Refuge

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Pablo Bose and Elizabeth Lunstrum

Disappearing coastlines, fields and homes flooded by rising waters, lands left cracked and barren by desertification, a snowpack shrinking in circumpolar regions year by year—these are only a few of the iconic images of climate change that have evoked discussion, debate, and consternation within communities both global and local. Equally alarming has been the threat of what such degraded and destroyed landscapes might mean for those who depend upon them for their livelihoods—as their homes, as their means of sustenance, and as an integral part of their cultural and social lives. A mass of humanity on the move—some suggest 50 million, 150 million, perhaps even a billion people[1]—the spectre of those forced to flee not as the result of war or conflict but rather a changed environment haunts the imaginaries of national governments, international institutions, and public discourse alike. Are these environmental refugees? Should they be granted the same protections and support as those who can prove their fear of and flight from persecution? Do the sheer numbers contemplated by the scale of the events and factors threaten to overwhelm the international refugee system?

Moreover, the effect of an altered climate is but one of the drivers of what might be termed "environmentally induced displacement" (EID). Extractive industries—oil, gas, minerals, and lumber among them—have left scarred and despoiled lands in their wake.[2] Collapsing fisheries and livestock herds bring their own forms of environmental disruption to the lives of those who depend upon them. Conservation initiatives meant to protect such resources and biodiversity alike have often resulted in the displacement of those already living in such zones or in restrictions on their ability to access or use their lands.[3] Development too is a contributor to EID, from increased urbanization to megaprojects like dams, highways, and railroads.[4] Added to these "human-made" processes are the effects of "natural disasters," including hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, and tornadoes that have swept people from their homes in a series of well-publicized events in recent years.

These processes disproportionately affect marginalized groups within their respective contexts—indigenous communities, the poor, and women. Many of the most affected groups are often vulnerable to begin with, lacking secure rights and access to resources and to formal recourse once these are jeopardized. Despite this apparent lack of power, the subjects of EID have consistently organized to contest their dislocation—often in highly visible ways, as in global protests against dams, oil development, and parks creation can attest.[5] Yet even with such notoriety, EID has not abated in recent years; if anything, the scale of extraction, the expansion of conservation zones, and the threat of climate change and what to do about it has only served to intensify processes of environmental displacement.[6]

In this special issue of *Refuge* we explore the phenomenon of EID through both conceptual and empirical work. We are interested in several key questions: What constitutes environmental displacement? How have various local and international actors responded to environmentally induced displacement? What are some of the debates regarding the concept of environmental refugees and their place within the international protection system? Additionally, the complexity of EID demands that we engage with the practices and discourses that help to organize and rationalize displacement. In this introduction we begin by briefly outlining some of the key literature on EID with a particular emphasis on environmental refugees. We focus as well on the overlaps and distinctions between conflict-induced, developmental, and environmental refugees. We are interested in the spatial dimensions of these processes—especially in

terms of concepts such as repatriation and non-physical displacements. We then turn to a brief discussion of the way in which the contributors to this special issue advance our understanding of EID by illustrating its complexities, the various scales at which these processes operate, the diverse perspectives of key stakeholders, and the impact upon displacers and displaced alike.

Environmental Refugees?

Since at least the 1980s, the topic of environmental refugees more generally and of climate-induced migration more specifically has been a controversial one amongst international organizations, nation states, and local movements alike. Among the debates are definitional questions: How many people might be displaced and by what specific events/processes? Is the term *refugee,* with all that it connotes and implies and the systems of protection it might suggest, an appropriate one to use? To some extent these controversies extend far beyond the use of the label *refugee* to the contestation of climate science and global environmental politics. Amongst those who do agree that climate change—no matter what its causes—exists, there remains a great deal of disagreement as to what it portends. Gemenne suggests that there is a divide amongst those concerned with the issue of EID between "alarmists" who speak of high displacement estimates and broad and sometimes stark definitions of "environmental refugees" and "skeptics" who favour much more modest displacement figures and more nuanced and multi-causal factors as the drivers.[7]

One of the best-known proponents of the "alarmist" school is Myers, who in 1997 estimated that there were "at least 25 million environmental refugees … a total to be compared with 22 million refugees of the traditional kind."[8] At the time he predicted that by 2025 over 200 million people would be displaced worldwide as a result of the impacts of a changing climate, with greater numbers by mid-century, and in his ongoing public lectures and scholarship on the subject his figures have ranged even higher. Such claims have become common both within the academy and without—some have even argued that as many as a billion people might eventually be displaced by climate change.[9] Other scholars have been critical of such claims, however, finding them based on little to no empirical evidence, poor modelling, or exaggerations.[10] Such "skeptics" have urged the adoption of more critical perspectives so as to avoid allowing such misperceptions to spread.

These figures remain prominent in the public's imagination, however; their size may be due to the wide range proposed by some of the first scholars to use the term *environmental refugees,* such as El-Hinnawi who defined them as "people who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of a marked environmental disruption (i.e., any physical, chemical and/or biological changes in the ecosystem or resource base that render it … unsuitable to support human life) … that jeopardized their existence and/or seriously affected their quality of life."[11]

Others, such as Suhrke and Visentin, have criticized El-Hinnawi's definition for being "so wide as to render the concept virtually meaningless … Uncritical definitions and inflated numbers lead to inappropriate solutions and compassion fatigue. We should not, however, reject outright the concept of environmental refugees. Instead we should formulate a definition that is more narrow but precise."[12]

Other scholars, such as Richmond[13] and McGregor,[14] have argued that the conceptualization of environmental refugees must acknowledge the environmental factors and the social, economic, political, cultural, and technological factors that influence environmental migrations. Within the global refugee regime, the term *environmental refugee* has also sparked considerable debate, primarily regarding the legal application of the concept. For example, the UNHCR has stated that it "has serious reservations with respect to the terminology and notion of environmental refugees or climate refugees. These terms have no basis in international law … UNHCR is actually of the opinion that use of such terminology could potentially undermine the international legal regime for the protection of refugees whose rights and obligations are quite clearly defined and understood … UNHCR considers that any initiative to modify this definition would risk a renegotiation of the 1951 Refugee Convention, which would not be justified by actual needs."[15]

The politics of environmental refugees—their definition, their production, their legitimacy, the determination of who might be responsible both for and to them—remains deeply contentious. Some small island nations have threatened lawsuits in the International Criminal Court against industrialized nations,[16] while other countries refuse to accept the category as a basis for providing sanctuary,[17] and the increasing frequency of "natural" disasters has raised the stakes for what to do with the subjects of environmental hazard.[18] It is to this burgeoning field of scholarship, political debate, and advocacy/activism that many of the articles in this special issue contribute.

Environment, Conflict, Development, and Displacement

The articles in this special issue also draw attention to the limitations of a global refugee regime that recognizes the legitimacy primarily of those who have been displaced by a conflict or persecution on the basis of race, religion,

nationality, ethnicity, or political ideology. It is clear that increasing attention over the past half-century has been paid to the fact that forced migration is and has been caused by many factors beyond armed conflict, including those tied to environmental factors and development projects. In many cases the drivers of such displacements may be overlapping, as with "resource wars" or resistance movements against particular forms of large-scale development.[19] Whatever the reasons for dislocation, the outcomes are nonetheless often quite similar: homelessness, landlessness, the loss of livelihoods and connection to important cultural and/or religious spaces, and in many cases physical and mental harm.[20] Yet the apparatus for global refugee protection tends to prioritize some factors—conflict and persecution based on political and religious beliefs as well as some identities—over others (such as development or environment). The constraints of such a definition have been tested in recent decades by new instances of conflict that are distinct from the post–Second World War context in which the structures of global refugee protection are based. The preponderance of forced migration within rather than across borders has given rise to the category of internally displaced persons (IDPs), while protracted situations, the role of non-state actors, and the context of global geopolitics have meant a radical re-examination of ideas such as repatriation and non-refoulement.[21] The UNHCR's *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement* does explicitly include the effects of development projects and natural or human-made disasters as amongst the drivers of forced migration within borders; however, the principles remain dominated primarily by a focus on conflict.[22] In addition, official refugee status has not been granted on explicit environmental grounds or those tied to development-induced displacement.

Some might suggest that to address all the forms of displacement in the world would be to overwhelm the current system, given the sheer numbers involved and the complexities in determining causality. Yet this remains an unsatisfactory answer: if forced migration constitutes a violation of human rights, then logistical difficulties are an insufficient reason for not pursuing adequate protections for those affected. In recent years considerable scholarship has shown that development-induced displacement has produced an arguably far greater number of "oustees" than conflict—yet the millions forcibly removed by the building of dams, roads, and parks (amongst many other projects) find themselves left out of the conversation regarding refugee protections.[23] A key challenge is the fact that displacement due to development is generally justified along nationalist or economic lines in a way that is for the most part unacceptable (other than to the most jingoistic of partisans) for conflict situations.[24] Many of those who have found their lives irrevocably

changed by development projects and schemes have little recourse, told that their sacrifice is for the greater common good. Displacement due to development projects also illustrates the inability of the current refugee system to address the challenge—repatriation to lands now submerged by a reservoir, for example, is clearly not an option.

A similar set of issues emerges when one considers environmentally induced displacement. The landscape or land-base may be irrevocably altered by a number of different environmental factors, rendering them uninhabitable—as farmlands parched by desertification or islands swallowed by rising waters attest to. The populations of such regions have little to no chance of returning—yet they experience scant luck in being deemed legitimate refugees. Perhaps more so than with development, the issue of causality becomes even more complicated and challenging in environmental displacement: who is to blame for the hazard posed to the Maldives, Tuvalu, or the deltas of Bangladesh? The nascent climate justice movement would certainly point to the overly consumptive and waste-producing economies and lifestyles of the industrial world as a culprit, and one might similarly point a finger at extractive industries and conservation initiatives for intensifying other forms of environmental displacement. However, these are all difficult to hold accountable for the impacts on a wide range of local communities.

Some critics—and certainly much of the political and public discourse—regarding environmental refugees have characterized them as little more than economic (or other) migrants who seek to use the trendy topic of climate change as a justification for making a move.[25] While volition is often considered a key part of any definition of displacement—a coercive rather than a voluntary migration—the complicated manner in which environmental displacement occurs calls into question an easy distinction between the "choices" made to move. Displacement due to a "natural disaster" and its destruction of a landscape may seem straightforward, but what of those much longer-term processes (such as those engendered by certain types of climate change) that degrade an environment? How do the inhabitants of such lands—who may not be forced to flee by a cataclysmic and spectacular event, but by a slow and inexorable weakening of their socio-economic capacities—justify their need for sanctuary? How do communities who have adapted to certain forms of cyclical environmental hazard—seasonal flooding, for example—by migrating to nearby regions temporarily make the argument that their risk has grown beyond their capability to manage it as the result of a changing climate? As White points out, the question of voluntariness in migration is seen as key in such situations as to whether nation states, international agencies, and the

general public believe "relief or refugee status should be accorded to the person in flight."[26] The question of volition and coercion also reminds us that the distinctions between environmentally induced, conflict-induced, and development-induced displacement are rarely discrete; rather, they describe processes (and often justifications) that overlap, reinforce, and often stimulate one another, as the contributions to this special issue illustrate.

Environmentally Induced Displacement: Contributions of the Special Edition

We begin with three papers that explore the ways in which environmental displacement is conceptualized, negotiated, and governed at multiple scales. In a timely and insightful article, McAdam addresses the shifting and evolving landscape of recent international negotiations meant to establish a framework for addressing climate change, migration, and natural disasters. She traces the path from the Cancún Adaptation Framework of 2010 through the efforts of the UNHCR to develop a guiding framework on environmental displacement in 2011 to the creation of the Nansen Initiative designed to create policy-making on environment and displacement in 2012. Meyer complicates this same policy-making realm in terms of a number of competing perspectives and interests and argues that these produce the governance of environmental migration at multiple levels. He suggests in particular that a number of distinct normative frameworks are employed in pursuit of divergent goals, with the most successful being that of international security. In their critical contribution, Omezeri and Gore focus not on stakeholders more broadly or the international arena but rather on one specific state's approach to the question of environmental migration. Their examination of the Canadian government's policy in this regard suggests that it has relied upon ad hoc, temporary measures to address environmental refugee claims and is delaying the development of any more long-term policies until an international consensus (or at least standard) emerges. Canada is hence not likely, these authors contend, to become a policy leader in this regard.

Drolet, Sampson, Jebaraj, and Richard move our focus away from states and international agencies to the role of the NGOs, social service providers, and community advocates who must deal on a regular basis with the impacts of environmentally induced displacement. They provocatively examine how social work through its professional associations might help to address the challenges of environmental migration. In particular they highlight an international initiative called the Global Agenda aimed at recognizing and intervening in conditions of inequality and unsustainable practices across the world. Using a social justice framework,

they argue that there is both a place for social work practitioners in protecting the rights of the displaced and a need to build greater understanding amongst social workers of the complex social, economic, and ecological connections implicit in environmental displacement.

What of the displaced themselves, who must live within the restrictions imposed by environmental displacement or alternatively evicted by such processes—not in theory or the future but in the present? In Blitz's article on the riverine and coastal-delta populations in Bangladesh, he uses the Sustainable Livelihoods framework to explore the relationships between place, and environmental and human security. He suggests that while the location is a vulnerable one—indeed, the situation of char-dwellers in an iconic illustration of the threats of climate change—a variety of adaptation responses by residents (including flexible migration and coping strategies) help residents to reduce their vulnerabilities. Blitz's article thus helps to complicate the ideas of environmental risks, hazards, and displacement itself. Thompson, Ballard, and Martin also focus on those who have been already affected by environmental displacement and add the important dimension of a focus on indigenous populations—often those who bear the brunt of environmental displacements—as they draw on interviews with members of the Lake St. Martin First Nation in the Canadian province of Manitoba, who describe their dislocation from their former homes. Their displacement was caused by a natural disaster and was equally an intentional act on the part of the provincial government who diverted the rising waters of a flood away from urban private property and sacrificed an indigenous community in the process. Also using the sustainable livelihoods framework, the authors suggest that the socio-economic vulnerabilities of community members have been increased as a result of this environmental disaster and associated displacement. Bringing the key question of power inequities to the fore, the authors, moreover, contend that a combination of racism, and lack of participation and power has rendered the situation ongoing and unresolved.

The final paper in our collection turns our attention away from institutional frameworks, social service associations, and environmental migrants and towards the displacers themselves. In an important theoretical addition and again one that foregrounds the issue of power, Butler uses postcolonial and critical race theory to examine the attitudes and perspectives of key figures within a "walled mine" in Northern Tanzania to provide important insights into the role of "the displacer" as a neo-liberal subject operating within a contemporary zone of neo-colonialist power relations. She argues that the psychological justifications used by such individuals and groups are central in understanding

the structural violence experienced by those displaced by these types of extractive industries.

Taken together, these articles ask us to challenge and reconsider the ways in which we might understand environmental displacement, the processes that produce it, and the rationales that justify (or alternatively contest) it, and they suggest that further research on this burgeoning field is necessary to make the needed theoretical and practical interventions for alleviating this contemporary crisis.

Notes

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Creating New Norms on Climate Change, Natural Disasters and Displacement: International Developments 2010–2013

Jane McAdam

Abstract

This article provides an account of attempts at the international level to develop a normative framework relating to climate change and migration from late 2010 to mid-2013. It traces the "catalytic effect" of paragraph 14(f) of the Cancún Adaptation Framework (adopted in December 2010), through to the concerted, but ultimately unsuccessful effort of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 2011 to get states to agree to the formulation of a "global guiding framework" on displacement relating to climate change and natural disasters. Finally, the article discusses the creation of the state-led Nansen Initiative in late 2012—a tentative "first step" towards international policy-making in this field—and the outcomes of its first sub-regional consultation in the Pacific in May 2013.

Résumé

Cet article rend compte des tentatives, au niveau international, de développer un cadre normatif dans le domaine des changements climatiques et de la migration, qui ont eu lieu entre la fin de 2010 et le milieu de 2013. Il retrace l'effet catalyseur du paragaphe 14(f) du Cancún Adaptation Framework (adopté en décembre 2010) par le biais des efforts concertés du Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés, mais qui n'on ultimement pas réussi à amener les états à s'entendre sur la formulation d'un cadre de travail global en matière de déplacements dus aux changements climatiques et aux désastres environnementaux. Cet article discute enfin de la création de l'Initiative Nansen vers la fin de 2012 – un essai de première étape vers l'établissement de politiques internationales dans le domaine – et des résultats de sa première consultation régionale dans le Pacifique en mai 2013.

Introduction

Over the past six or so years, a wealth of research has been published on the relationship between climate change and displacement. In part catalyzed by the publication of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's fourth assessment report in 2007,[1] scholars have sought to gather and refine empirical data about the impacts of climate change on human movement in particular regions and sub-regions of the world and to understand the role that climate change plays in driving such movement. While it is impossible to universalize the research findings, there is now a consensus on the following issues. First, climate change affects migration but cannot be isolated as the sole cause of movement. Rather, it interacts with and overlays other economic, social, and political drivers (or stressors) that themselves affect migration. It is a multi-causal phenomenon. Second, and closely linked to the previous point, climate change–related movement migration is a part of global migration dynamics generally, rather than a discrete, independent category, and it needs to be understood within a wider development context, not just a humanitarian one.[2] Third, while adaptation can help to reduce vulnerability and enhance resilience, it is unlikely to stop the need for some migration.[3] Indeed, migration can be a form of adaptation and a rational coping strategy, although the extent to which it is used to "flourish," rather than just to "survive," depends upon a person's resilience.[4] Fourth, climate change–related displacement is

likely to take different forms and will require a variety of responses at the local, national, regional, and international levels.[5] Comprehensive approaches are needed across government departments and international agencies. For instance, migration management should be linked with other policy objectives, including climate change adaptation, disaster risk reduction, humanitarian responses, and sustainable development. Fifth, policies must be proactive, not just remedial, and there must be sufficient budgetary support for long-term planning. Finally, affected populations must be informed, consulted, and actively involved in decision-making and policy implementation through participatory processes.

The past three years have witnessed the most concerted attempts so far by the international community to develop new normative frameworks on climate change and human movement, albeit with mixed success. What has become manifestly clear is that states want to retain control over these developments, both in terms of how the issue is represented and how responses are shaped. They are reluctant to assume formal obligations or to "delegate" responsibility to international organizations.

This article provides an account of attempts at the international level to develop a normative framework relating to climate change and migration from late 2010 to mid-2013. It traces the "catalytic effect" of paragraph 14(f) of the *Cancún Adaptation Framework* (adopted in December 2010), whereby states parties to the *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change* (UNFCCC)[6] recognized "climate change induced displacement, migration and planned relocation" as elements to be addressed within the framework of climate change adaptation.[7] This acknowledgement by states of the impacts of climate change on human mobility had threefold significance: as a matter of record; as a reference point to agitate for further action; and as a basis for securing adaptation funding to develop strategies on migration and resettlement. Against this backdrop, the article then examines the concerted, but ultimately unsuccessful, effort of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) throughout 2011 to get states to agree to the formulation of a "global guiding framework" on displacement relating to climate change and natural disasters.[8] Finally, the article discusses the creation of the state-led Nansen Initiative in late 2012—a tentative "first step" towards international policy-making in this field—and the outcomes of its first sub-regional consultation in the Pacific in May 2013.

Much of the article's focus is the strategic role played by UNHCR in putting the issue of climate change and displacement onto the international agenda. Given states' reluctance to implement their existing obligations under the *Refugee Convention* and other protection instruments,[9] UNHCR recognized from the outset that it would face a considerable challenge in motivating states to agree to new legal duties in this area.

My sense, based on personal observations over the course of this period as well as the extensive documentary record, is that states were resistant to being "pushed" into action by an agency that did not have a clear mandate for climate change–related displacement and was perceived by some as mandate-hunting. In some respects, perhaps the "push" happened too quickly. Even at the time, UNHCR was internally conflicted about whether or not it should be attempting to become more heavily involved,[10] and most of the legwork happened within the 12 months immediately preceding the ministerial meeting in December 2011 (which may have contributed to the view expressed by some states that there was insufficient research on which to progress deliberations).[11] At the same time, UNHCR saw the anniversaries marked by that meeting (the 60th anniversary of the *Refugee Convention* and the 50th anniversary of the *Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness*[12]) as providing a once-in-a-decade opportunity to advocate for enhanced protection commitments by states, and the meeting complemented (and fed into) parallel discussions in other forums (e.g. International Organization for Migration [IOM], Rio +20, the UNFCCC process, Human Rights Council, and the International Law Commission) on the links between climate change, natural disasters, and displacement.

The Cancún Adaptation Framework[13]

The primary mechanism for the coordination of humanitarian assistance between relevant international United Nations (UN) and non-UN agencies is the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). In June 2008, the IASC established a Task Force on Climate Change to raise awareness of and integrate climate change into various humanitarian agency programs and to encourage increased inter-agency analysis and cooperation.[14] One of its key objectives was to "lead the preparation of high-quality analytical inputs to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process,"[15] and as Task Force members, both UNHCR and the IOM were instrumental in advocating for cross-border displacement to be addressed in this context.[16] Through concerted engagement with the UNFCCC process, the IASC helped to build a dialogue between the climate negotiators and humanitarian community, and each sector was better able to understand the interests and needs of the other.[17] Furthermore, joint submissions by the heads of key humanitarian agencies sent "a coordinated signal" to states parties about the relevance of migration and displacement

to their policy concerns, and the willingness of specialized agencies to support them in their endeavours.[18]

In December 2010, the UN climate change conference (COP16) adopted the *Cancún Adaptation Framework*, which was the result of three years of negotiations on adaptation by states parties to the UNFCCC. In the Framework, states parties affirmed that adaptation must be given the same priority as mitigation, and that enhanced action and international cooperation on adaptation was urgently required to reduce vulnerability and build resilience.[19] Paragraph 14 invited all states parties to enhance action on adaptation under the Framework by undertaking, inter alia, "[m]easures to enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation with regard to climate change induced displacement, migration and planned relocation, where appropriate at the national, regional and international levels."[20]

That such a provision was included at all, and was framed in this way, was largely due to the interventions of the IASC and the support of a number of states and scholars.[21] The provision has three important features. First, it deliberately avoids questions of causation and responsibility, which are inevitably fraught.[22] Second, it frames movement broadly (not only as displacement) and acknowledges that migration and planned relocation can be forms of adaptation. Third, it recognizes the need for multipronged strategies at different levels of governance rather than a single, universal response.

Koko Warner, a key participant in the drafting process, suggests that a crucial factor in states' acceptance of the provision was because mobility was framed as a technical, rather than a political, issue, which was presented as a "legitimate part of a wider adaptation framework."[23] Ironically, had proposed references to "human rights" and "climate justice" been added here (as some delegates proposed), they would likely "have been a liability to the very inclusion of migration and displacement in the Copenhagen outcomes,"[24] given political sensitivities.

From a legal perspective, the provision is very weak. It is couched within a non-binding "decision" of the states parties to the UNFCCC and imposes no formal obligations on them, instead simply "inviting" them to undertake measures that assist "understanding, coordination and cooperation" on climate change–related mobility. It requires states neither to implement migration programs nor to "protect" people displaced by climate change. Arguably, this is appropriate in this context: while the climate change regime provides a high-profile "hook" for consideration of the protection and assistance concerns arising from migration and displacement, it is not a suitable forum in which to examine the complexity of these issues in a structured or comprehensive way.

However, from an advocacy perspective, the provision has far greater significance. First, it evidences states' recognition of the impacts of climate change on human movement and the need for strategies to address this. Second, it provides an important reference point and a "catalytic role"[25] for future initiatives seeking to tease out precisely what such measures might look like. Indeed, it sets out "many sensible options for beginning to think about (and undertake activities to address) the issue."[26] Third, it anticipates that planning for displacement, migration, and/or relocation will become part of states' national adaptation plans[27] and as such will be eligible for funding pursuant to the Green Climate Fund.[28]

Paragraph 14(f) of the *Cancún Adaptation Framework* was an important precursor to UNHCR's actions in 2011. It provided the impetus (and partial justification) for UNHCR's strategy in 2011 to secure states' agreement to develop a global guiding framework on protection in the context of climate change and displacement, beginning with the Bellagio expert meeting in February of that year.[29] An advantage of the provision was that it presented a state-determined point of reference for institutional actors to leverage action on climate change and mobility, in UNHCR's case by demonstrating the need for a new normative framework by highlighting the gaps in the existing protection regime.[30] Paragraph 14(f) was also invoked in the "Chairperson's Summary" of the Nansen Conference on Climate Change and Displacement in the 21st Century as "an important global affirmation of the need for measures related to migration, displacement and planned relocation" whose "implementation should be explored through appropriate fora,"[31] and a stated reason for the creation of the Nansen Initiative in late 2012.[32] The provision has thus been described "both as a matrix and a call for action."[33]

UNHCR's Lead Role: Getting Climate Change and Displacement onto the International Agenda (2007–2010)

As noted above, UNHCR was one of the key institutional players in the IASC's engagement with UNFCCC process and the lead author of a number of important submissions outlining the relationship between climate change and displacement.[34] It was inevitable that UNHCR would be drawn into the debate on climate change and mobility, not least because of the early (mis)framing of the issue as being about "climate refugees." Internally, the organization remains divided about the extent to which it should engage with the subject, and coordination of the area has been "passed around the agency like a 'hot potato.'"[35] Some states have voiced their disquiet with a perceived de facto shift in emphasis as

UNHCR engaged more and more with disaster-related displacement and the High Commissioner continued to highlight the protection gaps for those displaced by the impacts of disasters and climate change.[36]

UNHCR's legal mandate does not extend to displacement on account of disasters or the impacts of climate change,[37] and this remains the chief obstacle to its formal involvement.[38] However, the strong personal conviction of the High Commissioner, António Guterres, has driven the institution's engagement with the issue.[39] Describing climate change as "the defining challenge of our times,"[40] since 2007 Guterres has called on states to address contemporary circumstances in which there are "more and more people forced to move because of extreme deprivation, environmental degradation and climate change."[41] He has argued that UNHCR has a "duty to alert states to these problems and help find answers to the new challenges they represent"[42]—"[i]n line with [its] statutory responsibility for the progressive development of international law in areas of [its] concern"[43]—and in any case is the UN agency "with responsibilities and expertise in the area of forced displacement."[44]

In 2010, UNHCR's Background Paper to the High Commissioner's Dialogue on Protection Challenges—an annual forum involving states, non-governmental (NGOs) and intergovernmental organizations, and the research community—placed natural disasters and climate change on the agenda as new drivers of displacement. It noted that "conflict, extreme deprivation and climate change are tending to act more and more in combination; a trend that is likely to intensify."[45] For the first time, it also directed attention towards possible normative responses. Identifying "a lack of international guidance on meeting the protection needs of people forcibly displaced as a result of climate change, natural disasters and other circumstances that may fall outside the scope of the 1951 Convention,"[46] the paper asked, "Is the current architecture of humanitarian action adequate or are new mandates, institutions, coalitions or partnerships required?"[47] It suggested that "additional tools might be required to translate the needs of the displaced into tangible forms of protection."[48] A side event on climate change and displacement was also convened during the Dialogue and was well attended by state representatives and others, including the High Commissioner.[49]

In the lead-up to the 2011 commemoration of the 60th anniversary of the *Refugee Convention* and the 50th anniversary of the *Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness*, it was decided that UNHCR would use the opportunity to renew states' interest in normative developments. The end goal was to secure pledges by states at a ministerial meeting in December 2011 to address normative gaps, especially

(but not solely) in the context of climate change and natural disasters.[50] However, for UNHCR to secure sufficient support, a number of interim steps were required.

Bellagio Expert Meeting on Climate Change and Displacement (February 2011)

Having put the issue on the agenda at the 2010 Dialogue, UNHCR's next step was to organize a closed Expert Meeting on Climate Change and Displacement, held in Bellagio in early 2011. Arguably, one of its strategic purposes of the meeting was to equip UNHCR with a sound and contemporary expert evidence base to provide at least tacit endorsement of its end-of-year objective. UNHCR asked the experts to consider the following "key questions":

- Is the present legal and policy framework sufficient?
- If not, is there a need for additional instruments to protect those displaced as a result of climate-related events?
- What legal and institutional responses could be contemplated with respect to "sinking island" states?[51]

With the deliberations framed in this way, it was almost inevitable that the expert group would identify the need for further normative development, given the limitations of the existing legal and policy framework, which were already well known. Scholars were commissioned to write background papers highlighting the reach and limitations of existing international law in protecting those displaced by climate change impacts, and were asked to identify the elements that a guiding global framework might contain.[52] Although the expert group could not reach consensus on all issues, there was sufficient agreement on the following:

> There is a need to develop a global guiding framework or instrument to apply to situations of external displacement other than those covered by the 1951 Convention, especially displacement resulting from sudden-onset disasters. States, together with UNHCR and other international organizations, are encouraged to explore this further. Consideration would need to be given to whether any such framework or instrument ought also to cover other contemporary forms of external displacement …[53]

> Given the magnitude of the issues involved, there is a need for a collaborative approach based on principles of international cooperation and burden – and responsibility-sharing. UNHCR's expertise on the protection dimensions of displacement makes it a particularly valuable actor.[54]

This provided an imprimatur for the next stage of UNHCR's strategy: the Nansen Conference on Climate Change and Displacement in the 21st Century held in Oslo in June 2011.[55]

The Nansen Conference and the Nansen Principles (June 2011)

The Nansen Conference was convened by the Government of Norway, with the Center for International Climate and Environmental Research (Oslo) and the Norwegian Refugee Council, to explore responses to the "double predicament" of climate change and forced migration.[56]

Although UNHCR was not formally a co-sponsor of the event, it was a key player in its design. It was one of nine members of the conference's Advisory Board; it was singled out by the conference Chairperson, Margareta Wahlström (UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Disaster Risk Reduction for its "special support and involvement";[57] and the High Commissioner was the only institutional head to speak in the opening plenary session. Furthermore, the name "Nansen" is inextricably bound with refugee protection: the famous Norwegian polar explorer and humanitarian was the first High Commissioner for Refugees for the League of Nations.

The conference was important in building momentum for international cooperation on climate change and displacement, especially because it brought together high-level actors from many UN and other international organizations, governments, NGOs, and the scientific and academic community from a wide range of disciplines. Its particular objective was to agree "a common set of broad principles," to be known as the "Nansen Principles," which would "underpin actions to prevent or manage displacement, and protect displaced people in the face of climate change."[58]

As a government-led initiative, the Nansen Conference could more easily sidestep the politics and sensitivities around institutional mandates by including all relevant international organizations, without one in particular taking control or setting the agenda. It provided a relatively neutral space for other states to participate and a platform for a wide and diverse array of researchers and policymakers to present. At the same time, the process clearly fed into UNHCR's year-long plan to heighten states' awareness of the normative gaps, such that they would pledge at the December ministerial meeting to support UNHCR to develop a new global guiding framework on protection. Indeed, this was raised explicitly in the High Commissioner for Refugees' opening address.[59]

Norway had been one of the strongest state supporters of UNHCR's efforts to place climate change–related displacement on the international agenda. As early as 2007, it had encouraged UNHCR to "turn its attention to the issue of environmental degradation as a consequence of climate change, which was now at the top of the international agenda."[60] The Nansen Conference was framed squarely within the context of UNHCR's own initiatives to further international deliberations on the issue. It was described as "a timely and natural follow-up of the [Bellagio] expert conference on climate change and displacement organised by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in February"[61] and an important precursor to UNHCR's ministerial meeting in December,[62] and it was expected to feed into other policy processes, such as the upcoming UNFCCC negotiations and the Rio +20 conference on sustainable development.[63] In his opening address to the Nansen Conference, the High Commissioner introduced UNHCR's vision for a "global guiding framework for situations of cross-border displacement resulting from climate change and natural disasters"[64] and said that states would be invited to make pledges in relation to gaps in the current protection regime at the ministerial meeting in December.[65] In what could be interpreted as an appeal to states for an expanded mandate, he added that UNHCR could help to identify circumstances where such a framework would be activated and "develop procedures and standards of treatment for affected populations."[66]

The most significant outcome of the conference was the Nansen Principles—a set of ten overarching principles designed to shape and inform further action on addressing the linkages between climate change and mobility, both normatively and practically. They reflected many of the "main messages" from UNHCR's Bellagio expert meeting, including the idea of a global guiding framework.[67] The Principles emphasize the duties of states to their own populations and their need to ensure that adequate legislation, institutions, and resources are put in place, especially with respect to disaster risk reduction strategies.[68] However, they also state that a "more coherent and consistent approach at the international level is needed to meet the protection needs of people displaced externally owing to sudden-onset disasters," and that "States, working in conjunction with UNHCR and other relevant stakeholders, could develop a guiding framework or instrument in this regard."[69] The Principles nderscore the complementary roles of local, national, regional, and international actors.

Differences of opinion as to how the Principles should be framed and what they should contain hinted at the immense difficulties that would be faced by UNHCR in its quest for a global guiding framework.[70] Nevertheless, they reflect a policy consensus among key stakeholders and were proclaimed by the High Commissioner for Refugees as "a valuable contribution to the ministerial meeting that is planned for December."[71]

ExCom's Standing Committee Meeting: June 2011

According to those involved in the process within UNHCR, the agency's approach up to this point had been incremental,

and deliberately so. The first stage of its strategy—the Bellagio expert meeting and the Nansen Conference—was relatively successful, and there was no obvious backlash from states—an accomplishment that should not be underestimated, given their general reticence to develop further protection norms.[72]

However, there was a discernible shift when states met at the Standing Committee of UNHCR's Executive Committee (ExCom) later in June 2011. There, UNHCR put forward a proposal by the IASC for UNHCR to become the lead agency for coordinating protection responses in situations of natural disaster.[73] UNHCR was already the inter-agency cluster leader for international protection and for conflict-induced internal displacement, but there was no designated leader for natural disasters. The cluster leader for natural disasters was determined through a consultative process on a case-by-case basis, resulting in a lack of predictability in responses and delays in providing assistance.[74] Following extensive consultations with the UN's Emergency Relief Coordinator from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the protection-mandated agencies, it was determined that UNHCR would be best placed to coordinate this response.[75]

In essence, the proposal sought to formalize a role that UNHCR had already assumed in seven natural disasters between 2004 and 2011,[76] and at this point it was to be only a one-year pilot scheme.[77] Thus, in operational terms at least, it did not signify a radical shift in practice. However, it was controversial, not least because it dealt with internally displaced persons[78]—an already politically sensitive issue—and generated concerns among states about UNHCR exceeding its mandate and operational capacity.[79] While a number of states "recognized the need for strategies to deal with evolving forms of displacement, others urged prudence in this regard and suggested that the Office focus on ensuring more effective implementation of existing tools."[80] One suspects that, for some delegations, granting UNHCR a formal operational role with respect to protection in natural disasters was a step too far: from there it was a slippery slope to UNHCR becoming the "forced migration" agency, rather than the "refugee" agency, and from providing humanitarian "assistance" in disasters, to acquiring a new legal "protection" mandate. Anecdotal evidence from some observers at the meeting suggests that the proposal sparked some of the most intense reactions by states ever witnessed in that forum.[81] Although almost half of the delegates who spoke expressed support for the proposal in principle, many had reservations about the desirability of permitting UNHCR to assume additional responsibilities and activities.[82] The majority of states emphasized that UNHCR should focus on its mandated responsibilities. Some remained unconvinced

of the need for UNHCR to take on this extra role and called for further independent evaluation and information to show why it was required, as well as further discussion (including in the General Assembly).[83] States' concerns centred on mandate implications, resources and capacity, exit strategies, and questions about state sovereignty (given that this would deal with *internal* displacement—still a very sensitive issue within the UNHCR context).[84] As a result, "[t]here was a clear call for postponement of any designation of responsibility as lead agency for protection in situations of natural disaster until outstanding questions were answered."[85]

This did not bode well for the ministerial meeting in December. Even though the issue at the Standing Committee meeting was framed somewhat differently, it nonetheless suggested that if states were reluctant to grant additional operational responsibilities to UNHCR in the field of disasters and protection, it was unlikely that they would commit to developing further responsibilities for themselves.

Statement to the UN Security Council (November 2011)

Two weeks prior to the ministerial meeting, the High Commissioner for Refugees had the opportunity to address a UN Security Council briefing. In an impassioned statement, he explained that increasing numbers of people were "being forced to flee due to reasons that are not covered by the 1951 Refugee Convention"[86] and described climate change as "the defining challenge of our times … which is adding to the scale and complexity of human displacement."[87] He concluded that "it would be appropriate for the international community to formulate and adopt a set of principles, specifically designed to reinforce the protection of and to find solutions for people who have been forced to leave their own country as a result of catastrophic environmental events, and who may not qualify for refugee status under international law." Urging all UN member states to support this initiative, he reminded them of the upcoming ministerial meeting "where we will examine these and other protection gaps affecting the world's forcibly displaced people."[88]

UNHCR'S Ministerial Meeting (December 2011)

The ministerial meeting of December 2011 was a "landmark" event, attended by representatives of 155 states (including 72 ministers) to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the *Refugee Convention* and the 50th anniversary of the *Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness*.[89] Given the small number of states that had indicated they would support UNHCR's call for normative expansion, there was

a foreboding that the meeting held limited possibilities on this front.

In his opening address, the High Commissioner raised the theme of displacement on account of natural disasters and described climate change as "the key factor in accelerating all other drivers of forced displacement."[90] He noted that while the majority of those affected would remain within their own countries, those who did cross an international border would not be considered refugees but also would not be "truly migrants," because they would not have moved voluntarily. Accordingly, they would find themselves "in a legal void."[91] The call to action was couched in the following terms: "So while the nature of forced displacement is rapidly evolving, the responses available to the international community have not kept pace. This has created a number of serious protection gaps, particularly in the context of mixed movements, large-scale complex emergencies and environmentally-related displacement. Whilst some national and regional initiatives have sought to address such gaps, there is no coherent international framework for protecting the rights of persons who are displaced across borders owing to forces other than persecution, serious human rights violations and ongoing conflict."[92]

The meeting comprised plenary sessions and two roundtables, one of which was entitled "Protection Challenges and Opportunities: Where Will We Be in Ten Years?" It was in this context that the absence of a "coherent international normative framework for protecting the rights of persons who are displaced across borders owing to forces other than persecution, serious human rights violations and ongoing conflict" was raised for discussion.[93] Under this topic, UNHCR posed the following questions for states to consider:

> Could the existing normative framework be consolidated to more clearly identify where there are gaps? Reflecting upon existing good practice, could national responses and regional arrangements be further developed to fill these gaps? Would it be useful for States, UNHCR and other relevant actors to develop a global guiding framework or instrument to apply to situations of displacement across borders other than those covered by the 1951 Convention? If so, should this be limited to displacement relating to climate change and natural disasters, or could it be broader? Could temporary or interim protection arrangements be useful? If so, in which situations?[94]

UNHCR had hoped that this would encourage states to pledge to develop such a normative framework. However, only five states did. The pledge was made jointly by Norway and Switzerland, and endorsed by Costa Rica,[95] Germany, and Mexico. It read, "A more coherent and consistent approach at the international level is needed to meet the protection needs of people displaced externally owing to sudden-onset disasters, including where climate change plays a role. We therefore pledge to cooperate with interested states, UNHCR and other relevant actors with the aim of obtaining a better understanding of such cross border movements at relevant regional and sub-regional levels, identifying best practices and developing consensus on how best to assist and protect the affected people."[96]

Germany also stated that it was "ready to lend its support to initiatives that contribute to analyzing the impact of climate change and finding strategies to curb its effects, and help vulnerable populations build up a higher level of resilience."[97]

Only four other states made reference to protection gaps relating to climate change and natural disasters. Latvia did not endorse the pledge but did note that in reflecting on the work needed to ensure the continuing relevance of the refugee protection regime, "serious consideration should be given to the consequences of global climate change."[98] Argentina pledged to strengthen the implementation of mechanisms that it had adopted to respond to "new situations that are not envisaged in the international instruments for refugee protection," including "special temporary resettlement" which applies, *inter alia*, to people who, "despite not requiring international protection, are temporarily unable to return to their countries of origin due to the prevailing humanitarian conditions or owing to the consequences generated by natural disasters or man-made environmental disasters."[99] China promised to share knowledge in the area of disaster relief, mitigation, and preparation,[100] while Burundi said it would take urban refugees into account in strategies to reduce poverty and disaster risk.[101] The Inter-Parliamentary Union's support for "new approaches to deal with those displaced within or across national boundaries owing to environmental factors and natural disasters linked to climate change" was also noted.[102]

At the end of the meeting, a ministerial communiqué was issued. This did not refer to the topic of natural disasters or climate change, but instead noted only in general, and rather underwhelming, terms that "today's challenges in providing protection and achieving solutions continue to be serious, interconnected and complex. In this regard, we recognize the importance of enhancing international solidarity, strengthening action in accordance with the principles enshrined in applicable instruments and finding durable solutions. We will reinforce cooperation with each other and work with UNHCR and other relevant stakeholders, as appropriate, to deepen our understanding of evolving patterns of displacement and to agree upon ways to respond to the challenges we face in a changing global context."[103]

As Walter Kälin has explained, this was not accidental but was a deliberate expression of "a lack of willingness by a majority of governments, whether from reasons of sovereignty, competing priorities or the lead role of UNHCR in the process,"[104] to engage with displacement linked to disasters or climate change.

The Nansen Initiative (October 2012)

With such minimal support from states, UNHCR was in no position to advocate actively for a new "global guiding framework." It was apparent that states did not want to be "pushed" into action either by institutional actors or through an experts-based approach "introduced through the back door"[105]—a criticism some states had made about the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.[106] Thus, any new initiative would have to be driven from different quarters.

The Norwegian and Swiss governments considered that an intergovernmental process would best be able to take into account "the strong sensitivities of states towards the topic."[107] They detected in the ministerial communiqué "a certain, albeit very general, readiness to engage in a soft dialogue and to collect and share experience and practices in handling [climate change-related] displacement."[108] Accordingly, in October 2012, they launched the Nansen Initiative on Disaster-Induced Cross-Border Displacement with the aim of building "a consensus on key principles and elements regarding the protection of persons displaced across borders in the context of natural disasters that sets the agenda for future action at domestic, regional and international levels."[109]

The direct genesis of the Nansen Initiative was the joint pledge that Norway and Switzerland had made at the UNHCR ministerial meeting. This, in turn, had been stimulated by developments over the course of 2010–11: States' agreement at Cancún to enhance understanding and cooperation on climate change–induced migration, displacement, and relocation; and the Nansen Principles (especially Principles II and IX) that had emerged from the Nansen Conference and also been shaped by the findings of the Bellagio expert meeting.[110]

The Nansen Initiative, which will be operational from 2013 to 2015, is designed to promote a "bottom-up" approach to the issue. First, a series of sub-regional consultations will be conducted to gather more information about the varying challenges faced—as well as good practices adopted—in different parts of the world.[111] They will focus on the various phases of displacement—preparedness prior to displacement, protection and assistance during displacement, and solutions following displacement.[112] It is hoped that this process will enable national and sub-regional idiosyncrasies to be addressed and trust to be fostered between states.[113]

Second, through a global dialogue, the Nansen Initiative aims to develop a non-binding Protection Agenda based on three pillars: international cooperation and solidarity; standards for the treatment of affected people regarding admission, stay, and status; and operational responses, including funding mechanisms and responsibilities of international humanitarian and development actors.[114] It is envisaged that the Protection Agenda will serve as "a framework for further normative, institutional and operational development at different levels."[115]

While the Initiative's approach may be criticized as too tentative, it seems to be the only feasible strategy at this point in time. As the envoy, Walter Kälin, explained at the first Consultative Committee meeting, an absence of sufficient knowledge about "what happens on the ground" would make it difficult at this stage to draft a set of guiding principles adequately reflecting realities, and there is of course the practical obstacle as well, namely "the difficulty of getting governments on board with the idea of producing a normative framework right away."[116]

Even though the Nansen Initiative is state-led, there is a strong emphasis on its being an "open, dynamic, and inclusive process" that will actively involve non-state stakeholders.[117] Otherwise, there is a risk that it would "suffer from lack of relevance."[118] Co-chaired by Norway and Switzerland, it is overseen by a steering group that also includes Australia, Bangladesh, Costa Rica, Germany, Mexico, Kenya, and the Philippines. The composition of the steering group aims to ensure adequate and balanced representation from the global North and South.[119] A consultative committee comprising representatives from relevant international organizations, NGOs, think tanks, and academics informs and supports the process. The envoy of the chairmanship is to represent the Initiative and provide strategic advice, while a small secretariat in Geneva provides logistical support.[120]

Of the international organizations involved, UNHCR has a special role: it is a member of the steering committee and was a "catalyst" in putting the issue higher on the international agenda.[121] During the launch of the Initiative, one sensed a certain suspicion by states about UNHCR's role in the process, with both France and the United States separately seeking clarification of the precise nature of its involvement,[122] and others calling for IOM to be closely engaged.[123] At the launch, the envoy explained that IOM "would be an important partner in the process,"[124] and subsequently affirmed that "UNHCR, IOM and the Norwegian Refugee Council will play active roles."[125]

In terms of the Nansen Initiative's substantive work, it is significant that its focus is *disaster*-induced cross-border

displacement. Earlier iterations of its mandate referred to natural disasters "particularly in the context of climate change," but the decision to remove such references was strategic. In part, this was to diffuse political sensitivities around the climate change–displacement nexus, and in part to circumvent the empirical and conceptual difficulties with causation, which could serve as a distraction to policy development if states were otherwise committed to finding pragmatic ways forward.[126] It thus goes beyond paragraph 14(f) of the *Cancún Adaptation Framework* in that it considers not only climate change–related but geophysical disasters as well.[127]

Of course, from a "climate justice" perspective, it could be argued that the Initiative's focus on disasters, rather than climate change, misses an important opportunity to highlight the impact of climate change on human mobility and, in particular, to leverage climate change funding and assistance. However, as explored below, in reality this has not prevented the Initiative from examining climate change–related mobility. From a pragmatic perspective, focusing on "disasters" rather than "climate change" was key to securing (some) states' cooperation and support, and thus facilitating the potential reach and influence of the Initiative. And, as was noted in the "Chairperson's Summary" of the Nansen Conference on Climate Change and Displacement, "From a protection perspective, there is no compelling reason to distinguish between displacement due to climate-related and other disasters."[128]

The breadth of the Nansen Initiative's remit depends, though, on how the concept of "disaster" is understood. The Initiative adopts the definition of "disaster" used by the humanitarian community within the UN: "A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society involving widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses and impacts, which exceeds the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources."[129] Importantly, rather than conceptualizing a "disaster" as an event, the emphasis is instead on its *consequences*—the coping capacity of those affected. This is particularly important, given the Initiative's focus on both "sudden-onset disasters" (defined as "hydro-meteorological hazards such as flooding, windstorms or mudslides, and geophysical hazards including earthquakes, tsunamis or volcano eruptions") and "slow-onset disasters" (defined as "environmental degradation processes such as droughts and desertification, increased salinization, rising sea levels or thawing of permafrost").[130] While the concept of a "slow-onset disaster" seems counterintuitive if one thinks of a "disaster" as an "event" that happens (like a flood or landslide), it makes sense when a disaster denotes diminished coping capacity.

However, the concept note explains that slow-onset disasters come within the ambit of the Initiative only "in their end phase (i.e. when droughts or rising sea levels create life-threatening situations)," since this is when their effects "may be very similar to those of sudden-onset disasters."[131] It emphasizes that the relevant distinction "should not be the character of the disaster but rather whether it triggers displacement understood as forced movement of persons as opposed to voluntary migration."[132] This sits uncomfortably with scenarios where migration is a rational and desirable form of adaptation,[133] such as in some small island states. As Elizabeth Ferris has remarked, "[S]udden-onset disasters—cyclones, hurricanes, earthquakes … are the 'easy' events to identify."[134] The greater challenge lies in responding to the impacts of slower processes, which potentially pose a more permanent risk to the sustainability of certain human settlements in the longer term. The concept note states only that the Nansen Initiative "should be open to look at the close relationship" between cross-border displacement and related issues such as "migration as adaptation."[135] Without sustained examination of the latter, it is inevitable that protection gaps will remain. Furthermore, it is crucial that the existence of the Initiative is not used as an excuse to delay policy development in these areas.

Of course, it remains to be seen precisely how states involved in the Initiative will conceptualize "displacement" and "disasters," especially once the sub-regional consultations have highlighted the challenges faced in specific contexts (including small island states). Could the idea of a "creeping disaster"[136] be one way of incorporating anticipatory movement as a protection response? As the Initiative has already acknowledged, the legal challenge will be to identify the "tipping point where the basically voluntary movement of persons turns into forced movement." Since, operationally, there may be considerable overlap between the two, "it [is] necessary to ensure that victims of forced displacement triggered by slow-onset disasters receive protection and assistance, too."[137]

The outcomes of the first sub-regional consultation, held in the Cook Islands in May 2013, are reassuring on this front. The concept of "disasters" did not constrain deliberations or recommended actions for further action. Longer-term processes affecting mobility were a key part of the discussions, and many of the final recommendations related to long-term planning, including with respect to creating migration pathways, finding suitable land for resettlement, and ensuring that climate change adaptation and mitigation efforts continue.[138]

Further, the absence of "climate change" from the Nansen Initiative's mandate did not seem to hamper its work either. In fact, the Initiative's focus on disasters

appears to have widened, rather than obscured, the kinds of deliberations that would have occurred had the focus been on climate change alone. For example, the Pacific consultation was entitled "Human Mobility, Natural Disasters and Climate Change in the Pacific," reflecting the specific challenges facing that region. As Prime Minister Henry Puna noted in his opening address, "Climate change is one of the most pressing concerns that we—as Small Islands Developing States—face in the Pacific."[139] The consultation considered questions of loss and damage within the UNFCCC process, and some participants raised the possibility of international climate change adaptation funds being utilized for disaster risk management, preparation, and planned movement. Indeed, as noted above, the creation of the Nansen Initiative was itself a response to paragraph 14(f) of the *Cancún Adaptation Framework*, and its sub-regional consultations are structured around the three forms of mobility outlined there: displacement, migration, and planned relocation.

Conclusion

The creation of a new international treaty on climate change and displacement now seems even more unlikely than ever before.[140] On the one hand, this is because of enhanced understanding within the international community about the conceptual difficulties involved in attributing displacement to the impacts of climate change alone. On the other hand, it stems from states' reluctance to assume new legal obligations in the protection context—in other words, a lack of political will. There has been strong pushback from states when questions of normative development or mandate extension have been proposed by UNHCR and others. States have made clear that they wish to control any initiatives on this front, and that they are prepared only to take tentative steps at this stage.

What might this say about the development of protection norms more generally? Even the adoption of soft law has become increasingly contentious in recent years. ExCom Conclusions, for example, have become increasingly difficult to negotiate[141] and weaker in their normative content. Yet, while it is clear that even achieving soft law frameworks will take time, this is not necessarily a bad thing. Soft law can be important in creating a basis for dialogue between states and can enable them to experiment with new ideas without assuming formal commitments.[142] In the context of climate change, disasters, and displacement, it is imperative that protection frameworks are attuned to the needs of those who will move, which means that they must be underpinned and informed by high-quality research. The collaborative approach advocated by the Nansen Initiative holds considerable promise for sustained dialogue between governments, organizations, and researchers, and—fundamentally—each of these constituencies must also ensure that the voices of affected communities are heard if a new protection agenda is to be truly responsive to needs. Ultimately, the goodwill of all stakeholders to listen, share knowledge, and build trust will enable the international community to take its first steps towards building a normative framework on protection in the context of disaster-induced cross-border displacement.

Acknowledgement

Notes

1. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), *Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report; Summary for Policymakers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). See also the reports by each working group: <http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_and_data_reports.shtml#1>.
2. Asian Development Bank, *Addressing Climate Change and Migration in Asia and the Pacific: Final Report* (Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2012) at viii.
3. Government Office for Science, *Foresight: Migration and Global Environmental Change; Future Challenges and Opportunities* (London: Government Office for Science, 2011) at 9–10.
4. Susan F. Martin, with Koko Warner, Tamer Afifi, Walter Kalin, Scott Leckie, Beth Ferris, & David Wrathall, *Changing Climates, Moving People: Framing Migration, Displacement and Planned Relocation* (Bonn: United Nations University, 2013), <http://issuu.com/georgetownsfs/docs/policy_brief_8_web> at 8.
5. See e.g. The Nansen Initiative, *Human Mobility, Natural Disasters and Climate Change in the Pacific*, Report from the Nansen Initiative Pacific Regional Consultation (Rarotonga, Cook Islands: Nansen Initiative, 2013) at 6–8.
6. *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change*, 9 May 1992, 1771 UNTS 107, Can TS 1994/7 (entered into force 21 March 1993, ratification by Canada 4 December 1992).
7. *The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention*, FCCC Dec 1/CP.16, UNFCCC, 16th Sess, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (15 March 2011) at para 14(f).
8. UNHCR, Intergovernmental Event at the Ministerial Level of Member States of the United Nations on the Occasion of the 60th Anniversary of the 1951 *Convention relating to the Status of Refugees* and the 50th Anniversary of the 1961 *Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness* (7–8 December

2011), *Background Note for the Roundtables*, UN Doc HCR/MINCOMMS/2011/08 (18 November 2011).

9. *Convention relating to the Status of Refugees*, 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137, Can TS 1969/6 (entered into force 22 April 1954, accession by Canada 2 September 1969), read in conjunction with the *Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees*, 31 January 1967, 606 UNTS 267, Can TS 1969/29 (entered into force 4 October 1967, accession by Canada 4 June 1969); see also *Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment*, 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85, Can TS 1987/36 (entered into force 26 June 1987, ratification by Canada 24 June 1987); *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*, 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171, Can TS 1976/47 (entered into force 23 March 1976, accession by Canada 19 May 1976).

10. Nina Hall, "Climate Change and Organizational Change in UNHCR" in Michelle Leighton, Xiaomeng Shen & Koko Warner, eds, *Climate Change and Migration: Rethinking Policies for Adaptation and Disaster Risk Reduction* (Bonn: United Nations University, 2011), online: United Nations University <http://www.ehs.unu.edu/file/get/8468> at 111 explains that as at mid-2010, the planning was still in its formative stages. While there were suggestions that the meeting could examine how protection gaps might be filled, and that natural disasters might be one feature, nothing had been decided at that point in time.

11. In my view, some states have used the "research gap" argument as a pretext to stall developments in this area, especially since there is now a very large body of research available. I made comments to this effect at the first Consultative Committee meeting of the Nansen Initiative: The Nansen Initiative, Minutes of the Nansen Initiative Consultative Committee Meeting, Palais des Nations, Geneva, 2 October 2012, at 5.

12. *Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness*, 30 August 1961, 989 UNTS 175, Can TS 1978/32 (entered into force 13 December 1975, accession by Canada 17 July 1978).

13. For a comprehensive overview, see Koko Warner, "Climate Change Induced Displacement: Adaptation Policy in the Context of the UNFCCC Climate Negotiations," Legal and Protection Policy Research Series (UNHCR: Geneva, 2011), online: UNHCR <http://www.unhcr.org/4df9cc309.html>.

14. IASC Task Force on Climate Change, "Mid-Term Report for 2010" (9 July 2010), online: IASC<http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/pageloader.aspx?page=content-documents-default&bodyID=76&publish> at 1.

15. IASC, *Addressing the Humanitarian Challenges of Climate Change: Regional and National Perspectives: Findings from the IASC Regional and National Consultations, May–June 2009* (Geneva: IASC, 2009) at 9.

16. Comments of Walter Kälin, Minutes of Meeting: Launch of the Nansen Initiative, Palais des Nations, Geneva, 2 October 2012, at 6.

17. Warner, *supra* note 13 at 8.

18. *Ibid* at 7. See e.g. IASC, "Climate Change, Migration and Displacement: Who Will Be Affected?," 31 October 2008, online: UNFCCC <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2008/smsn/igo/022.pdf>; IASC, *supra* note 15; Koko Warner, "Workshop Report," Research Workshop on Migration and the Environment, 18 April 2008, online: Climate Change, Environment and Migration Alliance <http://www.ccema-portal.org/file/get/5774>; IASC Working Group on Migration/Displacement and Climate Change, "Displacement and Climate Change: Towards Defining Categories of Affected Persons," working paper first draft, 20 September 2008; Informal Taskforce on Climate Change of the IASC and the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, "Disaster Risk Reduction Strategies and Risk Management Practices: Critical Elements for Adaptation to Climate Change," 11 November 2008, online: UNHCR <http://www.unhcr.org/4a1e4f782.pdf>; Office of UNHCR, "Forced Displacement in the Context of Climate Change: Challenges for States under International Law" (20 May 2009), online: UNHCR <http://www.unhcr.org/4a1e4d8c2.html>; UNHCR, "Climate Change and Statelessness: An Overview" (15 May 2009), online: UNFCCC <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/smsn/igo/048.pdf>. Some of these are cited in Warner, *supra* note 13 at 7–8, fn 22.

19. *The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention*, supra note 7 at paras 2(b), 11.

20. *Ibid.*

21. For an overview of the drafting history and framing of the issue, see Warner, *supra* note 13.

22. Note that in the earliest mentions of climate change and mobility in the assembly text at Poznan (COP14, December 2008), discussions were framed around the notion of the "climate refugee" (see also *Summary of Views Expressed during the Second Session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention: Note by the Chair*, UN Doc FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/11 (11 August 2008) at 9 (Bangladesh)). In June 2009, the head of the US delegation raised concerns about the use of this language in the text, and it was subsequently revised: referred to in Koko Warner, *Migration and Global Environmental Change: Migration and Displacement in the Context of Adaptation to Climate Change: Developments in the UNFCCC Climate Negotiations and Potential for Future Action* (London: Foresight, UK Government, 2011), online: UK Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, <http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/foresight/docs/migration/policy-development/11-1269-pd23-migration-displacement-in-adaptation-climate-change.pdf> at 8. See earlier versions: *Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention on Its Seventh Session, Held in Bangkok from 28 September to 9 October 2009, and Barcelona from 2 to 6 November 2009*, UN Doc FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/14 (20 November 2009), online: UNFCCC

<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/awglca7/eng/14 .pdf> at 38, para 12(c) and at 56, para 13(b). On causation and state responsibility, see e.g. Roda Verheyen, *Climate Change Damage and International Law: Prevention Duties and State Responsibility* (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2005).

23. Warner, *supra* note 22 at 4.

24. *Ibid* at 9.

25. Warner, *supra* note 13 at 17. The fifth "Assessment Report" (2013) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has a sub-chapter on climate change and mobility, and it is addressed in other chapters as a cross-cutting issue.

26. *Ibid* at 12.

27. For a list of National Adaptation Programmes of Action where it is already referenced, see Jane McAdam, *Climate Change, Forced Migration, and International Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) at 271–80.

28. *Ibid* at 232; Walter Kälin, "From the Nansen Principles to the Nansen Initiative" (2012) 41 FMR at 48.

29. Kälin, *supra* note 28 at 49.

30. See UNHCR, *supra* note 8.

31. "Chairperson's Summary," in *The Nansen Conference: Climate Change and Displacement in the 21st Century (Oslo, Norway, June 5–7, 2011)* (Oslo: Norwegian Refugee Council, 2011), online: UNHCR <http://www.unhcr.org/4ea969729 .pdf> at 19, para 10.

32. The Nansen Initiative, "Towards a Protection Agenda for Disaster-Induced Cross-Border Displacement" (leaflet circulated at the launch on 2 October 2012), online <http:// www.nanseninitiative.org/sites/default/files/Nansen%20 Initiative%20Leaflet.pdf> at 1.

33. "Climate Change Adaptation and Disaster Risk Reduction: Key Messages from the Presentations," in *The Nansen Conference: Climate Change and Displacement in the 21st Century*, *supra* note 31 at 10.

34. See e.g. UNHCR, "Forced Displacement in the Context of Climate Change: Challenges for States under International Law," *supra* note 18; UNHCR, "Climate Change and Statelessness: An Overview," *supra* note 18.

35. Hall, *supra* note 10 at 110; see generally Hall, *supra* note 10 at 108–10, referring to interviews with UNHCR staff. Criticisms include concerns about UNHCR "overreaching its mandate and operational capacity," as well as concerns that focusing on climate change as a driver of displacement might come at the expense of other pressing and widespread causes. See also Nina Hall, "Moving beyond Its Mandate? UNHCR and Climate Change Displacement" (2013) 4 J. of Int'l Orgs Studies 91.

36. See e.g. UNHCR Executive Committee, "Report of the 51st Meeting of the Standing Committee (21–23 June 2011)" (20 September 2011), UN Doc A/AC.96/1104 at 7–8, paras 32, 34; UNHCR Executive Committee, "Report of the 50th Meeting of the Standing Committee (1–3 March 2011)" (24 June 2011), UN Doc A/AC/96/1097 at 5, para 15; UNHCR Executive Committee, "Report of the 61st Session of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme (4–8 October 2010)" (12 October 2010), UN Doc A/AC.96/1095 at 16, para 7; UNHCR Executive Committee, "Report of the 44th Meeting of the Standing Committee (3–5 March 2009)" (30 June 2009), UN Doc A/ AC.96/1065 at 7, para 28; UNHCR Executive Committee, "Report of the 43rd Meeting of the Standing Committee (23–24 September 2008)" (8 October 2008), UN Doc A/ AC.96/106 at 8, para 37; UNHCR Executive Committee, "Summary Record of the 610th Meeting" (1 October 2007), UN Doc A/AC.96/SR.610, 14, para 62. See also António Guterres, "Opening Statement" (statement by UN High Commissioner for Refugees, delivered at the 58th Session of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, Geneva, 1 October 2007).

37. Unless they also fall within UNHCR's mandated areas of responsibility: see further McAdam, *supra* note 27 at 39–51.

38. Note, however, the UN Economic and Social Council's praise of UNHCR's activities in "the context of man-made disasters": *Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees*, ESC Res 2011(LXI), UNESCOR, 61st Sess, Supp No 1, UN Doc E/5889, (1976) at 2.

39. See further Hall, *supra* note 10; McAdam, *supra* note 27 at 225–29.

40. António Guterres, "Maintenance of International Peace and Security: New Challenges to International Peace and Security and Conflict Prevention" (statement by UN High Commissioner for Refugees, United Nations Security Council Briefing, New York, 23 November 2011), online: UNHCR <http://www.unhcr.org/4ee21edc9.html> at 3. He did note, however, that climate change is not an independent variable but rather interacts with and reinforces "other global imbalances": *ibid*.

41. Guterres, *supra* note 36.

42. *Ibid*. However, a Working Group on Solutions and Protection within the Executive Committee of the UNHCR reported as early as 1991 that there was "a need to provide international protection to persons outside the current international legal definition of refugee [where they were] forced to leave or prevented from returning to their homes because of human-made disasters, natural or ecological disasters": Michelle Schwartz, "International Legal Protection for Victims of Environmental Abuse" (1993) 18 Yale J. Int'l L. 355 at 379.

43. José Riera, "Challenges relating to Climate Change Induced Displacement" (remarks by Senior Adviser to the Director of International Protection, UNHCR, "Millions of People without Protection: Climate Change Induced Displacement in Developing Countries" Conference, Berlin, 29 January 2013 at 6.

44. António Guterres (UN High Commissioner for Refugees), "Climate Change, Natural Disasters and Human Displacement: A UNHCR Perspective" (23 October 2008), online: UNHCR, <http://www.unhcr.org/4901e81a4.html> at 1.

See also remarks of UNHCR staff in Hall, *supra* note 10 at 106, 111, who stated that the High Commissioner had signalled his intention in internal meetings to shift UNHCR from a "refugee" agency to a "forced migration" agency.

45. UNHCR, "Protection Gaps and Responses," background paper (30 November 2010), online: UNHCR <http://www.unhcr.org/4cebeeee9.html> at 2.

46. *Ibid* at 6.

47. *Ibid* at 4.

48. *Ibid*.

49. UNHCR, "Side Event to High Commissioner's Dialogue on Protection Challenges 2010: Climate Change and Displacement" (8 December 2010), online: UNHCR <http://www.unhcr.org/4cff4c709.html>.

50. UNHCR, *supra* note 8 at 4.

51. UNHCR, "Climate Change and Displacement: Identifying Gaps and Responses" (22–26 February 2011), online: UNHCR <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendocPDFViewer.html?docid=4d1c92bb9&query=bellagi> at 2. It was unfortunate that the third of these questions effectively dropped off the agenda because it was seen as too specific to be dealt with in the time available.

52. Susin Park, "Climate Change and the Risk of Statelessness: The Situation of Low-Lying Island States," UNHCR Legal and Protection Policy Research Series (May 2011), online: UNHCR <http://www.unhcr.org/4df9cb0c9.pdf>; Jane McAdam, "Climate Change Displacement and International Law: Complementary Protection Standards" (April 2011), UNHCR Legal and Protection Policy Research Series, online: UNHCR <http://www.unhcr.org/4dff16e99.html>; Warner, *supra* note 13; Roger Zetter, "Protecting Environmentally Displaced People: Developing the Capacity of Legal and Normative Frameworks" (February 2011), online: Oxford Refugee Studies Centre <http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/search?SearchableText=Protecting+Environmentally+Displaced+People>.

53. UNHCR, "Summary of Deliberations on Climate Change and Displacement" (22–25 February 2011), online: UNHCR <http://www.unhcr.org/4da2b5e19.pdf> at 1.

54. *Ibid* at 2.

55. In UNHCR's view, it "fed directly" into that forum: Riera, *supra* note 43 at 5.

56. Jonas Gahr Støre (Minister of Foreign Affairs, Norway) and Erik Solheim (Minister of the Environment and International Development, Norway), "A Double Predicament," in *Nansen Conference: Climate Change and Displacement in the 21st Century*, supra note 31 at 4.

57. Margareta Wahlström, "A Common Understanding." in *Nansen Conference: Climate Change and Displacement in the 21st Century*, supra note 31 at 4.

58. Jonas Gahr Støre (Minister of Foreign Affairs, Norway), "Opening Address" (6 June 2011), online: <http://d2530919.hosted213.servetheworld.no/expose/global/download.asp?id=2222&fk=1581&thumb=> at 2.

59. António Guterres, "Address" (6 June 2011), online: UNHCR <http://www.unhcr.org/4def7ffb9.html> at 5.

60. UNHCR Executive Committee, "Summary Record of the 610th Meeting," *supra* note 36 at 8, para 33. Of the seven states invited to the Bellagio expert meeting, Norway and Germany were the only developed and "non-affected" states present, on account of their keen engagement with the issue. The other states were Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Kenya, Kiribati, and the Philippines.

61. Nansen Conference, "Climate Change and Displacement in the 21st Century," background paper (6–7 June 2011), online: Norwegian Government <http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Humanitært%20arbeid/Nansen_Conference_Background_paper.pdf>.

62. "Chairperson's Summary," *supra* note 31 at 18, para 1. See also Nansen Conference, *supra* note 61; Støre and Solheim, *supra* note 56 at 18.

63. "Chairperson's Summary," *supra* note 31 at 18, para 1. See also Nansen Conference, *supra* note 61.

64. Guterres, *supra* note 59 at 4.

65. *Ibid* at 5.

66. *Ibid*.

67. UNHCR, "Summary of Deliberations on Climate Change and Displacement," *supra* note 53 at 1–2.

68. Nansen Principles, Principles II, V, VI.

69. Nansen Principles, Principle IX.

70. Compared to earlier drafts, notable additions were the inclusion of environmental factors as well as climate change; the recognition of the role of actors beyond UNHCR; and the importance of using existing international law frameworks to the extent possible. One notable omission, despite a number of suggestions to include it, was the failure to reference responses to slow-onset impacts. The only tacit acknowledgement of this was a reference to "planned relocation" in Principle X.

71. Guterres, *supra* note 59.

72. Agnès Hurwitz, "Norm-Making in International Refugee Law" (2012) 106 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (Am. Soc. Int'l L.) 430 at 431.

73. UNHCR Executive Committee, "Report of the 51st Meeting of the Standing Committee," *supra* note 36 at 7–8, paras 30–36. See generally UNHCR Executive Committee, "UNHCR's Role in Support of an Enhanced Humanitarian Response for the Protection of Persons Affected by Natural Disasters" (6 June 2011), UN Doc EC/62/SC/CRP.19 at para 4 and sources cited there: UNHCR Executive Committee, "Questions and Answers on UNHCR's Protection Cluster Coordination Role in Natural Disasters" (23 February 2011), UN Doc EC/62/SC/INF./1; Bryan Deschamp, Michelle Azorbo, and Sebastian Lohse, "Earth, Wind and Fire: A Review of UNHCR's Role in Recent Natural Disasters" (June 2010), *UNHCR Policy Development and Evaluation Service*, PDES/2010/06. There had been some discussion of this during 2010: see e.g. UNHCR Executive Committee, "Report of the 47th Meeting of the Standing

Committee (2–4 March 2010)" (29 June 2010), UN Doc A/AC.96/1084; UNHCR Executive Committee, "Report of the 48th Meeting of the Standing Committee (22–24 June 2010)" (21 September 2010), UN Doc A/AC.96/1092.

74. UNHCR Executive Committee, "UNHCR's Role in Support of an Enhanced Humanitarian Response," *supra* note 73 at paras 2–3.

75. UNHCR Executive Committee, "Report of the 51st Meeting of the Standing Committee," *supra* note 36 at 7, para 33; UNHCR Executive Committee, "UNHCR's Role in Support of an Enhanced Humanitarian Response," *supra* note 73 at para 4.

76. UNHCR Executive Committee, "UNHCR's Role in Support of an Enhanced Humanitarian Response," *supra* note 73 at para 9. It had supported protection responses in natural disasters on a further four occasions. In 2010, "[m]any delegations welcomed UNHCR's willingness to undertake responsibility for persons displaced as a result of natural disasters under certain conditions—where no clear alternative leadership was present and where the affected State requested assistance": UNHCR Executive Committee, "Report of the 61st Session of the Executive Committee," *supra* note 36 at 16, para 7.

77. UNHCR Executive Committee, "Questions and Answers," *supra* note 73 at para 22.

78. See e.g. *ibid* at paras 4, 7–9.

79. For evidence of states' concerns, see UNHCR Standing Committee and Executive Committee records, *supra* note 36. See also the exchange in 2009 between Bangladesh and the High Commissioner about UNHCR's role in natural disasters and climate change, in which the former said it would not support an enhanced role for UNHCR and the latter said UNHCR did not want a "climate change mandate": UNHCR Executive Committee, "Summary Record of the 631st Meeting" (29 September 2009), UN Doc A / AC.96/SR.631 at 4, para 16, and at 8, para 39.

80. UNHCR Executive Committee, "Report of the 51st Meeting of the Standing Committee," *supra* note 36 at 4, para 8.

81. The documentary record also reveals that delegations continued to take the floor even after initial responses from UNHCR and OCHA to their concerns: see *ibid* at 7–8, para 34.

82. *Ibid* at para 31.

83. *Ibid* at para 32. While the report does not reveal the views of particular states, some evidence of viewpoints can be gleaned from the summary records of Executive Committee meetings: UNHCR Executive Committee, "Summary Record of the 610th Meeting," *supra* note 36 at 8, para 33 (Norway), 13, para 54 (Chile), 14, para 62 (Austria); "Summary Record of the 618th Meeting" (6 October 2008), UN Doc A/AC.96/SR.618 at 11, para 53 (Switzerland); "Summary Record of the 629th Meeting" (28 September 2009), UN Doc A/AC.96/SR.629 at 2, para 1 (France), 6, para 30 (Denmark); "Summary Record of the 631st Meeting," *supra* note 79 at 4, para 16 (Bangladesh); "Summary

Record of the 633rd Meeting" (30 September 2009), UN Doc A/AC.96/SR.633 at 9, para 45 (Australia), 10, 51 (Netherlands).

84. UNHCR Executive Committee, "Report of the 51st Meeting of the Standing Committee," *supra* note 36 at para 33; UNHCR Executive Committee, "UNHCR's Role in Support of an Enhanced Humanitarian Response," *supra* note 73 at para 7.

85. UNHCR Executive Committee, "Report of the 51st Meeting," *supra* note 36 at 7, para 32.

86. Guterres, *supra* note 40 at 2.

87. *Ibid* at 3. He did note, however, that climate change is not an independent variable but rather interacts with and reinforces "other global imbalances."

88. *Ibid* at 5–6.

89. See UNHCR, "Landmark Geneva Conference Opens with Appeal for the World's Forcibly Displaced, Stateless" (7 December 2011), online: UNHCR <http://www.unhcr.se/fi/keitae-autamme/kansalaisuudettomat/artikel/4b6fc167b0bbd245b0039340c49f33d6/landmark-geneva-conference-opens-wit.html>.

90. António Guterres, "Address" (statement by UN High Commissioner for Refugees, delivered at the Intergovernmental Meeting at Ministerial Level to mark the 60th Anniversary of the *1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees* and the 50th Anniversary of the *1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness*, Geneva, 7 December 2011), in UNHCR, *Pledges 2011: Ministerial Intergovernmental Event on Refugees and Stateless Persons (Geneva, Palais des Nations, 7–8 December 2011)* (Geneva: UNHCR, 2012) at 141.

91. *Ibid.*

92. *Ibid.*

93. UNHCR, *supra* note 8 at 4.

94. *Ibid.*

95. Costa Rica pledged its support after the meeting, as in his closing remarks, the High Commissioner referred to only four states: António Guterres, "Closing Remarks by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (8 December 2011)," delivered at the UNHCR Intergovernmental Meeting at Ministerial Level to Mark the 60th Anniversary of the *1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees* and the 50th Anniversary of the *1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness*, Geneva, online: UNHCR <http://www.unhcr.org/4ef094a89.html> at 1.

96. UNHCR, *Pledges 2011*, *supra* note 90 at 38; see also 76 (Germany), 96 (Mexico), 102 (Norway), 119 (Switzerland).

97. *Ibid* at 76.

98. *Ibid* at 89.

99. *Ibid* at 47, referring to Migration Law No 25.871, art 24, sub-para h.

100. *Ibid* at 63.

101. *Ibid* at 58.

102. "[W]e wish to see progress in the area of accessions to the principal refugee and statelessness conventions,

introduction of legislative safeguards for the prevention and reduction of statelessness, and new approaches to deal with those displaced within or across national boundaries owing to environmental factors and natural disasters linked to climate change": Inter-Parliamentary Union Statement on Parliamentary Action in Support of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and Refugee Protection (Panama, 20 April 2011), IPU Governing Council, 188th Session, in *ibid* at 170–71.

103. UNHCR, Intergovernmental Event at the Ministerial Level of Member States of the United Nations on the Occasion of the 60th Anniversary of the 1951 *Convention relating to the Status of Refugees* and the 50th Anniversary of the 1961 *Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness* (7–8 December 2011), *Ministerial Communiqu*é, UN Doc HCR/MIN-COMMS/2011/6 (8 December 2011) at para 10.

104. Kälin, *supra* note 28 at 49.

105. The Nansen Initiative, "A Protection Agenda for Disaster-Induced Cross-Border Displacement: Concept Note" (2 October 2012) at 7.

106. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, UN Doc E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (11 February 1998).

107. The Nansen Initiative, "A Protection Agenda," *supra* note 105 at 8.

108. *Ibid* at 2–3.

109. *Ibid* at 4 (emphasis removed).

110. *Ibid* at 1–3; The Nansen Initiative, "Towards a Protection Agenda," *supra* note 32 at 1.

111. The Nansen Initiative, "Towards a Protection Agenda," *supra* note 32 at 2.

112. *Ibid* at 2.

113. The Nansen Initiative, "Concept Note," *supra* note 105 at 8.

114. *Ibid* at 5; The Nansen Initiative, "Towards a Protection Agenda," *supra* note 32 at 2.

115. The Nansen Initiative, "Towards a Protection Agenda," *supra* note 32 at 2.

116. Nansen Initiative, Minutes of the Nansen Initiative Consultative Committee Meeting, *supra* note 11 at 3.

117. Steffen Kongstad (Norwegian ambassador to the UN Office at Geneva), Minutes of the Launch of the Nansen Initiative, *supra* note 16 at 3.

118. *Ibid* at 6.

119. The Nansen Initiative, "Concept Note," *supra* note 105 at 9.

120. Ibid.

121. José Riera (UNHCR), Minutes of the Nansen Initiative Consultative Committee Meeting, *supra* note 11 at 4.

122. See Minutes of the Launch of the Nansen Initiative, *supra* note 16 at 6 (France), 7 (US).

123. *Ibid* at 4 (Costa Rica), 5 (The Philippines), 7 (US).

124. *Ibid* at 8 (Walter Kälin).

125. Kälin, *supra* note 28 at 49.

126. The Initiative notes that nothing in its description of "disaster-induced cross-border displacement" should be taken to imply a direct and exclusive causality: The Nansen Initiative, "Towards a Protection Agenda," *supra* note 32 at 2; Minutes of the Nansen Initiative Consultative Committee Meeting, *supra* note 11 at 2. The Nansen Initiative Concept Note, *supra* note 105 at 6 explains, "The Initiative does not limit its purview to climate-related disasters, but addresses natural disasters regardless of the cause including geophysical hazards such as earthquakes, tsunamis or volcano eruptions. Reference to climate change is not restrictive but provides an important link to Article 14 (f) of the Cancún outcome." On complex causality, see McAdam, *supra* note 27 at 15–38, 196–97, and references cited therein.

127. Kälin, *supra* note 28 at 49.

128. "Chairperson's Summary," *supra* note 31 at 18, para 5.

129. UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, *2009 UNISDR Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction* (Geneva: UNISDR, 2009) at 9; The Nansen Initiative, "Towards a Protection Agenda," *supra* note 32 at 2.

130. The Nansen Initiative, "Towards a Protection Agenda," *supra* note 32 at 2. This is broader than the Nansen Conference, which focused on sudden-onset disasters.

131. The Nansen Initiative, "Concept Note," *supra* note 105 at 7.

132. *Ibid*.

133. *Ibid*.

134. Elizabeth Ferris, "Humanitarian Perspectives on 'Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters'" (speech delivered at the "Canada and International Law" Roundtable, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 21 April 2009), online: Brookings Institution <http://www.brookings.edu/speeches/2009/0421_natural_disasters_ferris.aspx>.

135. The Nansen Initiative, "Concept Note," *supra* note 105 at 7.

136. This terminology was used by Jan Egeland in discussions at the Nansen Conference.

137. Nansen Initiative, "Concept Note," *supra* note 105 at 4, referring to Walter Kälin and Nina Schrepfer, *Protecting People Crossing Borders in the Context of Climate Change: Normative Gaps and Possible Approaches* (February 2012), UNHCR Legal and Protection Policy Research Series, online: UNHCR <http://www.unhcr.org/4f33f1729.pdf> at 62.

138. For a detailed overview of the Pacific sub-regional consultation, see Jane McAdam, "Creating New Norms? The Nansen Initiative on Disaster-Induced Cross-Border Displacement" (1 April 2013), online: Asia-Pacific Migration and Environment Network, http://apmen.iom.int/en/m/editorials/item/104-creating-new-norms-the-nansen-initiative-on-disaster-induced-cross-border-displacement>.

139. "Message from the Prime Minister of the Cook Islands," in Nansen Initiative, 4.

140. See Jane McAdam, "Swimming against the Tide: Why a Climate Change Displacement Treaty Is Not *the* Answer" (2011) 23 Int'l J. Ref. L. 1, and the critique of treaty proposals there.

141. "Review of the Use of UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusions on International Protection" (9 June 2008), online: UNHCR <http://www.unhcr.org/483d701f2.html> at 8.

142. Kälin and Schrepfer, *supra* note 137 at 71.

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"Environmental Migration" as Advocacy: Is It Going to Work?

Benoît Mayer

Abstract

Can normative arguments for a governance of environmental migration succeed? The present analysis applies constructivist theories on norm entrepreneurship to the debate on the governance of environmental migration. Throughout the analysis, it appears that "environmental migration" is not constructed by one single, coherent norm entrepreneur. Rather, one may distinguish four normative enterprises that compete to use similar notions in the pursuit of divergent goals. They frame the issue of "environmental migration," alternatively, as one of humanitarian assistance, forced migration, environmental sustainability, or international security. The article analyzes the prospect of each individual normative enterprise and their interactions. It concludes that norm entrepreneurs elaborating on a language of international security will likely have the greatest impact on the governance of environmental migration. Other normative enterprises are already permeated by the dominant language of fears.

Résumé

L'argument normatif quant à une gouvernance des migrations environnementales peut-il convaincre ? Cet article propose une analyse de la gouvernance des migrations environnementales basée sur la théorie constructiviste de l'« entreprise normative ». Au travers de cette analyse, il apparaît que les « migrations environnementales » ne sont pas le fruit d'un seul acteur, mais plutôt de quatre groupes de pression distincts. Ces groupes de pression définissent le problème des « migrations environnementales », alternativement, comme un problème d'assistance humanitaire, de migrations forcées, de protection de l'environnement, ou de sécurité internationale. Cet article conclue que les

entrepreneurs normatifs qui s'appuient sur le concept de sécurité internationale sont sans doute ceux qui auront le plus grand impact sur la gouvernance des migrations environnementales. Les autres entreprises normatives ont déjà commencé à céder la voie au discours sécuritaire dominant.

> *There is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so.*
> —*Hamlet, 2.2*

Introduction

The great causes of humanity are defined through a socio-historical process of argumentation. Of late, it has become common to plead for specific efforts in relation to "environmental migration," in particular through international norms. The promoters of these normative arguments are not only academics,[1] but also NGOs,[2] international organizations,[3] and (more and more) states.[4] Yet the debate has centred on the ends that one should strive for, and less on the ways to achieve them, despite the saying that "a goal without a plan is just a wish."[5] For the ethical arguments at stake to become something more than a wish, it is necessary to develop pragmatic research that would identify which argumentative strategies work, which do not work, and which are counter-productive—that is, an argumentative plan.

This article is a modest attempt at sparking a cold analysis within this debate. Such a cold analysis would map the discursive arena by indicating the destinations that advocates would likely reach if they opted for a specific argumentative route, the perils that they would face *en route,* and perhaps the shortcuts that they could take to reach their destination in time.

For that purpose, this article is inspired by the "constructivist turn" of international relations studies, which demonstrated that, in the pursuit of international relations, "social construction matters."[6] The constructivist perspective is thus an attempt at introducing Derrida's notion of

deconstruction into the analysis of international relations, often along with Habermas's theory of communicative action.[7] In particular, this article makes use of a theoretical framework on norm entrepreneurship developed during the late 1990s and early 2000s.

The discussion is structured as follows. The first section reviews the constructivist literature, with a focus on theories on norm entrepreneurship. The second section analyzes how the issue of "environmental migration" has been framed. The third section discusses the individual prospects of four different normative enterprises. The last section questions the interactions among these normative enterprises.

Constructivism has developed through analytical studies on historical examples. In retrospect, there is an unavoidable tendency to elude unsuccessful arguments and to "flatten" successful ones. Unsurprisingly, things appear considerably murkier, sometimes undecipherable, when the same theories are applied prospectively to arguments in the making. In particular, complications result from the existence of competing normative enterprises that approach "environmental migration" in different ways and suggest diverging responses.

How Do New Norms Emerge?

At the end of the 1990s, the constructivist literature had reconceptualized norms, not as a given, but rather as the outcome of a social interaction—a process of transforming a mere possibility into a "should be" and finally into an "is."[8] For Ian Johnstone, norms "shape through interaction within and between states, and in a transnational process that involves representatives of NGOs, the private sector, and officials of international organizations, as well as states."[9]

Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink developed a theory of the "life cycle" of norms, constituting of three phases: "emergence," "cascade," and "internalization."[10] Each of these steps is supported by a distinct social process involving different actors. Firstly, "norm entrepreneurs with organizational platforms" gain the support of critical states, thus allowing the emergence of norms on global agendas. Secondly, "states, international organizations [and] networks" rally norm-breakers through "socialization, institutionalization [and] demonstration." Finally, "law, professions," and "bureaucracies" internalize the norms as habits: a new norm is born.[11]

Johnstone defines the "norm entrepreneurs" as "actors with a cause who mobilize support for that cause and seek to have it crystallized as an accepted standard of behaviour."[12] They can be relatively powerful leaders, head of states, or UN secretaries general, or influential advocates

such as Henri Dunant.[13] If individual qualities are certainly a must, Finnemore and Sikkink insist that "all norm promoters at the international level need some kind of organizational platform from and through which they promote their norms."[14] These organizational platforms can consist of NGOs,[15] intergovernmental organizations,[16] or states.[17] However, some authors conceive of institutional "norm entrepreneurs" such as states, the EU, or international organizations.[18]

Because norm entrepreneurship is essentially an attempt of the relatively powerless to affect the more powerful, norm entrepreneurs cannot use force: arguments are their only means. The analysis of norm entrepreneurship relates closely to communication studies, in particular in the work of Risse and Crawford.[19] Risse argues that social action cannot be understood through a pure "logic of appropriateness"; rather, a "logic of truth seeking and arguing" should also be part of the picture. Accordingly, "arguing constitutes a learning mechanism by which actors acquire new information, evaluate their interests in light of new empirical and moral knowledge, and—most importantly—can reflexively and collectively assess the validity claims of norms and standards of appropriate behaviour."[20]

Crawford adopts a broader conception of an "argument." Risse—highly influenced by Habermas's theory of communicative action—understands the logic of arguing as a rational process through which truth tends to emerge. Crawford's reception of Habermas is more cautious. For her, an argument is "an effort to persuade others to see the world in a particular way and to act in accordance with the conclusion that follows from the argument."[21] This already suggests that an argument does not need to be purely rational, as an argument is accordingly defined by its end rather than by its form. Crawford sketches a typology of arguments that distinguishes "practical," "scientific," "identity," and "ethical" arguments, but she also identifies the underlying "meta arguments … about whether we should have an argument and what that argument should be about."[22]

Identifying "meta-arguments" allows Crawford to explain the limits of argument: up to where actors are ready to be convinced. Evidently, international relations are not fully comprehended within the ambit of language ethics. Habermas's theory of communicative action roams the constructivist turn in international relations studies, yet this theory is not always the appropriate method of analysis—one may even argue that Habermas meant to develop a normative rather than a descriptive theory.[23] Arguments often depend not only on their internal validity as revealed by the discourse, but also on extrinsic elements such as the mere readiness of the (potential) interlocutors to be persuaded. Risse recognizes the issue of a limited openness to

persuasion. He distinguishes between three communicative *behaviours*: (1) "bargaining on the basis of fixed preferences," limited to "exchanging information about preferences, making promises, or threatening"; (2) "rhetorical action" supposing the strategic use of arguments to convince the other but with little willingness to change one's own opinion; and (3) "true reasoning" resulting from a "behavior oriented toward reaching a common understanding" where Habermas's theory on communicative action applies fully.[24] However, Risse does not explain why actors opt for one or another communicative behaviour. Crawford prefers to consider a continuum of communicative *settings* that situate an actor's behaviour in a conception of "*social* action" as "complex, consisting of communication, reflection, decision, and coordination with others." The continuum extends from circumstances where "there is no argument (killing and compulsion)" to circumstances where "there is only argument (discourse ethics)."[25]

Thus, this theoretical framework also hints at psychological studies on how decisions are made, in particular on the influence of emotional affects. Such works oppose the "rational processing system," which is "analytical, logical and deliberative" and "encodes reality in abstract symbols, worlds and numbers," to the "experiential system," "holistic, affective and intuitive," which "encodes reality in concrete images, metaphors and narratives linked in associative networks."[26] In particular, Epstein highlights the point that "experientially derived knowledge is often more compelling and more likely to influence behavior than is abstract knowledge."[27] Reflecting such psychological studies, constructivist authors have denounced the assumption of a cold rationality of the actors. In particular, Finnemore and Sikkink note that "politics without passion … is hardly the politics of the world in which we live." They emphasize the need to "pay … more attention to studies in psychology, particularly work on the roles of affect, empathy, conformity, and esteem."[28]

It is precisely in this direction that Crawford turns. Reverting to Aristotle, she considers *Homo politicus* as "a reasoning actor, not a rational one."[29] She submits that "argument and persuasion are characterized by emotion and normative concerns as well as by rational or logical process."[30] Therefore, she extends the scope of argument to emotions, both as "barriers and openings to arguments":[31] it is because of their emotions that actors are receptive to arguments. Thus, according to Crawford, "actors make their choice about what mode of action to pursue—say the choice between strategic action (coercion or killing) and deliberation—based on their emotional relationship with the other and their sense of what is normatively right in a particular setting."[32] Because emotions contribute to defining the

actors' communicative behaviour, so, too, do spontaneous moral conceptions (as opposed to reasoned ethics): "Actors judge a good argument not just by its practicality and truth value, but by what we consider is normatively right and how following it would make us feel."[33]

Beyond emotions, another finding of the constructivist literature is the importance of culture. Both Risse and Crawford highlight the role of a common cultural background as a condition for argument, referring to Plato's "enchantment," Foucault's "governmentality," and Habermas's "common lifeworld" quite interchangeably: "Without language and taken for granted beliefs we could not have coherent arguments."[34] As culture extends, lifeworld limits the scope for arguments: more is taken for granted and less is open to discussion. Yet, through meta-arguments, lifeworld "can be problematized or denormalized and hence opened up to arguments and persuasion."[35] Crawford notes, however, that international relations remain highly under-institutionalized when compared with an ideal-typical nation-state with high cultural integration. Despite the existence of international "deliberative institutions," she notes, "lifeworlds are thicker in regions … and arguments across lifeworlds are often incomprehensible or plagued with misunderstanding."[36]

Beyond rationality, emotions, and culture, constructivists recognize that "some domestic norms appear more likely candidates for internationalization than others."[37] This is because structural elements affect the reception of arguments. Hinting at communication studies, Finnemore and Sikkink argue that the success of an argument depends on the capacity of norm entrepreneurs to frame it within an efficient message: arguments that are "clear and specific, rather than ambiguous and complex" may have more chance of being understood and accepted.[38] For Crawford, *who speaks* matters as well, especially with regard to the different "emotional relationships" (e.g., trust, empathy or "extreme fear") woven with different potential norm entrepreneurs.[39] Furthermore, constructivist studies suggest that the substance of the argument also influences its prospects—positively if the argument participates in "a long-term trend toward humanizing the 'other,' or 'moral progress.'"[40] Lastly, material interests matter too, as well as actors' knowledge of their interests: Risse shows that "the more actors are uncertain about their interests and even identities," the more arguing processes are likely to occur.[41] With an optimistic view, Finnemore and Sikkink highlight the importance of the "use of expertise and information to change the behavior of other actors" and the "support of state actors to endorse their norms and make norm socialization a part of their agenda."[42] One may, however, imagine circumstances

where a veil of ignorance facilitates a consensus or, at least, a fair consensus.

Framing "Environmental Migration" as an Issue
Alarmists versus Skeptics
The debate on climate migration has often been conceived as the continuous opposition of two schools of thought with different disciplinary backgrounds.[43] On the one hand, the "maximalist" or "alarmist" school, dominated by environmental scholars, has prospered through the release of adventurous estimates and predictions of the numbers of "environmental refugees."[44] On the other hand, the "minimalist" or "skeptical" school (indeed a critique of the former), led by migration experts, highlighted the complex ways through which environmental change may induce, or prevent, different forms of migrations. The minimalists showed that the migratory effects of environmental changes depend largely on economic, social, political, and demographic factors. As a recent report put it, "The range and complexity of the interactions between [environmental, economic, social, and political] drivers means that it will rarely be possible to distinguish individuals for whom environmental factors are the sole driver ('environmental migrants')."[45]

Although the maximalist school has had very little to respond to the minimalist critique, its ideas remain surprisingly influential in public debate and in law and political science scholarship.[46] Gemenne related this epistemological divide to different political objectives: accordingly, the maximalist "coalition" advocated for environmental protection, whereas the minimalist one focused on a notion of "protection."[47] As a first analysis, the maintained influence of the maximalist school, despite its essential flaws, reflects the discrepancy between the scientific accuracy of an academic argument and its success, especially in political debates.

Four Collective Norm Entrepreneurs
This fundamental opposition between two schools of thought is an important starting point, but it is insufficient for our present purpose. Some narratives do not easily fit within a strict dichotomy between the "alarmist" and the "skeptical" coalitions. In one of the few sociological analyses of the debate, Vlassopoulou identified three sectors: to the "asylum" and "environmental" that correspond broadly to the two schools of thoughts, she added the "humanitarian" sector, which approaches environmental migration as part of the governance of natural disasters.[48]

I argue that four broad normative enterprises can be distinguished. They relate to (1) international assistance, (2) the protection of forced migrants, (3) environmental sustainability, and (4) international security. At the risk of oversimplifying the question, it might be argued that the first two projects elaborate on the skeptical views, whereas the last two groups rather follow the assumptions of the alarmist school. There are significant contentions *within* each normative enterprise, but I argue that each group of advocates is *broadly* united by a common goal, a common language and culture, a similar way of framing environmental migration as a governance issue, and overall a comparable argument. Each of these groups of advocates can be analyzed as a roughly coherent norm entrepreneur.

These normative enterprises pre-existed the discourse on environmental migration: in each case, environmental migration is a flagship rather than an ultimate goal. In other words, environmental migration is an intermediary step to grander projects—a strategic symbolic position from which each norm entrepreneur would dominate other argumentative battlefields.

The first enterprise promotes norms on international assistance. Leading institutions include UN agencies (e.g., UNDP),[49] international development agencies (e.g., World Bank, Asian Development Bank),[50] as well as multiple NGOs (e.g., CARE, Christian Aid).[51] They approach environmental migration through the notions of "disaster" and "human vulnerability," adopting languages of rights and development, but also more specifically of "disaster risk-reduction" and "resilience." This is concededly a broad group of heterogeneous agents, with significant differences in particular between the purely humanitarian actors and those working on development activities. However, those two fields have significant overlaps. In particular, as Minn notes, both "entail relationships between individuals and institutions in wealthy and impoverished countries, and have developed sizable infrastructures to facilitate these relationships and the processes that emerge from them."[52] Both frame "environmental migration" as a "disaster," although humanitarianism aims at responding to urgent needs following a disaster, whereas development aims at reducing the risk of, or recovering from, such a disaster. The need to coordinate humanitarian assistance and aid to development is well recognized.

The second normative enterprise promotes the protection of forced migrants. Its advocates feature in particular many academics (e.g., Alexander Betts, Stephen Castles, Graeme Hugo, Jane McAdam) and two international institutions (UNHCR and IOM). Here, the discourse on "environmental" or "climate refugees" follows and greatly reinforces previous arguments for the protection of "economic refugees." The argument revolves around the analogy between environmentally induced forced migrants and refugees as people in need of international protection.

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The third normative enterprise promotes the imperative of environmental sustainability. It puts together academics (e.g., Frank Biermann and Ingrid Boas, Norman Myers), environmental NGOs (e.g., Environmental Justice Foundation,[53] Equity BD), and some international institutions (UNEP, UNFCCC), with a support of some developing states (in particular AOSIS). These actors are interested mostly in the roots of environmental migration, either in terms of environmental protection (climate change mitigation) or of human resilience (climate change adaptation in situ). In fact, this normative enterprise often focuses on "climate migration" as a sub-issue circumscribed to instances of environmental migration that are attributed to anthropogenic global environmental change. It builds on "responsibility" and "climate justice," from which a duty to cease the harming conduct and to repair the injuries is inferred.

Lastly, the fourth normative enterprise promotes the reinforcement of national defence capabilities broadly understood, ranging from the military to border-control technologies, intelligence, etc. Its advocates are mainly members of the traditional security community (e.g., CAN Corporation, Jane's Information Group),[54] international institutions (e.g., the Security Council),[55] think tanks and researchers,[56] influential national institutions, and some industrial lobbies.[57] Arguing that environmental migration may give rise to illegal migration, international criminality, terrorism, and conflicts, these actors call for preventive action, including investment in strategic partnerships with transit countries, border-control technologies, and reinforcement of military presence overseas.[58]

Constructing Identities, Roles, and Interests
Environmental migrants do not take an active role in any of the four collective normative enterprises. Yet their absence from the debate often goes remarkably unremarked.[59] Even within their own states, environmental migrants hardly have any impact on the political agenda.[60] This can be explained by what Crawford calls the "barrier of simple participation": as she notes, "The poor cannot be heard unless the media or the powerful publicize their arguments."[61] Precisely: empirical studies show that environmental inducement to migration affects in particular the poor, who are less resilient and often more exposed to environmental changes.[62] Furthermore, environmental migrants lack a collective identity, prerequisite to any political existence as a group. "Environmental migrants" do not exist as anything approaching a socially constituted group that could have its voice heard; in fact, it must be rehearsed, and it is often impossible even "to distinguish individuals for whom environmental factors are the sole driver."[63]

This absence of those most directly concerned by the debate raises moral issues,[64] all the more because it contributes significantly to framing the debate: for whose benefit are the arguments on environmental migration developed? The identity of "environmental migrants" has not come from below: it has been imposed from above. The definition of this identity is an instance of competition amongst the four normative enterprises.[65] Each narrative is based on a different construction of "environmental migration," but in each case this figure is imagined in opposition from "us." Such dichotomies strive only because the "others" are voiceless. The first three collective norm entrepreneurs claim that they speak on behalf of environmental migrants, as they claim to emphasize respectively their need for norms institutionalizing international solidarity, their need for norms protecting all forced migrants, and their need for norms responding to climate change. The last collective norm entrepreneur constructs "environmental migrants" as at least potentially an enemy.

Firstly, the humanitarian normative enterprise construes a relation between the mighty, valiant saviours and the vulnerable, passive others presumably waiting to be saved. The success of the narrative in framing an argument depends on the strength of empathy, stemming from the perception of a link of kinship between the interlocutor and the "victims." Thus, Strömberg shows that "donors … give more to countries that lie closer, and with which they share a common language and colonial ties."[66] One of the greatest examples of massive donations, however, relates to the responses to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, where the emotional argument was supported by the immediate availability of dramatic images, the fact that the places affected were often touristic destinations, and the disappearance of many European tourists among the victims.[67]

Secondly, the forced migration normative enterprise follows an approach similar to the humanitarian dichotomy between the saviour and those in need of being saved, but it also builds on deep-rooted emotional attachment to the place as an element of identity. It opposes "our" space, seen as a safe haven and a potential place of asylum, to "their" space as inherently troublous. Psychological works on identity building have amply reflected on the role of place in individual identity building—in particular "home," conceived either as "a fortress to be defended" (against invaders) or as "an expression of the self" (to the other);[68] and the social dynamic at work here seems to build on the same element. Because of the importance given to the place, the forced migration argument is successful mainly in the West when it deals with immigration from the Third World: environmental migrants are conceived as destitute individuals fleeing collapsing socio-environmental systems

and heading toward "our" sanctuary. On the other hand, the narrative does not apply successfully to South-South or North-North migration: the former is frequently overlooked,[69] whereas the latter tends to be framed in humanitarian rather than migratory terms. George W. Bush offered an excellent illustration to the geographical rootedness of this argument when he argued that the New Orleanians displaced at the time of hurricane Katrina were not "refugees" but "Americans" who "need[ed] the help and love and compassion of our fellow citizens."[70] Because displacement was happening within "our" space, Bush felt an urge to reframe the issue in terms of humanitarian assistance rather than forced migration.

Thirdly, the environmentalist enterprise grounds its argument in a dichotomy between the "wrongdoers" and the "victims." Except for a few instances related to the environmental impact of development projects,[71] the discourse applies mainly to issues of climate justice. Environmental or climate migrants are conceived as passive individuals, "forced … to leave their villages and cities to seek refuge in other areas."[72] Here, however, the link between "us" and "them" is stronger as the plight of the environmental migrants is attributed to the Western way of life (and sometimes to its imposition on emerging economies). Yet "climate migrants" remain fundamentally the figure of the other in an asymmetrically globalized world. In much of the environmentalist literature, "climate migrants" are described as faceless numbers, generally a number of millions. Jacobson, a pioneer of this approach, argued in 1988 that "the rising number of environmental refugees is the best available measure of changes in the Earth's physical conditions."[73] Thus, the environmentalist enterprise deals with "climate refugees" as a symptom—the "canary in the coalmine"—and their numbers as a measure: "climate refugees" are a concern only inasmuch as their plight preludes and announces ours.[74] Yet, despite their reification and their passiveness, "climate refugees" may also be a threat: the holders of large claims against the Western world, unified by solid moral arguments—a sword of Damocles hanging over "us." Already, developing countries have started rising up and claiming that developed states have to "recognize and commit to honor their climate debt in all its dimensions, … including through … being accountable for the hundreds of millions of people that will have to migrate as a result of climate change and to remove their restrictive policies on migration."[75]

Lastly, the normative enterprise on international security reverses the roles: it construes "environmental refugees" as a threat. Accordingly, it is because "they" are poor and desperate individuals that "they" are also dangerous; it is because "we" are developed and open societies that we are vulnerable to them. The causes of migration do not matter as much as the growing numbers of increasingly desperate "climate Barbarians at the gates."[76] The argument is deep-rooted in a latency of xenophobia and racialization.[77] In contrast with the environmentalist argument, the security enterprise submits that environmental migrants are *so* dangerous that defending ourselves against the "victims-turned-villains"[78] has become a necessary step.

The Individual Prospects of Four Collective Norm Entrepreneurs

Which normative enterprise is most likely to succeed? This section assesses the prospects of each enterprise. It identifies extrinsic factors[79] such as the credibility of collective norm entrepreneurs, the possible emotional engagement of the interlocutors, and the role that domestic and international institutions can play in facilitating the discourse. It also discusses intrinsic elements such as the comprehensibility of the message and its capacity to fit within dominant representations.

Humanitarian Assistance

The first argument relies on what Fassin called "moral sentiments," which he defined as "the motions that direct our attention to the suffering of others and make us want to remedy them."[80] Such moral sentiments are arguably inherent to human nature and pre-exist any ethical reflection.[81] Whereas neither ethics nor moral sentiments are able to *determine* global politics alone, they certainly have an influence. Humanitarian actors have high prestige, from which credibility ensues.

Yet humanitarianism has also been challenged. Some have highlighted the danger of reifying the beneficiaries of international aid. Thus, for Fassin, "the very gesture that appears to grant them recognition reduces them to what they are not—and often refuse to be—by reifying their condition of victimhood while ignoring their history and muting their words."[82] Others have highlighted the insufficiencies of humanitarianism. In particular, David Rieff reflects a widespread sentiment that "no century has had better norms and worse realities."[83] He argues that, through humanitarianism, "the modern conscience is … allowed to delegate its guilt and its anxiety to the designated consciences of the world of relief, development and human rights."[84]

Humanitarianism surely is not a panacea. It might be best conceived as a cosmetic treatment rather than a substantive cure of the world's ills. Whereas acute humanitarian crises may trigger the commitment of substantial resources, Rudi Muhammad Rizki, the former UN independent expert on human rights and international solidarity, identified "a large gap between assertions of international solidarity in

theory and their reflection in practice." He added, "The fact that more than 1 billion people suffer from poverty and hunger is an indicator that, as the human race, we are failing to live as one family."[85]

So far, humanitarian advocates have been able to gather large funds to respond to a natural disaster, but they have been less successful in triggering resources for long-term policies. The success of normative arguments has been circumscribed to a clarification of state obligations vis-à-vis their own populations and to some technical discussions relating in particular to the right of a state to intervene in another state.[86] Yet there is little prospect for a broader normative framework, such as one defining state obligations toward the populations of other states. The humanitarian argument is simple, clear, and based on sound ethics, but it is too broad and not be sufficiently specific to have a substantial impact. A full realization of the humanitarian argument would require structural changes for which we might not yet be ready.

Forced Migration
Whereas the humanitarian argument is in a sense "too big to succeed," the second argument focuses on *forms* of vulnerability specifically linked to forced displacement. The refugee regime provides these norm entrepreneurs with an essential organizational platform: the UNHCR. Although it does not have a specific mandate for protection, the IOM has also been involved in some research and advocacy. Both international organizations are recognized as strong moral authorities.

The refugee regime is also a common lifeworld upon which norm entrepreneurs have often tried to elaborate their argument. They have done so generally either through an explicit analogy through the notion of "environmental refugees," or through proposals for "stretching" the refugee regime to other forms of "survival migration."[87] However, the influence of the protection of refugees extends well beyond explicit analogies. Crawford argues that previous ideas may affect later ones in at least three other ways: "as the background discourse; as the organizing principle of institutions and social structures; and through their association with feelings."[88] Even when not explicitly compared, "environmental migrants" are usually conceived on the background of the international refugee regime: this may explain the extraordinary resistance to ideas of multi-causality (persecution being conceived as a unique and direct drive for displacement), but also the constant emphasis on international migrants.[89]

However, a hurdle to the analogy (be it implicit or explicit) stems from challenges to the international refugee protection. State practice increasingly deviates from the norm,

and some of the states most affected by climate change are not parties to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.[90] In this context, UN High Commissioner for Refugees António Guterres and the UNHCR warn that redefining environmental migrants as "refugees" "could undermine the international protection regime."[91] If this might follow sound political grounds, the position is not necessarily ethically sound: supposing that refugees and "environmental migrants" are in a similar situation and that the amount of generosity is fixed, there is no reason to concentrate all these resources to the sole refugees.

The limit of the rational argument is where the emotional argument develops. There is no essential reason why the migrants should be protected rather than other vulnerable people—and the skeptical school has shown that those most vulnerable were often unable to move for lack of resources.[92] Yet, among other forms of human sufferings, migration attracts a specific attention that is linked to a deep-rooted fear of invaders. Hathaway demonstrated that the institutionalization of the refugee regime was triggered by "neither a humanitarian nor a human rights vision," but rather by "the pursuit by states of their own well-being"— an attempt at "govern[ing] disruptions of regulated international migration in accordance with the interests of states."[93] Yet if regulating international peace and security is the main motivation of critical states, forced migration norm entrepreneurs are opposed to the securitization of the issue: they assume that the outcome of securitization would not benefit forced migrants. As Castles notes, an alarmist discourse would "tend to reinforce existing negative images of refugees as a threat to the security, prosperity and public health of rich countries in the global North."[94]

On the other hand, however, there is little prospect for a "skeptical" discourse that would build on complex causality, recognize the rarity of international migration, submit that "migration" is perfectly "normal" and does not "endanger" Western states, and pay attention to those who are unable to move because they lack the resources necessary to move. In terms of communication, such a message would presumably remain perfectly inaudible for most of its interlocutors, not only because of its complexity and lack of emotional roots, but also because it situates the link environment-migration outside of our lifeworld when, for instance, evading the dichotomy between forced and voluntary migration or when calling for holistic development policies. Such a message would lead to a situation where, as Crawford puts it, "the words may be heard, but because of their different Weltanshung [*Weltanschauung*], interlocutors find they are incomprehensible to each other. Thus, those with power will not hear or even consciously exclude those who do not speak in the terms of the dominant discourse."[95]

Stuck in a dilemma between an alarmist narrative that risks being diverted by security actors and a feeble discourse that does not fit into the dominant lifeworld, forced migration advocates have had a hard time finding their place in the environmental migration debate. As a result, they have often developed a halfway, "neither-nor" approach, denouncing the notion of "environmental migration" in introductory considerations yet immediately leaving these remarks aside.[96] Nicholson identified this "ontological contradiction" in the academic literature: "There will be an acknowledgement that the 'drivers' of migration are always complex, and that all migration is conditioned by myriad contingencies and 'geo-social-political context.' Yet the same authors will often then continue to refer to 'climate displacement' as if it were an essential category."[97] In terms of protection, the concept of "environmental migration" is both impractical and irrelevant. Yet the advocates of forced migration could not but attempt to use the environmental migration debate to pursue further goals.

Environmental Sustainability
At first sight, the environmentalist normative enterprise appears quite promising. The call for adapting international governance to a new issue and the framing of this issue as a matter of responsibility touch deep-rooted, largely shared ethical principles. There is a strong scientific argument: experts overwhelmingly agree on the reality of global, anthropogenic climate change.[98] Besides, there are strong institutions. The 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, with 195 parties, is one of the most widely ratified treaties. The issue attracts great attention globally, as the large "COPs" (Conferences of the Parties) gather tens of thousands of environmental activists and journalists each year. Responsibility is also recognized in international law, at least when a state is responsible for the "serious consequences" that its conduct could cause to other states.[99] Attaching "environmental migration" to climate change might therefore look like a powerful argumentative strategy.

Yet there are four significant obstacles to the success of this argument. Firstly, the application of the argument is inconsistent with its ethical basis. Responsibility for climate change pleads for "compensation"—unconditional financial flows from those states "responsible" for climate change and those "affected" by it. This is roughly the approach followed by negotiations on loss and damages. Yet a corrective justice argument does not seem able to justify a centralized governance of climate migration, which would further curtail the sovereignty of the "injured" states. Responsibility does not justify interference.

Secondly, studies in the sociology of media on climate change show a tendency to over-represent skeptical claims over more serious scientific arguments, for the sake of what Boykoff and Boykoff call "adherence to first-order journalistic norms—personalization, dramatization, and novelty."[100] In another article, the same authors recall that industrial lobbies may also play a role in favouring skeptical claims to avoid costly mitigation measures, thus struggling against the scientific basis of the argument.[101] These factors explain that climate change denial remains influential, in particular in American media, despite the absence of any scientific support.

Thirdly, other authors have identified a gap between a cold scientific argument and its emotional perception—what Collins and Evans called "science's … short-term political impotence."[102] Thus, Leiserowitz showed that, "while large majorities of Americans believe climate change is real and consider it a serious problem, it remains a low priority relative to other national and environmental issues": it "lacks a sense of urgency."[103] Leiserowitz and other psychologists explain that this is due to a gap in perception: whereas climate change–related risks are viewed as affecting mostly "people and places far distant in space and time," the costs of potential response policies are immediately tangible.[104] In this context, individuals are tempted to "erect barriers to their personal commitment" to the issue, despite—or because—of their anxiety.[105] Too much of an alarmist discourse could thus favour policies that do not aim at avoiding, but rather at protecting ourselves against, climate change–induced migration—thus benefitting the fourth collective norm entrepreneurs.

Fourthly, although the ethical bases of the argument are relatively simple, environmental advocates fail to prescribe any simple solution. According to Williams, the absence of simple and efficient "packageable solutions" impedes the success of the scientific argument.[106] Furthermore, Hulme is concerned that "climate change is not making sense to us."[107] Hulme denounces the domination of a "purely physical reading of climate change"[108] that strips the discourse from "their constitutive human values and cultural meanings."[109] As a consequence, he argues, "climate change becomes a malleable envoy enlisted in support of too many rulers."[110] In a commentary on a proposal for a "climate refugee" convention, Hulme similarly expressed concerns over delegating "the fate of millions" to "some distant UN committee" that would oversee the "social dynamic of change in which multiple values and power relations are at work."[111] If the protection of environmental migrants is really what environmentalists strive for, they will need to coalesce with forced migration pundits and take the skeptical approach into account; if they strive for raising awareness on the need

for greater environmental sustainability, the argument will suffer from their inability to propose a simple solution.

International Security

The foundations of the last argument are often denigrated by researchers[112] with few exceptions. According to Elliott, for instance, "Claims about climate and environmental security, and about the security implications of climate migration, are … both empirically and conceptually fraught."[113] Despite this reception in the academic world, a larger audience often perceives security experts as credible norm entrepreneurs. The successful securitization of environmental migration reflects strong inequalities in the formation of public discourse. If it describes securitization as an "act of speech," the Copenhagen school of security studies also shows that the "securitizing agents" must also secure an argument that would "achieve sufficient effect to make an audience tolerate violations of rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed."[114] The way environmental migration has been securitized reflects a strong ascendency of Western norm entrepreneurs in the construction of environmental migration. The notion of a human security, as an attempt at displacing the emphasis from the receiving states to environmental migrants,[115] has had only a very little influence.

Security pundits possess strong institutional support, in particular from interested industrial lobbies, and they have had access to critical organizational platforms, including the United Nations Security Council.[116] Above all, they were able to deploy what the three other collective norm entrepreneurs lack: an efficient message. As White puts it, "Thinking in security terms is relatively easy."[117]

The security argument is rooted in strong emotions—fears—that compel immediate action. Here, the *grounds* for fear are diverse. A first layer of fears is xenophobic, sometimes racist; it relates to a "flood" of immigrants who would steal "our" jobs, confuse "our" national identity, or even perhaps bring violence or mix with "our" "race." This message is particularly efficient in the post-9/11 lifeworld, where migration is constantly associated with threats. Yet a second layer of fears relates to the touch of newness and uncertainty that "climate change" brings. Uncertainty and fears call for early precautionary measures.

Moreover, unlike the three other collective norm entrepreneurs, security norm entrepreneurs prescribe a *solution* that can be perceived as simple, realistic, and efficient. "Building fences against irregular migration is politically successful,"[118] White notes. It certainly is more politically successful than funding humanitarian cooperation or climate change adaptation. Here again, the security discourse does not need epistemological accuracy to persuade key actors

(governments and their constituencies) that derogations are justified in the face of migration and that military spending must be increased. This success is in spite of the gap, that Elliott highlights, between the "image of processes that are likely to be out of control and therefore highly threatening" in the security literature and empirical evidence that "slow-induced migration is the more likely outcome in the context of climate change."[119] The international security enterprise is misleading,[120] but, in terms of communication, it is also a particularly powerful argument that multiplies the fears of migration by the uncertainties of climate change.

The Prospects of a Disputed Issue

This article is a first attempt at applying constructivist theories to the normative debate on environmental migration. It identifies one methodological difficulty: the existence of four distinct collective norm entrepreneurs, for whom environmental migration is only an intermediary step toward different ultimate goals. The existing theoretical frame focuses on norm entrepreneurship by either a unique actor,[121] or a set of actors sharing a unique goal,[122] who combat inert bureaucracies, all things being equal. Here, however, applying these theories prospectively to the issue of environmental migration shows that different norm entrepreneurs concurrently frame environmental migration as an issue: they speak to the interlocutors with similar words, but their messages differ.

These norm entrepreneurs cannot but interact with one another. This is not only because normative enterprises generally struggle for public attention in what may appear as a finite pool of worries,[123] but all the more because, with regard to environmental migration, they compete on the same conceptual grounds. The reception of a message depends on its understanding by the interlocutor, which is framed partly by the previous reception of other messages. The four collective norm entrepreneurs identified here write different stories, but on the same support, with the risk that the audience may amalgamate all four narratives into a somewhat confused understanding.

The prospects of a dispute issue can be analyzed only in relation to other such enterprises. The following remarks are a sketch for more thorough analyses of such complex interactions. Four conclusions can be suggested.

Firstly, as to the representation of environmental migration, the maximalist (environmentalist and security) and minimalist (humanitarian and forced migration) enterprises are in direct epistemological contradiction: neither of them can fully succeed unless it eliminates the other. The rational argument, backed by a host of empirical studies showing the complex linkages between environmental factors and migration, is obviously on the side of the skeptical

perspective. However, the alarmist representation constitutes a simpler, more efficient message. Therefore, at least in the short term, the alarmist representation seems likely to maintain its ascendency in the political representations.[124]

Secondly, as to the nature of the argument, two approaches clash. For the humanitarian, forced migration, and environmentalist norm entrepreneurs, the disputed issue of environmental migration is before all an ethical one. For the security norm entrepreneurs, however, it is a question of self-protection. These approaches are not necessarily incompatible, but there is a finite space available in the public discourse, and one argument often takes attention away from the other. The two approaches call to different emotions, respectively empathy and fears: once an audience has associated environmental migration with existential fears, it is doubtful that it may return to empathy. Because fear is a more urgent feeling, security norm entrepreneurs are likely to impose a self-protective approach over the ethical one. The securitization of environmental migration may significantly impede ethical arguments because the discourse of animosity will interfere with the discourse of solidarity: the *necessity* of protecting "us" situates the debate beyond the realm of ethics: it outshines the *desire* to help "them."

Thirdly, as to the scope of the argument, it might be assumed that actors will prefer an argument prescribing a solution perceived as cheaper, at least if the outcomes are perceived as similar. To that extent, the forced migration argument has an advantage over the broader humanitarian argument: it is more specific and focuses on the most visible part—the displaced. In other words, addressing forced migration has a better satisfaction-to-cost ratio: it gives us a better image of ourselves at a lesser price. This advantage, however, is not an absolute one. By denouncing "invisibility" and highlighting the "roots of the problem" (of displacement), humanitarian advocates may successfully call for some attention to those "trapped in place." Their position will, however, remain subordinate to the forced migration argument, as it follows from the very structure of their argument—a comparison between visible migrants and invisible non-migrants.

Fourthly, as to the capacity of each normative enterprise to prescribe a solution perceived as simple and efficient, the security argument certainly prevails over each of the other arguments. The humanitarian, forced migration, and environmentalist solutions are plagued by aid fatigue and more generally by the limits of our willingness to "give," especially against a background of endless economic crises. It also suffers from the difficulties of engaging in global cooperation, and, in the absence of such cooperation, from the feeling that the aid brought by one isolated state would be a drop in the ocean of needs. In comparison,

the solutions prescribed by security norm entrepreneurs are (wrongly) perceived as efficient and cheap. As a matter of fact, it is profoundly disturbing to consider that the security argument might benefit from the social dynamics raised by other norm entrepreneurs. The increasing denunciation for environmental migration as a humanitarian, migration, and climate-change crisis might thus end up reinforcing the security narrative, leading to a further securitization of migration and climate change, and harming the climate migrants more than anyone else. This diversion of social awareness is more likely when arguments are based on, or influenced by, a similar alarmist representation of environmental migration.

Ultimately, the international security collective norm entrepreneur is likely to play the greatest role in defining possible solutions to environmental migration. Research and advocacy may continue to focus on other arguments, and these arguments might inflect policies, but the humanitarian, forced migration, and environmental arguments will not, on their own, define the global governance of environmental migration: they will remain subordinated to logics of fears and to their capacity to relate to the dominant discourse.

Conclusion

Wendt warned that, "if anything, structural change should be quite difficult."[125] Four normative enterprises competing on the same conceptual field do not make things any easier. If *some* change is certainly happening,[126] it is unlikely that the fundamental limits to the governance of humanitarian assistance, forced migration, or environmental sustainability will change as a result of the debate on environmental migration. In a world where migration is increasingly perceived as a threat to national security rather than an incredible opportunity for development and transcultural intercourse, the cold analysis initiated in this article suggests that the security argument for the "management" of environmental migration is most likely to succeed. With the aid of scholars, the advocates of humanitarian assistance, forced migration and environmental sustainability should reframe their argument in a language compatible with the security discourse, perhaps through concepts such as "human security" or, more convincingly, "global interdependence."

Acknowledgment

Notes

1. See, e.g., Frank Biermann and Ingrid Boas, "Protecting Climate Refugees: The Case for a Global Protocol," *Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development* 50 (2008): 8; Bonnie Docherty and Tyler Giannini, "Confronting a Rising Tide: A Proposal for a Convention on Climate Change Refugees," *Harvard Environmental Law Review* 33 (2009): 349; Emma Brindal, "Asia Pacific: Justice for Climate Refugees," *Alberta Law Review* 32 (2007): 240; Angela Williams, "Turning the Tide: Recognizing Climate Change Refugees in International Law," *Law & Policy* 30 (2008): 502; Derek R. Bell, "Environmental Refugees: What Rights? Which Duties?," *Res Publica* 10 (2004): 135; Norman Myers, "Environmental Refugees: A Growing Phenomenon of the 21st Century," *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society: Biological Sciences* 357 (2002): 609; Myers, "Environmental Refugees in a Globally Warmed World," *BioScience* 43 (1993): 752; Laura Westra, *Environmental Justice and the Rights of Ecological Refugees* (London: Earthscan, 2009); Christel Cournil, "The Protection of 'Environmental Refugees' in International Law," in *Migration and Climate Change*, ed. Etienne Piguet, Antoine Pécoud, and Paul de Guchteneire (Paris: UNESCO, 2011), 359; Harry Wijnberg and Stuart M. Leiderman, "The Toledo Initiative on Environmental Refugees and Ecological Restoration" (2004), http://www.reseau-terra.eu/IMG/doc/Toledo_Initiative.doc.

2. E.g., CARE, Equity BD, Christian Aid, Bread for the World, World Council of Churches, etc.

3. See, for example, Essame El-Hinnawi, *Environmental Refugees* (Nairobi: United Nations Environmental Program, 1985); "Climate Change and Its Possible Security Implications: Report of the Secretary-General," U.N. Doc. A/64/350 (2009); IOM, UNHCR, UNU, Norwegian Refugee Council, Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, *Climate Change, Migration, and Displacement: Impacts, Vulnerability, and Adaptation Options*, submission to the AWG-LCA 5 (2009); Antonio Guterres, *Climate Change, Natural Disasters and Human Displacement: A UNHCR Perspective* (Geneva: UNHCR, 2009); IOM, *Environment, Climate Change and Migration: IOM's Approach and Activities* (Geneva: IOM, 2011); IOM, *Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change Adaptation in IOM's Response to Environmental Migration* (Geneva: IOM, 2011); IOM, *Climate Change, Environmental Degradation and Migration: Addressing Vulnerabilities and Harnessing Opportunities* (Geneva: IOM, 2009); Asian Development Bank, *Facing the Challenge of Environmental Migration in Asia and the Pacific* (Manila: ADB, 2011); *Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants*, U.N. Doc. A/67/299 (2012).

4. Many states considered as affected by climate migration have been vocal in calling for international responses. More recently, some critical states have come to the fore, pleading for an international action. See, in particular, on the Nansen Initiative, Walter Kälin, "From the Nansen Principles to the Nansen Initiative," *Forced Migration* 41 (2012): 48.

5. This saying is often attributed to Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, although I could not find the original source.

6. Jeffrey T. Checkel, "The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory," *World Politics* 50 (1998): 325.

7. See Jacques Derrida, *De la Grammatologie* (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1967). See also Maja Zehfuss, *Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 196; Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Emanuel Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics," *European Journal of International Relations* 3 (1997): 133.

8. See Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization* 52 (1998): 916; Cass R. Sunstein, "Social Norms and Social Roles," *Columbia Law Review* 96 (1996): 903; Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

9. Ian Johnstone, "The Secretary-General as Norm Entrepreneur," in *Secretary or General: The UN Secretary-General in World Politics*, ed. Simon Chesterman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 127–8.

10. Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics," 896.

11. Ibid., 898. Similarly, Koh distinguishes between *interaction, interpretation*, and *internalization*. See Harold Hongju Koh, "Why Do Nations Obey International Law?," *Yale Law Journal* 106 (1997): 2659. Johnstone similarly identifies three stages, respectively, marked by *norm creation, institutionalization*, and *interpretation*. Johnstone, "Secretary-General," 127–9.

12. Ibid., 126.

13. Ibid.

14. Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics," 899.

15. See, e.g., Margaret E. Keck, *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).

16. See, e.g., Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004).

17. See, e.g., Annika Björkdahl, "Norm Advocacy: A Small State Strategy to Influence the EU," *Journal of European Public Policy* 15 (2008): 135.

18. Respectively: ibid. (state); Michelle Pace, "Norm Shifting from EMP to ENP: The EU as a Norm Entrepreneur in the South?," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 20 (2007): 659 (EU); Barnett and Finnemore, *Rules for the World*, 17 (international organization).

19. Their project is more far-reaching and aims at replacing arguments at the core of the analysis of international relations. Crawford submits that "an understanding of the world politics that minimizes the role of talk and argument has been deeply misleading and at the same time it serves the interests of those who do not want to have to defend, with arguments, their views and the arrangement of power they favor." Neta C. Crawford, "Homo Politicus and Argument (Nearly) All the Way Down: Persuasion in Politics," *Perspectives on Politics* 7 (2009): 120. The project is thus one of *opening* an explicit and perhaps transformative dialogue on the creation of norms.

20. Thomas Risse, "Global Governance and Communicative Action," *Government and Opposition* 29 (2004): 288. On the origin of the "logical of appropriateness," see James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, "The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders," *International Organization* 52 (1998): 951.

21. Neta C. Crawford, *Argument and Change in World Politics: Ethics, Decolonization, and Humanitarian Intervention* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 14.

22. Crawford, "Homo Politicus," 106 (emphasis omitted).

23. See Simone Chambers, *Reasonable Democracy: Jürgen Habermas and the Politics of Discourse* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 155.

24. Thomas Risse, "'Let's Argue!': Communicative Action in World Politics," *International Organization* 54 (2000): 8–9.

25. Crawford, "Homo Politicus," 107 (emphasis in original).

26. Anthony Leiserowitz, "Climate Change Risk Perception and Policy Preferences: The Role of Affect, Imagery, and Values," *Climatic Change* 77 (2006): 47–8.

27. Seymour Epstein, "Integration of the Cognitive and the Psychodynamic Unconscious," *American Psychologist* 49 (1994): 711.

28. Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics," 916. See also Neta C. Crawford, "The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships," *International Security* 24 (2000): 116.

29. Crawford, "Homo Politicus," 107.

30. Ibid., 105.

31. Ibid., 106.

32. Ibid., 106–7.

33. Ibid., 106.

34. Ibid., 110. See also Risse, "'Let's Argue!'" 12, 14.

35. Crawford, "Homo Politicus," 110.

36. Ibid.

37. Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics," 906.

38. Ibid., 907.

39. Crawford, "Homo Politicus," 118.

40. Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics," 907, and references cited.

41. Risse, "'Let's Argue!'" 33.

42. Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics," 899, 900.

43. François Gemenne, "How They Became the Human Face of Climate Change: Research and Policy Interactions in the Birth of the 'Environmental Migration' Concept," in Piguet, Pécoud, and de Guchteneire, *Migration and Climate Change*, 225; James Morrissey, *Environmental Change and Forced Migration: A State of the Art Review* (Oxford: Refugee Studies Center, Oxford Department of International Development, 2009); Cord Jakobeit and Chris Methmann, "'Climate Refugees' as Dawning Catastrophe? A Critique of the Dominant Quest for Numbers," in *Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict*, ed. Jürgen Scheffran, Michael Brzoska, Hans Günter Brauch, Peter Michael Link, and Janpeter Schilling (Heidelberg: Springer, 2012) 301.

44. Jodi L. Jacobson, *Environmental Refugees: A Yardstick of Habitability* (Washington, DC: Worldwatch Institute, 1988); El-Hinnawi, *Environmental Refugees*; Myers, "Environmental Refugees"; Diane C. Bates, "Environmental Refugees? Classifying Human Migrations Caused by Environmental Change," *Population & Environment* 23 (2002): 465; Christian Aid, *Human Tide: The Real Migration Crisis* (London: Christian Aid, 2007); Biermann and Boas, "Protecting Climate Refugees"; WBGU, *Climate Change as a Security Risk* (Berlin: German Advisory Council on Global Change / Earthscan, 2008); Gregory S. McCue, "Environmental Refugees: Applying International Environmental Law to Involuntary Migration," *Georgetown International Environmental Law Review* 6 (1993): 151.

45. Foresight, *Migration and Global Environmental Change: Final Project Report* (London: Government Office for Science, UK, 2011), 9; Gaim Kibreab, "Migration, Environment and Refugeehood," in *Environment and Population Change*, ed. B. Zaba and J. Clarke (Liège, Belgium: International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, 1994), 115; Kibreab, "Environmental Causes and Impact of Refugee Movements: A Critique of the Current Debate," *Disasters* 21 (1997): 20; Richard Black, *Refugees, Environment and Development* (Harlow, UK: Longman, 1998); Black, "Environmental Refugees: Myth or Reality?," UNHCR Working Paper on New Issues in Refugee Research no. 34 (Geneva: UNHCR, 2001); Richard Black, Dominic Kniveton, Ronald Skeldon, Daniel Coppard, Akira Murata, and Kerstin Schmidt-Verkerk, "Demographics and Climate Change: Future Trends and Their Policy Implications for Migration," Migration DRC Working Paper T-27 (Brighton, UK: University of Sussex, 2008); Astri Suhrke and A. Visenting, "The Environmental Refugee: A New Approach," *Ecodecision* 2 (1991): 73; Astri Suhrke, "Environmental Degradation and Population Flows," *Journal of International Affairs* 47 (1994): 473; Stephen Castles, "Environmental Change and Forced Migration: Making Sense of the Debate," UNHCR Working Paper on New Issues in Refugee Research no. 70 (Geneva: UNHCR, 2002); Graeme Hugo, *Migration, Development and Environment* (Geneva: IOM, 2008); Hugo, "Future Demographic Change and Its

Interactions with Migration and Climate Change," *Global Environmental Change* 21 (2011): S21.

46. See Carol Farbotko and Heather Lazrus, "The First Climate Refugees? Contesting Global Narratives of Climate Change in Tuvalu," *Global Environmental Change* 22 (2012): 382; Benoit Mayer, "Constructing Climate Migration as a Global Governance Issue: Essential Flaws in the Contemporary Literature," *McGill Journal of Sustainable Development Law and Policy* 9 (2013): 87. For some of the most authoritative empirical studies, see, e.g., Foresight, *Migration and Global Environmental Change*; EACH-FOR, *Synthesis Report* (EACH-FOR, 2009); United Nations University, *Where the Rain Falls: Global Policy Report* (Bonn: UNU, 2012).

47. See, e.g., Gemenne, "How They Became the Human Face," 44.

48. Chloe Vlassopoulou, "Institutional Barriers to the Recognition and Assistance of Environmentally Forced Migrants," in *Environment, Forced Migration and Social Vulnerability*, ed. Tamer Afifi and Jill Jäger (Berlin: Springer, 2010), 24.

49. United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 2007/2008: Fighting Climate Change; Human Solidarity in a Divided World* (New York: United Nations Development Programme, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

50. Asian Development Bank, *Addressing Climate Change and Migration in Asia and the Pacific* (Manila: ADB, 2012).

51. United Nations University, *Where the Rain Falls*; Christian Aid, *Human Tide*.

52. Pierre Minn, "Toward an Anthropology of Humanitarianism," *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance* 6 (2007), https://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/51

53. Environmental Justice Foundation, *A Nation under Threat* (London: EJF, 2012).

54. CNA Corporation, *National Security and the Threat of Climate Change* (Alexandria, VA: CNA, 2007); Jane's Information Group, "Hostile Environment: Climate Change and Resources Stress Threaten Global Stability," *Jane's Defence Weekly* 46, no. 16 (2009): 24.

55. UN Security Council, "Debate on the Impact of Climate Change," SC/9000 (New York: Department of Public Information, 2007). See also UN Secretary General, *Climate Change and Its Possible Security Implications: Report of the Secretary-General*, U.N. Doc. A/64/350 (2009).

56. D. Smith and J. Vivekananda, "A Climate of Conflict: The Links between Climate Change, Peace and War" (London: International Altert, 2007); Kurt M. Campbell, Jay Gulledge, J. R. McNeill, John Podesta, Peter Ogden, leon Fuerth, R. James Woolsey, Alexander T. J. lennon, Julianne Smith, Richard Weitz, and Derek Mix, *The Age of Consequences: The Foreign Policy and National Security Implications of Global Climate Change* (Washington: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2007); A. Dupont, "The Strategic Implications of Climate Change," *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy* 50, no. 3 (2008): 29; Jason D.

Söderblom, "Climate Change: National & Regional Security Threat Multiplier for Australia," *Security Solutions* 52 (2008): 58.

57. See, e.g., Benoit Mayer, Ingrid Boas, Jackson Ewing, Alice Baillat, and Uttam Kumar Das, "Governing Environmentally-Related Migration in Bangladesh: Responsibilities, Security, and the Causality Problem," *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal* 22 (2013): 177.

58. See, in particular, Betsy Hartmann, "Rethinking Climate Refugees and Climate Conflict: Rhetoric, Reality and the Politics of Policy Discourse," *Journal of International Development* 22 (2010): 233.

59. See Benoit Mayer, "Environmental Migration in the Asia-Pacific Region: Could We Hang Out Sometime?," *Asian Journal of International Law* 3 (2013): 101. See also Jane McAdam and Maryanne Loughry, "'We aren't refugees,'" *Inside Story: Current Affairs and Culture from Australia and Beyond* (30 June 2009), http://inside.org.au/we-arent-refugees/.

60. See Fanny Florémont, "Migratory Issues in Climate Adaptation Policies: A New Conceptualisation of Population Displacements?," *Foreign Development Studies* 39 (2012): 31 (showing that the politicisation of environmental migration in Mali is mostly donor driven: internal migrants are not influential in promoting norms for their own benefit).

61. Crawford, "Homo Politicus," 118.

62. See, for instance, Foresight, *Migration and Global Environmental Change*.

63. Foresight, *Migration and Global Environmental Change: Final Project Report*, 9.

64. Chimni recalls rightly that "Forced Migration Studies always seeks to signify the Other." See B.S. Chimni, "The Birth of a 'Discipline': From Refugee to Forced Migration Studies," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 22 (2009): 20.

65. On the role of identity-building in constructivist theories, see Wendt, *Social Theory,* 140.

66. David Strömberg, "Natural Disasters, Economic Development, and Humanitarian Aid," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 21 (2007): 221.

67. Jock Stirrat, "Competitive Humanitarianism: Relief and the Tsunami in Sri Lanka," *Anthropology Today* 22 (2006): 13.

68. Claire Christine Cooper, "The House as Symbol of Self," in *Designing for Human Behavior: Architecture and the Behavioral Sciences*, ed. Jon T. Lang (Stroudsburg, PA: Dowden, Hutchinson & Ross, 1974), 130. See also Kenneth O. Doyle, "The Symbolic Meaning of House and Home: An Exploration in the Psychology of Goods," *American Behavioral Scientist* 35 (1992): 790; Kenny Chow and Mick Healey, "Place Attachment and Place Identity: First-Year Undergraduates Making the Transition from Home to University," *Journal of Environmental Psychology* 28 (2008): 362; Richard C. Stedman, "Toward a Social Psychology of Place Predicting Behavior from Place-Based Cognitions, Attitude, and Identity," *Environment and Behavior* 34 (2002): 561; Mindy Thompson Fullilove, "Psychiatric Implications

of Displacement: Contributions from the Psychology of Place," *American Journal of Psychiatry* 153 (1996): 1516.

69. See, in particular, Khalid Koser, "Climate Change and Internal Displacement: Challenges to the Normative Framework," in Piguet, Pécoud, and de Guchteneire, *Migration and Climate Change*, 289.

70. White House, "President Meets with Representatives from National Voluntary Organizations," cited in François Gemenne, "What's in a Name: Social Vulnerabilities and the Refugee Controversy in the Wake of Hurricane Katrina," in Afifi and Jäger, *Environment, Forced Migration and Social Vulnerability*, 37.

71. For an example of a responsibility narrative on non-climate-related environmental migration, see Gil Marvel Tabucanon and Brian Opeskin, "The Resettlement of Nauruans in Australia: An Early Case of Failed Environmental Migration," *Journal of Pacific History* 46 (2011): 337.

72. Biermann and Boas, "Protecting Climate Refugees," 61.

73. Jodi L. Jacobson, "Environmental Refugees: A Yardstick of Habitability," *Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society* 8 (1988): 257.

74. See, e.g., Farbotko and Lazrus, "The First Climate Refugees?," 385.

75. Bolivia (submission received 26 April 2010), in *Additional Views on Which the Chair May Draw in Preparing Text to Facilitate Negotiations among Parties: Submission from Parties*, 30 April 2012, UNFCCC Doc. FCCC/AWGLCA/2010/MISC.2, 17.

76. Giovanni Bettini, "Climate Barbarians at the Gate? A Critique of Apocalyptic Narratives on 'Climate Refugees,'" *Geoforum* 45 (2013): 63.

77. "Environmental refugees" are often pictured as dark-skinned aliens. On the latency of xenophobia in our perception of migration, see Andrew Baldwin, "Racialisation and the Figure of the Climate-Change Migrant," *Environment and Planning: Part A* 45 (2013): 1474.

78. Betsy Hartmann, "From Climate Refugees to Climate Conflict: Who Is Taking the Heat for Global Warming?," in *Climate Change and Sustainable Development: New Challenges for Poverty Reduction*, ed. M. Salih (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2009), 143.

79. On the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic barriers, see Crawford, "Homo Politicus," 118.

80. Didier Fassin, *Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), 1.

81. See, e.g., ibid.

82. Ibid., 254.

83. David Rieff, *A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003), 70, cited in Minn, "Toward an Anthropology of Humanitarianism."

84. Ibid., 96.

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Temporary Measures: Canadian Refugee Policy and Environmental Migration

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Abstract

In 2010, 42 million people worldwide were displaced from their homes as the result of environmental factors. These "environmental migrants" lack international recognition and have no recourse to the protections of the international refugee regime. Given Canada's history of international refugee resettlement, this paper examines Canada's past and potential response to environmental migrants. Evidence reveals that the Canadian government relies on ad hoc, temporary measures, and that clear, long-term policy measures for issues surrounding forced migration due to environmental events are unlikely. The implications of this outcome are discussed, providing observations and lessons for researchers and advocates of migration rights.

Résumé

En 2010, 42 millions de personnes à travers le monde on été déplacées pour des causes environnementales. Ces « migrants environnementaux » ne sont pas reconnus sur le plan international et n'ont donc pas de recours possible en vertu du régime international des réfugiés. Compte tenu de l'histoire canadienne en matière de réinstallation de réfugiés au niveau international, cet article examine les réactions canadiennes passées et futures à la migration environnementale. Les données montrent que le gouvernement canadien se fie sur des mesures temporaires, ad hoc, et qu'il est peu probable qu'il mette en place des mesures et des politiques à long terme répondant aux problèmes liés à la migration environnementale forcée. On y discute des implications de ces résultats, tout en offrant des

observations et des conclusions pouvant intéresser les chercheurs et les avocats en droit de la migration.

> *Tens of thousands of mostly poor people have died. Tens of millions have been temporarily or permanently displaced … We must, above all, shift from a culture of reaction to a culture of prevention.*
> —*Kofi Annan*1

Introduction

Each year, humanitarian crises worldwide displace millions of people from places that once provided them with shelter, livelihood, and a sense of community. With little time to plan and few available resources, affected individuals and families, even entire villages, must move in response to the deterioration of their natural environment and at times cross international boundaries into neighbouring countries to seek safety. Described as a global phenomenon, "environmental migration" has the potential to affect a significant number of individuals.[2] While the effects are far-reaching, certain regions are especially vulnerable to environmentally induced population displacement. Factors such as a high population density, combined with a drought- or flood-prone climate, or proximity to a geographic risk factor such as an active fault line increase the risk of environmental displacement. Areas especially at risk for large-scale environmental migration are the Himalayan region, which may face severe water shortages due to glacial retreat, Pacific island states, and the drylands of Central America where considerable vulnerability to both drought and severe weather in the form of hurricanes exists. The Nile, Ganges, and Mekong River delta regions are also particularly at risk for major flooding, e.g., the flooding of large sections of Bangladesh

that displaced thousands during the 2010 monsoon season. In addition, the Sahel and Great Lakes regions of Africa are particularly at risk and have experienced acute and gradual environmental declines leading to migrations as a result of droughts and intensive land degradation.[3] In 2010, an estimated 42 million people were displaced from their homes as the result of immediate and long-term changes in the physical environment[4]—a figure that is roughly equal to the number of people displaced by war and persecution during the same period.[5] By the year 2050, the total estimated number of people likely to be displaced by changes in the biophysical environment is expected to reach 200 million, with some research indicating that the total number could be as high as 700 million.[6]

Multiple terms have been used to describe groups of individuals that are forced to move or choose to move in response to changes in their physical environment. Examples of terms used include *environmental migrant, environmental refugees,* and *environmentally displaced people.* Convention refugees, as defined by the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, are displaced persons who are offered a measure of protection by the international refugee regime. If, however, the cause of their displacement is due to an advancing drought, natural disaster, land loss, degradation, or other environmentally related factors, migrants may find that no guarantees of protection exist and they may be faced with the possibility of returning to a country they had once fled to confront a very uncertain future. In the long term, the indirect effects of climatic change are expected to increasingly influence human migration.[7]

In this paper we use the term *environmental migrant* to describe individuals or communities of people that must move or choose to move from a location as the result of changes in their biophysical environment. Migration resulting from immediate changes to the biophysical environment due to an acute event such as a natural disaster, or from long-term changes that cannot be directly rectified or mitigated by policy interventions are circumstances that would be classified as "environmental migration" in this context. This understanding of *environmental migrant* does not eliminate other intervening variables as causal explanations for migration. However, this paper suggests that migration caused by a clear shift in an individual's or communities' biophysical environment (for example, access to land for housing is removed, the quality of soil is irrevocably harmed or ability to produce food is eliminated, or access to necessary resources for survival like clean water are permanently disrupted) warrants the classification of *environmental migration*. This understanding conforms to the definition of environmental migrant advocated by the

International Organization for Migration and elaborated below.

Given this context, this paper examines how and if national governments, particularly ones that are high immigrant- and refugee-receiving countries, are responding to environmental migrant populations. Owing to Canada's historical role in international debates and policy development concerning migrants and refugees, and its legacy and reputation as a high immigrant- and refugee-receiving country, this paper asks two questions: How has Canada responded to forced migration and environmental migration events? And what does this experience teach us about the prospects for future responses to environmental migration?

Historically and in the very recent past, Canada has responded to incidences of forced migration with policy directives that have facilitated migration to Canada, provided status to migrants already in the country, expedited immigration processing, and provided other benefits to displaced persons if they have fallen within certain defined categories. Temporary and ad hoc, these policy directives allow policy-makers and the national government to make decisions on a case-by-case basis and to be flexible in the face of incidences of forced migration. This approach also has its drawbacks, however, and at times the result has been piecemeal policy development that amounts to a "wait and see" approach to the issue of forced migration. The few policy measures that are currently in place in Canada are not comprehensive and leave important decisions regarding the processing of individuals affected by disasters up to the discretion of individual immigration officers.[8] For example, Canada contributed to the relief effort in Haiti following the 2010 earthquake. The government issued policy directives after the earthquake as a temporary way of facilitating Haitian migration to Canada. These directives, a result of a natural disaster, were developed directly and solely in response to the event in Haiti and were not part of a broader policy or strategy relating to environmental migration generally. Does Canada's response to the earthquake in Haiti illustrate its present and future policy to environmental migration? Or will this event, other potential natural disasters, or expected migration due to environmental change lead Canada to develop a clearer policy and position on its response to and treatment of environmental migrants?

Using the events in Haiti, this paper argues that temporary, ad hoc policy directives will likely remain the principal response to environmental migration by Canada in the future. The immigration policy directives issued following the Haitian earthquake demonstrate the current state of environmental migration policy in Canada, which, arguably, is based on ad hoc, temporary measures, as opposed to a stable long-term approach. While it can be argued that this

approach allows for flexibility and a considered response to global migration needs on a case-by-case basis, it does not provide any clear national or global indication of how and if Canada will respond to future events of environmental migration. The absence of a position or policy provides no assurance to environmental migrant or refugee advocates about how the government will respond to future incidences of displacement, provides little guidance to individual immigration and refugee officers, leaving them to make decisions about admittance to Canada based on temporary, ad hoc policies, and priorities, and will do little or nothing to assist the international community in its future response and protection of environmental migrants.

This paper continues by first discussing environmental migration and its general relationship to refugee policy, including Canadian refugee policy. The paper then examines the response to the 2010 Haitian earthquake, which illustrates why Canada has addressed and likely will continue to address environmentally caused migration on a case-by-case basis.

Environmental Migration: The Conceptual Challenge

Considerable effort has been devoted to developing a definition of environmental migration that can gain international recognition and encompass the range of environmentally induced circumstances that lead to forced migration. Prominent international organizations such as the International Organization for Migration and the United Nations University (UNU) have voiced their support for granting international recognition to environmental migrants. UNU-Environment and Human Security Director Janos Bogardi has stated, "There are well-founded fears that the number of people fleeing untenable environmental conditions may grow exponentially as the world experiences the effects of climate change and other phenomena … this new category of 'refugee' needs to find a place in international agreements. We need to better anticipate support requirements, similar to those of people fleeing other unviable situations."[9] Borgardi's statement falls short of calling for the sort of recognition granted to convention refugees; however, it does underscore the international community's inability to find a place for environmental migrants within the existing protection framework for displaced persons. On its own, the international recognition of environmental migrants does not directly address the consequences of environmental migration; however, it is viewed as a useful policy objective for its ability to support other policy initiatives. Often international aid is directed to issues that have the backing of a constituency that can exert political pressure.[10] Accordingly, international recognition

of environmental migrants could be an important step towards developing an environmental migrant constituency that could direct resources and institutional support towards their particular needs.

United Nations Environment Programme researcher Essam El-Hinnawi is often credited with first attributing the term *environmental refugee* to individuals who have been displaced as a result of environmental causes. In 1985, El-Hinnawi described environmental refugees as "those people who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of a marked environmental disruption (natural and/or triggered by people) that jeopardized their existence and/or seriously affected the quality of their life. By 'environmental disruption' in this definition is meant any physical, chemical, and/or biological changes in the ecosystem (or resource base) that renders it, temporarily or permanently, unsuitable to support human life."[11] The term *environmental refugee* has since become popularized, perhaps as a result of the term's ability to draw parallels between the more familiar circumstances of political refugees fleeing persecution and the plight of individuals displaced by some form of degradation to their natural environment. The term *environmental refugees* evokes images of people fleeing devastation due to a natural disaster or other environmental catastrophe, and it is perhaps for that reason that the term has gained currency in the media and the wider public consciousness. From a policy perspective, there is also a potential benefit to the notion of an environmental refugee. Associating migration induced by environmental or biophysical conditions with conventional refugees might allow environmental refugees to benefit from the same kinds of protections offered by the international refugee-protection regime already in place. However, in practice this has not occurred. Despite initial attempts to better define the concept of an environmental refugee, use of the term is contentious, and there remains no general agreement on how to classify people displaced as the result of changes in their environment. There are several reasons for this ambiguity.

First, the term *refugee* carries a legal designation established by the 1951 *Convention relating to the Status of Refugees*. A refugee under the provisions of the convention is defined as "a person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it."[12] The refugee convention makes

no mention of the environment as a possible factor inciting forced migration from an area of residence, thereby excluding environmental migrants.

Second, the refugee convention is concerned with addressing circumstances of forced or involuntary migration—circumstances in which people could not reasonably choose to stay within their country of origin. The degree of volition involved in an individual instance of migration due to environmental circumstances generally exists on a continuum that is often very subjective: at one end of the continuum, the migration is involuntary, e.g., displacement due to floods or earthquakes, while on the other end of the continuum, the decision to migrate could be voluntary, e.g., inhabitants determine that the biophysical conditions are too poor and difficult to permit a livelihood to be sustainable and therefore migrate. There have been several attempts to develop a classification that defines what constitutes voluntary environmental migration versus the involuntary variety; the work of Diane C. Bates is one example.[13] However, it has proven difficult to make clear distinctions between the two. Even in the event that it were possible to classify environmentally induced migration more clearly, any effort to classify people migrating in response to environmental conditions as "refugees" is still impeded by the wording of the refugee convention, which requires that a person claiming to be a refugee experiences a form of persecution.

Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the majority of those displaced due to environmental causes do not cross an international border; rather, they are displaced internally and remain within the confines of their own country and therefore would not be the focus of any policies or programs designed to assist convention refugees.[14]

The issues noted above represent a significant challenge to a stronger international protocol or national policy relating to environmental migration. The challenge is particularly high if there is a desire to include environmentally displaced people under the current international refugee protection regime. Still more disheartening for environmental migrant advocates is the possibility that the "environmental refugee" concept is having a paradoxical effect, as refugee-receiving countries are seeking to limit their obligations under the refugee convention in order to avoid responsibility for an anticipated "flood" of environmental refugees.[15] It seems that conflating environmental refugees with political refugees is blurring the already well-established line of who has the legal right to seek asylum, thus potentially threatening the asylum process of convention refugees instead of enlarging the refugee regime to include the environmentally displaced. In an effort to maintain the rights available to refugees under the current refugee protection regime and to develop a concept that is more encompassing of the

multifaceted character of environmental migration, a number of alternative terms have been suggested, each with its own strengths and weaknesses.

Among the terms that appear in the environmental migration literature are *ecomigrant,* which demonstrates the link between the economic and ecological factors that influence migration.[16] Another concept is *environmentally displaced person* (EDP), which is useful for its similarity to *internally displaced person* (IDP), a displaced-persons category that has gained a degree of recognition through international "soft law" such as the *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*.[17] Within contemporary writing, *environmental migrant* is a term that has also gained a high level of support. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) has adopted the term and has put forward the following definition: "Environmental migrants are persons or groups of persons who, for compelling reasons of sudden or progressive change in the environment that adversely affects their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad."[18] The IOM definition establishes that the environment can be a critical factor that influences an individual or group to migrate. The language used in the definition addresses acute, short-term displacement as well as chronic, long-term displacement and takes into account the internally displaced in addition to those displaced across international borders. Further, the *environmental migrant* concept, as it is defined by the IOM, accounts for the multivariate nature of environmental migration and allows for a range of environmental migration circumstances. It has been noted that the IOM definition is limited by its omission of language that distinguishes between voluntary and forced migration; it also does not identify which state or non-state institution is responsible for the persons displaced.[19] However, it would be difficult for any definition to completely account for the myriad circumstances that constitute environmental migration.

In this paper, we accept that the term *environmental migrant* has the strongest and best utility globally. It encompasses immediate and prolonged changes in biophysical conditions that cannot be rectified or mitigated with policy or program interventions. As explained in the introduction, this does not eliminate the role that other factors could play in motivating migration, but it does emphasize that within instances of environmental migration the primary factor is an immediate or long-term pronounced change in the biophysical environment that renders the capability to maintain a sustainable livelihood impossible or extremely difficult.

Researchers involved in the study of environmental migration argue that some form of international recognition of environmental migrants is an essential policy objective that must be met in order to gain wider support from the international community.[20] Nevertheless, international recognition is only one aspect of a larger effort to address environmental migration. Ultimately, if a concept is to gain global acceptance in the international system, acceptance and support in nation-states are first required. Hence, the paper continues by considering examples of state-level policy initiatives that have been put in place to manage environmental migration in the absence of formal international recognition. For the purposes of this paper, various terms may be used interchangeably to refer to environmental migrants; however, the definition provided by the IOM should serve as the point of reference for all subsequent discussion.

Canadian Immigration and Refugee Policy and Environmental Migration

The causes of environmental migration are varied and interconnected. Consequently, occurrences of environmental migration present policy-makers with a set of challenges that span a wide array of policy areas. Policy-makers given the task of addressing incidents where populations have been displaced by natural events have several issues to consider. First, the decision of an individual to migrate in times of environmental change or disaster is usually based on a complex set of factors that often have as much to do with a potential destination offering greater opportunity for a livelihood as with the risk associated with staying in an environmentally degraded area. This is because the political, social, and economic environment in which migrants find themselves is often just as influential as the state of the natural environment.[21] Second, policy relating to environmental migration does not just respond to an immediate event, but also has to address the likelihood of future events that could lead to forced migration. It should come as no surprise, then, that environmental migration gives rise to a broad set of policies found in areas as diverse as natural resource management, international development, environmental protection, economic development, and national security.[22] However, it is not the aim of this paper to review the range of policies relating to the issue of environmental migration; rather, the discussion will centre on Canadian immigration and refugee policy as it relates to forced migration and environmental migration.

In the following sections, this paper first provides a general overview of migration and refugee policy in Canada. This paper then considers the case of the 2010 Haitian earthquake—a clear example of an environmental migration event. Together, these historic and recent events provide evidence to support the argument that temporary measures towards environmental migrants are likely to remain the standard practice.

Canadian Refugee Policy: Historical Precedents

Canadian immigration policy has prioritized international migration that best contributes to the country's economic growth. Be it settling the sparsely populated Canadian West for the purpose of agriculture during the nineteenth century, or the recent focus on attracting highly skilled immigrants and temporary foreign workers, Canada's tendency to relax admission requirements and allow large influxes of migrants usually occurs in conjunction with some form of economic imperative. Despite the overarching economic motivations associated with Canadian migration policy, immigration based on humanitarian factors has also played a significant role in the evolution of Canada's immigration system.

Canada's polices concerning refugee admissions were generally developed and implemented ad hoc until the country formally committed to the refugee convention in 1969. This step began the transition towards a formal process of granting protection to asylum seekers. However, there still exist large categories of displaced persons, e.g., environmental migrants or internally displaced persons, who are not covered under the formal refugee process. Furthermore, the Canadian government has taken steps to restrict the inflow of refugees under certain categories, with the stated reason being an effort to reduce the number of fraudulent asylum claims. For example, a provision of the recently enacted bill C-31, the Protecting Canada's Immigration System Act, establishes designated countries of origin (DCO). A DCO is deemed a country that does not normally produce refugees. Refugee claimants originating from DCOs are prohibited from applying for work permits and are denied health-care services under the Interim Federal Health Program (IFHP). In addition, while standard refugee claimants have 60 days to prepare their claims, DCO claimants must be prepared to present their claim within 30 days of their initial request for asylum.[23] The expedited refugee process is intended to dissuade fraudulent claims, yet critics of Bill C-31 claim that the latest reforms to the Canadian refugee system deny rights to vulnerable refugee claimants.[24] Given this context, how does the Canadian government respond at times when migrants are not persecuted but are displaced as the result of environmental events?

Special Measures: The Canadian Response to the 2010 Haitian Earthquake

The January 2010 earthquake, which struck near the Haitian capital city of Port-au-Prince, caused widespread

destruction and thousands of deaths. It was a natural event made considerably worse by the economic and political instabilities of Haiti's recent past. High poverty, poor construction standards, an underdeveloped infrastructure, and a general lack of public services turned an earthquake of major proportions into a tragedy of catastrophic scale. To illustrate this point, the 1989 San Francisco earthquake that registered a magnitude of 7.0 on the Richter scale was equal in strength to the Haitian earthquake, yet the San Francisco earthquake caused 63 casualties, a fraction of the tens of thousands of lives lost in Haiti.[25] While differences in natural risk factors explain some of the disparity between the casualty statistics of the Haitian and San Francisco earthquakes, the role that Haiti's political institutions, social conditions, and limited economic resources played in exacerbating the environmental catastrophe of 2010 are significant.

Despite the contributing factors, the displacement caused by the earthquake conforms to the definition of environmental migration. Norman Myers, an environmental migration researcher, notes that several decades of environmental and political mismanagement in Haiti have led to a situation where the majority of the Haitian population seeking asylum in other countries are doing so for environmentally related reasons, as opposed to the many who sought asylum from the persecution of authoritarian government during previous times in Haiti's turbulent history.[26]

In the aftermath of the earthquake, the Canadian government mounted a humanitarian response to the crisis. In addition to the financial and material resources provided by the Canadian government to assist with relief and reconstruction, Canadian migration policies played an important role in addressing the problems caused by disorganized environmental migration in Haiti. The Department of Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) implemented several policies that facilitated the efforts of Haitian nationals who were seeking to enter or remain in Canada. The implementation of those policies was accomplished largely using operational bulletins, which CIC uses "in exceptional circumstances" to issue "one-time-only instructions or to provide urgent instructions to staff for a brief period."[27]

Prior to the earthquake in Haiti, Operational Bulletin (OB) 83, "Guidelines for Priority Processing in the Event of Disaster Situations," was issued in 2008. The operational bulletin advises visa offices to use the discretionary powers granted to them by the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act to prioritize and expedite applications for permanent or temporary residence in Canada from countries affected by a natural disaster. OB 83 is a general operational directive. In effect, it is a reminder to visa offices that they possess the latitude necessary to respond to disasters

in a "humane and expeditious manner."[28] CIC clearly states that OB 83 is not a special program, nor priority processing, and it is the applicants' responsibility to demonstrate to the visa officer that they or their family members have been adversely affected by the disaster. In practice, OB 83 has not facilitated the migration of a significant number of displaced persons, since the responsibility of demonstrating the hardship caused by the disaster is placed on the affected individual, which may prove to be a significant barrier to entry into Canada, depending on the extent to which that person's life has been disrupted by the disaster. Moreover, beyond imprecise recommendations to exercise their delegated discretion, the bulletin provides minimal guidance to immigration officers making decisions on applications for permanent residency from individuals displaced by an environmental disaster. The outcome is a potential for a lack of consistency, as immigration offices and officers can interpret the merits of a natural disaster and its impact on applicants differently.

Following the Haitian earthquake, an additional operational bulletin was implemented to address the humanitarian crisis: OB 179, "Special Measures in Response to the Earthquake in Haiti." OB 179 instructed CIC officers to deliver immigration services to Haitian nationals that they might otherwise be ineligible to receive. In order to expedite the immigration process for Haitians seeking permanent residence in Canada, the special measures authorized the creation of the Ottawa Haiti Processing Office, which focused solely on processing immigration applications from Haiti. In addition, priority processing, fee exemptions, interim federal health coverage, as well as work and study permits were granted to selected Haitians seeking permanent residence. Further, a portion of the special measures addressed the ongoing adoption applications of Haitian orphans. The special program known as Operation Stork expedited the adoptions of Haitian orphans and evacuated several hundred Haitian children in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake.[29]

Policies intended to address the needs of Haitians already living in Canada were also a part of the Canadian government's response strategy. One such policy, the Temporary Suspension of Removals (TSR), suspended the deportations of Haitians who would otherwise be ineligible to remain in Canada. Unlike refugee status, which is granted on an individual basis according to the particular circumstance of the refugee claimant, TSR is a blanket protection available, with exception, to all nationals, from the designated country.

Predominantly clustered in the French-speaking city of Montreal, a significant Haitian diaspora community resides in Canada. The Canadian governor general at the time of the earthquake, Michaëlle Jean, herself a former refugee from

Haiti, was very involved in bringing attention to the situation in Haiti after the earthquake. These factors may explain the Canadian government's willingness to use immigration and refugee policy to implement a significant humanitarian response to the disaster in Haiti, providing protection to thousands of displaced Haitians. Nevertheless, the temporary and ad hoc nature of the immigration programs put in place should cause some concern amongst advocates for displaced persons and environmental migrants.

Gaps in protection and vulnerabilities may develop as a result of the implementation of temporary, ad hoc directives. For example, representatives from organizations that work directly with refugees in Canada identified TSRs as an area of concern to a Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration in 2006. The committee participants noted that, while protected from immediate removal, displaced persons residing in Canada as a result of the TSR program are unable to become permanent residents, sponsor family members, and go on with their lives; they often work in low-paying jobs and are limited in their access to health services and education.[30] As a result, the benefits of temporary residency protection in the case of Haitians or any other future group affected by a natural disaster is low. Lacking the legal protections of convention refugees, environmental migrants with temporary forms of status may find that they receive protection from one context of vulnerability (the environmental disaster) only to find themselves confined to another (temporary residency with no clear timeframe and few services of support).

Special measures provide governments with the ability to offer protection to individuals who migrate internationally as the result of environmental events. The ad hoc nature and temporary duration of these policy instruments are appealing to governments, since special measures are adaptable policies that allow a government to prioritize humanitarian crises while keeping in mind other economic, security, and political considerations without being bound to a certain course of action by international law. However, those same characteristics have the potential to undermine the already precarious security of environmental migrants, as governments may use their discretion to select which disasters they respond to, on the basis of their affiliation with the affected country and its residents. Selecting migrants and accepting refugees in relation to "national affinity" is common. But in the midst of disasters where global support is needed, particularly from countries where immigration has been and is essential to a country like Canada, inconsistent, ad hoc, and temporary policy measures present serious concerns for a unified, global response to catastrophic events. For example, there was significant public debate regarding the discrepancy between Canada's robust humanitarian response following the Haitian disaster, and the relatively subdued response to large-scale flooding in Pakistan just a few months later.[31]

The Canadian government's response to humanitarian crises varies, yet one principle is consistent: at the time of unanticipated international events that cause mass displacement, the Canadian government has responded in an ad hoc manner. It has chosen to evaluate the events and develop a response in retrospect and often only after pressure has mounted on it to do so. For anyone hoping that the Canadian federal government might develop a clear and consistent policy position on the issue of displacement caused by environmental change, this legacy does not bode well. It also suggests that Canada is unlikely to take a lead in advancing a global position or protocol on environmental migration. Even though international bodies like the UNHCR or the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) can, and do, identify data and models suggesting the potential for increased human displacement from environmental change in the future, the problem remains that the Canadian government has a legacy of "waiting and seeing."

For better or worse, the "wait and see" policy approach has served national governments well, as each can align its migration and refugee policies and practices to its own preferences. In short, history suggests that even when the Canadian government has responded admirably to forced migration and refugee events in the eyes of international observers, it has still done so on a case-by-case basis.[32] For forced migration events that are the result of political upheaval or conflict, this type of policy response may be understood. However, natural disasters occur regularly, and extreme weather events pose an increased threat, particularly for nation-states that are low-lying and prone to flooding or sea-level rise.[33] The 2011 Foresight Report on migration and global environmental change notes that while no particular policy or set of policies can entirely mitigate the effects of migration due environmental change, polices that prepare for and respond to the effects of environmental migration can facilitate planned and coordinated movements while reinforcing the long-term resilience of communities and households.[34] Hence, a clear, consistent policy position on environmental migration would seem to have merit. More clarity and consistency would offer migration and refugee advocates clarity on the likely actions of the government in future events and help them develop contingencies necessary to respond and assist; it would better ensure consistent actions between Canadian immigration offices and officers when responding to environmental migration events and emergencies globally; and it would put Canada in the lead in international discussions and debates

surrounding environmental migration—debates that are surely going to become more important in response to the ongoing and increasing effects of climatic change.

Conclusion: The Future of Canadian Policy concerning Environmental Migration

The Canadian government's responses to international events causing forced migration has often been applauded internationally. These responses, however, have not come as a result of a long history of advanced planning and anticipatory policy, but almost always as temporary or "special measures." Special measures remain an important piece of Canada's overall migration policy. Special measures programs were implemented for refugee crises in Lebanon in 1979, Poland in 1980, El Salvador in 1981, Sri Lanka in 1983, China in 1989, Kosovo in 2000, Haiti in 2010, and most recently as a response to the catastrophe that followed Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines. Just like these past events, a similar confluence of international and domestic influences continues to play an important role in determining which refugee crises receive formal policy attention. It is notable, then, that not every major incidence of forced migration elicits a Canadian response. The lack of a significant Canadian response to humanitarian crises in Afghanistan and parts of sub-Saharan Africa are notable examples.

Although civil war, ethnic conflict, and environmental disasters have ravaged Afghanistan and several countries in central Africa and the eastern horn of Africa, Canada has not put in place clear migration policies to aid in the repeated refugee crises affecting these countries or regions. The Canadian government has repeatedly maintained that the solution to Africa's problems "can only be found in Africa, by Africans."[35] Perhaps political differences, foreign government influence, or some other form of bias may explain Canada's unwillingness to accept significant numbers of refugees from Afghanistan and African countries. For example, in 2011, the worst drought in 60 years, widespread famine, and persistent conflict displaced 200,000 Somalis into Kenya.[36] Unlike in the case of the earthquake in Haiti, however, the Canadian government did not create any temporary special measures to assist Somali refugees to receive expedited services or processing, despite being home to one of the highest concentrations of Somalis outside of Somalia in the world. Financial assistance was provided to help with food relief, but not to facilitate migration. No policies such as the Temporary Suspension of Removals that were used after the Haitian earthquake or special immigration measures were implemented as part of its humanitarian response to the crisis. Canada's policy regarding African refugees generally corresponds with the United Nations policy on refugee resettlement, which advocates for the use of third-country resettlement only as a last resort,[37] preferring instead the durable solutions of repatriation and local integration when responding to humanitarian crises.

A number of factors internal and external to Canada explain its response to incidences of forced migration. Internally, ethnic or cultural communities and their influence or role in Canadian society; domestic political and social advocacy, national and provincial political ideology and affinity for the international incident, and the traction of an incident in the media all seem significant factors driving national response. But as we have noted in relation to more recent global events, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, the weight that these internal factors have on the national response is not clear, but is certainly worthy of future investigation. For example, under what conditions is a national government susceptible to domestic pressure and advocacy? This question is also important when considering the external factors that drive the Canadian national response. Under what conditions, for example, will the Canadian government reach out to or engage in an organized international response to an incidence of environmental migration or widespread persecution? Is national pressure on Canada, vis-à-vis another nation-state, more powerful than pressure from the UNHCR? Again, future research that examines a number of cases may be able to unpack this question more fully. Ultimately, the factors that push, persuade, or provide incentives for the national government to respond to environmental and non-environmental incidents are wide ranging. But what does remain consistent in most cases is that responses to forced displacement in Canada are reactive. Returning to the primary focus of this paper, the question that remains to be answered is, what does the study of the Canadian response to international migration emergencies and displacements contribute to an understanding of the links between national immigration policy and environmental migration?

It is difficult to generalize; nonetheless, the preceding discussion reveals useful insights relevant to issues of environmental migration. First, the history of migration policy (whether related to environmental events or not) provides important lessons about national humanitarian responses to environmental migration. The causes and consequences of displacement are complex, requiring input from a wide range of policy areas; nevertheless, it seems clear that Canada and a majority of other Western countries believe that immigration policy has a seat at the table in debates regarding the appropriate response to forced migration—environmentally caused or otherwise. Be it refugees fleeing the violent oppression of a dictatorial government or Haitians seeking to rebuild their lives after an earthquake,

facilitating the efforts of people trying to escape dangerous circumstances ought to be a key part of the policy discussion.

Second, immigration policy is not static and does not exist in a vacuum. Every government will have its own agenda and priorities regarding humanitarian responses; they are, nonetheless, subject to a complex interplay of interests, both domestic and international. For example, despite Canada's significant level of involvement in the response to Haiti's environmental migrants in 2010, the relief efforts required the contributions of various international organizations and foreign governments, each with its own particular set of objectives, in addition to the resolve of the Haitian people themselves. Environmental migration is characterized by its interrelations with other social, political, security, and economic issues. The complexity and scale of environmental migration events requires that an effective response have the widespread support of the international community. In Canada, allied foreign governments and intergovernmental organizations (particularly the UNHCR) have been influential in determining the direction of Canada's migration policy. But their influence cannot be generalized, given the variation in Canadian response to various international events. The current level of support for environmental migrants is not dependent solely on the policy direction of any individual nation or external pressure. Major changes to current Canadian practices regarding environmental migration will likely occur only if a significant number of like-minded countries within the international community deem it necessary. But as the example of Canada's withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol reveals, national interests do not always follow international norms. Each government is different and weighs the value of international engagement and cooperation differently, and usually on a case-by-case basis. Hence, Canadian policy-makers and the Canadian government must consider whether they wish to lead or follow international action on the issue of environmental migration. In 2012, for example, Norway and Switzerland announced their intent to formally create a global office and initiative to respond to environmental refugees. Named after the first UN high commissioner of refugees, Fridtjof Nansen, the Nansen Initiative "aims to address the legal and protection gap for people displaced across borders owing to environmental change and extreme weather events."[38]

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Canadian immigration policy offers interesting lessons regarding the future direction of environmental migration policy. In the short term, it is likely that governments will continue to respond to incidences of environmental migration using reactive, ad hoc, and temporary measures. The history of refugee policy in Canada demonstrates that special measures and ad hoc responses are the norm, while the formal protections offered to refugees as defined by the refugee convention are an exception to this standard practice. The international refugee regime was borne out of the particular circumstances of forced migration that arose during and after the Second World War. Environmental migration has yet to have an analogous impact on Western nations, and while there are promising signs that the international community is willing to talk more openly about the need to respond to the issue, without a comparable level of disruption, it seems unlikely that a response of a similar magnitude will occur in the near future. Given that global levels of forced migration due to environmental change and incidents are expected to continue and increase, and that Canada will be expected to be an international partner and willing migrant-receiving nation, it would seem pragmatic, if not ethical, to be part of the global solution to ensure that reliability, consistency, and predictability are strong principles underlying a global response to environmental migration events. Hence, for Canada, the question remains whether the country will take a lead role in the global debate about future responses to environmental migration or whether it will be satisfied relying on temporary measures.

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Social Work and Environmentally Induced Displacement: A Commentary

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with contributions from Tiffany Sampson,
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Abstract

Environmentally induced displacement is a growing concern across the globe. The human and social dimensions of affected displaced and migrating populations are of concern to the profession of social work, as many social workers are directly involved in working with vulnerable populations affected by environmental changes due to climate change, disasters, and environmental degradation. This new reality presents challenges in addressing social and economic inequalities and disparities, and this commentary argues for a need to build capacity among practitioners to consider the interconnections of social, economic, and environmental challenges in bridging practice and policy in ongoing legal discourses.

Résumé

Les déplacements provoqués par l'environnement sont une préoccupation internationale croissante. Les effets de nature humaine et sociale sur les déplacés et les populations migrantes préoccupent les professionnels du travail social, étant donné que de nombreux travailleurs sociaux se trouvent impliqués auprès de populations vulnérables affectées par des changements environnementaux dus aux changements climatiques, à la dégradation et aux désastres environnementaux. Cette nouvelle réalité pose des défis puisqu'elle relève les inégalités et disparités sociales et économiques. Cet article met donc en lumière le besoin de construire chez les travailleurs sociaux la capacité de considérer les interactions entre les défis sociaux, économiques, et environnementaux lorsqu'ils mettent en lien des pratiques et des politiques en matière légale.

Introduction

Social workers around the world play a potentially important role in promoting sustainable social development by bringing together social, economic, and environment considerations in local communities. The Global Agenda for Social Work and Social Development is designed by the International Federation of Social Workers (IFSW), International Association of Schools of Social Work (IASSW), and International Council on Social Welfare (ICSW) to strengthen the profile of social work in order to enable social workers to make a stronger contribution to policy development.[1] The Global Agenda focuses on four priority areas: (1) promoting social and economic equalities, (2) promoting the dignity and worth of peoples, (3) working toward environmental sustainability, and (4) strengthening recognition of the importance of human relationships. Human activities in most parts of the world are transforming the global environment.[2] A number of factors contribute to global environmental change such as air pollution and ozone depletion, climate change, land use change, deforestation, desertification, loss of biodiversity, land degradation, fresh water availability, hazardous wastes, and war.[3] Increasingly, social workers are being called upon to promote community capacity-building in response to social, economic, and environmental challenges that lead to displacement and migration due to these factors.[4] However, there is a need to build capacity in order to develop sustainable and effective interventions. "Green social work" is a term used to describe a holistic understanding of various environments and their impacts upon people's behaviour.[5] The human and social dimensions are central in addressing vulnerabilities, as people's health and well-being suffer as a result of inequalities, poverty, and unsustainable

environments related to the impacts of climate change, pollutants, war, natural disasters, and violence, to which there are inadequate international responses.[6] This article provides a commentary on the need to build social work's capacity in the international arena in order to contribute to the political and legal discourses on environmentally induced displacement. To meet this emerging need, the field of social work will need to strengthen its capacity in community development, advocacy, and anti-oppressive social protection initiatives, rather than clinical individualized social work interventions, in order to create interventions that bridge the needs of affected populations and policy development.

Definitions of Environment-Induced Displacement

Lonergan[7] explains that environmentally induced population movements are caused by (1) environmental stress such as an earthquake, cyclone, or other natural disaster; (2) development projects that create a permanent change in habitat, thus forcing people to leave their homes; (3) cumulative changes or "slow-onset" changes such as deforestation; (4) industrial accidents such as the nuclear accident at Chernobyl; and (5) conflict and warfare where environmental degradation is both a cause and effect of armed conflict. The term "development-induced displacement" concerns the plight of millions of people in developing countries who have been compelled or persuaded to move from their residences and their environments and have been uprooted from their livelihoods as a result of disruptions caused by infrastructural projects that characterized development planning in the 1960s and 1970s.[8] It is estimated that 15 million migrants are displaced by development projects every year in the world.[9] The question of how to protect people who are displaced from their homes and livelihoods by development projects, and the rights and responsibilities of various stakeholders, has led many to consider how affected populations may share equitably in the benefits.[10] Assan and Rosenfeld discuss the absence of a recognized definition, the disagreement over the number of environmental migrants, and the diverse legal perspectives.[11] McAdam considers climate change, forced migration, and international law by questioning whether flight from habitat destruction should be viewed as another facet of traditional international protection or as a new challenge requiring more creative and policy responses.[12] "Environmental refugees" under international law are not refugees and not entitled to legal protection when in a host state.[13] There is a need to facilitate policy efforts towards addressing diverse forms of migration at the national and international levels. The concept of environmental migration is controversial, largely because of the difficulty in measuring the extent to which environmental

factors compel people to move.[14] "Environmentally induced migrants" is a term used to describe persons on the move in response to immediate life-threatening events or because the environment has deteriorated their livelihoods so much that they can no longer support themselves.[15] Betts develops the concept of "survival migration" to highlight the situation of people whose own countries are unable or unwilling to ensure their most fundamental human rights (yet fall outside the framework of the refugee protection regime) by not focusing on the underlying cause of movement—whether persecution, conflict, or environment.[16]

Research examining the nexus between environmental change and human mobility has focused primarily on the migration of individuals and households.[17] Climate change is predicted to dislocate millions of people in regions already vulnerable to economic, political, and environmental disruption.[18] Adger considers aspects of fairness, justice, and equity in adaptation responses for vulnerable groups.[19] More recently, there is an emerging literature that considers how some communities are under direct threat of displacement due to climate-related factors. Corlett examines the effects of climate change as experienced by the people of Tuvalu, a tiny, picturesque Pacific nation.[20] Bronen discusses how the spectre of millions of people fleeing their homes because of climate change has sparked an international debate about creating human rights protections for climate change, and specifically presents the crisis in the Arctic where traditional responses of hazard prevention and disaster relief are no longer protecting communities, and have resulted in climate-induced relocation or "community relocation" as the only feasible solution to permanently protect the inhabitants of these communities.[21] The relocation of entire communities, not just individuals and households, may, in some circumstances, be the best adaptation response to climate change.[22] This new evidence demonstrates that flight is caused by environmental changes rather than the longstanding view that environmental migrants leave their homes in response to a number of social, economic, and environmental factors.

Despite the root causes of movement, the impact of environmentally induced migration on sustainable development and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals is an emerging and relatively unexplored issue.[23] The natural environment can lead to population movement in two main ways: through natural hazards such as earthquakes, tsunamis, wildfires, and other natural disasters that suddenly force people to move, and through slow-onset environmental changes such as soil degradation and erosion, deforestation, desertification, water, soil and air pollution, water-logging and salinization of irrigated lands, landslides and mudslides, radiation from nuclear waste, saltwater

intrusion and accelerated coastal erosion, riverbank erosion, extreme aridity and irregular rainfall, and sea-level rise. The interrelationship between the environment and other social, political, and economic factors, especially poverty and security, renders legal definitions and understandings complex for humanitarian efforts, disaster recovery, and development strategies. An integrated and holistic approach is necessary in considering environmentally induced displacement and migration movements and decisions, in which environmental factors should be considered in connection with other socio-economic factors. There is a need for further research to draw lessons for the future and to understand more clearly the policy implications of environmentally induced displacement and migration.

According to Warner, Hamza, Oliver-Smith, Renaud, and Julca, the reasons to migrate are not simple but rather involve influences that "push" and "pull" people to leave their home, which include economic, social, political, and environmental aspects. These factors are often interconnected, making it difficult to determine "one from the other."[24] With knowledge in micro, mezzo, and macro systems, social workers have the skills to examine complex social issues as they relate to humans and their environment. Knowing that migration does not occur in isolation from one's social environment, it is critical to examine who is migrating and who is not migrating, particularly in situations of environmentally induced displacement, in order to understand intersections of individuals, families, and communities with respect to power, discrimination, and vulnerability.

Climate Change and Natural Hazards

There is growing recognition that the effects of climate change are likely to lead to more migration, both internally and internationally, in the relatively near future.[25] Official estimates put the future scale of human displacement as a result of climate change from 150 million to one billion people.[26] Migration, whether permanent or temporary, internal or international, has always been a possible coping strategy for people facing environmental changes.[27] Yet migration caused by human-induced climate change as an adaptation strategy is a relatively new phenomenon. In 1990 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change noted that the greatest single impact of climate change might be on human migration—with millions of people displaced by shoreline erosion, coastal flooding, and agricultural disruption.[28] Climate-related human migration is as old as the constant onslaught of droughts, floods, food shortages, and other climate-related changes on earth that have forced the resettlement of populations throughout history.[29] In the *World Disasters Report* (2012) on forced migration and

displacement, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies explains that people's vulnerability to environmental hazards is increasing due to long-term degradation that is an effect of climate change.[30] Environmentally induced displacement and migration has the potential to become a phenomenon of a scale and scope never experienced. Its effects on the global economy, international development, and national budgets could have significant implications for almost all dimensions of human, political, and state security.

Climate change and its impact on migration is the object of increasing attention for both policy-makers and researchers.[31] There is a need for international legal and policy frameworks to consider environmental and climatic factors in migration—and their relationship to other social, political, or economic aspects, given the context of migration—and the manner in which to treat the people who move because of environmental factors.[32]

Climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies are both required to address this global challenge resulting from increasing global temperatures due to greenhouse gases. Migration can be considered an adaptation mechanism for those willing and able to move away from increased risk and dangerous circumstances. In other extreme situations, those with fewer means to move may opt to migrate as an expression of failed adaptation to the impacts of climate change in order to survive at a basic level. Given the complexity in determining causality of migration within the broader context of social, economic, and environmental factors affecting population movements, the International Organization for Migration defines the term *environmental migrants* as "persons or groups of persons who, for compelling reasons of sudden or progressive change in the environment that adversely affects their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad."[33] Facing severe environmental degradation due to climate change, populations can mitigate and/or adapt to the effects, accept a lower quality of life, or leave the affected areas.[34]

The Potential Role of Social Work

Social work's involvement in shaping the discussion on and response to the growing issue of environmentally induced displacement is critical.[35] Though the reality of displacement due to environmental factors is not a new one, the rate at which this kind of displacement is occurring and will occur is unprecedented. While it is difficult to predict the numbers of displaced persons, in part due to the lack of consensus regarding definitions and terminology, what is indisputable is that the number of environmentally

displaced persons will continue to increase. To date, much of the literature on issues related to environmentally induced displacement has been focused on physical and ecological impacts and legal ramifications, while the human and social dimensions have been touched on only briefly or omitted entirely. Dominelli argues that many of these social costs are invisible, downplayed by economic balance sheets that fail to include the impact of industrialization and loss of environmental amenities on people, livelihoods, homes, land, and ancestral belonging associated with a sense of place.[36] Individuals, families, and whole communities suffer trauma and loss due to displacement.[37] Livelihoods deteriorate due to changing climatic conditions and land degradation over time.[38] When livelihoods are disrupted, cultural customs are threatened, basic human needs often go unmet, and human rights are seriously compromised as a result of being displaced.[39] The communities to which displaced persons migrate are affected as well. In migrant-receiving countries, many displaced migrants are traumatized, vulnerable, exploited, and overwhelmed by the problems of coping with radical legal, economic, social, cultural, and personal problems for which they are inadequately prepared, financed, and socially supported.[40] The settlement and integration needs of immigrants and newcomers are well known in the literature, and there is a need to better understand the challenges and opportunities to provide migrants with the same level of support services to facilitate a "welcoming community" in the receiving local community. Adaptive social protection initiatives in developing countries are supporting climate change adaptation and mitigation in diverse contexts.[41]

Increasingly, social work practitioners, academic researchers, and community members are playing a role in addressing a variety of issues resulting from environmentally induced displacement and migration. This can include accompanying affected individuals, families, and communities in their quest for land use and property rights, providing social welfare, housing, employment, decent living conditions, help in pursuit of adequate livelihoods, social inclusion, food security, activities of daily routines, establishing social networks and social capital, and access to health and well-being, among others. Short- and long-term needs must be taken into consideration, as the displaced are at serious risk of becoming poorer than before migration, more vulnerable economically, and disintegrated socially.[42] While social work's suitability and responsibility to address the issue of environmental displacement is clear, there is a need to build capacity to better address these complex relationships in policy development. Application of a social work lens informed by human rights and social justice assists in understanding the personal impacts of environmental

displacement, while also locating the issue in a national and international context. Besthorn and Meyer note, "Individual adjustment and coping strategies of the environmentally displaced cannot be considered solely personal issues; they are a matter of international and public concern."[43] Global multidisciplinary and multilateral efforts are required to ensure victims of environmentally induced displacement are recognized and supported. This work should be grounded in a human-rights-based approach and should be preventative as well as responsive.

Human Rights

At the core of the environmentally induced displacement issue are human rights and the lack thereof. The IFRC states, "Individuals have a fundamental right to search for protection through migration, in anticipation of or in response to crisis situations. Fleeing the area is one of the most important protection mechanisms available to individuals and communities to deal with acute and chronic crises such as violent conflict, severe drought and food insecurity, or climate change-related disasters."[44]

Human rights are central to social work practice and are reflected in the profession's value in human worth and dignity and expressed in social work's code of ethics at regional, national, and international levels.[45] The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides clear guidance in article 13 that "everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state."[46] A rights-based approach encourages greater awareness of the plight of environmentally displaced persons who lack security and rights to a basic standard of living.[47]

Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights affirms that "everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence."[48] According to Martin, the ICCPR provides certain exceptions: "The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which are provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order (ordre public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights recognized in the present Covenant."[49] Numerous challenges remain in the field when human rights are not respected, and there is a need to build capacity in order to better address these violations at the policy level.

Social Work Practices and Approaches

In this commentary I argue that social workers have a special interest in contributing to international and local policy development and practices that serve to protect and to meet the human rights of environmentally displaced persons

and groups. In order to effectively address the impacts of environmentally induced displacement, it is necessary to approach the issue in a holistic way by considering the social, economic, and environmental concern pre-migration, during migration, and post-migration. Besthorn and Meyers write, "There would also be meticulous emphasis on not only meeting the immediate needs of environmentally displaced persons but working to change the mechanisms that have created the problem. This means that while professionals are working with environmentally displaced persons directly, they are also expressing their collective voice in the political arenas to advocate for them."[50]

From a review of the literature on disasters, it becomes apparent that social exclusion, social injustice, and marginalization that already exist in society are intensified in disaster situations and compounded by environmental degradation caused by destroyed infrastructure, including housing, power, transportation, communication systems, and toxic rubble.[51] Warner et al. state that people's resilience level and recovery ability from external forces are based on three factors: (1) possession of and/or access to financial assets, (2) the degree of the event and/or destruction, and (3) the employment of strategies that either decrease or increase poverty levels.[52] For social workers involved with individuals and families that have been displaced, specifically by rapid-onset environmental changes or slow-onset environmental changes, resilience levels and recovery are important, since human well-being is paramount. Social development is concerned with people's well-being. Midgley postulates that economic and social well-being are interlinked: you cannot have one without the other.[53] Social development and sustainability approaches are being considered in the context of international initiatives such as the Millennium Development Goals and Rio+20 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, given the impacts of climate change in today's world. It is imperative that the concerns of environmentally induced displacement be considered in this emergent international policy context and in the development of social protection initiatives.

Discussion of Policies and Principles

International migration lacks coherent global governance, as sovereign states generally determine their own immigration policies.[54] Government responses to environmentally induced displacement vary from offering "mobility incentives" to mandatory resettlement programs, with mixed results.[55] The development of national, regional, and international laws, policies, and organizational responsibilities that contribute to a system of governance require a policy agenda to consider environmentally induced displacement and migration. This situation derives in part

from uncertainties about the actual future impacts on the environment, which will likely be exacerbated by climate change. There is a need to address migration more effectively in relation to environmental change, given the lack of policy or institutional responses that are deemed appropriate to these forms of migration.[56] Several policy responses may be required to address the complexity of migration for environmentally displaced individuals and groups of people that include "internal or cross-border, rapid or slow, forced or voluntary" forms of migration.[57]

Action is needed to help populations affected by environmentally induced migration. Policy-makers, the scientific community, civil society, and various levels of government must seek solutions for those people who are currently migrating and who may be induced to migrate in order to seek safe and sustainable existences. Specifically, I argue that social workers need to build capacity in order to contribute to these debates, particularly in developing social protection initiatives. Environmentally induced migration is a process that can reduce or increase vulnerability, depending upon the context and the multiplicity of factors influencing population movements.

The Nansen Principles serve as a recommendation to guide responses to the urgent and complex challenges raised by displacement in the context of environmental hazards. Specifically, "Responses to climate and environmentally related displacement need to be informed by adequate knowledge and guided by the fundamental principles of humanity, human dignity, human rights and international cooperation."[58] The Nansen Principles further explain, "States have a primary duty to protect their populations and give particular attention to the special needs of the people most vulnerable to and most affected by climate change and other environmental hazards, including the displaced, hosting communities and those at risk of displacement. The development of legislation, policies, and institutions as well as the investment of adequate resources is key in this regard."[59] Finally, "The leadership and engagement of local governments and communities, civil society, and the private sector, are needed to address effectively the challenges posed by climate change" and environmentally induced migration.[60] In situations where "national capacity is limited, regional frameworks and international cooperation should support action at a national level and contribute to building national capacity, underpinning development plans, preventing displacement, assisting and protecting people and communities affected by such displacement, and finding durable solutions."[61] The Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015 further offers guiding principles on the need for prevention and resilience to be strengthened at

all levels, particularly through adequate resources, by international, regional, and local actors.[62]

A critical role in social work is advocacy, and social workers have a responsibility to advocate for marginalized and vulnerable populations that are displaced as the result of environmental changes, whether they are rapid-onset or slow-onset. International social work associations can play a role in the development of policy and strategies that consider social, economic, and environmental factors influencing environmentally induced displacement and migration. This will require building capacity within the profession, drawing upon community development, advocacy, and anti-oppressive approaches. The International Federation of Social Workers is the global federation of national social work organizations in 90 countries, representing over 750,000 social workers.[63] The International Association of Schools of Social Work (IASSW) is an international community of schools and educators in social work, promoting quality education, training and research in the theory and practice of social work, administration of social services and formulation of social policies. IASSW speaks on behalf of 2,000 schools of social work and 500,000 students.[64] The International Council on Social Welfare is a global, non-governmental organization that represents tens of thousands of organizations around the world that are actively involved in programs to promote social welfare, social development, and social justice.[65]

Conclusion

This commentary on social work and environmentally induced migration argues that social work involvement is necessary, as those who are affected most by environmentally induced displacement are vulnerable groups, such as the poor, women, older people, and children.[66] Not everyone is affected equally by the impacts of environmental changes prompting migration due to natural hazard events linked to climate change and disasters.[67] It is necessary to understand more clearly what population groups are likely to be affected by environmentally induced displacement and migration, and in what context, in order to design appropriate local interventions that support affected populations. This will likely include social protection initiatives. Environmentally induced migration is affected by the degree to which environmental change affects livelihoods, to which relative wealth (affluence) and asset ownership affects migration, and the severity and extent of environmental change now and in the future.[68] Environmentally induced migration is an issue of increasing policy relevance, because of inherent uncertainties and the potential magnitude and scope of this phenomenon. Climate-related stressors combined with ecosystem change such as sea-level rise and rapid-onset events

such as flooding have the potential to drive migration or prompt national governments to plan for the relocation and resettlement of affected populations. Mechanisms for supporting the settlement and integration of affected migrants is linked to pathways of immigration and migration and require further analysis in terms of benefits, support services, and establishing new livelihoods.

Further research is needed to understand how changing environmental conditions affect individual and group decisions to migrate, and the human and social dimensions of these changes. New definitions and understanding are needed for environmentally induced displaced migrants and people displaced by environmental factors to facilitate identification, measurement, and appropriate policy responses, legal frameworks, and social services. Multidisciplinary perspectives can contribute to increasing awareness and developing knowledge about environmental degradation and climate change impacts on migrants and potential migrants. Countries must understand how environmental processes and the environment affect living standards of their populations.

Policy and legal frameworks need to address environmentally induced displacement and migration experiences of individuals and groups affected by environmental change. Social workers potentially have an active role in promoting and strengthening human rights and social justice, and in empowering affected individuals, families, and communities facing this new reality. Gradual and sudden environmental changes will result in substantial human movements and displacements, and these situations will require timely humanitarian efforts and development interventions to avoid escalating crises.

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Location Security and Environmental-Induced Displacement: a Case Study of the Riverine Islands in Bangladesh

Brad K. Blitz

ABSTRACT

This article introduces the concept of 'location security' to describe the specific relationship between place, environmental and human security. It argues that 'location security' is determined by a location's resilience to risk, understood in terms of the degree to which a specific region is protected by virtue of geographical endowments and has sufficient infrastructure to withstand and recover from the effects of environmental hazards and ensure that rights are protected. To illustrate the concept of location security, this article uses the sustainable livelihoods framework to explore actual and anticipated environmental pressures that affect the river deltas of Bangladesh, and examines the adaptation responses developed by the inhabitants of the riverine islands. A central finding of this article is that flexible migration and localised coping strategies based on acute knowledge of their local ecological and geological systems, enables the char dwellers to reduce their vulnerability. In this setting, human and environmental factors when harnessed may enhance agency to mitigate hazards.

Résumé

Cet article propose le concept de « sécurité du lieu » pour décrire les incertitudes auxquelles sont confrontés les populations de zones menaces par les chocs environnementaux et les effets complexes de leur éventuelle adaptation. On y avance que la sécurité du lieu se mesure en fonction de la résilience de la zone considérée, determine par l'importance de sa protection par des subventions territoriales, par la présence d'infrastructure permettant de soutenir les risques environnementaux et de s'en remettre, et par la mesure dans laquelle les droits sont protégés.

Cet article explore les pressions environnementales actuelles et à venir au Bangladesh. On en conclut que la sécurité du lieu est déterminée par les interactions entre les considérations environnementales et humaines, au premier chef l'impact sur les moyens de subsistance, et que des migrations de formes et de durées diverses peuvent resulted de pressions environnementales, comme des pressions sociales, économiques et politiques.

Introduction

This article introduces the notion of 'location security' to describe the uncertainties facing people in environmentally threatened areas and the complex effects of their anticipated adaptation. 'Location security' recognises the interaction of multiple factors in the creation of both human and environmental vulnerabilities. It develops the concepts of vulnerability and risk as found in the literature on human and environmental security by emphasising the importance of place and agency for the protection and realisation of rights. 'Location security' is defined by a location's resilience to risk, understood in terms of the degree to which a specific region is protected by virtue of geographical endowments (topography, quality of soil, nature of human settlements), and has sufficient infrastructure to withstand and recover from the effects of environmental hazards. In this context, migration is one of several adaptive responses to location *insecurity* and livelihoods vulnerability where people may move both on a temporary and permanent basis in order to mitigate the effects of environmental hazards.

To illustrate the concept of location security, this article presents a single case study of the riverine island dwellers (char dwellers) in Bangladesh. It explores the ways in which their location and relationship to their fragile ecosystem defines their access to livelihoods and also how they are placed to respond to environmental shocks, above all riverbank erosion and flooding. Developing the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (SLF), this article explores how their specific location influences the livelihood strategies and outcomes available to individuals and households, including the prospect of migration. The SLF is used to inform the opportunities and obstacles facing char dwellers with respect to five key assets: physical, financial, natural, human, and social capital. This article concludes by identifying the ways in which char dwellers have coped with environmental stress and reviews the effectiveness of related livelihoods enhancing interventions including the Chars Livelihoods Programme.

Review of Relevant Literature

The concept of 'location security' features implicitly in region specific and country studies of environmental vulnerability. Hallie Eakin and Maggie Walser provide a preliminary discussion of 'location security' in their entry in the *Encyclopaedia of Earth* in which she writes that environmental vulnerability 'is neither an outcome nor a static internal condition but rather a dynamic property emerging from the structure of human relations, the internal attributes of specific populations and places, and the nature of social-environmental interaction'.[1] Vulnerability expresses both risk and the capacity for resilience. In the context of 'location security', the specificity of place is of paramount importance in the estimation of vulnerability. Further, just as environmental impacts may be differentiated across—and within—geographically bounded areas, for example within different parts of cities, river systems, or provincial territories, we note that adaptive responses may also be localised,[2] including migration.[3] Some people chose to flee following environmental disasters, while others do not.

The literature on human security also provides a basis for developing the concept of location security in its treatment of localised risk and the growing recognition of multi-causality and inter-causality in the creation of vulnerabilities.[4] There is also a growing body of empirical work on compound vulnerability which is relevant to this article. For example, in the *Voices of the Poor* reports, the largest public opinion survey conducted with approximately 60,000 people in 60 countries, the participants' responses illustrate a complex perception of insecurity which is informed by their understanding of structural deprivation and environmental vulnerability. Respondents describe their marginality not only in terms of their inadequate living conditions or the poor quality of available infrastructure but in relation to the environmental risks they face given their physical location. In such accounts, their settlement in unsustainable locations underscores their insecurity and deepens their poverty.[5] More recent studies by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) further identify a strong connection between location and vulnerability to flooding. For example in their report on climate risks, the ADB calls attention to the concentration of poor households in low-lying areas including swamps and wetlands where populations are exposed to potential storm and tidal surges.[6] Susmita et. al. (2009) similarly project forward to describe how both development efforts and natural weather events are creating unsustainable situations. They argue that climate-induced extreme weather events, may give rise to storm surges which will bring unmanageable levels of flooding to concentrated pockets of poor people in under resourced cities.[7] Other comparative studies have further called attention to the risks posed by poor quality housing and human settlement, on the edges of megacities.[8]

A further body of literature introduces the prospect of migration explicitly. Alam describes the relationship between environment and displacement and the geo-political challenges this raises in the context of Bangladesh and India. He argues that the combined effects of demographic pressures on land and water resources, environmental change and rapid development, have given rise to widespread landlessness, unemployment, declining wages and income, growing income disparities and degradation of human habitat which have encouraged the out-migration of millions of Bangladeshis to India.[9] Others have similarly found that a key driver of migration in South Asia is the breakdown of eco-system dependent livelihoods as a result of both human and environmental factors.[10] In this context climate change, which is associated with the increased frequency of extreme weather conditions, is considered to be a 'risk-multiplier'.

The relationship between migration and location security, however, requires further examination. Some prominent scholars have contested the deterministic leaning in both the environmental and human security literature briefly described above. Gemenne, for example, argues that increased water stress—when the demand for water exceeds the available amount during a certain period or when poor quality restricts its use—can affect migration patterns in different directions and may give rise to multiple types of adaptation.[11] Barnet similarly found that many would be migrants do not necessarily leave situations where they are at risk but rather invest in satisfying their basic needs.[12] Hence while migration is one means of adaptation, it is not necessarily the preferred option for many living in threatened

environments. Gemenne therefore suggests it is helpful to differentiate between types of migrant in order to describe both the push factors and potential duration of the migration. He suggests using the term *environmental migrants,* to describe those whose movement he claims is voluntary and pro-active. By contrast, the term *environmental displacees,* describes those whose movement is forced and reactive. Similarly Renaud et al. (2010) identify three main categories of environmental migrant: *environment emergency migrant* where one flees to save one's life; *environmentally motivated migrant* where a migrant decides not to return or decides against taking up an alternative livelihood in impacted area choosing to flee instead; and an *environmentally forced migrant* where following slow and ineffective attempts at recovery, the migrant does not return or if alternative livelihood would be delayed or was impossible—or if the impacted area no longer exists, the migrant flees. [13]

While situating the analysis within the above literature, this article synthetically contributes to both the writings on environmental displacement and human security. It revisits through an empirical case study how location and agency impact on vulnerability and offers policy considerations in combating those.

Conceptual Framework

This study uses the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SLA) to explore the ways in which char dwellers have responded to the environmental shocks associated with river bank erosion and flooding. Although the SLA was originally designed by the UK Department of International Development (DFID) to improve the agencies capacity to contribute to poverty elimination,[14] it has proved a remarkably flexible framework to analyse complex environmental challenges and their impact on livelihoods. [15] For the purposes of this study, livelihood is defined in broad terms to include the capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and activities required for a means of living. Borrowing from DFID's definition, we describe a livelihood to be sustainable 'when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and in the future, while not undermining the natural resource base.'[16]

A central feature of the SLA is the inclusion of five related asset types. These have been described in terms of types of capital which can be converted to inform strategies to affect livelihood outcomes which in turn may reduce vulnerability. The five assets are described as natural, social, physical, human and financial forms of capital. The strength of the SLA is its holistic nature. It takes into account not only threats, challenges and weaknesses (as part of the vulnerability context), but also improvised strategies, opportunities,

and strengths of individuals, households, and /or communities. The framework also provides for micro to macro level analyses of the contexts in which these strategies must be implemented, including links between micro and the macro institutional and policy making and delivery structures, and processes.[17]

For the purposes of this article, location security is defined as a location's resilience to risk, understood in terms of the degree to which a specific region is protected by virtue of geographical endowments (topography, quality of soil, nature of human settlements), and has sufficient infrastructure to withstand and recover from the effects of environmental hazards. What makes a location secure is a mix of both natural and human factors. For environmentally threatened populations, the degree to which they can enhance their sustainability by mobilising their assets necessarily informs their sense of security. In the context of environmental vulnerability, the preservation of natural and human capital (above all health) is especially significant since these are frequently among the most vulnerable assets.

Factors which inhibit location security include the destruction of natural capital and the loss of eco-dependent livelihoods as a result of deforestation, and the resulting ground water withdrawal and flooding, heat stress, poor housing and sanitation, soil erosion and infrastructure development. One of the most dramatic sources of natural capital depletion is in the construction of major infrastructural development projects in the form of dams, hydro-electric and energy production plants. During the last 50 years, in India alone, an estimated 25 million have been displaced by development projects. In that same period, development projects in China have displaced more than 40 million people, including 13.6 million in the past 15 years.[18] Most notably, China's Three Gorges Dam on the Yangtze River, which stretches across Sandouping, Yichang, and Hubei provinces was built in an earthquake zone and its construction required the drowning of farmland, cities and towns, and the involuntary relocation of 1.3 million people. The process of creating the dam came at considerable psychological stress,[19] and reportedly caused massive subsequent ecological damage downstream where further deforestation and coastal erosion rendered other areas unsustainable.[20]

Other causes of the depletion of natural capital include rapid urbanisation and unsustainable settlement in regions where there is inadequate urban planning and coordination of civic services. The rapid expansion of megacities in much of South Asia, East Asia and China has forced millions of migrants to exist in polluted and unsanitary living quarters, often in low lying coastal areas where infrastructure is lacking, leaving them vulnerable to flooding and displacement. Those most at risk include the urban poor concentrated in

flood prone areas in and around Ho Chi Minh City, Dhaka, Kolkata, and Manila.

Further, the extensive demand for timber and wood has led to high rates of deforestation and has put great strain on local living conditions for millions of people across the Asia-Pacific region. While Asia contains only 16 percent of the world's remaining tropical forests, approximately 25 percent of global forest loss is caused by deforestation,[21] in order to clear the ground for substitute income generating cultivation and production including other forms of agriculture, palm oil and biofuel production. Some argue that the net effect has accelerated vulnerabilities since deforestation impacts on livelihoods by affecting watersheds.[22] Examples of how deforestation has contributed to environmental pressures which have prompted the out-migration of vulnerable people are illustrated by the after effects of the droughts in Yunnan China and the drying out of the Paguyaman River in North Sulawesi, Indonesia.[23]

The distinct pressures mentioned above have given rise to different adaptation and mitigation strategies including seasonal and permanent migration as well as collective responses. Some governments have taken steps to protect their populations from climate-induced hazards, most notably the Maldives which established a sea wall around the main island that is claimed with protecting the population of Male from the 2004 Tsunami. Some countries, such as Thailand have also put in place schemes to reduce the effects of land subsidence;[24] others such as Vietnam have focused on providing alternative livelihoods to resettled populations.

For analytical purposes, we may distinguish between the following location specific vulnerabilities.

The Riverine Chars of Bangladesh

'Char' is the Bengali word for the sand and silt land masses which form the riverine islands in the Jamuna, Padma and the Meghna rivers. Chars play a critical role as cultivable areas in what is a densely populated state. An estimated 6.5 million people (approximately 5 per cent of the Bangladeshi population) live on chars.[25] Even in country where an estimated 40 per cent of the population are poor,[26] char dwellers are among the poorest of the poor and have had to adapt to survive in the ecologically fragile delta and river systems. Sarker et al. (2003), note that while chars provide an environment which is used for subsistence agriculture, animal husbandry and fishing they are difficult to access and form an extremely dynamic environment as a result of frequent and intensive flooding and erosion.[27] Three of the most precarious areas are the South West region and Sunderbans—the largest single block of tidal halophytic mangrove forest in the world—the Meghna Estuary region, and South East Chittagong division.

In response to the above environmental threats, migration has become a feature of life for char dwellers. Riverbank erosion is estimated to displace 600,000 people every year.[28] Poncelet argues that riverbank dwellers are at risk of 'involuntary migration', landlessness and homelessness. She claims that since 2003 approximately 135,632 families became homeless due to riverbank erosion and maintains that landlessness also results from the reallocation of (un)usable resources, noting that since 1973, over 158,780 hectares has been lost to riverbank erosion.[29] This involuntary migration stands in sharp contrast to the adaptation strategies which have sustained urban migrants in Bangladesh. In their study of displaced urban dwellers, the IOM recorded that 83 per cent of respondents cited unemployment due to frequent floods as the primary cause for the out-migration of a household member who settled in a city nearby. The out-migration, however, served to strengthen the position of the household back home since remittances were used not only to buy food but also capital investments, including the repair of homes.[30] By contrast, char dwellers who migrate often move to nearby and equally vulnerable chars where there is no possibility of generating a surplus required for remittances. Sarker et al. (2003) describe the specific locational challenges for char dwellers as a result of environmental pressures and eventual displacement:

> People displaced by char erosion have no other alternative than to settle on accreting char land elsewhere, creating a typical social and economic char environment. The economics of the char lands are largely based on agriculture, fishing and livestock-rearing. Education, health and extension services and support to cope with the calamities of flood and erosion are minimal. This not only results in individual misery, but also in unrealized potential of resources on the chars.[31]

We also note that by relocating from one char to another, char dwellers remain trapped in a subsistence level existence as landless farmers, fishermen or agricultural producers. Char dwellers may have access to these riverine lands but do not actually hold any natural capital and as a result are tied to their environment.

Nonetheless, char dwellers remain committed to the river deltas. In some 350 interviews conducted over 8 chars, Marie-Pierre Arseneault (2012) found that in spite of the risks, most people wished to remain on the chars. While several men interviewed had the opportunity to move away for work, such movements were temporary and the vast majority of permanent migrations were from one char to

Table 1—Location Specific Vulnerabilities

Location	Category Affected	Environmental Pressures	Vulnerabilities
Megacities	Urban migrants	Heat stress, sanitation and water, housing, disease, flooding.	Destruction of natural and human capital as a result of pollution, over crowding, public health risk, fatalities.
Tropical forests/mountain areas	Forest dwellers	Deforestation as a result of over logging; glacial melting.	Destruction of natural and human capital as a result of changes to watershed, drought and flooding, increase in water and air-borne diseases, infestation.
Himalayas	Mountain dwellers	Glacier retreat; increased flooding, heavy precipitation as a result of climate change	Destruction of natural and human capital as a result of displacement following soil erosion, crop destruction, damage to farming, increase in water and air-borne diseases, infestation.
Pacific basin, Pacific islands	Coastal Villagers	Flooding due to cyclones, sea-level rise, salinity, soil erosion, as a result of climate change	Destructition to natural, human and social capital following fatalities, damage to agricultural livelihoods, fishing, increase in infectious water and airborne diseases e.g. malaria.
Pacific islands	Low Lying Island dwellers	Flooding due to cyclones, sea-level rise, salinity, soil erosion, as a result of climate change	Destruction of natural and social capital as a result of statelessness; and destruction of livelihoods.
Inland	Farmers	Glacier retreat; increased flooding, heavy precipitation as a result of climate change; flooding due to cyclones, sea-level rise, salinity, soil erosion, as a result of climate change	Destruction of natural capital as a result of changes to watershed, drought and flooding; displacement, soil erosion, crop destruction.
Coastal and riverbank communities; low lying island nations	Fishermen	Flooding due to cyclones, sea-level rise, salinity, soil erosion, as a result of climate change	Destruction of natural capital as a result of pollution, flooding, loss of fish and related livelihoods.

another where they were still exposed to environmental risk, sometimes greater than in their previous setting.[32]

In spite of their fragile habitat, the char dwellers have developed a system of environmental adaptation suited to their limited assets and which draws upon their understanding of the natural processes of accretion and sediment dynamics. In response to flooding and coastal erosion, the char dwellers navigate the geological contest between loss of land from riverbank erosion and the emergence of new land through the process of accretion and move from char to char as necessary. For some, the possibility of returning to their reconstituted island home provides a source of security.[33] Writing on the development of chars and Mohammad

Arifur Rahman and Md. Munsur Rahman of the Institute of Water and Flood Management, Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology, describe how chars form over a 12–15 year period, during which time char dwellers engage in several different livelihoods from cultivating ground nuts to preparing the land for rice production. [34] They describe a tradition of adaptation and flexibility which includes exploiting the natural processes of land accretion, migration and the rotation of crops.[35] Elsewhere, Hanna Schmuck-Widmann (2001) has found that char dwellers on the Jamuna River follow strategies based on local-indigenous knowledge to produce agricultural products and rear animals.[36]

In addition to informal and traditional modes of adaptation, the government of Bangladesh, together with the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) has introduced specific programmes which aim to improve the livelihoods of char dwellers exposed to riverbank erosion and displacement. The *Chars Livelihood Programme* delivers both welfare and initiates human capital development efforts to support extremely poor households living on chars on the Jamuna River in Northern Bangladesh. The first stage of the programme was aimed at 90,684 households—of which 55,000 received a full package of support. Women, in particular were identified for assistance which included: i) the transfer of an initial amount of capital with could be used to purchase an income generating asset (e.g. cow, rickshaw, sewing machine), followed by further monthly stipends (over 18 months); ii) the provision of physical infrastructure including plinths to raise homesteads above the flood line, as well as latrines and tubewells to improve sanitation; and iii) the delivery of social development training and other types of technical and educational support. The programme also introduced char dwellers to village based microcredit and enterprise schemes and community-based health care.[37]

An independent review of the above programme recorded significant gains from both the welfare and human capital development interventions. It found that, as a result of the liverlihood enhancing aspects of the programme, some of the poor and most vulnerable households were raised above the extreme poverty threshold. Further it found that individuals supported experienced positive social benefits in addition to improved health, sanitation, and nutrition. DFID reports that at least 12,490 households (or 46,712 individuals) were been lifted above the extreme poverty threshold and more than 90,000 homes were rendered physically secure as a result of this programme. The evaluators also record further benefits including a significant reduction in the prevalence of stunting among children.

Other organisations working with international partners have focused on improving the physical security of the char dwellers. For example, the Center for Environmental and Geographic Information Services (CEGIS) and UNDP initiated a project where they placed flags to mark out sites vulnerable to river erosion as a warning to villagers. Such interventions have, however produced mixed results given the difficulties of reaching this geographically dispersed group.[38] Moreover, as noted above, many char dwellers have an acute understanding of their physical environment, including the dangers it presents.

While the government of Bangladesh has been primarily concerned with the displacement of urban dwellers, it has nonetheless produced a number of relevant environmental policies, including the National Environmental Management Action Plan (1996), the National Water Policy (1999), and the National Capacity Self-Assessment (NCSA) for Global Environmental Management (2007). Walsham's 2010 report for the IOM records that environmental and climate-induced migration is now included in these policy documents and underlines that the NSCA now refers to the problems of 'displacement by river bank erosion, rural-urban migration and the potential for out-migration from coastal zones'. Further, he notes the Draft National Plan for Disaster Management (2008) makes reference to displacement and specific vulnerabilities related to migration, including wider migration and development issues such as the gendered effects of migration for families left behind.[39]

Analysis

The above case study illustrates the pertinence of place in our consideration of both environmental and human security. While Bangladesh is subject to many environmental stresses and hazards, the above study of the riverine islands provides a crucial insight into the ways in which the natural habitat can be made adaptable to support even the most marginal livelihoods. Although the natural environment along the river deltas is extremely fragile and threatens the lives and livelihoods of millions of char dwellers, we note that the river systems themselves are sites of adaptation by virtue of the fact that land masses both disappear and reappear following flooding and remain potentially fertile and cultivable islands. Even in the absence of physical or indeed civic and administrative infrastructure on the chars, they are potentially agriculturally rich natural environments. The deltas are thus both sites of environmental vulnerability and arguably natural resilience.

The degree to which char dwellers are able to capitalise on the potential richness of the chars is, however, constrained by their own shortage of endowments, including financial and human capital. Their homesteads are at constant risk of flooding and their health is compromised by the absence of medicines and a restricted diet. Yet, as noted in the above discussion of the Chars Livelihood Programme, such inequalities can be ameliorated as a result of welfare, livelihood and human development interventions. The success of these interventions suggests that the considerable environmental challenges facing char dwellers can be managed and made more secure.

In terms of responding to the shock of environmental hazards including riverbank erosion and flooding, the vulnerability of char dwellers is compounded by their relative isolation from Bangladeshi society and their marginalisation as landless people. Although they have developed ways

of adapting to their natural environment, by migrating and responding to their relocation with flexible methods of farming and agriculture (e.g. rotating from ground nuts to rice), they have little or no natural capital of their own and hence may have little opportunity to move beyond the chars and river systems. For this reason, livelihood enhancement programmes including *Chars Livelihood Programme* are important ways of reducing complex vulnerability that results from environmental pressures and social inequalities.

The contested nature of the river habitat, as an environment where land is both lost and created from flooding, provides a unique context in which to revisit the above discussion and definition of an environmental migrant. As noted above, Gemenne and Renaud et al. have broken down the term environmental migrant to describe both the causal intention behind the act of migration and the conditions which sustain it. Arguably char dwellers could, at various points, be classified as environmental emergency migrants (who later return), or environmentally motivated migrants though, as Arseneault's research suggests that they are unlikely to fall into the category of the environmentally forced migrant who leaves permanently. The case of the char dwellers therefore illustrates the ways in which agency features in response to environmental threats and the importance of livelihoods and access to land, as some of the factors driving adaptation and migration.

As the above account records, the livelihood implications of environmental displacement in Bangladesh's river deltas are most profoundly felt among the extreme poor, landless, and remote communities which enjoyer fewer assets with which to mitigate the effects of displacement, migration and resettlement. In terms of scale and effect, it is important to note unlike rapid urbanisation and the proliferation of development-related projects in other parts of Bangladesh which may displace large numbers of people permanently, environmental displacement in the river deltas is often temporary. Again, the reasons for this are linked to not only to the limited options available to the char dwellers but also their successful exploitation of the ecological habitat.

The notion of location security helps to inform our understanding of the ways in which vulnerabilities are structured. We note that char dwellers have managed to diversify their livelihood strategies, combining agriculture, fishing, and farming due to both the richness of the river delta and their deep understanding of their natural environment and the geological processes which sustain it. They have done so because, even in the absence of much physical, financial or human capital, they enjoy the possibility of migrating within a familiar environment. We note that the context of their migration is notably different from the human-induced displacement experienced in the case

of major industrial development projects, such as the large scale dams noted above where people's freedom of movement and agency is restricted.

Conclusions: Reflecting on possible policy recommendations

The above study illustrates the pertinence of 'location security' as a means to understanding the complex interplay between human and environmental security. The specific context of the riverine deltas of Bangladesh, otherwise sites of considerable environmental hazard, are home to millions of char dwellers who have developed successful systems of adaptation which allow them to continue their marginal eco-dependent existence in a fertile habitat. Although their location is itself the site of environmental stress from flooding and coastal erosion, which in turn threatens livelihoods, it is also a place of natural resilience and renewal. The char dwellers have an acute understanding of their habitat and its natural endowments, which enables them to mobilise their own limited asset base and migrate between chars in order to protect themselves from the above mentioned environmental hazards. We note that where migrants have been able to take charge of their own lives by relocating both in advance and following disasters, in contrast to those displaced by large infrastructural projects, they have often successfully protected livelihoods. When people have freedom of movement, are able to adapt, plan and exploit their knowledge of the local situation, migration is easier to manage and has less environmental impact.

The vulnerability of the char dwellers is not limited to environmental risk but is also determined by social, political, and economic inequalities which are expressed in their lack of human, financial and physical assets. For this reason, interventions such as the Chars Livelihood Programme are important initiatives to reduce vulnerability. We note that when migrants are given the opportunity to develop their human capital base, they are better placed to diversify skill sets and are less reliant on vulnerable livelihoods. Equally, advanced planning to build up local defences by raising buildings on plinths, and by investing in livelihoods diversification interventions may in the long term protect vulnerable populations from the compound effects of isolation, environmental hazards, and limited opportunities for human and natural capital development.

The success of the Chars Livelihoods Programme suggests that the considerable environmental challenges facing char dwellers can be managed and made more secure. Arguably more targeted interventions which focus on building human capital through health and nutrition programmes minimises disease and provides additional safeguards to the char islanders. Further by promoting access to

common land, in this instance, fertile chars, the state may assist vulnerable populations which themselves have little or no natural capital and few convertible assets. For this reason, complementary development interventions which seek to protect homesteads, for example by raising them on plinths, are especially important.

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Lake St. Martin First Nation Community Members' Experiences of Induced Displacement: "We're like refugees"

Shirley Thompson, Myrle Ballard, and Donna Martin

Abstract

In 2011, a massive flood occurred in the Canadian province of Manitoba, and provincial government officials decided to divert water to Lake St. Martin and First Nation land to protect urban, cottage, and agricultural properties. As a result of this artificial flood, all community members were evacuated, with infrastructures and housing at Lake St. Martin First Nation permanently destroyed. Three years later, 1,064 Lake St. Martin First Nation members reside in urban hotels and other temporary residences. Data from participatory videography and community workshops were analyzed using the sustainable livelihoods framework. Environmentally and developmentally induced displacement transformed an entire First Nation community into refuges in their homeland. Jurisdictional issues and racism prevented provisioning of services to meet their basic needs, help rebuild their lives, and relocate their community. Inclusive evacuation, relocation, and water-management policies and procedures are recommended.

Résumé

En 2011 a eu lieu une importante inondation dans la province canadienne du Manitoba. Les fonctionnaires du gouvernement provincial ont décidé de détourner les eaux vers le lac St-Martin et les terres des premières nations afin de protéger les propriétés urbaines, rurales et agricoles. En conséquence de cette inondation artificielle, tous les membres de la communauté ont été évacués, et les infrastructures et les habitations de la communauté autochtone du lac St-Martin ont été détruites de façon permanente. Trois

ans plus tard, 1 064 membres de la communauté autochtone du lac St-Martin habitent dans des hôtels urbains et d'autres habitations temporaires. Nous avons analysé les données de vidéographies participatives et des ateliers communautaires à l'aide d'une grille de moyen de subsistance durable. Les déplacements environnementaux et développementaux ont transformé toute une communauté autochtone en refugiés dans leur propre région. Des questions de juridictions et de racisme empêchent de fournir les services de base, d'aider à la reconstruction de leur vie, et de réinstaller leur communauté. Des évacuations inclusives, des déménagements, et des politiques et des procédures de gestion de l'eau sont recommandées.

Introduction

Unprecedented water levels forced the entire community of Lake St. Martin First Nation (LSMFN) in Manitoba, Canada, to undergo an emergency evacuation in 2011.[1] The flooding was so severe that the LSMFN community, a reserve for 140 years and home to Anishinaabe people, is now uninhabitable. Considered the "largest spring runoff in the province's history," the geographical scope and duration of this flood surpassed previous records.[2] Provincial government officials lowered water levels in Lake Manitoba by flooding Lake St. Martin, responding to a 2011 consultant's report that stated, "If no action is taken, extremely high water levels on Lake Manitoba and Lake St. Martin are expected to continue for an extended duration, leaving communities and homes damaged from flooding, wind and waves."[3] The provincial government's decision saved cottages, agricultural areas, and communities on one lake by

Figure 1. The 2011 forecasted water levels due to flooding of Lake St. Martin FN

flooding three First Nation (FN) communities, including LSMFN, Pinaymootang, and Little Saskatchewan on Lake St. Martin (see figure 1). This diversion of water resulted in lower-than-average levels on Lake Manitoba but sustained flood levels in FN communities. In this context, this study asked the research question, what is the impact of water management and flooding on the well-being of displaced community members of LSMFN? In this paper, we describe how LSMFN community members struggle for a new, sustainable community. The sustainable livelihoods framework was used to guide data collection and analysis. This framework provided a broad examination of impacts

that included an exploration of the role of institutions and policies on impacts of flooding and displacement.

A literature review was undertaken to embed this case study in a broader understanding of the impact of flooding on health. Utilizing SCOPUS and Ebscohost databases and inputting the keywords *flood* and *health,* researchers located and critically reviewed. Literature reviews[4] and descriptive research[5] provided us with the current state of knowledge about short-term and long-term health impacts of flooding. Several studies focused on survivors of Hurricane Katrina,[6] and other research sites were located in China, Mexico, Poland, Thailand, South Korea, and the United Kingdom.[7] Few studies examined the health impacts of flooding on indigenous populations.[8] Most studies examined the health impacts of flooding using an individualistic approach with a biomedical focus. No studies examined the impact of flooding on families or communities.

Lake St. Martin FN was environmentally and developmentally displaced. Community members were displaced within their country of habitual residence as the result of environmental degradation.[9] The community land is now underwater and not considered suitable for building residences or infrastructures. Floods, like other natural disasters, are forces outside human control. However, although a flood cannot be stopped, it can be diverted from its flow to another course. In the case of the 2011 "superflood," the flood waters were diverted to the water-control structures at the Portage Diversion and the Fairford Dam. Utilizing water-management policies, provincial government officials created a flood at LSMFN, resulting in the communities' permanent displacement.[10] Upstream dams and water-control structures are statistically significantly associated with higher risk of death and injuries ($b = -1772$, $p =< 0.1$).[11] Thus, dams and water-control structures upstream from LSMFN placed these community members at greater risk to adverse impacts.[12] Thus, the fundamental reason requiring the change of residence is not—in this case—a specific environmental factor (for example, the occurrence of the superflood), but originates in human interference with the environment.

Background: First Nation Communities, Flooding, and Relocation in Manitoba

Many First Nation (FN) communities are affected by flooding in Manitoba, but the health and social and other impacts are largely unknown.[13] Hydroelectric dams have had an impact on FN communities, as many northern communities have been flooded and displaced.[14] The 2011 flood displaced 4,525 FN people from 17 FN communities in Manitoba. The effect on these community members was extensive. According to a Southern Chiefs' Organization resolution in

May 2012, a year after the 2011 flood, "There are currently 2,427 displaced evacuees from the eight affected communities, which are comprised of two Southern FNs completely evacuated and unable to return to their respective community with six other communities partly evacuated."[15]

Development causing flooding of FN communities in Manitoba is a reoccurring story. Hydroelectric dams have displaced many FN communities located in vulnerable locations such as flood plains or near rapids.[16] Chemawawin Cree were displaced and their livelihoods ruined when Manitoba Hydro dammed the Saskatchewan River, making a giant reservoir at Cedar Lake, to fuel the Grand Rapids generating station.[17] Furthermore, a series of dams and hydroelectric plants on the Nelson River in Northern Manitoba reversed the flow of the Churchill River by diverting it into the Nelson River as well as transforming Lake Winnipeg. This water manipulation displaced the South Indian Lake (SIL) FN community and flooded Nelson House FN territory. The ability of FN peoples to live off the land has been compromised at SIL FN and other communities, with SIL fishers reporting catching four tubs of fish with forty nets when before they caught forty tubs with four nets prior to construction of the dam.[18]

In flooding FN communities, the Crown had designated FN territory essentially as "sacrifice zones" in the broader development of settler capitalist Canadian society.[19] In 1998, Canada placed first in the Human Development Index (HDI), which measures well-being. Meanwhile, registered FNs living on-reserve ranked at seventy-eight on the HDI list, which is alongside Peru and Brazil. This designation alludes to on-reserve population's poor living conditions.[20]

Indigenous peoples and other vulnerable communities have a higher risk of severe flood exposure, which results in more negative health and other outcomes.[21] Cases in Canada and around the world exist where settlements of indigenous peoples have been placed on marginal land and/or in locations that are remote. For example, FNs in Manitoba were often relocated to reserves in swampy areas and flood plains, which make these communities vulnerable to flooding.[22] Floods exacerbate the poverty and vulnerability of FN peoples.[23]

History and Description of Lake St. Martin First Nation

Anishinaabe people have resided on the shores of Lake St. Martin for many generations, and elders from LSMFN talk about their grandparents telling stories of how beautiful life was there a long time ago.[24] Their traditional land was once home to abundant bison and other wildlife, as well as fish, with fertile land for agricultural activities. Their fishing, agriculture, and hunting livelihoods provided an

abundance of resources to feed and clothe their families and live well. These earlier times are described in Anishinaabe as *pimachiwiin,* which is a term that means the good life. From the mid-1850s until the water-control structure in 1961, fishing and agriculture provided some income and sustenance, although they were quickly outcompeted by the expensive technology outside fishermen provided.

The Lake St. Martin basin is situated in the boreal forest and its geomorphology consists of intermittent karst topography and soluble limestone bedrock.[25] Lake St. Martin basin was divided up into reserve property of the Crown into three reserves. LSMFN was part of Treaty 2 for Reserve No. 49, which is officially called the Narrows and also part of Treaty 5 for Reserve No. 49A. These treaties reduced their vast territory to a small land base of approximately 24 square kilometres on the remote northeast shore of Lake St. Martin, as can be seen in figure 2. This Anishinaabe community is located in the Interlake region of Manitoba, a few hours northwest of Winnipeg (225 kilometres), accessible by a gravel road.

In 1961, the Fairford water-control structure was constructed upstream at the Fairford River, which receives its water from Lake Manitoba (see figure 1 for the location of Lake St. Martin FN and its proximity to Little Saskatchewan FN and Pinaymootang FN). In 1970, the Portage Diversion resulted in higher water levels in Lake Manitoba and Lake St. Martin. With this development, Lake St. Martin FN has experienced reoccurring flooding with extensive environmental and human costs.[26]

Sustainable Livelihoods as the Guiding Framework

The sustainable livelihoods framework was used to guide data collection and analysis. This framework provided a broad examination of impacts (e.g., human, social, physical, environmental, and financial) and included an exploration of the role of institutions and policies on impacts of flooding and dislocation. A "sustainable livelihood" is defined as "the assets (natural, physical, human, financial and social), the activities, and the access to these (mediated by institutions and social relations) that together determine the living gained by an individual or household."[27] The sustainable livelihood framework can be used to analyze assets for FN peoples in Canada and the reasons for lower assets in these communities.[28]

Provincial officials manage risks from floods, and these actions can reduce or worsen impacts. Institutional structures (e.g., rules, customs, and land tenure) and processes (e.g., laws, policies, societal norms, and incentives) operate on multiple scales to change flooding impacts.[29] Institutional structures such as the Indian Act, and other colonial policies that continue to this day, take away local


Figure 2. Location of Lake St. Martin First Nation downstream from Lake Manitoba and the Fairford Water-Control Structure

decision-making powers and have resulted in a state in which many FN communities exist.

Lake St. Martin FN is affected by provincial water policy and federal land tenure and funding. Many institutions play a role in post-recovery from flooding, including different levels of government, private sector agencies, and non-government organizations. The way communities themselves are structured is due in large part to their relationship with the state, particularly FN communities, which are constructs of treaties by settlers to establish their governmental authority. Exploring the institutional and policy context offers a way to address the issues of water-level risk and to enhance water governance, management strategies, and services in conjunction with FN communities.

Method of Inquiry: Participatory Workshops and Videography

This participatory research was approved by the University of Manitoba Joint Ethics Board. Research methods included five workshops on strategic analysis and community planning, all of which had a participatory video (PV) component. Workshops were undertaken in both Anishinaabe and English languages. Workshops, focus groups, and PV were considered appropriate for an oral culture. PV interviews

Figure 3. Sustainable Livelihood Analysis applied to Lake St. Martin First Nation

and transcripts from focus groups were analyzed to identify codes, categories, and themes, using the sustainable livelihoods framework as a guide.

All community members were invited to participate, including school-aged children and youth. A convenience sample of 35 adults and several youth was acquired. Adults were asked questions relating to the five sustainable livelihood assets, or in other words, they were asked to describe their health, social relations, financial situation, infrastructure access, and access to nature. Additionally, participants were invited to share their perspectives about how different institutions, rules, customs, and processes played a role in their experiences of displacement. Youth were invited to share drawings of their experiences in LSMFN and their hopes for their new community. Data collection was completed in 2012.

The research process involved producing a video called *Flooding Hope: The Lake St. Martin First Nations Story.* Draft versions of the film were screened at community events to provide community members with the opportunity to provide input into the storyline. After the screenings, more interviews were undertaken based on feedback from participants. The film was selected for a number of film festivals, which served to share this community's story of displacement.[30]

Project Findings: "We're like refugees"
"We're like refugees" was often expressed by participants and emerged from the data as the major theme. This statement describes the overall predicament of this entire community that lost its homeland and many years later remains displaced. Findings were categorized by the five sustainable livelihood assets and then analyzed for the institutional/ policy and vulnerability context of LSMFN. See figure 3 to show how different levels of government played a role to increase the vulnerability of Lake St. Martin FN to flooding, which decreased their human, physical, natural, economic, and social assets. These institutions and policies shifted the flooding impacts from non-FN to FN for the 2011 superflood. The outer ring of this model represents the vulnerability context ring for Lake St. Martin FNs, which is bulging to show how lack of meaningful consultation and lack of including governance of water and services increased risks and negative impacts for FNs.

Human Assets
Human assets represent the health, education, and skills of individuals that contribute to the productivity of labour and capacity to manage land. Human assets have been greatly affected at LSMFN from flooding. For example, the impact of long-term flooding may explain the much lower median

income for LSMFN. Lake St. Martin FN community members had a median annual income of $1,636 in 2006.[31] This figure is drastically below that of Manitobans at $24,194/year, of FNs people living off-reserve at $22,500 per year, or of FNs people across Canada living on-reserve at $14,000/year. Since this income level was so unusually low, an inquiry to Statistics Canada was made, to which they responded, "There is no error in the Narrows 49 Indian reserve numbers for median income—total Aboriginal identity population 15 years and over."[32] Behavioural and psychological conditions associated with poverty include substance abuse, addictions, stress, compromised education, and limited capacity to identify and respond to risks.[33]

Educational attainment is low at Lake St. Martin FN. In 2006, approximately 11 per cent of LSMFN youth graduated from a secondary school, which is half the rate for Manitoba (approximately 21 per cent), according to Statistics Canada.[34] Prior to the evacuation, a school was sited by the federal government at an unsuitable location prone to snakes and moisture issues against the advice of the community, and soon after it was opened, public health authorities closed the school because it posed hazards. This closure resulted in children going to school in portables, prone to dampness and mould, for more than ten years, which was a poor learning environment. Also, schools at LSMFN went up to only Grade 9, which meant that youth could not acquire secondary school in their home community, and so was a major deterrent to attaining a high school education.

Evacuation resulted in large gaps in time where no suitable physical location was identified for schooling children. A school building was not made available to the children in Winnipeg until October 2011, despite many closed public schools identified by band staff as possibilities. As a result, the children missed almost four months of school in 2011 because there was no school building; the children faced mandatory evacuation from their school in early May to the end of school in June and were not provided with an alternative school. When relocated, children continued to be without a school in September to mid-October in 2011. From mid-October to June 2012, the school was temporarily located in the downtown core area of Winnipeg, which suffers from a high crime and poverty rate. The school was moved again to another temporary location in another part of the city in September 2012, which the City of Winnipeg's Planning, Property, and Development Department shut down for several weeks because the landlord violated a number of by-laws.

A resolution for Southern Chiefs Organization (SCO) in 2012 listed the health problems experienced by FN flood evacuees, which included "miscarriages, depression, other mental health symptoms, difficulties addressing those who have a chronic disease, etc., and have resulted in premature deaths."[35] A number of elders from LSMFN have died prematurely, since displacement. In *Flooding Hope,* one female elder sobs as though the flood's impacts are a visceral, physical pain: "How it hurts. It hurts. I want to cry all the time."[36] Long-term health hazards included worsening of chronic illnesses and mental health disorders.[37]

The children, when asked to draw pictures of impacts as part of a school exercise, showed their homes under water and conveyed a sense of loss: "I miss LSM. I am sad."[38] Since pets were not allowed in hotels and temporary housing, family pets often had to be taken to the humane society for adoption out of necessity, which created further distress among children.[39]

Lake St. Martin FN, similar to other FNs, experiences high rates of diabetes and other chronic diseases, which have been exacerbated by the flooding and induced displacement. Chronic diseases often worsen as a result of floods. Inability to maintain a stable medication uptake was the main barrier to continuity of care for chronic conditions during the disaster. Inadequate information and financial constraints were contributing factors. Also, with the youthful demographics at LSMFN, many pregnant women and young children were exposed to the negative and stressful impacts of the floods and displacement.[40]

High stress and anxiety were reported by participants. Mental health issues result from flooding and displacement, which take a heavy toll on people's overall health. The main evidence is in common mental disorders (anxiety, depression), post-traumatic stress syndrome, and suicide. Post-traumatic stress disorder is defined by the American Psychiatric Association as a severe and complex disorder precipitated by exposure to psychologically distressing events; it is characterized by persistent intrusive memories about "the traumatic event, persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma and persistent symptoms of increased arousal."[41] Impacts of the stress of displacement and flooding include attempted suicides and deaths from suicides. Long-term mental and physical health impacts are expected to be profound.

The most severe and enduring effects of relocation have been identified to occur where the entire community is affected and where the disaster is human-made rather than a natural occurrence.[42] The nature and magnitude of the created flood at LSMFN required the entire community to relocate permanently. Relocation, whether voluntary or compulsory, functions as a significant stressor and disrupts social support networks, with compulsory relocation being significantly more negative in the subsequent social support disruption and psychological adjustment.[43] After

involuntary relocation, rural indigenous communities have experienced a cultural identity crisis, resistance to innovation, and increased dependency upon the national government responsible for the relocation, as well as increased morbidity and mortality.[44] Even the threat of such relocations has been associated with severe levels of psychological distress and dysfunction.[45]

Social Assets

Social assets are the close social bonds that facilitate cooperative action, social bridging, and linking to share ideas and resources.[46] Once strong, social assets in FNs has been weakened by settler political systems, residential school, and poverty. In the case of LSMFN, the long-term flooding and then permanent displacement without satisfactory relocation to a new community has profoundly disrupted social assets.[47] The social impact included many reports of family breakups, increased family violence, drug use, alcoholism, and recruitment of community members by gangs in urban centres and host communities.[48] Compulsory relocation occurred with people dispersed across the province, which resulted in the disruption of social support systems and social networks.[49]

Support for LSMFN is strong amongst FN organizations and FN people but minimal among other Canadian organizations and the general public. First Nations organizations were supportive with resolutions and media from Assembly of First Nations, Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs, and SCO. However, these organizations have limited human, social, and financial capacity. The people from LSMFN live in two worlds—one that recognizes and values their rich traditional culture and indigenous knowledge, and the larger Canadian society where FN culture is stigmatized.[50] Following evacuation, community members reported experiencing overt racism on a daily basis in their hotels and throughout Winnipeg. These flood evacuees were shaken by how negatively the media and government portrayed them as living high off the public purse. By describing flood evacuees as dependent, helpless, and manipulative, flood evacuees were re-victimized. Chief Adrian Sinclair described how community members were called "freeloaders" and how elders were physically and verbally assaulted.[51]

Support by Canadians never materialized for this community that had lost everything. Church groups, charities, and development agencies were absent from playing any role. The only exceptions were the Liberal party, which in Manitoba has only one seat, providing generous media and political support, and some individual researchers from University of Manitoba.

Natural Assets

Natural assets comprise resources and land management, typically fisheries, forests, wildlife, agriculture, minerals, and non-timber products.[72] However, FN peoples, like other indigenous peoples, define nature more broadly than Western society.[73] First Nation people include stories, rules, norms, and beliefs as all part of their relationship to the land, air, and water. Although FN peoples' connection to land has changed over time and is complex, there is a marked difference in indigenous peoples' spiritual connection to place, compared to European settlers. Indigenous knowledge systems (IKS) are established from an ancient, ongoing relationship with the land. Nature and culture are not regarded as separate but are entangled together. McKnight acknowledged that land "constitutes identity, and loss of land is tantamount to loss of one's self … To have one's own country is to have a place where one can withdraw in times of trouble and where one can easily find sustenance … it bestows a degree of independence that cannot otherwise be obtained."[52]

Traditional land-use studies and plans enable a community to manage and govern their communities on the basis of indigenous values. Most FN communities in Canada have traditional land-use studies in place or funding for the community to do so, but LSMFN have not been afforded the opportunity to undertake a land-use study and are only starting to develop a community plan.[53] First Nation traditional land-use and occupancy studies consider land used for trapping, hunting, fishing, berry picking, medicinal plant gathering, timber harvesting, community/recreational areas, and youth training areas, as well as sites (cabins, campsites, old community/gathering sites, burial sites, spiritual/special sites) and travel corridors to be important historical, livelihood, and cultural sites.[54] The landscape, as well as elders and harvesters, tell the communities' history and stories. Sumner, an elder from Lake St. Martin FN, described the prosperity that existed on Lake St. Martin prior to the Fairford control structure: "The Anishinabek lived in abundance … There were lots of rabbits. There was lots of food. We picked duck eggs and seagull eggs. We caught a lot of fish in the little streams from the fish migration. There was a lot of fish. All winter they caught fish and now that doesn't happen. They filled the racks with hay … The fishers had small camps in Dauphin River where they stayed to fish commercially."[55]

The people lost their subsistence and economic livelihoods from fishing, farming, hunting, gathering, and gardening after the flood. The community misses their traditional foods, including wild game from hunting and trapping, fish, wild berries, and gardening.

Flooding has spoiled the community's natural assets. Elders and middle-aged participants shared how the community was so beautiful before the water-control structure, lined with sandy beaches. Traverse, an elder, described how she and her mother would go to the lake by rowboat and cast a net into the water to catch enough fish for a few meals.[56] Following the superflood, community members call this land a "wasteland," after the wastewater lagoons and waste-site leachate contaminated groundwater and the lake. Most of the land is water-saturated and is described as a swamp that does not support forests or agriculture. An elder related how when a tree is chopped down on the reserve, it is rotten on the inside.

Physical Assets

Equipment and infrastructure were limited prior to the superflood. Before the flood, this community lacked basic infrastructures. Gypsumville, with a population of 100, neighbours LSMFN and has paved roads, a grocery store, a fire hall, post office, community hall, and a medical clinic.[57] Lake St. Martin FN lacked a hospital, water-treatment plant, piped water and piped sewage, licensed waste-disposal site, community or recreational centre, library, school building, fire station, food store, and laundromat.[58] The available housing was overcrowded and lacked weeping tiles, which is a necessity for homes built on lands that are flood-prone or swampy. With increasing water levels, the community members described how the water and sewage cisterns popped up like "corks out of the soil."

During the flood, the main gravel road was used as a dike. Houses and the church were underwater and/or accumulated so much mould and chronic dampness that they are unsalvageable. Photos 1 and 2 show the extensive flooding that engulfed houses, despite sand bagging. This left community members without sheltered structures in which to gather as a community.

The evacuation required people to leave most possessions behind and disperse into different hotels in the Interlake, Winnipeg, and other locations. Without a home, many people resided in hotels, without a kitchen to prepare nutritious food. Without a way to make meals, healthy diets were difficult to maintain.[59] The daily evacuee allowance of twenty-four dollars per adult per diem did not cover the costs of having to eat in restaurants. Families had to make tough choices, deciding each day who would eat and who would not, as the money would not cover three meals a day for all family members. This initial stipend was drastically reduced to four dollars per adult per day, and many people spiralled into debt, taking loans from friends and family. Families were forced to access food banks to supplement their basic needs and often went hungry.

Photo 1. Housing at Lake St. Martin First Nation affected by 2011 flood (photo credit: Myrle Ballard)

Photo 2. Aerial view of impact of 2011 flood on Lake St. Martin FN (photo credit: Ryan Klatt)

Financial Assets

Financial assets are generally low for people living on FN reserves. Few LSMFN community members have bank accounts and fewer still have access to credit, which is important to deal with emergencies and needed for credit checks to move from a hotel to be eligible for temporary housing.[60] As community members were told they would be away for only a few days, they left with no more than an overnight bag or several suitcases. Lacking access to their property, their provisional needs were costly and could not be addressed adequately for lack of credit, low cash reserves, or no money at all.

Each family lost their individual homes and personal property through water damage or mould. These homes had been in the family sometimes for generations. The communal land and home ownership model of Aboriginal and Northern Development Canada prevented band members

from acquiring home ownership, which would normally allow people to accumulate home equity over their lifetimes. Without home ownership, compensation for the houses was not provided, even where significant upgrades and investments in the property were made. For example, a 78-year-old grandmother and lifetime resident on the reserve received a letter from the province's Emergency Measures Organization stating she was ineligible for compensation for the porch and garage she had paid for herself. Other evacuees received similar letters and no compensation.

Participants said that financial compensation should replace their losses. Compensation was not provided to replace homes, nor was there adequate compensation to replace lost income when flooding destroyed livelihood. For example, after destruction of the fisheries, commercial licences belonging to LSMFN fishers were given away in 2011—and the fishers received only 5,000 dollars in compensation. These fishers and their families cannot survive on this meagre compensation.[61]

Financial assets at the community level remain low after the flood. Lake St. Martin FN is dependent on the federal government for all revenues, lacking any band-owned business. Thus, any funding for health, education, and social programming as well as for physical infrastructure must come from the federal government. Like many FNs on marginal and remote lands, LSMFN fell into debt, with the result that many years ago it was placed under third-party management, under which accounting firms control all band funding and management. A large share of the funding to FNs goes to third-party accounting firms. This lack of control over financial resources meant that community leaders had no funding to conduct a health-needs assessment of community members. A health-needs assessment remains urgently needed to determine how to resolve health issues.

Institutional and Policy Impacts on the Experiences of Flooding and Relocation

Institutions and policies play a large role in determining the degree of risk that communities are subjected to by floods. Canadian provinces govern and manage water and all other natural resources; however, it is the federal government that is responsible for FN communities. Thus, a jurisdictional divide occurs regarding First Nations and access and management of resources. This jurisdictional division has curtailed any involvement of FNs in provincial water management decision-making processes.[62] Even intergovernmental forums, which are established to discuss national and international environmental concerns—for example, the Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment—failed to invite First Nations to the table.

The provincial government has the authority and mandate to manage water resources. The Province of Manitoba and their utilities have taken the approach that waterways are a common property resource, without recognizing that FN peoples have special rights to waterways or a right to accommodation.[63] Thus, the province controlled the water and developed dams and water-control structures for hydroelectricity in the "common good," with the "bads" inequitably falling on FN communities.[64] Provincial guidelines for operating dams privilege residential property and agricultural land over FNs communities.[65] Manitoba's government officials protected provincial land, following provincial guidelines, by channelling the water to FNs, through the Fairford Dam.[66]

First Nation lands are absent from any consideration in provincial water policy documents. Manitoba's operating guidelines of the Portage Diversion, which affects many FNs, do not mention FNs: "The Portage Diversion operating guidelines allow it to be used for three objectives: minimizing the volume of water diverted to Lake Manitoba, protecting the city of Winnipeg or preventing ice from jamming on the Assiniboine River east of Portage la Prairie."[67] Now 85 per cent of the LSMFN reserve has been ruled unsuitable for construction or rebuilding, as a result of the operation of the Portage Diversion and the control structure that place this area at high risk from flooding.

As well as riparian rights, Aboriginal peoples have a right to consultation on development that affects their treaty rights.[68] Despite having these rights and the duty of government to consult, LSMFN community members said that they have never been consulted about water levels at any time before or after the Fairford control structure was established. Lake St. Martin FN and other reserves nearby opposed drawing down Lake Manitoba water by way of Lake St. Martin flooding. To be able to channel more water to Lake St. Martin, the province applied the Emergency Measures Act, to override the requirement for an environmental assessment and the duty to consult on the 2011 $100 million water channel from Lake St. Martin to Buffalo Marsh, Big Buffalo Lake and into Buffalo Creek, although it borders the LSMFN reserve.

These provincial water decisions were not the only areas where the province did not provide meaningful consultation about their residences. The province chose both a temporary and permanent site, against the wishes of LSMFN. The LSMFN community voted to achieve a permanent settlement immediately at site 9 and bypass any temporary settlements to meet its economic, social, and cultural goals. The FN community had negotiated with the landowners of site 9 for a fair price of less than $2 million, and their sustainable community plan was endorsed by the Regional

Municipality of Grahamdale. However, the FN had no funds of their own to buy their chosen land and, according to the federal and provincial governments, the FN had no ability to choose their own land.

The province unilaterally decided the place for a temporary and final home for members of LSMFN. The provincial government invested $14 million of the federal government's money for temporary housing in 2011 at an abandoned military base, which was an unacceptable location, according to community members. Many families refused to move to the Manitoba Housing project on the military base, as it lacked piped water, piped sewage, a school, community centre, church, store, etc. In March 2013, only thirteen of the approximate sixty homes at this site were occupied by LSMFN evacuees. These actions by provincial government officials are reminders of the days of the Indian agent, when the federal government selected *skoonigans*—an Anishinaabe word that means "leftover land"—for FN reserves. History has repeated itself with the provincial choices of land for LSMFN.

The province purchased land adjacent to the flooded FN land in 2011 without consulting the FNs, with the intention of resettling the community at that site.[69] Participants said that the community needs a land base to regroup and rebuild its culture and social bonds. Under the stress of having no land base over such an extended period of time, many community members said that they feel increasingly pressured to accept this flood-prone and remote land with few economic development opportunities. At a workshop in 2013, the community created their LSMFN vision statement: "This Anishinaabe community is strong, sustainable and healing from the trauma of flooding and displacement on land free from flooding through empowering lifelong education, health and recreational services, abundant economic opportunities, rich cultural programming, healthy housing, state-of-the-art infrastructure and reconnecting to their ancestral lands."

To reach this vision, this community needs support to build its assets to overcome the trauma of displacement.

Conclusion

Lake St. Martin FN and other FNs have limited capacity to deal with flood impacts. A sustainable livelihood analysis indicated that community members of LSMFN were negatively affected by long-term flooding, as well as the 2011 superflood, which permanently displaced the entire community. Having low education levels, minimal financial resources, poor infrastructure, and lack of non-FN social networks, the community members had few resources, and these resources were diminished further. Presently, many evacuees are not having their basic needs met. Participants

said that they are suffering. Prior to the flood, LSMFN community members' assets were greatly reduced, compared to those of other Canadians and even other FN people, either on-reserve or off-reserve. Lake St. Martin FN has been impoverished for some time, with annual income less than one-tenth that of other FNs, and the flooding has required that many go to food banks to have enough to eat.

The impacts from flooding and dislocation on LSMFN are profound and extensive. Environmental and developmental displacement has resulted in community members describing themselves as refugees in their homeland. Participants reported that health impacts in their community include premature deaths, increased rates of suicides, miscarriages, mental health issues, and worsening of chronic diseases such as cancer, diabetes, and cardiovascular disease. The impact on community members is also expected to be more profoundly negative and long lasting than those subjected to other community relocations because of their deep attachment to their land and loss of subsistence and resource livelihoods.

Government and societal action is needed to uphold the rights of FNs and provide financial and human resources. In the low-resource settings of FN reserves, promotion of equitable and sustainable economic growth and culturally appropriate high-quality education is considered a necessary first step toward building their adaptive capacity for severe weather events, including floods.

By framing LSMFN and community members' experiences within the context of sustainable livelihoods, the negative role of the state in retaining and rebuilding assets of LSMFN becomes clear. Institutional and policy barriers, stemming from jurisdictional issues, as well as racism, has interfered with needed services and joint decision-making on water management and land for their new community. Policies regarding water management, post-evacuation services, and community redevelopment have not provided a voice for FNs to ensure their needs are met in a respectful and culturally appropriate way. In partnership with FNs, inclusive policies and procedures must be developed to prevent and mitigate future impacts of natural disasters and displacement.

Water institutions offer a way to move towards enhancing water governance and management strategies. However, FNs have to be at the table. Currently, FNs are not involved in decision-making on water management, nor are their interests are being considered when water-level decisions are being developed and implemented. The jurisdictional division of provincial water management has to be remedied so that FNs have a strong voice in the water-management decision-making process. Water management requires new

governance structures with increased participation of FN and other vulnerable peoples in decision-making.

Notes

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Colonial Walls: Psychic Strategies in Contemporary Mining-Related Displacement

Paula Butler

Abstract

In May 2011, African Barrick Gold, owner of the North Mara Gold Mine in northern Tanzania, announced a plan to erect a three-metre-high concrete wall to enhance security against incursions from local (displaced) populations. Taking this wall as both metaphorical and material, this paper questions the psychological impact of displacement on "displacers." How does this subject avoid psychic implosion? My review identifies legal infrastructure, mythologies of Canadian benevolence, CSR discourses, and community consultations as operating to provide psychic scaffolding for this dominant subject, who is thus inured against psychic distress and implosion in response to conditions of what can be deemed routine structural violence.

Résumé

En mai 2011, l'African Barrick Gold, propriétaire de la mine d'or du nord du Mara, au nord de la Tanzanie, a annoncé le projet de construire un mur de béton de trois mètres de haut afin d'augmenter la sécurité face aux incursions des populations locales (déplacées). En considérant ce mur de façon matérielle et métaphorique, cet article soulève la question de ses impacts psychologiques sur ces populations de « déplacés », et demande comment les individus concernés éviteront « l'implosion psychique ». Cette étude identifie les infrastructures légales, les mythologies de la bienfaisance canadienne, les discours de RSE et les consultations communautaires en tant que moyens pour fournir le soutien nécessaire pour aguerrir les sujets contre la détresse psychique et l'implosion en réponse à des conditions pouvant être considérées comme une violence structurelle continue.

Following the shooting in May 2011 of five Tanzanians at the perimeter of a largely Canadian-owned gold mine in northern Tanzania, the company announced a plan to construct around the mine site a 12-kilometre-long, three-meter-high concrete wall,[1] topped with electrified barbed wire and studded with closed-circuit security cameras. This decision was a response to repeated confrontations between community residents—often artisanal miners—and the mine security. Effectively, a Canadian-financed and majority-owned gold mine was established on Tanzanian soil from which local Tanzanian citizens and miners had been successively displaced, and who were now to be more definitively walled out.

While much "displacement literature" focuses on the impact of displacement on displaced populations, the questions I want to explore pertain to the subjects inside the wall, both literally and figuratively: the expatriates, senior managers, shareholders, and investors. Casting the "walled mine" as a type of gated community with historical links to colonial-era walled forts, I draw on post-colonial and critical race theory to analyze "the displacer" as a neo-liberal subject who operates in a contemporary zone of neo-colonialist power relations. Psychologically, what is required of this subject? What psychic gymnastics does this subject engage in to "live with" complicity regarding conditions of racialized structural violence in the form of large-scale displacement, loss, death, dispossession, and impoverishment (or exclusion from wealth) as it affects those living in the

vicinity of the mine? How does or can the "displacer" relate to "the displaced"?

This study, which draws specifically on the experiences at the North Mara Gold Mine, owned by African Barrick Gold (ABG), in northern Tanzania, builds on previous research with Canadian mining professionals who had worked in numerous African countries. With reference to the North Mara gold mine, I have had no direct access to the Canadian, expatriate, or other managerial employees at the mine in question.[2] I characterize this lack of access as, in itself, part of the psychic shielding offered to these subjects, just as the wall is placed around the mine's valuable resources. Methodologically, I am left to peruse the assemblage of corporate discourses, legal tactics, social technologies such as community consultations, and the installation of security and surveillance systems as a collection of mirrors through which something of the psychology of the displacer is reflected, can be discerned, and is tentatively theorized. Indeed, the extensive, interlocking nature of this assemblage is some indication of the depth of psychic risk to "displacers."

Directing the gaze to this dominant, ostensibly secured figure is not intended to marginalize or disregard the experiences of those who have been displaced; rather, it is intended to generate some further insights into the processes that continue to make tenable colonialist systems of domination in a formally post-colonial era. I draw on the idea of the wall as a metaphor for contemporary colonial binaries, and on the actual material existence of the fence/wall around portions of the North Mara mine site, as conceptual locations from which to consider the psychological dimensions of displacement as embodied in the displacers. In drawing attention to the micro-investments and tensions at the level of individual psyches in such operations, I offer a more comprehensive assessment of what is at stake and what would have to be transformed in order to respond to and realize what Ranjana Khanna terms "the call of justice for the future."[3]

Setting the Context: The North Mara Gold Mine

Mining in Tanzania predated the colonial era, then attracted the attention of both the German and British colonial rulers.[4] In 1979, under Nyerere's governance, a mining law was introduced that encouraged local Tanzanian mining of gemstones, gold, and other metals and minerals.[5] During the 1980s and 1990s, hundreds of thousands of Tanzanians took up employment as what came to be called "small-scale" or "artisanal" miners, principally in the Lake Victoria "gold belt" region in northern Tanzania. A USAID study published in 2001 indicated not only that by 1995, some 550,000 Tanzanians made their living at least partially

from small-scale mining, but that this economic activity had played a surprisingly significant role in reducing poverty.[6] The advent of structural adjustment programs in the context of economic liberalization advocated by the World Bank and other Western donors led to the adoption of a new, foreign-investment-friendly mining code in 1998.[7] Among other elements, such as tax concessions and the elimination of "performance requirements" (e.g., local sourcing; employment of nationals), the new law allowed total ownership of mines by foreign companies. In response, a number of Canadian and other foreign mining and mining-exploration companies entered Tanzania. By the early 2000s several major foreign-owned industrial gold mines were operating—Bulyanhulu (ABG), North Mara (ABG), Tulawaka (ABG), Buzwagi (ABG), Geita (AngloGold Ashanti), Golden Pride (Resolute)—in areas where, in most cases, Tanzanian artisanal miners had been active.

There continue to be conflicting assessments regarding the benefits to the nation of artisanal mining versus foreign-investment-led industrial mining. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to address this question in depth, a brief synopsis helps to set the context for understanding circumstances at North Mara. On one side, it is asserted that artisanal mining employs a vastly greater number of people and sees far more of the revenues reinvested in local communities and economies, as well as in the national economy, and is thus more significant in terms of poverty-reduction.[8] By contrast, advocates of foreign-owned industrial mining argue that the smaller number of jobs provided are safer and pay better, that there are far greater tax revenues that go into government coffers, and that industrial mining is able to access the resource at greater depths than can artisanal methods. Both sides accuse the other of illicit and illegal financial practices that reduce the revenues available to the nation (for example, smuggling on the part of artisanals;[9] corporate accounting practices that reduce taxes and other fees payable by foreign companies to the "host" government).[10]

The North Mara gold mine, owned initially by Afrika Masharki Gold Mines, an Australian company, came into production in 2002. It was acquired in 2003 by Placer Dome Tanzania (wholly owned by Vancouver-based Placer Dome Inc. of Canada), which in turn was acquired in 2006 by Barrick Gold Inc. In 2010 Barrick Gold created a separate company, African Barrick Gold (ABG), which is 74 per cent owned by Barrick. The North Mara Gold Mine is currently owned by ABG. The mine consisted initially of one open pit, the Nyabirama pit, with two additional pits, the Nyabigena and Gokona pits, subsequently opened. In 2011, production at North Mara was reported at 170,000 ounces of gold, at a production cost of US$810/ounce;[11] at that time, gold was

selling in the range of US$1,900 an ounce. The value of gold produced in one year from the North Mara mine alone was thus in the range of US$170 million.

There are a number of communities located in the vicinity of the pits, with the urbanized town of Nyangoto, at the edge of the Nyabirama pit, being the largest. The area is reported to be unique in that there was historically little in-migration to engage in mining; rather, most of the artisanal miners and local citizens are ethnically Wakuria, born in the area or indigenous to the area for generations. This suggests that there was considerable local sense of ownership of the territory and its resources, and it may explain why, from the arrival of the foreign companies in this mining area up to the present, there has been continuing discontent, complaints, and opposition from local community members.

While the number of Canadians and other expatriates who are employed by North Mara Gold Mine is relatively modest (approximately 15 per cent of the workforce, which totalled 2,329 employees in 2011),[12] the company is perceived as Canadian and signifies the installation of a Canadian presence in Tanzania. Its operation and expansion has been financed largely by capital raised on Canadian stock markets, as well as, since 2010, on the London Stock Exchange, where ABG is listed. Moreover, to the extent that Canada is perceived as a "white man country" with a British heritage, this presence assumes racialized dimensions with relatively recent historical colonial associations. I suggest that such associations subtend the chronic conflicts that have occurred at North Mara.

The first major traumas experienced by local residents due to the arrival of foreign mining companies were the land appropriations and forced evictions. A study funded by a global mining industry association, the International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM), presents the history:

> Mineral rights to some of the land required for the Nyabirama and Nyabigena pits was acquired by means of agreements with holders of mining claims—11 mineral rights holders at Nyabirama and five villages and two individual mineral rights holders at Nyabigena, as well as surface rights holders …
>
> The majority of land required was compulsorily acquired from over 500 surface rights holders who were relocated, over a number of years, to allow the mine and its infrastructure to be built. Over one thousand others were also compensated for loss of crops or surface improvements on land which was needed for roads, the airstrip or other mine infrastructure.[13]

Another account of these events appears in a complaint lodged by the Lawyers Environmental Action Team (LEAT), with the Tanzanian Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance. LEAT's "Complaint relating to Violations of Fundamental Rights and Duties Arising from Forced Evictions of Artisanal Miners from Afrika Mashariki Gold Mine, Tarime" described the events in graphic terms:

> On or about August 6, 2001, a heavily armed police Field Force Unit ("FFU") squadron … invaded the complainants' villages and, after four days of armed operations, violently drove the complainants out of their settlements and properties at Nyabigena and Nyabirama. During this violent operation, the said FFU squadron shot and wounded numerous villagers and—in collaboration with employees, workmen and/or agents of EAGM / Afrika Mashariki—destroyed the complainants' residential and commercial houses, mine workings, equipment, farms and growing crops. In addition, as a result of the said violent and forced evictions, EAGM / Afrika Mashariki took possession of the Nyabigena and Nyabirama sites including the properties lawfully held and owned by the complainants and have, since November 2002, operated the Afrika Mashariki Mine. At no point before, during or after the forced evictions did EAGM / Afrika Mashariki ever pay or offer to pay just, fair and reasonable compensation to the complainants for losses arising out of, or connected with, the forced evictions. At no point before, or subsequent to, the evictions did EAGM / Afrika Mashariki prepare or plan, finance or implement any resettlement or relocation plan or provide alternative lands; complainants, their families and dependants have been forced to live in great hardship. The combined loss suffered by the complainants as a result of these actions or omissions is conservatively estimated at Tanzania Shillings 50,920,000,000 (fifty billion, nine hundred and twenty million only) at the 1996 value of the Tanzania Shillings.[14]

Despite the assertion in the ICMM-funded study that "compensation has been processed for all landholders and lease and claim holders, which is designed to offset the inconvenience of loss of land,"[15] there are other indications that many of the claims for compensation for these and subsequent losses remain unresolved. African Barrick Gold's *Responsible Mining Report 2012* notes that of 443 grievances filed with ABG in 2012, 396 were lodged at the North Mara mine, where "the majority of new grievances continue to relate to historic land compensation matters."[16]

Having been displaced from the gold-rich areas, or lacking other sources of comparable income, many youth and adults "scavenge" for gold among the rock piles at the perimeter of the mine property. In some places, the original fence around the site had been torn down. These circumstances led to recurrent confrontations with security guards and police seconded to guard the mine. In 2005, two deaths

were reported; in 2006 another villager was shot by police; in 2008 a young man was shot by a security guard;[17] in 2011 five young men aged 25–35, among a large number of people hunting for gold-bearing ore at the perimeter of the mine, were shot and killed;[18] and two more deaths at North Mara Gold Mine, under similar circumstances, were reported in March 2013.[19] On several occasions, the deaths triggered mass protests from local community members who invaded the mine and caused extensive damage. Many arrests ensued. Moreover, a number of cases of sexual assault, allegedly perpetrated by North Mara mine security, were reported.[20] In addition, environmental complaints related to spills, contamination of the local river, and consequent ill health had been made. In response, a 2009 study investigating the presence of trace metal concentrations in local soil and water sources, conducted jointly by the Norwegian University of Life Sciences and the University of Dar es Salaam, Department of Botany, found evidence of high levels of arsenic and expressed concern regarding the lack of protection of local food and water sources from mine-related contamination.[21]

Although this paper is not focused directly on the impact of all these events on the members of local communities, such impacts have been documented by, among others, Tanzania's Legal and Human Rights Centre[22] and Canadian documentary photographer Allan Lissner, who reports,

> Since the mine opened in 2002, the Mwita family say that they live in a state of constant anxiety because they have been repeatedly harassed and intimidated by the mine's private security forces and by government police. There have been several deadly confrontations in the area and every time there are problems at the mine, the Mwita family say their compound is the first place the police come looking. During police operations the family scatters in fear to hide in the bush, "like fugitives," for weeks at a time waiting for the situation to calm down. They used to farm and raise livestock, "but now there are no pastures because the mine has almost taken the whole of the land … we have no sources of income and we are living only through God's wishes … We had never experienced poverty before the mine came here." They say they would like to be relocated, but the application process has been complicated, and they feel the amount of compensation they have been offered is 'candy.'"[23]

The accumulation of complaints at North Mara culminated most recently in the decision of 12 local residents to launch a civil law suit. On 30 July 2013, Leigh Day, a British law firm, filed proceedings in the United Kingdom High Court against African Barrick Gold and North Mara Gold Mine Ltd. for "deaths and injuries."[24] The allegations, which

have yet to be tested in court, are vigorously denied by the companies.

Of course, the company actively responded to all these events and problems, not only with "enhanced security" projects but with a number of widely publicized community outreach and community development programs. The North Mara Co-Existence Plan encompasses Village Benefits Implementation Agreements that have been signed with seven villages in the region. These agreements, totalling some $8.5 million over a three-year period (with likely prospects of a second three-year tranche at similar funding levels), typically feature provision of school infrastructure, access to water supply, upgraded health services, road improvements, and electricity supply. The company also supports community projects through its Maendaleo Fund, which is financed at $10 million/year and touted as the largest such development fund in Tanzania. According to ABG's *Responsible Mining Report 2012*, $1.4 million was spent on community development projects in the vicinity of the North Mara mine. A non-governmental organization called CanEducate, created by ABG employees, raised a further $127,000 for educational projects in 2012. In a discussion about events (particularly the number of deaths) at the North Mara Gold Mine in the British House of Lords on 26 November 2013, it was noted that the British high commissioner to Tanzania had visited North Mara and learned that "up to $12 million-worth has been spent on corporate social responsibility, including healthcare centres, schools and water boreholes."[25] The company also contracted the services of a conflict-resolution agency, Search for Common Ground, to provide human rights and conflict-reduction training with police, security personnel, and other relevant community groups.[26]

"Forting Up": Walls, Displacement, and Neo-colonial Power

Population displacement and the rise of "gated communities" have been identified as phenomena that often characterize contemporary capitalist "globalization."[27] The emergence of gated communities, featuring walls, security cameras, alarms, and private guards—a phenomenon Dupuis and Thorns call "forting up"[28]—is explained as a fear of crime and feelings of insecurity in contexts of both growing affluence of the elite class, and growing economic disparity. While there are occasional reports of benefits to neighbouring poor communities,[29] much of the literature on gating identifies it as a classed and raced bunker mentality, an exclusionary choice on the part of a dominant class to "not know" how the Other actually lives and to accede to a comfortable existence of non-awareness and non-accountability. While Dupuis and Thorns analyze the phenomenon

as a psychological response to risk—with allusions to the walled forts erected by European colonizers—they do not explicitly extend their analysis of the psychology of risk to the risks that could be deemed inherent in a global order characterized by racialized structural inequality rooted in colonial histories of land and resource appropriation. It is the anxiety of the historical "usurper" that I posit as a problem to be managed for the contemporary subject secured inside the walls (literally and figuratively) at the North Mara Gold Mine.

As was clear during European imperialism, there is often a direct correspondence between gating/forting, territorial incursions, and population displacements. In the context of the neo-liberal development model, foreign-investment-led industrial mining is understood to foster economic growth and thus contribute to poverty reduction. For such reasons, local population displacements are deemed a reasonable trade-off, given the economic benefits that are purported to accrue to the nation and the local region. The challenge then is to design effective methods for the movement of populations, resettlement, and compensation packages in order to maintain a "social licence" to operate. However, the empirical evidence demonstrating the incidence of increased impoverishment resulting from development-induced displacement has been sobering. Cernea notes that payments of compensation to those who have been displaced are "universally insufficient and inherently prone to distortion"; this results in "project-induced impoverishment."[30] He cites likely risks from displacement as encompassing landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalization, increased morbidity and mortality, educational losses, food insecurity, loss of common property, and social disarticulation.[31] He notes that "if resettlers become worse off, it is nearly always an indicator that project costs have not been properly internalised. They have been transferred to resettlers, who end up poorer than they were before the project" (and who could therefore, he adds, be regarded as investors—albeit involuntary ones—in the mining project).[32] Still, despite Cernea's important recognition of the cultural, social, and psychological dimensions of the experience of displacement for those displaced, the problem of displacement remains primarily technical—a matter of "getting it right."

Anti-colonial, post-colonial, critical race, and Marxist scholars bring a different explanatory framework to industrial-mining-related displacement. European-dominated global mining—or "predatory extractivism"[33]—is situated as a classic instance of (in Marxist terminology) "primitive accumulation," both a foundational and continuing requirement of the expanding capitalist system.[34] Thus the account of the lands at North Mara that were "compulsorily acquired" from local Tanzanian citizens by Euro-Western mining companies exemplifies the logic and historical practice of primitive accumulation. Racist colonial attitudes and the application of colonial power—by definition non-democratic and fascist—facilitated primitive accumulation in the past, but clear continuities are identified in the present. What this suggests is that primitive accumulation cannot be temporally associated with a brutal past era of colonialism and overt racism that has ended, but rather that colonialist power relations persist in the present. This was first recognized by Kwame Nkrumah, who in 1965 coined the term "neo-colonialism"[35] with reference to continued European domination of the African continental mining sector, and was more recently identified by Bohm and Misoczky who assert, with reference to their study of local resistance to the Alumbrera mine in Argentina, "Neocolonialism is precisely what we think is going on here: the term emphasizes repetition with difference, a regeneration of colonialism through other means."[36] From this perspective, population displacements are a kind of collateral damage of primitive accumulation, a form of structural violence that manifests in people's actual lives as illness, stress, unemployment, poverty, and reduced longevity. Banerjee coined the term "necrocapitalism" to capture the death-dealing effects of such processes.[37] What this indicates, additionally, is that the characteristics of colonial state-corporate power—bureaucratic, militarized, racist, and non-democratic or fascist—persist in thin disguise in some expressions of the modern state. Coloniality may be far less an aberration, or "state of exception," vis-à-vis the Enlightenment state of democracy, equality, and human rights, than is customarily assumed. Indeed, having analyzed Nazism from the perspective of Europe's colonies, Aimé Césaire[38] challenged the supposed exceptionality of European fascism and suggested that a fascist/colonialist exercise of power lies in wait, as an ultimate possibility, in the shadows of the Western liberal democratic capitalist state. Thus colonial violence can be anticipated—and should not come as a surprise—in neo-liberal modernity.

Psychic Dimensions of Neo-colonialism
This gives rise to questions about the kind of psychic tension and distress such a system must engender, and an appreciation for the elaborate socio-cultural architecture that must be constructed to obscure neo-colonial power and relations of domination, to garner consent and participation. How can the displacer, occupying a position of whiteness—in which whiteness, according to Tifsberger,[39] is "a history of seizure"—be enabled not to feel distressed or to implode psychologically? In fact, the psychological and social processes required to inure colonizers or displacers against the traumatic knowledge of colonial-racial violence

have been developed over several centuries and are finely engrained in Western epistemology and culture. Bergland, Loomba,[40] and Tifsberger, among others, identify psychology and psychoanalysis as a colonial discipline: as a new field of knowledge that emerged at the cusp of European colonialism (early 1900s) and was infused with the racial-colonial imaginary of colonialism. From this perspective, psychoanalysis could be interpreted as a social technology of psychic harm–reduction and management: if the source of psychoses could be located and fixed in the private realm of individual experience (especially childhood and experiences in the nuclear family, typically understood through a Eurocentric, Western lens) then historical socio-economic and political causes of psychic anxiety and distress could be denied.

Scholars such as Nelson, Chrisman, and Bergland[41] explored the collective psychological impact and psychic adaptations of colonizer subjects in relation to British imperialism in Africa and the colonization of America. In their work, land appropriation is identified as a central source of psychological uneasiness, sometimes manifested in nightmares and the prevalence of ("Indian") ghost stories.[42] Welch[43] investigates how Alexis de Tocqueville, a leading 19th-century French theorist of liberalism, and author of *Democracy in America,* managed the "cognitive dissonance" produced by the contradiction between his own liberal values—of which private property rights, and their legal protection, was central—and the atrocities perpetrated by the French military against Algerian peasants during the mid-1800s. These atrocities included mass killings of Algerian civilians and land seizures.[44] Welch notes that Tocqueville repressed recognition of the rights of indigenous populations in Algeria, developed "patterns of evasion" and a practice of mental "absenting" in which "atrocious events [that] cannot be reasonably accommodated in any larger schema of the political imagination … must … be made 'absent' to that imagination."[45] In *The Wretched of the Earth*, Fanon provides an account of a French-Algerian settler employed as a torturer of Algerian prisoners; this man came to Dr. Fanon for psychiatric treatment as he had become violent with his own wife and children. Fanon observes, "As he could not see his way to stop torturing people (that made nonsense to him for in that case he would have to resign) he asked me without beating about the bush to help him go on torturing Algerian patriots without any prickings of conscience, without any behaviour problems, and with complete equanimity."[46]

This "patient" wished to repress knowledge of his role in colonial domination in order to continue to reap its benefits (in this case, stable employment and livelihood). Colonial relations of domination appear to require dominant subjects to deny, block, suppress, or reframe the knowledge that they are harming (or killing) others, or enjoying what may rightfully belong to others. Lastly, racialization has proved central to these processes. As indicated earlier, Tifsberger[47] identifies "whiteness" as "a history of seizure"—a synonym, certainly, for "primitive accumulation." She asserts that such history is embedded in the white psyche, where it rests as an "unconscious memory of threat" that creates a "blank space"—a determined absence of knowledge of imperialist harm—that functions to protect and stabilize whiteness.

Walled-in at North Mara: Technologies of Protection

Contemporary global mining is thus situated in a web of unresolved historical trauma associated with colonial and racial violence; as such, it, too, requires and produces a range of psychic manoeuvres on the part of its participants. Without denying the individual agency of the displacers, I suggest that these subjects are collectively assisted and protected by an elaborate social, legal, and discursive architecture designed to make them (us) not know, not feel, not have to recognize, and not to have to be fully accountable for the meaning and effects of their (our) presence. This structure, which obscures its own foundations in order to garner consent and participation, demonstrates several common features: (1) the use of law as hegemonic power, (2) racialized representations of Self versus Other, (3) seemingly apolitical managerial and social technologies (e.g., "village benefit agreements") packaged in progressive discourses (e.g., "corporate social responsibility"), and (4) the alignment of the "global South host state" with the interests of foreign capital. Such scaffolding protects the psyche of the colonizer/displacer and in turn secures the neo-liberal-colonialist resource extraction project.

Central to such psychic self-preservation is a strategy of ambiguity, dissemblance, and porosity. This strategy operates as a unifying logic drawing together the disparate elements identified above. For instance, the concrete wall proposed at the North Mara Gold Mine shortly after the deaths of 16 May 2011 would have replaced the existing fence that had proved to be too permeable and porous; it had gaps, places where the fence had been pulled down, and where people—local artisanal miners, for instance—could get through and obtain some partial access to the resource.[48] The fence with gaps, the porous fence, as it were, presents a model for the psychic stance preferred by the neo-liberal subject who occupies a place inside the walled mine. If awareness of lack of personal integrity is one of the psychic traumas that must be eliminated in order for displacers to continue their work, what becomes necessary is the establishment of a "grey zone," a political-discursive space of ambiguity and possibility in which the integrity of

the colonizer/displacer subject appears feasible.[49] The paradigm of the porous fence enables the displacer to participate simultaneously in walling out the illegalized Other, while engaging hierarchically with the Other as a benefactor. The porosity thus preserves space for the displacers to assert their goodness and civility—to hide and erase from memory and view their foundational illegitimacy, and to naturalize their presence in a pseudo-state role as provider of social services: health, education, water supply, electricity, roads, etc. This is, however, a deliberately duplicitous and ambiguous stance, as the gesture of kindliness and "win-win scenarios" (as symbolized by the Village Benefits Agreements, and disbursements from the Maendaleo Fund) vis-à-vis those who have been displaced and dispossessed is always, in the final instance, conditioned by the possibility of erecting a solid, impervious wall topped with electrified barbed wire and monitored by closed-circuit television. Symbolically, this indicates the absolute right, on the part of the white capitalist investor, to the resource. The question as to whether the colonizers/displacers is conscious of the effect of their actions—do they know what they are doing, or have they successfully suppressed and re-narrated such knowledge—remains productively open, porous, and indeterminable. This is a necessary aspect of neo-liberal authority. The construction of a more impermeable wall—the "forting up" process—is accompanied paradoxically by a simultaneous acceleration of community outreach programs[50] including, as noted earlier, the hiring of a significantly named NGO, Search for Common Ground. Ironically, the erection of the concrete, barbed-wire-topped wall eliminates any actual "common ground" and effectively proclaims the foreign mining company's assertion of legal title to the concession and entitlement to Tanzanian gold. The physical porosity of the failed fence gives way now to a narrative and imaginary of porosity: the idea that the company can both wall out the local people and engage the local people in life-enhancing social programming. It is this duality that offers psychic protection to the displacer.

Paradoxically, the notion of porosity acknowledges the agency of the displaced populations. It is these populations who have broken down sections of the pre-existing fence in order to assert and acquire their means to live; it is their continuous resistance and refusal of the conditions and effects of displacement that have compelled the foreign-owned mine to engage in the host of actions itemized earlier, ranging from building a stronger wall, to contracting a consulting firm to develop conflict-resolution approaches, to directing some of the mine's profit to meeting local community needs. Unsatisfied with the response to date from the company, and perhaps in response subconsciously to what is symbolized by the concrete barbed-wire-topped wall, a group of twelve community members launched the legal suit mentioned earlier. These subjects may have lost loved ones and income, but they have not become defeated victims. The local community members' continuing memory of displacement, frustration, refusal, anger, and outrage at the injustices experienced is a major historical force driving events at this site. It is this anger and refusal that continuously batters both the fence/wall *and* the mythologies and discourses established to protect the displacers' psychological comfort and sense of integrity. However, the erection of the more impervious wall also signals a loss for the militant community members who have neither recovered their land nor forced out the foreigners, but are now subjected to a more intensified process of pacification (i.e., via the various community development projects and programs) and an aggressive response to their litigation.

Metaphorically, the porosity of the fence and of relations of power within the neo-liberal-colonialist context also provokes insights concerning the racial ambiguity of the displacer. As some 86 per cent of the mine employees at North Mara are national citizens—Tanzanians—the displacer figure is not always or necessarily a phenotypically white or expatriate subject, although it is a subject that occupies a position of racial dominance in the system of globalized capitalist resource extraction. In speaking of the "displacer," I assign much less complicity to those employed in working-class positions—i.e., the majority of Tanzanians employed at the mine—and rather look to those in professional, management, and senior roles, and, primarily, to the less-visible head office employees, company directors, and shareholders. In order to cut operating costs, ABG is intent on increased "localization" of professional employees. Over time, there will be fewer phenotypically white bodies in managerial, professional, and senior positions (although the Board of Directors and shareholders will remain overwhelmingly white). Similarly, many of the security officers and most police—those most likely to chase away or pull the trigger on locals accused of trespassing, stealing, etc.—are Tanzanians. A classic strategy of neo-liberalism is the blurring of what W. E. B. Dubois called "the colour line";[51] thus, the recruitment of Black Tanzanians into a colonial project of whiteness-as-seizure is another instance of the strategy of ambiguous porosity. This is a reinvention and redeployment of the older British strategy of "indirect rule" but one that still enables the white colonizer/displacer to remain invisibly in control, appropriate the bulk of the wealth, and simultaneously claim a position of innocence and benevolence. This guarantees psychic protection for phenotypically white employees (white Canadian or expatriates from another country including white South Africans) who can distance themselves from both overt and covert violence

and maintain a sense of themselves as "civilized," peace-keepers, etc. For example, it is still the white mine manager and his wife who appear in the media photo ops shaking hands with local village residents at the time of the signing of the Village Benefits Implementation Agreement.[52] This subject can freely move outside the fence/wall into the surrounding communities and in so doing resecures his own sense of innocence, goodness, and psychological comfort. He can thus avoid confronting and coming to terms with any fundamental injustice related to his presence.

Despite Canada's (highly ironic) official claims to have never been a colonizing power, Canada is an identifiable colonialist presence in Tanzanian gold mining. Tanzania is a formally independent nation, and Canada does not formally or directly govern the country; however, as the home-state to many of the companies that initiated the expansion of industrial mining in Tanzania since at least the mid-1990s, Canada plays a very influential role. Canadian diplomats and company executives participated in the drafting of the 1998 mining law. That input has been partially moderated with the introduction of the new 2010 mining law, even while some provisions from 1998 continue to protect companies' interests.[53] Canadian companies dominate Tanzania's mining sector, which has positioned Tanzania as one of the most important emerging gold-producing countries globally. A Canadian company is managing the development of Tanzania's first uranium mine.[54] Canada recently signed a bilateral foreign investment protection treaty (FIPA) with Tanzania, the terms of which offer strong protections against expropriation and international dispute-resolution mechanisms for Canadian private investors in Tanzania—with very little likelihood of reciprocal benefit for Tanzanian investors in Canada.[55] Indeed, this FIPA could be regarded as designed to be a hedge against the slightly more nationalistic content of the revised 2010 mining act—content that reflected increased popular demands from the Tanzanian citizenry to benefit from the country's mining wealth. As an investment destination, however, Canada touts Tanzania as an exemplary African country.[56]

This backing by law, by the free market legal framework, offers "displacers" a sense of entitlement, security, and thus a certain peace of mind. As a sign of rationality and fairness, the law can remain unquestioned and unidentified as a class- and race-based relation and strategy of power.[57] Indeed, the neo-colonialist legal framework—despite the considerable outlay of time and energy required to introduce it—becomes naturalized and universalized. Laws deployed to secure the rights of the displacer to be present and to extract wealth are presented in the terms of a naturalized rationality that anaesthetizes and thus soothes the psyche of the displacer.

As a white settler state, Canada has an established history of hiding or recasting its colonial practices.[58] As Canada's mining industry has rapidly expanded globally in the past 25 years, the Canadian state and mining industry have been vigorously engaged in countering charges of harm and representing Canada as a benefactor vis-à-vis mining-region populations. Exemplifying this agenda is the controversial decision, announced in early 2012, to provide multi-million-dollar aid funding for Canadian NGOs delivering community development programs in partnership with Canadian mining companies, in communities adjacent to the mines, as well as the creation by the federal government of the \$25-million Canadian International Institute for Extractive Industries and Development. As a discourse and set of now-routine institutional practices, "corporate social responsibility" (CSR) has been a central component of these objectives. In relation to the North Mara Gold Mine, the expanding set of community-focused programs—the Village Benefits Agreements, North Mara Co-existence Plan, Maendaleo Fund, social benefits programming, conflict-reduction training, sports programs, etc.—is evidence of the importance now placed by AGB on "securing a social licence"—i.e., gaining the acceptance or acquiescence of the local populations to their presence. Such initiatives, along with the government-funded programs mentioned, can be understood as part of the cultural-psychological scaffolding required to inure colonizer-displacers against both apprehension of and shock at structural violence of grotesque proportions. Individual displacers can rather identify with these programs of ostensible goodness, benevolence, and civility, and can reference these initiatives to protect their/ our own psyches both in relation to their/our own sense of self/sense of integrity and in relation to others' demands for accountability.

Finally, in the context of Canada's globalized mining industry, the assertion of Canadian goodness is secured to a significant degree through counter-posing those "African Others" (e.g., artisanal miners) who challenge and resist the Canadian mining presence as lawless, criminal, violent, and savage. Through this representational move, the displacer subjects are enabled to feel secure in the justice of their presence on the land and their access to the valuable mineral resource.[59] For example, in attempting to contextualize the frequent conflicts at the North Mara site, the company's webpage presents the area as a rough, lawless place, a kind of "wild west" zone: "Among Barrick's operations and affiliates, the Mara region of Tanzania, in which African Barrick Gold (ABG) owns and operates the North Mara mine, is especially challenging. The North Mara mine is located in a very remote, underdeveloped part of the country in close proximity to the Kenyan border. In-migration from other

areas and countries is rampant and law enforcement capacity is limited, making the area a magnet for transients, criminals and organized crime. Civil unrest due to poverty is a particular problem in the area, a fact widely recognized by Tanzanian authorities."[60]

Along the same line, an employee of the NGO, Search for Common Ground, contracted by the mine to develop conflict-reduction strategies with local community members, describes the local Kuria culture: "It is a warrior culture and many local men join the military."[61] Such statements can be seen to subtly evoke deeply entrenched racist imagery in Euro-American culture in which a series of cultural-psychological associations fall into place: warrior, violent, criminal, savage, primitive, incompetent. In short order, such subjects are rendered illegitimate, such that their displacement and redirection into other kinds of simplistic economic activities ("micro-enterprise") can be regarded not as an injustice but rather as a reasonable manner of handling a militant or defiant population.

Conclusion

By introducing a micro-psychological dimension, I have suggested that what is at stake for displacers is both material advantage and psychic well-being. Transformative justice appears to threaten both. I am aware that throughout this discussion the central figures, the displacers, have remained blurred, indistinct, and abstracted. They/we—all shareholders, for instance—are not clearly seen and not directly heard. Yet, as I suggested at the outset, this very obscurity may be a necessary dimension of the scaffolding offered to these subjects. They/we must not be put in a position of having to answer for, or speak for, themselves/ourselves; rather, they/we are ensconced behind, and assigned phrases through, an elaborate system of scaffolding, consisting of, as I have shown, legal discourses and practices, mythologies of Canadian goodness, progressiveness, and benevolence, discourses of CSR, and social technologies such as Village Benefits Agreements that seem to disavow histories of dispossession. This elaborate psychic scaffolding allows them/us metaphorically to scale the wall, to leave the walled mine, and rub shoulders in a friendly manner with the local community members, while retaining the security the wall affords. The wall "walls out" undesirables; it does not "wall in" the privileged. The mobility of the latter is guaranteed.

In thinking through the multiple meanings of the erection of the stronger security wall at the North Mara Gold Mine—a response to local invasions, protest, refusal, and deaths—I have also suggested that neo-colonial power develops new techniques for garnering consent to structural violence, resource appropriation, and domination: specifically, porosity as subterfuge. Thus, the barbed-wire-topped concrete wall is not a sign of theft, greed, and ruthlessness, but a sign of life for the populations in the vicinity of the North Mara Gold Mine. Countering this narrative, it is still possible to imagine that the alternative to mining-induced displacement and impoverishment is not a better technical solution or more community development programs to acquire the "social licence" from what Cernea charmingly calls "resettlers" (i.e., rather than displaced populations), but a transformed power relation that recognizes indigenous/local peoples' (and global South host states') substantive right to self-determination and alterity in livelihood models.[62] This is precisely what is feared, the risk that must be eliminated. It is in response to this "fear of justice" that the porous wall is replaced by an impermeable concrete wall. A strongly protective foreign investment protection "agreement" is leveraged into place. Aggressive legal responses are made to civil litigation. These are not necessarily the displacers' preferred choices, but they are enacted when that is what is required to counter the justice-demanding energy of the displaced, to preserve access to lucrative resources, and to protect the displacers from psychic implosion. Inside the walls, the protected "displacer" subjects continue to apprehend themselves/ourselves as good people with kind hearts—much in the style of Fanon's French-Algerian torturer of Arab-Algerian patriots. Such strategies serve to intercept and declaw demands for the displacers to depart, to cede territory, lands, and resources back to those who were displaced and dispossessed. It is this action that, from the colonizer's perspective, can never be seriously considered.

NOTES

1. See Geoffrey York, "In an African Mine, Gold Fever Sparks a Deadly Clash," *Globe and Mail*, 8 June 2011. Veteran Canadian journalist Geoffrey York reported on the deaths and on the wall-building plan, slated to cost $14 million. Reference to the wall construction and installation of closed-circuit TVs along the wall can also be found in Barrick Gold Corporation, "Statement from Barrick Gold Corporation concerning the North Mara Mine, Tanzania," 30 May 2011, http://www.barrick.com/investors/news/news-details/2011/North-Mara-Mine-Tanzania/default.aspx. The wall was referenced again in an article in the *Tanzania Daily News* in which it was noted that "the Canadian investor has also been forced to set up a multimillion wall fence to boost safety and security at the mine." Jacob Mugini, "Tanzania: North Mara Gold Mine Enjoys Improved Relations with Locals," *Tanzania Daily News*, 23 April 2013.
2. My request to conduct 30-minute Skype interviews with personnel in management positions at any of the ABG Tanzanian mines was politely turned down by ABG in Dar

es Salaam, who wrote, "Many thanks for reaching out to us and for looping us into your study that appears to be very interesting. Unfortunately, we are currently caught up with numerous assignments with extremely lean teams hence may not be able to offer the assistance you require. My sincere apologies and wishing you all the best." Stephen Kisakye, corporate manager, Community Relations, African Barrick Gold, personal e-correspondence, 30 September 2013. The interview questions were: (1) Historically, Tanzania has had extensive experience with artisanal mining. How would you describe artisanal mining now in the vicinity of your mine? (2) How would you describe the relationship between ABG as a company and local communities? (3) I understand that ABG North Mara decided to erect a wall around the site for security purposes. How would you describe the reaction of local communities to the wall?

3. Ranjana Khanna, *Dark Continents: Psychoanalysis and Colonialism* (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2005), 30.

4. For a detailed history of Tanzanian mining, see Tundu Lissu, "In Gold We Trust: The Political Economy of Law, Human Rights and the Environment in Tanzania's Mining Industry," *Law, Social Justice and Global Development Journal* 1, no. 2 (2001), http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/lgd/2001_2/lissu1.

5. For a more detailed discussion, see Paula Butler, "Tanzania: Liberalization of Investment and the Mining Sector; Analysis of the Content and Certain Implications of the Tanzania 1998 Mining Act," in *Regulating Mining in Africa: For Whose Benefit?*, ed. Bonnie Campbell, 67–80 (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikaninstitutet, 2004).

6. Lucie C. Phillips, Haji Semboja, G. P. Shukla, Rogers Sezinga, Wilson Mutagwaba, Ben Mchwampaka, Godwill Wanga, Godius Kahyarara, and Peter C. Keller, "Tanzania's Precious Minerals Boom: Issues in Mining and Marketing," African Economic Policy Discussion Paper number 68, March 2001, cited in Catherine McDonald and Alan Roe, "Tanzania Country Case Study: The Challenge of Mineral Wealth; Using Resource Endowments to Foster Sustainable Development," International Council on Mining and Metals, July 2007, 34. Such findings supported conclusions by Tanzanian human rights lawyer Tundu Lissu that revenues from artisanal mining had considerably cushioned the effects for Tanzania of its first phase adjustment to a liberalized economy. See Tundu Lissu, "'Conducive Environment' for Development? Globalization, National Economy and the Politics of Plunder in Tanzania's Mining Industry," 2004, 5, http://www.tanzaniagateway.org/docs/conductive_envirnments_for_development.pdf. Cited in Paula Butler, "Tanzania; Liberalization of Investment and the Mining Sector: Analysis of the Content and Certain Implications of the Tanzania 1998 Mining Act," in Campbell, *Regulating Mining in Africa*, 79: "Tanzania's artisanal mining sector generated an average US$30 million annually in official gold exports between 1990 and 1994 … In 1992, 76% of all mineral export earnings came from gold mining by artisanal miners."

7. For a detailed account of the content of the 1998 mining law, see McDonald and Roe, "Tanzania Country Case Study," 34n17; and Butler, "Tanzania Country Case Study," 68–9.

8. For analysis of employment in the artisanal mining sector globally and within Africa, the legal dimensions of artisanal mining, poverty reduction and artisanal mining, stereotyping of artisanal miners, and discriminatory treatment of artisanal miners, see Gavin Hilson and Clive Potter, "Structural Adjustment and Subsistence Industry: Artisanal Gold-Mining in Ghana," *Development and Change* 36, no. 1 (2005): 103–31; International Institute for Environment and Development and World Business Council for Sustainable Development, *Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development Draft Report for Comment: 4 March 2002* (London: IIED and WBCSD, 2002), chap. 13; International Labour Organization, *Social and Labour Issues in Small-scale Mines* (Geneva: ILO, 1999); Jesper Bosse Jonsson and Niels Fold, "Handling Uncertainty: Policy and Organizational Practices in Tanzania's Small-scale Gold Mining Sector," *Natural Resources Forum* 33 (2009): 211–20; Paul Justice Kamlongera and Gavin Hilson, "Poverty Alleviation in Rural Malawi: Is There a Role for Artisanal Mining?," *Journal of East African Studies* 5, no. 1 (February 2011): 42–69; Beatrice Labonne, "Artisanal Mining: An Economic Stepping Stone for Women," *Natural Resources Forum* 20, no. 2 (1996): 117–22; Siri Lange, "Gold and Governance: Legal Injustices and Lost Opportunities in Tanzania," *African Affairs* (2010): 110–39; Knud Sinding, "The Dynamics of Artisanal and Small-scale Mining Reform," *Natural Resources Forum* 29 (2005): 243–52; Petra Tschakert, "Digging for Justice: A Radical Re-imagination of the Artisanal Gold Mining Sector in Ghana," *Antipode* 41, no. 4 (2005): 706–40.

9. Such allegations are routine in commentary on artisanal mining by Western governments, corporations, and multilateral agencies. They appear in World Bank, *Strategy for African Mining,* World Technical Paper no. 181, Africa Technical Department Series, Mining Unit, Industry and Energy Division (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1992); as well as in Government of Canada diplomatic files Access to Information Request A-1997-3632, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Government of Canada: "Gold was smuggled out of the country … money was laundered … no taxes or royalties were paid." See also Lucien Bradet, "A Reality Check on Canadian Mining in Africa," *Embassy,* 23 November 2011. Bradet states, "This means people going to a mine and using their hands and artisanal tools to collect raw materials, extract the metal and sell it through informal channels. This is a large problem, not only for the mining companies that have received formal licenses from the government, but also for governments that don't receive any benefit, royalties or taxes

from these operations." http://embassymag.ca/dailyupdate/veiw/a_reality_check_on_canadian_mining_in_africa_11-23-2011.

10. Lissu and Curtis argue that the Tanzanian state should have received US$265.5 million more than it did—lost through loopholes, fraud, concessionary legislation, etc.—and that such an amount was not only larger than the country's entire health budget for 2007, but could have funded the building of 44,000 secondary school classrooms. See Mark Curtis and Tundu Lissu, *A Golden Opportunity: How Tanzania Is Failing to Benefit from Gold Mining* (Dar es Salaam: Christian Council of Tanzania, National Council of Muslims in Tanzania and Tanzanian Episcopal Conference, 2008), 25.

11. "North Mara," Mine Sites, http://www.infomine.com/minesite/minesite.asp?site=northmara.

12. Ibid.

13. McDonald and Roe, "Tanzania Country Case Study," 51.

14. Lawyers Environmental Action Team (LEAT), "Re: Assessment Summary of the Complaint regarding MIGA's Guarantee of the Bulyanhulu Gold Mine, Tanzania," 2 December 2002, Mining Watch, http://www.miningwatch.ca/sites/www.miningwatch.ca/files/LEAT_response_to_CAO_0.pdf.

15. The source of this statement appears to be the Community Affairs Department of the mine—at that time, owned by Placer Dome. MacDonald and Roe, "Tanzania Country Case Study," 52.

16. African Barrick Gold, *Responsible Mining Report 2012*, 5, http://www.africanbarrickgold.com/~/media/Files/A/African-Barrick-Gold/Attachments/pdf/reports-and-presentations/abg-responsible-mining-2012.pdf.

17. See Tundu Lissu, Lawyers Environmental Action Team, "Six Villagers Killed in Barrick's North Mara Mine," 17 June 2006, Rainforest Information Centre, http://www.rainforestinfo.org.au/gold/Barrick_kills.htm; Sakura Saunders, "Civilian Uprising against Barrick Gold in Tanzania," *The Dominion: News from the Grassroots*, 24 December 2008, http://www.dominionpaper.ca/articles/2385.

18. The five men were Emanuel Magige, 27; Chacha Mwasi, 25; Chacha Ngoka, 26; Chawali Bhoke, 26; and Mwikwabe Manwa, 35. Varying accounts of these events can be found at Peter Koven, "Seven 'Intruders' Killed at African Barrick Mine," *Financial Post*, 17 May 2011; Lisa Wright and Jocelyn Edwards, "Seven Dead in Clash at African Barrick Mine," *Toronto Star*, 17 May 2011; Geoffrey York, "In an African Mine, Gold Fever Sparks a Deadly Clash," *Globe and Mail*, 8 June 2011; Barrick Gold Corporation, "North Mara Update, September 2011," http://www.barrick.com/files/north-mara/North-Mara-Update-Sept-2011.pdf; and Barrick Gold Corporation, "Rebuilding Trust at North Mara," 13 February 2012, *Beyond Borders,* http://barrickbeyondborders.com/2012/02/barrick-gold-rebuilding-trust-at-north-mara/.

19. Jacob Mugini, "Two Killed in North Mara Gold Mine Invasion," *Tanzania Daily News Online Edition*, 4 March 2013, http://www.dailynews.co.tz/index.php/local-news/15173-two-killed-in-mine-invasion; see also Kerry Hall, "Two Dead after 4,000 Riot at Gold Mine in Tanzania," 6 March 2013, Mining.com, http://www.mining.com/two-dead-after-4000-riot-at-tanzania-gold-mine-52496/.

20. On the sexual assaults, see Barrick Gold Corporation, "North Mara Update, September 2011."

21. Åsgeir R. Almas, Charles Kweyunga, and Mkabwa L. K. Manoko, "Investigation of Trace Metal Concentrations in Soil, Sediments and Water in the Vicinity of 'Geita Gold Mine,' and 'North Mara Gold Mine' in North West Tanzania," IPM report 2009 (Dar es Salaam: Norwegian University of Life Sciences and University of Dar es Salaam, Department of Botany, 2009), 22–3, http://www.miningwatch.ca/sites/www.miningwatch.ca/files/FinalTanzania_0.pdf. See also Legal and Human Rights Centre, "Tanzania Human Rights Report 2009," 135, http://www.humanrights.or.tz/reports.

22. Legal and Human Rights Centre, "Tanzania Human Rights Report 2009," 135.

23. Allan Lissner, *Someone Else's Treasure: The Impacts of Gold Mining in Tanzania* (Dar es Salaam: Norwegian Church Aid Tanzania and Act Alliance, 2008), vi.

24. Leigh Day, "Tanzanian Villagers Sue London-Based African Barrick Gold for Deaths and Injuries; Leigh Day Issue Legal Proceedings against Mining Companies for Death and Injuries in Tanzania," 30 July 2013, http://www.leighday.co.uk/News/2013/July-2013/Tanzanian-viallagers-sue-London-based-African-Barri.

25. Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon stated in the British House of Lords on 26 November 2013, "Indeed, our high commissioner, on visiting the area, found that up to $12 million-worth has been spent on corporate social responsibility, including healthcare centres, schools and water boreholes. There is more to be done. For example, she pointed out that although there is a healthcare centre, it is not properly manned with healthcare professionals." See "High Court Orders African Barrick Gold to Stop Suing Tanzanian Villagers," 4 December 2013, Leight Day, http://www.leighday.co.uk/News/2013/December-2013/High-Court-orders-African-Barrick-Gold-to-stop-sui.

26. Barrick Gold Corporation. "Rebuilding Trust at North Mara."

27. Shelley Feldman, Charles Geisler, and Louise Silberling, "Moving Targets: Displacement, Impoverishment, and Development," *International Social Science Journal* 55, no. 175 (March 2003): 7–12.

28. Ann Dupuis and David Thorns, "Gated Communities as Exemplars of 'Forting Up' Practices in a Risk Society, *Urban Policy and Research* 26, no. 2 (June 2008): 145–57.

29. Rodrigo Salcedo and Alvaro Torrres, "Gated Communities in Santiago: Wall or Frontier?," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 28, no. 1 (March 2004): 27–44.

30. Michael M. Cernea, "For a New Economics of Resettlement: A Sociological Critique of the Compensation Principle," *International Social Science Journal* 55, no. 175 (March 2003): 38–9.

31. Ibid., 40.

32. Ibid.

33. Steffen Bohm and Maria Ceci Misoczky, "Resisting Neocolonial Development: Andalgala's People Struggle against Mega-Mining projects," *CADERNOS* 11, no. 2 (June 2013): 314.

34. See Bohm and Misoczky, "Resisting Neocolonial Development"; see also David Harvey, *The New Imperialism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

35. Kwame Nkrumah, *Neo-colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism* (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1965).

36. Bohm and Misoczky, "Resisting Neocolonial Development," 331.

37. Subrabhata Bobby Banerjee, "Live and Let Die: Colonial Sovereignties and the Death Worlds of Necrocapitalism," *Borderlands* 5, no. 1 (2006), 1–10.

38. Aimé Césaire, *Discourse on Colonialism* (New York: Monthly Review, 1972).

39. Martina Tifsberger, "Uncertainty and Method: Whiteness, Gender and Psychoanalysis in Germany," *European Journal of Women's Studies* 12, no. 3 (2005): 315–28.

40. Renée Bergland, *The National Uncanny: Indian Ghosts and American Subjects* (Hanover: University Press of New England, 2000); and Ania Loomba, *Colonialism/Postcolonialism* (London: Routledge, 1998).

41. Dana Nelson, *National Manhood: Capitalist Citizenship and the Imagined Fraternity of White Men* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998); Laura Chrisman, "The Imperial Unconscious? Representations of Imperial Discourse," *Critical Quarterly* 32, no. 3 (1990): 38–58; Bergland, *National Uncanny*.

42. "This history of European relations with Native Americans is a history of murders, looted graves, illegal land transfers, and disruptions of sovereignty. Among these, land ownership may be the source of the nation's deepest guilt … the land is haunted because it is stolen." Bergland, *National Uncanny*, 8–9.

43. Cheryl Welch, "Colonial Violence and the Rhetoric of Evasion: Toqueville on Algeria," *Political Theory* 31, no. 2 (2003): 235–64.

44. "The army seized property, dispensed with conventional justice, and eventually resorted to mass killings of civilians. In June 1845 General Pelissier trapped hundreds of people of the tribe of the Ouled Riah in caves, traditionally places of refuge. Refusing their terms of surrender, Pelissier ignited a fire at the cave's mouth and asphyxiated everyone within. Other commanders imitated his actions, which were defended by then governor-general Bugeaud on grounds that salutary terror would hasten the pacification." Welch, "Colonial Violence and the Rhetoric of Evasion," 237.

45. Ibid., 257.

46. Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, trans. Constance Farrington (New York: Grove, 1963), 269–70.

47. Martina Tifsberger, "Uncertainty and Method: Whiteness, Gender and Psychoanalysis in Germany," *European Journal of Women's Studies* 12, no. 3 (2005): 315–28.

48. The annual report of one Canadian mining company operating in West Africa does state explicitly, in a section entitled "Risk and Uncertainties," that "during the past 30 months, management estimates that approximately 15% of the indicated resource … has been lost to artisanal mining activity despite security measures carried out by mine management." This kind of admission of a direct material conflict of interest between expatriates and locals is rare, although it is evidently a real concern. Such commentary refutes claims sometimes made that there is no direct competition over resources between artisanal/citizen miners and foreign industrial miners on the grounds that artisanal miners cannot access metals below a certain depth.

49. This imitates, and is indeed productive of, the form of power that characterizes the (unexceptional) "state of exception," in which the "rule of law" continues to exist formally but is disregarded, bypassed with impunity, and without avenues of recourse.

50. Its value, $14.4 million—of which half was spent at North Mara—for all of ABG's Tanzanian mines in 2012, was a 95 per cent increase over the previous year. See African Barrick Gold, *Annual Report and Accounts 2012*, 45.

51. Sedef Arat-Koc observes, "The task is to recognize race as a technology of power that goes beyond skin colour to identify some of the ways race involves 'historic repertoires and cultural, spatial, and signifying systems that stigmatize and depreciate one form of humanity for the purposes of another's health, development, safety, profit and pleasure' [Singh, p. 223]. When we approach race in this way, it seems that a race logic and a race-like language can be used in the exclusion, stigmatization, and subordination of people beyond, as much as along, the colour line." Sedef Arat-Koc, "New Whiteness(es), beyond the Colour Line? Assessing the Contradictions and Complexities of 'Whiteness' in the (Geo)political Economy of Capitalist Globalization," in *States of Race: Critical Race Feminism for the 21st Century*, ed. Sherene Razack, Malinda Smith, and Sunera Thobani (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2010), 148.

52. Barrick Gold Corporation, "Rebuilding Trust at North Mara."

53. This is explained in more detail in Paula Butler, *Colonial Extractions: Race and Canadian Mining in Contemporary Africa* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, forthcoming).

54. See "Mkuju River Project," Uranium One, n.d., http://www.uranium1.com/index.php/en/development/mkuju-river-tanzania.

55. Paula Butler and Evans Rubara, "FIPA: The Myth of Reciprocity: A Commentary on the Foreign Investment Protection Agreement (FIPA) between the United Republic of

Tanzania and Canada," *Pambazuka News*, 8 August 2013, http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/88558.

56. This was expressed clearly by (Conservative) member of Parliament Lois Brown in her closing address, on 10 May 2013 in Ottawa, at the North-South Institute's conference "Governing Natural Resources for Africa's Development": "Canada's work in Tanzania is an excellent example. The mining sector there has played a significant role in the economic growth of Tanzania and with Canada's assistance, Tanzania now has more transparent and accountable regulation for its extractives, it raises public revenues and in turn it is able to invest in public services. We are also working to grow businesses and improve local economic development. With support from CIDA, the World University Service Overseas, or WUSC, is providing direct skills training to 400 young people, to help diversify the local economy. We enable communities to maximize the benefits of the extractive sector through skills development for women, men and youth. This assists the mining company to hire locally … The private sector is the driver of long-term economic growth. Canada's approach is to encourage local private sector development. We are committed to deepening our direct engagement with local and international private sector firms that can move individuals, families and countries from poverty to prosperity." http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xm3M1680yCw and http://www.nsi-ins.ca/nsi-forum-governing-natural-resources-for-africas-development/.

57. If under "formal colonialism" European law was unilaterally imposed on subject peoples without their consent, while purporting to have established the "rule of law," in contemporary neo-colonial contexts, the acceptance and adoption by African states of legal frameworks favouring the demands of foreign capital accomplishes an identical purpose: access to valuable resources. Bohm and Misoczky call this "a process of subalternization of formally sovereign national states eager to provide legal, political and administrative conditions for the extraction of their natural resources by transnational companies." Bohm and Misoczky, "Resisting Neocolonial Development," 314. In his study of the resource-extraction sector in Peru, Szablowski concludes that such "host states" manage the restricted sovereignty required by neoliberalism's unexceptional exceptionalism through practices of "selective absence": choosing not to act or intervene on behalf of Peruvian communities vis-à-vis foreign capitalist forces. David Szablowski, *Transnational Law and Local Struggles: Mining, Communities and the World Bank* (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007).

58. In their respective works, both Coleman and Thobani emphasize and document the deep psycho-cultural impulse within Canadian nationhood—that is, within the Canadian national psyche—to "whitewash" and depict as "civil" the nation's history and contemporary identity. See Daniel Coleman, *White Civility: The Literary Project of English Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006); and Sunera Thobani, *Exalted Subjects: Studies in the Making of Race and Nation in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007).

59. Paula Butler, "Violence as Civility: Race, Mining and Canadian Neocolonizers in African States" (PhD diss., University of Toronto, 2006); and Butler, *Colonial Extraction: Race and Canadian Mining in Contemporary Africa* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, forthcoming). Elsewhere, I have analyzed in detail the shifting historical production of the figure of the artisanal miner in corporate and multilateral agency texts since the mid-1990s when the liberalization of African economies took place. In a context where foreign companies are re-entering the continent and competing for access to lucrative mineral resources, the indigenous artisanal (or "small-scale" or "illegal") miner is cast as a figure who must be treated in one of three ways: *discredited* (cast as illegal, engaged in irresponsible behaviours such as child labour, environmental damage and unsafe use of mercury); *domesticated* (shown as impoverished, ignorant, and needy, in need of training, development assistance, and redirection to more benign [but less lucrative] income sources such as micro-enterprise); or *destroyed* (that is, when this subject becomes intolerably aggressive, assertive, or agentive, he will be evicted, removed, or at the extreme, killed).

60. http://www.humanrights.or.tz/reports.

61. Reme Moya of Sustainable Business Practices with Search for Common Ground.

62. Examples of community-based self-determination for alternative economies and resistance to FDI-led mining are provided in Arturo Escobar, "Displacement, Development, and Modernity in the Columbian Pacific," *International Social Science Journal* 55, no. 175 (March 2003): 157–66; and in Louise Silberling, "Displacement and Quilombosin Alcantara Brazil: Modernity, Identity and Place," *International Social Science Journal* 55: 175 (March 2003): 145–55.

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Book Reviews

Climate Refugees

❧

Climate Refugees is a visually arresting survey of some of the world's populations currently most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. Produced by a team of French journalists called the Collectif Argos, the intention of this book seems clear- to humanize the phenomenon of global warming and its effects in order to prompt decided international action on this issue. In particular, the concern of the Collectif Argos team is focused both on the overwhelming number of people who may soon be forced into mass migrations as the result of climate change as well as the very real problems posed by the ambiguous political status presently held by such 'climate refugees.' *Climate Refugees* therefore attempts to produce not just one 'face of climate change,' but rather works to personify the manifold impacts of climate change as it is variously experienced across our planet. Ultimately, this text is designed to be a wake-up call to those of us not yet living on the front lines of these events.

By ranging across the globe in search of their stories, the Collectif Argos has done a particularly effective job of highlighting how the concept of global warming itself can work to obscure the myriad ways that this issue manifests itself ecologically. The volume begins with an account from the Alaskan Arctic that represents one of the more commonly understood examples of these effects as evidenced by the rising temperatures and rotting permafrost that endanger an island community of Native Iñupiat. However, other featured stories also detail how the magnification of normal seasonal flooding is reaching disastrous proportions in Bangladesh and how rapid rates of desertification are now threatening many villages in the Chinese interior. Through exposure to these tales, the reader should ultimately come away with a better understanding of the large array of complex environmental problems that are associated with the more general notion of climate change.

Drawing upon their strengths as a team of journalists, the Collectif Argos has produced a series of short, easy-to-read pieces that engage with a handful of citizens in each of the nine featured geographic locations. The purpose of these essays is to examine how the daily lives of these people are being profoundly impacted by climate change. Each of these personalized perspectives is coupled with a wealth of images that serve to better illustrate the reality of these lived experiences. As an example, both the extreme vulnerability as well as the rich cultural diversity of an island nation like Tuvalu, which sits just 2 meters above sea level, becomes palpable. This is accomplished by a series of photographs that juxtapose evidence of the flooding issues already present there with the vibrancy of a Polynesian way of life that these rising waters imperil. Taken together, these personal stories and evocative photographs compellingly portray the many different ways that individuals and their communities are struggling to survive and maintain their unique lifeways in the face of global climate change.

One of the primary issues associated with this text, however, arises from the very fact that the diversity of problems associated with global warming are considered here under this all-encompassing banner. The inherent danger in this act of assemblage is that it becomes easy to overlook the fact that not all those at the geographic epicenters of these occurrences are equally threatened and/ or vulnerable. The story of Lake Chad's inexorable disappearance and the quiet desperation of its fisherman who once made a living on its rapidly receding waters is nearly heartbreaking. This is especially so when compared to the piece from the Halligen of coastal Germany that is also included in this work. In this instance, a rather charming scene of bucolic remoteness and occasional isolation ultimately imparts the sense that the area's stalwart inhabitants and their way of life are but mildly threatened. Clearly there is a great disparity between the levels of hardship that these communities are experiencing as a result of a changing climate, yet as 'vulnerable areas' they are given relatively equal consideration here.

It is recognized that it is largely beyond the intended scope of this work to provide a more in-depth examination of the political, economic and social conditions that work to place certain communities at greater risk while simultaneously constraining their abilities to effectively adapt to rapidly changing environmental circumstances. In their introductory chapter, the Collectif Argos writers do allude to the fact that it is often the world's poorest populations, whose lives are already marked by a fair amount of insecurity, that are generally the most affected by the impacts of climate change. They also make mention of issues of social justice in the context of the unequal burden that many less developed nations are forced to bear as they contend with the problems created by greenhouse-gas emissions that they themselves did very little to produce. However, with the stories that follow this introduction, it feels as if there is almost a missed opportunity to further explore the material ramifications of these essential arguments.

As a case in point, there are the two examples highlighted from the United States. These each feature communities whose vulnerability to the effects of climate change are quite likely linked to the historical marginalization they have experienced as a result of either their ethnic or racial status. Here we find an Alaskan Native village that will be forced to relocate in the very near future because of the severity of local coastal erosion. This is a move that many community members recognize as a direct threat to the cultural cohesion of their people. Yet, these villagers must try and induce the federal government to spend the extra money necessary to relocate them to the alternate area they deem most amenable to the retention of their current way of life. The second case from the US explores the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. This recent disaster has certainly led many to call for a more thorough deliberation of how certain social justice issues like the state of contemporary race relations in this country can magnify the vulnerability of minority residents to these environmental catastrophes. However, the brevity of the pieces featured in this work clearly does not allow for a deeper consideration of these elements of each story. Thus it can only be hoped that the reader becomes at least subtly aware of these critical issues with which we must contend if we are ever to effectively engage with the full suite of problems associated with global warming.

As a whole, the climate change stories presented in *Climate Refugees* ideally serve to represent a global issue whose impacts should also be understood as uniquely local. Therefore, while we must tackle this issue at the international level as the Collectif Argos suggests, careful attention should also be paid to the particularities of each place. *Climate Refugees* is the type of emotionally charged exposé that seeks to motivate its readers to want to know and do more about the challenges raised by climate change and the refugees it will likely create in the not so distant future. *Climate Refugees* therefore represents the best efforts of the Collectif Argos to instill a sense of caring and concern for those already being impacted by the effects of climate change. In this way, it is hoped that we all will be compelled to seriously reckon with the issues raised by the notion of 'climate justice' before it is too late.

Alana Shaw

Conservation Refugees: The Hundred-Year Conflict between Global Conservation and Native Peoples.

❧

Mark Dowie
MIT, ISBN: 9780262012614, pp. 376, 2009

The parks vs. people debate continues to garner attention in scholarly, policy, and activist circles. *Conservation Refugees* is Mark Dowie's welcome addition to this forum. From international conferences and the boardrooms of the largest conservation NGOs, to the patch of grazing land on the Serengeti, *Conservation Refugees* provides an accessible and informative overview of the displacement of indigenous peoples (both in terms of forced eviction and indirect forms) around the world for the purposes of biodiversity conservation. Not only does Dowie outline the history of this debate from the establishment of Yosemite and Yellowstone up until today, but he also argues for a new conservation paradigm whereby indigenous peoples and powerful conservation interests work together to balance the protection of nature and culture. This paradigm is one where indigenous peoples participate fully in conservation and the management of protected areas not as stakeholders, "but as rights-holders and equal players."[1]

It is recognized that it is largely beyond the intended scope of this work to provide a more in-depth examination of the political, economic and social conditions that work to place certain communities at greater risk while simultaneously constraining their abilities to effectively adapt to rapidly changing environmental circumstances. In their introductory chapter, the Collectif Argos writers do allude to the fact that it is often the world's poorest populations, whose lives are already marked by a fair amount of insecurity, that are generally the most affected by the impacts of climate change. They also make mention of issues of social justice in the context of the unequal burden that many less developed nations are forced to bear as they contend with the problems created by greenhouse-gas emissions that they themselves did very little to produce. However, with the stories that follow this introduction, it feels as if there is almost a missed opportunity to further explore the material ramifications of these essential arguments.

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Dowie organizes the book by alternating chapters focused on case studies of specific indigenous groups—from North and South America, Asia, Australia, Sub-Saharan Africa—and their experience with biodiversity conservation, with thematic chapters concerned with the social construction of "nature" and "wilderness", the political economy of conservation, scientific vs. traditional ecological knowledge, among others. This provides an assortment of empirical examples in addition to an overview of many topics that one would find in an introduction to the political ecology of conservation. With the wide range of case studies based largely on his own investigative journalism and supported by the work of others, Dowie does sacrifice depth for breadth. As a result he may miss some nuance in certain places. However, the vast amount of ground that is covered allows Dowie to highlight the scale of conservation-induced displacement, the myriad of forms that it takes, and the similarities that connect them all. People may also rightly point out that the book lacks theoretical rigor. However, as a journalist, not an academic, and in conjunction with his ability to outline the issues in an accessible way that has the potential to bring the issues at hand to new audiences, Dowie may be forgiven.

In the first line, Dowie sets the book up as a "good guy vs. good guy story" with international conservation pitted against indigenous peoples.[2] His reason for not labeling international conservation as the bad guy is because the big conservation actors "should not be assigned the same 'bad guy' status as 'extractive corporados' and others who push native people around and compromise ecosystems in their avaricious quest for resources and profits." [3] He adds to this by pointing out that big conservation is also doing some good by protecting biodiversity. It is a noble goal to move away from a narrow good guy vs. bad guy or David vs. Goliath narrative, but the 270 pages that follow the first line of the book tend to fall into it nonetheless. At times it is actually difficult to see how international conservation and the extractive bad guys are wholly separate because Dowie himself details how the two have partnered in many instances. This often makes extractive activities possible in some of the most ecologically sensitive areas while indigenous peoples are excluded from the same spaces. Furthermore, his arguments concerning the political economy of conservation highlight how the separation of "nature" and people is in part tied to the quest for money on the part of conservation NGOs as well. Perhaps most damaging to the "good guy" status of big conservation are the words of indigenous groups themselves to make the point that conservation, not the extractive industry, "has become the number one threat to indigenous territories."[4]

It is difficult to critique Dowie for portraying big conservation as the bad guy, even though he said he would not. Indeed the actions of organizations like the IUCN and Conservation International that the book details largely speak for themselves. It is conceivable, however, that he refrains from wanting to call international conservation the bad guy because a new conservation paradigm that takes the rights and conservation capacity of indigenous peoples seriously depends "very much on the compassion and understanding of global conservationists."[5] He does point to several areas of progress in this regard and has hope for the future, a hope that depends on international conservation—as well as governments—coming to its senses and doing the right thing.

Where Dowie might be most vulnerable is in his glorification of community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) and its status compared to fortress conservation. Indeed, he is rather quick to the conclude, "There can be no question that the Mataven [CBNRM] model of conservation is gradually displacing the Yosemite/Yellowstone model."[6] While he does admit that this is occurring "perhaps too slowly",[7] I wonder how we can reconcile this with the expansion of traditional forms of fortress conservation such as new national parks, but also with different manifestations such as private reserves and examples of green grabbing, all of which continue to exclude and even expel indigenous and local communities. Furthermore, Dowie seems somewhat reluctant to admit the failures and problematic aspects of CBNRM itself. Referring to his hope that CBNRM will take hold over fortress conservation in Gabon, Dowie argues "previous chapters attest that community-based conservation is a tried and proven method."[8] Yes, he does give examples of CBNRM successes, but he also leaves out the numerous critiques of CBNRM—including those put forward by scholars he routinely references[9]—and the many initiatives that have failed on both ecological and socio-economic and cultural terms. While I am on Dowie's side that community-based conservation is where we should be headed, it still does deserve to be critically analyzed. A chapter dedicated to this would be a welcome addition. With that said, we, and especially the conservationists among us, should heed his argument that "people who will help you most in conservation are those who depend on the environment for their livelihood."[10]

Dowie provides an excellent introductory foray into the people vs. parks debate and the political ecology of conservation more generally. For anyone looking for an in-depth analysis of particular cases, you would probably be better served by going to many of the outstanding sources that Dowie references including works by Dan Brockington, Rod Neumann, and Jim Igoe, among others. With that said, *Conservation Refugees* is a welcome addition to any bookshelf and is especially useful for the uninitiated, but not

only. To be sure, one of the most important contributions of the book is simply in its framing of those being displaced for the purposes of conservation as "refugees". While elaborating on what is meant by the term refugee could have strengthened this framing—for example, why is it not in the chapter "A Word about Terms"?—it is a bold step to use the concept of conservation refugee. I would also argue that it is a step in the right direction of bringing the issue of conservation-induced displacement into broader conversations concerning forced-displacement and refugee studies. Indeed, the figure of the conservation refugee should not only be of interest to political ecologists or those of us interested in conservation, but should also be the purview of those interested in displacement and "refugeeism" more broadly.

Notes

1. Mark Dowie, *Conservation Refugees: The Hundred-Year Conflict between Global Conservation and Native Peoples* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009), 250.
2. Ibid., ix.
3. Ibid., x.
4. Ibid., xviii.
5. Ibid., 254.
6. Ibid., 239.
7. Ibid., 239.
8. Ibid., 260.
9. See, for example, Daniel Brockington, *Fortress Conservation: The Preservation of the Mkomazi Game Reserve, Tanzania.* Indiana University Press, 2002 and Wolfram Dressler, and Bram Büscher. "Market Triumphalism and the CBNRM 'Crises' at the South African Section of the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park," *Geoforum* 39, no. 1 (2008): 452–65.
10. Dowie, *Conservation Refugees,* 221.

Francis Massé