1]

Proper early warning analysis improves response. We "explicitly emphasize that the design and management of early warning systems should be intimately connected with the task of determining responses to warning. This emphasis complements the view that an improved capacity to know about and correctly interpret events early will improve the quality of responses that are brought eventually to bear" (George and Hoff 1996). An effective early warning system devises appropriate responses. Without an adequate early warning system that provides good analysis, proposed responses could be unrealistic due to the lack of any detailed understanding of the issue. As a result, such responses bring humanitarian interventions of any kind into disrepute and undermine all international actions except

response itself for it can facilitate compromise and the move towards peace between the parties to the conflict since, "it is only when actors are ill-informed about each other's capabilities or unable to anticipate each other's beliefs that secession or outside intervention may occur" (Cetiyan 1996).

Proper early warning analysis also improves communication. We argue that quality analysis is essential for effective communication though not in itself sufficient. Without a quality early warning system as the fundamental building block of an international system, not only will any communications lack content, beyond generally pointing out that a crisis exists, but it will be very difficult to derive appropriate and effective responses.

More specifically, developing a preventive capacity to respond appropriately to early warning signs in particular areas requires four kinds of analyses:

- generic knowledge of the advantages and disadvantages of a range of individual policy tools useful for prevention;
- policy-relevant lessons from retrospective studies of actual recent instances when crises and conflicts have emerged, and preventive responses have been launched (usually involving several policy tools) that either succeeded in avoiding escalation or failed;
- country or region-specific analyses of a prospective nature that seek to anticipate or "test" the applicability of particular measures and multi-tool strategies to specific settings;
- organizational assessments of the comparative capacities of different decision making and implementation mechanisms in undertaking the various tasks of early warning and preventive responses.

The **raison d'être** *of early warning of human-made crises that result in extensive human suffering is the desire to be better prepared to alleviate such crises when they occur, or, better yet, to prevent them from happening in the first place.*

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in responding to them preventively under different conditions. Thus, the policy makers, being asked today to allocate scarce resources away from current crisis alleviation and routine programming to preventive capacity-building, need more confidence that there is a body of accumulated knowledge about proven preventive methods that they can take off the shelf to at least guide them in dealing with specific trouble spots. There is also little experience regarding the optimal implementing mechanisms for applying those options. Consequently, EWNET will be designed to access what knowledge does exist on these questions and to sponsor new analysis to expand the current knowledge base for preventive diplomacy. No early warning system can resolve the central issues of communication and action. Nevertheless, a working and effective early warning system can go a long way in alleviating

those based on narrow nation-state interests. Further, any response must be monitored to allow for flexibility and alteration in the face of changing circumstances. The very foundations of an early warning system are those that can be used to monitor and calibrate responses.

An effective early warning system can help clarify obscure normative foundations for responses, such as the large obscure area said to exist between traditional UN peacekeeping under Chapter VI and enforcement action under Chapter VII (Urquart 1995, 3). We further agree with Sekerez (1996) that, "The UN needs to establish an early-warning system which would require intelligence and planning capacities and which would alert the Security Council for appropriate action and similarly, try to avert it from taking wrong steps." Finally, early warning is critical to the effectiveness of the

Addressing the Problems of an Early Warning Network

An effective early warning network must address a variety of issues: responsibility; transparency versus secrecy; the synergy of quantitative and

qualitative research; the relationship with other existing early warning efforts; and corporate involvement. The proposed network must be able to respond to the challenges raised by each of these issues if it is to be successful. We will address each in turn.

In early warning, in contrast to self-interested intelligence, the benefits are spread very widely and constitute a net gain for the world rather than for any particular party. However, as a result, there are two major difficulties concerning responsibility. Where should the responsibility for gathering the information, undertaking the analysis, and developing appropriate

institution to assume responsibility for gathering and assessing the information required by an early warning network.

The second difficulty related to responsibility, that of response, is inherent to early warning and the issues which it addresses. Precisely because the threat is not one to the existence, or even immediate wellbeing, of a member or set of members of the international community, most importantly the powerful members, the responses to emergencies are varied, complex, and difficult. Moreover, even if it was agreed that something needed doing, it is not equally obvious what should

cerning some information or the sources of some information. Guilmette (1996) is undoubtedly correct in his analogy to the flying buttress in suggesting that "[t]he emergence of large windows and transparency corresponds to moving away from the middle-age secrecy era" in favour of lighter but fragile walls, requiring a fundamental rethinking of basic architecture. This is a problem that occurs at a number of levels.

Some argue that what is most important about early warning is its total transparency, indeed its high visibility, precisely to stimulate the political will that is not naturally in place as in the case of direct threats to state interests. Thus, "[p]rocedures should be established and organizations created for the public release of selected intelligence information" (Macartney 1996). However, though early warning is far more oriented to transparency than secrecy, the basic architecture of an early warning system must provide some limitations on the input of materials, more restricted access and correspondence for those doing the analysis, and some severe restrictions on very limited areas where confidentiality is critical. Flying buttresses, like electronic communications, may make a new institutional architecture possible, and indeed even desirable, and may require much greater transparency than ever before; but those new institutions do not overcome the need for private spaces and for restricted access to allow trust to develop (some of these issues are addressed in more depth later on under technological issues).

A major hurdle to an early warning network concerns the relationship between different methodologies in the collection of information for early warning purposes. In the past there has been a gap between academics involved in quantitative, indicator research to derive general categories for anticipating events, and those engaged in specific, qualitative case studies. In many cases there has even been mutual criticism of each other's work for the utility of early warning. More re-

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The basic idea of an early warning system leans towards absolute transparency which contrasts with the need for traditional secrecy or, more accurately, confidentiality concerning some information or the sources of some information.

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responses be located? Who should assume responsibility for organizing and coordinating an appropriate response? Although, in theory, the answer to the first would seem obvious—vesting the responsibility solely in the UN—in practice this solution is not functional for a number of reasons. These include the current financial difficulties within the UN; the limitation of human resources within the UN (including the way employees are hired and slotted), and, as a consequence of the first two points, the unwillingness to assign the appropriate resources to build up such a capacity. Within the UN, there is the tendency to merge operational with intelligence responsibilities, already hampered by the lack of an adequate analytic intelligence capacity. As subsidiarity emerges as a guiding principle within the UN, regional capacities are built up where both the knowledge and primary interests in responding already exist. Finally, there has been a marked unwillingness of members of the UN to authorize a full scale early warning intelligence activity lest it be used against some of the members themselves. Because of the combination of these factors, the UN is not a viable

be done and certainly not who should do it.

The proposed Early Warning Network is not designed to correct either of these two problems. However, we do provide a way around the first one by making the UN itself, and other international organizations, partners in a separate entity (EWNET) focusing on early warning. In addition, we structured EWNET in a way to begin dealing with the second issue by proposing that a given state be appointed as the leader for focusing its early warning efforts on a particular crisis area and providing the leadership for responding to a crisis where the state has existing intellectual, NGO, and policy making resources as well as a strong humanitarian interest in resolving the crisis.

Transparency

The issue of transparency is a key problem for early warning: how open, and widely, can and should information (and the source of such information) be shared? The basic idea of an early warning system leans towards absolute transparency which contrasts with the need for traditional secrecy or, more accurately, confidentiality con-

cently, however, under the auspices of International Alert, particularly under the leadership of Hayward Alker, Kumar Rupesinghe, and Ted Robert Gurr, specialists in indicator research are applying their immense combined talents to undertake a series of re-

do not need to cover a breadth of countries, their measures can be much more sensitive and case specific.[2]

Thus, it becomes very clear why the linkage between in-depth case study and indicator research can be extremely powerful for the purpose of

Another important issue is that a new early warning network cannot ignore the efforts already in existence. In recent years, several early warning innovations have been initiated by institutions that are much freer than the UN or governments in making information and analysis visible. In addition to the traditional watch (e.g., Africa Watch), human rights (e.g., Amnesty International), and refugee organizations (e.g., U.S. Committee for Refugees), there are specialized organizations such as International Alert in London, the Center for Preventive Action at the Council of Foreign Relations in New York, and the Carnegie Notables Group in Washington which attempt to combine experts with notables who can take care of the communication aspects of alerts. The main problem with these approaches, however, is the localized and fragmented nature of such innovations. The Early Warning Network proposed here attempts to overcome the piecemeal approach by providing the potential for knitting all these efforts together in an academic-NGO-policy consortium.

In the past there has been a gap between academics involved in quantitative, indicator research to derive general categories for anticipating events, and those engaged in specific, qualitative case studies.

stricted comparative case studies along the model proposed by Alexander George of Stanford University.

In the proposed Early Warning Network, we intend to integrate and institutionalize these links between general theory, case studies, and indicator research, and further connect such analysis to those who have undertaken research on tool kits of appropriate responses (e.g., Michael Lund) and those who have worked on the problem of communicating the results of analyses to decision makers in an effective manner. When providing links between indicator research and in-depth case studies, we combine the best of both worlds.

Case studies, even when comparative, while able to provide a rich and in-depth view of one particular crisis and/or country, have the basic problem of generalizability; it is hard to generalize from one (or several) case(s) onto the larger "population." Thus, we may know what caused genocide and mass exodus in Rwanda, but we are unable to transfer such findings to another case. Yet it is hard to neglect the importance of the ability of case studies to focus on the uniqueness of each crisis, which is very important when formulating responses. Something that might have worked in Rwanda may not work in Burundi. Thus, we need to seek out specialists on Burundi to aid us in pinpointing the unique solutions for Burundi before engaging in blanket reactions. In-depth case studies have the advantage of contextual sensitivity that large scale indicator analyses do not. Since case studies

early warning. Each methodology can complement the drawbacks of the other and work jointly toward the finding of solutions to an existing crisis. Indicator research can furnish the necessary comparative breadth needed for understanding similar structural components of crises, while case studies can "fill in the blanks" with information that is case specific. In brief, case studies lack the breadth, yet have the necessary depth to understand unique situations; quantitative analysis has breadth, yet lacks the necessary depth to provide a complete picture. Thus, there is room for a very functional division of labour and complementarity.

In light of the above, in a network linking diverse researchers together, researchers can exchange indicators and collaborate in their research in or-

Even here, institutional innovations have been adopted to confront the limitations of state agencies while taking advantage of their strengths as well as the greater freedom of NGOs. The rather open Burundi Policy Forum and the more restricted Burundi Security

...[C]ase studies lack the breadth, yet have the necessary depth to understand unique situations; quantitative analysis has breadth, yet lacks the necessary depth to provide a complete picture.

der to improve their models. Case study research can be used to supplement the knowledge from quantitative analysis enabling area experts to evaluate the information provided to them from quantitative models and case studies in order to tease out overall patterns and the proneness of a certain country to humanitarian disaster. Researchers working on responses can ultimately rely on multiple analyses when formulating policy suggestions and case scenarios.

Forum were instituted to connect intelligence from states, academics, and NGOs specializing in human rights monitoring, refugee advocacy, conflict resolution, and emergency relief, to share information and devise appropriate responses, from the extreme of deploying stand-by forces to more modest efforts geared to impeding arms flows, or freezing extremist leaders' foreign bank accounts and abilities to travel. Such efforts need to be extended and incorporated into an early

FIG. 1: EWNET PROPOSED OPERATING STRUCTURE

EWNET
(International Consortium on Early Warning)

Board of Governors (25)
4 states (e.g. Canada, Denmark, etc.)
6 international agencies (e.g. DHA, UNDP, etc.)
5 other non-investor international organizations
(e.g. OAU, Amnesty International, etc.)

Executive Body (5)
2 states, 2 international agencies, 1 other

Central Management Team

Chief Executive Officer (CEO)

Assitant Executive Officer (AEO)—Administration

Assitant Executive Officer (AEO)—Sales

Finance

Technical

Assitant Executive Officer (AEO)—Research

Indicator

Communication

Response

Area Studies

20 Crisis Area Nodes (CAN)
(e.g. Great Lakes Region)

warning network that goes beyond one particular crisis area.

Furthermore, the United States government already has a global early warning capacity which is increasingly moving towards transparency. For example, the U.S. National Security Council has provided satellite pictures of refugee flows to assist humanitarian agencies. U.S. Ambassador Albright released satellite photos of movements of prisoners and burial sites to help document Serb atrocities in the Bosnian war. These, however, were not early warnings but very late warnings and after the fact analyses. The US National Intelligence Council has tried to fill the early warning gap

by providing national intelligence estimates of impending global humanitarian emergencies associated with internal conflicts, dubbed 'complex emergencies,' for 1994 through 1996.

Locating any early warning network solely within the United States has inherent limitations. There is a clear tendency to target for conflicts analysis that can be avoided, and to focus on responses that might resolve such conflicts without a major expenditure of human, financial, and political resources. To be more specific, the major developments of EW in the United States have been held hostage to Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 and the declared unwilling-

ness of the United States to respond except where there is little risk and expenditure, financially or politically. Thus, the U.S. early warning system is not geared to assisting those countries committed to prudent internationalism or to challenge the current United States reluctance in this area.

Last, but not least, another drawback of existing early warning innovations is the absence of any business linkages. In a controversial article, a former Director of Intelligence in the United States, Stansfield Turner (1991), argued for the use of intelligence resources in direct support of private corporations. Russia has been the most advanced in using these sug-

gestions to redeploy its intelligence service for these purposes, unfortunately sometimes for allegedly corrupt practices. We propose, however, to take advantage of these suggestions for much more benevolent purposes by providing a system for making early warning a self-financing enterprise while providing information and analysis needed by businesses to assist them in decision making.

Operation of the Early Warning Network (EWNET)

The consortium will be controlled by the founding partners, including states, international agencies, and non-profit organizations. It is critical that the design and management of an early warning system be intimately connected to the policy actors who carry the responsibility for determining responses to any EW. We envision a corporate partnership of state and international agency investors. The consortium should be composed of approximately fourteen states, six international agencies, and five NGOs

for the regional crisis networks responsible for the basic information collection and exchanges, analyses, and the development of strategic alternatives. The consortium will also be responsible for setting up the protocols for the regional early warning systems, selecting sites, and setting up the management team to develop the system as a self-funding organization through the sale of the analyses developed. Finally, the consortium will be responsible for negotiating a contract with a sales organization that will sell subscriptions to the information network and analysis developed in order to make the operation self-financing (see Operational Chart).

The Central Management Team will consist of a small compact group with nine employees. In effect, the sales force and the actual research will be contracted out. The communication of the public alert would be left to policy makers and agencies. A Chief Executive Officer (CEO) would oversee three Assistant Executive Officers (AEOs): Administration, Sales, and Research.

search would oversee the contracts with the various bodies (CANs) undertaking research in specific crisis areas as well as develop separate research teams in three other areas: theoretical modelling based on the comparisons of the various cases to further develop key indicators, communication research, and response research.

The Communication research area team would focus on informing the early warning teams of intelligence gathering, reducing obstacles to absorbing information and analysis, reinforcing possibilities for consultations, initiating dialogues, and forging connections with institutions engaged in public alerts. The AEO Response research team would have the difficult task of undertaking research on bridging the age-old gap between policy research analyses and timely policy initiatives.

Each Crisis Central team will consist of five to six operational members and a backup analytic capability of twenty to forty scholars and policy makers with area expertise. The information base will be provided by a larger pool of 200–400 personnel with access to information and specialized knowledge of critical aspects of the region.

The efficiency of this system depends on the involvement of policy makers at all levels, the development of high profile alert units separate from the consortium, and the retention of control in the hands of a group of like-minded "internationalists" with a commitment to minimal standards of international behaviour.

Due to the nature of the [EW] network—a central point for correspondence from predominantly developing countries—it will be necessary to ensure that all correspondents have adequate access to the Internet.

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and regional organizations. While twenty of the partners would be required to make a full investment, we expect to include five additional participants (such as the OAU and Amnesty International) which will only be required to make nominal investments. Further, it is hoped that money generated by EWNET can be used to fund research on the large data collections and analyses of these organizations.

A central organization would be used for selecting research and analysis teams, defining their roles and responsibilities, and developing normative and technical protocols for operations and research. The central body will also be responsible for managing funds and selecting the locales

Coordination of the administration would be the responsibility of an AEO who would oversee both the financial and technical administration of the consortium. The technical protocols will provide increased access from those able to access information, able to input information, those participating in the analysis, and those managing the Crisis Area Node (CAN).

Each AEO would oversee the particular operations for that sector of the network. The AEO Sales would oversee the contract with the sales organization responsible for obtaining contracts with states, international organizations, corporations, etc., as well as ensuring that they have adequate access to the information and the analyses produced. The AEO Re-

Technological Issues

EWNET is a communications system and information repository that would comprise a web site and a listserv on the Internet. The web site would have three purposes: 1) to provide information about the Early Warning Project to other researchers, subject matter experts, students and interested parties in general; 2) to provide a central repository for information posted by EWNET correspondents from remote locations (through a password pro-

tected mechanism); and 3) to afford researchers and analysts a centralized source of information for analysis (password protected).

EWNET will allow authorized correspondents to post their dispatches to a secure area on the server that can be accessed only by authorized analysts. There will be a listserv to be used as a general tool for correspondence between EWNET members and users. The listserv will automatically forward all messages posted to it to all subscribers. All those affiliated with EWNET would have email addresses for private correspondence. The entire system, including the web site and listserv would be key word searchable.

Because the system will use the Internet as its medium, it will be available to those with Internet access anywhere in the world. Due to the nature of the network—a central point for correspondence from predominantly developing countries—it will be necessary to ensure that all correspondents have adequate access to the Internet. (If the correspondents are affiliated with universities in their respective countries, this should be less of a problem.) Because the network will be relied upon by users with varying levels of Internet access, it will be necessary to ensure its functionality over slower speed lines and with various World Wide Web browsers.

The web site can be designed with varying degrees of security. A simple password protected area can be installed in areas not open to general use. A 'deeper level of security can be obtained by housing EWNET on a secure server such as Netscape's commerce server. This option would automatically encrypt any information sent through it, and still the process is transparent to the user. A third level of security can be obtained through the use of encryption combined with the implementation of server—side Java (a programming language). Even greater security can be built through the creation of a virtual private network over the Internet. This would necessitate the installation of servers in each of the locations where secure correspond-

ence would be sent and received. Each of the security options involves a greater level of sophistication, software, and cost.

In developing a technical protocol for EWNET, various options will need to be decided. A general estimate of the amount of information to be digitized and/or converted to HTML initially must be made, as well as an estimate of what graphics work is required: e.g., do logos already exist so that they can be scanned or will original graphics be designed? Will there be regular additions to the site such as photographs, maps, diagrams, etc.? Aside from allowing for multiple remote contributors and a listserv, will there be any other special functionality required such as forms or questionnaires for online completion? What level of security is required? i.e., does the system have to be secure to a determined and skilled hacker or to a curious but unauthorized researcher? Will the WWW site be hosted on your own server or a remote server?

Conclusion

In this abridged version of our initial proposal, we have described our suggestion of an early warning network, namely an academic-NGO-policy consortium than incorporates the gathering and analysis of information with response and communications research. The major strength of the proposed EWNET is that it utilizes existing expertise, knowledge, and authoritative personnel already located in universities, think-tanks, and government and international agencies within the field, rather than trying to employ personnel from scratch as a special early warning unit or agency which might cost the equivalent of $50 million and still not have the depth or breadth envisioned for EWNET. If you are interested in a complete version of this proposal and any updates on our efforts please contact the Prevention/ Early Warning Unit at the Centre for Refugee Studies. ◼

Notes

1. We do not intend, initially, to deal with the age-old problems of the relationship between intelligence and action such as signal to noise ratios; the disparity between inputs and the expectations of observers; the danger of crying wolf that can impair the credibility of any alert; and the problem of non-recognition accorded to the signaller who correctly appraises a danger that leads to action since the events being warned about are averted— in other words, the problem of rewards as incentives to those providing alerts.

2. For a detailed discussion of the problems and advantages of indicator analysis in early warning, see the Susanne Schmeidl's and J. Craig Jenkin's article in this issue.

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Selected Efforts/Research in the Area of Early Warning

Susanne Schmeidl

The entries listed below are based on a very broad definition of early warning. Anyone involved in research on conflict prediction, mediation, and/or resolution is included as I believe that early warning, in order to be successful, must take into consideration a wide range of factors. In addition, I wish to encourage interaction among different participants who share an interest in early warning.

The following descriptions of efforts/research in the area of early warning are based on submissions to the Centre for Refugee Studies after request for the creation of a directory on "Who is Who and does What in Early Warning" was posted on the Internet. Thus, this list is incomplete by definition, excluding those efforts that for some reason have not come to the attention of the Prevention/Early Warning Unit at the Centre for Refugee Studies. The search for submissions to the directory is ongoing. If you or your organization have been omitted, please contact us in order to be included in the final directory. The final version will be done in cooperation with Jeremy Bristol at International Alert, London.

There are five kinds of entries: efforts undertaken by NGOs; United Nations' efforts; Governments or Government Efforts; Research Centres at Universities; and Individual Researchers. The difference between the last two is that the former is an organized research effort with an established research project, while the latter refers to a research project that is undertaken by one or two researchers. Most of the listings here are self-entries. Only in a very few circumstances did I include a research effort without an initial submission (these efforts are marked with an asterik [*]). Individual researchers were only included if they answered our request for information and provided enough material to be discussed. This section, therefore, is the most incomplete. If you wish to learn more about certain efforts/research you can contact the people identified.

As the author of this compilation, I take complete responsibility for any errors or misrepresentation that may have occurred during the research process. Any corrections for the larger directory should be directed to Susanne Schmeidl at the Centre for Refugee Studies (schmeidl@yorku.ca; Tel.: 416–736–5883; Fax: 416–736–5837). If you know of any efforts/research not mentioned here which you think ought to be included into the directory, please let us know.

I. Early Warning Efforts by Non-Governmental Organizations

ACCESS

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ACCESS was founded in 1985 as a nonprofit, non-advocacy information service on international affairs issues. In an effort to keep the public informed of important international developments, ACCESS publishes timely, impartial summaries of current issues, as well as overviews of the diverse perspectives contributing to the foreign policy debate.

Please contact ACCESS or their web-page for their publications and guides such as *The ACCESS Guide to Ethnic Conflicts in Europe and the Former Soviet Union*.

Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development—ACORD

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ACORD is an international consortium of NGOs that implements development, rehabilitation and emergency programmes in Africa. The Consortium is independent of political and religious affiliations.

ACORD has been interested in conflict issues for a number of years, stemming from the widespread proliferation of conflicts in Africa which have affected almost all the programmes we have in the continent. ACORD currently coordinates a network of NGOs, academics and other interested organisations and individuals in the issues of conflict, development and peace, called CODEP. ACORD is also part of a consortium carrying out a three-year ODA-funded research programme into Complex Political Emergencies.

ACORD has a range of interests that fall under the heading 'conflict,' but our primary focus is on issues directly relevant to development and emergency programming in Africa. Early warning is one of those interests.

Carter Center—Conflict Resolution Program*

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http://www.emory.edu/carter_center

The Carter Center is a nonprofit, non-governmental organization founded in 1982 by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and Rosalynn Carter. The Center is dedicated to resolving conflicts and fighting disease, hunger, poverty, and oppression through collaborative projects in the areas of democratization and development, global health, and urban revitalization.

1995: International Guide to NGO Activities in Conflict Prevention and Resolution.

State of World Conflict Report: A Publication of the International Negotiation Network

Council on Foreign Relations; Center for Preventive Action

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The Center for Preventive Action is an initiative of the Council on Foreign Relations to study and test conflict prevention—to learn whether and how preventive action can work by doing it. Many of today's most serious international problems—ethnic conflicts, failing states, and humanitarian disasters—could, potentially, be averted or ameliorated with effective early attention. Yet few have attempted to put this idea into practice, and even fewer have evaluated such attempts. The CPA uses the unique resources of the membership of the Council on Foreign Relations to address this lack of action and understanding.

The primary function of the CPA is to learn about conflict prevention by engaging the members of the Council in such efforts. The CPA sends teams to pre-explosion crisis areas. These teams map out a strategy to settle or manage the conflicts and then advocate action by appropriate governments and organizations, national and international, private and public:

- An Advisory Group of Council members, including diverse and experienced practitioners and experts, works in consultation with the CPA's professional staff to choose such pre-explosion areas of conflict for CPA action. The Advisory Group also assists in assembling the teams.
- The teams visit the area for approximately two weeks. There, they talk not only to politicians, but to business leaders, religious leaders, journalists, nongovernmental organizations, and anyone else who can contribute to their understanding of the conflict. The group investigates both possible terms of a settlement and methods of bringing about a settlement by com-

bining incentives, sanctions, and mediation.

- Upon its return, the team presents a report or map of how to resolve or manage the conflict for review by the Advisory Group. The map is prepared in terms accessible to a wide policy audience. The CPA then publishes a report, briefs political and other leaders, writes articles and opinion pieces, instigates Congressional hearings and other actions. The Center seeks to deploy all the means at the command of the Council on Foreign Relations to mobilize the American and international communities to organize action to prevent conflict from escalating, or better, to resolve it.
- A CPA working group visited the South Balkans in December 1995 to study potential conflicts in Macedonia and Kosovo. The Center is also forming a working group on Nigeria. The group will both study ways out of the current transition impasse and address the broader political and economic structural decay in Nigeria.

The Center also collaborates with other organizations engaged in preventive action. In cooperation with the African American Institute, Refugees International, and Search for Common Ground, the Center has helped to organize the Burundi Policy Forum since January 1995. This Forum coordinates conflict prevention activities in Burundi of North American-based organizations with the U.S. government, the United Nations, and a similar European Burundi forum coordinated by International Alert in London. The Forum has become the focal point for discussion of Burundi in the United States, advocating a number of comprehensive policies on the part of the U.S. and other governments and supporting the peace efforts of the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General in Burundi.

The Center is funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Twentieth Century Fund (for joint projects), and the United States Institute of Peace (Burundi Policy forum).

Forced Migration Projects*

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The Open Society Institute Forced Migration Projects monitor circumstances in different regions of the world in order to provide the international community with early warning of forced movements of people, and to identify the social, economic, and political conditions which may cause such dislocations. The Projects encourage early and effective humanitarian responses to migration emergencies; advocate the humane treatment of those unable to return; urge permanent solutions for those displaced; and promote measures that avert individuals' need to flee.

International Alert

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Please see the article in this issue for further information. In addition to the efforts described therein, Jeremy Bristol, in collaboration with Susanne Schmeidl at the Centre for Refugee Studies, York University, is working on a directory of all current early warning mechanisms and databases.

InterWorks

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InterWorks has worked with UNHCR for the past ten years in training for emergency management of refugee influxes. These trainings have been offered about three times a year, around the globe for the last ten years.

We have written several training pieces for different UN agencies and others on Early Warning, including updates on this or that "new initiative" and some of the computer-based networks being set up.

Minnesota Advocates for Humanitarian Rights Conflict Prevention Project (MAHR)

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MAHR is preparing an Early Warning Handbook in an effort to help integrate the work of human rights groups with the conflict prevention process. The Handbook will present a methodology that can be characterized as a three-step process: (1) gathering information accurately; (2) evaluating and reporting significant information effectively; and (3) advocating early warning responses with key conflict prevention actors in ways that enhance the incorporation of human rights values into the conflict prevention process. The Handbook is intended to serve, among other readers, nongovernmental organizations and civic groups in the areas of potential or escalating conflict.

The Handbook will focus primarily on promoting conflict prevention through the use of human rights monitoring, reporting, and advocacy in situations which have not yet escalated to armed conflict. The proposed methodology will be offered to help defuse conflict in situations of tensions and disturbances, and to help manage root causes of conflict in postwar phases of reconstruction or transition. The methodology will not directly apply in situations of interstate or internal armed conflict or genocide.

The fact-finding section in the handbook will focus on documenting patterns of violations of either individual or group rights, rather than isolated instances of violations. Thematic focuses will be selected with reference to root causes of conflict; those focuses will likely implicate civil, political, labour, social, economic and cultural rights.

The handbook will include a survey and directory of significant early warning and conflict prevention mechanisms that are operational in situations short of armed conflict. Those mechanisms will include structures and activities of the United Nations and regional intergovernmental organizations and key international and regional nongovernmental organizations. Brief references may be made to certain mechanisms triggered in situations of armed conflict (e.g., peace enforcement actions under chapter VII of the United Nations Charter). Mechanisms under development but not yet operational will be excluded except where deemed to be of sufficient potential to merit attention.

Partnership to Enhance the Effectiveness of Conflict Management

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International Task Force
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Centre for Applied Studies in International Negotiations (Geneva)
Centre for Strategic and International Studies (Washington)
Conflict Management Group (Cambridge, MA)
Institute for Resource and Security Studies (Cambridge, MA)
International Alert (London)
Partners for Democratic Change (San Francisco)
Search for Common Ground (Washington)

PEECM is a partnership of international and indigenous NGOs. The partnership was established to improve the effectiveness of conflict management, a field that encompasses efforts to obtain early warning of conflict and interventions that seek to prevent, mitigate, transform or resolve conflicts. Participating NGOs independently pursue their own conflict management programs, but will work together to exchange information and identify opportunities for collaborative action. While many PEECM activities will have a regional focus, the partnership seeks to promote effective conflict management worldwide. The partnership is currently coordinated by the Institute for Resource and Security Studies (IRSS).

PEECM proposed to undertake a three-year pilot project in Bosnia, Croatia, Hungary, Serbia, Slovakia, and Slovenia to benefit those countries and create new practices for wider application. Within the six countries, the project will develop a system for information exchange, will establish consultative mechanisms to pursue coordination opportunities, and will link up indigenous NGOs with each other. The activities will yield the following benefits:
- accessible, timely information exchange;
- empowerment of indigenous conflict management practitioners;
- improved coordination of conflict management programs;
- improved matching of conflict management capabilities to needs;
- better integration of conflict management with other humanitarian and peace building function; and
- the creation of bridges between: users and provides of conflict management services; government and nongovernment actors; and indigenous and international practitioners.

Gutlove, P., and G. Thompson. 1995. "The Potential Cooperation by the OSCE and Non-Governmental Actors on Conflict Management." *Helsinki Monitor: Quarterly on Security and Cooperation in Europe,* 6(3):52–65.

PIOOM (Interdisciplinary Research Program on Root Causes of Human Rights Violation)

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PIOOM is a scientific research program, the aim of which is the reduction of human rights violations throughout the world. PIOOM is a Netherlands-based, independent, nonpartisan, nonprofit organization, promoting and engaging in research. PIOOM's research supports the work of Amnesty International and other

human rights organizations, as well as UN-agencies. It strives to lay bare the ideological, economic, social, cultural, historical and political roots that lead to human rights violations. PIOOM also strives to identify factors that inhibit human rights violations.

The Center for the Study of Social Conflicts (COMT) of Leiden University is the headquarters for PIOOM's international network of PIOOM associates who can be found in nearly fifty countries around the world. The initiator of PIOOM is J. D. Backer, Rear Adm. Rtd., and former Chairman of the Dutch section of Amnesty International. The PIOOM Foundation was established on October 4, 1988.

PIOOM's basic research programme consists of seven projects. These have been outlined in:

Schmid, A. P. *Research on Gross Human Rights Violations: A Programme*, 2nd enlarged edition, with commentaries by C. Flinterman, K. J. Gantzel, T. R. Gurr, and M. McClintock. Preface by A. J. F. Köbben, Leiden, COMT, 1989 (1988). 245p.

Two questions are central to the work of PIOOM:

1) What are the causal factors behind gross human rights violations?
2) What are the optimal strategies to counter contemporary human rights violations and to prevent future violations?

Project Titles (please contact PIOOM for further information):

1) Toward a Global Map of Gross Human Rights Violations Conflicts in the 1980s and Beyond
2) Determinants of Gross Human Rights Violations by State and State-Sponsored Actors in Domestic Conflicts, 1960–1990
3)–6) These projects deal respectively with Policy and Prison Officers as Gross Human Rights (GHR) Violators; The Military as GHR Violator, and Vigilante Groups and Death Squads as GHR Violators.
7) Determinants of the Independence and Impartiality of the Judiciary

We are also working on a proposal on the Early Warning of Refugee Migration.

Schmid, A. P. 1996 (ed.). *Whither Refugee? Human Rights Violations and Refugees: Causes and Consequences. Proceedings of PIOOM Symposium of June 17, 1994.* Leiden, LISWO. (forthcoming).

Jongman, A. J. 1996 (forthcoming) (ed.). *Contemporary Genocides. Causes, Cases, Consequences.* Leiden, LISWO. (forthcoming).

Schmid, A. P., and A. J. Jongman (eds). 1995. *Monitoring Human Rights Violations.* Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.

Jongman, A. J., and A. P. Schmid. 1994. *Monitoring Human Rights. Manual for Assessing Country Performance.* Leiden, LISWO.

Crelinsten, R. D., and A. P. Schmid. 1994. *The Politics of Pain. Torturers and Their Masters.* Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.

Prevention/Early Warning Unit, Centre for Refugee Studies

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We are currently engaged in several ongoing projects with the aim of developing an early warning network. The main goal is to develop a comprehensive academic-NGO-policy consortium to create a workable, effective, economic and cost-recoverable early warning system to deal with humanitarian emergencies, complex emergencies and conflict areas. (See article in this issue for more detail.)

Second, Dr. Susanne Schmeidl and Jeremy Bristol of International Alert, London, are compiling a directory on existing early warning efforts worldwide. Their work, as well as that of others, will appear in a special issue of *Refuge: Canada's Periodical on Refugees* entitled "The Early Warning of Humanitarian Disasters."

Third, the Prevention/Early Warning Unit is overseeing electronic discussion group on early warning issues (EWNET-L). The purpose of the group is to provide a platform for researchers (academic and non-academic) and policy makers to discuss issues related to early warning. This includes the exchange of research, ideas, information etc. on early warning. (See advertisement in this issue on how to join.)

Fourth, there will be a workshop on "The Synergy of Early Warning Research" at CRS on March 15–17, 1997. This workshop will address the issues and problems of early warning analysis. Leading aca-

demics involved in early warning research and policy makers from governments and prominent international organizations will be in attendance. The integration of policy responses within academic research will ensure that the resulting early warning analysis will be sensitive to the needs of policy makers.

The Strategy Group

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The Strategy Group is a new international "do tank" based in Washington, D.C. but with an international cast of issues and associates. One of our key projects is the "Venice Process," a major project conducted in association with UNESCO aimed at (in our alternative phrase for 'early warning') "Early Strategic Engagement." This applied early warning effort seeks to foster both the development of a theoretical basis for preventative interventions and the development of an international framework of processes and professional "doing early warning."

II. Early Warning within the United Nations System

Early Warning Activity at the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees*

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Development of indicators for the early warning of population movements, refugees and displaced persons. A pilot study is in progress applying indicators to a half-dozen countries.

Structured assessments of country situations likely to generate refugee flows:

evaluate issues, developments, groups in conflict and international responses. Participates in UN inter-agency meetings on early warning; situation summaries available on request. REFWORLD CD-ROM published biannually.

REFWORLD on CD-ROM is a collection of databases developed by the UNHCR Centre for Documentation and Research (CDR). REFWORLD contains authoritative information on refugees including current country reports, legal and policy-related documents and literature references.

CDR is an information, research and training centre for UNHCR. It is dedicated to providing reliable and current information and analysis on all aspects relating to refugees and displaced persons, including their countries of origin, legal instruments, human rights, minorities, situations of conflict, and conflict resolution.

If you would like to subscribe to this valuable research tool, please write to the CDR at the address above or through e-mail cdr@unhcr.ch.

HEWS—Humanitarian Early Warning System

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Prevention is the most effective way of reducing the human suffering and material destruction that are the inevitable results of conflict. As a well-recognized tool to assist the international community in achieving the goal of prevention, early warning has received an increasing amount of attention in the last few years. Using as its focal point the collection, analysis, and dissemination of early warning information in the humanitarian field, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) has established the Humanitarian Early Warning System (HEWS). Setting up such a system was not seen as an end unto itself. Instead it was conceived as a way to support decision making with a well organized information base that pulls from a wide-reaching network. This tool is meant to ensure that decision-makers are better informed and have the maximum amount of time, and consequently a larger set of options, needed to prevent crises from erupting. It is evident that the number of options available to the international community decreases as a situation deteriorates or descends into violence.

The purpose of the HEWS is to compile and analyse information from a number of sources in order to identify potential crises with humanitarian implications. Currently, the database contains information on over one hundred countries, with more intense analysis of particularly vulnerable areas. Information is of two types, quantitative and qualitative, and includes reporting from the various early warning systems that exist, for example, in the food and agriculture sector. UN information, from both the headquarters- and field-levels, is supplemented with that from outside sources. Recognizing that much critical information and many useful insights rest outside of the UN, the challenge has been to harness this expertise as and when appropriate.

Early warning is necessary but not sufficient to prevent or even prepare for crises. Credible signals must translate into early and effective action. Thus, information on potential crisis situations, such as the reports HEWS generates, are fed into the consultation processes that determine what actions should be taken either towards preventing crises or preparing for their impact. DHA is thus able to focus attention on situations of concern in discussions with its humanitarian partners as well as with other departments within the UN Secretariat.

ReliefWeb

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For a description please see the article on ReliefWeb in this issue.

III. Selected Efforts of Governments/Governmental Organisations

State Failure Task Force*

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This study was prepared in response to a request from Vice-President Gore. In July 1994, he asked the Central Intelligence Agency to work with outside experts to design and carry out a study on the failure of states. He asked that the consultants develop a methodology that would identify key factors and critical thresholds signalling a high risk of crisis two years in advance. He suggested going back forty years to identify examples of serious domestic crisis. The State Failure Task Force was established to take on this work. Composed of distinguished experts from academic institutions, data collection and management specialists from the Consortium for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN), analytic

methods professionals from Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), and senior government officials, the group met frequently in plenary sessions and in smaller units to address various aspects of the study.

The study is the first comprehensive empirical effort to identify the correlates of state failure. It analyses inductively some 600 possible contributing factors, many of them suggested by prior academic research on cases and causes of regime crisis and breakdown. Several simple but powerful models are identified that may help guide U.S. foreign policy makers.

In predicting specific country failures, the work is less fully developed. Indeed, the study has four significant limitations:
1) Data gaps and irregularities reduced the extent to which the role of some variables could be analysed.
2) Although associations were discovered between a number of variables and state failure, these linkages cannot be said to demonstrate cause and effect.
3) Although the task force developed models that discriminate between historical failures cases and control cases with an accuracy rate of about seventy percent, this same level of accuracy cannot be guaranteed on a forward look basis.
4) Given the qualified success in distinguishing failures from non-failures, input from country experts must continue to guide any assessment of future risks of state failure.

Selected Findings

Of the thirty-one variables identified as significant discriminators between the problem countries and the controls, the best predictors of state failure from 1955 to 1994 were high infant mortality and low trade openness. The relative effect of these two variables varied with a country's level of democracy. Low trade openness was more strongly associated with the risk of state failure in less democratic countries, while high infant mortality was more strongly associated with the risk of state failure in more democratic countries. In particular, rates of trade openness and infant mortality relative to the world median levels proved useful indicators of risks of state failure.

Funding

Central Intelligence Agency to Science Applications International Corporations.

Report

The senior consultants are preparing summaries of the study's initial results and implications for publication in scholarly journals. A request to make the full report generally available through the U.S. Government's Technical Information Service is pending decision in the Vice-President's office (9/96). In the interim, address queries to Ms. Leslie Arron, Contracts Manager, Science Applications International Corporation, P.O. Box 1303, McLean, VA 22102.

U.S. Agency for International Development

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USAID is engaged in a variety of initiatives that deal, at least peripherally, with early warning. The Policy Bureau has sponsored two recent workshops on early warning of state collapse, one in 1994 and one in 1995. These workshops brought together USAID, U.S. Dept. of State, other U.S. government agencies, academics, NGO leaders, other donors, to discuss these issues. Also, USAID is part of the inter-agency Greater Horn of Africa Initiative, which has a team focused on early warning and prevention. The GHAI RADARS Team has had a number of early warning experts brief the team on their systems (Doug Bond, Ted Gurr, Lincoln Bloomfield, etc.). Most recently, USAID's Center for Development Information and Evaluation has been asked to prepare information on early warning systems and preventive action. As the designated researcher, Heather McHugh has written a short paper on preventive diplomacy, and an annotated bibliography on early warning systems.

IV. Academic Departments and Early Warning Research

CASCON—Computer-Aided System for Analyzing Conflicts

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CASCON is a computer-aided system on the analysis of conflicts. This project is a spinoff of many years of research under the direction of Lincoln Bloomfield at MIT on the subject of local conflict and its prevention. The results of that research, including the model on which CASCON rests, are explained in Bloomfield and Leiss (1969).

The software remained under development as a sideline, and an experimental DOS version on floppies was completed in the late 1980s, including a manual. The software has been developed by Bloomfield's associate Allen Moulton. MIT has been making that version available at cost to users who request it. A forthcoming book by Bloomfield (1996) will contain a new version of CASCON for Windows. The previous database consisted of sixty-six cases, while the new version has eighty-five coded by three experts each for 571 factors.

Bloomfield, L., and A. Leiss. 1969. *Controlling Small Wars*. Knopf.

Bloomfield, L. 1996. *Managing Conflict at the Turn of the Century*. St. Martin's Press. (forthcoming).

Bloomfield, L. 1994. "The Premature Burial of Global Law and Order: Looking beyond the Three Cases from Hell." *The Washington Quarterly*, 17(3):145–61.

Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research*

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Main Research Areas, Organizational Structure

The Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research, founded in 1986 and based at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zürich, is an independent academic institution researching and teaching in the fields of security policy and conflict analy-

sis. It relies on a holistic concept of security encompassing military, political, economic, social and ecological dimensions. The work of the Center is focused on three main research areas:

1. Swiss security policy;
2. international, primarily U.S. and European, security policy;
3. basic conflict and peace research.

Within these broad topics, certain current developments are of special interest to the Center. Regarding the consequences of the end of the Cold War, the political upheavals in Europe, the quest for a new European security architecture, and the economic and political consolidation of the Western European nations, attention is devoted to the changing Swiss role in a volatile international environment. The Center is also closely following, and contributing to, the domestic debate on the official Swiss security policy concept. Furthermore, the Center's research is concerned with methodological approaches to risk analysis. In the realm of international security policy, the focus is on historical aspects of U.S. foreign and security policy, on the origins and the future development of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and on models for a new European security structure. Attention in the field of peace and conflict research is devoted to comparing relevant theories of conflict and war. Anthropological, structural, and—most recently—ecological explanations are included. This theoretical approach is complemented by empirical analyses of local and regional conflicts. The conflict research group is presently engaged in the Environment and Conflicts Project (ENCOP), in conjunction with external institutions.

The Center maintains an extensive list of publications on general subjects in the field. Please consult the web-page for a listing.

Conflict Early Warning Systems (CEWS) Research Programme of the International Social Sciences Council.

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The research programme was designed as a scholarly, international social science response to Boutros Ghali's agenda for peace. It is focused on providing interdisciplinary knowledge that can be of help to the governmental, intergovernmental and nongovernmental members of the UN system with special interests in conflict prevention. Our first major project will be a coordinated study of conflict prevention successes and failures, with cases taken from Latin American, Asian, African, European experience. This research is funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York on a two year grant. Tentative book title: *Alarms and Responses: A Comparative Study on Contemporary International Efforts to Anticipate and Prevent Violent Conflict.*

Alker, H., T. R. Gurr, and K. Rupesinghe. 1995. "Conflict Early Warning Systems: An Initial Research Program." Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Chicago, February 21–24.

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The research activities can be divided into two areas: 1) the origins and dynamics of conflict and 2) conflict resolution and international security issues. The analysis of peace research is going as well as the production of research-based education materials.

1. The Origins and Dynamics of Conflict.
The Department has carried out several studies on wars and confrontations in recent history, and on economic dependencies and their significance for the outbreak of war (Wallensteen 1973; 1981; 1984).

The relationship between economics and superpower involvement in armed conflict has concerned several researchers. A comprehensive analysis of the links between raw material needs and superpower military interventions in the Third World has been done (Hammarström 1986/1993). Conflicts concerning resources in particular regions, i.e. the South China Sea, are now being analysed. Another factor has been starvation and food prices in connection with internal and interstate conflicts in Africa and Asia (Wallensteen 1988a). Related to this field are studies on the linkages between environmental degradation and conflict (Swain 1993a; 1993b). An ongoing project on this theme is investigating environmentally induced population migration and its contribution to native-migrant conflicts in South Asia (Swain). Research attention has recently been given to global water issues (Wallensteen, Swain).

A major project deals with the diffuse effects of military conflicts across regions, between 1919 and 1992. Using a comparative perspective, this project attempts to analyse the interaction processes and regional contexts through which interstate conflict diffusion occurs (Hammarström 1993a; 1993b; 1994).

One study focuses on the links between domestic problems and interstate conflict (Heldt), and another deals with the escalation of ethnic conflict (Melander). The links between changes in military capabilities and the escalation of protracted conflicts are also studied (Holmberg).

Data on armed conflicts are continuously collected and statistics on major armed conflicts have been published in the SIPRI Yearbook since 1988. As of 1993 a list of all armed conflicts appears in *Journal of Peace Research*. This is a basic resource primarily for research. Regularly a report of all armed conflicts is published on a regular basis, entitled *States in Armed Conflict* (Wallensteen 1989, K. Lindgren 1991, Heldt 1992, Axell 1993, Nordlander 1994, Sollenberg 1995). The information has been used to study civilian casualties in wars (Ahlström & Nordquist 1991).

2) Conflict Resolution and International Security Issues
An important concern is the issue of durable conflict resolution. This includes development of concepts and theory (Wallensteen, Nordquist, Heldt) and empirical studies of specific types of conflicts and areas (Nordquist 1983/1992). In par-

ticular, the durable settlement of border conflicts has been studied (Nordquist 1992). In this context, studies on conflict resolution and peacekeeping in Southeast Asia and Asia Pacific have been completed (Amer 1989; 1993).

A comprehensive textbook on conflict resolution has recently been published, in Swedish (Wallensteen 1994b). An interest in mediation processes has also emerged (Wallensteen 1991, Nordquist). An ongoing project is studying the dynamics of integration as a parallel process, where integration may be a cause of conflict as well as a process towards enduring conflict resolution (Äsberg).

Several regional studies are also undertaken. Please consult to the WWW-page or write to the department for information. Also consult the web-page for an extensive list of publications.

Promoting Peace Research: The development of the field of peace and conflict research is analysed in *Peace Research: Achievements and Challenges* (Wallensteen 1988b), with contributions from several noted researchers in the international peace research community. One particular effort was the development of the Uppsala ethical principles for researchers (*Journal of Peace Research*, 1984, Vol. 21, No. 4).

The 1993 Executive Seminar on Conflict Prevention and Conflict Resolution. Executive Summary. Uppsala: Dept. of Peace and Conflict Research.

States in Armed Conflict (1988–1994) Dept. of Peace and Conflict Research. Several editors: Wallensteen, P. (1989); Heldt, B. (1992), Axell, K. (1993), Nordlander, Y. (1994), Sollenberg, M. (1995).

Wallensteen, P. 1973. *Structure and War: On International Relations, 1920–1968*. Stockholm: Rabn & Sjögren.

Wallensteen, P. 1981. "Incompatibility, Confrontation and War: Four Models and Three Historical Systems, 1816–1976." *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 18, No. 1.

Wallensteen, P. 1988b. *Peace Research: Achievements and Challenges*. Boulder: Westview.

Wallensteen, P. 1991. "Is There a Role for Third Parties in the Prevention of Nuclear War?" In *Behaviour, Society and Nuclear War*, edited by P. E. Tetlock et al. New York: Oxford University Press.

Early Warning of Genocides and Politicides

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The research focuses on testing sequential models of the causes of genocide and mass political murder (politicide). The model identifies background and intervening conditions plus types of "accelerators," defined as "events that rapidly increase the level or significance of the most volatile of the general conditions." Multiple categories of accelerators are specified and information on them was gathered systematically for 18-month periods prior to the onset of genocidal or near-genocidal violence in Rwanda, Burundi, Bosnia, and Abkhazia. Some kinds of accelerators were present in much greater numbers immediately prior to the onset of the two clear-cut cases of genocide (Rwanda, Bosnia) than in the other two cases. The results suggest that monitoring and analysing accelerators is a potentially near-real-time method for systematic early warning of impending genocide.

Sources of Funding
See Minorities at Risk

Future Research
Additional comparative case studies are planned. One objective is to test the generalizability of the findings of the initial studies. The second is to identify points in the sequence at which different kinds of preventive diplomacy and other interventions have been attempted, and to assess their effectiveness or lack of effect in checking the onset and escalation of violence.

Harff, B. 1992. "Bosnia and Somalia: Strategic, Legal, and Moral Dimensions of Humanitarian Intervention," *Report from the Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy* (University of Maryland, College Park) 12(3/4):1–7.

Harff, B. 1994. "A Theoretical Model of Genocides and Politicides." *Journal of Ethno-Development.* 4(July):24–30.

Harff, B., and T. R. Gurr. 1995. "Victims of the State: Genocides, Politicides and Group Repression from 1945 to 1995." *PIOOM Newsletter and Progress Report.* (7 Winter):24–38.

Gurr, T. R., and B. Harff. 1996 (forthcoming). *Early Warning of Communal Conflict and Genocide: Linking Empirical Research to International Responses.* Tokyo: UN University Press.

Early Warning in Russia

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I have been am a member of the Network of Ethnological Monitoring on Early Warning of Ethnic Conflict sponsored by the Institute of Ethnology & Anthropology (Russian Academy of Sciences) and Conflict Management Group (Harvard University) since 1993. I also collaborate with the Network of Ethnic Studies (Ulster University) and other organisations dealing with the problem of early warning. Members of our network are currently working on creating a model of early warning which will monitor interethnic tension. This work is in its initial stage.

The North-Caucasian branch of the Institute of Social and Political Research makes use of social studies including surveys, public opinion polls etc. My latest research, entitled *Chechen Crisis in Mass Consciousness of the Population of North Caucasus* (sample=4000 respondents), analysed the perception of the war in Chechnia by the inhabitants of contiguous regions, ethnic status, ethnic stereotypes, and used them as indicators of potential interethnic conflicts. This study was published in Moscow in 1995.

Currently, I am working on a project entitled "Mass consciousness in the zone of conflict and war," which will entail field research in Chechnia.

ENCOP—Environment and Conflicts Project*

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Environmental pollution and ecological degradation are becoming ever greater causes of conflict. There have always been wars over scarce non-renewable resources. But only in our time has the non-sustainable exploitation and misuse of vital renewable resources such as soil, vegetation, water, and air become a main topic in both domestic and international politics. The trans-border character of these ecological problems turns them into a source of conflicts between states. By jeopardizing the natural base for economic and social development and causing migration movements, environmental degradation can also lead to internal revolts and violent clashes between ethnic groups.

Environmental problems are seldom the only cause of conflicts. However, when interwoven with such elements as population growth, poverty and injustice they increasingly contribute to existing and future political tensions. The avoidance or peaceful settling of conflicts induced by environmental degradation will be one of the most pressing of mankind's problems in the near future. Research done at ENCOP includes:

1. The role of desertification and environmental refugees in the civil war in Sudan;
2. The impact of climate change, deforestation and water diversion on the intra/interstate relations in Bangladesh;
3. The influence of ecological degradation on ethnic relations in Nigeria;
4. The struggle over shared water resources in the Middle East;
5. Water scarcity and soil degradation as a source of conflicts in central Asia;
6. Environmental stress, ethnic cleansing, and tribal conflict in Rwanda;
7. Large-scale mining and environmentally induced conflicts.

ENCOP publishes a series of Occasional Papers representing intermediate results of the project. Check the web-page for more information.

GEDS (Global Event-Data System) PROJECT—University of Maryland

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The GEDS Project is an ongoing effort to develop a system for tracking international and domestic interactions worldwide, providing narrative and analytical descriptions of events from on-line news reports, including codings *(inter alia)* for conflict intensity, level of cooperation, parties directly and indirectly involved, issue type, casualties, etc. The GEDS data can be generated near-real-time as needed for early warning purposes, and can be further coded for specific "accelerator" categories described in early warning models such as those developed by Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff (see the Minorities at Risk and Genocide Project). Current research projects include evaluations of the models developed by Gurr and Harff; use of COPDAB (Conflict and Peace Data Bank)-scale time-series data on conflict intensity to predict outbreak of civil war; and development of a capacity for automated pre-coding of events to allow for broader coverage of near-real-time events than is possible with computer-assisted human coding. Dynamic GEDS data is also being interfaced with structural data profiling states and non-state communities (initially Gurr's Minorities at Risk and Polity data) and episodic data (initially Wilkenfeld and Brecker's International Crisis Behaviour data) to provide more comprehensive early warning materials.

Davies, John L., and Chad K. McDaniel (1994). "Event Data and Software for Early Warning." *Journal of Ethno-Development*, 4(1):72–76.

Global Early Warning System for Displaced Persons (Forced Migration)—GEWS

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Global Early Warning System for Displaced Persons (Forced Migration) was founded in 1984. The FUGI (Futures of Global Interdependence) global model designed by Onishi can be used as a global early warning system for displaced persons (forced migration) because it classifies the world into 180 countries and regional groups where each country and/or regional model has four major subsystems such as (1) the environment; (2) development; (3) peace and security; (4) human rights. GEWS predicts the possible occurrence of displaced persons (forced migration) using the following indicators: (1) the destruction of the environment; (2) failures in development; (3) a lack of peace and security; and (4) the violation of human rights in each country or region.

Onishi, A. 1986. "A New Generation FUGI Model—A Global Early Warning System for National and International Conflicts." In *Contributions of Technology to International Conflict Resolution*, edited by H. Chestnut, 39–55. IFAC: Pergamon Press.

Onishi, A. 1987. "Global Early Warning System for Displaced Persons: Interlinkages of Environment, Development, Peace and Human Rights." *Journal of Technological Forecasting and Social Change*, Vol. 31(3).

Onishi, A. 1990. "Uses of Global Models: A New Generation FUGI Model for Projections and Policy Simulations of the World Economy." *International Political Science Review*, Vol. II (No.2):280–93.

Onishi, A. 1995. "FUGI Global Model as GEWS (Global Early Warning System Model)." In *The Proceedings of the 1995 Summer Computer Simulation Conference*, edited by T. I. Oren and L. G. Birta, 1070–177. Ottawa, Canada: SCS.

Global Modelling Research: Toward the Development of a Conflict Alert System

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The overall project is to develop a Conflict Alert System, a computer-based system that generates alerts that a violent conflict is going to erupt in some country or region anywhere in the world in three to twelve months. There are several sub-projects associated with this main efforts.

1) Identifying configurations of conflict early warning indicators

This sub-project involves searching for combinations—in the form of particular configurations—of indicators that have consistently appeared before different kinds of violent conflicts in the past. Once found, probability statements can be attached to the configurations to the effect that "When we see this configuration, eighty-eight percent of the time a conflict of this type could erupt within twelve months." The idea then would be to monitor countries and alert policy makers when a certain configuration associated with conflict potential is observed. In order to find specific configurations several issues need to be addressed: a) methods need to be developed that can apply pattern recognition techniques to conflict early warning indicators; b) indicators, when in combination with each other create the harbinger configurations, need to be identified; c) data corresponding to the indicators needs to be collected; d) different types of violent conflicts need to be specified; and e) finally pattern recognition techniques need to be applied to the data collected. The first component of this sub-project is complete. I am working with students to complete the other pieces.

2) Development of computer software for a conflict alert system

For an analyst whose job is conflict early warning, the question to ask is, "how should the computer program look and operate so that the analyst can easily receive and interpret the information that caused the program to generate an alert?"

3) Development of a taxonomy of violent conflicts ranging from global or systemic wars to struggles for turf by warlords

I am convinced that we will not be able to develop a working conflict alert system until we carefully and precisely specify different kinds of conflicts. Going through the literature, I have come up with a list of over 100 different kinds or types of violent conflicts. To create a taxonomy, I am as-

sembling a database containing a list of all violent conflicts from 1495 to the present. The list looks like it will be in excess of 3,000 cases. For each case I will identify the conflict according to its status with respect to different criteria that distinguish different conflicts. (Existing typologies are useful in providing some of the criteria.) After assembling the database, I will use the clustering techniques that numerical taxonomists use to generate a hierarchical taxonomy of violent conflicts.

Brecke, P. 1995. Response section of a Forum on "An Early Warning System for the United Nations: Internet or Not?" *Mershon International Studies Review* 39(2):315–26.

Brecke, P. 1995. "Using Neural Networks to Find Harbingers of Violent Conflicts in Descriptions of Country Situations." Paper 95–3 in the Working Papers Series of the Georgia Consortium on Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, Georgia Institute of Technology.

Brecke, P. 1995. "Using Neural Networks to Find Harbingers of Violent Conflicts." Paper presented at the IFAX/SWIIS Conference, Vienna, Austria. (The paper will be published in the Proceedings of the conference by Pergamon Press in 1996.)

Kansas Event Data System (KEDS)

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The KEDS project has focused on the development of a Macintosh computer program that can be used to generate political event data directly from the machine readable newswire reports available on data sources such as Nexis. The computer program and its coding dictionaries are available without charge to interested researchers, and we also can provide event data sets that have been coded using KEDS. We have completed two data sets covering the principal actors in the Arab-Israeli conflict for 1979–1995; one set is coded with the WEIS event data system and the other with BCOW (Behavioural Correlates of War) codes. We continue to

maintain these data sets and are working on new sets covering domestic and international conflicts in the Persian Gulf, West Africa, and the former Yugoslavia. To date, most of our efforts have focused on the development of the program and the coding dictionaries. We have only recently begun working on statistical techniques specifically directed at early warning using event data. We anticipate completing several substantive papers focusing on statistical early warning techniques in the next two years.

Gerner, Deborah J., Philip A. Schrodt, Ronald A. Francisco, and Judith L. Weddle. 1994. The Machine Coding of Events from Regional and International Sources. *International Studies Quarterly*, 38:91–119.

Schrodt, Philip A. 1994. "Event Data in Foreign Policy Analysis." In Laura Neack, Jeanne A.K. Hey, and Patrick J. Haney, *Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change*. New York: Prentice-Hall, pp. 145–66.

Schrodt, Philip A., and Deborah J. Gerner. 1994. "Validity assessment of a machine-coded event data set for the Middle East, 1982–1992." *American Journal of Political Science*, 38:825–54.

Schrodt, Philip A., Shannon G. Davis, and Judith L. Weddle. 1994. "Political Science: KEDSNA Program for the Machine Coding of Event Data." *Social Science Computer Review* 12(3):561–88.

The Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre*

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The Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (PPC), a division of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, provides research, education and training in all aspects of peacekeeping, and serves as a single focal point for peacekeeping information and activities. It is named in honour of Lester B. Pearson, former Prime Minister of Canada. In 1956, at the time of the Suez Crises, he invented peacekeeping for which he was awarded the 1957 Nobel Peace Prize.

To guide its activities, the PPC has developed the concept of the "New Peace-keeping Partnership." The term is applied to those organizations and individuals which work together to improve the effectiveness of modern peacekeeping operations. It includes the military; civil police; governments; nongovernmental agencies dealing with human rights and humanitarian assistance; diplomats; the media; and organizations sponsoring development and democratization programmes.

The Pearson Centre offers national and international, multidisciplinary individuals and groups the opportunity to examine specific peacekeeping issues and update their knowledge of the latest peacekeeping practices. The Centre offers multifaceted curriculum of special interest to all stakeholders associated with peacekeeping operations. It offers an extensive schedule of conferences, seminars, workshops, training, and education courses. The Centre also sponsors field research with deployed peacekeeping missions, and a Visiting Scholars Program.

Minorities at Risk Project

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The project has compiled and is analysing detailed information on the status and conflicts of 270 politically active communal groups in 1990-95. Phase III of the project, just completed, includes this information on each group:

- a brief overview of group history and status;
- 1995 population estimates and map(s) of group's spatial distribution;
- a chronology of events initiated by or affecting the group from 1990 through 1995;
- a detailed coding of 1990-95 information on the group's distinguishing traits, cohesion, inequalities, discrimination, grievances, political organization, and international support;

- coded data on group involvement in anti-government protest, rebellion, and communal conflict from 1945 to 1995 (coded annually from 1985 onward);
- an assessment of short-term prospects for improvements or deterioration in group status.

This information is being analysed for the following purposes:

- testing models of factors (e.g., group inequalities, mobilization, political environment) most closely linked to magnitudes of ethno-political conflict and conflict escalation;
- the identification of groups with the highest risk of future conflict and repression;
- the comparative assessment of domestic and international strategies for improving the status of ethno-political groups and reducing the potential for conflict and repression;
- regional and global assessments of trends in ethno-political conflict.

The systematic identification of groups with highest risks of future conflict and repression provides the basis for risk assessments (or very early warnings) that are being made available to multiple audiences including NGO representatives, national and international policy makers, and scholars. Results for African groups will be presented to and discussed with NGO representatives and European policy makers at a meeting convened by International Alert (London) in September 1996.

Sources of Funding

United States Institute of Peace, National Science Foundation, Korea Foundation, International Alert (London)

Future Plans

In the summer of 1996, the edited narrative materials and assessments on each group were made available on the World Wide Web through home pages at the University of Maryland and International Alert. Selected risk assessment indicators for each group are included.

Funds are being sought for: periodic updating of chronologies and assessments through the year 2000; improving the quality and graphic display of WWW materials; the inclusion of maps and source bibliographies for each group.

Gurr, T. R. 1993. *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflict.* Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace.

Gurr, T. R., and B. Harff (eds). July 1994. "Early Warning of Communal Conflicts and Humanitarian Crises." *Journal of Ethno-Development,* 4.

Gurr, T. R. 1994. "People Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System." *International Studies Quarterly,* 38:347-77.

Harff, B., and T. R. Gurr. 1995. "Victims of the State: Genocides, Politicides and Group Repression from 1945 to 1995." *PIOOM Newsletter and Progress Report,* 7 Winter, 24-38.

Gurr, T. R., and B. Harff. 1996. *Early Warning of Communal Conflict and Genocide: Linking Empirical Research to International Responses.* Tokyo: UN University Press. (forthcoming)

More information on the Minorities at Risk Project (all three Phases) can be found on the following web-site: http://wizard.ucr.edu/~wm/M@R.HTM (Please note that the lower case/upper case distinctions are important). This web-site was created by Will H. Moore who was a Senior Researcher on Phase III. (Department of Political Science, University of California, Riverside, Idyllwild, CA 92549; will.moore@ucr.edu).

PANDA—Protocol for the Assessment of Nonviolent Direct Action

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PANDA project members have been working with the Kansas Event Data System (KEDS) development team for several years to extend and refine the dictionaries used by the KEDS automated sparse parsing program for use in the near-real time development of worldwide interaction event data. The KEDS program operates with a transparent and easily modifiable set of dictionaries that defines its operating protocol. PANDA project members have developed a set of dictionaries to facilitate the testing of propositions related to nonviolent direct action and the early warning of violence. The utility of the PANDA protocol for early warnings on conflict is premised in part upon the notion that nonviolent struggle may serve

as a functional substitute for the violent prosecution of conflict. PANDA's focus on nonviolent alternatives to waging conflict constitutes an explicit recognition that while conflict is inevitable, violence is not necessarily the only option, and accommodation is not always possible or desirable. In the face of genocide, for example, a moral imperative dictates against compromise. PANDA's early warnings on conflict, then, are designed to illuminate conflict interactions where physical and coercive force is not employed, even as accommodative exchanges are ruled out. By monitoring and examining event reports with a "data lens" that is sensitive to nonviolent direct action, PANDA tracks the evolution of conflict manifest in both violent and nonviolent forms of action. This effort is aimed at developing a better understanding of the conditions, accelerators, triggers and processes by which some situations of conflict erupt into violence.

Bond, D. 1994. "Nonviolent Direct Action and the Diffusion of Power." In *Justice without Violence*, edited by P. Wehr, H. Burgess and G. Burgess. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Bond, D., and B. Bennett. 1994. "The Practice of Democracy: Global Patterns and Processes in 1990." Paper presented at the XVI World Congress of the International Political Science Association in Berlin.

Bond D., B. Bennett, W Vogele, and others. 1994. "PANDA: Interaction Events Data Development Using Atomated Human Coding." Paper presented a the ISA annual meeting in Washington, D.C.

Bond, D., and W. B. Vogele. 1995. "Profiles of International 'Hotspots'" Prepared for the U.S. General Accounting Office.

Refugee Early Warning Project

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We are working on the development and empirical assessment of causal model of conditions associated with refugee flight by country of origin. Data is collected from both the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the U.S. Committee for Refugees for 1964–1995. Data is collected by country of origin, with information on the country of asylum. Data on the internally displaced is also available. Initial analysis for 1971–1990 and future analysis for the 1990s is under way.

Schmeidl, S. 1997. "Exploring the Causes of Forced Migration: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis, 1971–1990." *Social Science Quarterly*, June. (forthcoming)

Schmeidl, S., and J. C. Jenkins. 1996. "The Growth of the World Refugee Crisis: An Overview." In *Under Threat*, edited by Lubomyr Luciuk and Martin S. Kenzer. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. (forthcoming)

Jenkins, J. C., and S. Schmeidl. 1995. "Flight from Violence: The Origins and Implications of the World Refugee Crisis." *Sociological Focus*, 28(1):63–82.

Schmeidl, S. "Comprehending Forced Migration: The Evolution of a Global Problem over the Past Three Decades: 1964–1994." Currently under review at *International Migration Review*.

Schmeidl, S., and J. C. Jenkins. "The Early Warning of Refugee Migrations: Problems Constructing an Indicator Model." Currently under review at *International Migration Review*.

UN Fact-Finding and Intelligence-Gathering

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This ongoing study examines how the UN gathers and uses information for preventive diplomacy, early warning and the management and resolution of conflict. Several historical and recent case studies are being carried out to learn lessons for the present and future:
- early/late warning in Korea (1950);
- the UN role in the Cuban Missile Crisis;
- Intelligence and peacekeeping: The UN Operation in the Congo (1960–64);
- early warning in Rwanda;

- information-gathering in the former Yugoslavia for peacekeeping, sanctions monitoring and the international criminal tribunal.

The project also looks at present practices on information/intelligence-gathering in the UN and evaluates proposals for improvements.

One aspect of the project concerns technologies for peace (peacekeeping, arms control, the prevention, management and resolution of conflict) and how they are used by the UN.

Dorn, W. 1995. "Intelligence and Peace-Keeping: The UN Operation in the Congo 1960–64." In A. Walter Dorn and David J. H. Bell *International Peace-keeping* Vol. 2(1):11–33.

Dorn, W. 1995. "Keeping Watch for Peace: Fact-finding by the UN Secretary-General," In E. Fawcett and H. Newcombe *United Nations Reform: Looking Ahead after Fifty Years*, pp. 138–54. Toronto: Science for Peace.

Dorn, W. 1996. "UN Information Systems for Peace and Security." In *International Information: Documents, Publications and Information Systems of International Governmental Organizations*, edited by P. Hajnal. Libraries Unlimited. (forthcoming)

V. Individual Early Warning Research Efforts

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Abstract of Preliminary Research Report (for a copy contact Aldo Benini)

Persistent Collective Violence and Early Warning Systems: The Case of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa

One of the little known specifics of the democratic transition in South Africa 1990–1994 is its system of early warning on political violence. The strong role that grassroots organizations played in monitoring affected communities and suspected perpetrators set it apart from systems that are driven primarily by academics. Academics were important for the analysis of the reports collected by the popular movement and for formulating warnings on trends and hot zones which the transitional government as well as the media actively demanded. This paper describes the mechanisms and analyses data from the province of KwaZulu-Natal, where high levels of political violence continued for much longer than in the rest of the country. Using regression techniques, we show that the violent behaviour of the main political antagonists changed significantly after the April 1994 national elections. Also the violence followed different causative patterns in the various subregions. Profiles derived in 1994 and 1995 informed the government's decision to postpone regional elections in KwaZulu-Natal three times before they could be held in June 1996 in a climate of relative tranquillity.

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Helen Fein is a leading scholar on genocides. She has published extensively on this topic, as well as on the issue of the early warning of genocides.

Fein, H. (ed.) 1994. *The Prevention of Genocide: Rwanda and Yugoslavia Reconsidered.* New York: Institute for the Study of Genocide. (Also contributor)

Fein, H. (1990) 1991 (new introduction). "Genocide: A Sociological Perspective." Special Issue of *Current Sociology.* Sage Publications.

Fein, H. (ed.). 1989. *Genocide Watch.* New Haven: Yale University Press. (Also contributor).

Fein, H. 1994. "Tools and Alarms: Uses of Models for Explanation and Anticipation." *Journal for Ethno-Development,* July, 31–35.

Fein, H. 1994. "Prediction, Prevention and Punishment of Genocide: Observations on Rwanda and Future Policies." *Refuge: Canada's Periodical on Refugees,* 5(15):1–4.

Fein, H. 1984. "Scenarios of Genocide: Models of Genocide and Critical Responses." In *The Book of the International Conference on Holocaust and Genocide: Towards Understanding, Intervention and Prevention of Genocide,* edited by I. Charney and S. Davidson. Boulder, Co: Westview Press.

Fein, H. 1992. "Dangerous States and Endangered Peoples." In *Early Warning and Conflict Resolution,* edited by K. Rupesinghe and M. Kuroda. London: St. Martin's Press.

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Hirsch, Herbert. 1996. *Genocide and the Politics of Memory: Studying Death to Preserve Life.* University of North Carolina Press.

The last two chapters of this book are devoted to the prevention of genocide. Within the context of that discussion, I take a brief look at some of the proposals for early warning and I extend the analysis to consider other aspects of international law and a change in the way nation states are viewed.

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Political Indicators of War Escalation

This project is aimed at developing a leading political indicator of a government's intention to escalate conflict to war through its attempts to mobilize public opinion in the mass media. Since all governments, regardless of how authoritarian, prefer to have this support before undertaking a risky action like war, the model is applicable across the board. Even in countries with an 'open' media system, governments maintain enough influence over opinion leading efforts to generate a meaningful indicator. This work is based on an idea Karl Deutsch had back in the mid-1950's, when he was writing about using media as 'an early warning network.'

The project is described in a forthcoming book by Ben Hunt (Fall 1996) *Getting to War.* University of Michigan Press. He tests his model with a range of statistical and case study analyses, and the results are striking. Even for wars that took the world by surprise (e.g., Falklands/Malvinas), the models provide a clear prediction of imminent conflict.

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Louis Kriesberg is examining the ways constructive struggle are and might be conducted at various stages of social conflicts. This analysis helps specify policies that intermediaries and partisans in conflicts can pursue to avoid, limit, end, and prevent destructive conflicts. Cases of ethnic and other communal conflicts that exhibit relatively effective applications of problem-solving conflict resolution approaches are also examined. His work focuses as well on the ways to coordinate various intermediary and partisan efforts to wage constructive struggles and to pursue problem-solving conflict resolution methods.

Kriesberg, L. 1996. "Preventing and Resolving Destructive Communal Conflicts." In *The International Politics of Ethnic Conflict: Theory and Evidence,* edited by P. James and D. Carment. University of Pittsburgh Press. (forthcoming)

Kriesberg, L. 1992. *International Conflict Resolutions: The U.S.-USSR and Middle East Cases.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Kriesberg, L., and S. Thorson (eds). 1996. *Timing the De-Escalation of International Conflicts.* Syracuse Studies and Peace Conflict Resolution. (forthcoming)

Kriesberg, L. 1996. "Varieties of Mediating Activities and Mediators in International Relations." In *Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation,* edited by J. Bercovitch. Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Kriesberg, L. 1994. "Conflict Resolution." In edited by *Peace and World Security Studies: A Curriculum Guide,* edited by M. Klare. Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Kriesberg, L. 1993. "Intractable Conflicts." *Peace Review* 5(4):417–21.

Kriesberg, L. 1994. "Regional Conflicts in the Post-Cold War Era: Causes, Dynamics, and Modes of Resolution." In *World Security: Challenges for a New Century*, edited by M. Klare and D. Thomas. New York: St. Martin's Press.

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The research program on "The Systemic-evolutionary Extended Signal Approach" (© Dr. Andrea K. Smutek-Riemer) entails several projects both theoretical (backdrop: Signal Approaches) and case studies (period of analysis 1987 to 1997).

The research process is systematic and evolutionary. The time frame is from 1994–2000. The basic outline of this research is completed as are two cases: one on the former Yugoslavia (a pilot project) and a nearly finished one on Turkey (it is going to be continued until 1997). Cases on Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Hungary are going to follow in 1997 and 1998. The last project is comparison of all these cases.

Vetschera, Heinz/Smutek-Riemer, Andrea. 1992. "Signale zur Früherkennung von krisenhaften Entwicklungen am Beispiel der Entwicklung zur Jugoslawienkrise." In *Sicherheitspolitik Deutschlands: Neue Konstellationen, Risiken, Instrumente*, edited by Heydrich, Wolfgang et al., 287–330. Baden-Baden.

Vetschera, Heinz/Smutek-Riemer, Andrea. 1993. "'Signale' zur Früherkennung von krisenhaften Entwicklungen am Beispiel der Entwicklung zur Jugoslawienkrise." *Österr. Milit. Zeitschrift*. 1:17–25. (Both papers introduce a new approach in early warning using the crisis in former Yugoslavia.)

Smutek-Riemer, Andrea. 1995. "Die Früherkennung von Krisen zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit: Anforderung an ein Krisenfrüherkennungssystem aus österreichischer Sicht." *Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitschrift*, 3:22–24.

Smutek-Riemer, Andrea. 1995. "Krisenfrüherkennung: Die Quadratur des Kreises?" *Soldat und Technik*, 258–60. (The articles provide an overview of prerequisites in the area of early warning.) ❏

EWNET-L
Electronic Discussion Group on Early Warning Issues

Background

The purpose of this list is to provide a platform for mutual discussion for researchers (academic and non-academic) and policy makers on issues related to early warning. This includes the exchange of research, ideas, information etc. on Early Warning.

Early Warning here is very broadly defined as the Early Waring of humanitarian disasters, which includes ethnic/communal conflict, genocides/politicides, wars, refugee migrations etc. We hope to link as many people together into this worldwide network in order to create a community of Early Warning scholars and strengthen ties between the research and policy community. Currently there are 90+ individuals and organizations signed up on EWNET-L and we are growing monthly.

How to join

EWNET-L is a closed list in order to avoid commercial abuse of the list. Therefore, you cannot simply join EWNET-L as other e-mail discussion groups. You need to be added manually by the list-manager. In order to be added send a message to: EWNET@yorku.ca stating the following:

1. Who you are and what work you do

2. Your interest in early warning

3. Your coordinates (mailing address etc.)

This information will aid us in keeping our database on the "early warning community" up to date. In addition, frequently a message will be sent around to everyone on EWNET-L introducing new members so that participants know who are the members of EWNET-L. Please consider becoming part of this discussion list.

Also, we will be working on a follow-up issue of *Refuge* in late 1997 to (a) critically respond to issues raised; (b) provide space to address issues that did not receive enough attention; and (c) give voice to new or different efforts that were left out in the current issue.

Please send your requests to join EWNET-L, and/or your contributions to Susanne Schmeidl <EWNET@yorku.ca> or <schmeidl@yorku.ca>. Phone (416) 736–5883.

CALL FOR PAPERS

REFUGEE IDENTITY IN RESETTLEMENT COUNTRIES

The Centre for Refugee Studies will soon publish a special issue of *Refuge* on 'Refugee Identity in Resettlement Countries.' The issue will address topics such as:

- Gender and refugee identity
- Processing refugees and identity
- Identity (re)formation among refugees
- Immigration and identity
- Civic identity and civic participation among refugees in resettlement countries

Papers are now being invited on these issues and other related areas will be considered. Please send your contributions asap, but not later than January 29, 1997.

Articles may not exceed 16 pages (double-spaced) or about 4000 words. Short papers of about 900 words are also welcome. Word processed submissions may be sent in disc or by e-mail.

Deadline: January 29, 1997.

For further detail, please contact:

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